Counter-Insurgency in my perspective by: P/Dir. Leocadio SC Santiago Jr.

Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win. Sun Tzu
Thirty plus years ago, I donned the uniform of a soldier and that decision transformed my perspective of the society not only where I belong, move but also as a whole. From the very first day in the Philippine Military Academy until I graduated as a 2 nd Lieutenant with the former Philippine Constabulary, what was impounded to my mind were discipline and that I was a warrior and I will fight any enemy of the Philippines be it from internal or external. The focus of my service was centered on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, even when I became a police officer in the Philippine National Police, these two are my theaters and I treated my police operations based on the principles of these two parameters. Now, as I prepare to bow-out of the service, there are realities of the past that I learned. I stepped out of the Academy with a mind-set of finding and defeating the insurgents and the terrorists. Mortal combat was my driving force not realizing that it is the least effective weapon in the arsenals to fight the insurgents and the terrorists. I was led to believe that the insurgents and the terrorists were recruited because they are hungry and wanted to just have what a hard working person has by use of force. This belief stayed with me until I met the former chief of staff of the NPA founder Jomma Sison and who opened the NPA guerilla front in the Bicol Region (my apologies for not naming him for his security). That person also became one of my mentors in political analysis and this was what he said that I cannot forget since: People are recruited into the ranks of the NPAs not because they are hungry or have nothing materially, they are recruited and joined the NPAs because they were abused, taken advantage of and the NPAs took advantage of these thinking fueling their feelings of being disenfranchised. In Tagalog dahil sila ay inapi. That truth made me realized that there are basically three stages in fighting in the theaters of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. These three stages are: 1) Force against Force (Insurgents/Terrorists against the Armed Forces), 2) Force against Force with Law Enforcement (Insurgents/Terrorist against the Armed Forces with Law Enforcers) and 3) Force against Local Government Unit with Law Enforcement.

Force vs. Local Government Unit w/ Law Enforcement 3rd Stage

Force vs. Force w/ Law Enforcement Force2nd Armed Forces w/ Law Enforcement vs. Stage Force vs. Force (Insurgency/Terrorist vs. Armed Forces) Stage

1st

In the span of my uniformed service, I have served five Commander-in-Chiefs the fifth being His Excellency President Benigno Simeon Aquino III. The four previous presidents have all defined national strategy to address the problem of insurgency/ terrorism. In paper it has all the components of success with common paradigm of clear, hold and consolidate. However it seems not to go beyond stage 1 or Force against Force. These national counter-insurgency/ counter-terrorism strategies were made by the Armed Forces and since Armed Forces cannot dictate on the required components beyond that of the Armed Services, these national strategies when implemented unleashed only the Armed Forces. That was the fatal weakness since history has already time and time again proven that the Armed Forces is the least effective weapon to end insurgency/terrorism. After World War II, the Philippine faced its first real insurgency problem, the Hukbalahap (Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon, a communist organization patterned after the USSR socialist ideology) rebellion. The Huks were guerillas in World War II that amassed weapons during the war. They are communist and eventually after the WW II were not recognized by the Allied Forces as legitimate guerillas. The Huks were based in Central Luzon and their battle cry beyond their ideological foundation is land for the landless. The height of this rebellion reached it apex in the 1950s. After several set backs, the Philippine Government placed the cudgel of countering this rebellion under one-man responsibility, the then Secretary of Defense, former President Ramon Magsaysay. This campaign crippled the Hukbalahap movement so that the government was able to pursue the initial stage of stage 3, Force against Local Government Unit with Law Enforcement. The basic out-line of the Anti-Hukbalahap campaign were: a) Stage 1 Force against Force The Armed Forces were re-structured into highly mobile, fully equipped and well-trained Battalion Combat Teams. Special commando unit was utilized as spearhead of these BCTs, the Scout Rangers. Tactical psychological operations were deployed in support of combat tactical operations. b) Stage 2 Force against Force with Law Enforcement In the cleared areas by the Armed Forces, the Philippine Constabulary took the lead albeit at the beginning still supported by the smaller contingent of the BCTs. Legal actions were being brought to bear against the Hukbalahap. The populace felt that the force of the government were there to stay and not be redeployed else where like the Armed Forces. At this period, the Economic Development Corporation was introduced to the arsenal of weapons to neutralize the Hukbalahaps. The Economic Development Corporation or EDCor was in-charge of infrastructure developments in the conflict areas and the areas where resettlement of Hukbalahaps took place. The resettlement neutralized the issue of Land for the Landless. Resettlement areas were in Mindanao, then undeveloped and under populated. c) Stage 3 Force against Local Government Unit with Law Enforcement The peace that follows allowed the Local Government Units with the Law

