Bombed by Blinders In the 1950s the Soviet Union was struggling to build a strategic air arm comparable with

the immense and powerful US Strategic Air Command. The high pace of technological and an intelligence development was such that it often caused work on replacements to begin even before the original aircraft had been accepted into service. Such was also the case with the type that later became known as the Tupolev Tu-22. Intended as a supersonic bomber for use against targets too well-defended for the Tu-16 Badger, this sleek and handsomelooking aircraft, capable of dashes at speeds over Mach 1, eventually saw its share of combat. Instead of being used against high-value NATO targets in the central Europe, carrying nuclear weapons, the Blinder was used extensively during a number of local wars in Africa and the Middle East, and most of the details about its combat service remain completely unknown if not ignored. Development In the early years of the Cold War, the USSR anxiously tried to close the bomber gap with SAC. Although Western observers tended to believe that the USSR had numerical superiority in the field of nuclear bombers, the reality was completely different. While the SAC was capable of launching a massive attack, sending thousands of bombers to hit Soviet cities and military bases with nuclear bombs from many places around the globe, the Soviets lacked even a single bomber that could attack any targets in the continental US (CONUS) and return to the USSR. Consequently, there was a lot of pressure on the design bureaus to come up with corresponding aircraft, capable of carrying nuclear weapons and striking targets thousands of kilometers away from Soviet soil, as the only long-range bomber the Soviets had in service in the early 1950s was Tu-4 Bull, a reverse-engineered version of the Boeing B-29 Superfortress. Pushing this design to its limits, and equipping it with different types of engines, the Tupolev OKB eventually fielded the Tu-16 intermediate-range jet bomber (designated Badger by the Air Standards Coordinating Committee ASCC), and then the turboprop Tu-95 Bear. Even before these two types entered service, it became clear that they would be very vulnerable against modern supersonic interceptors. Thus, in 1955 the Tupolev staff started working on Project 105 with the code-letter Yu, the 32nd letter of the Cyrillic alphabet. To keep the design of the airframe and the wings as clean as possible so that the aircraft could cruise at high speeds, it was decided to mount the two Dobryinin VD-7M turbojets at the base of the vertical tail, in separate nacelles, over the fuselage. Such an unorthodox arrangement would also reduce the effects of asymmetric thrust if one of the engines should fail. Influenced by the Project 103, the fuselage was based on the Tu-16 while a new wing with 52 degrees sweep was planned. A prototype, as such, flew on June 21, 1958, but it was not capable of supersonic flight. To solve this problem, the aircraft was completely redesigned, and a new Project 105A came into being, with the main difference being an area-ruled fuselage - that suffered less from transonic drag - and a new wing swept at 55 degrees. Since there was now insufficient room in the fuselage, the main undercarriage was moved into large fairings mounted on the wings. The 105A complied with specifications outlined by the military, having a maximum weapons load of 12,000kg on short range missions or 3,000kg with maximum internal fuel. Its major improvement over the Tu-16 however, was the capability of supersonic speeds over shorter

distances, which made it less vulnerable to defenses in the target area. Although the loss of the second prototype caused another re-design this time the tail plane ten pre-series aircraft were built to 105A standard at State Aircraft Factory 22 in Kazan. Intended solely for evaluation, these Tu-22Bs (Blinder-As) did not yet carry any of the specific missionequipment of the later full-production versions, but all ten made the types public debut at the Tushino Airshow in July 1961. This caused considerable confusion in the West, where observers immediately concluded that the type must already be in large-scale service. During the early phases of the Tu-22s development it was decided to build four specific versions. First to enter service was the Tu-22R (R for Razviedchik or reconnaissance). The Tu-22R was basically similar to the Project-105 and although mainly tasked with reconnaissance, it was also equipped with Rubin-1 bombing radar and was capable of conventional bombing. During production, more powerful RD-7M2 engines with 500kg of extra thrust were installed, which were subsequently retrofitted to older Tu-22Rs. Beginning in 1962, most newly-built examples received refueling probes, mounted on the nose, and their designation was changed from Tu-22R to Tu-22RD (D for Dalnevo dieistviya or long-range). Older examples got similar probes from 1965, and during the 1980s, some were upgraded with either the Koob sideways-looking radar becoming Tu-22RDKs or with a more advanced recon suite, becoming Tu-22RDMs. No less than 150 Tu-22R and RDs were built, making this version the most numerous produced at Kazan. In order to provide a suitable training aircraft, the TU-22U (U for Uchiebny or training) was developed, on which the navigators seat was replaced by a raised second cockpit to provide room for an instructor. Subsequently, all Tu-22Ds were fitted with refueling probes and became Tu-22UDs. Both versions received Western designation Blinder-D. The next version the Tu-22K, later Tu-22KD (Blinder-B) was developed as a missilecarrier armed with the powerful Raduga Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen) air-to-surface missile and easily recognizable by the enlarged radome for the Rubin-PN radar. Each of 70 Tu-22K and KDs produced could carry either one Kh-22 semi-recessed under the fuselage, or two on wing-hardpoints. In total some 700 Kh-22 missiles were manufactured during the 1960s, and additional - considerably upgraded - versions were built in the 1970s and 1980s. The final production version of the Blinder was equipped for electronic warfare, and designated Tu-22P (P for Pomekh or jammer) Blinder-E.

How it all began - two Tu-16PPs belonging to Soviet Naval Aviation, but in full Libyan markings and officially assigned to the 1110th Sqn - at the time manned by Soviet personnel - which had six Badgers on strength until these were replaced by Tu-22Bs. This unit stationed in Libya replaced the aircraft and personnel of the 90 ODRAE, equipped with six Tu-16Rs and stationed in Egypt in the late 1960s and early 1970s. (US DOD, via authors) Export Versions Initially, it seemed as if the Tu-22 was likely to serve a rather unglamorous career with Soviet Long-Range and Naval Aviation, seeing no action except for exercises and overflights

of NATO shipping. The prospects changed in 1973, however, when both Libya and Iraq were each allowed to purchase a few Blinders. The Soviets were reluctant to deliver any capable offensive weapon system to the Arab nations: they were monitoring the Arab-Israeli conflict purely from the standpoint of the Cold War against the US, and were not interested in empowering the Arabs to fight conflicts that could end in direct confrontation with the US. Therefore, they repeatedly failed to meet the Arabs demands for complex weapons systems. The Arabs, however had no interest in the Cold War, but wanted to be able to confront Israel, and were purchasing arms wherever they could. Had any Western power looked likely to supply the required weapons instead of the USSR, the Arabs would have been only too pleased, but, during the 1960s, there was no such country. In the early 1970s, France started delivering modern arms to different Arab nations, and especially after the ArabIsraeli War in 1973, the Libyans developed a two-fold strategy of a simultaneous cooperation with France and the USSR, which enabled them to acquire large quantities of arms within a relatively short period. The Libyan strategy was relatively simple: if the French would not deliver the requested weapons, Tripoli would turn to the Soviets, and viceversa. Iraq was soon to develop a similar strategy, except that it took several years longer for the French to start supplying it with aircraft.

A beautiful study of a Libyan Tu-22B intercepted by F-4N Phantoms from VF-51 and VF-111 (at the time with CVW-19 aboard USS F.D. Roosevelt, CV-42), underway in the Mediterranean on 24 November 1976. (USN photo, via authors) Libya and Iraq were preparing to play a much bigger role in the next war against Israel. Both countries, however, are relatively distant from Israel, and as there was no chance of getting more powerful Mirage IV medium range bombers, they turned to the Soviets for an equivalent. Given that Libya and Iraq were rich enough to afford the acquisition and operation of larger and more complex aircraft and the Iraqis were already operating a squadron each of Tu-16 and Ilyushin Il-28 Beagle bombers since 1960, the Soviets were tempted to deliver. The USSRs decision was reinforced by the cooling of relations with Egypt as well as the experiences of the October War, in 1973. The Iraqis and Libyans felt they needed an aircraft with the capabilities of the Tu-22, as during the October War it became apparent that only by uniting the armies of several Arab

countries would they be capable of fully matching Israels military power. No significant degradation of Israeli military capabilities was possible without striking targets inside Israel. Besides, the Iraqi regime had started developing nuclear weapons, and consequently a carrier platform as well as experienced crews was needed. The Tu-22 would make the Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) and the Libyan Arab Republic Air Force (LARAF) capable of attacking Israel at high speeds and levels, after flying directly from their respective bases. The aircraft would for example start from Iraq, thunder at high speed and altitude over Israel to deliver their bomb loads, and then continue for a landing in Libya: once there, they would refuel and re-arm, and attack Israel again on the return flight. This way there was no need to make relatively slow deployments of tactical aircraft to bases closer to the front, in Egypt or Syria, as had been necessary in 1973, which then positioned valuable assets within the striking range of the Israeli Air Force. Also, such operations would leave the Israelis with only a minimal chance of a successful interception, whether that was by manned interceptors or MIM-23 HAWK SAMs. The Blinders destined for delivery to Iraq and Libya were designated Tu-22Bs. This version was in reality a RD7-M2-powered Tu-22RD, with reconnaissance equipment removed. Iraq and Libya each ordered 14 Tu-22Bs and two Tu-22Us, to be supplied in two batches. This decision was to considerably influence the operational use of the type by both air forces.

Shot from a series of photographs showing a pair of Libyan "Blinders", taken by US Navy pilots shadowing the bombers on their delivery flight. Notice the absence of serials. (USN photo, via authors) Iraqi and Libyan pilots were trained in several phases and places at Zyabrovka Air Base (AB), as well as with the 147th TsBPiPLS School, at Savostleyka AB, starting in late 1973.

The first Iraqi pilots trained on Tu-22s were Major Amir Hamawi (who was later to become the commander of the first Iraqi Tu-22 squadron and director of Iraqi Tu-22 operations), Captains Sad Mekkawi, and Jihad Hammoud. All had previous experience with Tu-16s and Il-28s, and were the first to get intensive training before helping to instruct additional personnel. The first three Libyan pilots were led by Colonel Masun Mathelon, who became the commander of Libyan Tu-22 operations, Captain Akil Zatari, and Lt. Mohammad Kabalan. The Libyan pilots were also the most experienced available, and just like their Iraqi counterparts they were later to become top squadron and wing commanders, leading most of the combat sorties flown by their units. Their training was supervised by Gen. V. S. Shukshin, a veteran of the Soviets Tu-22 operational evaluation, and Lt. Gen. V. Proskurin, who became commander in charge of the Iraqi and Libyan Tu-22 flight and combat training programs, and director of both the Iraqi and Libyan ground-crew technical and maintenance training, undertaken at Ryazan. Right from the start Soviet instructors were less than impressed with the performance of Iraqi and Libyan Tu-22 pilots: they rated most of them only as fair, complained about the lack of aggressiveness displayed during training, and also complained that their students did not master tactical weapons delivery methods, but were passed for political reasons. Their conclusion was that Iraqi and Libyan Tu-22 crews would be barely capable of executing even short duration missions, and that their execution of combat operations would always be driven more by self-preservation than the task at hand. Such conclusions, however, were only partially correct: as time was about to show, namely, that Arab Tu-22 operations were about to suffer foremost from exactly the same problems that dogged Soviet units equipped with the type - serviceability.

A pair of early Libyan Tu-22Bs, as seen from USN Phantoms in November 1976. (USN photo, via authors) First Combat Missions It could be said that the Iraqi Tu-22Bs got the doubtful honor of flying the first combat operations for this type. In 1974 the Iraqi regime was in the middle of an intensive campaign against the Kurdish guerrillas in north of the country; an enterprise that eventually led to a direct confrontation with Imperial Iran. Through early 1974, the IrAF

frequently bombed Kurdish villages and communications, and so it did not take long until the brand-new bombers were put to use. The first combat sorties flown by Iraqi Blinders appear to have occurred already in January 1974; against a Kurdish insurgent camp near Qalat Dizah. This mission also saw the first combat usage of the huge FAB-9000, a nine ton bomb which had significant effects on material and men on the latter both physically and psychologically. The IrAF continued using intensively these bombs so that only three out of the first batch delivered remained in stock by April 1975 and the Soviets refused to supply more. This caused one of major controversies between Iraq and the Soviet Union at the time. As no Iraqi crews were fully qualified on the type, the Soviets had to fly the new bombers themselves. At the time, the USSR already had liaison officers attached to the Tu-22 program in Baghdad and Tripoli; namely Major Y. G. Ustimenko, and Col. Vladimir Bumagin, respectively. Both are known to have flown combat missions with Blinders with or for the respective air forces. Two Soviet-flown Iraqi Tu-22Bs were especially active on the nights of September 27 and 28, when they bombed the Kurdish positions at the Amrara Pass, and HQs at the foot of Haaj-Omran Mountains. Several missions were also flown on subsequent nights, all at altitudes over 40,000ft (12.000m). These first strikes were not especially precise: most of the bombs fell kilometers away from aim-points, and the only target hit was the so-called Hamilton Road bridge. Additionally, from the start of their service in Iraq, Tu-22s proved dangerous to fly, prone to malfunctions, exceptionally problematic to maintain, and the weapons-systems operators needed great skill and a considerable amount of luck to place their bombs precisely on target. The sortie rates suffered accordingly. The Kurds had no defence against Tu-22Bs, as they only possessed rusty WWII vintage anti-aircraft guns, barely effective against low-flying aircraft. But the situation was soon to change, and the Iraqis felt vindicated in their decision to purchase the Blinder once the Iranians got involved. Initially, the Iranians limited their activities to intercepting Iraqi communications: which is how they identified the presence of Tu-22s in Iraq, and learned that they were flown by Soviets. Iranian military intelligence recorded several communications in Russian, and later disclosed through Iraqi Kurds the names of some of the Soviet officers that had flown IrAF Blinders. The Iranians also supplied the insurgents with Soviet-made SA-7s (from Israel, via Iran; this was confirmed when Iraqi intelligence captured several dozens of these missiles later in 1975, and found out that these came from stocks captured by Israeli forces during the 1973 War). Consequently Iraqi planes had to operate at higher levels, in turn decreasing accuracy and effectiveness. A few weeks later, however, the Imperial Iranian Armed Services (IIAS) moved a contingent of troops supported by two MIM-23 HAWK and several Rapier SAM batteries into Iraq. Disguised in Kurdish civilian clothes, Iranian military personnel started firing at IrAF fighters and bombers - within a matter of days, 14 Iraqi aircraft had been shot down by HAWKs, including at least one Tu-16 and several Su-7s. This time the Tu-22s were held back or were in need of maintenance and subsequently the regime in Baghdad was swift to accept negotiations with Tehran, mediated through Algeria that resulted in the so-called Algiers Treaty. The first combat use of the Tu-22Bs came to an end before it had properly started: it is still not known if the Soviets and the Iraqis gleaned any important lessons from this episode.

Iraqi Air Force Tu-22B serial 1111, showing the typical camouflage of the Iraqi Blinders. (artwork by Tom Cooper) Supersonic Twin In late 1974 and early 1975, as the Soviet crews were getting their first taste of combat flying Iraqi Tu-22Bs into missions against Kurds, the first fully-qualified Iraqi crews started to return from their training in the USSR. Within the IrAF, the Tu-22Bs and Us were operated by the 7th Squadron of the 4th Composite Bomber Wing, the so-called Strategic Brigade, based at the al-Walid Air Base, in western Iraq (better known in the West as H-3 after a nearby pumping station supporting the oil-pipeline from northern Iraq into Jordan), where huge underground bunkers were built for their protection. Initially, the deliveries were relatively slow, and it was only in 1978 that the last of the first ten Tu-22Bs and two Us arrived in Iraq. Although two more were delivered in the following year, persistent problems with handling, malfunction-prone avionics and engines, and complex maintenance seldom resulted in any more than seven or eight Blinders being operational in Iraq at any given time (which in turn was the main reason for confused reporting about the exact number of delivered examples). To begin with, Iraqi crews were pretty negative in their views of the type: the Supersonic Twin as the Blinder was nicknamed by Iraqi pilots was a handful to fly and maintain. The pilots were impressed by the speed and power of the aircraft, they appreciated the huge wing-fences that helped reduce induced drag, and the highly swept wings enabled very smooth handling at high speeds. But, it was difficult for a single pilot to fly it at high speeds, and it soon became notorious because of its very high landing speeds. The recommended landing speed was 310km/h (192mph), resulting in pilots learning fast that the breaking chute was vital to a safe landing. The loss or malfunction of the chute would mean the loss of aircraft and the crew as there was no way of stopping the aircraft in time using just the brakes, and the ejection seats of the co-pilot and navigator fired downwards (only the pilots ejection seat fired upwards on the Tu-22B). The RD7-M2s were also causing continual problems and pilots had to learn to pay careful attention to throttle settings. Before selecting afterburner, for example, throttles had to be set manually to the neutral position. In most other regimes, throttle handling had to be very precise and any distraction or failure to pay attention to the settings during flight would lead to an emergency situation due to engine mishap. An engine malfunction at supersonic speed could result in a total failure of the airframe. Due to the length of the Blinders fuselage and its relatively high angle-of-attack during landing, a tail-skid was installed under the rear fuselage. Former Iraqi Blinder pilots reported that this skid saved a considerable number of bombers and crews, which would otherwise have been lost in bad landings. Nevertheless, two Iraqi

Tu-22Bs were lost in crashes, both for reasons similar to those that had also caused the loss of no less than 70 Soviet Blinders by 1975. In 1976, one crashed during landing after the forward strut of the landing gear collapsed at high speed; another example was lost in 1978 due to pilot-error during take-off; and a third example was damaged beyond repair by fire during engine run-up before the take off. Aside from such problems, IrAF Blinder crews and their High Command were also very disappointed by the lack of range (even if Tu-22 had the best range of all the combat aircraft in the whole Iraqi Air Force) especially at lower altitudes (as well as the very hard ride at low levels). The reason: the Soviets had deleted in-flight refueling probes (IFRs) from the aircraft before delivery, and refused to supply any tankers to Iraq. Consequently, the Tu-22Bs in Iraqi service were very limited in range and payload, and there was no remedy for this problem. In combat, they were never able to carry the maximum designed weapons load, but were instead usually armed with between four and 12 FAB-500 bombs. Nevertheless, the Tu-22 was to prove a versatile design, which for the first time enabled the IrAF to fly useful reconnaissance and maritime-strike sorties over the Persian Gulf. Also, the Soviets had taught the Iraqi pilots the supersonic toss-bombing technique, which was to prove invaluable when they wanted to avoid entering the enemy defensive envelopes surrounding their future targets. Under the African Sun Meanwhile, the situation with Libyan Tu-22Bs had worsened: the LARAF, which experienced a period of massive growth in the early 1970s, and was still in the middle of the process of acquiring huge numbers of MiG-23s, MiG-25s, and Su-20/22s, simply lacked enough experienced crews, and the capability to maintain and fly complex Blinders. Two years after the first Tu-22s arrived in Libya, in 1977, on average only one or two examples were ever operational, the rest were kept in open storage or were unserviceable most of the time. The maintenance proficiency and tactical organization were poor or, some would say, almost chaotic, and if anybody was working on Libyan Blinders, then it was the Soviets who also piloted the aircraft during the very small number of sorties undertaken in the late 1970s. Nevertheless, LARAF created two units with the type, the 1110th Expeditionary Bomber Squadron the unit that had been operating six Libyan (actually Soviet Naval Air Arm) bomber-reconnaissance aircraft Tu-16PP since the early 1970s and the 1120th Expeditionary Bomber Squadron. These were more commonly known as the First Bomber Squadron and the Second Bomber Squadron, respectively. The 1110th was based at alJufra/Hun AB, and the 1120th at Okba Ibn-Nafi AB. However, the main maintenance center and the stocks of spares were positioned at Ghadames AB, which did not help to ease operations. By 1979, when all 14 Tu-22Bs and two Tu-22Us ordered by Tripoli had been delivered, serviceability slowly improved. The First Bomber Squadron was largely maintained and flown by non-Libyan crews, i.e. Soviets, East Germans, Syrians, and even some Pakistanis, who undertook missions by day or night on a fairly regular basis. The 1110th became the main operational Tu-22 unit within the LARAF, and maintained two Blinders on permanent alert status at al-Jufra/Hun AB. The 1120th which operated both Tu-22Us was mainly Libyan-manned, but was only a training unit, and its aircraft mainly provided a source of spares for the First Bomber Squadron. When the Libyan Tu-22 pilots of the Second Bomber Squadron were flying, they usually stayed fairly close to their bases; their operational tempo was very low, and no night-time missions were flown. Despite the situation, it was not long before the Blinders of the 1110th Squadron were

involved in their first combat missions, when Libya offered its support to the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin Dada.

Although not in color, this photograph reveal additional details of the camouflage pattern worn by early Libyan Tu-22Bs, as seen from USN Phantoms in November 1976. After the short war with Egypt, in July 1977, original Libyan markings were changed to simple green "fields" - applied to the same position as seen here - which remain in use today. (USN photos, via authors)

Poor Show for Idi Amin The infamous Ugandan tyrant came to power during a British-supported coup in 1971. His brutal and bloody rule caused many of his opponents to flee to Tanzania, where they were organized, armed and prepared for an invasion of Uganda, with the main aim being to topple Idi Amin. Their first such operation, undertaken on September 17, 1972, however, was doomed to failure, as the dictator had asked Libya for help, and Colonel Ghaddafi swiftly dispatched up to 3,000 troops, five Lockheed C-130H Hercules transports and apparently several Mirage 5Ds to Entebbe, in southern Uganda. The presence of Libyan troops and aircraft was felt immediately. On 20 September 1972, the Ugandan Army launched a counteroffensive, with the MiG-17s and MiG-21s of the Ugandan Army Air Force as well as Libyan Mirages flying a series of strikes against different objectives in Tanzanian cities of Bukoba and Mwanza. Subsequently, Ugandan and Libyan troops managed to drive the rebels back into Tanzania. This improved relations between Uganda and Libya and secured Amins rule to such an extent that he declared Uganda an Islamic Republic, and immediately began a campaign of terror against Ugandans of Asiatic origin. Again, most of Amins enemies concentrated in Tanzania, where the National Liberation Front (NLF) was organized and armed, with a new offensive against Uganda taking shape.

However, Amin learned about these plans and in October 1978 ordered a pre-emptive attack against Tanzania. The onslaught was spearheaded by a series of strikes against Bukoba from 10 October onward, flown by Ugandan MiG-17s and MiG-21s, most of which were ineffective. However, Ugandan troops managed to cross the border and occupy the town of Kyaka, where up to 8,000 civilians were massacred, and thousands of others forced to flee. Within a week, however, the small but well trained Tanzanian Defence Forces were mobilized, and the resistance started to intensify. On 28 October 1978, the first Ugandan MiG-17 was shot down by an SA-7 near Bukoba, and subsequently, another Ugandan fighter was lost while attacking a bridge near Kyaka. By November, the Tanzanians had stopped the Ugandan advance, and by late December 1978, all Ugandan troops were expelled from Tanzania. That still did not end the fighting, because in early January 1979 Tanzanians launched a single offensive into Uganda, as a sort of peace-enforcing operation, with the main task of putting an end to Idi Amins rule. On 20 January 1979, up to 10,000 Tanzanian troops - supported by Chinese-supplied T-59A tanks and MiG-21MF fighters - crossed the border and started an advance deep into Uganda. By late March, the Libyan garrison at Entebbe was effectively under siege, and the Ugandan Army was on the verge of total collapse. In a vain attempt to save the situation, Ghaddafi swiftly dispatched two Tu-22Bs of the 1110th Squadron LARAF under command of Col. Mathelon, to Nakasangola airfield, north of Kampala. On the early morning of 1 April 1979, one of these two aircraft flew the first and only combat sortie undertaken by the type during that conflict. In a shabby bullying attempt at power projection aimed at Tanzanians, the bomber dropped 20 FAB-250 bombs, aiming for Mwanza, but missed completely. In retaliation, the Tanzanian AF reacted with a series of strikes flown by MiG-21MFs against Kampala, Jinja and Tororo which damaged the morale of Ugandan troops more than anything else (contrary to other reporting, Tanzania had not received any J-6s or J-7s at that time). The presence of the Libyan forces and aircraft could not prevent the Tanzanian troops from overrunning Uganda, and so Libya started to evacuate its troops. Idi Amin immediately resigned, and fled aboard an LARAF C-130H to Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, however, the Tanzanians tightened their grip on Entebbe, and on 7 April 1979, a C-130H (s/n 116) was shot down by an RPG-7 round as it took off from that airfield, which was later captured by Tanzanian troops. By late May 1979, airfields at Gulu and Nakasangola had been captured as well, and all Ugandan MiG-17s and MiG-21s found there were by the time either destroyed or captured by the Tanzanians: two MiG-17s and a single MiG-21MF were already shot down; two or three MiG-17s and several MiG-21s were captured intact and taken to Tanzania as war booty, while four irreparable MiG-21s were dumped at a local scrap yard. On 3 June 1979, Tanzanian troops reached the Sudanese border, and the remnants of Amins army were forced to capitulate. During the conflict around Lake Victoria, Libyan Blinder fleet only flew one combat operation, intended as a show of strength - the bombs missed their target and the whole show failed to impress the Tanzanians at all. Nevertheless, the situation was soon to change, as during the 1980s both Libyan and Iraqi Tu-22s saw much more action and far more serious combat. Start of the Long War On 22 September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, starting a bloody war with a powerful but largely ineffective counter-air offensive against IRIAF airfields. By this time, the Iraqi Air Force had the largest bomber fleet in the entire Middle East, and this saw extensive service

from the first day of the war, even though its military impact remained small. All the Iraqi bombers were concentrated within the 4th Composite Bomber Wing. Tu-22s were still operated by the 7th Bomber Squadron, while the 8th Bomber Squadron had eight Tupolev Tu-16 and 11 or 12 Ilyushin Il-28 bombers (Iraqis later received several additional Tu-16s and Il-28s from Egypt, as attrition replacements). In general, half of the available aircraft were operational at any given time even if there were periods when not a single bomber could take off. Both units were still heavily dependent on Soviet personnel for support and maintenance, and due to their strategic reach they were carefully monitored by Iran, the US and Israel, which tracked any deployment of these bombers from their main bases at H-3 Northwest and H-3 al-Wallid, where they would usually be parked deep in their underground reinforced bunkers. One of the small numbers of effective strikes during the initial Iraqi onslaught against Iran, on 22 September 1980, was not meant to be a copy of the Israeli strikes from the Six Day War, instead it was intended to deliver the message of what the Iraqis could do to Iran. A solitary Tu-22B of the 7th Sqn attacked the above-ground fuel storage depot on the military side of Mehrabad airport the IRIAFs Tactical Fighter Base 1 (TFB.1). All six bombs found their mark, largely destroying the depot, and leaving only the emergency underground fuel tanks intact, which amounted for just a six or seven days fuel supply for Iranian fighters, tanker and transport aircraft based there. This dealt a severe blow to the IRIAF, as the Iraqis had also embarked on an intensive campaign against Iranian oil refineries in Khuzestan, and had hit several other important fuel depots, thus causing a shortage of kerosene and aviation fuel in the country. This went so far that the Iranians were finally forced to import kerosene from the USSR, amazingly, this was flown in to Mehrabad aboard the same Soviet transport aircraft that only a few days earlier had delivered shipments of spare parts for MiGs and Sukhois to Iraq! Another Tu-22 strike on the first day of the war was also flown by a single Blinder, piloted by Capt. Mokfi, against the Iranian Kerendi early warning radar station. All of the bombs missed the target, but they did kill several Pasdarans (IRGC members) stationed nearby. Nevertheless, for his achievement in this operation, Mokfi was decorated with the Saddam Star medal for heroism: most likely, it was the connections the good captain had straight into the top of the Iraqi regime that won him this high decoration, but more about this later. After the partial success of these first Blinder strikes deep into Iran, and considerable problems and losses experienced by the MiG-23BN fleet, CO of the 4th Composite Bomber Wing, Col. Hamawi, in agreement with the High Command of the IrAF, decided to use only Tu-22Bs for similar missions for example against the automotive industrial targets in the Tehran area. It seems that the US interested in the demise of the Iranian clerical regime supplied the blue-prints of the Iranian early warning radar net to Baghdad. This helped the Iraqis to use the gaps in Iranian radar coverage to penetrate deep into the Iranian airspace without being disturbed before dropping their bomb loads except by point defenses. Compared with smaller MiG-23BNs, Blinders could attack while flying at higher speeds, which made them less vulnerable to Iranian SAMs. Of course, they also carried heavier payloads, and due to their longer endurance they were able to dash away at higher speeds if there was a threat from IRIAF interceptors.

Scene from H-3 SW AB, late afternoon of 22 September 1980. The Tu-22B that had just landed after bombing the fuel depot at Mehrabad AB, near Tehran in Iran, is surrounded by ecstatic Iraqi airmen greeting the crew. Note the heavy wear and tear of the camouflage colors caused by sun, sand and spilled fuel and lubricants. (authors' collection) The 7th Squadron IrAF flew the next strike against the Iran National and former American Motors of Iran car factories on 25 September, but their bombs missed the targets by about two kilometers. The problem was that of the weapons aiming system. Based on what had been recovered from one of the USAF B-47 Stratojets the Soviets have shot down somewhere along or over their borders in the 1950s and 1960s, the PSB-11 optical sighting system of the Tu-22B was never satisfactory, and was prone to malfunction and very complicated to use, even if the aircraft had been crewed by Soviets. The final result and the precision of such attacks depended largely on luck: time and again, the Iranian interceptors would either manage to approach Iraqi bombers, or pass near them while en route to another task, but they lacked the fuel and weapons to engage. For example, on 26 September, two F-4Es returning from a strike against an airfield in Iraq had a close encounter with two IrAF Il-28s that were bombing Pasdaran positions near Panjwin. With barely enough fuel in their tanks to get home, the two Iranian crews looked on frustratingly at the Iraqi bombers and continued on their way. The battlefield over which this war was fought was simply too large for both air forces to be everywhere at every given moment. This fact helped many Iraqi bombers and their crews to survive the first days of

the war and fight another day, or even re-strike targets they had missed on previous missions. On 28 September, the Blinders of the 7th BS returned to hit automotive factories near Tehran, this time hitting both, Iran National and American Motors, killing four workers and injuring 65. Intensifying campaign In response, the IRIAF started an intensive counter-air campaign, targeting all airfields in Iraq where Tu-22s could be serviced. This usually involved between 120 and 140 aircraft in a single wave, lasted for the whole first week of the war. It was so effective that the IrAF was forced to pull back its bombers to airfields in western Iraq, which were considered beyond Irans reach. Contrary to what is usually reported, the Iraqis did not evacuate their aircraft into Yemen or Saudi Arabia: such rumors were started by Baghdad in order to prevent the IRIAF hunting for the 4th Composite Bomber Wings aircraft all over Iraq particularly, as immediately upon the start of the war and first Tu-16 and Tu-22 strikes against targets in Iran, IRIAF pilots were determined to destroy these aircraft whenever possible. Actually, IrAF bombers continued flying regular sorties against Iran so often that they could never have been based outside Iraq, and away from their maintenance centers. The only reasons for one- or two-day long breaks in their operations were IRIAF strikes against Iraqi airfields, as well as the bad weather that occurred in the area during late September and early October 1980. Certainly, new strikes are known to have been flown by IrAF Tu-22Bs (and Tu-16s) on the afternoon of 3 October. The first of these was undertaken by two Tu-22Bs that approached Tehran around 15:35 hrs undetected, flying low between the mountains. One bombed the Rey oil refinery, south of the capital, killing three construction workers, but then the nearby IRIAF MIM-23B SAM site opened fire in response - the Iraqi bomber immediately increased its speed and deployed chaff, so that the missile exploded some distance away, only damaging the wing. Apparently that particular Tu-22B managed to clear the Iranian airspace and land safely in Iraq. In turn, the Iraqis claimed that during this attack their other bomber destroyed two Boeing 747s and several other transport planes parked on the ramp at Mehrabad. But, in fact, neither of two bombers reached Mehrabad at all that day. Shortly after, two high-flying Tu-16 bombers were detected by Iranian early warning radars as they were approaching the border city of Mehran. Two F-4Es were scrambled to intercept, led by Capt. M. Amiri. As the Phantoms climbed towards the Tupolevs, they entered the envelope of an SA-2 SAM site of the II Iraqi Army Corps. The air defence units of this Corps were considered the most aggressive and best-trained in the whole Iraqi military, and they proved why, firing some ten SA-2s - they finally hit the Phantom while at a very high level, exploding it in the air and achieving one of only five kills scored by this weapon during the whole war. Capt. Amiri and his weapons system operator, 1st Lt. S. Haji, died instantly - the IRIAF lost a brave crew because they had been so determined to get an Iraqi Tu-16 that they ignored the more imminent danger. The next strike flown by the 7th IrAF BS was again undertaken three days later, on 6 October, again against TFB.1, and again in the afternoon, but this time the bombers were escorted by several MiG-23s. Three Tu-22s penetrated the outer ring of Iranian defenses flying at a low level, and targeted the north-western section of the Mehrabad complex, where facilities belonging to the Iranian Aircraft Industries (IACI) are positioned, as well as the Iranian helicopter complex in the north-eastern corner. Most of the bombs missed their

targets, but several hit an office-supplies warehouse. Nevertheless, the formation then turned southeast, towards the Rey oil refinery.

Iraqi Air Force Tu-16 serial 566. Badgers were also used intensively during the war with Iran, sometimes in conjunction with Tu-22s. (artwork by Tom Cooper) By now, the air defenses were ready. The Blinders faced heavy anti-aircraft fire as they dropped the rest of their bombs. One Tu-22B was hit while clearing the target - it separated from the three-ship formation, trailing smoke, and then crashed into the Bibi-Shahrbanu Mountains south of the Iranian capital. Despite ejecting at a low level, all three crewmembers survived - they landed near a local cemetery and were captured soon after. This was the first confirmed downing of a Tu-22 bomber in combat. The two other Blinders took evasive action and ended up flying directly over central Tehran including the primeministers palace. They thundered past so low that rooftop anti-aircraft guns were unable to fire at them without hitting other high-rise buildings and civilians. On the other side, both Iraqi bombers reportedly strafed streets with their 23mm NR-23 tail guns. Despite the loss of a precious bomber, the Iraqis were determined to keep their ingress route to Tehran open and strike back at any opportunity. At the time the IRIAF was putting several F-4 formations over Baghdad on a daily basis, often even announcing their strikes on TV or radio in advance, and for the IrAF it was a matter of pride to be able to respond in a similar manner. The IRIAF Phantom pilots had their next encounter with Iraqi bombers on 12 October 1980, when an F-4E was scrambled to intercept two Tu-16s that penetrated the Iranian airspace west of Dezful. Detecting the approaching Iranian interceptor on their radar warning receivers (RWRs) the crews of the two Iraqi bombers had to abort their sortie after launching only one KSR-2 (AS-5 Kelt) missile towards the City of Dezful, and then escaped back over the border. The Phantom arrived too late to intercept the Tu-16s, but the crew nevertheless detected the large but slow - missile and shot it down using an AIM-7E-2 Sparrow. In order to increase the safety of their attacks, on 21 October two Tu-22Bs of the 7th BS tried to hit the IRIAFs early warning radar station near Karaj, overlooking Tehran. All their bombs missed. In the aftermath of this attack rumors surfaced in Iran that the Iraqi embassy positioned in downtown Tehran had installed a radio beacon on its roof to help Blinder crews navigate to and over the city. (It was one of several ironies of this war that despite the fierce and bitter war being fought along the borders Iraq and Iran did not break off diplomatic relations until the very last months of the First Persian Gulf War!). In total, although they managed to hit some of their targets time and again, the Tu-22s of the 7th Sqn IrAF remained largely ineffective. The main problem was that two thirds of their

strikes had to be aborted as they got deeper into Iran; the crews were advised to abort as soon as their RWRs alerted them to IRIAF interceptors. Even when the raiders came through, they had to face the increasingly effective Iranian air defenses: MIM-23B Improved-HAWK SAMs could reach any altitude at which the Tu-22 could operate, and at low level even optically guided AAA was dangerous, due to the sheer size of the Blinder. In addition, the IRIAF had meanwhile initiated an outright hunt for Iraqi bombers, scrambling interceptors whenever there was even the slightest chance of catching any of the Tupolevs. On the afternoon of 29 October 1980 two F-14As from TFB.8 were finally brought into a position to intercept a Tu-22B that was underway either towards the Iranian holy city of Qom or Esfahan. The bomber was shot down by a single AIM-54A and crashed near Najaf-Abad, killing the crew of three. Almost simultaneously, another Blinder was claimed shot down by the air defenses of Qom, while attempting to bomb the Shahin-Shahr thermal powerplant. According to Iranian records, bodies of all the six crewmembers were recovered. After this disappointing show and heavy loss of precious crews, and with most of its air bases under persistent Iranian attacks, the IrAF was forced to safeguard its remaining seven operational Tu-22Bs in their underground hangars at H-3 AB. This effectively ended the first episode of the Blinders participation in the Iraq-Iran War. The Return of the Blinders During the winter of 1980-1981, the IrAF bomber fleet was largely non-operational and kept back at H-3 air base, so the Iranians decided to hit it there. On 4 April 1981, a month-long series of counter-air strikes began with eight IRIAF F-4 Phantoms flying their boldest interdiction strike of the whole war, penetrating over 1,000km into Iraq in order to attack all three airfields of the H-3 complex. Achieving complete surprise, the Iranians made several passes against al-Walid, H-3 Northwest and H-3 Southwest ABs, destroying three An-12s, one Tu-16, four MiG-21s, five Su-20/-22s, eight MiG-23s, and two Mirage F.1EQs (delivered only weeks earlier), as well as damaging eleven others beyond repair, including two Tu-16 bombers. Two Iraqi pilots and 14 other personnel were killed, together with three Egyptian and an East German officer, while 19 Iraqis, four Egyptians, and two Jordanians were badly injured. Although no Tu-22s are known to have been seriously damaged during this attack, the strike considerably degraded Iraqs capability to retaliate. The Egyptians rushed in several of their Tu-16s as replacements for the IrAF. Nevertheless, after a whole series of similarly successful strikes against other Iraqi airfields, the Iranians finally cancelled their 180-day counter-air offensive, and in late April 1981 the high command of the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Services (IRIAS) decided to give up trying to achieve and maintain total control of the Iranian airspace. Iranian commanders understood that due to the incompetence of the Islamic fundamentalist regime, the IRIAF had been weakened already before the war, and could not continue to suffer any more. In short, the Iranians were forced to keep the tempo of operation to a minimum, in order to limit their losses. IRIAF units were ordered to hold the Iraqis, instead of hunting and destroying them. This order was detested and despite the personal risk it would involve the personnel protested fiercely, knowing that the Iraqis would regard the lack of intensive Iranian operations as a sign of weakness and seize the moment to regain the strategic initiative. That was exactly what happened...

