Clinton's Rhetoric On Somalia A Burkian Reading From A Diplomatic Perspective

Global Media Journal Arabian Edition Fall/Winter 2010 Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.
33-52
Clintons rhetoric on Somalia: A Burkian perspective
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Clintons rhetoric on Somalia: A Burkian reading from a diplomatic perspective

By Mustafa Taha1
American University of Sharjah
President William Jefferson Clintons policy speech of Oct. 8, 1993, on Somalia reflects on some of the problems haunting policy-makers in their endeavor to advance U.S. interests in the post-Cold War turbulent world. The speech epitomizes a genre of crisis rhetorical communication that Clinton used to justify the U.S. intervention in Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Former U.S. presidents used war rhetoric to justify American interventions in Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait. What makes Clintons rhetorical strategy on Somalia unique is that it delineated his policy on a nascent phenomenon in the international scene -failed states. Emerging as the world unchallenged superpower, the United States strived to chart a new world order affirming its values of freedom, democracy and market economics. But instilling these values in developing societies and imposing them on countries ruled by authoritarian regimes or experiencing political disintegration proved to be at high financial and human costs. Clintons speech tried to address these intractable issues. Media coverage of the killing of the U.S. soldiers in Somalia overshadowed many facets of a successful relief and humanitarian operations. The unexpected loss of American lives in Mogadishu in October 1993, compounded by graphic media coverage of the American military fiasco, allowed Clintons critics to frame Somalia as reminiscent of Vietnam. Human loss calls into question the wisdom of transforming a humanitarian mission into a peacemaking operation and engaging the U.S. ground forces in places where the United States does not have vital interests. Clintons rhetorical strategy aimed at silencing Republican critics and maintaining public support for the U.S. presence in Somalia.
A former diplomat for his native country, Sudan, and the UN in Somalia, Mustafa Tafa is an assistant professor of mass communication at the American University of Sharjah, where he teaches courses in international public relations and public diplomacy. He holds a Ph.D from Ohio University. E-mail: mtaha@aus.edu.
Global Media Journal Arabian Edition Fall/Winter 2010 Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 33-52
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Deterred by the failed American military intervention in Somalia, the U.S. decision-makers refrained from providing the United Nations with military logistics during the Rwandan civil war. The horrifying genocide that ensued claimed more than half a million human lives. Moreover, the military failure in Somalia contributed to delaying the U.S. intervention in BosniaHerzegovina, and Kosovo. The U.S. intervention in Somalia and its ramifications constituted a landmark in the U.S. foreign policy because it involved an unprecedented task of rebuilding a failed state. As the humanitarian intervention in Somalia unfolded in December 1992, it became evident that saving starving Somalis and addressing humanitarian needs required political rehabilitation (Adam, 1992; Hirsh and Oakley, 1993; Lyons and Samatar, 1995). Stopping a clannish civil war and rebuilding government institutions in devastated Somalia required a robust military power to enforce peace agreements, sustain security, and promote national reconciliation (Cohen, 1992). Mindful of these realities, the Clinton administration embarked on a forcible disarmament policy to sustain peace in Somalia (Disarming,1999). Moreover, the United States supported a UNsponsored nation-building strategy to establish a Somali government (Himelfarb, 2009; Friedman, 1993a; Apple, 1993a). 2 The Clinton administration overlooked one important factor: soliciting the consent of powerful Somali faction leaders. Getting consent required trust and confidence building, two missing elements in the U.S./UN effort in Somalia. As a result, Aidid refused to cooperate because he perceived the U.S./UN policy as an effort to undermine his power base to the advantage of his political rivals. 3 When Aidids militia men brutally killed 23 Pakistani peacekeepers on June 5, 1993, the U.S./UN indicted Aidid, 4 and tried to arrest and bring him to justice (Lorch, 1993; Gordon, 1993). 5 The hunt for Aidid caused the conflict between Aidids militia and the U.S./UN forces to
For The U.S. and UN efforts on nation-building and rehabilitation of political institutions see Back to basics in Somalia, New York Times, Aug.10, 1993, A18. See also Madeleine Albright, Yes, there is reason to be in Somalia, New York Times, Aug. 10, 1993, A19. She argues that the U.S. should help Somalia which was a failed a state to enable it to emerge as democracy. 3 For a good account on the Somali situation see, A. O. Mansur, Contrary to a nation: The nature of the Somali clan system. In Ahmed, A. J. (Ed.), The invention of Somalia, (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press). The tragic humanitarian situation is depicted by Paul Lewis, U.N. chief requests new force to ease Somali misery now, New York Times, Jan. 12, 1992, A1.; Michael Gordon, U.N. backs a Somalia force as Bush vows a swift exit, New York Times, Dec. 4, 1992, A1. 4 For an account on the reasons that led the UN to accuse Gen. Aidid of killing the Pakistani peacekeepers, see the testimony of Ambassador David Shinn, before the Subcommittee on Africa, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, Second Session, March 16, 1994. 5 Kenneth B. Noble, 400 U.S. Marines attack compound of Somali Gunmen, New York Times, Jan. 8, 1993, A1. The Marine pounded the camp with tank and artillery fire, while heavy armed
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escalate, and led to the killing of the 18 U.S. Rangers on Oct. 3, 1993 (Apple, 1993b; Cushman, 1993; Taha, 1999). Gruesome television images of the body of a U.S. soldier dragged on the streets of Mogadishu elicited visceral public outrage in the United States and eroded public support for the U.S. mission in Somalia (Martin, 2006; Robinson, 2000; Sharkey, 1995/96). 6 Increased public and Congressional pressures forced Clinton to reverse his policy on Somalia. 