Author: Malcolm Scott Date: August 2010 The focus of analysis in regards to party discipline is a comparative analysis of the

ninety-third and one hundred fourth sessions of the United States Congress. These two sessions of Congress are noticeable for the particular dynamics as part of a series of trends in United States politics. The idea is the reflection of the connections between the capacity for party discipline, party cohesion and electoral outcomes. These are tied to coalitions of highly politically active individuals and shifts in alliances of Southern states from the nineteen fifties to the nineteen nineties. The ninety-third and one hundred fourth sessions of Congress in the United States House of Representative are noticeable for shifts of power from committees to political parties. The ninety-third session in the House of Representatives was merely one of those from the ninetysecond to the ninety-fourth sessions in which the growth of the majority party leadership can be observed. The shift in power in the hundred fourth session of the House of Representative is noticeable for the works of Representative Newt Gingrich and the associated Republican Revolution for which he received much praise and loyalty from fellow Republicans. An important trend that occurs in both sessions in which the power of majority leaders becomes considerable is the weakening of the system of seniority (Aldrich and Rohde 2001). This is crucial for the balance of power between political parties and committees. Seniority allows legislators otherwise more subject to pressure from majority leaders to act with less regard for pressure from party leaders (Aldrich and Rohde 2001). If seniority is less of a criterion for the selection of committee chairs, then the majority leaders can exert pressure to control the committee chairs (Aldrich and Rohde 2001). However, upon examination of incidents where the seniority is a weaker criterion, it can be seen that there is a strong, relatively cohesive majority

that is capable of override of committee chairs. This can be around the turn of the century when a coalition of Democrats and Republicans managed to override the authority of Rules Committee chairman Joseph Cannon, and it is also demonstration that majority coalition can work against party leadership such as House Speakers (Cooper and Brady 1981). A similar trend can be seen during the sessions of the nineteen seventies and the nineteen nineties. During these sessions of the House of Representatives, there is a fairly strong, cohesive majority coalition that can manipulate the rules of procedure, including the procedure and criteria for the nomination of committee chairs. This cohesiveness can be seen when Democratic Representatives downgrade the value of the seniority criterion in the nineteen seventies (Haeberle 1978). It is also observed when Newt Gingrich possessed enough power and influence of the House of Representatives as its speaker to displace senior committee chairs. The cohesiveness is necessary for the power of party relative to that of committee chairs (Aldrich and Rohde 2001). This factor of control of the seniority criterion for committee chairs seems to be key (Crook and Hibbing 1985). For both the ninety-third and the one hundred fourth sessions of the House of Representatives, majority leaders already had a series of tools at their disposal to control committees and outcomes. Party leadership had the capacity to create and to destroy committees and subcommittees (Cox and McCubbins 1993). The leadership could control the number of the seats contained within these structures (Cox and McCubbins 1993). They could appoint the chairs for the committees (Cox and McCubbins 1993). The party leadership can offer incentives such as funds contributed from some legislators to the campaigns of other legislators, a factor that will be later discussed to effect cohesion beyond simply enforcement of party line voting (Cox and McCubbins 1993). However, after nineteen forty-six, the sessions for the early