Well staged photograph released by the Iraqi "Ministry of Information" in 1981, with the caption: "Iraqi Air Force Tu-22 taking off to drive the Iranian aggressors back across their border". (former Iraqi Government, via authors) Less than neutral USSR The Iraqis were already doing their best to bring the shattered and weakened IrAF back into the war, and despite their neutral stance regarding hostilities between Baghdad and Tehran, the Soviets decided to become more active in supporting Iraq. After negotiations between Moscow and Baghdad, in May 1981 two Tu-22K/KPs taken from the Soviet Strategic Air Force (Dalnaya Aviatsiya), together with 200 Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen) missiles, ten Soviet aircraft weapons operators specialized in Tu-22Ks and Kh-22s, and nearly 100 weapons technicians needed to maintain the missiles and aircraft, were deployed to Iraq. First the Soviets set about getting as many Iraqi Tu-22s operational as possible, refurbishing them completely one by one, as well as rebuilding the example badly damaged by an engine fire before the war. In addition, the Soviets helped to train Iraqis to use the Tu-22Bs and Tu-22K/KPs properly, and monitored the testing of the Kh-22s under combat conditions. From then on, and for a considerable period of time, a Soviet officer flew on board Iraqi Tu-22s on every mission. Although the Tu-22Ks also had a limited free-fall bombing capability, their main task was to give the IrAF some sort of stand-off capability against Iranian interceptors and MIM-23B I-HAWK SAMs, which were claiming many IrAF fighters, especially MiG-23s. As a result, the most numerous version of the Kh-22 sent to the IrAF was the Kh-22P anti-radar missile, and the Kh-22MP, equipped with a more advanced passive radar seeker (in total, by 1985

no less than 300 Kh-22s of different variants had been delivered to Iraq). The results of these tests were a major disappointment for both the IrAF and the Soviets - to such a degree that still today, nobody in Russia or Ukraine is willing to talk about the matter. Whatever limited success the weapon had was solely due to the extensive efforts of the Iraqi pilots and crews. The Iraqis first used their Tu-22Ks to attack specific Iranian MIM-23 sites. The Iranians had only three or four of these active over the long border with Iraq and several more defending important sites deeper inside the country. But all were continually changing positions, causing immense problems for the IrAF. When operating against Iranian HAWK sites, Iraqi Tu-22Ks would usually attack in pairs, with each aircraft launching a single missile from as close a range as was deemed safe. There were several problems. The main one being that theTu-22Ks Leninets PN radar (ASCC code-named Down Beat) was large, heavy, cumbersome, and highly unreliable, and once it had failed during the flight, the Kh-22 was of little use. As this often occurred, a considerable number of attacks had to be aborted. The Iraqi crews came to dislike the PN radar and in many cases it was replaced with additional ECM equipment, mounted inside the radome. Kh-22s were also quite unreliable and tended to be touchy to handle. They were propelled by highly toxic nitric acid oxidants and hydrazine, which were extremely hazardous in operation and distrusted by both the ground personnel and flying crews. The guidance system was prone to malfunction as well, and many rounds failed after being launched. The engines almost never failed to fire, but too often the seeker heads lost the track of the target and failed to guide. In addition, Iraqis reported that the Iranians had somehow started jamming the Kh-22s radar, and that Soviet as well as East German weapons technicians were very worried about this development; and they always blamed the Iraqi pilots and crews and their poor skills for failed missions. The anti-radar versions, the Kh-22P and Kh-22MP, were especially sensitive to rough handling during shipping, storage or loading, and their carriers Tu-22KPs were not much better. Data supplied by the Koob electronic intelligence system, installed to passively scan emissions from enemy radars, was usually insufficient to launch from anything like the maximum range over which the Kh-22 was tested (claimed to be up to 550km if released at high speeds and levels, or 400km if released from medium level and cruise speed). Additionally, Iraqi pilots learned that the seeker heads of Kh-22P/MPs had such a poor sensitivity that the missile had to be released from much shorter ranges frequently down to between 15 and 30km. The Soviets and East Germans again blamed Iraqi crews for the lack of success. Yet when several of their crews were sent on missions against Iranian SAMs they experienced the same results as the Iraqi crews. Iranian reports about Iraqi bomber crews indicate that these were definitely the elite of the IrAF - all were highly educated, excellently trained, and experienced pilots, very confident in their capabilities. On the other hand, they were facing superbly trained Iranian MiM-23A/B crews, who were specialists in this kind of warfare, and their SAM sites proved exceptionally troublesome and evasive targets. The Iranians were swift to recognize the patterns of Tu22K/KP attacks, and moved their sites frequently, catching the Iraqis by surprise time and again. The net result was that the Iraqi Tu-22K/KPs had to attack the same Iranian HAWK site over and over for up to ten days in order to destroy or damage just a single radar! As a matter of fact, only two Iranian MIM-23 sites were ever damaged by Kh-22s fired from Iraqi Tu-22Ks - one, defending Vahdati TFB.4, in June 1981, and another, positioned near Mehrabad, in May 1982, despite a large number of Kh-22s being spent in both cases.

The exact number of attacks per site remains unknown, but interviewed former IrAF pilots said that in both cases, at least 12 missiles were fired at each target, of which only one scored a hit. Besides, during the first of these operations a Blinder was shot down by a MIM23B, and during the second, another was damaged beyond repair. In the end, the Iraqis learned to respect and fear the HAWK system and its operators, trying to avoid them whenever possible. The idea of using Tu-22Ks and Kh-22s for SEAD/DEAD missions was dropped and the IrAF started pressing the Soviets and in turn the French for other weapons and equipment. Instead, both the remaining two Kh-22-compatible Blinders and associated missiles were used for anti-surface attacks against different large civilian targets in Iran for the next few years, the last rounds being spent sometimes in early 1986, and there have been no reports of their use since.

The only known serial applied on Tu-22Ks was 4514 of the 7th BS IrAF, and it is believed that this example survived the war with Iran. Considering the importance and quality of the deployment of this Blinder version and the associated Kh-22 missiles, as well as the intensity with which the Tu-22s were used in this conflict, it is astonishing how little is known about the whole affair. (artwork by Tom Cooper) VIP-pilots By mid-1982, the IrAF was in a very poor state, down to barely 150 combat aircraft from the 350 plus it had at the start of the war - it was in need of new equipment as much as organization. The latter was finally addressed on a direct order from Saddam Hussein, in response to the poor results achieved by the air force in the war so far, not to mention the heavy losses. This reorganization was to impact upon the next period during which Iraqi Tu22s were barely used. By this time, there were 19 Iraqi pilots qualified to fly Tu-22s, and according to contemporary Iranian and Soviet reports these 19 were considered to be slightly above average in situations requiring adaptability and flexibility during combat missions. The situation regarding Iraqi ground crews also variedfrom poor to fair, and the Soviet technicians were still needed to keep Iraqi Tu-22s flying. Now the IrAF needed highly experienced pilots in other units - the reorganization of the IrAF units introduced in 1982, mainly consisted of reassigning the more experienced pilots and commanders back to front-line squadrons to increase the overall combat capabilities and performance of those units. Most of the Iraqi Tu-16 and Tu-22 pilots were sent to units equipped with tactical fighters, where they should have focused on training less experienced pilots thus ensuring they would be able to fly and use new and more capable aircraft foremost the Mirage F.1EQs. One of the main reasons for this decision was also the cost and complexity of maintaining Blinders (and Badgers): the expense of maintaining just one Tu-22 could keep a whole squadron of between 12 and 14 Sukhoi Su-22 fighter-bombers in service. At this time, the Iraqis learned that the Blinders delivered to their air force were all refurbished and partially

rebuilt old Soviet aircraft, well worn out even before they reached Iraq. Needless to say, such aircraft needed extensive maintenance just to be kept flyable, let alone fully operational. Besides the early combat experiences showed, that despite the ruggedness of the Tu-22, any kind of combat damage even the most minor would cause the aircraft to become unstable and disintegrate in flight, forcing the crew to eject. The shifting of highly experienced bomber crews to units equipped with tactical fighters, however, resulted in some of the most painful losses for the Iraqi Blinder pilots. Two of these occurred during a single strike, flown on 27 January 1983. Four Su-22s of the 69th Sqn IrAF, led by Maj. Rajabian, unit commander and former Tu-22 pilot with 41 Blinder combat sorties to his credit, were scheduled to destroy the Karaj early-warning radar station west of Tehran. The four Sukhois were to be escorted by four MiG-23s of the 73rd Sqn IrAF, led by another former Tu-22 pilot and deputy commander of that unit, Capt. AlMokfi. But they used the same ingress route once too often, and the formation was intercepted by two F-4Es from TFB.3 shortly after penetrating Iranian airspace at low level near the Iraqi town of Halabcheh, and both section leaders were shot down within seconds, while another Su-22 was damaged and the rest of the Iraqi formation aborted their attack. Maj. Rajabian, brother-in-law of Gen. Adnan Kheirollah, the then Iraqi Defence Minister, and Capt. Al-Mokfi, decorated with the Saddam Star medal for heroism shown on the first day of the war, and a son-in-law of Gen. Hisham Fakhri, at the time one of the top Iraqi army generals, both ejected safely and were captured shortly afterwards. The Iranians, of course, took special care of the two Iraqi VIP officers with such good connections straight into the top of the Iraqi regime, but, rather to their surprise, they learned that neither Rajabian nor Al-Mokfi had anything good to say about Saddam Husseins clique - quite on the contrary. Both explained at length how much they despised the regime, and were extremely talkative, telling the Iranians among others all about Iraqi Tu-22 operations, and that the IrAF Command and Control Centre at Nukhaib, near the Saudi border, received daily intelligence from the USA, explaining where IRIAF interceptors were patrolling the skies and which Iranian SAM sites were active. And so the Iranians learned how the Iraqis had avoided flying into the areas where Iranian air defenses were active and ready. Former IRIAF F-4 pilot Capt. Daryush Z, who participated in several Blinder-hunts, was not surprised and later recalled: Somehow the IrAF always seemed to know which of our early warning radars were in service and which were not, plus they seemed to have a very good understanding of where our HAWK SAM units were set up and where the IRGC HQ-2 SAM units were based. They also seemed to somehow know where our F-14As were and how many were combat ready on a daily basis: having all these information allowed them to plan their missions into Iran with some safety factors built in for success and survivability. Weapon of Terror Strenuous efforts on behalf of the IrAF and with plenty of Soviet help, ensured that by early 1984 eight Tu-22Bs including the example damaged by engine fire before the war two Tu-22Ks, and both Tu-22Us were operational again. A new group of personnel was trained and there were finally enough spares and Soviet maintainers to keep the fleet at a high readiness rate. As a result, IrAF Blinders could now fly more missions than ever before, even if the number of available airframes never again reached previous levels. In response to a direct order from the Iraqi dictator, the IrAF changed its overall strategy and started targeting Iranian cities along the border, thus initiating what later became known as the

War of the Cities. Iraqi Blinders were deployed intensively, mainly to strike targets deeper inside Iran mainly in the Tehran area. Quite a few sorties reached their target areas and the Iraqi bomber fleet soon became a major headache for the Iranian people and the IRIAF. As the Iraqi bombers increased their attacks on different cities, the Iranian religious and military leadership, as well as the public, began exerting severe pressure on the IRIAF to stop the bombardments. Iraqs apparent success led the Iranian people to doubt that the IRIAF was capable or willing to intercept enemy bombers. In reality, however, Iranian interceptors were flying at every opportunity and going after every Iraqi aircraft they could detect. Indeed, flying was so intensive that normal maintenance schedules had to be ignored. While most of the Iraqi strikes were spoiled by Iranian interceptors, each raid that managed to get through sapped the peoples view of their air force, its capabilities and determination.

Dramatic photograph illustrating the ferocity of Iranian efforts to intercept Iraqi bombers images like this had not been seen since the end of World War Two. The picture was taken by the tail gunner of an IrAF 8th BS Tu-16 bomber while on a mission against Orumiyeh, in north-western Iran, on 1 February 1985, when two F-5Es from TFB.2 intercepted a formation of two Tu-16s, escorted by four MiG-23s. Although outnumbered and outgunned, the Iranian pilots managed to force the Tupolevs to jettison their bombs prematurely and abort the mission. Just a single MiG-23 was damaged by a Sidewinder and crashed while trying to return to Iraq. Nevertheless, the Iraqi MiG-23 pilots did a good job and successfully covered the vulnerable Tu-16s, none of which were damaged. Although both Iranian fighters survived, the official caption was: "Iranian fighter being driven off and destroyed by an Iraqi Air Force Tu-16 tail gunner who was defending the Iraqi people from more criminal attacks by the Iranian air force". (former Iraqi Government, via authors) The first Tu-22 strikes of the War of the Cities were flown in mid-February 1984. Within a few days a number of cities in northern Iran including Zanjun, Qazyin, and Rasht had been hit, and soon enough the Blinders were attacking targets in the Tehran area again. The 4th Composite Bomber Wing now equipped with Tu-16s and Tu-22s only was still operating from the H-3 complex, but, most of the missions were staged via al-Huriyah AB, near Kirkuk, where pairs of Blinders would refuel before starting their 550km long highspeed runs against the Iranian capital. They would cruise at a very high speed, which made them extremely difficult to intercept - in order to catch any Iraqi bombers the Iranians had

to be in the right place at the right time, and of course the Iraqi crews were not there to make their job easier. For a while, the situation was so precarious that the IRIAF considered deploying two or three F-14As to TFB.2 at Tabriz. However, this idea was dropped because the Tomcat fleet was already overstretched by the need to defend the oilfields in the south, as well as tanker convoys and Khark Island in the Persian Gulf. Instead of Tomcats, the whole 32nd TFW, equipped with F-4Es, was deployed to Tabriz in early March 1984, in a bid to deter Iraqi bombers. Ghost bandits A former F-4 Phantom II pilot with the 12th TFS, Capt. H. Mohammadi, recalled one of the missions he flew during which he experienced the full complexity of intercepting Tu-22s, as well as fighting new Iraqi tactics and capabilities: On 15 March 1984 (soon after the seizure of Iraqi Majnoon artificial islands during an Iranian offensive), a formation of five fast-moving Iraqi planes were detected by a lone IRIAF F-14A, unarmed but acting as a radar-picket, on station some 44km east of the Qazyin City, just west of Tehran. This F-14 of the 73rd TFS was together with two other Tomcats based at Mehrabad for testing equipment and weapons, and also for some crew training. On this day, it happened to be testing new repairs to its radar system, and was thus on the right place at the right time... The five Iraqi planes were identified by the AWG-9 radar as four Tu-22 bombers, all underway at about 40,000 feet and high speed, and one Tu-16 bomber flying at about 45,000ft, just behind the Blinder formation. The TFB.1 immediately scrambled our pair of F4Es and began to prepare four more Phantoms for take-off, while our SAM units were alerted that Tehran would soon come under attack. However, as luck would have it, the Iraqi bombers detected the emission of the AWG-9 on the lonesome F-14 and were no longer intent on just flying into the open arms of the IRIAF and Tehrans air defenses: instead, these bombers and their Iraqi crews (that is if they were Iraqis) behaved somehow different than before and we were not to see this right from the start of the following action. I led my wingman along the intercept vector towards the Iraqi bombers: initially after takeoff, I had a very good feeling that these five Iraqi planes had showed us their plan early, and that they would now pay a high price for this. For once in the time as we climbed into our Phantoms we had solid information on our side: how many, what type, and where the Iraqi planes were. Plus the air force had fighters in place to intercept them. However, I was still feeling somewhat apprehensive as we climbed to intercept these Iraqi bandits for two main reasons. The first was that this was a large group of bombers and second that we did not know why was there a lone Tu-16 tagging along behind the much faster Blinders. IrAF bombers were very rarely seen in such large numbers: it was more common for them to attack as single bomber or in pairs or trios at most. I was thinking at first that the Iraqi Badger was acting as "pathfinder" for the Tu-22s, but the Blinders were instead clearly leading the Tu-16 into the battle. Then I came to the idea that the Tu-16 might have acted as a tanker, so to extend the endurance of the Blinders: my wingman, 1st Lt. S. Maleki, agreed with me that this must have been the case. It would not take long to learn that we were both wrong. As we closed, my WSO and I started setting up an AIM-7 Sparrow attack, but, as I briefly

 attempted a lock-on onto the lead Tu-22, any hope for a missile attack immediately vanished. The two leading Blinders both initiated their high-speed dashes, pulling ahead of the others in their flight. I thought at that moment, that perhaps they were going to intercept my flight, but then they both climbed, and then made abrupt U-turns, one bomber going to the left and one to the right. It appeared to me at that moment that the Iraqi pilots had chosen to run back home, and my wingman confirmed that he was thinking the same over radio. However, even as we were talking, my WSO reported that the other three Iraqi bombers were holding their direction and speed. Thinking to myself again that this was bad, and that the Iraqis were splitting their formation in order to make it more difficult for us to intercept them, I can assure you that moments later things went from bad to worse, as all the Iraqi planes disappeared like ghosts from the radar display of our Phantoms... What happened? They jammed our radars using SMALTA-5 ECM systems, and then also jammed my radio communication with the wingman and with our base: instead I could hear the low- and high-pitched sounds of jamming from the Soviet Pelena II electronic radio jammer in my earphones (I knew how the Pelena II sounded as Ive heard it before). Later, while reconstructing the Iraqi operation on debriefing, we determined that the lead two Tu22s had pulled ahead and climbed to drop a large package of chaff, forming a huge chaff cloud barrier in front of the remainder of their formation, before turning back towards Iraq. We guessed that their bomb-bays must have been fully-loaded with chaff for them to be able to create a chaff cloud large enough to hide them all from our radars. But, now we did not only have to contend with this chaff cloud, but we also did not know that at least one of the remaining three Iraqi bombers was also equipped with a powerful electronic warfare suite manned obviously by a capable operator, who knew how to operate it against us: the Iraqis dropped chaff and jammed us before, but not like this (IrAF Tu-22s were carrying flare and chaff cartridges usually in the rear of both of their main landing-gear pods, along with strike cameras). Having no other plan in my mind, I used hand signals to tell my wingman to follow me into the chaff-cloud, and switch to Sidewinders. We still had enough fuel and a total of eight AIM-9s between us that could not be jammed by chaff plus four pairs of good Iranian eyes, which were now our only hope for intercepting Iraqi bombers. As we flew into this man-made blind-zone scanning the sky overhead for our targets, we did not know that the remaining two Tu-22s had dropped to a lower level and speed. Simultaneously, the lone Tu-16 was climbing at its top-speed to a higher altitude: soon it would become all too clear to us that the powerful jammers and the good electronic warfare specialist were located aboard that Badger. The two Blinders, by then at only 600ft, launched a single AS-4 missile each towards Tehran: the missiles ignited properly and started climbing to a higher altitude for a maximum efficiency cruise, and then the bombers turned away back to Iraq. The lone Tu-16 continued towards Tehran at first, approaching to only some 30km from the city, and supplied the mid-course guidance update to the two missiles that were now at a high altitude, until they approached close enough for their own terminal guidance systems to activate and acquire the target: Mehrabad TFB.1. The air was suddenly free of most of Iraqi jamming, and the Tu-16 then also turned back towards Iraq, allowing the two of our radars near Tehran to detect the AS-4s in their terminal dive at a very high speed from high altitude. The noise, surprise, and confusion caused by this attack did far more damage to the people of Tehran than the two 1,000kg warheads ever could.

Meanwhile, we had regained a clear picture on our radars, but by now it was too late for them to help us catch the Iraqi bombers: we were short on fuel and had to return back to TFB.1 even as the tower informed us that the airfield was hit. There was no joy for the IRIAF and Iran on that day.

Iraqi Tu-22U in the USSR, shortly after the end of the First Persian Gulf War, having been sent there for refurbishment. The two Tu-22U were apparently serialled 1115 and 1116. (authors' collection) Iraqi missile variety Despite such sound tactics, the massive use of EW and deception, the Iranian interceptors sometimes had better luck. Barely ten days later, on 25 March, a Tu-22B was shot down by an Iranian F-14A using an AIM-54A Phoenix missile over the Majnoon islets, while still inside Iraqi airspace, but over positions held by Iranian troops. What an achievement this was for the IRIAF, but how the Iranian Tomcats maintained their success against improved Iraqi Blinders, their jammers, and tactics, was explained by Capt. Y, a former IRIAF intelligence officer: We knew that the Russians flew special Tu-22s for Iraqis on missions over Iran, in 1984, 1985, and again in 1988, and that they tested a large variety of different weapons, tactics, and equipment. Many of these weapons were new, some were just early prototypes, and some were not even in production but only in later stages of the development. The Russians fired from Iraqi Tu-16s and Tu-22s many AS-4, AS-5, and AS-6 missiles against targets in Iran (frankly, the Iraqis even fired a large number of HY-2 Silkworm and CSSC-3 Seersucker anti-ship missiles against different land targets as the war neared its end: the Russian anti-ship missiles had obviously many applications), and also dropped many new free-fall weapons, like FAE bombs, air-dropped mines, and anti-armor cluster bombs. Many of these weapons worked fine against our troops dug-in on the front.

They also tested top-of-the-line special electronic gear although, the ECM and ECCM systems used on their Tu-22 in general had only mixed results. The old Soviet SMALTA-2 jammer, used initially on Tu-22s, and the TAKAN-1 ECM system, used on Tu-16s, were actually useless against our MIM-23B I-HAWK SAMs. But the SMALTA-3, installed on their Tu-22s and Su-22s from 1983, functioned against the I-HAWKs, even if only from very short ranges two or three kilometers. Of course, we would be firing our SAMs from longer ranges and before the Iraqis could get as close. After 1983, however, the Russians also started using the very powerful SMALTA-4 and -5 systems on some of their MiG-25s and Tu-22s deployed in Iraq, and the ECCM capabilities of their systems were also improved. We did not think that the Russians ever have let any Iraqi pilots to fly the aircraft equipped with these systems, which could blind the MIM-23B from a distance of between 10 and 15 km for short periods of time. The SMALTA-5 was the only system capable of jamming our I-HAWK radars and at the same time also whiting out the radar scopes of our F-4s from ranges of around 10 km. Interestingly, neither SMALTA-4 nor -5 could jam the F-14s AWG-9 radar. Consequently, the Iraqi and Soviet Tu-22B and Tu-22K/KD crews were still advised to avoid Iranian F-14s and F-4s at all cost, or if already too close to the target to execute a supersonic toss attack, thus simultaneously releasing bombs and initiating an evasion maneuver that could not be tracked even by the AIM-54. Exact details remain sketchy, but it seems that by using this tactic Tu-22s evaded several Phoenix missiles. Iron bombs and supersonic lobs The main weapon of the Iraqi Tu-22Bs remained the FAB-500, a free-fall iron bomb, 12 of which were usually carried. The model used on the Blinder had a tail shroud covering the fins and proved very accurate when dropped from higher altitudes and speeds. Besides, the FAB-500 was also very reliable, as it was equipped with a number of different fusing systems, which also ensured great versatility. As already indicated, however, during the war the Iraqi Blinders used other different free-fall weapons, including the giant FAB-5000 and FAB-9000 bombs especially when they had to hit from stand-off ranges. These huge weapons were usually released with the help of the supersonic toss technique, which saw the bomber approaching the target at a supersonic speed and altitude of 50,000ft (15.240m) before releasing the weapon. Once free of the load and still kilometers away from the target the aircraft would then complete an Immelmann and roll-out to return to Iraq at a high speed. Most of the targets attacked by Iraqi Blinders were large, fixed objects, often heavily defended, such as cities, radar sites, oil refineries, and open bulk-storage areas; hard to miss with iron bombs. Some Iranians are sure that in most of the attacks - in which the supersonic toss technique was applied - the Soviet pilots flew Iraqi Blinders: other sources, however, indicate that several Iraqi crews mastered this maneuver as well, and applied it successfully. It is certain that no Tu-22 using this technique was ever shot down by Iranian defenses. The FAB-5000 proved an exceptionally destructive weapon: it would kill and destroy anything within 50 meters of the impact point, and cause heavy blast damage out to 100 meters. The FAB-9000 was usually carried only on shorter-ranged missions and would kill and destroy everything within 75 meters of the impact point, while heavy blast damage was caused out to 200 meters and of course other kinds of damage caused out to over a kilometer. Along FAB-1000s, FAB-3000s, and FAB-5000s, the FAB-9000 remained also a major weapon against concentrations of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) troops

during the war with Iran. One of its primary targets was the Iranian military camp at alJufair, near Ahwaz , which was a main disembarkation point for troops committed to Iranian offensives in the region of Howeizeh Marshes; the Majnoon Isle, in the Howeizeh, was hit several times through 1984, after it was occupied by the Iranians. A particular mission that saw deployment of FAB-9000s with help of supersonic toss technique was one undertaken by three Tu-22s on the evening of 16 February 1986, against Iranian troops that occupied the city of al-Faw. The Iranians used the small docks in the local harbor to ship their men and materiel across the Shatt al-Arab waterway by night. Each of the three Tupolevs dropped one FAB-9000, equipped with South-African Jupiter proximity fuses, set to detonate the weapon eight meters above the ground. In addition to INS and RSBN-navigation aids, our pilots used radar to approach at a level of 7.000m and a speed of Mach 1.2; targeting was conducted with the help of the tank farm in al-Faw, which made a superb radar echo. Once the weapons hit, all hell broke loose on Iranian communication networks: their casualties were very heavy. The deployment of this weapon in combat was complex, but the ballistic computer of the Tu-22 was working quite well, and Iraqi pilots proved capable of dropping the FAB-9000 from subsonic or supersonic speeds (up to Mach 1.2). Eventually, the FAB-9000 was used so excessively, that IrAF again almost run out of stocks. For this reason, the Iraqi military industry developed a home-made version, which entered production at the Nassir Establishment, some 25km north of Baghdad - the Soviets provided no help even if they were aware of Iraqi efforts. The IrAF Safety Board subjected this version, called Nassir 9, to extensive ground and flight testing. The weapon was testdropped from both types of aircraft that were to use it, Tu-16 and Tu-22, and static detonation testing was conducted, necessary to measure the overpressure and patterns of shrapnel distribution, as well as to compare them with the Soviet original, which - as concluded by the Iraqis was developing a higher overpressure and had a wider shrapnel distribution pattern than any comparable Western weapon. Nassir 9 matched the Soviet model to 90% of its capabilities, and entered service in 1988. The last remaining FAB-9000s and Nassir 9s were destroyed by IrAF in 1993, on a weapons range.

Nassir-9, the Iraqi reverse-engineered version of the FAB-9000, put on display in front of the former IrAF HQ building in downtown Bagdad. (authors' collection)

The Tu-22Ks continued using Kh-22: most of the missiles were still fired against Iranian radar stations and SAM sites, but a number were also fired against highly reflective radar targets, including oil refineries and industrial sites. Eyewitnesses recalled a Kh-22-strike against Rasht, a city on the coast of the Caspian Sea, in February 1985, which came without any previous warning: suddenly there was a terrible explosion that blew away a large house and severely damaged several others. Despite using Kh-22s and the supersonic toss attack technique, deception, and heavy electronic countermeasures, the situation remained difficult for Iraqi Blinder crews, and they still had to abort their attacks on numerous occasions. From March 1985, IrAF Tu-22s, were often accompanied by MiG-25RBs and Mirage F.1EQs, and in the middle of that month they spearheaded a kind of aerial offensive against the largest Iranian cities. On 10 March, Tabriz was attacked and hit by three bombs from high altitude, killing 22 and injuring 21 civilians. On the same day, a single Iraqi bomber either a Tu-22K or one of the updated MiG-25RBs sent to Iraq by the Soviets for testing fired two missiles at Esfahan, killing one and injuring 19 civilians. On the same evening, a sole Tu-22K fired one Kh-22 towards Esfahan after approaching at a very high altitude, and before IRIAF fighters could intercept it, killing two civilians and injuring four others. On the next morning, the heaviest series of strikes of the whole war so far were unleashed. Three heavy bombs each leaving a 4 meter deep crater hit Tabriz, killing eleven civilians. Shortly after, a single Iraqi bomber approached Qazvin but was surprised by the Iranian air defenses, which fired two MiM-23 HAWKs. Both SAMs missed and landed in the fields nearby, causing no damage. The heaviest strike then hit Kermanahsh, where Tu-16 and Tu-22 dropped massive bomb loads killing 110 civilians and security personnel. Shortly after, at around 11:20, the fourth wave, consisting of two Tu-22s, attempted to approach Tehran from the west, but two F-14s were scrambled to intercept and the Iraqi bombers were forced towards the border at high speed. Finally, the port of Bandar Khomeyni was bombed and damaged. By attacking different targets far apart from each other, the Iraqis frequently managed to stretch the IRIAF to the limits, and find holes in Iranian air defenses. The Iraqis continued their attacks on the following day as well. On the morning of 12 March 1985, two Tu-22Ks launched Kh-22s against two points in north-eastern Tehran, killing five and injuring eight. Slightly later, Arak was attacked, but the air defenses were alert, and the Blinders were caused to jettison their bomb loads. In face of such problems, Saddam Hussein still considered the War of the Cities to be a useful method for pushing Iran towards an armistice, and the IrAF was compelled to continue similar operations, even if it had to overcome considerable problems due to lack of suitable targeting information, precision, and properly-functioning weapons. On 14 March, and then especially on 25 May 1985, seven Tu-22Bs attacked Tehran again, this time penetrating successfully and causing damage to some industrial targets. Additional raids were also flown against Esfahan and Shiraz. All crews of the 7th BS participating in this raid were decorated, and Col. Hamawi advanced to the rank of Lieutenant General (he was later to become the Commander of the IrAF, only to be executed by the regime during the Gulf War II, in 1991). Twilight of Service in Iraq In response to these fierce bombing attacks, by early 1986 the Iranian air defenses had been revamped following a complete reorganization of all its assets, some indigenous improvements, but also a series of massive and clandestine arms shipments from Israel,

USA, South Korea, Singapore, and elsewhere. As a result the Iraqis began to consider their Tu-22s as too vulnerable to be used for attacking targets inside such well-defended areas like Tehran. The well-prepared and executed Iranian Valfajr-8 offensive, initiated in February 1986, which resulted in the capture of most of the Iraqi Faw Peninsula, brought Iraq on the verge of military defeat, and the IrAF was compelled to deploy all available assets, regardless of the price. Together with Tu-16s, Tu-22Bs and Tu-22Ks were initially thrown into the attacks against Iranian troop concentrations - the Iranian air defenses along the front were more effective than ever before, however, and the IrAF started suffering excessive losses among its tactical fighters. Unable to recapture Faw, or hit the Iranian units on the front with air power, the regime in Baghdad lost patience. On the early morning of 15 February 1986, Blinders supported by MiG-25RBs and escorted by MiG-25PDs bombed Tehran twice before the third formation was intercepted by F-14s. The Tomcats shot down a MiG-25RB, but the Tu-22s escaped undamaged. The next morning, the Tu-22s were sent back to the front at Faw, and deployed against the Iranian Kowsar-3 MIM-23B SAM site, that was operational near the city. This SAM site had previously presented an immense problem to the Iraqis, and it was to do so again on 16 February. Early in the morning, Kowsar-3 started work by downing a single MiG-23BN, and causing the rest of the Iraqi formation to abort. Shortly after, the second strike appeared, this time the Iranian SAMs shot down an Iraqi Tu-22K. With this, the IrAF was down to only one Tu-22 capable of carrying Kh-22s: unsurprisingly, there are no reports of Kh-22 usage in this war after that date. As a matter of fact, the whole Iraqi Blinder fleet did not reappear in the war until July 1986 when this time escorted by Mirage F.1EQs as well as MiG-25s several were sent to resume daily strikes against Tehran and Esfahan. Most of the time, they were still capable of finding blind spots in the Iranian radar network, and when needed they would be supported by tactical fighters dropping chaff canisters, or employing heavy jamming.

