DOCTRINAL NOTE 07/01

Authority Msn Sp Gp, LWC

THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT INTRODUCTION 1. In todays turbulent and uncertain world, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of future conflict. Therefore the Army must be prepared to meet the challenges of any type of operation, in a range of physical environments, and against all kinds of threats, simultaneously. This is the nature of the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE). The adaptive foundation of training for high intensity conflict remains valid; however, it should be complemented by training that prepares our soldiers to cope with a variety of tactical situations across the spectrum of conflict occurring simultaneously within the same geographic area. AIM 2. It should be noted that the Armys structures and doctrine will continue to be derived from MOD1 and Army2 publications. This Doctrinal Note (DN) is not endorsed doctrine; rather it articulates one view of the COE on which comment is welcomed. It has been written as a result of concerns expressed at the tactical level that the COE was not articulated and often misunderstood. The DN will be updated regularly to ensure that it evolves as the operating environment changes. Thus the aim of this DN is to describe a view of the COE for the benefit of common understanding and further development. COE VARIABLES 3. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has studied the nature of the COE on behalf of America, Britain, Canada and Australia (ABCA). This work has been focused on developing a range of scenarios that provide an adaptive training environment that reflects todays challenges for military forces deploying on operations. Recently ABCA has undertaken work to develop a scenario generator, which has further informed understanding of the COE. The scenarios generated will be made available for unit and formation training, principally training for enduring operations (The War). As part of its work, TRADOC has developed a list of 6 variables that describe the COE. These variables have been accepted by all ABCA nations. They are: a. b. c. d. e. f. Physical. Political. Economic. Human. Military. Information.

4. All are inter-related, with each one assuming greater or lesser importance depending on the situation. As the extent and influence of each variable changes with time, so the operating environment changes. Taken together, the variables cause the dynamic, complex and often
1 2

Such as Defence Strategic Guidance and Joint Warfare Publications. Such as Army Doctrine Publication Land Operations and the Army Field Manual.

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simultaneous dilemmas that the Army will face when operating across the Continuum of Operations within the COE. ABCA has identified a number of main characteristics associated with each variable. These are listed at Annex A and may be of use to the chain of command when developing training scenarios. 5. The ABCA work does not include Legal as a critical variable in the COE. However, the COE will be defined, in part, by the legal regime applicable to the situation. The legal basis for the use of force, such as a UN Security Council resolution, will establish the boundaries for the mission. The Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC3), customary international law and other international treaties and conventions addressing matters such as the use of certain weapons, will impact the COE. Additionally, British forces on operations must comply with UK national law and policy, as all participating coalition forces will be bound by their own national laws and policies. The impact of the applicable legal regime on the COE cannot be ignored. KEY CONSIDERATIONS 6. Key considerations when training for, and operating within, the COE are: a. British forces on operations must comply with national law and policy, as well as The Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC), customary international law and other international treaties and conventions. (Paragraph 5) b. To achieve success, forces must be well practised in Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) that facilitate agility and flexibility when faced with situations across the spectrum of conflict. (Paragraph 9) c. Tactical military forces must be familiar with the characteristics of the physical environment, experienced in operating in a range of them and aware of the influence the various characteristics will have on operations. (Paragraph 10) d. Tactical commanders must understand and appreciate the variety and types of relationships that exist inside and outside the theatre of operations. When establishing relationships, commanders must be careful not to cause unnecessary resentment and hostility among local populations. (Paragraph 13) e. British forces need to understand the political environment in which they operate and the political perceptions of the populations living in the area of operations. Military training must include exposure to the variables of the political environment in order that tactical forces can place their actions in national, regional and global contexts. (Paragraphs 14 and 16) f. The military must be trained to exploit the wide variety of media available to achieve desired effects through non-kinetic activities. (Paragraph 16) g. Awareness of the economic environment may enable humanitarian actions to be taken by a military force to decrease tension and reduce the economic disparity between sections of a community. (Paragraph 19) h. Cultural and religious differences should be respected and every effort made to avoid causing offence. The use of the local language, even at a basic level, may be very helpful. Appropriate priority should be given to cultural awareness and language training both before and during deployment. Commanders should endeavour to identify the elders in a

The Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations.