7 Eventually, the U.S. forces pulled out of Somalia on March 31, 1994, leaving the country in disarray (Kraus, 1993). Presidential crisis rhetoric Numerous studies have investigated presidential crisis rhetoric. Pratt (1970) examines the speeches made by President Eisenhower on Oct. 31, 1956, during the Suez crisis; President Kennedy on Oct. 22, 1962, during the missile crisis and; and President Johnson on Aug. 4, 1964, during the Gulf of Tonkin crisis. He argues, we expect the Kennedy and Johnson speeches to be similar, because of the similarity of the threat and of the time; however, the Johnson and Eisenhower speeches are the ones that share several characteristics, not Kennedys (Pratt, 1970, p. 195). Pratt contends that unlike Eisenhower and Johnson, Kennedy was willing to identify himself as responsible for his actions (p. 199). Wander (1997) suggests that to understand the rhetoric of American foreign policy the critic should take into consideration: (1) the ceremonial nature of that rhetoric; (2) its function in domestic politics; and (3) its relation to facts and events beyond the language employed, matters on which the lives of tens of millions, if not the whole of humanity, now depend (p. 154). Wander perceives foreign policy as more than what is officially announced. Thus, the task of criticism should focus on raising real issues and assisting in serving the interests of human survival by rising above parochial concerns (Wander, 1997, p. 176). Cherwitz (1978) examines three presidential speeches on the Tonkin Gulf incident. He argues, the Tonkin Gulf incidents afforded the administration the rationale necessary to present a persuasive case to the public and congress for intervening in Vietnam (p. 97). Referring to the centrality of the president in foreign policy formulation, Cherwitz argues, through manipulation, the President was able to engineer public consensus. His precipitation of Cobra helicopter gunship launched anti-tank missiles. Major Gen. Charles Wellhem, commander of the First Marine Division said in simple terms, we hit them with a storm of fire. 6 John H. Cushman Jr. 5 G.I.s are killed as Somalis down 2 U.S. helicopters, New York Times, Oct. 4, 1993, A1. 7 It is important to note that Republicans dominated the newly elected Congress. The resolution passed 406 to 26, with both Democrats and Republicans supporting the resolution. Many Republicans found in the debate an opportunity to criticize the Administration for allowing the United Nations to direct the U.S. policy.
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the crisis and limitation of foreign policy alternatives, therefore, were effects stemming directly from his rhetorical discourse (p. 103). Cherwitz (1978) suggests that the process of foreign policy making gives the president the opportunity to present to the congress and the public a fait accompli. Because the Imperial Presidency is still alive, Cherwitz expects other Vietnams. Hahn (1980) examines President Fords rhetoric on the Mayaguez affair and suggests that such the situation provides the President with terministic compulsion to follow the implications of the terminology to their logical conclusions (p. 43). He asserts that Fords false claims corrupted the public discourse surrounding the event (Hahn, 1980, p. 42). Presidential discourse justified the 1958 Lebanon intervention, the 1965 Dominican intervention, and the 1983 invasion of Grenada. President Johnson described the civil strife in Lebanon, and the dissolution of government in the Dominican as justifications for the U.S. intervention (Procter, 1987). Reagans rhetoric depicting rulers of Grenada as thugs, stressed the need for intervening in other countries to save American lives and restore democracy. Procter (1987) differentiates between war rhetoric and rescue missions rhetoric and argues, The fundamental characteristic of rescue mission rhetoric is the symbolic construction of a chaotic scene approaching anarchy (p. 248). He adds, In war rhetoric, presidents label governments or people as polluters of American ideals, whereas in the more limited rescue mission presidents assign guilt to a chaotic scene (p. 246). In presidential rhetoric, purification of polluters is limited in rescue mission rhetoric compared to war rhetoric. Ivie (1980) articulates this notion and asserts that war rhetors are guided by the topoi of savagery in their search for communicable forms that fulfill the dramatistic function of purification through victimage (p. 292). He argues that the metaphor of savagery and its supporting cast of decivilizing vehicles play a central role in constructing the image of a hostile and threatening enemy (Ivie, 1997, p. 74). According to Ivie, the American presidents consider a war situation as a moral crisis, a challenge to American ideals. War is defined in purpose terms as attacks against Americas rights (p. 343). Thus, war is perceived as an undesirable means to a more permanent peace which will insure the security of these principles (Ivie, 1997, p. 344). Procters (1987) and Ivies (1974; and 1980) characterizations of presidential crisis rhetoric neatly fit Clintons rhetorical strategy on Somalia. Birdsell (1987) examines President Reagans speeches on the bombing of the Marines in Beirut, Oct. 23, 1983, and the invasion of Grenada that occurred few hours later. He argues that Reagans rhetoric attributed the deaths of more than 200 Marines to the scene. In Reagans rhetoric, American presence is carefully linked with the interests of the West, with peace, with Israel, with the military security of a portion of Beirut, and with the personal well-being of a Lebanese child (Birdsell, 1987, p. 269). Birdsell (1987) asserts, Reagan subordinates the Marines to multinational role, depicting the international force as a constraint upon American interests (p.270). Subsequent anti-interventionist rhetoric in the United States demanded that American forces should not be put under foreign command. By stating that additional the U.S. forces would be put under an American commander, Clinton suggested that existing American
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troops in Somalia were not under American command, and shifted the blame of the debacle to the United Nations. Birdsell (1987) indicates that Reagan invaded Grenada to compensate for the losses the United States incurred in Beirut. The experience in Grenada rehabilitates the agent made suspect in Lebanon; the scene is proven malleable by proxy (p. 271). Thus, At one level, these goals figure as a purposive rationale for American involvement, a set of programs pursued in order to alter scenic circumstances to bring them more closely into line with American policy expectations. This explanation would feature the frustration of American purposes by the malign scene (Birdsell, 1987, p. 269). Bostdorff (1994) analyzes Reagans rhetoric on Grenada from a dramatistic perspective. She argues that Kennedy, Nixon and Reagan employed anti-thetical identificational appeals based on mythical characterizations. Reagans anti-thetical appeals allowed him to use Grenada to demonstrate victory over other foes in Lebanon and Iran (p. 197). By framing his mission in Grenada as a rescue mission and not an invasion, Reagan made his terms for means more consistent with the rest of his talk. Just as other terms for situation were imbued with purposiveness, the means of a rescue mission also contained the purpose of freedom, for to rescue means to free (Bostdorff, 1994, pp. 195-196). Comparing the scene-purpose ordering in crisis rhetoric of Kennedy, Carter, and Reagan, Bostdorff (1994) argues