An IrAF Tu-22B, apparently photographed in 1989 or 1990, during refurbishment in the USSR. Note the dark appearance of the aircraft, painted in olive green, contrary to the usual descriptions of Iraqi "Blinders" being painted in sand and dark earth. (authors' collection) On several occasions, the appearance of the Blinders was not detected by their opponents until their bombs had started to fall. However, the number of missions aborted because of Iranian F-14s was still too high for the contribution of the Tu-22 to be characterized as useful. Besides, the Soviets had now started supplying more advanced tactical aircraft and weapons to Iraq, among them Su-22M-4Ks and Su-22UM-3Ks, equipped with smaller but more effective anti-radar missiles, like the Kh-28M and Kh-25MP, and the effectiveness of

MiG-25RBs in Iraqi service was also constantly increasing. By 1987, therefore, the Iraqi Blinder fleet was again largely grounded. Final strike By late 1987, the strategic circumstances in Iraq had changed dramatically. Temporarily unleashed from the tight control by the regime, the IrAF took the war deep into Iran, flying hundreds of sorties each day mainly to hit targets of economic significance. This together with the clever tactic of avoiding unnecessary air-to-air battles, the use of stand-off weapons by Iraqi pilots, the massive employment of chemical weapons along the frontlines, and the increasing US support for Baghdad caused great problems and concerns for Iran, which soon found itself exhausted by the long conflict, even to the point of experiencing manpower shortages. Despite very intensive Iraqi operations, however, one target survived relentless attacks: the oil storage and export installations on Khark Island. The IrAF had launched several aerial offensives against Khark, a few of them a couple of months long, hitting the installations on the island with dozens of strikes, in 1984, 1985, and 1986. Most of these operations, however, either missed the target or suffered extensive losses for no gain in exchange. Nevertheless, by early 1988, US support for Iraq became widespread, influential, and effective, that by then, US Navy ships were directly supplying targeting information for Iraqi anti-ship strikes in the Khark area, as well as for the oil installations on the island. This support led to the last large operation involving Iraqi Tu-22s. In late 1987, the IrAF purchased four Xian B-6D (H-6D) bombers and between 30 and 50 2,440kg (5,379 lb) C.601 semi-active radar-guided anti-ship missiles from China, hoping to be able to use them against Iranian shipping mainly oil tankers underway in the southern Persian Gulf. For various reasons, however, the B-6Ds and C.601s were no more successful than the Mirage F.1EQ-5 and AM.39 Exocet combinations: the C.601s 225kg (496 lb) warhead would not cause more damage than an Exocet when hitting super-tankers, which proved highly able to withstand attacks due to their huge size and massive construction. Besides, the Iranian defenses were still vigilant and very active, downing more Iraqi aircraft over the Persian Gulf than ever before. In total, oil exports from Khark were still flowing, and were barely disrupted by Iraqi strikes. On the evening of 16 April 1988, however, US Navy ships underway in the central Persian Gulf reported a convoy of Iranian tankers heading towards Khark, and supplied all the relevant data to the Iraqis. Throughout the next day, additional reports arrived in Baghdad about the minimal activity of Iranian interceptors in the air over the Persian Gulf. To the IrAF, which had suffered extensive losses in the area during February 1988 (no less than eight Mirage F.1EQs and one B-6D were shot down by Iranian F-14As during separate battles), this seemed to be the opportunity it was looking for. It could now conduct a massive strike against the convoy while it was loading crude oil at Khark, delivering a decisive blow to the Iranian oil exports. By this time, only six Tu-22Bs and two Tu-22Us remained operational, and the IrAF needed most of the following 48 hours to get them ready for the strike along with six MiG-25RBs, and a total of 18 Mirage F.1EQs, six MiG-23BNs, and two Su-22s (the last were to act as SEAD escorts). Meanwhile, additional reports from the US Navy effectively declared the area around Khark a shooting gallery, full of excellent targets. Finally, at around 01:00 on 19 March 1988, on the eve of the Persian New Year, the first wave, including four Tu-22Bs and six Mirages, took off from Shoaibah AB, near Basrah. This attack was devastating - first two of the Mirages first launched their Exocets, scoring two hits in the accommodation block of

the tanker Kyrnicos - it was so badly damaged that it had to be towed back to Larak Island. Then, 32 minutes later, and supported by heavy jamming from escorting Mirages carrying Caiman ECM pods, the Blinders arrived, dropping 12 FAB-500 bombs each. Their attack came as a complete surprise: Avai, a super-tanker of 316,398dwt, was hit by several bombs, causing a horrible conflagration. Massive explosions ripped the giant ship apart, killing 22 of the crew. Nearby, Sanandaj, weighting 253,837dwt, was also hit with equal precision: 26 of the crew perished, and the ship was gutted by flames. The Blinders disappeared before even a single IRIAF interceptor could scramble from Bushehr. The US Navy ships nearby monitored the unfolding attack, and reported that it was executed in good order. But then, either the skipper of the carrier USS Ranger (CV-61) or USS Guadalcanal (LPH-7) issued a message that the Iraqi attack was ...deplorable in nature, followed by a general order to all the other skippers of USN ships in the area to ...stop acting like Iraqi guardians. The repercussions from this decision were far-reaching, as this happened exactly at the moment the second Iraqi wave consisting of two Tu-22Bs, four MiG-25RBs, six MiG-23BNs, and two Su-22M4-Ks was approaching Khark from northwest, while at least two Iranian F-14As were doing the same from southeast, and two F-4Es from the south! Turning the tables What happened when these aircraft met over Khark at 0932hrs that morning, can only be described as a complete catastrophe for the IrAF, even if full details are still not available. The IRIAF F-14 crews were working extremely well and lucky that their planes and missiles were in excellent condition. Swiftly establishing proper firing parameters, they launched at least five Phoenix missiles within a very short period. While it is possible that more Iraqi aircraft were shot down, the radars onboard USN ships confirmed the downing of one Tu-22Bs, and a single MiG-25RB. Not one of the seven crewmembers from these aircraft was rescued. While the high-speed pursuits were going on at high levels, MiG-23s and Su-22s made low approaches, but by this time the IRIAF MIM23B system on Khark was operational and fired several HAWKs in quick succession, It was confirmed that the site shot down one MiG and a Sukhoi within 30 seconds. The strike upon Avai and Sanandaj was certainly the heaviest and for both sides the costliest of the whole Tanker War. The Iraqis destroyed two of the largest Iranian shuttle tankers, used for transporting crude oil to the lower Persian Gulf, where it was loaded into ships sent by customers. Iran was forced to postpone further oil exports for quite some time. However, they not only did they once again fail to destroy the oil installations at Khark, but Iraq also certainly lost at least two precious Tu-22Bs, together with a single example each of a MiG25RB, MiG-23BN, and Su-22M-4Ks, as well as their irreplaceable crews. It should be explained that the number of Iraqi planes lost during this battle was based on radar monitoring by USN ships: as they were not stationed very close to Khark these results may not have been very accurate. It is, therefore, very likely that the Iraqis suffered even more losses because it is known that their third wave arrived in the Khark area at around 15:00hrs, and that by that time the IRIAF MIM-23B site on the island had apparently fired all of its rounds, as numerous urgent Iranian radio messages were intercepted, requesting replacement rounds to be sent from the mainland. Certainly the IrAF never tried anything similar again against Khark, and the Iranian tanker shuttle did not suffer any further losses of this nature. There were far fewer Iraqi antishipping strikes after this, and even though the War of the Cities continued afterwards it

was mainly with surface-to-surface missiles. For IrAF Blinders, the strike against Khark flown on 19 March 1988, was their swan song, because they did not fly any more combat missions again. In total, during the First Persian Gulf War, the 7th BS IrAF lost four Blinders in combat: two Tu-22Bs to Iranian F14As and AIM-54A Phoenix missiles, one Tu-22B and one Tu-22K to MIM-23B Improved-HAWK SAMs. Not a single crewmember known to have ejected from these aircraft, was recovered - although six were captured by the Iranians, the rest died. Another two were claimed by the Iranians, one to F-14As and one to AIM-7E-2 Sparrows fired by F-4E Phantoms, but these claims remain unconfirmed. Additionally, at least three Blinders are known to have been so severely damaged by Iranian defenses that they had to be written off even if returning safely to Iraq, and as already described two other Iraqi Blinder pilots were captured after being shot down while flying other aircraft. Questionable success in Chad Meanwhile, Libyan Arab republic Air Force (LARAF) Tu-22Bs became involved in yet another struggle in Africa, this time in Chad, a former French colony. In 1973, Libya annexed the Aouzou strip in northern Chad, an area supposedly rich on oil and uranium reserves. By 1980, this along other foreign influences and political rivalries between two factions one led by Hassan Habr and the other by Goukouni Oueddei caused the outbreak of a fierce civil war. After last French troops left Chad, in August 1980, Habr organized an uprising against his former compatriot Oueddei, forcing him to call Libya for help. On 9 October 1980, two Libyan Tu-22Bs flew a long-range strike successfully targeting Habrs forces around the Chadian capital. From then on, the 1110th Sqn LARAF permanently held two Blinders on alert at al-Jufra/Hun AB. High Command in Tripoli had requested that the unit be able to launch them within four to six hours of being put on notice for a mission (a very tall order for the LARAF at the time, and especially a unit equipped with Tu-22s!). The Soviet, East German, Syrian, and Pakistani crews, supported by their hosts, and the crews of the 1120th Sqn, worked intensively to make such schedule work, and the Libyan ruler Ghaddafi soon showed little restraint when using the Blinders in Chad. In 1981, Libyan troops arrived in NDjamena, fighting on Oueddeis side. Indirectly, this caused a French and US reaction in support of Habrs Forces Arme du Nord (FAN) with arms and supplies mainly coming from the West via bases in Sudan. By mid-1981, the civil war in Chad had resulted in total chaos in the country, and it is very likely that the operations of the USNs 6th Fleet in the Gulf of Syrte, in August 1981 (that led to an air battle in which two F-14As shot down two Libyan Su-22s) were also influenced by this fact. With Western help, the FAN developed into a small but effective army, well equipped with light weapons, but lacking heavier punch, especially SAMs. Meanwhile Oueddeis forces were supported by a strong LARAF contingent, including Mirage 5s and Su-20/-22s, as well as SIAI-Marchetti SF.260WL Warriors, and Tu-22Bs of the First Bomber Squadron, which were now frequently forward-deployed at Maatan Bishrah AB, in southern Libya. From September 1981, after finishing work on enlarging the airfield near Aouzou, in north-western Chad, Libyans also deployed a number of aircraft there sometimes including Blinders - the possession of Aouzou enabled the LARAF to react more swiftly to calls for air strikes against FAN, targeting places in Chad, but also inside Sudan, mainly using Tu-22Bs. FAN and Sudanese air defenses at the time were poor, and in most cases the Libyans were able to carry out surprise attacks. However, on 16 September 1981, the Sudanese shot

down a Libyan SF.260 over the border - this was initially reported to be a bomber, or even a Tu-22, because it was known at the time that Libyan Blinders had flown a number of strikes against targets in Sudan.

Wreck of a LARAF SIAI-Marchetti SF.260WL Warrior, shot down over Sudan on 16 September 1981. The aircraft was initially incorrectly claimed as either a "Libyan bomber" or even a "Libyan Tu-22". Of interest is the squadron crest, carried on the fin, together with the LARAF serial "341". Libya purchased over 260 SF.260s in different versions, and these saw widespread service with the military, as well as with civilian air clubs, enabling dozens of new pilots to be trained - several of whom subsequently flew Tu-22s. (US DoD, via authors) The Libyan ruler was so enraged by the loss of the Warrior that he ordered another power projection to be undertaken by the 1110th Sqn. This time Omdurman, the second largest city in Sudan, was to be attacked. The mission was flown in late September by a single Tu22B that dropped three FAB-500 bombs. All the weapons missed and instead blasted three civilian houses, killing three and injuring another 20 civilians in the process. Nevertheless, the attack caused considerable dismay in Sudan, Egypt, and the US. The Egyptians promptly dispatched a squadron of F-4Es to the Sudanese border, while the US deployed two carrier battle groups to the Gulf of Syrte, as well as eight F-15Cs and a single E-3A AWACS to Cairo West AB, in Egypt. Unperturbed, the Libyans continued to send Tu-22Bs to strike other targets in Chad and Sudan, attacking some 20 additional objectives by November, when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) managed to negotiate a ceasefire between FAN, Oueddei and the Libyans. By early 1982, a OAU peace-keeping force was positioned at NDjamena, however, the peace would not last for long. In the spring of the same year, the FAN started a swift offensive and captured the Chadian capital, installing Habr as the new president and forcing Oueddei to flee to Libya.

Of course, Ghaddafi was not amused by the new situation, so he helped Oueddei organize a new and better-equipped armed force under the auspices of the Gouvernment dUnit Nationale Tchadienne (GUNT). By April 1983, the GUNT supported by the 2,000 strong Libyan Islamic Brigade (essentially a mechanized unit manned by Libyan and other Arab volunteers) moved into northern Chad, and launched an offensive against the FAN, supported by intensive LARAF operations. Habrs forces were unable to stop the onslaught of the much improved enemy, and soon Ghaddafi felt strong enough to reinforce the Libyan contingent and start a fully-fledged invasion of Chad. Spearheading this attack was again the LARAF, and its aircraft flew hundreds of missions over following weeks. Tu-22Bs were foremost used to pound the airfield and base at Faya Largeau. The bombing campaign was not only intensive, but also precise, and in July, Habr after suffering considerable losses was forced to pull FAN back into southern Chad. When the GUNT and the Libyan Islamic Brigade continued their advance southward, however, Zaire came to the aid of the FAN, dispatching 1,750 soldiers and three Mirage 5Ms to NDjamna. This, and at least 35 tons of French aid in arms and ammunition, gave the FAN the ability to counter the offensive, retaking Abch and Faya by 31 July 1983.

After the short war with Egypt, in the summer of 1977, new markings were introduced by the LARAF, so also on "Blinders of the 1110th and 1120th BS, consisting of simple green fields, as illustrated on this Tu-22B intercepted by USN fighters high over the Mediterranean Sea, in the summer of 1981. During the 1980s many aircraft began to show signs of their heavy use and permanent exposure to the elements - the green color eventually became "bleached" to chocolate brown. (USN photo, via authors) Habrs counter-offensive provoked a fierce Libyan response, and over the next few days, LARAF now operating from Faya Largeau as well dispatched dozens of Tu-22Bs, Mirage 5Ds, Mirage F.1ADs and Su-22M-2/-3Ks to attack various targets, successfully scattering several FAN units that were underway in the barren and open desert. Simultaneously, Libyan Mirage F.1EDs patrolled along the 16th parallel to keep any eventual French reinforcements or Zairian Mirages away from the battlefields in the north. Operating from Aouzou and Faya, Libyan aircraft were much closer to the front and able to give constant air support. In addition, LARAF Ilyushin Il-76, Lockheed C-130 Hercules, and Boeing-Vertol CH47 Chinooks transporters were able to fly supplies closer to the units, while Mil Mi-8 and Mi24 helicopters were also deployed on a number of smaller forward strips to support ground troops. The FAN lacked means to counter Libyan air power - during the whole campaign only one

Su-22M-2K was shot down (on 4 August 1983; the pilot was captured). Since the LARAF continued to cause heavy losses to FAN forces, Habr was finally forced to call France for direct assistance, and on 5 August 1983, up to 2,000 French soldiers were deployed to NDjamena with the help of US C-141 Starlifter transports as part of Operation Manta. Within days, French reinforcements were deployed along the 16th Parallel, blocking the Libyan advance. The Toyota Wars The situation in Chad had stabilized by early 1984, and both sides tried to consolidate their positions. With northern Chad under the firm control of the GUNT and Libyan expeditionary forces, the LARAF established a major air base at a barren location called Ouadi Doum, where a 3,800m long runway was built, defended by one SA-6 SAM site and numerous ZSU23-4 flak batteries. This base had barely become operational, when in 1986 fighting erupted once again with a new GUNT offensive towards NDjamena. France, whose forces had been pulled back to the Central African Republic, initiated Operation pervier, deploying a larger contingent of the Foreign Legion into Chad. This time, however, the French decided to achieve air superiority over the battlefield by removing the threat of the Libyans operating out of Ouadi Doum AB. On the morning of 16 February 1986, French Jaguars and Mirage F.1Cs originally based at Bangui in the Central African Republic flew a very successful strike against this airfield, causing considerable damage to the runway and also several air defence systems. Although taken completely by surprise by the fierce French reaction, Libyans prepared its revenge in under 24 hours - on the next morning, a single Tu-22B crossed the 16th Parallel along a commercial air corridor, and descended to very low level while continuing on a southerly course. Approaching NDjamena, the bomber swiftly climbed to 5,030 meters and accelerated past Mach 1. This time it was the French who were taken by surprise - the sole Blinder dropped three bombs very precisely: one hit the taxiway and two others struck the runway, closing the airfield for several hours. The precision and success of this attack as well as a subsequent reconnaissance run over NDjamena by a lonesome Libyan MiG-25R shocked the French, and forced them to deploy a MIM-23B I-HAWK SAM site to the Chadian capital with the help of USAF C-5A Galaxy transports. This build-up of French forces in March 1986 coincided with a decline in LARAF strength, partly caused by very intensive operations, and partly because at the time most Pakistani advisors had left the country. Contrary to some reports, there was no spares shortage - in fact, one of the reasons that Libya purchased so many combat aircraft in the 1970s was that Ghaddafi was shocked by the huge losses of Arab air forces during the war against Israel in 1973. He became obsessed with purchasing not only more aircraft than the LARAF could need, operate, or maintain, but also stockpiling vast quantities of spare parts (so many that the LARAF would never be able to use them all up). Yet, Libyan Tu-22 operations were so intensive in 1986 that the Second Bomber Squadron abruptly ceased flying, when its personnel and most of the aircraft were transferred to the First Bomber Squadron to help lessen the maintenance load caused by the permanent alert status and frequent combat operations. Additional strain was put on the LARAF, when a unit each of MiG-23MS, Mirage 5Ds, Mirage F.1ADs, Su-20/-22s, and at least a pair of Tu-22Bs were permanently stationed in Chad, causing the supply lines from northern Libya to the limit.

From March to April 1986 the Libyans were also engaged in a series of clashes with US forces in the Gulf of Syrte that culminated with the combined USN-USAF strike against Benghazi and Tripoli, on 15 April. The situation in Chad calmed down, especially after Oueddei was wounded in a firefight in the Libyan capital, and arrested by Ghaddafis police. By the end of 1986, reinforced by deliveries of MANPADs and guided anti-tank missiles, and encouraged by the absence of the LARAF, Habr felt strong enough to begin an offensive that would eventually expel over 10,000 Libyan troops deployed in the country. On 2 January 1987, forward elements of FAN overrun southern Libyan positions and advanced toward north, causing heavy losses, while suffering only minimal casualties. Again, the LARAF reacted with a series of air strikes, flown mainly by Tu-22Bs, Su-22s and MiG-23BNs, however, the French Air Force was now active over the front, and its Mirage F.1Cs prevented the LARAF from being as effective as before by making it too risky for the Blinders to strike concentrations of FAN troops and their supply bases. Instead, on 19 March 1987, FAN crushed two powerful Libyan counter-attacks in central and eastern Chad, and forced Libyans to flee toward Ouadi Doum. This base fell to FAN troops two days later, after catastrophic Libyan losses.

Libyan ZRK-KUB SA-6 launcher vehicle, captured by FAN during the fighting near Ouadi Doum, and inspected by Chadian troops in 1987. Later that year, this type of missile was turned against its former owner, and used to shoot down a Tu-22. (US DoD, via authors)

The Chadians, French, and Americans were delighted to find stores of Soviet-built equipment that the Libyans had left behind, including two Tu-22B Blinders, three Mi-24 Hind helicopters, eleven L-39ZO trainers, and two SF.260s, all of which were captured intact, together with all the equipment for at least one SA-6 and one SA-8 SAM site, plus a large amount of communication equipment and ammunition. On the morning of 23 March, the LARAF responded by dispatching two Tu-22Bs that bombed Ouadi Doum, trying to destroy the captured equipment. Additional Blinders and other Libyan fighters then also bombed Faya Largeau and several other towns captured by FAN. Such attacks continued for the following months. However, by this time the FAN was equipped with US-supplied Redeye and Egyptian SA-7 (Sakr-Eye) MANPADs, which claimed several Libyan aircraft. In addition, the Chadians rushed one of the SA-6s captured from the Libyans into service as well. On 8 August 1987, two Tu-22Bs attempted an attack against the airfield at Abch and one Blinder was hit by one of two SA-6s fired: the crew was killed instantly. The spoiled Blinder-raid was too much for Habr - by late August 1987, he clandestinely gathered 2,000 fighters in northern Chad. On the night of 4 September 1987, they drove over the border and 300km deep to the main Libyan air base at Maatan Bishrah. Arriving in the middle of the night, the FAN caught the Libyans in their underwear - within two hours the airfield and the adjacent base were completely demolished, and the Libyans suffered catastrophic losses, including 26 Su-22s, MiG-21s, MiG-23s, Mirages, and two Mi-24s (both shot down while attempting to take-off). Before dawn, FAN troops withdrew back into Chad. Once again, Ghaddafi was outraged, and many of his military staff paid with their heads for this catastrophe. However, the Libyan leader was determined to show his might, and ordered one more raid to be undertaken by the Tu-22Bs of the 1110th Sqn. On the early morning of 7 September 1987, four Blinders penetrated the Chadian airspace, two closing on Abch and two on NDjamena. This time, however, the French were ready. Their ground control in NDjamena detected the approach of the Blinders and vectored a pair of French Air Force Mirage F.1Cs to intercept. Realizing these could not catch the TU22s in time, however, they then ordered the Mirages to stay away and handed the intercept to a battery of the 402nd Air Defence Regiment, French Army, that was defending the airfield of the Chadian capital instead. This fired one or two MIM-23B I-HAWK SAMs, scoring a hit that caused one of the Blinders to explode into several large pieces which were then targeted by Crotale SAMs of a locally based French Air Force battery. Eventually the French recovered much of the wreckage, including the landing gear that is now on display at the entry gate of the artillery regiment that scored the kill. They also recovered the wreckage of the cockpit with the bodies of the crew. These turned out to have been Europeans, later identified as East Germans. Both in this, and in the case of the Blinder downed by Chadian SA-6 on 8 August, the Libyans initiated intensive SAR operations for any survivors, and promised a considerable reward for them being recovered alive, but it seems that not a single of the six crewmembers survived the downing of their bombers. Interesting, the controller that initiated the intercept had subsequently to report to the commander of the French Air Force detachment in NDjamena, and was blamed in front of all the pilots for depriving the Arme del Air of its first combat aircraft kill since the end of the World War Two! The other Tu-22 en route to attack NDjamena aborted and disappeared without dropping any bombs. The second section was not much more successful either, and even if it

managed to drop its bombs all 24 missed the target and hit houses near the Abch airfield, killing several civilians. Although afterwards the Libyans amassed several brigades on the Chadian border, the war was actually over, and on 11 September 1987, a cease-fire was signed by all the parties involved and with the exclusion of a few more air raids by the LARAF, flown in early October, during which the FAN shot down a Su-22M-3K and a MiG-23MS using newly acquired FIM-92A Stingers it was largely observed by both sides. By early 1988, the LARAF MiG-25Rs also stopped flying reconnaissance missions over Chad. End of the line in Iraq and Libya By 1989, both the Iraqi and the Libyan Tu-22 fleets were in the same condition they had been more than ten years previously, except that there were far fewer of them and that most were beyond their anticipated airframe life or beyond repair. Only five Tu-22Bs and Tu-22Us remained intact in Iraq, but they were hardly used at all. When Gulf War II broke out, in the early morning of 17 January 1991, all were stationed still with the 7th Bomber Squadron at al-Taqqadum AB. This unit was now added to all the remaining six Tu-16s and H-6Ds of the 8th Bomber Squadron (at least one of which was equipped with Sovietsupplied UPAZ-1 Sakhalin pods and acted as a tanker), which in turn re-qualified on Sukhoi Su-24MKs. It appears that although all surviving Tu-22Bs were refurbished in the USSR in 1989 and 1990, the Iraqis were actually planning to completely replace them with Su-24s. Consequently, when on the first night of Operation Desert Storm the USAF F-117As appeared undetected over al-Taqaddum, the Iraqi bombers were caught still inside their revetments and reduced to piles of scrap by direct hits from laser-guided bombs. The sole surviving B-6D was recovered and made operational only in the year 2002; US and UK pilots detected it airborne several times as late as March 2003 occasionally accompanied by the sole surviving Iraqi Su-24MK. This bomber should have been destroyed by US air strikes in the following month. When al-Taqaddum was captured by the units of the Australian SAS in May 2003, the wrecks of the former proud and sizeable bomber fleet of the IrAF were still lying in their revetments: all were given to two scrap merchants from Baghdad, and turned into aluminum ingots. Through analyzing satellite and ground level images, it can be concluded that there was a total of 8 Tu-22 wrecks present at alTaqaddum before being melted down. The fate of the Libyan Tu-22s was different - out of the airframes that survived attrition, the war in Chad, and dozens of combat sorties flown against targets in Sudan, only five Tu-22Bs and a single Tu-22U remained operational by 1992: the last flight of a Libyan Blinder was recorded on 7 September of that year. As in Iraq, they were replaced in service by Su24MKs. With the relatively recent advent of publicly available satellite imagery, it can be definitely confirmed that 7 Blinders, in apparently good condition, are stored at al Jufra / Hun AB, while another is derelict at Mitiga AB. Four were lost in Chad two shot down and two abandoned at Ouadi Doum and one example was lost in an accident in the 1980s, while trying to land at Brach. The fate of the remaining three airframes out of the total 16 delivered is unknown, but it is likely that some if not all three were lost in accidents over the years.

Right from the start of their service with these two Arab Air Forces, the Iraqi and Libyan "Blinders" carried different camouflage colors, though applied in the same pattern of broad dark green stripes over tan (in the case of Libyan examples) or olive green (on Iraqi examples) on the upper sides of the fuselage and wings, while lower surfaces were pale grey. Unfortunately, in the case of Libyan Tu-22s no serials are known, none being visible on any of the available photos. (artwork by Tom Cooper)

Iraqi Air Force Tu-22B serial 1113, showing the typical camouflage of the Iraqi Blinders. It appears that Tu-22Bs were serialed 1101 to 1114. (artwork by Tom Cooper) Silent Service in Afghanistan The last combat sorties flown by Libyan Blinders in 1987, and Iraqi examples in 1988, were not to be the final missions flown by the Tu-22. The last combat sorties flown by the type were undertaken by examples in service with their original user, Soviet Long-Range Aviation, during the final stages of the Afghanistan War. In the late 1980s, Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was losing political and popular support, and the cost of the ongoing conflict became unbearable by the economically precarious USSR. The Gorbachev government decided it was time to end the military presence in Afghanistan, and completed the withdrawal of Soviet contingent by February of 1989. To cover the retreat a massive use of firepower was deemed necessary, to prevent the Afghan Mujaheddin from overrunning every position abandoned by the Soviets. Although Tu-16 Badgers, as well as Tu-22M2 and Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers had been used over Afghanistan before, during the withdrawal Long-Range Aviations bombers had to take over the role from departing Frontal Aviation units and delay the Mujaheddin. In October 1988, two squadrons of Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers from Poltavas 185. TBAP were deployed to Mary-2 AB in the Soviet Republic of Turkmenistan. During their bombing missions over Afghanistan, they dropped mainly FAB-1500 and FAB-3000 heavy bombs, which were used against known targets, and also as area denial weapons with delayed fuses that would detonate the bombs up to six days after they had been dropped.

Since a lot of targets for Badgers and Backfires were located in the Khost region, near the border with Pakistan, there was always a potential threat from the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) F-16A Fighting Falcon interceptors, which had already downed numerous Soviet and Afghan aircraft over that area. As a result, Backfires needed ECM cover to jam PAF early-warning radars. Consequently, the Tu-22PDs of the 314 DBAP, usually based at Ozernoye, were also deployed to Mary-2 AB. During missions over Afghanistan, the jamming capabilities of the Blinder-E proved successful, and no PAF interceptor was encountered, even if some other Soviet and Afghan aircraft including the Su-25 flown by Alexander Rutskoy, who later became Russian Vice President and later Governor of Kursk were intercepted and shot down by PAF F-16s during the same time-frame. In December 1989, Tu-22M-3s from Poltava were replaced with similar aircraft from OrshaBalbasovo AB, and in January of the following year the jammer-Blinders were replaced with four Tu-22PDs from the 203 DBAP, usually stationed at Baranovichi AB. However, they were pulled back after only several weeks, leaving Mary-2 in February as soon as the last Soviet troops had been pulled back from Afghanistan. There are reports that the Tu-22PD BlinderEs of the 203 DBAP entered Pakistani airspace several times completely unnoticed by PAFs air defenses, but such rumors were never confirmed. This last short combat deployment of Tu-22 Blinders ended with three Tu-22RDs of 199 ODRAP from Nezhin AB, being stationed at Mozdok AB, on 3 November 1989, for photographic reconnaissance duties over Afghanistan. Their only mission was cancelled, however, and the aircraft returned to Nezhin within a week. The subsequent collapse of the USSR eventually sealed the fate of the remaining Blinders. Although nominally still on strength with the Ukrainian Air Force well into the late 1990s, their last mission had been flown several years earlier. ***************** In summary, the Tu-22s were used against enemies and over areas they were never intended to fly. Instead of being deployed in regiment-sized formations against larger NATO bases in the western Europe, or against USN carriers in the Mediterranean Sea, in most cases Iraqi and Libyan Blinders flew one-, two-, or three-ship missions, dashing at high speeds over targets in their neighboring countries, in order to remain out of reach of ground based defenses or interceptors. While they managed to evade most of enemy fighters sent against them, the results of their bombing attacks were rather mixed. This was caused foremost by usual need to develop proper bombing-techniques for use in conjunction with an exceptionally tricky weapon aiming system, a malfunction-prone aircraft, the lack of proper targeting information, and also poor tactics. In total, the Tu-22s never proved entirely satisfactory, and even the Soviet blaming of poorly trained Arab crews for the lack of success could not avert the fact that the precision of every single attack undertaken by the type was not only depending on the training of the weapons operator, or his skills and experience, but also due to technical reliability to a great degree also on a fair amount of luck. The Tu-22B, its bomb-aiming system, and most of its weapons with exception of the FAB-500 bombs were too malfunction-prone to allow better bombing results regardless of the plane operating at high speeds and altitudes, or from low levels. The same must be concluded about the Tu-22K: the Kh-22 was a highly unreliable weapon, and available reports about its deployment in Iraq, in the period between 1981 and 1986, indicate that only one in 12 missiles functioned as advertised by the manufacturer, and expected from the crews. Even this result was only achieved by intense efforts of Iraqi ground and flying crews, which were the only ones to regularly deploy this acid-propelled weapon in combat. Soviet and East German pilots and weapons system operators could not improve the situation: as a matter of fact, even the Tu-22M-2/-

3s deployed over Afghanistan were still suffering from similar problems. The raids of the lonesome Libyan Tu-22Bs against the airfield at NDjamena in 1986, as well as the strike against the Khark, in 1988, remain the two best-known of very few perfect examples of what could have been achieved with this aircraft if it was more properly developed in the first place.

Fire in the Hills: Iranian and Iraqi Battles of Autumn 1982 In the late summer and early autumn of 1982, in the Sumar hills on the border between Iraq and Iran, the two neighbors fought some of the fiercest battles of the whole First Persian Gulf War. The fighting in this area was not as massive as during many larger operations conducted before and afterwards. Yet, it included extensive use of air power by both sides, producing not only remarkable results, but also some of the most controversial and best known claims of this war.

Flying in a classic formation, resembling that seen so often when UH-1s of the US Army operated in South East Asia, a section of IRIAA AB.205s is seen from another Iranian helicopter while transporting troops deep behind the Iraqi lines on the southern part of the Moharram TO, in autumn 1982. (Authors' Collection) The Iran-Iraq War started on 22 September 1980, when Iraqi air force fighter-bombers and bombers bombed almost every Iranian airfield in their range, while the Iraqi Army invaded Iran on several spots along the international border. This attack caused an all-out war, and a long, bitter struggle between the two countries began. After 18 months of fighting, in 1982, the Iranian ground forces finally managed to organize themselves sufficiently to expel Iraqi forces from Iranian soil. In a series of offensives undertaken between March and June, the Iranians out-maneuvered and overwhelmed the main contingent of the Iraqi Army (Iran) inside the Iranian province of Khuzestan, which was completely liberated in the process. During this fighting, the Iraqi military was truly battered: its strength fell from 210,000 to 150,000 troops; over 20,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed and almost 30,000 captured; two out

of four active armored divisions and at least three mechanized divisions were decimated to less than a brigade strength, and the Iranians captured also over 450 tanks and armored personnel carriers. The Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) was left in no better shape, and after losing up to 55 aircraft since early December 1981, could count with barely 100 intact fighter-bombers and interceptors: a defector who flew his MiG-21 to Syria, in June 1982, revealed that the IrAF had only three squadrons of fighter-bombers left capable of mounting offensive operations into Iran at the time. The Iraqi Army Air Corps (IrAAC) was perhaps in a better shape, and could still operate more than 70 helicopters. The fighting in 1982 also took its tolls of the Iranian forces, but losses were not as heavy as those suffered by the Iraqis and despite the hard-felt lack of heavy weapons and empty ammunition depots spirits were high. The Iranians felt they were fighting for a just cause ending Iraqi occupation of the oil-rich Khuzestan. Having achieved this, they had to decide about their next step, so through the summer numerous meetings were held between leading clerics, politicians and military officers. Theoretically, there was a potential to conclude the lengthy UN- and Algerian-mediated negotiations with several Arab states, accept the Saudi and Kuwaiti offers to pay reparations for the damage caused by the Iraqi invasion of Iran, and end the war. But, this required negotiations with the regime in Baghdad and that was something the Iranian leadership would not consider. Bringing the War to Iraq Instead, deluded by their own successes, leaders in Tehran decided to bring the war into Iraq, and topple the regime in Baghdad, particularly now that the position of the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein seemed much weaker. The Iranians just had to decide how to reach this objective. The professional military officers, who were against a longer war, suggested that it needed to be concluded swiftly, before military equipment shortages and depreciations began to take their toll. As an alternative, some came forward with a plan for a bold and massive all-out thrust towards Baghdad, which was to be captured regardless of losses. Such ideas were dismissed, however, seemingly because the Iranian political and clerical leaderships were not interested in a swift end to the war. Instead a decision was taken to crush the Iraqi war machine by capturing one area after the other, in a hope that a series of massive blows delivered foremost by the Islamic Republic Revolutionary Guards Corps units (IRGC; better known as Pasdaran) would cause unrest or even uprisings from within the Iraqi Shiite society. It was the first in a catalogue of huge mistakes, which was later not only to cost Iran a clear-cut victory in the war, but bring it to a verge of defeat. The first strategic objective was the capture of the second-largest Iraqi city, Basrah. On 14 July 1982, after rejecting another UN call for a ceasefire, the IRGC started the Operation RAMADHAN. The military objectives, however, were beyond the reach of the IRGC at the time. The Iranians supposed wrongly that they would hit one of the weak points in the enemy defenses whilst Iraqi military was still in turmoil after recent defeats, but they lacked proper intelligence. It was completely unknown to them, that the Iraqis had learned about the preparations for RAMADHAN, and had reinforced the defenses of Basrah by additional units pulled back from the central and northern front sectors. As a result, the poorly-trained Pasdaran and Basij forces attacked some of the heaviest fortified Iraqi positions in the Zeid (Fish Lake) and Shalamcheh areas, and after a week of fighting were stopped in a hail of Iraqi defensive fire and flanking maneuvers. Even the Iranian Chieftain main battle tanks (MBTs) and BMP-1 armored personnel carriers (APCs) of the 16th and 92nd Armored Division could not change the outcome.

During this offensive, the IRGC for the first time deployed some of its armor mainly T-55 MBTs and Type 63/531 APCs of the recently-established 30th Armored Division IRGC, all of which had been captured from the Iraqis during the previous engagements and for the first time were being grouped as independent units. Iranian armored units were supported by the 21st and 77th Infantry Divisions, 58th Commando and 23rd Special Forces Brigades, 22nd and 33rd Artillery Groups, as well as the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 7th Infantry Divisions IRGC. The Islamic Republic of Iran Army Aviation (IRIAA) also deployed a sizeable helicopter division, including 34 Bell AH-1J/T Cobras, and a number of Bell 204s, Bell 206s, Bell 214s, and Boeing CH-47 Chinooks in support role. But the Iraqis instructed also by a team of East German advisors now started operating their Mil Mi-25 Hind and Arospatiale SA.342L Gazelle attack helicopters in hunter/killer teams, which proved especially effective. The tactics used by the IrAAC hunter/killer teams was simple but highly effective, as it put the best capabilities of both helicopter types to advantage: the Mi-25s would go in first and roll over the Iranian positions firing 57mm unguided rockets, trying to suppress the anti-aircraft positions. The Gazelles would follow, using the confusion to fire their HOT anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) against singled out Iranian tanks. Even if the IRIA and IRGC armored units had put up a persistent fight, and continued to bulldoze their way towards Basrah into the month of August, in the end they suffered such heavy losses both in men and tanks that a counterattack by the Iraqi armored formations threatened to completely annihilate them. Only a final intervention by the IRIAA AH-1J Cobra gunships saved the remaining Iranian armored formations from certain destruction, and enabled them to pull back. While the Iranians were making up their mind and organizing their first series of offensives into Iraq, the Iraqis were working intensively to reorganize their damaged forces, and making preparations for the defence of their country, while simultaneously purchasing new equipment from every possible source and mainly with the help of Saudi and Kuwaiti loans. During 1982, they managed to re-establish contacts with Moscow, convincing the Soviets to restart deliveries of aircraft and tanks ordered already in 1979, but stopped in September 1980. Additional deals with France were also concluded, including orders for more Mirage F.1EQ fighters, SAMs, ammunitions and heavy weapons, including selfpropelled artillery. Finally, huge numbers of tanks and F-7B fighters were ordered in China. Expecting the Iranians would come back sooner or later, the Iraqis now initiated a series of air raids against the Iranian economy and civilian installations in the cities along the border, which were later to develop into distinct and familiar patterns of this war the so-called War of the Cities in which the IrAF played a dominant role. In addition, they started targeting Iranian and international shipping in the Persian Gulf along the Iranian coast and the Khark Island, where most of the Iranian oil exports were loaded. This tactic later developed into the well-known Tanker War. In the event, the strategy initiated a war of attrition that lasted right to the end of the First Persian Gulf War and resulted in heavy destruction on both sides, as the Iranians soon started to retaliate by targeting the Iraqi oil industry with precision air strikes.