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community as they could be the gate-keepers and may prove a useful entry point for the development of relationships. (Paragraph 22) i. Multiple third party actors, including Other Government Departments (OGDs), other agencies, Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), International Organisations (IO), religious and voluntary organisations, entrepreneurs, multinationals and private and state contractors are present in the COE. Consideration should be given to forming Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JICG) and inviting the exchange of liaison teams with appropriate organisations. Formation training (for both enduring and contingent operations) must, wherever possible and appropriate, incorporate representatives from OGDs, NGOs and other agencies. (Paragraphs 23 and 24) j. The Military Environment will differ for each region and each situation, with the adversary or adversaries possessing different structures, equipment and capabilities. The Military Environment is not just confined to those theatres where troops are deployed. In the COE, threats are likely to be found wherever there are British interests, including the homeland. The British Army must be prepared to deploy into any operational environment and perform its full range of tasks while dealing with a wide range of enemy threats. Training must reflect these challenges, whilst simultaneously supporting UK Operations to protect the home base. (Paragraph 25) k. The Army will become increasingly involved with other agencies in the COE and, once major combat operations have concluded, it will work increasingly in support of OGDs. The adoption of the Comprehensive Approach and the Effects Based Approach (EBA) should result in unity of effort across government departments and it is incumbent on the Army to understand their capabilities, appreciate their areas of expertise and know their modus operandi. Such a level of understanding can only be achieved by training and operating together. (Paragraph 28) l. The internet and mobile phones already provide asymmetric opponents with unprecedented agility. This trend exists across the continuum of operations and the Army needs to understand how to defeat networked enemies. (Paragraph 32) m. In the COE tactical commanders will, in an instant, be faced with multiple threats and situations to which they must respond correctly. Training must reflect this complexity and prepare commanders appropriately. (Paragraph 34) n. All soldiers, and this is particularly pertinent to Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) troops, must be capable of basic infantry skills with which to defend themselves. Leaders at all levels are responsible for developing a soldier first mentality and ensuring that training adequately reflects the potential threats. (Paragraph 35) o. Military forces need to be aware of how their every activity would be perceived both locally and globally. Information operations to support military actions should be conducted to explain the necessity of such action and preempt those of the adversary. (Paragraph 40) p. The worldwide availability of satellite television and other media enables the rapid distribution of information from the point of action to a global population. Whilst adversaries may not support freedom of the press and other media, they may exploit them for their own purposes. British forces must be aware of this and ensure that their own actions can withstand intense and detailed scrutiny. (Paragraph 41) q. Information Operations must be targeted, resourced and coherent across all levels of operation. (Paragraph 42)

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BACKGROUND 7. The land environment in which the British Army is currently required to operate is arguably more complex than that for which it has traditionally trained. This is not to say that the adaptive foundation of training for high intensity conflict is no longer valid it is. The adaptive foundation could, however, be complemented by training to cope with simultaneous and changing tactical challenges within the same geographic area. Throughout history the British Army has faced numerous and varied threats, for example the conflicts or emergencies ranging from Korea, Suez and Malaya to Northern Ireland, Oman and the Falkland Islands. Yet throughout recent history the greatest perceived threat, and the threat against which training was focused, was posed by the Soviet Bloc. The risks of large scale armed conflict between nation states have reduced with the end of the Cold War, but they have not disappeared. We now face a spectrum of threats ranging from conventional forces to international terrorists and from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to computer viruses. These threats may manifest themselves wherever there are British interests and be initiated from any region on earth. In todays turbulent and uncertain world, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of future conflict. Therefore the Army must be prepared to meet the challenges of any type of operation, in a range of physical environments, and against all kinds of threats, simultaneously. This is the nature of the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE), which General Krulak USMC has described as being confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three adjacent city blocks - the Three Block War.4 The UK uses the term spectrum of conflict to describe the environment in which operations take place, and recognises that multiple types of operation may be conducted simultaneously.5 DEFINITIONS 8. The JWP 0-01.1 definition of an environment6 is inadequate to explain the COE. The US Department of Defence (DoD) defines an operational environment as a composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander.7 Fundamental to understanding the COE is recognition and acknowledgment of the number of variables affecting the environment and influencing the military activity that takes place within it. The COE has six critical environmental variables which reflect the complexity of current operations. Even after the briefest of studies it is easy to see how these factors interact, change and evolve. The COE is therefore dynamic. Accordingly no two situations are ever likely to be the same. The COE is the environment in which the military is operating today. In the days, weeks, months and years ahead it will be different. PHYSICAL 9. The broad range of geographic and climatic conditions that exist in potential operating environments are obvious and will not be described in detail. The challenges posed by operating in the Iraqi desert, the Sierra Leone jungle, the Bosnian mountains - or any other region - are different, with the geography and climate of each environment influencing the conduct and nature of military operations. Potential enemies understand that less complex and open, unpopulated terrain favours
4

The Three Block War was a concept devised by Gen Charles Krulak in the late 1990s to describe the complex spectrum of challenges likely to be faced by soldiers on the modern battlefield. In three contiguous city blocks soldiers may be required to conduct full scale military action, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief. The Three Block War concept is not restricted to an urban environment, but does articulate military operations of varying intensity taking place in close proximity to each other. 5 ADP Land Operations, page 11. 6 An environment is defined as the surroundings in which an organisation operates, including air, water, land, natural resources, flora, fauna, humans, and their interrelation. (AAP-6 and JWP 0-01). No definition of the operational environment is available in AAP-6 or JWP 0-01.1 7 US JP 1-02.

