Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
A REVIEW ON Endogenous Fringe Benefits, Compensating Wage Differential and Older Workers By Gail A. Jensen and Michael Morrissey
(In Partial fulfillment Of Requirements for Course of Labor Economics)
Article
Productivity of labor is equal to the wages and fringe benefits. So the studies conducted, said that only those persons insure their health who have high wages not those with lower wages. The authors reply to these studies that the compensation is based upon the productivity and employers try their best to find such workers whose productivity is higher, whereas older workers because of their low productivity are paid less wages. However, wages and insurance depends upon the profit maximizing decision of firms and utility maximizing choices of workers. There is a negative relationship between wages and health insurance that is, the workers with low health insurance are paid high wages and vice versa. Jensen and Morrissey present in their model Wage insurance package that worker supply their services for those jobs where they expect maximum utility, and they are compensated more whereas employer or firms decision for the compensation of worker depends upon how much profit it earn. According to hedonic wage function for workers the compensation to the worker is equal to his/her Marginal value product (MVP). This compensation includes fringe benefits and the cash wages. The compensation given by employer is inversely related to other health insurance carried and positively related to workers loss. According to the model workers fringe benefits are of three types: Receipts of employer sponsored health insurance in the workers own name. Enrollment in a pension plan. Annual paid vacations.
All above three types of fringe benefits are endogenous. This model was overidentified so the authors used 2SLS (two stages least squares) method to overcome the problem. So it is necessary to capture the effect of omitted factors in disturbance term which give rise to correlation between them. Secondly a risk averse person will be more careful for getting health insurance from employer and will choose a secure job. Results of the model support the theory and estimation conducted by Jensen and Morrissey. The workers who already have an alternative source of income are more likely to take jobs that do not provide health insurance. At the policy level our findings are encouraging. If labor markets do adjust to reflect the nature of compensation bundle the implications of policy analysts are correct by providing 3
raise taxes then it will shift the untaxed forms of compensation. If insurance coverage is provided from public sector job then it will crowd out private sector jobs. All this suggests a number of future research initiatives. Obviously, new research should focus on the endogenity of coverage (compensation) and look for data that allows one to explore the simultaneous determination of wage and benefits decision.