to mid nineteen seventies and nineteen ninety-four in the House of the Representatives illustrate the more dramatic alterations in legislative procedure, particularly the stronghold over committee chairs (Aldrich and Rohde 2001). A major aspect of this power seems to stem from party unity and cohesion (Moscardelli et al, 1998; Shickler and Rich 1997). These circumstances bring up the intricate political dynamics leading up to that cohesiveness or lack thereof. A dominating influence for the cohesion of a political party will be the electoral outcomes for representatives in their local districts. Characteristics of electoral outcomes tracked anywhere from the past few decades back to the eighteenth century influence electoral outcomes and resulting party cohesion within legislatures (Lebo et al 2007). One of the oldest tracked dynamics is a direct conflict between party unity and electoral success (Lebo et al 2007). The stronger the unity of the political party, the more likely it will be that electoral outcomes for legislators involved will be relatively poor (Lebo et al 2007). A political party must deal with tradeoffs between these two complimentary goals. Majority parties within the House of Representatives theoretically might attain party cohesion at the expense of demands from electoral constituents but become vulnerable. Minority parties could have the luxury of generally poor electoral outcomes regardless of party cohesion and maintain this party cohesion. Unless a majority party has at least a slight disregard for general electoral outcome, a minority party that is small but unitary could have an advantage against a heterogeneous majority party, limiting the capacity of the majority party to govern. This would include the creation or use of procedures that could enhance the strength of the majority party within the House of Representatives. An additional and more relevant factor involves the existence of polarized voting behavior between the two main political parties (Hopkins 2008). There has been polarization in the voting behavior of legislators of political parties in the past few decades since the nineteen

seventies (Pildes 2010). Although political elites are frequently the focus of study and discussion in regards to ideological and behavioral polarization, some research indicates that some of this polarization extends to the general population (Jacobson 2003). This recent of trend of polarization is significant for reasons that will be discussed briefly. However, polarization in voting patterns is apparently a fairly regular occurrence within the context of United States political activity (Hetherington 2009). During the nineteenth century, patterns of polarized voting behavior were fairly common, and this was especially the case in the context of slavery and race relations (Hetherington 2009). That polarized voting behavior existed in response to tensions about the role of race in national consciousness should be kept in mind later in this paper. This paper is positing that national tensions regarding race have a key role in the dynamics influencing party discipline during the ninety-third and one hundred fourth sessions of the United States House of Representatives. The observation by some researchers is that racial tensions, particularly in regard to southern states, facilitated shifts in partisan alignment, and there has been the idea that shifts left effects on partisan alignment left effects on party cohesion and thus party discipline (Theriault 2006). However, this shift in alliance better explains the dominance of the Democrats in the ninety-third session of the House of Representatives and that of the Republicans in the one hundred fourth sessions (Fleisher et al., 2007). The polarization observed must also be viewed within the dynamics of the influence of political ideologues and elites. A major factor that seems to be involved with at least recent polarized political behavior is the activity of political elites and people classified as ideologues in the shaping of electoral outcomes (Pildes 2010). Political elites, including strong party identifiers, party members and activists, play a key role in the powerful partisanship noted in electoral outcomes (Fleisher et al., 2007). These individuals are the strongest supporters of the policies, political parties and

candidates of their choices (Fleisher et al., 2007). Actors within this category have the strongest policy preferences, the strongest voting pattern and greatest political contributions beyond simply voting. These actors are significant due to multiple dynamics they set into motion to reinforce political polarization and indirectly party cohesion. This class of actors will be the most reliable and most resourceful constituents that legislators would rely on to maintain a strong probability for election and reelection. This would include resources such as votes, funding or activist assistance. Legislators will orient themselves towards these ideological key constituents and only moderate their platforms and voting records to acquire the support of minimal numbers of centrists and moderates. These key figures include activists and party leaders to provide cues for the general electorate. It has been demonstrated that less ideological voters will take cues from these influential individuals and adapt their political viewpoints and voting behavior partially in accordance with these viewpoints. As a result, voting populations have become more ideological over the past few decades. Specifically, not only have most ideological people already displayed the most frequent and consistent voting behaviors, but also more voters with moderate or regular positions gradually became more ideological in disposition (Jacobson 2003). There have dwindling numbers of moderate or centrist voters, and the need for aggressive campaigns to reach out to these potential voters with great influence over electoral outcomes is stronger (Pildes 2010; Lebo et al., 2007). Electoral districts for the House of Representatives are more sorted along partisan lines at the expense of moderate/centrist districts (Pildes 2010). Legislators for the House of Representatives are more likely to be more ideological and to require more funding for more aggressive campaigns to sway the remaining moderate/centrists voters in their districts (Lebo et al., 2007).