that President H.W. Bush exemplified the scene-purpose ordering when he defined the goals for invading Panama. The invasion was meant to protect the lives of Americans in Panama and to bring General Noriega to justice in the United States (Bostdorff, 1994, p. 209). Other goals included restoration of democracy and protection of Panama Canal Agreement. These studies indicate scholarly interest in presidential rhetoric in general, and crisis rhetoric in particular. They provide valuable insights and inform this study in many ways. The United States continues to intervene in other countries on the pretexts of saving innocent lives and protecting democracy. Somalia is an excellent example elucidating how Bushs rhetoric highlighted the tragic scene to justify the U.S. humanitarian intervention. Clintons rhetorical strategy on Somalia was similar to Bushs rhetorical strategy: The Somali people needed the U.S. assistance (Taha, 2006). The U.S. humanitarian effort stood out, but the U.S. military involvement in Somali political wrangling was downplayed. Thus, Clintons rhetoric follows a pattern charted by previous presidents, particularly Reagans rhetoric on Lebanon. The premise is clear, and the narrative is telling. The United States is the world leader providing humankind with the right ideals. Opponents of these ideals constrain the U.S. interests; they should be removed or marginalized.
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Theoretical framework: Dramatism theory Kenneth Burkes dramatism theory provides an insightful contribution to rhetorical criticism. Burke (1968) defines dramatism as a method of analysis and a corresponding critique of terminology designed to show that the most direct route to the study of human relations and human motives is via a methodological inquiry into cycles or clusters of terms and their functions (p. 445). As an approach to study human motivation, dramatism utilizes terms derived from drama studies. Burkes dramatism is a theory of action which he struggles to reduce to a methodology so it can be tested by concrete application to forms of expression (Duncan, 1965 p. 148). Dramatism relies on two key assumptions. One assumption conceives of language use as an action rather than motion. Whereas motion involves bodily functions, action emerges from the brain which is capable of the using symbols. Burke (1945) asserts, Dramatistically, motion involves action, but action is more than motion (p. 76). He provides three conditions for action: freedom or choice, requiring individuals to act at their free will; purpose or will, depending on individuals ability to choose or select something from various options; and motion which is a sine qua non for action. Thus, Burke (1968) underscores the centrality of action by emphasizing meaning (p. 447). The other assumption of dramatism stipulates that humans develop and present messages in much the same way that a play is presented (Foss, 1989, p. 336). Human beings use rhetoric to create characters and situations similar to those created in plays. This assumption is important because once a critic knows how a rhetor has described a situation, the critic is able to discover that rhetors motive for action in the situation (Foss, 1989, p. 336). Research questions: 1. What were the motives embedded in Clintons speech on Somalia? 2. Did the assertions in Clintons speech reflect the truth in Somalia? 3. Where there any missing information (pentad) in Clintons speech? Method This study uses Kenneth Burkes pentad to examine Clintons rhetorical strategy on Somalia. To unveil the motives embedded in Clintons speech on Somalia, this study utilizes the five basic elements of dramaturgy constituting the basic structural terms of Burkes pentadic approach. These pentadic terms are: act, agent, agency, scene, and purpose. Act deals with discovering the rhetors motive that led to action (Burke, 1945, pp. 227-274). According to Burke (1945) a scene can be a site, the ground or situation in which the act occurs (p. 12). Identifying the scene may include time and physical description.
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Agent refers to the performer of the act (Burke, 1945, pp.171-226). Naming the performer may include providing some of the performers physical and psychological characteristics. Purpose refers to whatever the agent intends to achieve by performing the act (Burke, pp. 275320). Duncan (1962) defines purpose as belief in certain values as necessary to community survival (p. 434). These terms represent the rules guiding critics to discover the rhetors motives. Burke (1945) argues, In a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that names the act (names what took place, in thought or deed), and another that names the scene (the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred); also you must indicate what person or kind of person (agent) performed the act, what means or instruments he then used (agency), and the purpose.(p. xv). Burke (1945), suggests, any complete statement about motives will offer some kind of answers to these five questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose).(p. xv). In addition, to these five elements, Burke recurrently employed attitude to discover the motives. Attitude deals with how the act was done and through what means. Foss (1989) argues, Burke developed the pentad to be the used internally -- within a rhetorical artifact itself -- so that the pentadic elements or the five terms are selected from the actual content of the rhetoric. (p. 339). The first step in pentadic criticism is identifying the five pentadic terms. The second step is pairing of ratios. The pairing of the five terms of the pentad illuminates the dominant pentadic element in the message. According to Foss (2004) critics use the systematic pairing of the elements in the pentad to discover the relationship between them and the nature of the influence each has on the other (p. 387). Burke suggests that identifying the dominant term helps in discovering the philosophical underpinnings guiding the rhetor. Thus, the dominant term can be utilized to identify the philosophical system to which it corresponds, with that system generating ideas about the definition of a situation, its meaning for rhetors and audiences, and its possible consequences (Foss, 2004, p. 389). Burkes dramatisic pentad is a useful tool for analyzing presidential rhetoric (Grable, 2000). The pentad neatly suits Clintons speech on Somalia because Clinton used his speech as a rhetorical vehicle to persuade his audiences to accept and support his policy on Somalia (Griffen, 2006). Analysis Clintons speech of Oct. 7, 1993, on Somalia explains why the United States intervened in Somalia and why its forces should not be immediately withdrawn in reaction to the killing of the 18 American soldiers. To analyze the speech from a pentadic perspective it is important to divide it into temporal parts reflecting the scene and the phases of the U.S. intervention in Somalia. The following figure shows 18 pentads in Clintons speech.