During the fighting between Shalamcheh and Basrah, in the summer of 1982, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps deployed its armor for the first time in the war. When this experienced problems with Iraqi defenses, Chieftain tanks of the Iranian Army were also sent to help. The Iraqis responded with vicious helicopter attacks, deploying "Hunter-Killer" teams of their Mi-25 and Gazelle helicopters. The vehicles seen here were caught in the open and destroyed or disabled by hits from HOT ATGMs. (Authors' Collection) Eyewitness Account It was the second morning of the Operation Ramadhan. The IRIAA firing teams, consisting of three AH-1 Cobras and one Bell 214 as SAR asset, continuously pounded Iraqi positions, to a degree that they persistently asked over the radio for air cover. During one such mission, of which 214 SAR crew were Maj. Jamshid Pour-Azad and Capt. Gheibi, three Iraqi MiGs suddenly appeared in the sky over the Iranian helicopters. The IRIAF FAC-officer responsible for the area was swift to request air cover for the firing team, and soon two IRIAF F-4 Phantoms entered the fight and intercepted the Iraqis. In the meantime the helicopter team landed on a designated emergency range and witnessed the close turning dogfight overhead. Pour-Azad could see air-to-air missiles being exchanged, before one of the Iraqi MiGs burst into flames and turned towards Iraq trailing smoke. This moment of joy did not last long, because soon two IrAF Mirage F.1EQs joined the foray and quickly targeted one of the Iranian fighters with air-to-air missiles. The Phantoms rear fuselage caught fire and dived toward the ground. Both pilots ejected safely, but were seen landing on the direction of the Iraqi positions. This alarmed the SAR helicopter crew, who wasted no time in starting and taking off to the rescue of the downed Phantom crew, despite Iraqi aircraft and helicopter gunships operating in the area. On the way towards the predicted landing zone, Iraqi anti-aircraft fire opened fire, and Iraqi snipers tried their best to hunt down the downed pilots hanging under their parachutes. As soon as the Phantom pilot touched the ground, the SAR chopper landed beside him and picked him up. Moments later, the navigator also made a hard landing and was quickly picked up too. However this was not the end to the ordeal, as two huge Mi-25 Hinds decided to give a chase to the SAR team. The Iranians speeded away, trying to reach the positions of their ground forces, the suppressing fire from which forced the Iraqis to change their minds and turn back. The team safely made it back to its base. The Opponents Following the costly failures at Shalamcheh and east of Basrah in July, during the rest of the

hot summer, the Iranians changed the direction of their push - this time listening to the Joint Chiefs of the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces (IRIAS) and preparing operations directed towards Baghdad, initiated at a place from which the Iraqi capital was only 120km away. The first from a series of offensives was code-named MUSLIM-IBN-AQIL. This was an operation prepared by Iranian I Army Corps, commanded by Col. A. Rostami, including the 28th Mechanized Infantry Division (28th MID), and the 81st Armored Division (81st AD), which were reinforced by a large number of Pasdaran and Basij that had to suppress their petty rivalries and work together with the IRIAS against the Iraqi Army. The operation targeted liberation of some Iranian territory west of the Sumar hills, still held by the Iraqis, and then capturing the Iraqi border city of Mandali, some 65nm (120km) northeast of Baghdad the ultimate goal being Baghdad itself, if an appropriate crack in the Iraqi defenses could be caused. The Iranian commanders always hopped that by making surprise attacks against Iraqi lines on the central or northern front there was a small possibility of catching the Iraqi Army off balance, or overstretched, and breaking a whole part of the front. For this purpose, the Iranian troops were first to isolate the Iraqi pocket in Naft Shahr, and then reach the Mandali-Baqubah road at a point some 41nm (75km) from the Iraqi capital, where the Iraqi Army held a large depot with huge vehicle parks and workshops.

IRIAF F-4Es from TFB.3 armed with up to four Hunting BL.755 CBUs flew a number of interdiction- and close-air-support sorties during the Operations Rhamadan, Muslim-Ibn-Aqil and Moharram, suffering only minimal losses in exchange for a considerable number of airto-air kills as well. (Artwork by Tom Cooper) The air support for the operation was to be given by a battalion of the IRIAA from the Kermanshah Army Aviation Group, including two dozen Bell AH-1J Cobras and Bell 214A Isfahans, and commanded by Capt. H. Namazian. They were forward-based near Sumar and were to play a crucial role in supplying ammunitions to the advancing Iranian ground forces. In addition, the IRIAF prepared some 14 or 15 McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom IIs from the 31st and 33rd Tactical Fighter Squadrons (TFS) at the TFB.3 near Hamedan, led by Capt. R. Salmaan and Capt. S. Khalili, respectively. Meanwhile, the 51st and 53rd TFS from the TFB.5 at Omidiyeh, led by Maj. A. Sadeghi and Capt. R. Jamalan, respectively, prepared between seven and nine Northrop F-5E Tiger IIs. Facing this limited Iranian task force was the whole Iraqi III Army Corps, consisting of the 3rd Salaheddin Armored Division, newly rebuilt and equipped with T-72 tanks, the 5th and 6th Mechanized Divisions, and the 11th Infantry Division, reinforced by at least one artillery, and one special forces brigade. At the time, most of these units were still not back to their full strength, but the Iraqi Army could count on increasingly effective support from its IrAAC, even if it had no permanently stationed units in the area. Instead it had a series of

main bases and forward airfields, all equipped with pre-positioned fuel and ammunitions, to which reinforcements could be sent as needed. Iraqi Mi-25s The IrAAC was established in late July and early August 1980, during preparations for invasion on Iran. It was based on the model of the French Army Aviation (ALAT). It operated all the helicopters used to support the Army, and its flying crews and technicians were mainly trained in France, Soviet Union and the UK. The IrAAC was not yet a fully developed even if well-trained and competent force, and its officers still had much to learn about heliborne operations. On many occasions it could do little more but to copy Iranian tactics. This air arm participated in the war right since the start, flying hundreds of sorties every day: on 30 October 1980, for example, the IrAAC is known to have flown no less but 120 attack sorties. However, the Iraqis lacked proper equipment the heavily armed Mil Mi-8 was the workhorse of the IrAAC and while it was ideal for transporting troops and supplies, it was too large and inadequately-equipped for anti-tank duties, and too vulnerable to Iranian interceptors. Equally, the Arospatiale SA.342 Gazelle was too lightly armored, and until the arrival of the first larger shipments of HOT ATGMs from France also inadequately equipped for the anti-tank role. The other French-built helicopter in service was the Arospatiale SA.316C Alouette III, procured in the early 1970s. Alouette IIIs were equipped with heavy machine-guns as well as French-made AS.11 and AS.12 ATGMs. They were previously used in attacks on Kurdish insurgents, their missiles having devastating effects when used to target caves: the Kurds learned to fear the small French helicopter more than anything else. Nevertheless, Alouettes were mostly used as liaison helicopters, and for artillery spotting, in northern Iraq. Nevertheless, the Iraqis were willing to learn and stubborn: despite severe losses they had suffered in the two years of the war with Iran. The fact that their invasion ended with a failure which cost them dearly, forced them to invest heavily in the increasing effectiveness of their arms including their IrAAC. They were ready to invite foreign advisors and listen to any good ideas they had, especially in the connection with the Mi-25 Hinds. By 1982, the IrAAC operated a total of eight squadrons, designations of which were in the range 60+ (probably 61 thru 68) and which boasted only some 70 operational helicopters in total, foremost Mi-8s, Mi-25s, SA.342L Gazelles, and SA.316Cs (later on, the IrAAC was reorganized into two Attack Transport Helicopter Wings, the 1st and the 2nd). Each helicopter squadron was deployed in several detachments, distributed along the front. For example, the No.64 Assault, Transport, Training, and Special Operations Squadron, the unit which operated all the Iraqi Mi-25s, had eight Mi-25s permanently based in pairs at Samarah, Baiji, Mousel and Falujah, and equipped to drop bombs filled with chemical weapons besides the usual SA.342Ls and Mi-25s. Other Hind pairs were usually based at Basrah, near the Presidential Palace in Baghdad (where they acted as escorts for helicopters used by Saddam and his family), at Kut, Kirkuk, Nasseriyah, Jalibah, Routba, or Tallil. Iraqi Mi-25s frequently operated from sites near several large early warning radar sites, which time and again became targets for notorious Iranian commando raids, most of which had been catastrophic for the Iraqis. During the fighting in autumn 1982, Mi-25s of the No. 64 Assault, Transport, Training and Special Operations Squadron were deployed in two detachments and were based at Kut, Mousel, and Kirkuk, from where they could also operate against the Kurds, which already then had to learn to evade heavily armed Iraqi helicopters and their devastating firepower, frequently put into use against villages and refugee convoys. Maj. K. Ati commanded the

northern detachment, designated the 1st Special Operations Unit No.64 Squadron, while Maj. Badreldeen commanded the southern detachment, designated the 4th Special Operations Unit. In 1982 the Mi-25 was still a relatively new asset in the Iraqi arsenal. Iraqis ordered their first 12 Mi-25s in 1977, as a part of a huge agreement which by 1979 saw total orders for no less than 250 other Soviet-built aircraft and helicopters (most of them were delivered only after 1982, as in September 1980 the USSR stopped most of its arms deliveries to Iraq). The first four Mi-25Ds arrived in Iraq in April 1980, followed by four more in June of the same year. By the time of Iraqi invasion of Iran, on 22 September, six remained operational with the 4th Squadron of the newly formed IrAAC, as one was under repair and another was shot down by Iranian F-14As on 7 September, during some of the first serious skirmishes between Iraqi and Iranian forces. Three more Mi-25s were lost in combat against Iranians by the end of the same year, and after losing the fifth example, in January 1981, the Iraqis ordered sixteen new Mi-25s (despite the fact that officially Moscow had declared an embargo on the export of weapons to Iraq after it invaded Iran). Finally, in May 1982 another order for 18 examples followed, and it seems that some examples from this batch started arriving in Iraq by October of the same year. The Soviets were particularly slow to deliver Hinds at the time, as the demands of the war in Afghanistan were considered more urgent. By August of 1982, only some 20 Mi-25s were in service with the IrAAC. All were flown by the pilots of the No.64 Assault, Transport, Training, and Special Operations Squadron, which consisted of the most capable and most loyal Iraqi helicopter pilots. The trust the Iraqi regime felt for this unit was such that two Mi25s were permanently based somewhere in or around Baghdad, where they could constantly cover any movement of the Iraqi top leaders. Iraqi Mi-25 pilots liked the type, praising its good range, weapons load, speed, and versatility, however, they disliked the weaknesses of the weapons system which lacked precision and reliability as well as the size of the helicopter and its lack of agility. Recalling the fact that especially the IRIAF F-5 pilots developed a predilection for hunting down Iraqi helicopters over the front, the former IrAAC Mi-25 pilot, Capt. Aduan Hassan Yassin, concluded: I always felt like flying the largest target around. Indeed, the Iranians soon learned to fight the Mi-25 by all available means, and would frequently organize proper hunts for them. As a result, by the summer of 1982, the IrAAC invited a team of East German advisors to help develop better tactical methods for the use of the Hind in combat a fact still fiercely disputed by a number of high-ranking Iraqi officers. One of the outcomes was the as previously mentioned introducing hunter/killer teams, in which Mi-25s were used to suppress Iranian air defenses, in order to enable the more vulnerable Gazelles to use the HOT ATGMs. Five such teams were organized, one of which was led by East German Capt. Ralf Geschke. Interestingly, the Iraqis never considered their Mi-25s to be anti-tank helicopters, and preferred to describe them as combat transport helicopters. Therefore, the Iraqi Mi-25s were never equipped with AT-6s, nor was this weapon contrary to numerous reports in the Western and Russian press ever delivered to Iraq during or after the First Persian Gulf war. They were not even deployed to Iraq for testing purposes, the Soviets did all the combat testing for the AT-6 in Afghanistan. Also, contrary to other reports, Iraqi helicopters were never armed with the AT-4 Fagot/9K11 ATGMs either. Although this weapon was delivered to the Iraqi Army even

before the war, and despite their wish to do so, the Iraqis could not mount it on their Mi-8 or Mi-25 helicopters for two reasons: because neither type had a stabilized sighting system for the gunner, and because of the fierce back blast (of between three and five meters) the motor of this missile develops on launch. The lack of the stabilized gun system prompted the Soviets to choose the AT-2/Scorpion missile as the main armament for the Mi-25 first of all. On the other side, the large back blast was the reason why the idea of mounting the AT4 so it could be fired out of the side doors of the helicopters, was also dropped. Therefore, for the entire war, the only ATGM used by the IrAAC Hinds remained the slow and weak AT2B/C, 1.000 of which were delivered together with the first two batches of Hinds to Iraq. But, in fact, as Col. Sergey Bezlyudnyy and Maj. Dark Gurov - two former Soviet advisers who spent no less than six years in Iraq during the war with Iran (1980-1983, and 19861989) remarked, Iraqi Mi-25s flew combat missions very seldom equipped even with these weapons.

A well-known photograph of an IrAAC Mi-25 thundering low over an Iraqi mechanized formation on the flat plain of Shalamcheh. (US DoD via Authors)

Mi-25s of the No.64 Squadron IrAAC, as used during the fighting in autumn 1982. In an attempt to help improve the identification process, the IrAAC started to paint large national flags on several sections of its helicopters (including the bottom). (Artwork by Tom Cooper) IrAF in Autumn 1982 Finally, the IrAF could at the time deploy a few depleted squadrons of MiG-23MS (the No.39), MiG-21MFs, and a single unit of Mirage F.1EQs (No.79 Squadron), plus an equivalent of two squadrons of Su-20/-22s deployed with five units, and two MiG-23BN units to five different bases east of Baghdad and three along the Iranian border (the last

three being Subakhu, Baqubah, and Sheikh Jassem). At the time, the Mirage F.1EQs only seldom operated over the front and were rather kept back for the defence of strategically important installations inside Iraq. Similar was the situation with the No.96 Squadron IrAF, which was already operational with MiG-25PDs deployed in two or three flights (one of which was entirely manned by Soviet and other East European pilots) in northern, southern and western Iraq. Iraqi MiG-25PDs were sometimes sent to intercept aircraft often civilian - inside Iran. In contrast, the No.84 Squadron with MiG-25RBs was foremost occupied with operations against Khark Island, and was not especially useful for fighting over the front.

A MiG-23MS in the colors of the No.39 Sqn Iraqi Air Force, as seen at al-Taqaddum, in the early 1980s. (Artwork by Tom Cooper) Weapons of Trade The rough terrain along the central part of the Iraqi-Iranian border forced both sides to make extensive use of their airpower. Such terrain could offer more protection to fliers of both sides, and was therefore preferred when compared with the completely flat terrain on which most of the fighting on the southern sectors took place. By 1982, namely, both the Iraqis and the Iranians realized that this war would be won by the side that managed to conserve its forces and resources the longest. While both sides came to this conclusion, the results were very different for the Iraqis compared to those of the Iranians. For the Iraqi regime, which could replace the losses in aircraft and helicopters more easily than the Iranians, the use of airpower had its merits even if it was never considered decisive. The IrAF and the IrAAC were constantly suffering considerable losses, and by the summer of 1982 were hardly in operational condition, but the loss of a single pilot or a flying crew had less impact on the morale and the total combat capability of the Iraqi military than a loss of a whole regiment or brigade of ground troops. For the Iranians, the situation was completely the opposite: their ground forces were numerically superior, but they lacked heavy equipment, and their flying services had to carefully husband equipment and qualified crews. Therefore, they had to make a very careful use of airpower, and to deploy it only when ultimately necessary. Yet, the regular Iranian Army, organized and equipped according to the US Army experiences from the Vietnam War, depended heavily on helicopters, especially when fighting on such rough terrain on which the operations in late summer and early autumn 1982 were to be undertaken. In areas where there were no good roads, fast moving battles heavily depended on supplies flown in by Bell 214s and CH-47Cs, and on the fire-support from Cobras. Even the Pasdaran and Basij learned to appreciate the appearance of the IRIAA helicopters overhead, and a sight of only one or two Cobras usually helped considerably

bolster the morale of the troops. The Iranians knew how good their pilots were, and the regime in Tehran was glad to use the popularity of IRIAF and IRIAA aces completely neglecting the fact that almost all of them had actually been trained by the Great Satan for its purposes. In 1982, the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Aviation (IRIAA) was a battle proven force, highly experienced in operational use of helicopters. During the 1970s, it purchased a huge number of attack and transport helicopters, including 202 AH-1J Cobras, 287 Bell 214As, and 214 AB.206 JetRangers. Approximately 20 additional AB.205s were used for SAR and CASEVAC tasks, while the large fleet of 118 CH-47C Chinooks (64 from the US and 55 from Italian Elicopteri Meridionali) were used for all possible tasks, including normal trooptransport duties, CASEVAC etc. By 1982 quite a few Bell 214As and some Cobras had already been lost during the fighting in Oman, in the 1970s, and then against the Kurdish uprisings in the Iranian Kurdistan, in 1979 and 1980, as well as the subsequent repulsing of the Iraqi invasion. But, the IRIAAs fleet remained a force to reckon with, with the fourth largest helicopter fleet in the world, and could still boast over 620 helicopters. These were organized into three so-called Direct Support Combat Groups, each operating an attack helicopter division (equipped with AH1Js, Bell 214s/AB.205s and AB.206s), and a General Support Group of medium and heavy transport helicopters, equipped with Bell 214As, and CH-47Cs.

An AH-1J Cobra ("International") as seen in the livery of the "Islamic Republic of Iran Army Aviation" (IRIAA) during a forward deployment near frontlines. Note the tents in the camp for crews in the rear. (Authors' Collection) The IRIAA found it difficult to concentrate a large number of helicopters at a particular section of the front, mainly because the front was so long. It also still lacked enough crews to man all the available helicopters, let alone to train new ones. Contrary to the usually accepted version, however, maintenance problems were minimal, foremost because in the

1970s a large helicopter repair facility; the Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (IHSRC), was established by Bell Textron/Bell Corporation at the eastern part of the Mehrabad airport, and it was becoming increasingly competent and independent from any foreign help. This facility was now capable of refurbishing and completely rebuilding all helicopter types in Iranian arsenal. Also, the maintenance capabilities of the field units were constantly increasing, and even if there was a steady shortage of trained personnel, the flying crews were meanwhile battle-hardened and experienced. Only the poor strategy of the Iranian political leadership precluded the IRIAA to be together with the IRIAF of decisive importance for the outcome of the war. In the autumn of 1980 these two services had stopped the initial Iraqi drive into Khuzestan almost alone and at a time when Iranian ground forces were largely in chaos. This confirms their capability at the time. Approaches to Baghdad The MUSLIM-IBN-AQIL offensive was launched on the evening of 1 October 1982, with small IRGC units in high spirits attacking Iraqi positions high on the hills, followed by mechanized Army units in the morning. Shortly after the dawn, the F-5Es from Omidiyeh TFB.5 and F4Es from Hamedan/Nojeh TFB.3 flew their first strikes, hitting the nearby Iraqi logistical centers. On the ground, there was a lack of co-ordination between the IRIAS and the IRGC units and so the battle soon developed into a bloody struggle for every hill. The Iranian advance was very slow, and by 4 October they still had not reached Mandali. On the contrary, the Iraqis counterattacked towards Sumar, supported by artillery and helicopter gunships. That was the start of a massive air-land battle. According to the original plan for MUSLIM-IBN-AQIL, the 31st and 33rd TFSs were to support the operation by flying nine to 12 strike sorties per day, with the 51st and 53rd TFSs following with a similar number of close air support sorties. This was clearly not enough, so the IRIAA Cobras did their best by flying numerous daily combat missions per airframe and the crew. The IrAF responded by sending more and more fighter-bombers as it deployed additional units at airfields near the front. But, the IRIAF then deployed one MIM-23 HAWK SAM site to cover the battlefield near Mandali, which became operational on the morning of 5 October, downing one MiG-23BN. In the middle of persistent quarrels between the IRIA and the IRGC, on the evening of the same day the Iranians started the next phase of their operation, this time better combining their infantry and armor. In the event, they were stopped on the hill overlooking Mandali, some two or three kilometers outside the city. Some outskirts of Mandali were held only very briefly, as in the morning the Basij unit was hit by Army artillerys friendly fire after it started an attack almost two hours too early. The Iraqis deployed their special forces brigade of the Republican Guards, trained for combat in urban areas and heavily supported by Mi-25 and SA.342 hunter/killer teams. By 7 October, the Iranians had lost their positions overlooking Mandali; but, they held off the other Iraqi counterattacks and also claimed seven Iraqi fighter-bombers as shot down, in addition liberating 150km2 of their own soil. Subsequently, the IRIAF resorted to counter attacks against the local Iraqi airfields at Subakhu, Baqubah, and Sheikh Jassem, forcing the IrAF to temporarily disperse its fighters concentrated there. Iran also lost a Cobra, piloted by the senior IRIAA regional commander and tactician; Capt. Yahya Shemshadian, on that day. In turn, on 10 October, while covering a Boeing 707 tanker which was supporting one of these attacks, Maj. Jalal Zandi shot down two Iraqi MiG-23s while flying an F-14A a claim again fiercely denied by Iraqis. The IRIAF was generally more successful in air combats at the time, mainly owing to the superior training of its pilots, but also equipment and firepower of its fighters. Besides the

two MiG-23s downed by Maj. Zandi, by the end of the month, also one Su-20 (by F-4s), two MiG-21s (by a combination of F-4s and MIM-23 Hawk SAMs), one SA.342 (by an F-5F), and two Mi-8s (both by F-5Es) were confirmed shot down over the MUSLIM-IBN-AQIL territory of operations (TO). In response, the Iraqis claimed to have shot down no less than three Tomcats, eight Phantoms, five Tigers and at least 20 IRIAA helicopters. In fact, Iranian actual losses were one F-4E, shot down by AAA over the Al-Rashid AB, near Baghdad, one F-5E (by SA-3 or SA-6) near another Iraqi air base, and one AH-1J, intercepted and shot down by IrAF Capt. Ahmad Salem, who almost crashed his MiG-21 while trying to turn into his slow target at low speed and altitude.

The Iranian fleet of F-14A Tomcats remained fully operational and were used to excellent effect during the war. The F-14A 3-6079, shown here, was the last example delivered to Iran and one of the most distinguished during the whole war. At least a dozen Iraqi aircraft were shot down by different pilots flying this Tomcat. Note that this F-14 is shown here as it appeared early during the war: without the fin flash, and still wearing the title "IIAF" (instead of "IRIAF") under the cockpit. Exact reasons for this remain unknown, but it is possible that this Tomcat was put into deep storage upon delivery, and returned to service in a rush. (Authors' Collection) Mi-25 vs. F-4 Iraqs over claims for the numbers of Iranian aircraft shot down in air combats and by air defenses was characteristic for this war; many Iranian reports were not much better. But, the most controversial of all the Iraqi claims ever was published on 27 October by the Iraqi magazine Baghdad Observer, a publication controlled by the Iraqi regime and targeting Western reporters. In the report with the title The Day of the Helicopter Gunship an air battle was briefly described that supposedly developed several days earlier, and in which one Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter had shot down an Iranian F-4 Phantom. According to the Baghdad Observer, the engagement happened north of the Eyn-e Khosh area and the Phantom was destroyed by a next generation, long-range, AT-6 Sprial ATGM, fired by a Mi-24 helicopter specially prepared and brought to Iraq by the Soviets in order to test the AT-6 missile in the air-to-air mode. Ever since, this claim has been making rounds in various Western, Ukrainian, and Russian publications. In general, this claim has widely been accepted as authentic, and was considered as confirmed even by observers with considerable knowledge about helicopters and anti-armor warfare, or former dignitaries of the Soviet Air Force and airspace industry. Most Russian and Ukrainian observers use it to confirm the capabilities and firepower of the Mi-24 attack helicopter and the AT-6 missile, even if very few people know anything about the background of the claim, or its initial source, while others are obviously ignoring these, while maintaining that the claim was confirmed by US intelligence. Significantly, even Western armored warfare experts who are usually skeptical to accept any

kind of Arab claims especially for destroying such an advanced product of Western technology like an F-4 Phantom II fighter-bomber have shown more than ready to accept that this incident really happened. Considering the number of sources and their authoritativeness, it seems therefore not easy to dispute anything in this context. Under closer scrutiny, the reality turned out to be completely different and this case illustrates once more how poorly the air war between Iraq and Iran has been researched so far. The more one looks into this case, the more evidence there appears to be that there was no engagement between Iraqi Mi-25s and Iranian Phantoms at least with the claimed result in the time and place stated. On the contrary it appears that the actual source for all the publications which so far mentioned this claim regardless of being Western or East European sources is the same: the report of the Washington based Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which repeated the claim of the Baghdad Observer on the page E 2 of its Communiqu No. 885, FBIS-MEA-82-209, from 28 October 1982. Even if originally established by the CIA, FBIS is no US intelligence, but rather a service compiling reports from all possible foreign media sources and broadcasts, and reporting these to different US services, government agencies, and branches of military. FBIS neither confirms nor denies reports it is forwarding: it simply reports what was reported by somebody else. This is frequently ignored, especially by an increasing number of research works published in recent years, many of which meanwhile explain that this air battle actually happened on 27 October 1982 - that means, on the same date which the claim had actually been published for the first time in Baghdad Observer, which in turn obviously described that the engagement had happened several days earlier! Actually, ever since that report was published for the first time in the Baghdad Observer, no new details about this engagement appeared: no gun-camera footage (all Iraqi Mi-25s, and all Soviet Mi-24s were equipped with gun-cameras), no narratives by the (unknown) pilots who supposedly managed that feat (especially surprising, given the fact that the crew of the scoring Mi-24 should have been Russian), not even a closer description of how this engagement developed; nothing, except some rumors from Russia, that this battle must have happened, if for no other reason, then because the Soviets and Iraqis had supposedly organized a party to celebrate this success several days before the report in Baghdad Observer was published. Research about theoretical possibility that the Soviets might have deployed some AT-6equipped Mi-25s to Iraq brought no positive results whatsoever. As revealed earlier, the Iraqis never got any AT-6s. Furthermore, while both the Iranians, and later the US forces during the Second Persian Gulf War, in 1991, have captured hundreds of Iraqi ATGMs, including such Western products as Milan, HOT, AS.11, and AS.12, or Soviet-produced AT2s, AT-3s, and AT-4s no AT-6s, nor any traces of them in the Iraqi military, were ever captured or found. In addition, during the early 1980s, the Soviet Air Force was so short of Mi-24s due to the war in Afghanistan, and under such pressure to field as many Mi-24s as possible with units facing the NATO, that deliveries of Mi-25s to Iraq slipped badly behind the schedule. At one point the Soviets were forced to even take several East German Mi24s, which were in the USSR for refurbishment, and press them to service in Afghanistan! When these helicopters were returned to their owners, a number of them had been found having patched-up bullet holes in the fuselage. It should be remembered that in 1982 relations between Moscow and Baghdad were not close enough for the Soviets to consider sending one of their most important weapons to Iraq. Particularly as they were already working on using the R-60 (ASCC-Code: AA-8 Aphid) short-range air-to-air missile as the main air-to-air weapon for the Mi-24, because they

were well aware that the AT-6 could not be used in that role: the version available at the time the 9M114 (AT-6A) was so poorly manufactured that it constantly failed even when tested under ideal conditions. This fact was confirmed by a series of tests conducted by the US Army on the Aberdeen Proving Grounds during the 1980s and 1990s under the code-name Passive Nova 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and using a total of 120 AT-6s clandestinely purchased from different East European sources. Conducted by top US Army personnel, expertly trained in the use of Soviet-produced weapons systems, these tests showed that only four out of 100 AT-6s fired against targets moving at speeds of up to 15km/h would score a hit and destroy the target. The testing against stationary targets ended with only slightly better results, as only eleven out of 100 AT-6s would hit and destroy the target and that while being fired from a fixed tower, not from a helicopter diving at high speed and flown by a crew under stress and in hurry! US Army personnel concluded from the tests that the most reliable part of the AT-6 was the warhead (despite its small diameter) and that the weapon was highly efficient if it managed to score a hit, which, however, would did not happen very often. In short, not only that these facts completely contradict Russian sources which claim a hit probability of 7080% for the AT-6, but - statistically - there is also no possibility that the AT-6A could hit a target moving at 350-500 knots while fired from a helicopter which is also moving. As a matter of fact, the claimed hit probability of 70-80% for the AT-6 is probably valid only for the AT-6B and AT-6C versions, and only for rounds fired during the trials in the later 1990s. In 1994, the Russians have completely rebuilt and upgraded their whole remaining stock of AT-6-missiles. Obviously, they have had good reasons to do so! Some East European sources seem to have known this, and therefore they claimed that the Mi-24 scored this kill using unguided rockets and machine-guns, instead of AT-6s. Albeit, the same sources stated that this happened on 27 October 1982, which is actually the date on which the initial claim was published by the Baghdad Observer. Therefore, and as the same sources have not offered any additional details about this engagement, but have also added quite a few other mistakes, there is a credible doubt about the quality of research these sources have completed about the air war between Iraq and Iran at all. In another case, there is a claim that the kill was actually scored by the AT-4 Fagot ATGM, a weapon indeed delivered to the Iraqi Army by the Soviets. The fact is, however, that the IrAAC had given up all efforts to mount the AT-4 on its Mi-8 or Mi-24 helicopters, for reasons mentioned above. On the contrary, a very intensive research with the help of several former Iraqi and Iranian pilots brought no confirmation that an engagement of this kind happened in the given area at the given time and especially not with the result as claimed by Baghdad Observer. Two former Iraqi helicopter pilots who flew with the 4th Squadron IrAAC in 1982, and three other former officers of the Iraqi military remember being told about how Iraqi helicopters had shot down Iranian helicopters time and again during the war. They remember also that pictures of the wreckage of Iranian helicopters were shown to them, and they also remember many of their comrades being killed when Iraqi helicopters were shot down by Iranian helicopters and fast jets. But, they never heard about any claim that any of their Mi25s had shot down an Iranian F-4, nor about the Soviets ever deploying any Mi-24s and AT6 missiles to Iraq and achieving anything similar. The closest any IrAAC Mi-25 ever came to doing something of this kind was in January 1981, during the Battle of Susangerd, when a Mi-25 armed with four Scorpion missiles and four UV-32-57 pods by accident confronted an Iranian F-4 Phantom that was attacking Iraqi ground forces. The gunner in the front cockpit of the Iraqi helicopter took notice of the approaching F-4, sighting the smoke from its engines, and notified the pilot: he then unleashed all of 132 rockets caliber 57mm towards the Iranian fighter that flew at low level, and perpendicular to his flight pt. The Iraqi pilot

never claimed he had shot the Iranian fighter, nor had any other Iraqi sources claimed anything similar until the report in Baghdad Observer, over a year later.

An AT-2/Scorpion missile as seen on an IrAAC Mi-25 that was captured by US Army, in 1991. The AT-2 remained the sole ATGM used by Iraqi Hinds during the whole war: no AT6s were ever delivered to Iraq, and the Soviets never sent any of their AT-6-equipped Mi24s to that country. Consequently are all claims for an Iraqi Mi-24 to have shot down an Iranian F-4 Phantom using AT-6 missiles false. (US DoD via Authors) All of Iraqis interviewed by the authors consider such claim to either have been a propaganda plot by the Iraqi government which, after severe setbacks from the previous fighting during 1982, was in a dire need of some good news at the time this claim was published. Or, so they say, there must have been a smart Iraqi journalist who tried to rewrite the same incident in another way. Both of former IrAAC pilots confirmed just like US documents released to the authors under several FOIA inquiries that the AT-6 was never accepted to Iraqi Army service, especially not by IrAAC Mi-25s, and that the Soviets also never tested that weapon in Iraq. To the best knowledge of the authors, the IRIAF wartime records, as well as other official documents mention no losses of any F-4s or F-5s over the front near Eyn-e Khosh in October 1982, and no losses of any Iranian fighters to Iraqi fighters ever. Finally, none of several dozens of other former Iraqi and Iranian pilots and officers interviewed can remember about hearing any similar claim either: several of them actually ridiculed the idea. As a result, we can only conclude that a Mi-24 never did shoot down an F-4 Phantom in the Eyn-e Khosh area during October 1982.

Phantom REALLY meets Mi-25: as an IRIAF RF-4E thundered low over the Iraqi forward airfield near Suleimaniyah, in autumn 1982, it took this photograph which shows two parked Iraqi Mi-25s. (Authors' Collection) Operation MOHARRAM Just few days after the Operation MUSLIM-IBN-AQIL was initiated, the Iranians already started preparing their next offensive, code-named MOHARRAM. For this operation, the IRIA concentrated three divisions of the III Corps, reinforced by five brigades of Pasdaran, and supported by 16 to 18 AH-1J Cobras organized in two regiments of the 1st Attack Helicopter Group, commanded by Maj. A. Bassiri and Capt. K Oweysee, respectively, and deployed from Esfahan to TFB.4. Eight of the deployed Cobras were TOW-capable, and with them also 300 TOWs were forward-deployed. Among the crews who were to participate in this operation were Capt. Ali Gravedigger Shafi, and his gunner, Warrant Officer Amir Alai one of the best Cobra crews the IRIAA ever had, with quite a long list of successes to their credit. In addition to the helicopters, the Iranian Gendarmerie and IRIAA were also to use a small number of Cessna O-2A Bird-Dogs as forward air controllers, foremost for coordination of their air, helicopter, and artillery attacks. (By 1982, these O-2s were also used by the Gendarmerie for anti-drug smuggling operations). The IRIAF was also better prepared for this offensive than it had been for MUSLIM-IBNAQIL. At TFB.4 near Dezful, the 41st and 43rd TFSs prepared a dozen or so F-5Es and F5Fs, and they were reinforced by the 32nd and 34th TFSs, commanded by Maj. Shahram Rostami and Col. A. Fatahe, respectively, which flew in some 12 F-4Es. In addition, the 81st TFS from Esfahan was to fly constant Tomcat CAPs over the front, foremost in order to escort at least one Boeing 707-3J9C-tanker (also equipped with Roving Eye US-supplied ELINT-equipment) which was to support the Phantoms participating in the operation. In this way, the Phantoms and Tigers were to operate more freely over the front, where they could better concentrate on supporting ground troops and worry less about Iraqi interceptors and helicopters.