Interest groups with more ideological dispositions will have greater influence not simply in the influence exerted over the persuadable portion of the electorate but in the reinforcement of the ideological dispositions of the legislators desiring office within the United States House of Representatives. There is no noticeable influence of the funding of interest groups on the voting records of House Representatives, but there exists a combination of the circumstances of more ideological electorates, more ideological candidates and representatives, greater openness to ideological interests, and greater need of donor funds for campaigns (Hall and Wayman 1990). Ideological interests reinforce ideological political dynamics. At this point, it should be noted that this polarization instills greater party cohesion and introduces another dynamic by which polarization and party cohesion can be reinforced (Pildes 2010). There is reduced ideological dissimilarity between party leadership and the electorates of the members of the House of Representatives. Legislators are more likely to comply and to support the agenda of party leadership (Heberlig et al., 2006). This means that legislators are more likely to support the efforts of the party leadership to support weak candidates through political action committees (Heberlig et al., 2006). The ideological legislators will be more willing to support ideological candidates with similar political viewpoints (Heberlig et al., 2006). Countering these dynamics, appeals to moderate/centrist voters may mitigate polarized voting behavior and party cohesion. The distribution of electorates and their policy preferences has a key role in the correlation between the preferences of constituents for legislators and of those of party leadership. Research about the distribution of Republican and Democratic over districts over the past few years helps to demonstrate this. It has been found that Democratic-supportive districts contain high concentrations of voters electing based on those dispositions (Hopkins 2008). It was found that Republican supporters were more evenly distributed over a broader range of districts

(Hopkins 2008). A result was that Republican leaning districts would be more vulnerable to political candidates who were relatively moderate (Hopkins 2008). This sets up a notable dynamic between the two political parties in the House of Representatives. The Democratic Party has recently acquired many of these more moderate, Republican-leaning districts via moderate candidates in addition to the solidly liberal, pro-Democrat districts (Hopkins 2008). The Republican Party has fewer moderate seats in addition to solidly conservative, pro-Republican districts (Hopkins 2008). The result is that the Republican minority is more cohesive than the Democratic majority, which has more voices and more moderate members within the legislature than the Republican Party (Hopkins 2008). It is here that it can be seen that there is the tradeoff between party unity and electoral viability. The realignment of southern states between the Democratic and Republican parties is partially an explanation for the events of stronger party leadership in the ninety-third and one hundred fourth sessions of the House of Representatives. It should be noted that substantial aspects of the realignment began in the late nineteen sixties and only ended in the nineteen nineties, and this fits fairly well with the change in party strength observed in both sessions of Congress (Roberts and Smith 2003). This relationship does not seem to be merely a correlation. Prior to the late nineteen sixties, there is an infamous relationship between the southern American states and the Democratic political party (Pildes 2010). Support within the southern states was so strong against the Republican Party that there was practically a one-party system for all intensive purposes (Pildes 2010). During the late nineteen sixties, voter support for the Democratic Party broke into conservative and moderate-liberal Democrats. The moderate-liberal faction was more likely to remain within the Democratic Party, while conservative faction was more likely to shift to align with the Republican Party (Pildes 2010). When this disruption first

began, there was less need for ideological moderation amongst party leadership as a whole (Pildes 2010). The Democratic Party was divided for years between northern and southern Democrats as they struggled to compromise with each other and as southern Democrats controlled committee chairs (Pildes 2010). With the beginning of this partisan shift, compromise as extensive as it had been was less necessary. At this point, there was probably a greater degree of party unity as southern, as conservative Democratic politicians held less sway over the party leadership (Crook and Hibbing 1985). This could help explain the momentary cohesion within the party necessary to oppose the seniority criterion of committee chairs. The effects of the end of the southern realignment can be seen through the one hundred fourth session of the United States House of Representatives. The realignment of the southern states between the Democratic and the Republican Parties lasted for approximately thirty years and apparently most ended during the nineteen nineties. This realignment was probably relevant to the majority victory of the Republican Party for the first time in around forty years. Southern states completed their alignment with the Republican Party during this time, and this provided a core of particular constituents enabling stronger Republican support. Conservatives otherwise aligned with the Democratic Party in prior decades were more likely to have aligned with the Republicans (Pildes 2010). The realignment is rooted in two fairly old social and economic conditions. One changing condition that seems to have been key to fueling the realignment is the expansive economic development seen within southern states in the past few decades (Pildes 2010). This economic development initiated a shift to various forms industry and commerce away from traditional reliance on agrarian systems in these states. The development of the economies of southern states probably led to increases in the diversities of interests within these states and the number of