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a sophisticated military force equipped with long range, precision guided weapons, sophisticated reconnaissance capabilities and the ability to manoeuvre rapidly. They will attempt to reduce the advantages of our better find, fix, strike and exploit capabilities by adopting interior lines and are likely to take advantage of any limitation in our Rules of Engagement (ROE). This could be manifested, for example, by operating in complex terrain; amongst non combatants or in proximity to infrastructure that we wish to, or have to, preserve. Urban areas offer the most complex terrain, providing the adversary the capability to operate from above, below, and at ground level. Importantly, operating in urban areas usually places the adversary in close proximity with non combatants. Some of these are their support base (whether willingly or not), some provide camouflage and some are targets. However, all are non combatants. It should be noted that adversarial forces will not always be full time opposition and may spend periods of time engaged in perfectly legitimate activities. This emphasises the need for an agile and flexible force that can succeed when faced with situations across the spectrum of conflict. This agility and flexibility will, in part, be dependent on what the deployed force comprises; but it is critically dependent on the deployed force being well practised in TTPs that facilitate this agility and flexibility. Increases in tempo often come from being more agile and flexible (conceptually and physically) than an adversary, rather than repeating actions more quickly than an adversary. 10. Climatic conditions will influence the activities of all actors involved in conflict. Potential enemies understand the limitations of technical ISR equipment and will utilise poor climatic conditions to screen their activities from observation. Additionally, all actors involved in a conflict know that poor or extreme climatic conditions affect the ability to maintain and operate complex technical equipment and weapon systems and can have a detrimental affect on human endurance. The Army will need to operate in all weather conditions, by day and night, and in all seasons, especially as seasonal differences in countries like Afghanistan are significant. However, commanders must be aware of own and enemy capabilities and how they vary according to climatic variations. An adverse change in the weather adds difficulty to all aspects of observation and movement, thereby increasing risk and encouraging simplification of military activity. A sophisticated enemy will monitor how the Army responds to climatic variations and will seek to take advantage of any perceived weakness. Therefore, when planning and training for operations the Army must transition between these climatic variables seamlessly, so that the impact of adverse conditions is negated and provides opportunities that can be exploited. 11. Infrastructure and natural resources form part of the physical environment and will vary significantly by region and nation. Transport infrastructure will affect movement and provide a channelling effect which can be used by both sides in a conflict. Other national or regional infrastructure may be targeted to demonstrate offensive capability or to have a psychological effect. Natural resources may also be targeted for destruction, or used by the adversary for the creation of wealth to fund their activities. Collateral Damage (CD), and damage caused to dual use facilities8 can adversely affect nation building activity, consent for the military presence among the local population and media reporting, any of which can influence perceptions at home, regionally and globally. The Army needs to be trained to minimise CD and to become more aware of the wider impact of its actions. Equally, it must be appreciated that CD changes the physical environment, making it more or less complex. Additionally, the joint engagement and targeting processes should highlight those areas and objects that cannot be engaged for legal reasons as well as those objects that should not be engaged, unless absolutely necessary, due to their value either during subsequent military operations or for post conflict re-construction.

Dual use facilities are those that can be used for military or civilian purposes and may be legitimate military targets.