Although the Iranians had amassed sizeable forces for MOHARRAM, which could have posed a threat if they had breached Iraqi lines and neared the approaches to Baghdad, the actual objective of the operation was limited, to say the least. First, the deployed forces were to secure several hills still inside Iran, and then take the large Bayat oilfield. In the last phase, the industrial towns of Tib, Zobeidat, and Abu-Qarrab and associated oilfields were to be taken, and eventually the Sharahani-Zobeidat road, which could be used for an advance towards Ammarah, was to be cut off. As it transpired, the bold drive deep into Iraq, eventually led by Iranian mechanized forces, was stopped at its first phase by Iraqi minefields and defensive fire in addition to heavy rain. The initial attack by Basij, started on the night of 1 November 1982, run directly into an extensive minefield causing many casualties. Meanwhile, the Iranians were more successful on the Bayat oilfield, making some gains and capturing 50 oil wells, before the Iraqis moved in two brigades from the north, and stopped the advance. By the dawn of 2 November, the IrAF, the IrAAC, the IRIAF and the IRIAA had thrown everything they had into the battle, with the Iraqis trying to block a further Iranian advance towards the west, and the Iranians trying to suppress Iraqi armor, which was constantly inflicting losses on their infantry. The IRIAF Tomcats intercepted numerous Iraqi formations, claiming seven MiGs, Sukhois, and helicopters as shot down. The Iraqis had fiercely denied suffering such losses, but in event the IRIAF established local air superiority, enabling TFB.3 Phantoms to bomb Iraqis with BL.755 CBUs, destroying scores of tanks and other vehicles. (Until today, most of Iraqi sources deny the Hunting BL.755 cluster-bomb units were as effective as most Iranian sources claim; the Iraqis stress that up to 80% of the bomblets dropped from BL.755 failed to detonate). Then the IRIAA Cobras and the Gendarmerie O2As appeared over the battlefield and started rolling the Iraqi tanks back. By constantly holding three to four AH-1Js over the front, but moving them up and down between the hills under coordination from O-2As, the IRIAA fliers created the feeling of dozens of them attacking almost simultaneously, and several captured Iraqi officers even asked if the IRIAA had more Cobras delivered from the USA. In fact, the Iranian Cobra pilots used the classic tactics of US Army Aviators, called Dead Ground, in which they would repeatedly approach the same area from several different directions, all the time flying behind the cover (low hills, earthen depressions, rock outcroppings) at high speed, then enter a hover, do a short pop up maneuver to acquire the targets and fire, and then move back behind the cover. When using 20mm guns or unguided rockets, they would usually disappear before the Iraqis could detect their presence. The situation was barely different when TOWs were used, as once the missile would be fired, Iranian pilots would bring their helicopters back behind the nearest cover, only keeping their nose over the obstacle (so to be able to guide their weapons), and thus exposing only the part of the rotor and a very small part of the fuselage to the enemy. Using this tactic, on 2 November and during the following days, the IRIAA Cobras destroyed at least 106 Iraqi MBTs and 70 APCs. Capt. Shafi and WO Alai were reportedly alone responsible for the destruction of 26 Iraqi tanks and other vehicles using TOWs and unguided rockets, as well as two Gazelle and one SA.316C Alouette (used as forward artillery observer) with 20mm cannon fire. The IRIAA also suffered some losses during early November 1982 in the MOHARRAM TO, including one AH-1J to Iraqi anti-aircraft guns, and one O-2A, probably shot down by SAMs. Due to this success, by the time the third phase of the Operation MOHARRAM was initiated, on 6 November, the Iranian forces had reached the strategic Sharahani-Zobeidat road, cutting the most important Iraqi logistical route in the area. Using helicopters to rapidly resupply and reinforce their forward units, they immediately started the assault on

Zobeidat. The town was captured, but held only very briefly, as the Iraqis were swift to react with a major counteroffensive of their elite Republican Guards units, which deployed their brand-new T-72 tanks, recently delivered from the USSR, driving them directly from Baghdad. Initially, the Iranians had no effective weapons against the T-72, except TOWarmed Cobras and motorcycle-riding RPG-7 teams. Both were apparently ineffective against the front armor of the T-72s, so they had to search positions which would enable them to engage from the flank. This considerably complicated the matters for Iranian fliers and fighters, and another IRIAA AH-1J was shot down by Iraqi ZSU-23-4s indeed while operating against Iraqi T-72s. The losses of Iranian anti-tank teams of course, were appropriately higher. By the 7 November, both sides suffered extensive losses, and were very tired of constant battles, so they settled to stabilise their new positions, or to improve them through local counterattacks. This led to continuous activities in the air for the rest of the month, hampered only by the bad weather. After the initial shock due to the heavy losses on 2 November, the IrAF returned over the battlefield, but at high altitude, which proved to be a wrong tactic, as Iranian F-14s were still patrolling the area. The first IrAF formation which reached the front on the morning of 7 November lost one of its Su-22s, flown by Capt. Raje Suleiman, who was captured, before hastily being taken away. Several other fighter-bomber formations were subsequently forced to abort their missions after Iranian Tomcats were detected in front of them, and at one moment the circumstances appeared to the Iraqis so desperate that they started preparing some of the No.64 Squadrons Mi-25s for attacks with chemical weapons: only the high winds and rain stopped them from mounting such mission.

On the morning of 7 November 1982, IRIAF F-14As shot down an Su-22 belonging to a formation which was about to attack Iranian positions in the Moharram TO. IrAF Capt. Mohammad Raje' Soleiman ejected safely and was captured by the Pasdarans shortly later. (Authors' Collection)

The weather worsened in the following days, and by mid-November, the fighting on the ground bogged down in the mud. Nevertheless, the IRIAF managed to deploy one of its HAWK SAM sites near the front, which went into action on the morning of 16 November, instantly shooting down one of four MiG-21s that attempted to bomb and strafe Iranian positions near the Bayat oilfield. Another MiG-21 was claimed shot down shortly after by a Sidewinder fired from an F-4E. It is possible, however, that these two claims are for the same aircraft, then Iraqi sources deny the units that flew this type to have either suffered such losses, or flown air-to-ground sorties at the time. For the next four days, aerial operations were hampered by more bad weather, but on 20 November, both the IrAF and the IRIAF were flying again, and additional air battles developed as the fighters and helicopters from both sides frequently run into each other while on air-to-ground missions. Thanks to the much better equipment of the Iranian aircraft, which helped their more experienced and superior trained pilots keep a good situational awareness in airspace simultaneously used by larger numbers of enemy fighters, the IRIAF remained highly successful: an F-4E shot down an Iraqi MiG-23BN using Sidewinders, while F-5Es had a particularly successful day, downing one Mi-8 with guns and one MiG-21 by AIM-9s. Iraqi Generals Meet Iranian Tomcats During the war with Iran, for Iraqi generals the life depended on two factors, both of which had to do with their superiors: a) not taking too much action and make themselves too dangerous for the dictator in Baghdad as to become his target, and b) not taking too little action as to appear incompetent as a military leader and become a target for that reason too. In general, Iraqi high-ranking officers would seldom appear very close near the front: instead they preferred to control the battle from the safety of field headquarters, rarely less than 30 or more kilometers in the rear. Sometimes, however, tours on the front had to be done, or the situation b could develop: this was especially important because several cases were known in which Iraqi field commander deliberately distorted intelligence information to their superiors, and they had to visit the front every time they wanted to see what was happening on the ground. Exactly one such case provided the source of the next well known at least in Iran and Iraq, but also within specific circles of the US military and highly contentious claim from this period of the war: the one about IRIAF interceptors downing five or six Iraqi fighters during a 17-minute engagement, followed by two IRIAA Cobras downing a helicopter carrying an Iraqi general, and the escorting MiG. This story is still being perpetuated on the internet even now. Over time the actual story has been altered, corrupted and misused so many times by both sides, that even the memories of former Iranian and Iraqi fliers cannot be wholly relied upon. The following account has been compiled during a series of interviews with several participants, as well as by using reports from both sides, and could therefore be considered as the most complete and accurate version published so far. By 20 November 1982, the Iraqi troops in the MOHARRAM TO, on the front between Eyn-e Khosh and Musiyan, were in a critical condition. The Iranians had managed to capture several important oilfields, and cut the main communication lines into the area; the IrAF was prevented from intervening by the IRIAF interceptors and SAMs; and the intervention efforts of the IrAAC ended with its helicopters either being shot down by Iranian fighters and Cobras, or being hampered in their operations by strong winds and bad weather. Also, the Iraqi Army suffered heavy casualties, including 3,500 soldiers killed, and the whole

sector of the front was in danger of collapsing. Iraqi generals could already hear the first allegations from the dictator in Baghdad. Fearing that losses might be approaching those suffered during the spring Iranian offensives of 1982, Maj. Gen. Maher Abdul Rashid of the Iraqi Army General Staff and commander of the III Army Corps, and Lt. Gen. Abdul Jabbar Mohsen, deputy commander of the IV Corps and Army spokesman, decided to tour the front and meet with their local field commanders.

An IrAAC Mi-8 seen wearing the standard camouflage applied to this type in Iraqi service. Note large Iraqi national flags, used for easier identification after several "blue-on-blue" incidents. (Authors' Collection) On the morning of 21 November, both generals boarded an armed Mi-8 helicopter, piloted by Capt. S. Mousa, which was escorted by two other Mi-8s and one Mi-25 acting as a pathfinder. Overhead, flights of four MiG-21s and four MiG-23s were providing top cover, and these were continuously relieved by other flights as they ran out of fuel during the formations slow progress towards Mandali. At around 10:40hrs, at 12.200m (40,000ft) and only eight kilometers from the Iranian border, two IRIAF F-4Es underway to attack targets in Iraq, were approaching a Boeing 707-3J9C-tanker escorted by two F-14As, led by Capt. M. Khosrodad. The Tomcats were flying a race-track pattern around the tanker, with one of them continuously scanning the airspace over the front by its AWG-9 radar. Around 10:45hrs, just as the first Phantom started receiving fuel from the tanker, the radar onboard Capt. Khosrodads F-14A acquired several Iraqi fighters apparently closing from the west and well within the range of the AIM54 missiles of his Tomcat. Despite the standing order not to fly into the Iraqi airspace or leave the tanker unprotected, Capt. Khosrodad decided to attack: he ordered his wingman, whose aircraft was only armed with Sparrows and Sidewinders, to remain with the Boeing and the two Phantoms; then Capt. Khosrodad headed off west.

Working swiftly, he and his RIO fired two AIM-54As and two AIM-7E-4s in rapid succession, and both were most pleased when they noticed that at least two of their radar contacts disappeared within seconds of each other: apparently, so they thought, they had just spoiled another Iraqi air raid.or so they thought. Meanwhile, although their radar net was supposedly able to track aircraft up to 200km deep inside the Iranian airspace, the Iraqis were completely unaware of the two Iranian Tomcats nearby. The first sign of something going wrong for Capt. Mousa was when the pilot of one of the escorting Mi-8s which was flying a couple of kilometers ahead - shouted out a warning that no less than three of escorting fighters (or what was left of them) were falling out of the skies in flame to their left and right, and that the helicopter carrying generals should make a hard right turn in order to evade the debris. Seconds later, also one of the MiG-pilots started shouting warnings, saying that they had no clue what had attacked them, but strongly suggested the Mi-8 with the generals onboard to leave the area and immediately turn west! Seeing the wreckage of the downed MiGs falling towards him, Capt. Mousa was in a complete agreement with his colleagues, so he turned around, and the trip to the front by Maj. Gen. Rashid and Lt. Gen. Mohsen was over before it really started. Meanwhile, after spending all his medium- and long-range missiles to shoot down one MiG21 and two MiG-23s within a couple of seconds, Khosrodad returned to the tanker and advised several other F-4s in the area about the Iraqi fighters: his AWG-9 apparently never detected Iraqi helicopters which flew slow and low between the hills, and several kilometers behind the escorting fighters. The Phantoms indeed tried to intervene, but before finding the helicopters about which they did not know any way - they ran into a formation of IrAF Su-22s en route for an attack against Iranian ground troops. A wild dogfight developed, and as pilots from both sides tried to jettison their air-to-ground weapons, one of the Sukhois was shot down, while the rest of the Iraqi formation fled to the west. The battle continued without the Iraqi generals, and on the same day, Capt. Ali Gravedigger Shafi also got involved in an air combat. While attacking Iraqi armor, he was confronted with one of IrAAC Mi-25 and SA.342L hunter/killer teams. Short on fuel, Shafi and his gunner, WO Alai, only managed to fire two long bursts from their 20mm cannon at the Mi-25 before having to disengage and return to their base without observing the results of their attack. Capt. Shafi and WO Alai, however, were killed only five days later, when their AH-1J was shot down by the Iraqi anti-aircraft guns. By this time, the air-to-ground battle between the Iraqis and Iranians in the area between Eyn-e Khosh and Mandali was over for all purposes. Neither side could be completely satisfied: the Iraqis had suffered considerable losses in soldiers and equipment, and were forced to pull back from a number of important spots along the border. But, they successfully defended Mandali. Sacrificing at least two brigades of Basij, the Iranians breached the Iraqi front, but then their attack lost the momentum and no drive closer towards Baghdad was possible any more in the face of the stiff and bitter Iraqi resistance, even if the Iranians were this time particularly close to achieve a serious breakthrough. The Iraqis had managed to bring forward reinforcements from Baghdad and other parts of the front, and build new defence lines, as a result two highly promising Iranian offensives lost any chance of success, as the forces and material involved were simply insufficient and overstretched for prolonged battles of attrition.

Certainly the higher leadership of both sides were unable to recognize the importance and success of the airpower, even if it had proved itself once again beyond any doubt: therefore, all the successes and sacrifices of the Iranian and Iraqi fliers were again in vain. Having had a permission to deploy stronger armored reserves, which could have exploited the gaps in the Iraqi front, the Iranian Army could despite the very difficult terrain and poor roads have scored a decisive success even with the little air support the IRIAF/IRIAA could offer. Its soldiers were in good spirits, relatively well trained, and willing to fight deep into Iraq. Of course, with a fully operational IRIAF the Iranian Army could have done much more. Equally, an IrAF deployed to its advantage, instead of being limited to small-scale operations in response to Iranian offensives, could have tackled the enemy infantry more effectively and crush the Iranian operations in a much shorter time. Whatever the strategic outcome of the two Iranian offensives undertaken in autumn 1982 was, the results of the use of airpower against armor were humiliating to say for least. Not only that the armor was deployed mainly for the support of the slow-moving infantry, instead in bold drives through and behind the enemy lines, but the attack helicopters proved exceptionally effective and both the AH-1J and the SA.342L met expectations of many Western observers, confirming the results of different peace-time testing by the NATO. While the US Army expected an exchange ratio of around 16:1 for the battlefield in the Central Europe, the Iranians who used the same tactics and helicopters as the US Army and the USMC reached much higher ratios, of between 40 and 50:1. The lightly-armored French-built SA.342L Gazelle helicopters were typical representatives of the contemporary European ideas about the use of helicopters for anti-tank warfare: their obvious vulnerability proved these concepts as partially wrong. It was obvious that Gazelle lacked the armor protection for operations in a high-threat environment. Nevertheless, their HOT ATGMs, just like US-supplied TOWs used by the Iranians, had no particular problems with destroying tanks of any type, regardless if Soviet-built T-55s and T-62s, or US-built M60A-1s, and British Chieftains. The huge and powerful AT-2-armed Mi-25s obviously lacked the precision needed for effective anti-tank operations, but were highly efficient in suppressing enemy artillery and anti-aircraft defenses, and therefore could be used to support the Gazelles: the East German concept of the hunter/killer teams was therefore proved and confirmed in action.

Despite endless rumors about AIM-54s being "sabotaged by the CIA" or "Hughes technicians" during the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the stock of 270 AIM-54s delivered previously remained intact. Sabotaged were only 18 "ready to use" rounds, at the Khatami AB (TFB.8). All of these were subsequently repaired with help of spare parts purchased clandestinely from the USA. The IRIAF's F-14 Tomcat fleet was therefore well suited to continue using the weapon during the whole war against Iraq. This still from a video shows an AIM-54A being loaded under the left shoulder station of an Iranian F-14. (Authors' Collection)

Post Scriptum The following is known or can be said about some of the officers and pilots involved in the fighting between Iraq and Iran in the autumn of 1982, as well as eyewitnesses and participants who helped in research that resulted in this feature. - IrAAC Capt. Aduan Hassan Yassin went on to fight the Iranians until 1984. During his numerous combat missions with the Mi-25 in 1983, for example, he fired a total of 22 AT-2 ATGMs, scoring only two kills an Iranian M-113 APC and a M-60A-1 MBT, and damaging another M-60A-1 foremost due to the weaknesses of the weapon, the warhead of which was not powerful enough to penetrate the armor of heavier Iranian tanks. On 14 September 1983 he also claimed one IRIAA AH-1J as destroyed by a salvo of 57mm unguided rockets. During this time, his Mi-25 was damaged no less than nine times by Iranian fire. Finally, on 17 July 1984, together with another pilot of his unit he defected to Syria in two Mi-25s (both of which were taken over by the Syrians and included in the SyAAF). - IrAAC Capt. S. Mousa continued to fly Mi-8s until March of 1983, when his helicopter was shot down over Iranian positions and he taken prisoner of war. He was released from captivity a couple of years after the war was over, and subsequently emigrated from Iraq. - IrAF Capt. Ahmad Salem was decorated for his success against the Iranian Cobra helicopter and subsequently sent to France where he was trained on the Mirage F.1EQ fighters. Later during the war, he also flew AM.39 Exocet-equipped Mirage F.1EQ-5s in a total of 15 anti-shipping strikes against the Iranian tankers around the Khark Island. In late March 1987, while escorting a Su-22 strike against the oil installations on Khark, he claimed one IRIAF F-4E as shot down using two R.550 Magic Mk.I air-to-air missiles. His career as fighter pilot came to an abrupt end after his last anti-shipping strike, flown on 15 May 1987, during which he hit the USN frigate USS Stark (FFG-31) with two Exocets, causing death of 37 US sailors. Despite his and his superiors protests, he was grounded and put under observation by the Iraqi secret services, and felt his life threatened enough by the Iraqi regime to escape the country in 1989. - East German Capt. Ralf Geschke continued to advise Iraqi Mi-25 pilots and led one of the Mi-25 and SA.342L hunter/killer teams of the No.64 Sqn IrAAC until 16 June 1983, when he run out of luck, and his Hind was intercepted by the F-4E flown by IRIAF Lt. Col. Siavash Bayani, while on a training mission near Taji Army Air Base, in Iraq. LieutenantColonel Bayani, who had already shot down one Iraqi Mi-25 in 1980, destroyed Capt. Geschkes Hind by a Sidewinder shot, killing both of its crewmembers. - IRIAF Maj. Jalal Zandi known as an excellent pilot, but often described as brazen, continued his career with IRIAF, in spite of frequent and fierce disagreements with Col. Abbas Babaie, an officer differently described as the mastermind of IRIAFs capability to keep its F-14-fleet intact, or simply a war hero. There are, however, numerous former IRIAF pilots who not only deny that Babaie ever even qualified on F-14s, but also outright refuse to even mention his name, most likely because of his close cooperation with the clerical regime in Tehran. Zandi survived all his differences with Babaie, and numerous air battles with Iraqi Air Force, to claim a total of nine confirmed (through examination with US intelligence documents released according to FOIA inquiry) and two or three probable kills. It is possible that he scored between eleven and 12 air-to-air victories, thus becoming the most successful F-14-Tomcat pilot ever, and certainly the leading IRIAF ace. He retired only a couple of years ago with the rank of Lieutenant General, but died in a car accident, in 2001.

- IRIAF Maj. Shahram Rostami also continued a successful career, during which he flew not only F-4 Phantom IIs, but also - mostly - F-14A Tomcats, claiming several more air-toair kills as well. Already in December 1982, for example, he shot down an Iraqi MiG-25RB that operated at more than 60,000ft and Mach 2.1 over the Persian Gulf, using a single AIM-54A missile fired from a range of more than 70km. He later became the deputy commander of the IRIAF. Despite many merits and virtues, never really reached the highest brass in the IRIAF, and eventually emigrated from Iran. Many other Iranian and Iraqi pilots and officers which participated in these battles would not survive the war, while most of the survivors were meanwhile forced to leave their countries. All of them agree with this account, even if few dispute specific details as given here. The lessons they learned in these bloody battles were largely ignored by the public for different reasons. In the hope that these highly valuable memories will be saved this way, the authors of this article would like to thank and express gratitude to all those who provided help and advice, especially The Last of the First granted on the strict understanding that, except certain cases, the individuals would not be named.

A photo from luckier days - and a historical document? This photograph taken in July 1977, should also be showing the then 1st Lt. Abbas Baba'ie (rear row, first from the left). If this is truth, then Abbas Baba'ie was obviously one of early Iranian pilots qualified on Tomcats. (IIAF-Association via Authors) Sources and Bibliography Although repeatedly asked to this topic we are not ready to reveal any names of (or directly point at) eyewitnesses and participants involved in research related to this article. This is a measure necessary for several reasons. We are aware that this enables a number of persons to criticize our work (often fiercely), even to offend us personally, but we consider the privacy and personal safety of our sources as untouchable. Of written documents released through FOIA inquiry, the most useful was SPEARTIP 01490.

Without intention to offend anybody, but considering the obvious need to inform, and with greatly appreciated help of Mr. Scott Buddha Barnes, retired US Army AH-1-pilot, we have reconstructed the approximate flow of spread of the story about an Iraqi Mi-24 using an AT6 to shot down an IRIAF F-4 Phantom in different publications: - 27 October 1982: Baghdad Observer magazine, publishes (on p.4) report Day of the Helicopter Gunship, stating that an Iraqi Mi-25 Hind shot down an Iranian F-4 Phantom, north of the Eyn Khosh area. The report further stated that the Soviets brought a specially prepared Mi-24 Hind with a next generation longer range AT-6 Spiral ATGM, that was tested in the air-to-air mode. - 28 October 1982: FBIS cites report from Baghdad Observer in Communiqu No.885, FBIS-MEA-82-209, p.E2 - May 1984: the same claim is cited in Hind, Overpowering or Overrated, Air International, p.252 - 1986: Anti-Tank Helicopters, by Steven J. Zaloga & George Balin, p.36 - 1988: Advanced Combat Helicopters, Evolving Roles, Motorbooks International, p.10 - 1988: Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army, by David C. Isby, Janes, 2nd Edition, p.442 - 1988: Soviet Helicopters, by John Everett-Heath, Janes, 2nd Edition, p.131 - June 1989: Mr. Marat Nikolaevich Tishenko, then chief designer for the Mil Design Bureau, confirmed this claim at the 1989 Paris Air Show, and in a personal interview to Mr. Barnes, in Miami, in February 1992. - September 1989: Russian Round-Up, by John Fricker, Air International, p.131 - January 1990: Recent Soviet Rotary-wing Revelations, by John Fricker, p.19 - October/November 1990: Iraqs Rotary Assets, Part 1, by Yossef Bodansky, Defense Helicopter World Vol. 9/No.5, p.24 - October 1992: Gallery of Middle East Airpower, by John W. R. Taylor & Kenneth Munson, Air Force Magazine, p.68-69 - 2001: "Mil Mi-24 Hind; Attack Helicopter", by Yefim Gordon, Airlife Publishing, p.70 - February 2001: Fighter vs. Helicopter Air Combat, by Scott Reynolds, Air International, p.111 Appendix I History of IRGC Armored Formations The first armored units of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) were equipped almost exclusively with MBTs and APCs captured from Iraq, specifically: - 160 vehicles captured during the Operation "Samene-al-Aeme" (breaking siege of

Abadan), in September 1981 - 170 vehicles (including 100 MBTs and 70 APCs) captured during the Operation "Tarigh alQods" (liberation of Bostan), in November 1981 - 320 vehicles (including 150 MBTs and 170 APCs) captured during the Operation Fath-ulMobin (on the front west of Dezful and near Shush), in March 1982 - 105 vehicles captured during the Operation Bait al-Mugaddas (liberation of Khorramshahr), in April 1982. During the early stages of the war the IrA and the IRIA were actually using similar equipment, including BMP-1s, BTR-50s and BTR-60s; however, only the BTR-60s were really operational with the Iranian Army, while other vehicles were in storage. The IRIA was mainly using Western equipment, and first had to develop an infrastructure to maintain and develop the bulk of captured MBTs and APCs. It was mainly for such reasons that the Iraqi MBTs captured during the first year of the war were usually stripped of their heavy machine guns but otherwise left where found, to later be picked up by salvage companies. Sometimes the local IRIA troops would also try to use captured tanks as static artillery. The situation began changing in September 1981, when Iranians captured some 160 intact vehicles of the 3rd Iraqi armored Division (including 6AB and 8MB), when this was shattered on the eastern bank of Karoun River. These vehicles, and extensive support from IRIA's technical services, enabled the IRGC to establish one mechanized battalion, with some 200 personnel, operating a total of ten MBTs and 35 APCs. This unit successfully participated in the Offensive Tarigh al-Qods, in November 1981, resulting in the liberation of Bostan and capture of even more Iraqi equipment, including 170 MBTs and APCs. The IRGC armored battalion was therefore expanded into the 30 Armored Brigade IRGC. This formation was swiftly trained and ready to participate in the next large-scale operation, Fath ul-Mobin, in March 1982, when some 330 Iraqi armored vehicles were captured. In the event, by April 1982, the IRGC operated a total of some 500 T-54/55s and various APCs captured from the Iraqi Army. These were further reinforced by addition of 100 BMP-1 IFVs, taken from IRIA storage. Most of these vehicles were concentrated into the newlyestablished 30 Armored Division IRGC. This unit consisted of four battle groups and a single support group. To facilitate training and operations of the new division, training and maintenance facilities were set up in Khuzestan, enabling it to become operational within barely a month and start the Operation Beith al-Mugaddas with a total of some 400 MBTs and APCs in service. This unit is known to have suffered some 300 KIA during liberation of Khorramshahr, and even more extensive casualties during the first Iranian offensive on Basrah, the Operation Ramadhan.

I Persian Gulf War, 1980-1988 The Mother of all Build-Ups During the 1970s, both Iran and Iraq invested heavily on their air forces, creating not only two of the largest and most powerful air arms in the Middle East, but also worldwide. The circumstances and the results of these investments remain largely unnoticed, just like the details about the deployment and operations of both air forces in the long and bloody war of attrition between the two countries, fought between 1980 and 1988. In 1960s and 1970s, Iran was a firm US ally; consequently, the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF) was developed along the USAF lines, and relied on US threat perceptions, doctrine, strategies, tactics, purchasing, production, as well as training policies. Everything in the IIAF, its air power doctrine and capabilities, was tailored for supporting a joint US-Iranian operation against a possible Soviet invasion of Iran from the north. Even the traditions and markings of the IIAF strongly resembled those of the US Air Force (USAF). A chain of huge air bases and a widespread early warning system were erected against the USSR. Consequently, the self-sufficient structure of the IIAF was weak during the 1970s, and was planned to be developed during the 1980s. Instead, during the 1970s, Iran was turned into a huge forward base for local as well as the US forces, where huge stocks of spare parts and weapons were piled. Partially, such a policy was also influenced by the fact that after learning about Israeli problems in 1973, the Iranians began to order additional amounts of equipment, spare parts and weapons, which could enable them to fight an intensive war for many months without any external help. The IIAFs strategic stocks, managed by the costly Peacelog automated inventory system, became so huge that even in 1986 the emerging Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) was still using bombs and missiles purchased during the 1970s even if expired shelf-lives of most items caused operating difficulties. By constantly taking part in joint exercises with the USAF, USN, RAF and the Turkish and Pakistani air forces, in addition to sending its best crews and pilots for training courses to the US and Israel, the IIAF honed the skills of its chain of command, pilots, and technical personnel to highest possible degrees. Iranian reconnaissance assets were also involved in constant monitoring operations along the Soviet borders, together with USAF/CIA personnel and equipment. The IIAF was trained to function as a member of a team with large and farreaching objectives, and so had to keep the pace. There were some problems, like lack of proper EW systems and gaps in radar coverage of the Iranian airspace, as well as a lack of effective anti-shipping systems, but they were recognized and measures were taken to rectify them. During the late 1960s and through 1970s, the IIAF took delivery from the USA up to 104 Northrop F-5A/Bs Freedom Fighters, and then continued with purchases of 32 McDonnell Douglas F-4Ds, 177 F-4Es, 165 F-5E/Fs, at least 20 RF-4Es (only 16 of which were delivered officially), and 80 Grumman F-14As, as well as a large fleet of Boeing 7073J9C tankers, Lockheed C-130E/H Hercules transports, and a number of Boeing 747-2J9C strategic transports. By 1979, up to 300 F-16A/Bs, seven Boeing E-3A AWACS aircraft and other assets were on order, negotiations for 75 more F-14As were due to start, and the IIAF was also to build the most comprehensive training installations outside the USA, very similar to those used for the Red Flag exercises. Training began with a fast pace, in the US, and young Iranian officers started undergoing F-16 flying and AWACS control courses. Despite having only 450 combat aircraft, and planning to get around 400 more by 1982, bases and facilities built in Iran could easily accommodate and support as many as 3,000 fighter and support aircraft. For comparison, when the US deployed its forces to the region after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in late 1990, it stationed around 2,400 aircraft on various air bases spread in five countries in the region as well as on aircraft carriers, within six months. Interestingly this number peaked at 2,790 aircraft (very close to the 3,000

number) on February 24, 1991. The infrastructure for such an operation was not available, however, and had to be hastily improvised: on most air bases, the US, British, and French aircraft initially stood exposed to a harsh climate, and even if after several months a large number of makeshift shelters were built, most of the aircraft were not properly protected for the duration of their deployment in the area, while most airfields were simply overtaxed. No such problems would be encountered, if bases in Iran were available to the Gulf alliance. Iraq, to the contrary, could not count on any such support. Although the Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) is the oldest Arab air force (established already in 1924), the policies of the countrys leadership increasingly isolated it from the outside world. For more than 30 years, the IrAF was organized, trained, and equipped by the British, and the British influenced every aspect of the Iraqi air force structure and operations, including the air policing of Kurdish areas in northern Iraq. After the fall of the monarchy, in 1958, the IrAF began to increasingly equip itself with Soviet-built aircraft. To many observers, it was logical therefore to describe the IrAF as an entity operating according to the Soviet doctrine, while the fact was that after purchasing over 60 Hawker Hunters during the early 1960s, the Iraqis were never satisfied with what they had got from the Soviets, and tried hard to get more hardware from the West. For different reasons, however, deals for SEPECAT Jaguars, BAe Hawks, and Dassault Mirage 5s were all spoiled, and it was not before 1977 that Iraq finally ordered its first large numbers of Western combat aircraft and helicopters - from France.

Mirage F.1EQ built for the IrAF, as seen before delivery, during testing in France, in 1980. The type - and even more so its weapons, manuals and French instructors brought the IrAF pilots into the world of modern air warfare, equipping them with a potent and far reaching attack platform, but also a reasonable high-level interceptor. Mirages saw extensive use, but losses were heavy, and by the end of the war none of a total of six units equipped with them was left with more than eight airframes. (Dassault, via Authors) The isolation from the outside was felt also in training, operations, and capabilities of the IrAF. Under constant observation and heavy pressure by the ruling regimes, the IrAF became at least as much a victim of the usual tendency of its officers to mix into the politics, as it suffered from being equipped with second-class hardware supplied by the USSR, which simply would not make it more capable of defending the huge Iraqi airspace. This was one of the reasons why the IrAF leaned heavily on Indian Air Force (IAF) instead on the Soviets for training during the 1970s and a better part of 1980s. This changed only to a slight degree in 1979, when a massive contract was signed with Moscow, covering

delivery of over 200 combat aircraft and helicopters, including the first Mi-25 Hinds and MiG-25 Foxbats. The purchase of the latter, namely, was conditioned by the Soviets on the presence of a large number of their advisors, which were to keep the Foxbats stationed at the Shoaibah AB, near Basrah under control for a number of years to come. The IrAF had also some limited combat experiences from a few wars against Israel, and the continuous low intensity fighting against the Kurdish insurgency. The Iraqis barely learned any important lessons from the war in 1967, but very closely observed the October War of 1973, in which several IrAF squadrons took part as well. The Iraqis understood very well that under given circumstances, they did not have any choice but to form an air defense command along the Soviet lines, equipped with almost 100 Mikoyan MiG-21s, over two hundred SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 SAM sites, and a large number of anti-aircraft guns. Despite the size of their country, and the long borders with their neighbors, however, the Iraqis could merely concentrate their SAM sites and point defense interceptors around the vital installations: between such areas, over 90% of the Iraqi airspace was not permanently defended. The rest of the air force, was equipped with MiG-23s which were a huge disappointment for the Iraqis limited-capability Sukhoi Su-7s (mainly used for training) and Su-20/-22 attack planes, while a single bomber wing flew Ilyushin Il-28s, and Tupolev Tu-16s and Tu-22s. Thus, while by 1979 the IIAF was an excellent force on the verge of becoming a power of strategic proportions equipped with first-class weapons and systems, the IrAF was still a small tactical asset, the most modern combat aircraft of which was MiG-23.

Tu-22Bs, delivered in mid1970s, and operated by two squadrons of the IrAF were the most potent bombers in the Iraqi arsenal early during the war, and were used intensively for striking targets deep inside Iran. The type proved exceptionally complex to maintain and operate, and the units equipped with it had to cease operations several times during the war. Nevertheless, they proved very precise in bombing and were used time and again: in their last combat sortie, Iraqi Tu-22s flew as part of a huge strike package which hit Iranian tankers at Khark very hard, on March 18, 1988, but one was shot down by Iranian interceptors during that operation. (via Tom Cooper)

The Iraqi Invasion The chain of events, which finally led to the Iraqi invasion of its eastern neighbor, was directly initiated by the Islamic revolution in Iran, in February 1979, which followed a series of unrests throughout the country, starting in 1978. The demise of the Shahs regime had tremendous consequences for the IIAF, which not only lost its name, but also its whole command staff. Constant purges through 1979 and 1980, and plans by the new regime to cleanse the air force suspected of being royalist and disloyal to Islam not only caused hundreds of the air force officers to be purged, imprisoned or executed, but finally threatened even the bare existence of the whole service. This was certainly one of the most influential reasons for the Iraqis to attack Iran; it was clear, namely, that the IrAF had no chances against an intact and fully operational Iranian air force. Although the combat operations during the First Persian Gulf War were officially started on the afternoon of September 22, 1980, intensive fighting along the central sector of the Iraqi-Iranian border erupted already on September 4, and until today, Iraqis consider this date as the starting point of the war. During most of September, both the IrAF and the IRIAF supported ground forces with a large number of reconnaissance and combat sorties. Far better equipped and trained Iranians caused extensive losses to the Iraqis, even if their operations were hampered by technical problems, and also by the need to simultaneously fight an Iraqi-supported Kurdish revolt in the northwest Iran which was costly in terms of helicopters, aircraft, and crews lost. Despite losses, the lack of any powerful Iranian response during early skirmishes, the reports on the dreadful condition of the Iranian armed forces, and the clandestine support from the US (which delivered blueprints of the Iranian air defense system to Baghdad), Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, ensured Iraqis that a war against Iran could be successfully initiated and quickly concluded probably with the crushing of the new regime in Tehran itself. Therefore, on the afternoon of September 22, 1980, the Iraqis initiated a war against Iran with a massive armored onslaught into the southwestern province of Khuzestan, and a simultaneous two-wave attack by the IrAF against most important IRIAF air bases in western and central Iran. The air offensive flown by heavily armed aircraft but lacking the needed capabilities, and pilots who lacked proper training turned into a complete failure, and not even another try, on the following morning, could preclude the IRIAF to respond in full power. Only four hours after the first Iraqi attack, namely, four Iranian F-4 Phantoms bombed the Rashid AB, in southern Baghdad, and utilizing IIAF-era contingency plans on the morning of September 23, no less than 140 Iranian F-4D/E Phantoms, F-5E/Fs and F-14s responded by an aerial onslaught against Iraq. Thus a relative aerial siege of Iraq was initiated, which was to last for almost a week, and during which the IRIAF continued to put large formations of fighter-bombers over Iraq each morning, systematically destroying Iraqi oil-production and war-fighting capabilities, and also forcing most of the IrAF into exile, in Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Equipped with ECM pods, BL.755 CBUs, and the Mk.80 series of bombs, and using specially reconnoitered ingress corridors, the Iranians had not much problems in flying almost completely undisturbed deep into Iraq. If the IrAF managed to intercept any formation, its fighters were usually detected in time, and shot down in large numbers. On September 25, for example, no less than five MiG-21s and MiG-23s were shot down in a single air combat near Baghdad, in exchange for two damaged Phantoms. When the IrAF tried to attack deep into Iran, even if flying along blind spots of the Iranian early warning radar system - the Iraqi formations were frequently intercepted, and several times shot down to the last plane. Especially units equipped with the MiG-23s suffered severely.

A reconnaissance photograph of the Iraqi al-Hurriyah AB, near Kirkuk, taken on September 25, 1980, by an IRIAF recon jet, minutes after the airfield was attacked by Iranian Phantoms. Note the bomb crater on the top of the HAS: the hit cracked the concrete, but the two Iraqi MiG-21s seem to have escaped any serious damage. Iranian RF-4Es and RF5Es, flown by some of the best Iranian pilots, flew hundreds of extremely dangerous reconnaissance missions deep into Iraq. (Authors collection) After almost a week of intensive attacks against Iraqi targets, the IRIAF had to change its strategy, as the Iraqi Army was now driving almost 60km deep into southern Iran putting several Iranian cities and important air bases under threat, while the list of the targets in Iraq was almost exhausted, and bad weather hampered many of the operations. Consequently, the Iranians threw the whole power of their air force to stop the Iraqis. This task was completed by late October 1980, albeit at a very heavy price, as a lack of proper EW systems, and even chaff and flare dispensers, became evident. The Iraqi invasion, however, saved the lives of numerous Iranian unattached officers, who were released from Islamic regimes prisons, in order to help in the fighting. Together with other skilled personnel, these pilots were to become the most important asset at the hands of the IRIAF for the rest of the war.