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Pentad No. 1: Time Act
Agent
Agency
scene starvation; tragedy
purpose anarchy
Pre-Dec. 92: fighting; small number drought; Blocking aid of Somalis anarchy Pentad No. 2: Time Act Post- Jan., 93: military Intervention Pentad No. 3: Time Act June, 5, 93: killing of UN officers
Agent USA; Leadership
Agency US forces; consciences
scene security normalcy
purpose rescue: save lives
Agent people who caused the problem
Agency resistance
scene nationBuilding
purpose disruption; cause anarchy; Famine
Pentad No. 4: Time Act Oct, 3, 93:
Agent
Agency violence
scene chaos
purpose cause anarchy; expedite US withdrawal
killing of gang; thugs US officers Desecrating Body; showing Captured pilot
Pentad No. 5: Time Act Oct. 3, 93:
Agent
Agency horror; anger
scene
purpose
Reaction to Americans the killing of US soldiers; Desecrating Body; showing Captured pilot
public opinion solidarity
Pentad No. 6: Time Act Oct. 3, 93: Blackhawk went down; fight back
Agent US forces
Agency heroism
scene intense fire
purpose defend US interests
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Pentad No. 7: Time Act Oct. 7, 93:
Agent
Agency sympathy
scene Somalia
purpose thank for US efforts
Somalis 15,000 demonstrated Somalis
Pentad No. 8: Time Act Oct. 8, 93: Secure; free captive
Agent Clinton
Agency
scene
purpose defend US interests
determination Somalia
Pentad No. 9: Time Act Oct-Mar., 94: remain in Somalia For now
Agent US forces
Agency pressure; security
scene Mogadishu
purpose protect US; secure roads; prevent anarchy give Somalis time resolve problems purpose protect troops; finish mission
Pentad No. 10: Time Act Oct-Mar., 94: add US troops Pentad No. 11: Time Act Oct-Mar., 94: Dialogue Pentad No. 12: Time Act Pre-Mar. 94: hasty Withdrawal Pentad No. 13: Time Act Pre-Mar. 94: do job effectively
Agent Clinton
Agency military hardware;
scene Somalia
Agent USA
Agency
scene
purpose find political solution purpose change US policy
diplomacy; politics Amb. Oakley Agency killing of Americans scene pressure by terrorists
Agent USA
Agent Clinton
Agency troop replacement
scene world
purpose maintain security
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Pentad No. 14: Time Act Mar. 31, 94: orderly Withdrawal Pentad No. 15: Time Act Post-Mar. 94: peace Efforts
Agent USA
Agency prudence;
scene
purpose
withdraw show leadership/ on our terms credibility
Agent African countries; Others
Agency order; security
scene Somalia; Africa
purpose political settlement
Pentad No. 16: Time Act Pre-Mar. 94: finish the Work Pentad No. 17: Time Act
Agent USA
Agency do it right
scene Somalia
purpose show world US takes on challenge
Agent
Agency message
scene U.S. public; world
purpose convey country gratitude
Pre-Mar. 94: thank; Clinton Sympathize with families of killed soldiers Pentad No. 18: Time Act Agent Pre-Mar. 94: do our job U.S.A
Agency increase strength
scene Somalia
purpose bring U.S. troops home
Analysis In his justification of the U.S. intervention in Somalia Clinton indicates, We went because only the United States could help stop one of the great human tragedies of this time. He adds, agonizing death of starvation, a starvation brought on not only by drought, but also by the anarchy that then prevailed in that country (Pentad 1). Thus, the tragic situation of dying children and starving Somalis impelled the United States and its leadership to send its forces to combat anarchy and starvation and to save Somali lives. Clinton argues, In a sense, we came to Somalia to rescue innocent people in a burning house. Weve nearly put the fire out, but some smoldering embers remain. If we leave them now,
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those embers will reignite into flames, and people will die again. Thus, the purpose of stationing the U.S. forces in Somalia is to continue to protect the lives of innocent Somalis (Pentad 9). Clinton describes the mission as a success arguing that, We saved close to one million lives. And throughout most of Somalia -- everywhere but in Mogadishu -- life began returning to normal . None of this would have happened without American leadership and Americas troops (Pentad 2). Thus, the role of the United States and its leadership (agent), as well as its military forces (agency) contributed immensely to rescuing and saving Somali lives. This is clearly illustrated in Pentad 2. Clinton explains the intentions of some Somalis who want disorder and chaos. He asserts, But then, in June, the people who caused much of the problem in the beginning started attacking American, Pakistani and other troops who were there just to keep the peace with others, these people sought to fight and to disrupt, even if it means returning Somalia to anarchy and mass famine(Pentad 3). Clinton identifies the present goals of the U.S. forces in Somalia in Pentad 9. Clinton underscores the need for a political solution and says, we must pursue new diplomatic efforts to help the Somalis find a political solution to their problems. That is the only kind of outcome that can endure, for fundamentally the solution to Somalias problems is not a military one, it is political (Pentad 11). For this reason Clinton asked Ambassador Bob Oakley, who served effectively in two administrations, as the U.S. representative in Somalia to travel again to the region to immediately advance this process. Clintons exit strategy required relinquishing the American role in Somalia to other countries. He says, Leaders of the neighboring African states, such as Ethiopia and Eritrea, have offered to take the lead in efforts to build a settlement among the Somali people that can preserve order and security. He also refers to other nations and other countries (Pentad 13). Clinton argues against hasty withdrawal because it undermines the U.S. interests. He asserts that hasty withdrawal will undermine the U.S. efforts in Somalia because other nations would leave, too. Chaos would resume, the relief effort would stop and starvation soon would return (Pentad 12). Clinton adds:
First, they are there to protect our troops and our bases . Second, they are there to keep open and secure the roads, the port and the lines of communications . Third, they are there to keep the pressure on those who cut off relief supplies and attack our people, not to personalize the conflict but to prevent a return to anarchy . Fourth, through their pressure and their presence, our troops will help to make it possible for the Somali people, working with others, to reach agreement among themselves so that they can resolve their problems and survive as we leave. Our own credibility with friends and allies would be severely damaged. Our leadership in world affairs would be undermined at the very time when people are looking to America to help promote peace and freedom in the post-Cold War world. And all around the world, aggressors, thugs and terrorists will conclude that the best way to get the U.S. to change our policies is to kill our people. It would be open season on Americans. That is why I am committed to getting this job done in Somalia not only quickly but also effectively. (These assertions are reflected in Pentad 12).