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POLITICAL 12. The end of the Cold War marked the end of superpower influence in specific regions and, resulted in power vacuums. After years of relative stability some regions have become characterised by a lack of governance, with several actors, including non state actors, competing for power. These fragile states cling to power as best they can but often the reach of the government is limited, leaving areas where government influence and control is missing. These potentially lawless areas can provide the bed of support that enables criminal and insurgent activity to grow and spread. The various actors are motivated by a number of factors, including personal gain, national advancement, social development, religious supremacy and ideology. Somalia is a good example where Government control has been lost in large areas of the country, which are ruled by Warlords. These areas may provide the conditions where global terrorists can train and prepare unnoticed and unchecked, and have local ruling factions who harbour or actively encourage them. 13. Friendly and adversary nation states and non state actors form alliances with common objectives which may be political, economic, military, cultural, strategic9 or tactical in nature. As the world moves away from the traditional long term, fixed alliances of the past, regional and global relationships will become more fluid and unpredictable. Alliances form or change rapidly, even during the course of an operation or campaign. Adversaries will vary from conventional military forces to armed criminal elements, from conventional forces operating in an unconventional way to insurgents, foreign fighters and terrorists. Alternatively, the adversary may be disparate groups with a shared ideology, but who have never met and communicate through global networks. Tactical commanders must understand and appreciate the variety and types of relationships existing inside and outside the theatre of operations. Only once all the actors have been identified can a commander properly identify the threat and then focus on countering and subsequently defeating it. 14. Political environments differ significantly from one region to another and the difficulties of conducting operations are likely to be unique to each situation. British forces need to be aware of the political environment; and the political perceptions of the populations living in those environments, in order to place their actions in context nationally, regionally and globally. An action taken against one state or region may generate reactions in other parts of the globe, depending upon political alliances and affiliations. Understanding these ethnic, linguistic and cultural links helps the commander and his staff to predict the reactions to events and activities.10 Predicting the behaviour of populations and groups can inform the effects based planning process and highlight secondary and/or unintended effects. 15. National Will reflects the extent to which a population supports its governments policy and its ability to employ military forces. Governments of many western countries may be seen as vulnerable by their adversaries due to the democratic way in which they are elected and their consequential reliance on the will of the people for their political survival. As a result, popular support can have a direct influence on government policy and influence the end states, effects and objectives a military force is required to achieve. An adversary will try to attack its opponents National Will whilst preserving its own. Casualty figures, legitimacy, monetary cost, legality, necessity and the length of any conflict or operation all influence public opinion and affect support for a government. But it must also be appreciated that some adversaries are not reliant on will as understood by western democracies. Some adversaries are driven purely by money and others by religion and ideology. Therefore, the fact that western democracies can have their will shaped by the media is a weakness that can be exploited. The Army is limited in its ability to exploit the media to the same degree as it must report the truth. However, there could be situations when a preemptive media plan could defuse a situation, prevent a hostile reaction or just explain the military view. All too often the military media plan is reactionary and simply used to explain events after
Eg: The destruction of Israel, the defeat of capitalism or the spread of the extreme parts of some religions. In preparation for the deployment to Afghanistan, COMARRC visited the UK to speak with UK based Afghans to understand better the people with whom ARRC force elements would be interacting.
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they happen. It is therefore vital that the Information Strategy is coherent across government so it can be vigorously prosecuted to protect the National Will and also undermine the adversarys position. 16. Tactical military actions can have strategic effect, and can be political in nature. Military forces must understand the political environment existing for each specific operation or scenario in order that positive effects can be optimised and negative effects, from inappropriate or insensitive activities, minimised. Military training must include exposure to the variables of the political environment in order that tactical forces become accustomed to considering the results of their actions in this context. Equally, the military must be trained to exploit the wide variety of media available to achieve desired effects through non kinetic activities. ECONOMIC 17. Threats from nation states are most likely to come from rogue11 or failing states, although they may be generated by states in transition.12 As states try to develop economically they may experience cycles of political stability and instability. States in transition can become direct competitors with each other, causing tension and the potential for conflict. Failed or failing states are fragmented in such a way that the rule of law is absent; their instability becomes a threat to their neighbours and to developed nation states. Countries can move from one category to another as conditions change. External influences can have a direct affect on a states ability to develop economically and, depending on the nature of the influence, can increase competition with other states in the region. Within the economic environment of a state or region there will be a divide between those that have and those that have-not, resulting in tensions that give rise to threats to stability and spill over into conflict. Global, regional or inter state competition for natural resources will increase friction; and interruptions to the flow of natural resources or commercial supplies by one state may ultimately result in conflict with another.13 There may also be other direct consequences of such actions, including the inability of a nation to farm effectively or for its industry to function competitively, resulting in the loss of trade and an increase in unemployment. States whose economies depend overly on one material or resource can be particularly sensitive to changes in supply, price or volatility in global markets. 18. Economic superiority, rather than military superiority, may be the key to regional dominance. A strong economic position allows a nation or non state actor to buy military technology or conduct prolonged operations. Economics influence the relationship between states, and between individual state (and non state) actors and other actors at the regional or global level. Such relationships can result in military or political assistance being offered, or lead to increases in tension potentially resulting in conflict. The ability of states to exploit their natural resources and create wealth varies and can create local and international tensions. Such tensions may undermine the security environment established by military forces. 19. Awareness of the economic environment may enable humanitarian actions to be taken by a military force to decrease tension and reduce the economic disparity between sections of a community. Security operations to promote stability will reduce looting and economic migration and provide reassurance. The effects of such actions should be maximised through the Information Strategy. External economic influences can have a destabilising influence just as external economic assistance can help develop and sustain a state. A failing state could be plunged into more rapid decline if economic support is withdrawn, but donor countries need to see that support is
11

Rogue states are those that are hostile to their neighbours or to the interests of stable and developed nation states. 12 States in transition are those states that are moving from an agricultural based society to an industrial based or information based society. 13 For example, the damming of a river interrupting the water flow downstream, the turning off of gas or oil supplies, or the refusal to ship grain.