F-4E Phantom II in colors of the Iranian Air Force and armed with four Hunting BL.755 CBUs, photographed from a Boeing 707-3J9C tanker, seconds after ending an in-flight refueling operation on the start of another frantic mission into Iraq. Fast and powerful, the Phantom II was used by Iranians for every possible task, and was frequently flown far beyond deeming possible. Surprisingly vital, the type remained effective throughout the war, and also successful in air-to-air combat, scoring victories against much more modern types as late as May 1988. (Authors collection) Iran Strikes Back By January 1981, the Iranians already felt capable of starting a counteroffensive, but their first large offensive, the operation Howeizeh, initiated on January 5, ended in failure and caused considerable losses in equipment of the regular forces. As a result, for the next few years the IRIAF and the Army were not to participate intensively in any other offensive operations, except in support of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Nevertheless, this support often proved indispensable, so during the retaking of Khoramshahr, in September 1982, and the final expulsion of the Iraqis from Iran, in the Spring of 1982, the IRIAF but also the Iranian Army Aviation (IRIAA) destroyed huge amounts of Iraqi equipment. The IrAF, to the contrary, after a short recovery in spring and summer of 1981, was at the end of its strength by late 1982, and only huge urgent deals with China with Egyptian and Saudi help and the USSR, which re-started delivery of the replacement equipment (stopped earlier in protest to the Iraqi invasion of Iran), saved it from annihilation. Therefore, through 1983, the IrAF was foremost preoccupied with reorganizing, while the IRIAF tried to conserve its remaining strength by limiting crossborder sorties and organize first large clandestine shipments of spare parts from the US, as it was clear now that the war was to last for a conceivable future. By 1984, the Iranian ground forces were reorganized well enough for the IRGC to start its first strategic offensive the Operation Kheibar which included a swift crossing of the Howeizeh marshes with the large-scale help of IRIAA helicopters, and the capture of the Majnoon Islets, with the eventual target of severing the communication lines between Baghdad and the second largest Iraqi city, Basrah. Despite increasing problems with the maintenance of its aircraft foremost caused not by the lack of spare parts, but by intensive operations which precluded usual maintenance schedules the IRIAF supported these operations by at least 100 combat sorties per day on average, which was simply not enough. On the other side, as the Iranian battlefield air defenses were not effectively developed and repaired, the IrAF and the IrAAC had their field days hunting Iranian troop concentrations in the barren terrain of the southern front.

A stunningly close shot of the Iraqi National Assembly (Majless ol-Vattani) in Baghdad, taken by an IRIAF RF-4E early in the war. (Authors collection)

The Iraqi Air Force kept the IRIAF and IRIAA under constant pressure during the whole war, frequently raiding airfields and helicopter bases in western and southern Iran. Most of them, however, were not especially effective, as Iranian air bases were huge and excellently hardened, but time and again some Iranian aircraft, including few F-4s and F-5s, were destroyed. (via Authors)

An F-5E from the TFB.4 (Vahdati AB, near Dezful) seen in flight at low level over the Karkheh River, in Khuzestan Province, Iran. The Tiger IIs flew the highest number of sorties of all IRIAF aircraft during the war. Both the F-5E and the F-5Fs were used intensively for all kinds of tasks, including close air support, battlefield interdiction, interdiction strike deep into Iraq, reconnaissance, and even CAP. Despite some weaknesses, they also scored a number of aerial victories, even against much more modern and powerful aircraft. (Authors collection) The same year saw also an intensification and internationalization of the so-called Tanker War, which was going on at a slow pace already since autumn 1981. It now saw both sides attacking Persian Gulf shipping. This development was one of the most brilliant Iraqi strategic moves during the war. Even if the Iraqi attacks against the Iranian shipping were very costly both in terms of expensive equipment required, and immense technical and tactical problems, which caused suffering losses for hardly any results and never totally successful, it internationalized the conflict which could only be to Iraqi advantage. Namely, by ordering their anti-shipping weapons from France, and later by gaining support for such operations from the United States, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (as well as Bahrain and Qatar, which permitted Iraqis to use their airspace), the Iraqis were to assure not only more help and support for them, but also to cause direct confrontation between Iran and the US which was one that Iran had no winning chance. In addition, it forced Iranians to concentrate a considerable amount of their high value assets much-needed to support the land offensives on defending shipping and offshore oil facilities.

The weapon of choice in the Tanker War: Mirage F.1EQ-5, designed and built specially for the IrAF, launching an AM.39 Exocet during the trials in the Gulf of Biscay, in 1982. The IrAF started using the Exocet already in October 1981, six months before the Falklands War and with slightly more success than the Argentineans. But, with the time and for a number of reasons including the improved construction of modern merchant ships, introduction of improved countermeasures by Iranians, a highly effective convoy system, and poor Iraqi targeting procedures this expensive weapon remained relatively ineffective, and could never seriously threat the flow of Iranian oil exports. Out of over 400 strikes in which some 600 Exocets were expended, some 250 hits were scored, causing a loss of 115 ships (less than 1% of all the ships which were underway through the Iranian side of the northern Persian Gulf between October 1981 and June 1988). (Dassault, via Authors) The War of Many Wars The Tanker War was also the dominant feature in the air war during 1985; a year in which the IRIAF was again reinforced by more clandestine deliveries of spare parts and weapons from the US and Israel a tendency which was to increase in 1986 and 1987. Reinforced, combat experienced, and better trained than before, the Iranians then prepared their most successful offensive of the war, the Valfajr-8, the target of which was the Faw Peninsula, in southern Iraq. The offensive was initiated on the evening of February 9, 1986, and was instantly a huge success, with Iranians not only capturing the whole peninsula and the port of Faw, but also badly mauling the Iraqi Army and air force. The IRIAF and the IRIAA conducted intensive operations as well, adding to the carnage on the battlefield, but also flying again deep into Iraq, including a raid against the H-2 pumping station over 600km deep inside Iraq, which was hit on February 15, by four Phantoms that flew the operation without the help of in-flight refueling. Downing of around 45 Iraqi aircraft foremost by HAWK SAMs and Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns - was another turning point in the

Iranian air defense strategy, a strategy that had begun to transform into an effective counter to the increasing Iraqi air activity towards the end of the war.

The carnage on IraqiIranian battlefields was massive, as the war could at best be described as a catalog of many major campaigns, each similar in intensity and size to the 1973 war between Israel and the Arabs. Iranian authorities documented wreckages of several hundreds of Iraqi fighters and helicopters found behind Iranian lines. This is a Su-22M, shot down by an Iranian MIM-23 HAWK SAM near the city of Faw, on February 16, 1986. The pilot did not manage to eject. After the great disappointment with MiG-23BN, the Su-20/-22 became the next Iraqi hope, and with the time it developed into the most important Iraqi strike asset. The losses were heavy and less than 50% of all the 160 examples delivered between 1974 and 1986 survived the war. (Authors collection). For the rest of 1986, and until the Spring of 1988, the IRIAFs efficiency in air defense constantly increased, as not only new or repaired weapons, but also new and more innovative tactical methods were brought to bear. For example, the Iranians would integrate loosely their SAM sites and interceptors to create true killing fields, to which dozens of Iraqi planes would be lost (which in turn caused reports in the West, about the IRIAF using F-14s as mini-AWACS). The IrAF reacted by increasing the sophistication of its equipment, incorporating a massive use of modern ECM pods, chaff, ARMs and chemical weapons.

Iranian P-3Fs, operated by the IRIAF but in very close coordination with the Iranian Navy (IRIN), also remained operational. They were usually stationed at Bandar Abbas with their main maintenance base at Shiraz and were used extensively for patrolling the Persian Gulf. Their activities were instrumental for Iranian capability to track the international shipping but also avoid confrontations with the USN. (via Authors) By that time, it became clear to the IRIAF that it could not win the war, despite its sophisticated equipment, as it lacked enough equipment and personnel to sustain a war of attrition that developed, and would not be permitted to lead an outright onslaught against Iraq. The IrAF, to the contrary, lacked truly modern equipment and experienced pilots. This was now to change, as after pleads from the Iraqi military structure, Iraqi dictator finally decreased the political influence on every-day operations, and left the fighting of the war to his combatants. In addition, the Soviets due to their own financial problems started delivering more advanced aircraft and weapons to Iraq, while the French considerably improved the training of the flying crews and technical personnel, and continuously introduced new methods for countering Iranian weapons and tactics. The results of such change were increasingly felt by the Iranians from late 1986, through the whole 1987, and until the end of the war, as the IrAF moved on a comprehensive campaign against the Iranian economic infrastructure. The main Iraqi target now was the destruction of Iranian war fighting capability, and the IrAF much reinforced by more modern weapons and equipment delivered from France, USSR, and even the US was to succeed in this task, regardless of immense losses it suffered in exchange. By late 1987, the IrAF could count on direct US support for the conduct of its long-range operations against Iranian infrastructural targets, and oil installations deep into the Persian Gulf. USN ships actively tracked any movements of Iranian shipping and defenses, and reported them to Iraqis. This tendency went so far that in February and March 1988, in several occasions when the USN did supply targeting information to the Iraqi air force, but did not warn their aircraft of Iranian

interceptors presence, the Iraqis would each time suffer considerable losses. A good example for such events was the massive IrAF strike against Khark island, flown on March 18, 1988, in which the Iraqis destroyed two supertankers, causing immense loss of lives, but also themselves losing five aircraft to Iranian F-14 Tomcats, including two Tupolev Tu22Bs, and one Mikoyan MiG-25RB.

Deemed "written off" by all Western sources, Iranian fleet of F-14As remained fully operational and played the most prominent role in the air defense of strategically important installations during all eight years of the air war between Iraq and Iran. The type not only scored dozens of kills, but was even more influential due to its sheer firepower: the Iraqis so feared the F-14 and its AIM-54A missiles that their pilots were instructed to avoid engagements with Tomcats at any price. Therefore, almost 60% of engagements between Iranian F-14s and Iraqi aircraft ended without even a bullet being fired but with Iraqis retreating at high speed. Those which failed to recognize the threat, or decided to continue, usually suffered extremely heavy losses as Iranian Tomcats scored repeatedly using all available weapons. Never before in the history of modern air warfare could any interceptor claim such effectiveness. (Author's collection) After this catastrophe, the IrAF never again flew any large-scale raids into the Persian Gulf; however, such tactics were no more necessary, as now the USN was to directly confront the Iranians a move important also because it forced the IRIAF to re-deploy considerable assets from fighting Iraq, as well as from defending important economic assets, to the Strait of Hormuz area. This could also be seen by the clerical leadership, who had sent the IRGC to attack heavily defended Iraqi positions around Basrah, in February and December 1987, resulting in immense losses, as a face-saving opportunity. The simultaneous end of the clandestine US support for Iran coincided with the increasing pressure by the IrAF against the Iranian economy. Iran, was now rapidly running out of economic strength and will to fight. In that sense, the American Operation Praying Mantis, undertaken on April 18 1988 simultaneously with the Iraqi offensive, which liberated the Faw Peninsula from Iranian occupation, not only badly mauled the Iranian Navy, but also

made it clear to the leadership in Tehran that the conflict had to be ended sooner rather than later. The downing of the Iran Air Airbus A300, on July 3, 1988, heavy losses of the IRIAA during the fighting on the central front, and the downing of two F-14As by Iraqi Mirage F.1EQ-6s, on July 19, were in that sense only some of the last acts in a war, which was indeed lost and won if the fact that the Iraqi regime survived a war determined to be ended with its demise, can be considered as a victory by air power, or lack of the same.

USN A-6E from VA-95 Green Lizards dropping CBUs on Iranian warships and speedboats during the Operation Praying Mantis, on April 18, 1988. Praying Mantis almost broke the back of the Iranian Navy, decreased its capability to escort convoys of oil tankers between the Khark Island and the Hormuz, and almost crushed the superiority it had enjoyed in the war against Iraq so far. Nevertheless, for the Iraqis, this operation came too late, as by that time they had given up trying to stop the Iranian oil exports via Khark. (USN photo) Unrecognized Lessons The experiences from the use of airpower during the Iran-Iraq War are of immense importance, yet completely ignored. It was the first war in which both sides used a large number of medium-range air-to-air missiles (MRAAMs). Even more so, it was the first war in which long-range air-to-air missiles (LRAAMs) precisely, the AIM-54A Phoenix were used, with huge success to engage tactical fighters. It was also the first war, in which an air force the Iraqi started to fly in small formations at medium levels and deploy standoff weapons in huge numbers in order to evade ground-based air defenses, instead of penetrating at very low levels. The Iran-Iraq War was also the first war in which both fighting sides attacked each others nuclear reactors, and in which the surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) were introduced by both sides as weapons of terror. It was an air war in which both sides made extensive use of all possible means of the electronic warfare; by 1988, the use of ECM or the lack thereof was decisive factor and a matter of life and death of many fliers on both sides. The First Persian Gulf War was also the first conflict in

which armed UAVs were deployed by Iran to attack land targets. And, finally, for the first time in anger, very-high-flying aircraft were shot down at their maximum operating altitude using LRAAMs. Despite all, the air war between Iraq and Iran was so far one of the least known, worst researched, and most ignored and misunderstood air wars ever. The most likely reason for this fact is that the war was used as a testing ground for a huge number of diverse weapons systems, many of which debuted nowhere near as expected or advertised by their manufacturers, as well as the fact that both the West and the former Soviet Union completely underestimated the capabilities of the two involved sides to wage a high-tech war, instead preferring to concentrate on some of the best known and most successful propaganda-campaigns of the 20th Century.

I Persian Gulf War: Iraqi Invasion of Iran, September 1980 Iraq Iraqi Army (IrA)

1400hrs, 22 September 1980: the T-62s of the 6th AD crossing the Iranian border. With the air strikes of the Iraqi air force, and the drive of the Iraqi ground troops, the war started. It was to end only eight years later, after terrible losses and immense destruction upon both, Iraq and Iran. (all photos Tom Cooper collection) In August 1980 the Iraqi Military had 212.000 troops, 2.000 tanks, 1.000 artillery pieces, 370 combat aircraft, and 230 helicopters. The Order of Battle of the Iraqi Army was as follows: I Army Corps (sector between Rawanduz and Marivan) - 7th Infantry Division (HQ Soleimaniyah) - 11th Infantry Division (HQ Soleimaniyah; including 113IB, parts of which were detached to III Army Corps) II Army Corps (sector between Qassre-Shirin, Ilam, and Mehran, armor deployed between Mehran and Dezful) - 6th Armored Division (HQ Baqubah) - 9th Armored Division (HQ Samavah; 35AB, 43AB, 14MB) - 10th Armored Division (HQ Baghdad, 17AB, 42AB, 24MB) - 2nd Infantry Division (HQ Kirkuk) - 4th Infantry Division (HQ Mawsil) - 6th Infantry Division (HQ Baqubah) - 8th Infantry Division (HQ Arbil) III Army Corps (HQ al-Qurnah, sector between Dezful and Abadan)

- 3rd Armored Division (HQ Tikrit; 6AB, 12AB, 8MB) - 10th Armored Division (HQ Baghdad; 10AB) - 12th Armored Division (HQ Dahuoq; held in reserve) - 1st Mechanized Division (HQ Divaniyeh; 1MB, 27MB, 34AB) - 5th Mechanized Division (HQ Basrah; 26AB, 15MB, 20MB) - 10th Independent AB - 31st Independent Special Forces Brigade (minus two battalions: one was attached to 5th Mechanized Division, another to 3rd Armored Division), - 33rd Independent Special Forces Brigade - 113 Infantry Brigade (detachments) There were also two independent armored brigades, the 10th and the 12th, dislocations of which are as of yet unclear. Standard Iraqi armored division (AD) of the time had two armored (equipped with 300 T-62 MBTs) and one mechanized brigade (with BMP-1 ICVs), a single artillery brigade (with selfpropelled artillery), and support elements. A standard Iraqi mechanized division (MD) had one armored brigade (equipped with 200 T-54/55s), one mechanized brigade (equipped with Czech OT-64s APCs or BTR-50s), and one artillery brigade, as well as support elements. According to Western sources, in September 1980 the IrA operated some 100 T-72 tanks, probably attached to the 10th Independent Armored Brigade, based at al-Rashid Barracks, in Baghdad. Some Iraqi sources state that the first shot of the war was in fact fired by their T-72s. However, there is no firm confirmation yet that the Iraqi Army indeed operated T72s at this stage of the war. Their first confirmed appearance occurred only in 1982. All Iraqi ADs and MDs had also an organic air defense regiment, consisting of at least one SA-6 SAM-site (contrary to many wrong reports, the Iraqi SA-6s always remained under the Army control), SA-9s, and ZSU-23-4s. At later stages of the war the SA-13s replaced SA-9s in most of the mechanized formations.

Within only few days after the start of the war, the Iraqi troops already learned to fear the attacks of the Iranian air force - especially the AGM-65 Maverick-armed F-4Es: the crew of this BMP-1 is evacuating their vehicle in hurry because of two Phantoms that appeared over the horizon.

Iraqi Army Air Corps (IrAAC) The IrAAC at the time operated two Composite Combat Transport Wings (the 1st and the 2nd) with a total of eight squadrons of helicopters. Each of the squadrons had several flights, each of which was equipped with a different types of helicopters, so that every squadron had a number of Mi-8s, SA.342L Gazelles, and SE.316 Alouette IIIs on order. The exception from this rule was the 4th Assault, Transport, Training, and Special Operations Squadron (4th ATTSOC), which, beside the Mi-8s and SA.342Ls, also operated all the 17 Mi-25s available to the Iraqis at the time, as equipment of the 4th Squadrons Special Operations Unit (4th SSOC). Also, the 3rd Assault, Transport, and Training Squadron operated the handful of remaining Wessex HU.Mk.52 helicopters. The main base of the IrAAC was al-Taji, but different flights from different squadrons were deployed at many different sites throughout the country. The 4th ATTSOC/4th SSOC, for example, had usually pairs of Mi-25s based at Basrah International, near the Presidential palace in Baghdad, alKut, Kirkuk, Nassiriyah, Jalibah, Ruthbah, and Tallil. Very early after its establishment in 1980, the Mi-25s of the 4th SSOC were armed with chemical weapons, and the unit would usually have at least a pair of Mi-25s armed with chemical bombs based at Samara, Baiji, Mawsil, and/or Falluja. Later, the same unit was to get Bo.105 helicopters, some of which were also armed with tanks for spraying chemicals. Also later during the war, at the times of the larger Iranian offensives and after more Mi-25s were delivered to Iraq, the 4th SSOC established permanent detachments at each of these bases, at which the Hinds equipped with chemical weapons stood constant alerts. Theoretically, the IrAAC was under IrA control, but effectively it was put directly under the control of regime already at these times. The IrAAC did not control all the Iraqi helicopter assets: a VIP-Transport unit, flying SA.342s and Mi-8s, was responsible for transportation of important political and military figures, while a squadron of some 14 (out of 16 originally delivered) SA.321G/H Super Frelons, some of which were compatible with AM.39 Exocet anti-ship missiles, was assigned to the Iraqi Navy.

With some 40 examples in service, the SA.342 Gazelle was the main type of attack helicopter with the Iraqi Army Aviation early during the war. While well-armed, the type proved too vulnerable to any kind of anti-aircraft fire, and losses were heavy.

As the Soviets were slow to deliver more Mi-25s, the Iraqis were slow to introduce these to service. Besides, by the end of 1980, out of six examples delivered to Iraq, four were lost in combat (including one to IRIAF F-14As and two by IRIAA AH-1J Cobras). Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) (Note: The following Order of Battle for the Iraqi Air Force and the Iraqi Army Air Corps were upgraded with additional information, which were not available at the time the book Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988 was published by Schiffer Military Publishing, Atglen, PA, in December 2002): IrAF/Support Command (Deployment as from north towards south, and from west towards east) Kirkuk Fighter-Bomber Wing - No. 1 FBS, Su-20, at al-Hurriyah AB (Kirkuk) - No. 5 FBS, Su-22M, at al-Hurriyah AB (Kirkuk) - No. 17 FS, MiG-21MF, at al-Hurriyah AB (Kirkuk) - No. 44 FBS, Su-22M & Su-22M-3R, at al-Hurriyah AB (Kirkuk) Mosul Fighter-Bomber Wing - No. 11 FS (Det.), MiG-21MF, at Firnas AB (Mosul) Qayyarah West Wing (in formation; not operational) - No. 63 FS, MiG-23MLA, at Qayyarah West (moved to Tahmmouz AB after the start of the war) - No. 79 FS, Mirage F.1EQ (not yet delivered) - No. 92 FS, Mirage F.1EQ (not yet delivered) Bomber Wing - 7th Sqn, Tu-22B/U, at Tahmmouz AB ("al-Taqaddum", near Habbaniyah) - 8th Sqn, Tu-16/Tu-16K-11-16, at Tahmmouz AB (the 7th and 8th Squadrons were later

combined into the 10th Squadron). A handful of Il-28s were at Tahmmouz AB as well; their condition at the moment of Iraqi invasion remains unclear: according to one source they were not operational any more but used as decoys; according to others they were deployed in combat. - No. 39 FS "Defenders of Baghdad", MiG-23MS, Tahmmouz AB - No. 84 FRS, MiG-25RB, Tahmmouz AB (in formation; not operational) - No. 96 FS, MiG-25PDS, Tahmouz AB (in formation; not operational) Flying Leaders School - Detachment ?, Hunter F.Mk.59A/B at Rashid AB (Baghdad) - Detachment ?, Jet Provost T.Mk.52 at Rashid AB (Baghdad) al-Rashid Fighter Wing - No. 9 FS, MiG-21PFM, at Rashid AB (Baghdad) - No. 11 FS, MiG-21bis, at Rashid AB (Baghdad) - No. 70 FRS, MiG-21RF, at Rashid AB (Baghdad) H-3/al-Wallid Wing - No. 84 Sqn (actually detachment), MiG-23MS, at al-Wallid AB - No. ?? Sqn (actually detachment), MiG-21bis/MF, at al-Wallid AB al-Kut Fighter-Bomber Wing - No. ?? FBS, Su-7BMK, at Abu Ubaida al-Jarrah AB ("al-Kut" or "al-Jarrah" AB) - No. 23 FBS, MiG-23BN, at Abu Ubaida al-Jarrah AB ("al-Kut" or "al-Jarrah" AB) Nasseriyah Fighter-Bomber Wing - No. 73 FS, MiG-23MF, at Ali Ibn Abu-Talib AB ("Tallil") (in formation; not operational) - No. 77 FBS, MiG-23BN, at Ali Ibn Abu-Talib AB Shoibiyah Fighter-Bomber Wing - No. ?? FS, MiG-21MF, at al-Wihda/Shoibiyah AB - No. 109 FBS, Su-22M, at al-Wihda/Shoibiyah AB The IrAF/ADC also operated almost 120 SA-2 and SA-3 sites (soon to be reinforced by at least four batteries of Roland-2 SAMs, delivered from France), as well as all the AAA over caliber 57mm. While SA-2s and SA-3s were operated as complex sites, Rolands were to be deployed as single firing units. It must be added that a sizeable contingent of Soviet air force was operational with the IrAF at the time of invasion. This consisted of 24 MiG-25R/RB/RBShs, at least 12 MiG-21MFs and at least eight MiG-23MLAs, all based at as-Shoibiyah AB, near Basrah, which was effectively put under Soviet control. Original intention was to test these aircraft against Iranians, before gradually putting them under Iraqi command. For example, between August 1980 and April 1981 four MiG-25s were put under Iraqi control, and the MiG-23MLA-unit consisted of Soviet but also Iraqi pilots, while the MiG-21MFs were eventually all given to the IrAF after the war started. The Iranians, however, did not care very much about Soviet or Iraqi plans, but four F-4Es from TFB.3 raided as-Shoibiyah heavily already in their first strike in response to the Iraqi invasion, on the late afternoon of 22 September. Additional strikes were flown on the following two days, and eventually the Soviets were forced to evacuate all MiG-25s to H-3/al-Wallid AB, in western Iraq, while all the MiG-23MLAs were moved to Qayyarah West AB, in north-western Iraq. Although Moscow was time and again stressing its neutral stance regarding this war, its

contingent remained in Iraq until April 1981: it was actually evacuated only after the MiG23MLA-unit suffered heavy losses in air combats with Iranians (including four MiG-23MLAs to a single IRIAF F-14A, on 29 October 1980; two additional examples were lost while fighting Iranian counteroffensives in 1981), and several MiG-25s were destroyed and/or damaged on the ground by Iranian Phantoms in the "H-3 Blitz", on 4 April 1981. IrAF/Training Command Air Force Academy, Tikrit Basic Training - 1st Flying School, A.202A Bravo - 2nd Flying School, A.202A Bravo - 3rd Flying School, Mi-2, Mi-4, SA.342 Gazelle Primary Training (partially conducted from al-Rashid AB) - 4th Flying School, L-29 - 5th Flying School, L-29 Weapons Training - 6th Flying School, PC-7 - 7th Flying School, Jet Provost T.52, at al-Rashid AB IrAF/Transport Command Transport Brigade - 31st Sqn/A Flight, Il-76MD, at Baghdad/Saddam International - 31st Sqn/B Flight, An-12B, al-Rashid AB - 32nd Sqn/A Flight, An-2, miscellaneous airfields Most of the transport aircraft except all the An-12Bs, but including all Il-76MDs were operated in the colors of the Iraqi national airline, Iraq Airways. The same company also operated numerous An-24TVs, most of which, however, were used for military purposes, and quite a few of which were cached and destroyed on the ground during early Iranian air strikes. Iraqi Navy (IrN) Naval Aviation - No. ?? NS, SA.321GV Super Frelon, at NAS Umm-ol-Qassr - No. ?? NS, AB.212ASW, (in formation; not operational; helicopters never delivered) Iran Islamic Republic of Iran Army (IRIA) In general, the units of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army were in very poor condition. Most were down to only 50% of their strength (some even less) and under command of lowerranking officers, as all the generals of the former Imperial Iranian Army were removed from their posts after the revolution in 1979. During the early days of the war there was a considerable chaos within the chain of command, which led to a situation in which most of larger units were scattered into small battle-groups, that fought in cooperation with local militias and without a coherent overall command. In September 1980 the IRIA had following units garrisoned along the Iraqi border:

- 16th Armored Division, based in Ghazvin, with three ABs equipped with M-60A-1 MBTs and M-113 APCs, including 1st in Ghazvin, 2nd in Zanjan, and 3rd in Hamedan. - 81st Armored "Kermanshah" Division, with three ABs equipped with Chieftain MBTs and M-113 APCs, including 1st in Kermanshah, 2nd in Islam-Abad-Gharb, and 3rd in Sar-ePol-e-Zahab. - 92nd Armored "Khuzestan" Division, with three ABs equipped with Chieftain MBTs and M-113 APCs (including 283rd Arm Cav. Bn), including 1st west of Khorramshahr and south of Ahwaz, 2nd west of Dezful, and 3rd west of Ahwaz. - 21st Infantry Division, based in Tehran, established as combination of the 2nd Guards Brigade and the 1st Infantry division in Tehran, with total of four mechanized formations (including brigades of the former 1st Guards Division and Independent Guards Brigade, and 141 Infantry Battalion) - 28th Infantry Division, with one AB (equipped with M-60A-1s MBTs), two MBs (equipped with M-113s), and a reconnaissance regiment (equipped with Scorpion LTs and M-113s), deployed in the areas of Sanandaj, Saquez and Marivan. - 64th Infantry Division, garrisoned in Orumiyeh, and covering the Oromiyeh, Mahabad, Piransahr and Salmas areas. - 77th Infantry Division, consisting of one AB (equipped with M-47s) and two MBs (equipped with BTR-50s), garrisoned in Khorasan, and covering the Soviet and Afghan borders, as well as remaining eastern Iran. - 37th Armored Brigade, based in Shiraz - 88th Armored Brigade, based in Zahedan (equipped with Chieftain MBTs), covering the borders to Afghanistan and Pakistan. - 30th Infantry Brigade, with HQ in Gorgan. - 84th Infantry Brigade, with HQ in Khoramabad, but deployed in field and covering the Ilam area, connecting the positions of the 81st and 92nd ADs. - 23rd Special Forces Brigade, with HQ in Tehran, deployed along the Iraqi border in 13 separate detachments. - 55th Airborne Brigade, based in Shiraz, with a battalion deployed in Sardasht, and a company each in Sanandaj and Dezful. - 11th Independent Artillery Group, deployment area unknown. - 22nd Independent Artillery Group, deployed in Khuzestan. - 33rd Independent Artillery Group, deployment area unknown. - 44th Independent Artillery Group, deployment area unknown. - 55th Independent Artillery Group, deployed in Khuzestan.

Islamic Republic of Iran Army Aviation (IRIAA) Kermanshah/Bakhtaran Army Aviation Group, main base Shahid Ashrafi Esfahani, in Kermanshah - ? Company, AB.205 and AB.206 - ? Company, Bell 214C - ? Company, Bell 209/AH-1J Esfahan Army Aviation Group, main base Shahid Vatanpour (named so in 1981), near Esfahan, and Shahid Ashtari/4th Army Aviation Support Base - ? Company, AB.206 - ? Company, Bell 214C - ? Company, Bell 209/AH-1J - ? Company, CH-47C Kerman Army Aviation Group, main base Masjed-Suleyman - ? Company, Bell 214C - ? Company, Bell 209/AH-1J Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) * TFB.1, Mehrabad IAP (Tehran) 11th TFW - 11th OCU "Instructors", F-4E & RF-4E (detachment at TFB.4 in 1981) - 12th TFS, F-4E & RF-4E 1st ERW - ?? TRS, (E)C-130E - ?? TRS, RF-4E and RF-5A (only nominally: all aircraft were deployed with different units of 21st, 31st and 61st TFWs) ?? TTW - 11th TTS, C-130E/H - 12th TTS, C-130E/H - Tanker Squadron, Boeing 707-3J9C and Boeing 747-2J9F - Base Flight, Bell 214A & HH-43 - ?? TTS, Fokker F.27M ?? Training Wing - ?? TS, T-33A - ?? TS, Beech F33 * TFB.2, Tabriz IAP (Tabriz) 21st TFW - 21st TFS, F-5E/F - 22nd TFS, F-5E/F - 23rd TFS, F-5E/F - Detachment, RF-5A (assigned to any of the three TFS') - Detachment, C-130H - ?? COIN Sqn, O-2A - Base Flight, Bell 214A * TFB.3, Shahid Nojeh AB (former Shahorkhi AB, near Hamedan) 31st TFW

- 31st TFS, F-4E & RF-4E - 32nd TFS, F-4E & RF-4E - Base Flight, Bell 214A 32nd TFW - 306th TFS, F-4D (sent to 71st TFS in December 1980) - 308th TFS, F-4D (sent to 72nd TFS in December 1980) - 33rd TFS, F-4E & RF-4E (from December 1980, with F-4Es from 71st TFS; detachment at TFB.4 from early 1981) - 34th TFS, F-4E (from December 1980, with F-4Es from 91st and 101st TFWs; detachment at TFB.9 in 1988) - Base Flight, Bell 214A * TFB.4, Vahdati AB (Dezful) 41st TFW - 41st TFS "Lions", F-5E/F - 42nd TFS "Devils", F-5E/F - 43rd TFS "Tigers", F-5E/F - 306th Detachment (71st TFS), F-4D (periodically from October 1980) - 308th Detachment (72nd TFS), F-4D (periodically from October 1980) - Detachment from 21st TFW, F-5E (temporarily deployed in October/November 1980) - Base Flight, Bell 214A * TFB.5, Kermanshah (by 1980 used by IRIAF only as emergency airfield; instead, TFB.5 became one of main IRIAA bases) - no units permanently deployed * TFB.6, Bushehr IAP (Bushehr) 61st TFW - 61st TFS, F-4E & RF-4E - 62nd TFS, F-4E & RF-4E - 61st TTW, C-130H - Base Flight, Bell 214A * TFB.7, Hor AB (Shiraz) 71st TFW - 71st TFS, F-4E (replaced for F-4Ds from 32nd TFW) - 72nd TFS "Flying Lions", F-14A (replaced by F-4Ds from 32nd TFW; all F-14s to 73rd TFS' detachment at Mehrabad in 1981) - 73rd TFS, F-14A 71st TTW - 71st TTS, C-130E/H - 72nd TTS, C-130E/H - 73rd TTS, Fokker F.27M - Base Flight, Bell 214A - VP-??, P-3C * TFB.8, Khatami AB (later Shahid Baba'ie AB; Esfahan) 81st TFW - 81st TFS, F-14A - 82nd TFS, F-14A

- Base Flight, Bell 214A * TFB.9, Bandar Abbas AB (Bandar Abbas) 91st TFW - 91st TFS "Sharks", F-4E - 92nd TFS, F-4E * TFB.10, Chah Bahar AB (Chah Bahar) 101st TFW - 101st TFS, F-4E (disbanded in 1980, crews sent to TFB.3; reformed in the 1990s with remaining F-4Ds) - 101st TTS, C-130E/H * TFB.11 Omidiyeh AB (Aghajari) (construction incomplete and not operational at the start of the war; was to see larger deployment of IRIAF units only from 1981) 51st TFW (in formation) - 51st TFS, F-5E/F (in formation) - 52nd TFS, F-5E/F (in formation) * TFB.12 Masjed Soleyman (used by IRIAF as dispersal airfield or for basing of an F-5Edetachment from 41st TFW, as well as for larger detachment of IRIAA helicopters) - no units permanently deployed Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) - 3 Marine Battalions Islamic Republic of Iran Naval Aviation (IRINA) * NAS Chahbahar - HC-?, Bell 206 - HM-?, MH-53 - HS-?, AB.212ASW Iranian Deployment in Khuzestan For the defence of Khuzestan, which was the main target of the Iraqi invasion, the IRIA had following units at hand: 92nd Armored Division was covering 400km of front (which was attacked by five Iraqi divisions and something like five brigades). This unit was at 50% of its nominal manpower, but reinforced by following elements: - 37th Armored Group, composed of parts of the 37th Armored Brigade deployed to support the 2nd AB/92nd AD west of Dezful. - 151 Fortification Battalion, manning the main fortifications north of Khoramshahr and 27 other fortifications developed along the border to Iraq (usually built some three kilometers from the border); this unit was equipped with 80 M-4 Sherman and M-24 Chaffee tanks, emplaced in a number of static fortifications (each "fort" had two tank-emplacements), 106mm recoilless guns, anti-aircraft artillery and anti-tang guided missiles; it should have counted some 1.300 troops in total, but was badly understrength. - 1 infantry battalion from 21st ID - 1 infantry battalion and 1 armored company from 77th ID

- 1 armored battalion from 88th AD - 1 battalion of IRIN Marines (deployed at Khoramshahr Naval Base).

Iranian Army Chieftain seen moving towards the front near Abadan: a single company of these tanks remained inside the city after it was put under a siege by the Iraqis. Iraqi Invasion The Iraqi operations between 22 and 30 September 1980 developed as follows: I Army Corps - 1st and the 11th IDs mainly operated against the Kurds - 4th ID started actually the first attack into Iran, capturing Panjwin after two days of fierce fighting against Iranian border troops, gendarmerie, and the local Pasdaran, Basij, and Mostafazin units (which were joined under the unitary Revolutionary Guards Command as per 1 January 1981) even before the invasion was officially started, on 22 September. Once the Iraq invaded Iran, the 4th ID started a drive into Iranian Kurdestan, with the task of capturing Orumiyeh and Sandandaj. II Army Corps - 7th MD advanced towards Qassre-Shirin, capturing the city after much fighting in which the place was completely destroyed; then advanced towards the provincial capital Kermanshah (renamed Bakhtaran after the revolution in Iran, but renamed back to Kermanshah after the war with Iraq). - 2nd ID captured Mehran, threatened Ilam, and reached the foothills of the Zagros Mountains, thus cutting off the road network connecting northern Iran with Dezful and the rest of Khuzestan. - the task of two armored divisions belonging to this corps was to capture Dezful and sever the road connections between northern and southwestern Iran. - 10th AD was to drive deep into Iran together with the 9th AD. However, it was swiftly stopped by counterattacks mounted by the Iranian Army Aviation (IRIAA) and the Air Force (IRIAF). The IRIAA deployed a large number of Bell AH-1J Cobra attack helicopters - which made excessive use of AGM-71A TOW ATGMs and the IRIAF the Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II

fighters, armed with Mk.82s, napalm, and cluster bombs, as well as 68mm rocket launchers. In a series of air strikes during the first five days of the war, almost 50% of the vehicles belonging to the 10th AD were destroyed. - 9th AD managed a much deeper penetration, driving over 40kms into Iran within the first week. In the process of the advance, it captured the strategically important early warning radar station some 15km southwest of Dezful, and directly threatened the Vahdati AB (TFB.4 in Iranian military parlance), which was put under heavy artillery attacks. The drive of this unit, however, was also stopped by the stubborn resistance of the IRIAA and the IRIAF, which while trying to buy time for the heavier Iranian Army units to be mobilized, effectively neutralized the 9th AD as a combat-capable unit, destroying over 200 of its MBTs and APCs. III Army Corps Task of the units belonging to this corps was the actual target of the whole invasion: the capture of the Iranian oil-rich province of Khuzestan, in order to secure the waterway of Shatt-al-Arab for Iraq, enlarge the Iraqi reach into the Persian Gulf, and secure additional oil resources. Topography of the area favored invaders and the use of tanks and other armored vehicles. - 1st MD was tasked with an offensive from al-Amarah towards Ein-e-Khoosh and Fakeh, with aim of reaching and capturing Andimeshk and Dezful, in turn isolating Ahwaz from the north; this unit became stuck only few kilometers from the border and was not able to advance until the 10th AD penetrated deep into Iran, in turn causing IRIA units to pull back in good order behind Pol-Naderi bridge on Karakeh River.