people from outside of these regions normally who were residents within these states. Another, older explanation revolves around racial tensions. Racial tensions probably have a role in the changes in partisan alignment observed in southern states. Lower class southern voters are more likely to vote Democratic compared to those of higher income (Pildes 2010). Nevertheless, it is argued here that the historical implications extending to the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century are grounds for the consideration of race in politics. Neither party polarization nor racial tensions in politics would have been particularly new and unfamiliar forces within American politics (Hetherington 2009). Polarization of partisan identity and voting behavior seems to be a fairly historical occurrence within the history of United States politics (Hetherington 2009). It especially is noted at times of the eighteen sixties and seventies, in regards to the relationship of southern states and other districts of the United States. The point is that racial tensions are a frequent and regular driving political force even if relatively weak (Pildes 2010; Hetherington 2009). During the realignment of the late twentieth century, tensions around policies concerning civil rights and voting regulations were probably secondary to those of the effects of economic development on the electorate (Pildes 2010). However, focusing on the effects of racial tensions helps provide insight to an additional historical backdrop on social factors driving polarization. As mentioned earlier, polarization is a fairly common trend within American politics. While there was a trend of greater convergence of both political parties in regards to their platforms and voting behavior prior to World War II and after the turn of the century, this behavior is apparently anomalous within United States political history. A major driver of polarization within the nineteenth century involved racial tensions around the eighteen fifties and sixties (Hetherington 2009). The point is that polarization and polarization in regards to racial tensions are not irregular

occurrences with American politics. This would allow greater numbers of points of political equilibrium allowing more party cohesion and greater advantage for majority party leadership in viability compared to various committee chairs. The strength of the majority party leadership relies on the capacity of the leadership to be more powerful than committee chairs and thus have greater power to ensure party discipline. Ironically, this would probably rely on party support within the legislature already (Young and Heitshusen 2003). The capacity of majority leaders to overpower and to control committee chairs relies on political party cohesion. Legislators will only concede as much power to centralized authorities as they will consent. The willingness to concede power is potentially electorally disadvantageous for legislators within the House of Representatives, and this involves partially the extent to which there is similarity or dissimilarity between the policy preferences of constituents and those of party leadership. Even with limited dissimilarity and heterogeneity, there are potential electoral hazards for party cohesiveness. A key influence of these factors and the viability of different candidates of varying platforms is a series of political elites from activists to party leadership that influence the perceptions and preferences of the electorate, influencing and reinforcing polarization of ideology and voting behavior within electorates as well as within their own ranks. The pathways of this polarization can be driven by various historical and contemporary factors such as the civil rights movement, realignments of southern states and economic development. These factors can align to allow stronger party leadership relative to committee chairs, which is seen in the ninety-third and the one hundred fourth sessions of the United States House of Representatives. Specifically, southern political realignments in addition to other factors seems to be have been key to events within these two specific sessions of Congress.

The ninety-third and one hundred fourth sessions of the House of Representatives illustrate the effects of extent polarizing political dynamics within historical and social context. Shifts in partisan alignment in southern states enhanced the cohesiveness of the dominant American political parties. This cohesiveness could be enhanced further through polarizing dynamics such as the work of activists. When cohesiveness is strong enough, the majority leadership exerts stronger control over the capacities and autonomy of committee chairs.

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