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being invested appropriately and not being embezzled by corrupt officials and organisations. Since economic players may become adversaries and/or people with local influence who may assist, commanders must know who they are and how they are funded. 20. An economic imbalance can lead to unrest, disorder and conflict - internally and regionally, possibly leading to intervention by other states who feel their interests are threatened. Therefore it is just as important to understand the local economic situation as it is to appreciate the national and regional economic drivers as disparities in wealth (whatever wealth is measured in) are a constant source of tension. Impartiality in the delivery of aid is essential and must be maintained. This is not just a military function but needs coordinating across Other Government Departments (OGDs) and, if possible, across Non Governmental Organisations (NGO) activity as well. The CIMIC Staff is crucial in achieving this end and it must ensure that CIMIC activity is conducted to support the overall plan. HUMAN 21. The human environment consists of groupings based on national identity (family, clan and tribe), language, religion, culture, ethnicity, beliefs and values held in common. An action acceptable to one may be offensive to another. Different groupings will hold different views on such fundamentals as birth, life and death; honour and dishonour. Western society may interpret the behaviour of a group as barbaric or inhumane whilst such behaviour is considered traditional and valuable by the group itself. It is similar with law and punishment, for example practices condoned under Sharia Law. Extreme devotion to a particular religion or set of beliefs, or significant hatred of a particular group, may provide an adversary with an unshakable will and a willingness to die for the cause. Non combatants14 may be hostile, tolerant or friendly in nature and may change their attitude as a result of actions by any actor. Their consent may be given freely or may be conditional. 22. The figureheads within the human environment will differ, depending on the culture, education, religion and political belief resulting in a complex matrix by which authority and power is exercised. This is of relevance, as the allegiance of a group may not be to the Head of State but to someone outside the state borders. Respect for elders is traditionally maintained in many countries. These elders may have been influenced or marginalised by other actors such as insurgents, warlords or criminals. Nevertheless, commanders should endeavour to discover who the elders are as they could be the gate keepers and may prove a useful entry point into the community. The value placed upon health and education may differ according to cultural and religious beliefs or the general level of development of the society. It is necessary to respect cultural and religious differences and every effort should be made to avoid causing offence. Consequently, adequate time should be given to cultural awareness training when preparing to deploy on operations and continued once deployed. The beneficial effect of personnel able to communicate using local languages, at all levels of competence, should never be underestimated. Linguists with high levels of competence will normally be a scarce resource due to training time and cost but low levels of competence are not so demanding of time or resources. 23. The COE includes the presence of multiple third party actors, including OGDs, other agencies, NGOs, International Organisations (IO), religious and voluntary organisations, entrepreneurs, multinationals and private and state contractors. Such external organisations can have both stated and hidden interests and objectives which may either assist or hinder the accomplishment of British military and political objectives. Maintaining awareness of third party activity will be a challenge, as many will not want direct contact with military forces as it may compromise their neutral position. Nevertheless, attempts to contact these organisations should be made, even through third parties, as some will have humanitarian and other specialist capabilities beyond those available to military forces. Consideration should be given to forming Joint Inter14

Also known as uninvolved civilians in the US.