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Expressing indignation, Clinton asserts, we all reacted with anger and horror as an armed Somali gang desecrated the bodies of our American soldiers and displayed a captured American pilot, all of them soldiers who were taking part in an international effort to end the starvation of the Somali people themselves (Pentad 5). He adds that the majority of Somalis support the U.S. efforts. Clinton corroborates his argument stating that, This week some 15,000 Somalis took to the streets to express sympathy for our losses, to thank the U.S. for our effort. Most Somalis are not hostile to the U.S., but grateful, and they want to use this opportunity to rebuild their country (Pentad 7). Clinton praises American heroism: we witnessed a dramatic example of the heroic ethic of our American military. When the first Blackhawk helicopter was down this weekend, the other American troops didnt retreat, although they could have . They stayed with their comrades. Thats the kind of soldiers they are; thats the kind of people we are. Clinton identifies with those missing in action and the captive soldier (Pentad No. 6). I want you to know that I am determined to work for the security of those Americans missing or held captive. Anyone holding an American right now should understand above all else that we will hold them strictly responsible for our soldiers well-being. We expect them to be well treated, and we expect them to be released (Pentad No. 8). Clinton insists on conducting an orderly withdrawal from Somalia. If we stay a short while longer and do the right things . All American troops will be out of Somalia no later than March 31 except for a few hundred support personnel in non-combat roles. He adds, This past weeks events make it clear that even as we prepare to withdraw from Somalia, we need more strength there. We need more armor, more airpower, to ensure that our people are safe and that we can do our job. To do the right thing, he says we may need up to six months to complete these steps and to conduct an orderly withdrawal (Pentad 14). The United States has to face the challenge in Somalia to prove that it is a credible world leader. Clinton argues, So let the U.S. finish the work we set out to do. Let the U.S. demonstrate to the world, as generations of Americans have done before the U.S., that when Americans take on a challenge, they do the job right (Pentad 9). Clinton assured the American people that he (agent) would do an effective job, and said that troops from other countries (agency) would replace the U.S. forces and maintain security (purpose) in Somalia (Pentad 13). He also promised that the U.S. would finish the work in Somalia in the right way (agency) to demonstrate to the world that the Americans could take on challenges (Pentad 16). Clinton told the American people that the U.S. (agent) would increase its strength (agency) in Somalia in order bring the soldiers home (Pentad 18). He also expressed his thanks and sympathies (act) to the families of the killed soldiers, and conveyed to them the gratitude of their country (Pentad 17).
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The ratios: In Pentad 1, ratios indicate that the dominant term is scene, which includes tragedy and starving Somalis. In Pentad 2, the controlling pentadic term is agent, which is the United States. Its role was instrumental in securing relief supplies and rescuing and saving starving Somalis. The pairings of terms in Pentad 3 suggest that the dominant term is purpose. Militia men and gangs managed to kill the UN peacekeepers to cause anarchy and famine. The dominant term in Pentad 4 is the scene of chaos that caused the killing of the American soldiers. The U.S. forces suffered as they become part that chaotic scene. The agent (gang) is given any credit for causing the problem to the U.S. forces. The reaction (act) of the American people to the killing of American soldiers is the dominant term in Pentad 5. The visceral reaction of American public to the gruesome images of killed and captured soldiers is seen as a controlling term. In Pentad 6, the dominant term is the agent. The American troops fought back heroically to protect their comrades and save the U.S. interests. The sympathy (agency) that many Somalis showed in their pro-U.S. demonstration and their support for the United States is the dominant term in Pentad 7. In Pentad 8, pairings of terms suggest that the dominant term is defending U.S. interests (purpose).To be determined to secure the captive American pilot, Clinton as an agent was required to have that purpose. Moreover, the purpose of defending the U.S. interests is also the dominant term in Pentad 9. Protecting U.S. forces, securing roads and ports, preventing anarchy and helping Somalis required the act of stationing the U.S. troops in Somalia. The pairings of pentadic terms in Pentad 11 suggest that the controlling term is diplomacy (agency). Ambassador Robert Oakley is depicted as an important component of the American effort to engage in negotiations to find a political solution to the Somali problem. Pentad 12 and Pentad 14 provide two alternatives. Clinton explicated the downsides of a hasty withdrawal in Pentad 12. If the United States succumb to terrorist pressures (agency) and withdraw, thugs and terrorists will target and kill Americans in many places around the world to force the United States to change its policies. Some of the outcomes of a hasty withdrawal will be a return to anarchy and starvation in Somalia and loss of American leadership and credibility. Agency is the dominant term in Pentad 12. On the other hand, Pentad 14 illustrates the purpose (controlling term) and the virtues of an orderly withdrawal. The merits of staying in Somalia to do the right thing and conducting an orderly withdrawal will promote American leadership and enhance its credibility on the global stage. In Pentad 13, the controlling term is agency (troop replacement), because the U.S. forces could not leave without ensuring that security would be maintained (purpose). In Pentad 15, the dominant term is the act of continuing peace efforts. Peace efforts are important ingredients for finding a political settlement. Neighboring countries and other African countries (agent) could not maintain order and security (agency) without effective peace efforts.