Enforcement to take the lead in the sustainment of stability. The completion of Stage 3 however was not attained. Politics reared its ugly head and as a result, the core root cause of rebellion was not totally eradicated. The Hukbalahap campaign however remains one of the ideal models for counter-insurgency/ terrorism. Outside the Philippines, another counter-insurgency/terrorism campaign reflects the three stages of counter-terrorism. That was the Malaysian Emergency that at least 85% or more was similar to the Hukbalahap campaign. The similarities are: 1) The campaign was placed under one unified command and single accountability at all stages. There was only one man running the campaign and he has total control of all instruments that will be utilized to conduct the counter-insurgency/terrorism. 2) In Stage 1 (Force against Force), both campaigns streamlined its armed forces to be the spearhead of the campaign. Both used all the tactical doctrines in the armed forces arsenal. Psychological operations were utilized extensively in both campaigns. 3) In Stage 2 (Force against Force with Law Enforcement), the campaign makes the community feel that the government is there to stay. It is at this stage that the campaign shows the people that the government respects the law and though armed, they are there to insure the legal rights of the community. It is also emphasized in this campaign that the law enforcers are part of their community and will not leave them to the retaliations of the insurgent/terrorists. Limited development is introduced, only those that the Armed Forces/ Law Enforcers are capable of delivering. 4) In Stage 3 (Force against Local Government Unit/ Law Enforcement), only the Malaysian Emergency could be said to fully accomplish this phase. As to after the British left Malaysia was another matter but as far as the Malaysian Campaign was concerned, during the closing period, Stage 3 was being implemented and exercised. As to the Anti-Hukbalahap campaign, the Philippines was then in the verge of Stage 3 but election followed and the Campaign Commander ran and won the Presidential election. After more than 30 years of campaigning, there were a lot of ups and downs in the counterinsurgency/terrorism that I participated. Majority of these sadly to say was in Stage 1 (Force against Force). For one reason or another, when we are at the verge of Stage 2 (Force against Force with Law Enforcement), things bogged down. And the succeeding administration starts of with the counter-insurgency/ terrorism campaign at Stage 1 (Force against Force). The taking into the helm of Presidency by His Excellency President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, the counter-insurgency/ terrorism campaign was at Stage 1 downgraded from Stage 2 which suffered a set back at the latter part of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyos administration when the latter rescinded the operation of Inter-Agency Legal Action 3

Group. I am however highly encouraged and very optimistic when HE President Aquino, a strong advocate of human rights and justice declared that under His administration, ALL OUT JUSTICE will be the motto of the uniformed service. The marching orders He gave the Chief of the Philippine National Police, the Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines and all uniformed service was straight forward, BE THE GUARDIAN AND PARTNER OF THE FILIPINO NATION. Immediately, the PNP and the AFP set into action the orders of HE President Aquino. There was an immediate synergy of the PNP and the AFP in the operational aspects specially at the tactical level which the insurgency/ terrorism affected areas felt. The Joint PNP/AFP Public Safety Coordinating Center became the spearhead in the actualization of the Presidents marching order. With the active implementation of the JPSCC protocols, the counter-insurgency/ terrorism reached Stage 2. Successes of the JPSCC Task Forces in the field are all highlighted by success stories. These successes ranges form counterinsurgency/ terrorism, anti-drug, anti-kidnapping and anti-criminality operations. It is my belief that expanding, funding and institutionalizing the JPSCC Task Forces will pave the way for the counter-insurgency/ terrorism campaign reach Stage 3 (Force against Local Government Unit with Law Enforcement). The reason I believe this can be done under the administration of HE President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III is simple, He showed and took action showing that He can go after anybody He thinks has done wrong regardless of position or political party affiliation. It is a period in time that the uniformed service specially the Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines should take into heart the marching orders of no less than the Commander in Chief, HE President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III. After all, it is us in the uniformed service that bled and when gods of fortune are not with us dies in the field so that the Filipino Nation enjoys the fruit of their labors and attain their dreams of a sunny life.