Parts of the 1st MD advancing towards Dezful, in late September 1980. - 10th AD was to push along a route parallel to the 1st MD, on its northern flank, towards via Dehloran and Musian to Malavi, Andimeshk and Dezful, isolating Dezful from the north in the process. The division successfully accomplished the deepest Iraqi penetration of the war: it's elements were the first to reach the Karakeh River, some 75km behind the border, on the seventh day of the war. - 6th AD was to do the same, but along a southern route: it was to penetrate Iran near Bostan, then pass north of Susangerd and capture Ahwaz. In a drive similar to that of the 10th AD, the unit reached northern suburbs of Ahwaz by the end of the first week of the war.

T-62s of the 6th Iraqi AD seen on the Karakeh Plain, in March 1982: weeks later, this unit was almost annihilated by Iranian attacks which turned the course of the war against Iraq. - 5th MD attacked directly towards and to the north of Abadan: it's original objective was advance on and the capture of Ahwaz. The unit achieved only a minimal penetration and was not able to do more than support the 3rd AD in its advance. Nevertheless, these two units achieved an encirclement of Khoramshahr. - 3rd AD was to build the third prong of this attack, with the target of driving some 40km deep into Iran, then turning south and isolating Khoramshahr. It was stopped by exceptionally heavy Iranian air attacks while advancing north of Khoramshahr, and managed a penetration of only some 15-20 kilometers. As a result, it was barely able to cut the road connecting Khoramshahr with Ahwaz in the northeast. It's 12th "Abu-al-Wallid" Armored Brigade was held back as Corps reserve, and did not participate in combat. Battle of Karoun River The battle of Karoun River erupted on 11 October 1980, when elements of the 5st MD and 6th AD established a small bridgehead on the eastern side, near Darkhowein, some 15km northeast of Khoramshahr, causing a surprise on the Iranian side and threatening to block local Iranian supply routes. From that point the Iraqis could advance towards east and south, and eventually encircle Dezful. Battle of Karakeh River The battle of Karakeh River erupted when elements of the 1st MD, on their advance towards Andimeshk and Dezful, established a bridgehead near Shoush.

On the Iranian side, the frontlines defending Dezful with the Vahdati (TFB.4) and the strategically important Dehloran radar site were held by following units (as seen from the north towards the south, stretching from Beyat, via Nahr-Anbar and Shoush to Fakkeh): 283rd Arm Cav Bn/92nd AD 2nd AB/92nd AD 37th AB (Combat Group) 138th Inf Bn/21st ID 141st Inf Bn/21st ID (held as reserve at Pol-Naderi bridge)

Failed Experience: Battle of Naderi Bridge, the First Iranian Counter-offensive Already in early October 1980 the High Command IRIA prepared its first counter-offensive. This was to be based on reinforcements deployed from Tehran into the Dezful and Andimeshk area, foremost on elements from the 21st Division, supported by the 291st Armored Battalion/77th Division. The 2nd Brigade of the 92nd Armored Division was also deployed in the Shoush area, but apparently did not participate in this operation. The task of this operation was to breach the Iraqi frontlines near Sorkheh Naderi, due south-east of Andimeshk, and launch a two-pronged advance: the northern via Dashe-eAbas towards Ein-e-Khoosh, and southern via Chenaneh towards Fakkeh, on the Iraqi border. In the case of success, the southern prong would then turn towards south and attack Iraqi rear installations in the Bostan area. This plan was very bold, calling for a swift advance of few small Iranian Army units (equivalent of one division) against no less but two reinforced Iraqi divisions. Without surprise, this offensive, launched on 15 October 1980, achieved only minimal gains, resulting in a small dent in Iraqi lines: while the infantry of the 21st Division advanced for few kilometers, the Hunters of the IrAF Flying Leaders School - flown by some of the most experienced Iraqi pilots - hit the M-60 MBTs and M-113 APCs of the 291st Battalion as these were marshaling for their advance in a valley north-east of Andimeshk, destroying a number of tanks and APCs. Even more severe was the blow the Iraqi fighters caused by a strike against the supply column of the Iranian battalion, which also caused heavy damage and resulted in the Iranian unit being left without fuel and ammunition. Eventually, the Iranian offensive had to be cancelled before it was properly started. This was the only significant operation of this war in which the IrAF Hunters are known to have participated. According to Iraqi sources interviewed recently, it was also the last opportunity at which this type saw combat. It is interesting to note that this was another occasion during this war when the air power delivered at least one of decisive blows: even if the Iranian planning was overenthusiastic, the operation at the Naderi Bridge had a potential to cause severe losses to the 10th Iraqi AD - if the initial attack could breach its left flank. However, the pre-emptive Iraqi air strikes made it impossible for the Iranians to launch their armored strike. Battle of Khorramshahr Iraqi Army Units Involved (Sept/Oct.1980) - 3AD (35 + 43 AB, 14th MB) - 31 Special Forces Bde (in particular the 2nd and 3rd Bn) - 33 Special Forces Bde (in particular the 8th and 9th Bn)

- al-Hassan Tank Bn (detached from 26AB/5MD and attached to 33rd SF Bde) - 3 Mech Bn (detached from 15AB/5MD - the main body of which was attacking towards Ahwaz on flank of 3AD) - 1st Bn (detached from 49IB) - 4th Commando Bn (detached from 2ID) - 2nd and 3rd Bns (detached from 2IB/2ID) - 1st Bn/429IB - Jeish-Al-Shabi Forces (two battalions of paramilitary) - 1st Bn (detached from 23IB) - 3rd Republican Guards Special Forces Bn (detached from Republican Guard Brigade) The first Iraqi operation to enter Khorramshahr was launched by the main body of the 3rd AD. This was stopped and blocked at Pol-No and Nahr Arayez, and could not proceed with attack. The next attempt had been launched by the 8th Battalion of the 33rd Special Forces Brigade. This was stopped with heavy losses for Iraqis, causing a shock on the Iraqi side. The IrA commanders reacted by deploying additional commandos, followed by armor support. The battle of Khorramshahr lasted for 34 days, and saw an immense investment of Iraqi forces, far beyond what Iraqi war plans envisaged. In turn, this battle enabled the Iranians to stabilize front-lines at Dezful, Ahwaz and Susangerd, and move reinforcements to Khuzestan: by the time Khorramshahr fell, the Iraqi Army units deployed to capture this province were no longer facing just the Iranian 92nd AD, but also the 16th AD, 21th ID, and 77th ID.

T-62 of the 3rd AD passing down the streets of Khoramshahr: only a handful of buildings in the city were not destroyed during the fighting in October and November 1980, resulting in Khramshahr frequently being nicknamed "Iranian Stalingrad". Conclusions Overall Iraqi plan for invasion of Iran was originally indeed based on similar British plans for an intervention from the 1950s, as reported in several different sources. After almost 30 years, in every of which the planning was updated by Iraqis in accordance to changes on

the Iranian side, a completely new plan was developed. According to former high-ranking Iraqi officers, the eventual idea for invasion in 1980 was to drive the Iranian artillery units away from the Iraqi border, so these could not shell Iraqi cities - foremost Basrah. This task was to be completed within a time-frame of between three and seven days, and then Baghdad intended to negotiate with Tehran. This would be completely in accordance with standard Arab war strategy of delivering a heavy "first blow", and then negotiating on the basis of "new situation". Accordingly, the penetration the Iraqi High Command was looking for was not to be deeper but 40km, and there was no intention for holding any Iranian territory for any longer periods of time. This idea led nowhere, then the Iranians were not ready to negotiate - especially not with Iraqi troops so deep within their territory. Also, the Iranian clergy was interested in extending the war and exploiting it for own purposes - for firming itself in power. The Iraqi military was well-equipped but actually not completely ready for the war when it was ordered for an invasion of Iran: nevertheless, the Iranians were even less ready. The most important Iraqi units fared surprisingly well: "tank-raids" deep over the open terrain between the Iranian cities several times surprised the Iranian High Command, causing shock and chaos between scattered Iranian units that were badly outnumbered and overstretched in an attempt to defend too large parts of the frontlines. Although many observers tend to describe the Iraqi operations as "Soviet-style", the Iraqis were far more influenced by the British, and fought accordingly - even if their Army was almost exclusively equipped with Soviet MBTs, APCs, and artillery.

Iranian Chieftain MBT seen early during the war. The Iranians had only one Armored Division stationed in Khuzestan on the start of the war, and this was actually still in organization in 1979, when the Islamic Revolution developed. Consequently, the unit was not ready for fighting when the Iraqi invasion came. Nevertheless, the two of its armored brigades did their best to help stop the Iraqi advance. The missing link which in the end turned the whole Iraqi operation into a failure was the airpower aspect: the IrAF could never match the Iranian flying services, foremost the IRIAF

and the IRIAA. It lacked the firepower, aircraft capability, and training. The Iraqi regime knew this; but, they hoped that the condition of the Iranian Air Force and the Army Aviation would be at least as poor as that of the rest of the Iranian military. There was also a hope that the IrAF could suppress the IRIAF by the first strike against most important Iranian airfields. This hope - fuelled foremost by reports from Iranian officers who defected to Iraq during 1979 and - especially - summer of 1980, was in vain. Within only 24 hours, the IRIAF turned into a war-fighting machinery, striking not only all over Iraq, but also causing tremendous losses to the Iraqi Army on the ground. Within only three weeks - and it would take less time if there was not a period of bad weather through the early October 1980 - the IRIAF effectively stopped the Iraqi invasion by completely destroying its supply, and most of the depots near the front.

Right from the start of the war, transport helicopters of the Iranian Army Aviation and Air Force were very active in moving reinforcements and supplies - as well as evacuating injured - along the front. It was mainly due to the immense efforts of their pilots that the Iranians managed to stop the Iraqi onslaught. Quite a few helicopters (as well as IRIAF aircraft) went into combat still wearing the title of Imperial Armed forces. The Iraqi Air Force gave its best to put the IRIAF under pressure, but only few of its support operations were effective. The IrAF also suffered considerable losses. Consequently, it turned its attention against targets of propagandistic character. The sole success the Iraqi fliers achieved that far in the war was the disruption of the fuel supply in Iran, which caused shortfalls felt even by the IRIAF - in one moment depleting its strategic reserves of kerosene to a level sufficient for only a few days. In response, the IRIAF mounted a strategic POL-campaign, damaging the whole Iraqi oil industry to such a degree that Iraq had to cancel all oil exports. The Iraqi oil industry was not to recover from this blow for several years. The IRIAF campaign against Iraqi POL depots and oil industry was three-fold: the Iranians effectively interdicted those oil depots that were supplying fuels and lubricants to the Iraqi military; they blocked the Iraqi ports of al-Faw and Basrah, and then also neutralized the two oil terminals south of al-Faw (al-Omayeh and al-Bakr). Subsequently, the IRIAF hit all the major pumping stations along the oil-pipelines to Turkey, Syria, and Jordan, effectively

stopping the oil flow.

The KRB3MR-bridge, seen here after being hit and destroyed by GBU-10 LGBs, dropped by IRIAF F-4Ds: although four aircraft each armed with two LGBs were sent into this attack, already the first bomb hit home and the Iraqi advance north of Ahwaz was stopped. Eventually, the Iraqi offensive had to fail: the Iranian regime could not be crushed from within by a foreign intervention, then the highly patriotic Iranians rallied around regardless which leadership in Tehran to defend their country. Contrary to Iraqi expectations, even Arabs living in Khuzestan - but so also Iranian Kurds, Armenians, and Azerbaijanis - joined the battle for the defence of Iran. Actually, the Iraqi invasion enabled the shaky regime in Tehran to establish itself in power, and thus resulted in exactly the opposite situation than expected. Although in the state of chaos the Iranian Army and other ground forces (including different formations of the "Revolutionary Guards", Gendarmerie and Police) proved able to improvise stubborn and bitter resistance, which came as a complete surprise for the Iraqis. Consequently, the Iranians caused immense casualties to the inexperienced Iraqi Army. Only a considerable chaos within the regime in Tehran and the leadership in field, foremost caused by the Islamic Revolution of 1979, prevented Iranians from deploying the full power of their military against Iraq already at an early stage in the war. In fact, even in 1980 most Iranians expected this war not to last for longer than few weeks: that this did not happen was one of the most severe blows for many of them. But, at the time of the revolution they were not yet aware of this fact.

Patriotism alone, however, would not have been enough to stop the Iraqis - without the Iranian air power. The IRIAF and the IRIAA, namely, were highly effective in destroying so many Iraqi vehicles, artillery pieces and supplies, that the Iraqi Army's offensive capability was effectively neutralized. The Iraqis could not continue their advance despite a decision for their armored and mechanized units to drive deep between the Iranian cities, and so cut these off the rear instead of becoming entangled in urban warfare. The air power was thus - contrary to what is usually reported about this war - instrumental for the eventual outcome. The Iranian flying services effectively won this "Battle of Persia" even at a price of ultimate sacrifice of many precious crews and aircraft. The reasons for the success of Iranian air operations are manifold. Although Iraqi sources deny this stubbornly until today, a single squadron of IRIAF F-14s established air superiority over the battlefield in Khuzestan, in mid-October 1980, by downing over a dozen Iraqi fighters within only two days, and in turn enabling the units from Vahdati AB (TFB.4) and Hamedan (TFB.3) - reinforced by elements from Tabriz (TFB.2) - to first neutralize newlyestablished Iraqi air defence system in the area (consisting of several SA-6-sites), and then destroy the Iraqi supply-net. The IrAF was out of condition to counter F-14s, and even less so to prevent IRIAF F-4s and F-5s, as well as IRIAA AH-1Js from hitting Iraqi ground forces heavily. To besiege encircled Iranian cities in Khuzestan the Iraqis needed additional resources. These, however, had to be moved along exposed supply communications. The IRIAF hit these heavily and repeatedly. For this reason the Iraqis were eventually able of capturing only one large Iranian city: Khoramshahr - situated only few kilometers from the Iraqi border. Elsewhere, the advancing Iraqi mechanized columns were put under vicious air strikes that destroyed men and equipment. The bold Iraqi offensive over the Karoun River, in late October, for example, was spoiled despite the moment of surprise and chaos it caused in local Iranian forces - because the IRIAF and the IRIAA, despite all the problems with targeting intelligence, managed to find the Iraqi break-through and destroy any vehicle their pilots could find. The Iranian air operations were frequently so effective, that there are several examples in which a division of four AH-1J Cobras was sufficient to stop advance of a whole Iraqi armored brigade for hours. Such cases proved decisive. The City of Khoramshahr was eventually captured by the Iraqis after exceptionally bitter fighting for every house, flour and room - where Iranian air power could not play a dominant role or be effective - but during which the Iraqis suffered such heavy losses that they never attempted anything similar with any other Iranian city again. By the time Khoramshahr fell, namely, their strategic reserves were drained down to a point where they were not able of re-starting any offensive operations for years to come. Their invasion of Iran therefore died in the face of stubborn Iranian resistance - and then the rainy season of November 1980.

Future Development of GCC Air Forces

Orders of battle, platform procurement, and technological developments often figure disproportionately in assessments of the capabilities of modern air forces. Building and maintaining an air arm requires careful consideration of the threat profile facing a state, the level of financial commitment, and constraints on the skilled manpower base and available technologies. With growing downward pressures on defence spending and increasing focus on counter-terrorism, as opposed to conventional warfighting capabilities, development of effective air forces requires increasing ingenuity at the dawn of the 21st century. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE present a revealing case study of how small and medium-sized regional states are adapting to changes in the procurement and operational environments. Despite landmark air operations in the Balkans, Chechnya, and Afghanistan, the Gulf was the crucible of air warfare in the 1990s. GCC militaries have hosted and closely interacted with western air forces for over a decade. The result has been a quiet shift from building fleets and inventories, to building and maintaining capabilities. Long-considered one of the least likely candidates for reform in its military procurement and force planning policies, the activities of GCC air forces now provide key pointers to future trends.

Effective threat assessment, focusing on both the national threat and specific air warfare threat environment, is vital to the development of air power procurement and employment options. Despite this, threat assessment has not always been an integral part of GCC force planning. The early development of GCC air forces was instead primarily driven by a number of socio-economic and political factors. Air and air defence-led deterrent postures were eminently suitable for the GCC states, complementing their low populations and high government revenues. Large transfers of modern aircraft cemented western security guarantees and acted as symbols of national pride and growing modernity. Following two decades of conflict in the Gulf, however, threat assessment has become an increasingly important driver in the development of GCC air and air defence forces. The importance of maintaining effective air defences both over cities and maritime arteries was harshly driven home to the combatant and non-combatant Gulf States alike during the Iran-Iraq war, the associated tanker war, the Gulf War, and the militarised containment of Iraq that followed. Like many small and medium sized regional states outside Europe, the end of the Cold War did not radically alter the threat spectrum and air force mission profiles facing GCC states. Post-Cold War readjustment stressed expeditionary warfare out-of-area deployments and voluntary involvement in wars of choice. Wars of necessity involving conventional military homeland defence receded in incidence. As vital interests are not at stake in typical western interventions, the western way of war calls for minimal exposure of friendly troops and non-combatants to risk, and as air opposition is low in many interventions, air-to-air capabilities are firmly second-place to air-to-ground capabilities. Interventionist countries no longer face a single monolithic threat from either NATO or the eastern bloc and thus require strategic airlift capabilities and ship-borne carrier aviation to meet the geographically dispersed threats of tomorrow. The strategic context of the Gulf States has not changed as radically nor in the same ways as that of western powers. Homeland defence and the maintenance of navigable sea-lanes remains the primary focus of GCC armed forces, despite improving relations between GCC states and their regional neighbours. Expeditionary warfare is not a major factor, as states remain focused on the regional military balance. Cold-War style overland invasion by armoured forces remains a serious threat in the Gulf. Early warning remains a vital force multiplier - defensive forces must be able to fight from a cold start in the case of warning failure. In the case of the GCC states, lack of sufficient strategic depth demands that rapid results are achieved at the early stage of any invasion, the so-called Halt Phase. No Gulf State can assume that it will begin a conflict with air superiority and few will manage to attain air supremacy without western assistance. Air-to-air and surface-to-air capabilities remain of great importance in the Gulf States.

The GCC states have found themselves vulnerable to a broadening range of military and paramilitary threats, however, expanding the spectrum of potential threat agents beyond the states geographic neighbours. The threat radii of Iraqi, Iranian, and Israeli strategic missile forces continue to grow, as have the weapons of mass destruction capabilities of these states. Other states such as the are developing long-range strike capabilities that extend beyond the 150km range of the Missile Technology Control Regime by marrying stand-off heavy air-launched cruise missiles to long-range strike aircraft. The sanctuary of range is fast disappearing for Gulf States. Sub-state actors and covert destabilization campaigns remain important proxy weapons in interstate warfare, particularly between Iran and Iraq, and between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Other sub-state actors may be largely transnational and apolitical but nonetheless represent a serious national security threat (such as narcotics, goods, or people-smuggling criminal organizations). Yet while the offensive capabilities ranged against the Gulf States are increasing, it can be argued that hostile intentions are likely to decline due to drivers such as the rise of moderates in Iran since 1997, the cessation of various border disputes between GCC states, and the possibility of regime change in Iraq. This reduces the likelihood of major armed conflict, particularly between Iran and the GCC states, but does not necessarily reduce the political utility of well-balanced deterrent armed forces in the region. The fluid, incrementally changing balance of power in the Gulf involves long-term battles of perception concerning the identification of regional leaders, revolving around issues such as the contribution of forces during the resolution of crises and the relative willingness of certain states to back their words with actions. As democratic civil society develops in the Gulf, history dictates that nationalistic tensions, posturing, and interstate clashes will accompany the nation-state building process. Though issue resolution through arbitration and negotiation has enjoyed some success in recent years, there is ample evidence that once issues become politicised, they quickly become resistant to non-violent resolution (e.g., the Iranian-occupied Tunb islands and Abu Musa). In such cases, military capability represents a key bargaining chip. In designing their air arms, the GCC states thus face a dilemma. As serious as potential external threats are, Gulf leaders are growing increasingly aware of urgent non-military threats to regime stability and national security. Military deterrence is one vital pillar of national security, but economic and socio-political well being provides the other legs that allow the structure to remain standing. Economic stagnation, oil dependence, foreign debt, and profligate spending have left most GCC members incapable of maintaining defence expenditure and subsidized welfare simultaneously. Thus, on the one hand, strong pressures are depressing spending on high-intensity armed forces, whilst on the other, the GCC are conscious that peace and stability are a product of deterrent dynamics in the region. Though is difficult to imagine military scenarios where western security guarantees will not prove to be the decisive factor, the GCC states have committed to a common defence policy, and increasingly need to display credible military forces to reduce the leverage and high profile of western security guarantors, and increase the political credibility and potential for independent policy of the regional alliance. Though GCC states and their air forces face many common threats, the varied geography and differential sizes of GCC states has led each state to identify the unique roles and missions of its own air arm. Bahrain Bahrains position at one of the most volatile points in the region makes it impossible for Manama to neglect its external defences. The emirate has identified two primary threat scenarios. The first, and likeliest, concerns the resumption of armed clashes on Bahrains shared maritime border with Qatar including Hawar Island, and the Fasht al Dibel and Jarada shoals - and the Zubara enclave on the Qatari mainland. The second scenario concerns Bahrains important role in US regional contingency planning, which may make the country a target for its northern Gulf neighbours. This was amply demonstrated when Iraq fired Scud missiles at Bahrain in 1991. The primary role of the small but effective Bahrain Amiri Air Force (BAAF) is patrolling of the countrys extended coastline and offshore assets. Air forces have historically been the primary combatants in such clashes; in April 1986, Qatari helicopters fired on Bahraini positions on Fasht al Dibel, while in June 1991 the Bahraini Air Force penetrated Qatari airspace to warn against further actions. In a major conflict with Iran or Iraq, the Bahrain Amiri Air Force (BAAF) is postured to detect and delay incoming attackers. Bahrain represents a key tripwire in the early warning chain being developed by the GCC. Prolonged forward defence is unlikely, however, as Bahrain lacks the strategic depth or size for effective dispersal. This is despite construction of new shelters and dispersal hardstands at Sheikh Isa, an airbase developed specifically to

reduce the vulnerability of the BAAF, which was previously based at the northerly Muharraq field. Under sustained attack, the BAAF would fall back on nearby Saudi airfields used by the BAAF for training. Kuwait Kuwait does not have any border disputes with other GCC nations. Instead the threat is confined to the northern Gulf States Iraq and Iran - which have alternately dominated Kuwaiti defence thinking since the 1970s. The Kuwaiti government remains the most belligerent GCC state vis--vis Iraq. Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed stated in early September that while Saddam Hussein continues to keep Kuwaiti prisoners of war, and continues to televise threats against Kuwait, we consider the war against Iraq to have never ended. Potential causes of conflict with Iraq are long-standing, however, and will not disappear even if the Baathist regime in Baghdad is replaced. The most likely threat scenario remains a major conflict with Iraq, involving the renewal of persistent Iraqi claims to suzerainty over Kuwaiti territory ranging in seriousness from the islands of Bubyan and Warbah, through the Rumaila oilfield. A second, less likely threat scenario revolves around a conflict in which Iran and Kuwait are brought to blows either due to bilateral maritime disputes or due to US presence in the country. The role and mission of the Kuwaiti Air Force (KAF) in a future Iraq scenario would include an early attempt to blunt or delay an Iraqi ground incursion during the crucial Halt Phase. The core mission of the armed forces is to hold key points, including the Mutla Pass and thereafter the road junctions at Al Jahra, until US forces can deploy. The key capability required to undertake this type of action is armour-killing firepower. Kuwaits ability to undertake this mission would be greatly complicated against a rehabilitated Iraq. Whilst the no-fly and no-drive zones currently provide an unprecedented buffer of range and warning time to the Kuwaiti military, a rehabilitated Iraq could again overshadow the Kuwaiti Air Force. This weakness led Kuwait and the US to develop the more southerly Ahmed Al Jaber as the main operating base, even though this facility is still only around 100km from the Iraqi border. Though Kuwait mulled the development of an additional airbase in the south as late ago as November 1994, the status of the deal is uncertain and the KAF would more probably fall back to Saudi main operating bases at Riyadh and Jubail. In both this scenario, and that of Iranian air attacks, Kuwait recognises that tactical ballistic missiles and air-launched stand-off weaponry make it unlikely that the first wave of incoming attacks can be intercepted. Thereafter, air superiority would have to be contested within enemy airspace and at extended ranges. Kuwaits vulnerability to heliborne assault from Iraq was proven on 2 August 1990, leading the KAF to stress dense low-altitude air defences. Oman After over twenty years of peace in Omans Dhofar province and lacking any serious disputes with its GCC neighbours, the two key threat scenarios identified by Oman involve Yemen and Iran. The first scenario foresees an incident similar to the 1987 Yemeni incursion into Oman, which the Royal Air Force of Oman (RAFO) helped repel, and Muscat remains wary of future military adventurism along the 308km border. A second scenario envisages a breakdown in Omans successful defence diplomacy and confidence-building programme with Iran, leading to a deliberate or inadvertent clash on the Straits of Hormuz or Gulf of Oman. Omani and Iranian naval forces previously faced off in shows of force in 1980, and the Anglo-Omani Saif Sareea (Swift Sword) exercises both focused on thinly veiled scenarios dealing with the Iranian threat. The positioning of Omani airfields reflects dual concerns about Yemeni and Iranian intentions, with the main fighter base Thumrait positioned equidistant between the two threats. The RAFOs dual role is to provide air-to-ground support to surface forces over its own territory and coastal waters. Oman maintains an ability to operate from strategic depth against either opponent, with Masirah, Thumrait, and Salalah beyond the current comfortable range of Iranian theatre ballistic missiles, and Seeb (plus the planned Masana airbase) well beyond the range of Yemeni strike aircraft. Though Omans northern territories are only 60-100km distant from major Iranian naval bases, airfields, and missile launch baskets, hardening at Khasab and Seeb indicates a forward defence posture. The northern islands facing the Straits of Hormuz are faced with the prospect of rapid Iranian heliborne or amphibious assaults, highlighting the need for low-level air-defence and anti-shipping capabilities. Oman must defend over 2,900km of mainland coastline plus numerous islands, placing a high premium on maritime surveillance and transport capabilities. Qatar Though there are no explicit threats to Qatars national security, the emirate is conscious of past conflicts and future potential for trouble, focusing on Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. The most likely threat scenario is a reactivation of the aforementioned territorial disputes with Bahrain. A second potential conflict scenario involves a clash on Qatars land border with Saudi Arabia, where Qatari land and air forces periodically practice holding actions in disputed wadis. Though Qatars maverick foreign policy has reduced most tensions with the northern Gulf states, two issues could lead to conflict with Iran. The first involves the

massive North Pars gas field shared by Iran and Qatar, which hold the key to Qatars economic future and represent a strategic prize. The second involves Qatars growing role in US contingency planning, including the use of Al Udeid airbase. The role and mission of the Qatar Emiri Air Force (QEAF) is to deter low-level incursions into Qatari territory and offshore holdings, either by denial (air defence, close air support, and anti-shipping strikes) or punishment (long-range strikes against high-value targets in Saudi Arabia and Iran). Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabias expansive size means that it faces a diverse range of threats on its borders and beyond. These threats must be balanced against a range of non-military threats to national security and the stability of the House of Saud that gained prominence throughout the last decade. Failures to develop non-oil income and boost job creation represent major threats to economic security and social stability. Saudi Arabia is faced by a number of threat scenarios involving its peer competitors in the Gulf Iran and Iraq. Though currently dormant, border disputes could turn hot with Yemen or Qatar, and even in peacetime, Saudi Arabia must police a porous 1,458km border with lawless Yemen. Saudi Arabias stature, and its possession of ageing Chinese CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missiles, attracts Israels attention, suggesting a final conflict scenario concerning a preemptive Israeli strike on Saudi facilities. Geography dominates Saudi Arabias military aerospace posture. Saudi airbase facilities boast great depth, providing fallbacks against each potential foe as the US intended. Conversely, Saudis vital targets are mainly within easy striking range of potential foes. Saudi Arabia shares a 488km border with Iraq, plus a 222km border with Kuwait which Iraq reached within twenty-four hours of invading Kuwait in 1990. Saudi analysts remain concerned that Iraq could muster the strength to lunge over the border and take a Saudi border town hostage. Candidates include Arar, Rafha, Khafji, or even Jubail or Hafr al Batin. Whether this is possible, it is Riyadhs perception. Almost 1,000km of coastline faces Iran, where major air bases are positioned less than ten minutes flying time from Saudi airspace. The heart of Saudi political and economic life is concentrated along and inland from this coastline, presenting a bevy of targets, including oil and gas installations, desalination and power plants, port, shipping, and urban areas. This diverse range of threats and strategic key points moulds the roles and missions of the Royal Saudi Air Force and Royal Saudi Air Defence Force. The core role of these services is to deter attacks by denial and punishment. The core military mission is to be capable of fighting from a cold start, perhaps with little strategic warning, and to be capable of deploying to any threatened area in the country. Saudis air and air defence forces must be able to generate tactical warning of incoming aircraft and missile strikes and intercept them (perhaps within visual range) before they penetrate to the Kingdoms key economic targets or return to their home bases. Air forces must also be capable of acting as a force multiplier to increase the combat power of Saudi Arabias land and naval forces. If deterrence fails, Saudi aircraft and ballistic missiles must be capable of penetrating to the heartland of an attacking state and delivering heavy and accurate long-range strikes against high-value targets. In peacetime as well as during war, military airpower must support the distribution of logistics and personnel across wide areas. UAE The UAE has no major disputes concerning its land borders, and instead views military threats as originating primarily from its 1,488km Gulf coast, along which the main economic and population centres of the federation are arraigned, including important offshore assets. The most likely military conflict scenario facing the UAE involves the Iranian-held islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. The ongoing development of UAE naval power projection forces, amphibious assault vessels, and navalised helicopters presents the UAE with a new tool to either pressure Iran into co-administering or withdrawing from the islands, or to retake and defend them. Uniquely for a GCC state, the UAE has committed its armed forces to military intervention and support missions outside the Gulf. In 1999, the UAE deployed AH-64A attack helicopters to U.N. peacekeeping duties in Kosovo. In October 2001, the UAE announced its intention to spend $50 million on de-mining operations in Lebanon Operation Emirates Solidarity. It is possible that the UAE will continue to deploy troops to emergencies involving Muslim communities, indicating its growing confidence and regional profile. The role and mission of the UAE Air Force and Air Defence (UAEAFAD) appears to be developing from defensive and deterrent to include offensive and intervention roles. Long-range strike and airlift forces are under development for these missions. Facing Iran, the UAE has little strategic depth, indicating the need for a cordon of forward air and naval defences. The Gulf coast also presents numerous non-military security concerns, acting as an entry point for smugglers, illegal immigrants, and polluters, creating strong impetus for the development of maritime patrol capabilities.

Defence and aerospace spending in the GCC states The pattern and significance of post-Cold War global defence spending has increased the significance of the Gulf as a source of arms sales. Though global defence expenditure has declined by 33.7 percent since 1985, defence spending in the GCC states only decreased by 21.4 percent during the same period. In contrast, Iraq largely dropped off the spending map, and Iran drastically scaled back spending during its 1991-95 five-year plan. The disparity in the growth and contraction of GCC and non-GCC states has been caused by the combination of sanctions, the withdrawal of foreign credits, the cessation of major hostilities, and economic retrenchment in Iraq, Iran and Yemen. Average Annual Defence Expenditure in $ millions Five-year plan..1986-1990.....1991-95.....1996-00 Bahrain................154...........246.........351 Kuwait..............1,342.........6,101.......3,904 Oman................1,442.........1,703.......2,114 Qatar....................842...........580.........1,280 Saudi Arabia....17,371......23,817......20,553 UAE.................1,498.........2,549.......2,711 GCC total.......22,832.......34,999......30,052 Iran...................4,054.........3,171.......4,560 Iraq...................8,869.........3,522.......1,334 Yemen.................683...........569.........439 (Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance (London: I.I.S.S., 1987-2002) The outlook for future defence spending varies from state to state. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait remain the key markets. Following heavy spending commitments made in the early 1990s, Saudi may defer major procurements until the 2006-2010 period. Of the $12 billion and $15 billion supplemental funds set aside for their respective rearmament programmes, Kuwait and the UAE each have around $4 billion worth of uncommitted funding remaining. Major Kuwaiti procurement projects frozen during the 1996-2000 fiveyear plan will be undertaken in the 2001-2005 five-year plan instead. Bahrain and Oman are small markets and will rely heavily on the US to assist with procurement. Oman has initiated a sustained increase in spending, with the Omani government indicating that the 2001-2005 period will see Omans major rearmament drive, including expenditure of over $2 billion per year. Following very high per capita spending in the late 1990s, Qatar has completed most of its air and air defence procurement for the foreseeable future.

Row of USAF F-16CGs as seen parked on an Iraqi airfield hit by sand-storm, during operation "Iraqi Freedom", in March 2003. (Photo: USAF)

Procurement practices in the GCC Five key trends emerge from analysis of the air and air defence procurement practices of the six GCC states: US vendors are increasing their market shares: As well as dominating traditional markets such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, the US has made key inroads into the UAE and Oman markets. The Bush administration has strongly increased Foreign Military Financing aid to Bahrain and Oman, and may extend aid to other states under the mantle of the war against terror. The US continues to open markets and maintain market share by transferring large amounts of surplus military equipment (Excess Defence Articles or EDA) to GCC states, capturing future sales in the profitable fields of aerospace parts and technologies, military aircraft engines, avionics, and communications technologies. At the other end of the technology transfer scale, the US is rapidly relaxing restrictive export controls to win business in the GCC states. Once one GCC state is cleared to receive a system, breakout occurs (i.e., GCC states ordering the Raytheon AMRAAM jumped from zero to four in two years). No-restrictions technology transfer was a key European and Eastern Bloc market differentiator in the past, but looks likely to diminish. GCC states may represent partners in collaborative design: The $2 billion UAE investment in collaborative development of key US technologies (such as the integrated avionics and Agile Beam Radar on the F-16 Block 60) indicates a change in the status of GCC states willing to commit large sums to procurement (for the moment limited to Saudi Arabia). Buyers are more cautious: Gulf States have slowed the rate of fleet replacement and aerospace spending in general. Buyers are prepared to delay major purchases, push back out of services dates, and mothball large numbers of aircraft, despite the risks posed by capability shortfalls and reduced inventories. It is often considered preferable to break major procurement commitments and delay in-service dates than order cheaper equipment with deleted sub-capabilities. Upgrading current equipment is increasingly acceptable as an alternative to new procurement. New-build models, with longer operational lifespan, are preferred to second-hand equipment despite the price difference. New purchases may rely on part-exchange or resale of retired types (Kuwaiti and Qatari Mirage F-1, Kuwaiti A-4KU, Saudi F-5E/F).