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In the absence of peace efforts, establishing a sustainable political settlement in Somalia will be a futile endeavor. The pairing of terms in Pentad 16 suggest that the dominant term is purpose. Clinton wanted the U.S. forces to do the right job (agency) in Somalia to prove to the world (purpose) that America can rise to the challenges and overcome them. In Pentad 17, Clinton expressed his thanks and sympathy (act) to the families of the killed soldiers and conveyed (agency) to them the gratitude of their country (purpose). He also promised to increase the strength of the U.S. troops (agency) in Somalia to help in bringing the American soldiers home (purpose). This point is illustrated in Pentad 18. Having examined the pairings of terms in all the pentads, the researcher found that the dominant term is purpose. Purpose is featured seven times; act three times; agent, two; agency, three; and scene, three. The purpose of sending U.S. forces to Somalia, and keeping them there despite the mounting Republican opposition and waning public support. The speech highlights the purposes of defending U.S. interests and demonstrating to the world the viability of the American leadership. Moreover, the purposes of protecting the U.S. troops in Somalia and ensuring an orderly withdrawal. According to Burke (1969) if the featured term is purpose the corresponding philosophy is mysticism. In mysticism Identification often becomes so strong that the individual is unified with some cosmic or universal purpose (Foss, 2004, p. 389). Discussion Burkes pentadic approach provides critics with powerful analytical tools to unveil a rhetors motives by analyzing the rhetors speech. The pentadic terms derives their power from their ambiguity and malleability. Indeed, there is no consistent rule for applying the terms across situations, and that there is not necessarily a single, correct rule for applying the terms in any particular situation (Birdsell, 1987, p. 277). Pentadic alignment and formulations depend on the critics ability and insights. The authors previous diplomatic experience and work with the United Nations in Somalia contributed to his understanding of the Somali situation. In certain circumstances illuminating the motives may require in-depth knowledge that may add to the pentads internal elements. Mirroring President Reagans speech on Lebanon, Clintons speech on Somalia situated the U.S. forces as an integral part of the UN troops. Clinton managed to shift the blame from himself as a Commander-in-Chief, and assigned it to the United Nations and the Somali scene. This frame selected the United Nation for victimage by deflecting the blame from Clinton. It also suggests that the United States is not an agent that could be defeated Somali gang, but constituted part of the tragic scene. Clintons speech marked a reversal in the U.S. policy on Somalia. It was a reactive move in response to the killing of the eighteen U.S. soldiers. The speech was intended to reverse an eroding public support for Clintons policy on Somalia. The speech highlights morality and
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righteousness, and depicts the United States as a reliable world power that could rescue and save the lives of needy people. It includes multiple layers of acts, agents, agencies, scenes and purposes. In his speech, Clinton the used terministic screens to highlight the scenes of success by underscoring the role of the United States as an agent, and blurring the scenes of failure by situating the United States as part of an uncontrollable scene (Burke, 1966, pp. 44-52; and Burke, 1984, p. 280). Clintons speech justifies the intervention as a rescue mission to save starving Somalis (purpose) by illuminating a tragic humanitarian situation (scene) that could not be ignored. It explicates the moral responsibility guiding the United States (agent), and the noble role that the U.S. forces (agency) played in securing food supplies to starving Somalis. Pairing of the ratios suggest that the tragic situation in Somalia was so compelling (scene) that it warranted a robust military intervention to suppress the Somali gangs and save the lives of starving Somalis. Thus, the overriding term in Clintons speech is the purpose. The purpose is featured in various pentads and dominates the speech. It extends from saving Somali lives, to protecting U.S. forces, to maintaining U.S. leadership and credibility. Clintons motives aimed at spearheading an international effort to rehabilitate and make the failed state of Somalia a success story. But using Western political paradigms to build Somali political institutions, proved to be futile. Most of the foreign political architects who tried to build political institutions in Somalia lacked political sensitivities. The U.S./UN top-down approach used for nation-building failed because it overlooked Somali cultural and social values. Building a viable Somali government could have helped in securing the east African region from Islamic radicalism. A failed state can have an adverse domino-effect on its neighbors. For this reason, Somalia acquired more importance because it is adjacent to the Arab oil-rich proU.S. countries (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Gulf states). Previous studies show that Johnson, Nixon, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton used rhetorical strategies to situate agents as part of uncontrollable scenes to absolve themselves from any blame for political failures. The complexity of international affairs and the pre-occupation of the American people with domestic politics allow the presidents to frame foreign policy issues and manipulate public opinion by using rhetorical strategies that serve their purposes. Previous presidential rhetoric (Bostdorff, 1994; Birdsell, 1987; Procter, 1987; Ivie, 1997) differs from Clintons because there is no well-defined enemy in post-Cold War world. Thus, the evil in Somalia was not communism, but the murky and ill-defined terrorists, thugs, and warlords. Such attendant dangers constrain the United States ability to expand its value-laden market economy and democracy. Clintons speech ignored Aidid and did not treat him as an agent. Prudently, it did not recognize him or call him by name. Verbal attacks on Aidid could have boosted his popularity and bolstered his political base. Clinton did not want to demonize Aidid and kept the door open for negotiating with him. This diplomatic savvy proved instrumental in facilitating the release of an American pilot who had been in Aidids custody. It also helped in pulling the U.S. forces from Somalia without further casualties.