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agency Coordination Groups (JICG) and inviting the exchange of liaison teams with appropriate organisations. Information sharing should be encouraged and may need to be initiated by military forces. Military tasks may result from the presence of third party actors.15 Liaison with the other actors can lead to entry points for military activity; equally information sharing can improve situational awareness. 24. Army training and procedures must take account of the essential civil contribution to stability operations. The UKs Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan is a good example of cross government cooperation where the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the MOD are represented. Formation training (for both enduring and contingent operations) must, wherever possible and appropriate, incorporate representatives from OGDs, NGOs and other agencies, and opportunities to include Comd 52 Inf Bde, as the Army proponent for Security Sector Reform (SSR), should be created. MILITARY ENVIRONMENT 25. The military environment will differ for each region and each situation, with the adversary or adversaries possessing different structures, equipment and capabilities. The leadership will vary from the professional to the charismatic amateur or fanatical; and the state of training of the adversary will reflect this range. The Military Environment is not just confined to those theatres where troops are deployed. In the COE, threats are likely to be found wherever there are British interests, including mainland UK. Similarly, the military environment extends to wherever the threat initiates - hence it may be global in nature. The British Army must be prepared to deploy into any operational environment and perform its full range of tasks while dealing with a wide range of enemy threats, and training must reflect these challenges, whilst simultaneously supporting UK Operations to protect the home base. In particular, the challenges of sustaining a force deployed on expeditionary and enduring operations whilst under threat from a range of adversaries, in a nonlinear battle space, must be appropriately reflected in training. 26. The military environment is further complicated by the presence of private military contractors, state-sponsored military contractors and a large number of third party actors. Although third party actors may not be hostile, their presence, activities, and interests can affect the ability of military forces to accomplish their mission when operating in a foreign country. British forces may have to adapt their procedures to take account of the presence of third party actors especially when conducting stability or humanitarian operations. In some cases beneficial relationships can be established. 27. Access to technological advances available on the global market is reducing the technological advantage the Army and its allies have traditionally enjoyed. Easy access to new technology allows potential adversaries to achieve equality or even superiority over Army systems in selected niche areas. In urban areas or other complex terrain, less advanced weapon systems may still find effective uses, for example technicals and roadside bombs firing Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs). Technical information for the development of effective low cost weapon systems is widely available over the internet and enables the adversary to develop and adapt to the activities of British forces. 28. UK military operations are likely to become increasingly JIM.16 Operational deployments will rely on joint enablers and niche capabilities will be provided by organisations not organic to the deployed HQ, regardless of scale of effort. If these organisations are not incorporated early enough they could be under utilised, thus reducing the overall effect the force will have. The Army will become increasingly involved with other agencies and once major combat operations have concluded the Army will work in an increasingly supportive role, supporting OGDs. The adoption of
15 16

For example, security of infrastructure development projects, convoy protection and additional QRF tasks. Joint, Inter Agency and Multinational.

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the Comprehensive Approach17 and the EBA should result in unity of effort, but it is incumbent on the Army to understand the capabilities of these agencies, appreciate their areas of expertise and know their modus operandi. Such a level of understanding can only be achieved by training and operating together. The same can be said for multinational operations and every opportunity should be sought to train and share information with and understand the languages of our most likely coalition partners so that greater understanding and interoperability can be achieved, especially as multinational operations are increasingly more likely, as is involvement with indigenous armed forces. THE ADVERSARY 29. The adversary, though not listed as a characteristic of the Military Environment (as agreed by ABCA), will operate within it. It is appropriate therefore to consider the adversary that British forces may operate against, both now and in the near future. The adversary must not be underestimated or overstated as it potentially includes large, conventional, well equipped armed forces of nation states, armed criminal gangs and everything between those two extremes. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) may be in the arsenal of a conventional force or terrorist organisation and mass destruction may result from a terrorist or criminal act. 30. British forces can expect potential adversaries to adapt their methods of fighting, in particular the adversary will attempt to: a. Control access into the region.

b. Change the nature of the conflict through tactics and manipulation and exploitation of the information domain. c. d. e. Employ operational shielding. Control tempo. Neutralise technological overmatch.

f. Attempt to cause, not just in the theatre of operations, politically unacceptable casualties. g. Allow no safe sanctuary by attacking across the front and throughout the depth, wherever there is a perceived weakness. 31. During the initial phases of force entry, the adversary may employ a high operational tempo, taking advantage of the weaknesses inherent in power projection. As British forces gain a foothold in the region, the enemy may slow the tempo to prolong the conflict, taking advantage of any perceived lack of political commitment over time. The enemy will try to survive tactically and operationally long enough to win strategically. For the enemy, a stalemate or a state of prolonged mutual attrition may be good enough, as long as he maintains enough power and local support. 32. Knowledge of their locality will initially offer the adversary a significant advantage, which will decrease with time as British forces engage with the local inhabitants and their familiarity with the environment increases. The actions of the unconventional or unscrupulous adversary will not be constrained by international law or conventions, which will allow him to target objects and persons protected by such protocols. When opportunities arise, the adversary will attack high visibility targets and cause politically unacceptable casualties, thereby undermining British political will, adversely influencing public opinion and creating damaging psychological effects. He will seek to maximise
17

Joint Discussion Note 4/05, The Comprehensive Approach.

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the effects of his actions through the conduct of information operations using global media, including the Internet. The Internet and mobile phones already provide asymmetric opponents with unprecedented agility. This trend exists across the continuum of operations and the Army needs to understand how to defeat networked enemies. The adversary may choose to avoid conflict, choosing rather to disperse into the population to re-form when circumstances and the environment offer it an advantage. 33. As adversaries focus on preserving their own combat power, they will attempt to neutralise any technological advantage, particularly in long-range, standoff precision fires and ISTAR capabilities. They are unlikely to mass their forces in predictable templated echelons. Rather, they will disperse forces in areas of physical or moral sanctuary, often located in urban or other complex terrain and shielded by civilians and man made structures. Then they will use manoeuvre tied to opportunity, massing forces and fires from dispersed positions at a time and place of their own choosing. Conversely they may disperse to maximise the global impact of their actions. At the tactical level, there is a high likelihood of close combat in urban environments or other complex terrain.18 In specific tactical situations, the enemy might be able to employ a niche technology to create parity or overmatch British forces deployed in that particular area. 34. The unconventional or asymmetric approach enables actions to be focused on perceived weaknesses, thereby maximising the effectiveness of limited capabilities, whilst avoiding the Armys strengths. Adversaries may group together in pursuit of a common goal: to that end military forces of a nation state may coordinate their actions with any number of state or non state actors having unconventional military capabilities. British forces must therefore have the capability and flexibility to operate against such a range of opponents in the same operational theatre. As General Krulak suggests, the military may conduct three different types of task in three different city blocks. Equally, in the same blocks the military may face three different types of threat simultaneously. So the phrase Three Block War is hugely relevant not only to the different military activities, but also to the different enemies who could be faced. Commanders must be flexible and sufficiently well trained to be able to meet these complex challenges. Tactical commanders will, in an instant, be faced with any number of threats and situations and they must make the right decision. Training must reflect this complexity and prepare commanders appropriately. It must be demanding and tactical commanders must have the freedom to make decisions based on what they have practised in training. 35. The adversary will seek to deny British forces a safe haven during every phase of deployment and as long as they are in the region. He will be prepared to attack British military and civilian targets anywhere in the region, within the UK and overseas. Consequently all troops, regardless of role, must have basic combat skills. Everyone must understand that there are no safe routes or safe areas - to think otherwise plays into the adversarys hand. All soldiers, and particularly CS and CSS troops, must be capable of the basic infantry skills to defend themselves. Leaders at all levels are responsible for developing a soldier first mentality and ensuring that training adequately reflects the potential threats. The adversary will be aware of the increased opportunities and greater utility of prisoners for diverse exploitation. Therefore British military forces must be mentally and physically prepared to avoid capture. The impact of captured soldiers, NGOs, or civilians being displayed in the media or used for propaganda is significant since there is an implied obligation for the military to secure their release. 36. Conventional military forces can be researched in considerable detail and their doctrine and TTPs learnt, but they are not necessarily the greatest threat in the COE. The unconventional threats posed by the forces of rogue, failing or failed states and transnational and global groups willing to commit acts of violence are significant, as they are difficult to anticipate and interdict.

A recent Australian analysis of small wars showed the average close combat engagement range was 19 metres.

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These groups will vary significantly in size, intent, will and capability19 and therefore present a significant array of threats to British forces. Exposure to this array of threats in the training environment is essential. 37. Understanding how enemy military forces are perceived by their societies is an important factor. Are they associated with a brutal regime? Do they have a history of involvement in politics (e.g. staging a coup detat)? Do they, in fact, have a relatively good reputation compared with other public institutions? Do they recruit largely from one ethnic, cultural or linguistic group thus leading to distrust from another? Understanding this factor is important for two reasons. Firstly, it makes it easier to drive a wedge between the enemy and the civilian population and secondly, in COIN, we may need to operate with the local Armed Forces and we need to understand how they will be perceived by the wider population as it may effect that populations perception of us and our actions. 38. The adversary may also compete politically, offering an alternative to the existing government. He will be flexible in approach and will change strategy, objectives and actions to exploit perceived weaknesses. As the British Army adapts, so too will the adversary, to stay one step ahead, to maximise the advantages offered by the physical environment and to exploit the restrictions to actions of British forces imposed by international law. The adversary may be well educated and may have studied British operations and doctrine. He will use considerable initiative when applying doctrine, avoiding templating and seeking to remain unpredictable. The adversarys patterns of operation will change as he achieves success or experiences failure. He believes that, through adaptive use of all available forces and capabilities, he can create opportunities that, properly leveraged, can allow him to fight and win, even against a technologically superior opponent. 39. The G2 staff is the lead for gathering information about the adversary and environment and fusing it to produce intelligence. However, all members of the force must understand all aspects of the operational environment. Whilst HUMINT makes a significant contribution, the key is to fuse all intelligence sources and analysis (SIGINT, IMINT, TECHINT, ELINT, Human Factors analysis etc), and from all levels (strategic, operational and tactical). Operations must be led by intelligence and be seen to adhere to the standards of British society. Military forces must not become overly reliant on technically sophisticated information and intelligence gathering systems for their information needs. The COE is highly complex and, whilst technical systems can provide an advantage when conducting war fighting operations, they cannot replace an effective HUMINT capability, supported by adequate numbers of proficient linguists able to perform in specialist roles. Both human and technological networks need to be developed with equal priority. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 40. World media and the proliferation of other information collectors can make military operations and actions transparent to a global audience, visible to all who have access to printed media, television, radio or global networks such as the internet. For many, seeing is believing - and only the most basic level of literacy and analysis is required to form an opinion. The adversary understands this well, so British forces must seek to use perception management to manipulate how the public perceives specific events. The adversary will exploit military mistakes and failures and use propaganda and disinformation20 to persuade the local population to support their cause whilst undermining the military position. Similarly, at the strategic level, international media coverage can impact on British political decision making, global opinion, and the sensitivities of coalition members. The strategic impact of international media coverage of tactical military actions can directly result in restrictive measures or freedom to conduct further actions and may influence changes to the ROE. Military forces need to be aware of how every activity conducted would be perceived both locally