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The striking similarity between Reagans speech on Lebanon and Clintons is that the international forces are seen as crippling the U.S. ability to function globally. Systematic discrediting of the United Nations allowed the United States to drag its heels in paying its arrears to the UN system. Constrained relations induced the United States refusal to provide the United Nations with ground troops for peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and Bosnia. In the mid-1990s, the United States insisted that NATO should constitute the core of any international force in Kosovo. The reason was to make sure that the U.S. forces be under a U.S. commander. There is a telling omission in Clintons speech: a missing pentad. Clinton did not mention one of most difficult problems facing the peace-making operation in Somalia. The missing pentad illustrates the U.S./UN political agendas. After June 6, 1993, the U.S./UN forces worked in tandem to marginalize Aidid, and started hunting for him. A ransom was announced for his arrest ($ 25 million). That move was not prudently calculated and lacked political savvy and cultural sensitivity. Cultural traits and clan affiliations suggest that arresting a clan chief for the sake of money was inconceivable in Somalia. The hunt for Aidid further complicated the security situation and aggravated animosity toward the U.S. forces. Although the missing pentad did not appear in Clintons speech, it was felt in the Somali scene. Pairing of the ratios suggests that the overriding term is marginalizing Aidid and striking him out of the political equation (purpose). Missing pentad: Time Oct, 3, 93 Act Hunt for Aidid Agent U.S. troops Agency surprise attack scene save face; show resolve purpose exclude Aidid; stop violence
Examining the unsaid illuminates some of the rhetors motives. In political contexts, including Somalia, words often belie deeds. Incorporating the missing pentad in Clintons speech will make his administration (agent) responsible for the problems that the U.S. forces faced in Somalia, and the failure of the military mission. Clintons rhetorical strategy aimed at depicting his administration as a victim of a chaotic situation. On Oct. 3, 1993, the American forces were not fighting to save the starving Somalis. Their mission was to capture Aidid. Had Clinton mentioned this fact in his speech, he could have drawn more criticism from his Republican rivals as well as the media. Conclusion Pentadic analysis of Clintons speech on Somalia reveals the motives of his administration. In addition to saving starving Somalis, Clinton tried to rescue Somalia and turn it into a model
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for rehabilitating failed states. He wanted to be seen as a credible world leader who could help peoples vying for freedom, and democracy in many places around the world. Clintons attempts to transform a humanitarian mission into a nation-building operation encountered enormous political hurdles. Most of these difficulties emanated from the differences in values as well as socio-economic and cultural differences. For some Americans the failure in Somalia became reminiscent of Vietnam, namely Clintons Republican critics. The political apathy and public outrage following the military debacle in Somalia may have become a disincentive for the United States dissuading it from intervening to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Nonetheless, as Reagan compensated for his failure in Beirut by invading Grenada, Clinton restored his credibility by reinstating democracy in Haiti. In both incidents the Presidents rhetorical strategies succeeded in mustering Congressional and popular support. Both presidents used imagery of dying children, and decried constraints imposed on U.S. forces within multinational military settings. Burkes pentadic approach to analyze Clintons speech on Somalia proved to be useful in unveiling Clintons political motives by exploring the manifest statement. Unveiling the unsaid and constructing a missing pentad proved to be an insightful exploration. Understanding presidential rhetorical strategies and discovering motives are instrumental because they inform the critic with insights about foreign policy agendas. Studying presidential rhetorical strategies can also enhance our understanding of available alternatives policies and enlighten U.S. about power configurations in other parts of the world. Future studies on presidential rhetoric should take into consideration the rhetoric of the audiences on the receiving side. Technological advances in global communication will help and influence presidential rhetoric by informing it with opponents competing rhetoric. References Adam, H.M. (1992). Somalia: Militarism, warlordism, and democracy. Review of African Political Economy, 54, (1992), 11-26. Apple Jr., R.W. (1993 A, Oct. 13). Policing a global village. New York Times, A1. Apple Jr., R.W. (1993 B, Oct. 5). Clinton sending reinforcements after heavy losses in Somalia. New York Times, A1. Beer, F.A. and Hariman, R. (Eds.). (1996). Post-realism: The rhetorical turn in international relations. East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press. Birdsell, D.S. (1987). Ronald Reagan on Lebanon and Grenada: Flexibility and interpretation in the application of Kenneth Burkes Pentad, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 73 (3): 267279. Bostdorff, D.M. (1994). The presidency and the rhetoric of foreign crisis. University of South Carolina Press. Brock, B.L. (1990). Rhetorical criticism: A Burkeian approach revisted. In Brock, B.L., Scott, R.L. and Chesebro, J.W. (Eds.). Methods of rhetorical criticism: A twentieth-century perspective. (3rd ed.). (pp.183-195). Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press. Burke, K. (1972). Dramatism and development. (Barre, Mass.: Clark University Press).