19 20

John MacKinlay, op cit, Page 98. Deliberately false information.

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and globally; information operations to support military actions should be conducted to explain the necessity of military action and pre-empt those of the adversary. 41. The revolution in communications enables the adversary to communicate globally and without significant infrastructure support. This provides significant freedom of movement and makes detection and location more difficult. The worldwide availability of satellite television and other media enables the rapid distribution of information from the point of action to a global population. Whilst adversaries may not support freedom of the press and other media, they may exploit them for their own purposes. Again, British forces must be aware of this and ensure that their actions can withstand intense and detailed scrutiny. The Internet also provides easy access to technical information on weapon design and employment, and military tactical publications. This information is of most use to adversaries inexperienced in military matters, as they are able to access information that enables them to construct capable weapons systems from readily available materials, often at low cost. The Internet also enables the widespread dissemination of religious, political and cultural doctrine and material, some of which may be extreme in nature and may result in the recruitment of fanatical and dedicated followers across the world. 42. The adversary may have better local knowledge than British forces, while the converse may be true in relation to the regional and global situation. It is critical for British forces to acquire good local knowledge to support tactical military operations and this is an inherently human activity. Equally, British Forces need to embrace cognitive effects and exploit the media to influence activity with at least as much vigour as the adversary. The Information Operation must be targeted, resourced and be coherent across all levels of operation. Knowledge of local languages will contribute greatly to Info Ops. Info Ops are not new; OPSEC, deception and field security have all long been facets of military operations. Arguably, a successful Info Ops campaign contributed to the success of the Allied landings in Normandy during WW2. Since WW2 the relative importance of Info Ops has declined, but in the 21st century they are recognised as increasingly important. Despite this recognition the Army still does not currently fully resource this important line of operation. Tactical military Info Ops must support operational and strategic themes, which are not well articulated at present. Despite this, tactical Info Ops are an essential Line of Operation in every campaign and may have primacy in some areas. Whilst this is recognised on operations it is not adequately reflected during training and planning. 43. The complexities of operating in an increasingly JIM environment and the reliance on reach back means that NEC is a pre-requisite to achieving the degree of connectivity required. Increased connectivity will allow increased situational awareness, collaborative planning (e.g. the US Armys Command Post of the Future system) and agility. The costs associated with NEC mean it will be achieved incrementally, but as it develops and enhances capability it will become vulnerable. The Army must retain fall back procedures as computer network attack provides new opportunities for adversaries.

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ANNEX A TO DOCTRINAL NOTE 07/01 COE CRITICAL VARIABLES 1. The UK has endorsed six discrete environments or variables that ABCA agree should be reflected in training scenarios representing the COE. These variables have important characteristics that help describe the environment. This Annex lists the variables and their main characteristics to assist the chain of command when generating scenarios for training. 2. Physical Environment. Characteristics: a. b. c. d. 3. Geography. Climate. Infrastructure. Natural Resources.

Political Environment. Characteristics: a. b. c. d. Historical Context. Global Context (international standing and external relations). Regional Situation. Nature of State (type of governance, political maturity, structures, power base and non state actors). Stability. Alliances. National Interest. National/regional Consensus.

e. f. g. h. 4.

Economic Environment. Characteristics: a. b. c. d. Stage in Economic Development. Exploitation of Natural Resources. External Influences. Equality of Opportunity.

5.

Human Environment. Characteristics: a. b. Demographics. Ethnicity.

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c.

International Community. (1) (2) (3) (4) Multinationals. Contractors. NGOs. UN Agencies.

d. e. f. g. h. 6.

Religion. Culture and Attitudes. Health (state of population and access to healthcare). Education (availability and access). Language

Military Environment. Characteristics: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. Structures. Effectiveness. Equipment. Leadership. Training. Doctrine. Intent.

7.

Information Environment. Characteristics: a. b. c. d. e. f. Media. Infrastructure. Access to Information. Literacy. Disinformation. Attitude of Population.

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