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Burke, K. (1968). Dramatism. In Sills, D. (Ed.). International Encyclopedia of Social Science, VII: 445-452. Burke, K. (1945). A grammer of motives. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Burke, K. (1966). Language as symbolic action: Essays on life, literature, and method. Berkeley: University of California Press. Burke, K. (1984). Permanence and change: An anatomy of purpose. New York: New Republic, 1935/ also 3rd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Burke, K. (1942). The study of symbolic action. The Chimera, 1, 7-16. Cragan, J.F. and Shields, D.C. (1995). Symbolic theories in applied communication research: Borman, Burke and Fisher. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, Inc. Cherwitz, R.A. (1978, Spring). Lyndon Johnson and the crisis of Tonkin Gulf: A Presidents the justification of war. Journal of Speech Communication, 42 (2): 93-104. Cohen, H.J., (1992, Dec. 17). Update on Operation Restore Hope. Statement by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C. Dec. 17, 1992, The U.S. Department of State Dispatch 893, Dec. 21, 1992, vol. 3, No. 51. p. 896. Crable, B. (2000). Burkes perspective on perspectives: Grounding dramatism in the representative anecdote. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 86, 318-333. Disarming Somalia, Sort Of. (1992, Jan. 8). New York Times, A 24. Duncan, H.D. (1962). Communication and social order. Oxford University Press. Foss, S.K. (2004). Rhetorical criticism: Exploration & practice (3rd ed.). Long Grove, IL: Waveland. Foss, S.K., Foss, K.A. and Trapp, R. (1991). Kenneth Burke, In Foss, S. K., Foss, K. A. and Trapp, R. Contemporary perspectives on rhetoric. (3rd ed.), pp. 169-208. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. Foss, S.K. (1989). Rhetorical criticism: Exploration & practice. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, Inc. Friedman, T.L. (1993, Oct. 15). Dealing with Somalia: Vagueness as a virtue. New York Times, A1. Griffen, E. (2006). A first look at communication theory (6th ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. Hirsh, L. and Oakley, R. (1995). Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on peacemaking and peacekeeping. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press. Jehl, D. (1993, Oct. 8). Clinton doubling force in Somalia, vowing troops will come home in 6 months, New York Times, A1. Gordon, M.R. (1993, June 15). Somali warlord, still at large, in a test of wills with UN. New York Times, 1993, A12. Hahn, D.F. (1980, Spring). Corrupt rhetoric: President Ford and the Mayaguez affair, Communication Quarterly, 28 (2): 38-43 Hatzenbuehler, R. and Ivie, R.L. (1983). Congress declares war: Rhetoric, leadership, and partisanship in the early republic. Kent State University Press. Himelfarb, S. (2009). Media and peacebuilding: The new army stability doctrine and media sector development, Media, War & Conflict, 2; 7. Online at: http://mwc.sagepub.com/ cgi/ content/abstract/2/1/7
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Ivie, R.L. (1997). Cold War motives and the rhetorical metaphor: A framework of criticism. In Medhurst et al. Cold War rhetoric: Strategy, metaphor, and Ideology (pp. 71-97). Michigan State University Press. Ivie, R.L. (1980). Images of savagery in American justification for war. Communication Monographs, 47, 279-294. Ivie, R. L. (1974). Presidential motives for war. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 60, 337-345. Kuypers, J.A. (1997). Presidential crisis rhetoric and the press in the post-Cold War world. Westport, CT: Praeger Series in Political Communication. Kraus, C. (1993, Sept. 29). House vote urges Clinton to limit American role in Somali conflict. New York Times, Sept. 29, A1. Lorch, D. (1993, June 8). UN moves troops to Somali city and vows punishment for attack. Lyons, T. and Samatar, A.I. (1995). Somalia: State collapse, multilateral intervention, and strategies for political reconstruction. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. Martin, S.E. (2006). U.S. media pools and military interventions in the 1980s and 1990s. Journal of Peace Research, 43; 601 Medhurst, M.J., Ivie, R.L., Wander, P. and Scott, R.L. (1997). Cold War rhetoric: Strategy, metaphor, and Ideology. Michigan State University Press. Pratt, J.W. (1970 September). An analysis of three crisis speeches. Western Journal of Speech Communication, 34 (3): 194-203. President Clintons address on the U.S. policy in Somalia, Oct. 7, 1993 (1993, Oct. 8). The Washington Post, A21. Procter, D.E. (1987, Summer). The rescue mission: Assigning guilt to a chaotic scene. The Western Journal of Speech Communication, 51, 245-255. Robinson, P. (2000). The news media and Operation Restore Hope: Illusion of a media driven intervention. Paper presented to the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, CA., March 14-18, 2000, p. 3. Sharkey, J. (1995/96). When pictures drive foreign policy. Mass Media. Annual Edition, 95/96, 140-143. Taha, M. (2006). The framing of the U.S. intervention in Somalia: Convergent and divergent frames. Paper presented to the 56th Annual Convention of the International Communication Association of the Association (ICA), Dresden, Germany. Available online at: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p92036_index.html Taha, M. (1999). The New York Times coverage of Somalia, 1993: A content analysis. Paper presented to the 1999 Convention of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC), New Orleans, U.S.A. Available online at: http://list. msu.edu/archives/aejmc.html - Item 001343 Tonn, M.B., Endress, B.A. and Diamond, J.N. (1993). Hunting and heritage on trial: A dramatistic debate over tragedy, tradition, and territory. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 79 (1993), 165-181. Wander, P. (1997). The rhetoric of American foreign policy. In Medhurst et al. Cold War rhetoric: Strategy, metaphor, and Ideology. (pp. 153-183). Michigan State University Press.

Clinton's Rhetoric On Somalia A Burkian Reading From A Diplomatic Perspective

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Global Media Journal Arabian Edition Fall/Winter 2010 Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.

Clintons rhetoric on Somalia: A Burkian perspective