Buyers are more professional: GCC procurement practices have improved greatly during the late 1990s, led by the UAE and Kuwait, who have both instituted strong oversight into arms deals. Bribery, through the use of commissions payments and local fixers (commission agents) continue at reduced levels, but have been largely pushed underground. Closer ties with the US which considers commissions payments as illegal bribes - have reduced commissions, as have local initiatives. Tendering and selection processes are becoming more effective and more rigorous. Buyers are more assertive: Even buyers with comparatively little financial clout are growing intolerant towards overpriced and downgraded equipment. Buyers are also ensuring that competitive offset agreements are out in place, guaranteeing that deence companies reinvest a portion of the value of the sale back into investments in the purchasing GCC state. Offset agreements are now approaching 100-115% of the original value of the sale, and may include features such as pre-offset (invested before a sale has even been agreed) or cash offsets (a simple discount, paid in western currency).

Above and bellow: in the last 15 years, most of GCC states proved good US allies and supporters, providing extensive basing facilities - in return for security guarantees. Regardless if at Kuwaiti airfields (see the USAF F-15E above), or at Masirah AB, in Oman (loading of a GBU-31 on an USAF B-1 bomber, bellow), the US servicemen can feel safe so far. In exchange, the GCC states have experienced a period of immense economic development, which mirrored also in the development of their armed forces. As the US influence is increasing, the times when other arms suppliers were delivering large amounts of arms are past: some of the GCC states are now selling even their advanced aircraft of European origin and replacing them by "Made in America" types. (Photos: USAF)

Three case studies of GCC procurement policy Bahrain Partly as a result of the strong US military aid it receives, Bahrain is likely to distribute most of its arms purchases amongst US vendors and surplus US government equipment. Bahrains relationship with the US has been very close since 1971, when US security guarantees and basing agreements quickly replaced similar arrangements with the British. Since then, Bahrain has proved to be a steadfast naval base and a useful host of US aerospace expeditionary forces, acting as a replacement aircraft carrier when US naval vessels could not be spared. As well as providing low or no-cost equipment, Bahrain enjoys a high degree of trust in the US Congress, and has accessed sensitive technologies such as the Raytheon FIM-92 Stinger and AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, where other Arab allies of the US might have failed. Though lacking the financial clout to dictate requirements for cutting-edge US technology as the UAE and, increasingly, Kuwait has done Bahrain has displayed canny procurement practices throughout the past decade. This has not been in the field of offset development, where Bahrain remains poor, but in the fields of cost-saving and technology transfer. Key upgrades, such as the F-5E/F modernisation, have been procured at little cost, involving US EDA transfers. Where major purchases have been necessary, Bahrain has taken the long-term view and opted for the most advanced technologies on offer. A case in point is the Peace Crown I and II purchases of Block 40 F-16C/Ds. Though the US offered former US Air Force and embargoed Pakistani F-16A/B Block 10/15 aircraft (with mid-life upgrades), as well as downgraded US F-16N models, Bahrain applied total life cycle costing perspectives to the deal and stuck to its demand for more sophisticated models. Rejecting the inferior J-79 engines offered with some US models, the Bahrain Amiri Air Force meticulously weighed the technical merits of General Electric and Pratt and Whitney engines, extracting the best terms available from each vendor. Bahrain also insisted that the advanced Raytheon AMRAAM missile be incorporated into the Peace Crown II deal, becoming the first nation in the Gulf to receive the missile and starting the technology break-out that has seen three other GCC countries receive the type in short order. Peace Crown II included the purchase of ten new-build F-16 Block 50/52 and the upgrade of Bahrains 12 Block 40 models to Block 50/52 standard. Kuwait Though Sheikh Jaber al Mubarak al Hamad al Sabah, Kuwaits Deputy Minister of Defence, stated in 2002 that arms purchases were always constructed according to the merits of the weapons rather than the

demands of supplier politics, Kuwait habitually diversified the source of arms to retain influence across the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Since 1992, Kuwait has ordered $7.25 billion worth of defence equipment from the US, $897 million from the U.K., $572 million from France, with vastly reduced totals from Russia and China. The US has also supplied vast amounts of low or no cost Excess Defence Articles (EDA) - surplus US equipment. Though Kuwait is likely to continue to receive a high proportion of new and used US equipment, the Paladin howitzer deal showed that legislators could move to block deals if they involve non-competitively priced downgraded or surplus US equipment. Kuwait has historically accepted such deals including the $1.9 billion deal that saw substantially downgraded Boeing F/A-18C/D delivered to Kuwait with tight restrictions on their employment. Kuwait now displays more savvy procurement polices, however, and has begun to use its leverage as a high spender in a buyers market. The AH-64D deal - twelve years in the making is a testament to Kuwaits determination to acquire top-quality versions of equipment. Kuwait held out, risking a major capability shortfall in the meantime, to ensure it received a highly advanced version of the Apache. This is a major turnaround when it is recalled that Kuwait was initially only allowed to purchase downgraded F/A-18C/D and ordnance on the proviso that it relinquished other older US aircraft it had on a one to one basis for the new aircraft. Kuwait, like many Gulf States, is no longer willing to jump through US Congressional hoops in this manner, and has instead purchased a deadly and highly survivable day/night tank-killer. The high unit cost of the deal may well raise eyebrows in the National Assemblys attentive Public Accounts Committee (or Audit Bureau), and parliamentarians are bound to comb the clauses of a deal with so much room for kickbacks and commissions. The deal was carried out as a government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) rather than commercial transaction, indicating that oversight will be present at the US end at least. If Kuwaiti intermediaries profit at all, it will be through the choice of industries for offset investment, which could total hundreds of millions of dollars according to government spokesmen. The Ministry of Finance and Countertrades Offset Department looks set to monitor the agreement closely.

After more than ten years of almost continuous confrontations with Iraq, but also extensive US support, the Kuwait Air Force is now very compatible with the US military. Seen are KAF F/A-18C fighters, armed with AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles (Photo: USMC)

UAE

The UAE for reasons of interoperability and effective relationship as much as any other predominantly buys French and US armaments, and can effectively play off these vendors against each other. Deals are judged strictly on their technical and offset merits, however, setting new standards of professionalism in GCC procurement practices. The Khalifa Directive of December 1986 stated that no commissions agents or mediators were to be utilised in the sale of lethal equipment, though this ban has slowly extended to most military equipment. A professional tendering system operates through the UAE armed forces General Headquarters. The UAE Offsets Group strictly requires that offsets worth at least 60 percent of the value of deals be fulfilled within seven years (ten at the maximum), with milestones at three and five years, and with strong focus on profitability not simply investment. The UAE was reported to be mulling a major investment into the Russian air defence industry in 2002-03 as part of a mooted $4 billion purchase of Antei-Antey surface-to-air missiles and air defence sensors. Though the scale of this deal is in doubt, the UAE has, in the past, allowed Russian debts to the federation to be liquidated in return for 50 Pantsir S-1 air defence units, redesigned to UAE specifications that boosted interoperability with western equipment and therefore export prospects. The Pantsir deal was an early example of UAE direct investment in foreign defence industries, a growing trend that reveals features of the UAEs increasingly assertive and sophisticated procurement policy. Though outspent in raw value terms by both Saudi Arabia ($24.2 billion in FY2001) and Iran ($4.6 billion), the UAE procurement drive has been both well timed and well executed. The UAE effectively started from scratch and does not have to service large fleets of aircraft, ships, or land formations, as both Saudi Arabia and Iran does. The 1995-2005 rearmament drive has been undertaken in a buyers market and the UAE has shown itself to be a tough negotiator, maintaining competition between French and US vendors and accessing top-grade technologies rather than the downgraded export versions that Saudi Arabia accepted during the 1980s and 1990s. Where equipment did not meet specifications, the UAE has displayed strong determination in its dealings with western vendors, particularly Dassault, with whom the federation enjoys a very close and frank relationship. The UAE successfully forced Lockheed Martin and the US government to stump up a $2 billion performance bond to guarantee F-16 deliveries and extracted a no-questions-asked $160 million advance cash offset to seal the deal, on top of the standard 60 percent offset arrangement. To save the 2.5 percent fee levied by the US Department of Defence on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) deals, the UAE was allowed to make a direct commercial purchase of the aircraft. Finally, the UAE received the object codes required to update their aircraft mission computers with new types of threat without US assistance, allowing the UAE Air Force and Air Defences (UAEAFAD) to keep track of Israeli aircraft. This represents a new kind of relationship between the US and any Arab nation. The UAEs involvement in collaborative development projects makes it unique amongst GCC states. Though such involvement became highly advanced in the late 1990s, it has been ongoing in a number of low profile projects for twenty years. The UAE embarked into a secret, highly forward-looking relationship with GECMarconi-Dynamics (now Alenia Marconi Systems) in the 1980s to design and build the Al Hakim series of powered stand-off precision-guided munitions, over a decade before such weapons altered expectations in the 1991 Gulf War. More recently, the UAE made a major and unprecedented investment in the US defence electronics industry, becoming the core partner in systems that will provide the backbone of the USA.F. of tomorrow. The F-16 deal included a $2.5 billion advance payment to assist in the development of a new internal avionics suite and $500 million towards the development of the Northrop Grumman APG-68 Agile Beam Radar. If USAF or export sales are made, the UAE will receive royalties. The U.A.E has also signalled its interest in becoming involved in the field of advanced next generation jet trainers and light combat aircraft. As well as high levels of spending on procurement and research and design, the UAE has also focused an increasing proportion of its defence expenditure on training and expansion of personnel and maintenance. This more balanced approach to defence spending should remedy many current weaknesses in UAEAFAD capabilities, bringing UAE spending patterns into line with western air forces.

UAEAFAD Mirage 2000s are equipped with advanced sensors and weaponry, including al-Hakim series of stand-off PGMs. (Photo: Dassault Aerospace)

A holistic focus on manpower and maintenance The more holistic focus on the human resources and technical support dimensions of air force design is also developing in the other GCC states. Contrary to their traditional focus on airframe purchases, the GCC states are increasingly remedying their weaknesses in the fields of manpower management, training, and indigenous maintenance capabilities. Significant efforts are being made to increase the number of indigenous groundcrew. Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE have best capitalised on US and French assistance to increase the number of local groundcrew. Saudi Arabia remains woefully undermanned in groundcrew. GCC aircrews are slowly increasing in number, though only Bahrain has exceeded the comfortable minimum 1.5:1 pilot to aircraft ratio. Kuwait and the UAE continue to utilise US training opportunities to generate a steady flow of pilots. Fleet rationalisation and retirement is assisting pilot to aircraft ratios. GCC pilots are flying around 130 hours per year or more. The sophistication of training is increasing, with the integration of train-as-you-fight features such as distributed mission-training systems that use linked simulators to allow units to train together at lower costs. The BAe Hawk trainer series is the regional standard, operating or on order in all GCC states. The GCC states collaborate effectively to facilitate training in the region, utilising Saudi airfields, ranges, and even training aircraft. Increasing numbers of western exercises provide additional training opportunities, and more frequent regional exercises are a sign that GCC states are individually determined to improve standards. Though training in the U.K. and US remains an indispensable part of air defence training, both Kuwait and the UAE have established air defence schools. Maintenance and operations support are finally receiving the recognition they deserve in GCC air forces. The danger of maintaining insufficient spares has been recognised since the Saudi air force ground to a halt in 2001. Though expensive foreign contractor support packages and overseas overhaul facilities remain the preferred options for GCC states, there are signs that the Gulfs largest aerospace spenders Saudi Arabia and the UAE are changing their practices, and in particular drawing more support services in-country to reduce costs and disruption to fleet readiness. Furthermore, these states have begun to build significant joint venture, locally based aerospace industry support facilities. The Ali Salam Aircraft Company and Advanced Electronics Company are two Saudi Arabia examples of successful offset-driven joint ventures, as is the UAEs Gulf Aircraft Maintenance Company. Dassault is due to set up a depot-level maintenance facility in the UAE. In future, increasing numbers of modern new-build aircraft and weapons will decrease the maintenance burden, dovetailing with increased maintenance capabilities of GCC states to improve readiness.

Future Projects More pragmatic threat and capability-driven procurement has led to rapid improvement in the quality of fleet management in GCC air and air defence forces, which are moving towards appropriate sizes for the tasks they undertake. In the majority of cases, this has involved expansions of fleets and the addition of new capabilities. In the case of Saudi Arabia, this has meant rationalisation, leading to downsizing through the mothballing aircraft types. Recent procurement indicate a bias towards multi-role models that display the design elasticity to grow with their users requirements - the GCC preference for smaller, light fighter aircraft, benefiting from miniaturised avionics and other advanced features, is one example. At the same time, there are still large numbers of ageing airframes in use in the Gulf, including over 120 transport helicopters over 20 years old (average age 27) and 59 transport aircraft over 20 years old (average age 27), indicating a strong market for replacements and upgrades. GCC air and air defence forces are only slowly homogenising and standardising their number of aircraft types. Polyglot fleets are still the norm, particularly in transport helicopter and aircraft inventories. Some GCC forces still field up to eight types of transport helicopter, with the average across the alliance being four. Across many fleets, increasing standardisation is slowly developing, however, largely driven by increasing U.S. sales, that are creating regional standards such as the F-16 and the C-130 families, and the E-2C Hawkeye. The Bahrain Amiri Air Force (BAAF) The BAAF has notable gaps in its inventory dedicated training aircraft, fixed wing transport aircraft, and maritime patrol or airborne early warning aircraft. In the case of transport aircraft the lack of capability has been a conscious choice, whilst, in the other cases, tight funding has constrained procurement. Bahrain originally intended for the F-16 to be its sole combat jet, but could not secure U.S. sales of advanced versions of the type until the late 1980s and instead purchased the F-5E/F as a stopgap measure, not expecting to be operating the types simultaneously. Though the F-5E/F has allowed strong interoperability with Saudi Arabia, performs a useful training role and has been upgraded to perform effectively in the optimised anti-surface role, the BAAF will welcome the chance to standardise on the F-16 Block 50/52. Up to four more Block 50/52 may be purchased under the original approved limits of the Peace Crown agreements, and Bahrain may go as far as ordering another eight models to form a third squadron to replace the F-5E/F unit. The BAAF has, from the outset, been a believer in multi-role aircraft through economic necessity as much as any operational reason and the employment of optimised F-5E/F was not the preferred option of the organisation. Though Bahrain could still opt for ex-USAF inventory early block F16s, it is likely to purchase inventory or new-build Block 50/52 aircraft. All 22 Bahraini F-16s now operate at this standard following the application of Falcon Up and Pratt and Whitney Engine Up structural and engine overhauls. Bahrain may turn to BAe to build a package of training support, Pilatus PC-9 turboprop primary trainers, and Hawk 100 lead-in flight trainers (for the F-16). Bahrain has no turboprop trainers, a basic requirement for a modern air force, and would benefit from retiring hard-to-maintain F-5F twin-seaters and removing the advanced training burden from Bahrains four F-16D twin-seaters. Funding remains a problem, however, as the U.S. will not welcome the effective shuffling of its aid to fund European sales, while the provision of training aircraft is a notable area of U.S. weakness. Nor is it clear whether Bahrain will establish a small fixed-wing transport fleet. As recently as 2000, Bahraini officers stated that the country had no requirement for a transport element. Compact geography and cost issues made case-by-case chartering (using Gulf-based Tiger Air) a more viable option. Despite this, Bahrain may be offered ex-U.S. C-130B at no or low cost, or more modern C-130H. The BAAF may also pursue no or low cost U.S. options to meet army demands to modernise its helicopter fleet, where roughly twenty medium transport helicopters have been in service for 20-25 years. U.S. surplus Sikorsky Blackhawks are one option, whilst another would be IAR-330 Pumas reconditioned by Eurocopter Romania. Bahrain may purchase a Kaman SH-2G naval helicopter for its ex-U.S. Perry-class frigate, Sabha. As mentioned, one or more maritime patrol or airborne early warning aircraft may be purchased.

Purchased as a stop-gap measure until rights for acquisition of F-16s could be secured, the Northrop F-5Es still present one of two main assest of the Bahrain Amiri Air Force, the future of which remains unclear due to uncertainities regarding a number of training- and support projects. (Photo: ACIG.org archives)

Kuwait Air Force (KAF) The KAF order of battle presents an orderly picture that many GCC states, reflecting on their heterogeneous inventories, would consider idyllic. For the most threatened frontline GCC state, however, there will always be more to do. Fighter, training, and transport fleets require upgrade and enlargement, while Kuwaits ageing helicopters requires ongoing modernisation. Maintaining the current level of homogeneity will reduce absorption and maintenance costs. Though modern by the KAFs standards, the package of F/A-18C/D ordered by Kuwait in 1985 did not build in the longevity (or the quantity) required to keep Kuwaiti air forces competitive in the second decade of the 21st century. This will necessitate a near-term purchase to supplement the F/A-18C/D force and provide it with a package of modern weapons systems, including the Raytheon AMRAAM and advanced air-to-ground munitions. The most likely option remains a supplemental buy of Boeing F/A-18 aircraft, either modern C/D versions (up to $40 million per unit) or the advanced multi-role F/A-18E/F Super Hornet (between $50-80 million per unit). The deal is likely to involve as little as 10-20 airframes (most likely one squadron of 1012), rather than the 35 originally conceived by U.S. vendors. Kuwaits experience of ordering a major $2 billion package of U.S. aircraft and weapons should stand it in good stead, and the emirate is likely to insist that advanced features be incorporated into the package, including in-flight refuelling capability. Kuwait may link the sale to an upgrade package to bring the entire fleet up to the same standard. French alternatives to a U.S. buy would need to overcome the negative cost issues associated with introducing a new type, as well as overcoming strong U.S. lobbying and market advantages. Either the $6070 million Dassault Rafale or the $35-60 million Mirage 2000 family could be chosen, particularly if they offered substantially better technology transfer and offset programmes. Cost could also be reduced if Dassault managed to facilitate buy-back of Kuwaits 13 Mirage F-1BK/CK aircraft, which have been upgraded and maintained by Dassault since they were retired from operational service. This kind of deal was used to sweeten the UAE purchase of Mirage 2000-9 in 1998, and Kuwait has previously successfully sold 23 A-4KU Skyhawks to the Brazillian Navy in 1998. New fighter purchases will create a requirement for dedicated jet trainers to meet the need for pilots. Kuwait may support new fighter deals with new purchases of BAe Hawk 100 trainers. Kuwait has, meanwhile, upgraded all its major fleets of European helicopters. French defence maintenance company COFRAS carried out full airframe and engine rebuilds on the SA-432K Gazelle fleet, and an EADS/Thales partnership will upgrade the SA-330/332 Puma and Super Puma fleets for $43 million. Kuwait will also supplement its transport aircraft fleet with four Lockheed Martin C-130J aircraft ordered in

December 1999 for $200 million. Kuwait could purchase up to four more aircraft. Up to three of Kuwaits fleet may be converted or delivered as KC-130J tanker variants. ***imag4e:center*** Royal Air Force of Oman (RAFO) The RAFO needs to implement a long overdue fleet rationalisation programme, reducing the number of turboprop trainers, utility helicopters, and transport aircraft in operation. Through new purchases and upgrades, Oman is likely to emerge from the current five-year plan with a smaller but more modern and maintainable fleet with improved capabilities. Through a mixture of well-timed upgrades of the capable Jaguar fleet and hard-nosed commitment to invest heavily in the F-16 Block 50/52, Oman will end the current decade with modern and capable fast jet forces. The $65 million Jaguar 97/GR.3 upgrade programme completed between 1997-2001 was smoothly executed in partnership with the U.K.s RAF and Hunting Aviation. The product was a highly sophisticated day/night ground attack aircraft capable of carrying a wide range of precision-guided munitions. The 20 upgraded Jaguars will remain in service until around 2008 and could serve for even longer. By that time, Oman will be operating 12 F-16C/D Block 50/52 multi-role aircraft and may order four more of the type to replace some of the capability lost when the Jaguar fleet retires, moving to a two type fleet (with the BAe Hawk). Oman took a long-term view when it ordered new build Block 50/52 models rather than refurbished ex-U.S. Air Force Block 10/15 models as some industry analysts predicted. Investing almost $400 million in one deal (plus a further $600 million in munitions and support services) was an unprecedented step for the RAFO, but is likely to represent a saving when viewed in terms of total life-cycle costing, as well as a lower maintenance burden. The F-16 was designed to grow with the requirements of the air forces using it, and the RAFO will benefit from increased interoperability with U.S. forces as well as F16 users like Bahrain, Jordan, and the UAE Following increasing mothballing of its ageing helicopter fleet, Oman is likely to invest heavily in homogenising its rotary forces in the current five-year plan. At least three types the AB-205, AB-212, and AB-214 will be retired, and 30 new airframes ordered. Contenders include the Eurocopter AS-532 Cougar, the Sikorsky S-70L Blackhawk, or the GKN Westland EH-101. Oman appears to have already committed up to $600 million in the April 2001 order for up to 20 Agusta Westland Super Lynx naval attack helicopters (likely to cost $32 million per unit). The state of the art Super Lynxes will strongly boost Omani antisubmarine and anti-surface vessel attack capabilities and two are likely to be mounted on the Royal Navy of Omans two 83m corvettes. Ten further helicopters may be purchased using funding of $250 million. Oman also has an urgent need to upgrade or modernise its fixed-wing transport aircraft fleet, particularly considering the non-contiguous and expansive nature of Omans geography. At least three C-130J aircraft are likely to be ordered in the 2001-2005 period to reduce strain on the existing fleet of 3 C-130H and 8 Shorts Skyvan. Qatar Emiri Air Force (QEAF) The small QEAF inventory includes a number of ageing aircraft types and is in need of homogenisation. The purchase of 12 Dassault Mirage 2000-5 combat aircraft (including nine EDA multi-role and three DDA trainer versions) provided the QEAF with a core multi-role air combat capability. The $1.2 billion deal propelled Qatar to become the worlds highest per capita defence spender of the late 1990s, Deliveries of aircraft and associated weaponry were completed between 1997-99, involving a complicated swap that took Qatars existing Mirage F-1 EDA fleet to Spain, via an upgrade programme at Dassault facilities in France. The aircraft swap netted Qatar $130 million, which was subtracted from the $1.2 billion deal. Twelve fixed wing combat aircraft is insufficient, however, even for a state of Qatars size, and the emirate is likely to replace its six ageing Alpha Jets with another combat-capable trainer that could support ground forces in time of war. Qatar is unlikely to upgrade these jets, as experience has shown that the type can require up to $6 million worth of refurbishment per airframe (a factor that dissuaded the UAE from purchasing reconditioned Alpha Jets). If funding can be released, the frontrunner remains an order of 15-18 BAe Hawk 100, which were selected in 1996 as part of a broader $825 million deal, but the deal was frozen due to budget constraints. In the near-term, Qatar is more likely to homogenise and supplement its fixed wing and helicopter transport fleets. Qatar has an urgent requirement for at least two fixed wing medium military transport aircraft. Qatar

also requires up to 10 medium transport helicopters that can be armed for close air support missions, with the S-70L Blackhawk identified as a likely contender. In the meantime, upgraded Westland Commandos will continue to serve in the transport and naval attack role.

Acquisition of 12 Dassault Mirage 2000-5 multi-role fighters propolled the small Qatar Emiri Air Force into the front-line between Gulf air forces when it comes to combat capability: these aircraft are not only modern, or well-equipped, but also flown by pilots with considerable combat experiences from the war with Iraq, in 1991. (Photo: ACIG.org archives)

Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) Saudi Arabia is an excellent illustration of the complex range of choices facing the Southern Gulf states as they are forced to rationalise their aircraft fleets. The following table categorises the key systems in the RSAF fleet in fleet management terms. It does not include the many small inventories of aircraft that exist within the RSAF and other services, often attached to the Royal Flight or the Saudi Armed Forces medical Service. Saudi Arabia has prudently built its transport and trainer fleets around single types and has provided funding to keep up numbers of new aircraft of these types. The RSAF is likely to replace and augment its C130 fleet with up to 70 new build C-130J aircraft in the near-term. Another ten KC-130H tankers may also be added. Saudi Arabia may have taken steps to replace its ageing AB-212, AB-206, and Bell 205 helicopters in the near future. In Feb 2001, Saudi Arabia announced the purchase of 16 new transport aircraft from Finmechannica SpA subsidiary Agusta and Bell Helicopters for $150m. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia continues to operate 75 transport and utility helicopters that are between 22-35 years old, indicating the need for ongoing fleet replacements and upgrades. In the field of combat aircraft, however, the Kingdom must rationalise its fleet management. The threat profile facing Saudi complicates the process. The RSAF faces the probability that Iranian, Yemeni, and eventually reconstituted post-Baathist Iraqi air-to-air capabilities are going to increase significantly in the mid-term, forcing consideration of the retention of optimised air superiority aircraft. The extreme ranges from which Saudi aircraft must fly to reach the heartlands of Iran or Iraq, or indeed trouble spots on the Saudi borders, means that long-range remains a key consideration in force planning. Reducing the maintenance burden of operational fleets is a further core concern. Saudi Arabia has already given some indications as to its procurement strategy. The F-5E/F, though not completely mothballed as some reports suggest, have now fallen into a training role, leaving Saudi Arabia with a capability shortfall close air support that would not be easy to reconstitute in time of war. Minister of Defence and Aviation Prince Sultan noted in June 2001 that the F-5E/F were still good and useful but would be replaced if Saudi had the opportunity.

Nine reconnaissance version RF-5E aircraft are likely to be kept in operation, having been upgraded and installed with Global Positioning System navigation in a $7.4 million Northrop Grumman deal in 1997. Twenty-seven mission planning systems for the RF-5E were purchased from U.S. firm Sanders Corporation in 1995, and Saudi has U.S. Congressional blessing for structural strengthening upgrades to extend the lifespan of the type. The rest of the F-5 community appear to have been phased out of operation, with a small number of the 35 F-5B/F trainers continuing to fly and up to 53 F-5E ground attack aircraft in storage. These aircraft are believed to be in saleable condition having received regular $50 million Northrop Grumman maintenance inputs every two years until they reduced operations in 1997. Though the maintenance-heavy F-5 is unlikely to be bought by countries not presently using the type, the aircraft is so prolific across the Middle East that Saudi will find a large market for operational F-5 airframes and spare parts carcasses. According to Saudi fast jet pilots, Riyadh attempted to sell F-5 to Brazil another user who have maintained and upgraded the capability of their fleet but asked too high a price in a marketplace where the cost of advanced inventory aircraft (such as earlier Block 10/15 Lockheed Martin F-16) is rapidly dropping. Morocco and Tunisia represent the next best options, currently operating 39 and 15 F-5 respectively; though both countries are reported to be haggling with Lockheed Martin over F-16 buys. Thus, whilst an F-5 sale could go ahead with Saudi, increasingly few countries are willing to invest in technology that Northrop Grumman itself no longer produces. The Tornado IDS fleet is receiving upgrades through 2006, aimed at pushing back the types out-of-service data to 2020. The GR.4 MLU-1 upgrade with make Saudi Tornadoes capable of employing Paveway III GPSguided munitions, Alenia Marconi Systems Brimstone anti-armour weapons, and the 250-300km Matra B.A.e. Dynamics Storm Shadow missile. Indications suggest the Tornado ADV aircraft may be converted for the strike and reconnaissance role. The air-to-ground versions of the F-15S and the Tornado fleet will adequately provide the long-range strike and reconnaissance requirements of the RSAF. Speculation instead focuses on two other capability areas that will require procurement decisions within the next 2-8 years. The first, precipitated by the retirement of the F-5E/F fleet, is the requirement for an inexpensive and highly survivable aircraft capable of carrying out the ground attack role. Tornado IDS and F-15S could carry out this role, and options include not replacing the F-5E/F at all or replacing the type with a smaller number of expensive F-15S, in addition to converted Tornado ADV. Boeing are keen to keep the F-15 production lines open and is believed to be offering new build F-15s at discount rates, bringing with them the advantage of improved standardisation in the polyglot RSAF Though a longer-term perspective suggests that the maintenance costs of large and complex aircraft like the Tornado and F-15 make near-term replacement with a new medium or light multi-role aircraft more palatable, the higher initial costs of absorbing a new type may cancel out prospective savings. Furthermore, until sufficient pilots can be trained, the retirement of the F-5E/F represents a boon for operational readiness, arguing against an expansion of platform numbers. It is quite possible that, with the RSAF focused on consolidating its manpower and training (plus maintenance) in the near-term, Saudi Arabia may skip a generation of aircraft procurement, dipping into the market in the latter part of the decade when many older Saudi F-15 reach the end of their lifespans. If, on the other hand, Saudi Arabia does make a new purchase, a number of systems would meet RSAF requirements. Whilst medium multi-role aircraft such as the Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter, Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, and Boeings F/A-18E/F Super Hornet meet the preferences of Saudi aircrew for larger or multi-engined aircraft, they may not offer significantly better performance than new generation light fighters such as the F-16, Saab Gripen JAS-39X, or Dassault Mirage 2000, which can take advantage of increasing miniaturisation of electronics and weaponry to carry advanced electronic warfare suites, conformal fuel tanks, in-flight refuelling probes, and therefore greater payloads at increased ranges. This obviates the need to maintain separate types for long-range strike and short-range close air support. Minister of Defence and Aviation Prince Sultan is believed to be strongly behind a near-term F-16 purchase, while Crown Prince Abdullah opposes near-term fleet replacement. Saudi is unlikely to order close air support versions of the BAe Hawks, as the day of the small, dedicated subsonic attack aircraft may have passed, both in terms of capability and the spiralling costs of such aircraft relative to high-performance and low cost surplus F-16s. A more distant future procurement decision which will need to be taken in the 2005-2010 timeframe concerns whether an optimised air superiority fighter is needed to replace the F-15C/D fleet. This will greatly

depend on how the air-to-air capabilities of regional rivals increase. Though the northern Gulf States present the more explicit threat to Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom has a habit of mirroring Israeli procurement practices in the air superiority sphere. If Israel receives significant numbers of the Lockheed Martin F-22, Saudis may follow suit, imposing a highly damaging financial burden on Saudi defence spending. United Arab Emirates Air Force and Air Defence (UAEAFAD) Though the UAE has spent $9.9 billion on advanced combat aircraft - $3.4 billion on the Mirage 2000-9 series and $6.5 billion on the F-16 there are still a number of significant peripheral capabilities that the UAE must develop during this decade. Strong budgetary support, a willingness to enter into collaborative development, and a preference for top-grade equipment are the hallmarks of UAE aerospace procurement policy. The latter feature stems from the threat profile facing the UAE Irans growing military prowess. Ongoing speculation surrounds potential purchases of trainer aircraft by the UAE The UAEAFAD needs pilots quickly, placing a heavy burden on existing trainer aircraft. In 1997 it was announced that a further 12 advanced jet trainers may be required, and Dubai is also known to be interested in replacing its aged Hawk Mk. 61 trainers. The purchase of new jet trainer looks likely to involve the procurement of up to 12 further Hawks and the upgrade of the remainder of the fleet to a common standard. Attempts to supply 30 German Alpha Jets to the UAE in October 1999 were frustrated by the very high refurbishment costs required though each jet would have reportedly only cost $1 million, each required up to $6 million of reconditioning. The UAE is also looking beyond the current generation of trainers into the field of advanced next generation jet trainers and light combat aircraft. In January 2000, the UAE signed two Memorandum of Understanding with DASA, signalling UAE interest in influencing and sponsoring the collaborative development of the DASA AT-2000 (or MAKO) project, which is planned to move into advanced development in 2007-10. The UAE previously expressed interest in the Karakoram K-8, a trainer jointly developed by Egypt, Pakistan, and China. The development of a next generation trainer could represent a significant technology and expertise transfer to the UAE that would assist in its indigenous maintenance and support industry. The UAE is likely to improve its transport aircraft fleet, either by upgrading its C-130H fleet or by buying new or inventory CN-235 or C-130, standardising on existing types. Standardisation is also required across the transport helicopter fleet, where over half of the fleet are more than twenty years old. Upgrades for UAE Super Pumas were purchased in November 2001, involving $125 million reconditioning of 25 engines and installation of glass cockpits at Eurocopter Romania, between 2001-04. Speculation concerning large helicopter fleet purchases identifies a wide range of potential purchases, with reports suggesting that 30 Mangusta A-129 or Westland Lynx may be purchased, while other reports suggest 40 Agusta AB-412HP Griffins and 10 further IAR 330L Pumas. Further Westland AS-532 Cougar sales may also be on the cards. In the mid-term, a hopeful U.S. defence establishment has identified the UAE as a possible export customer for the Boeing MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, which would provide a combination of helicopter and transport aircraft capabilities that the UAE might find attractive. The aircraft is able to deliver medium loads, including troops, at relatively long ranges (700km) much faster and therefore with less exposure that helicopters could. At around $40 million each, however, the UAE will think carefully about investing in this unproven and trouble stricken project. The UAE may also invest in refuelling aircraft in order to boost the endurance or range of its Mirage 2000-9 and F-16 aircraft. This would allow UAE F-16 to strike out to ranges of 1,150km with significant ordnance loads, and allow F-16 escorted UAE Mirages to move within striking range of Tehran (using stand-off airlaunched cruise missiles). The UAE has been linked to a possible purchase of three Boeing 767 tanker/transport aircraft (Italy purchased four similar aircraft for $700 million). Alternatively, the UAE could purchase ex-U.S. Navy Viking S-3 aircraft and employ them as small airborne tankers. The Vikings would also be able to act as maritime patrol aircraft and carry out anti-submarine and anti-shipping attacks.

The biggest "spender" when it comes to the defence in the last ten years was definitely the UAE. No less but $9.9 were spent on acquisition of advanced combat aircraft. For the future the UAEAFAD is not satisfied only with purchasing available equipment, but is heavily involved in sponsoring development of new aircraft: the F-16F depicted here, is a "custom" variant, developed to UAE specifications. (Photo: Lockheed-Martin)

One of the most recent acquisitions by UAEAFAD is a batch of AH-64 Apache helicopters. These are to become the main means of close air support for the UAE armed forces in the next 20 years. (Photo: ACIG.org archives)

Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait; 1990

Existing in the shadow of powerful states of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, Kuwait - a country of mere 14.000 square kilometres, with a population of some 1.6 million - became foremost known as an oil-rich nation at a strategically important position, the existence of which was threatened ever since it was created as a selfruled area. The northern part of the Persian Gulf was under nominal control of the Ottoman Empire until the end of the World War I. In the early 1920s Kuwait was given the status of an independent sheikdom Dawlat alKuwait (State of Kuwait) - ruled by the al-Sabbath family, that governs it until today. Its foreign affairs were handled by the British until 1961. One week after the formal termination of this arrangement (through a treaty that recognized Kuwaits full independence) Iraq unilaterally announced that Kuwait was to be considered Iraqi territory. Emir Abdullah al-Sabbath immediately appealed to the British, who had promised military aid in the case of emergency. The rapid deployment of combat aircraft of the RAF and one aircraft carrier of the Royal Navy, as well as subsequent landings of British troops in Kuwait City have prevented any further Iraqi moves. In the years afterwards, Kuwaitis mainly profited from immense oil wealth. The government of Kuwait attempted to show the Arab world that this wealth was not to be considered a threat. Large proportions of oil revenues went to the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development and Kuwait has been a principal source of funds for the Arab League, particularly after disastrous defeat of Egypt, Jordan and Syria during the 1967 War with Israel. Armed Forces Kuwaiti armed forces were created in reaction to Iraqi threat from 1961. Initially, they were slowly but methodically organized and trained by the British, who remained influential well into the 1970s. The situation changed in the 1980s, when the government introduced a number of modernization projects, all of which remained very limited in nature and were based on procurement of cheap hardware from a multitude of sources, eventually causing a logistical nightmare. Driven by their own experiences in the area, the British were initially foremost interested in developing the Kuwait Air Force (KAF). This was originally equipped with six Jet Provost T.Mk.51s, and four Westland Whirlwind helicopters all of which were flown by British pilots. After an initial cadre of native pilots was trained, in 1969 a total of eleven Hawker Hunter F.Mk.57s were delivered, pending the Kuwaiti search for more advanced aircraft. This ended by the British and the USA almost forcing Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to buy BAC Lightning F.Mk.53 interceptors, even if these have not been exactly what either customer needed: the British were interested in purchasing 50 General Dynamics F-111 fighter-bombers from the USA, and the sale of Lightnings was to ascertain the funding for this project. The lack of experience among Kuwaiti pilots proved to be a handicap in the use of sophisticated Lightnings and so several additional deals had to be concluded, all of which were to support the purchase of Lightnings. Eventually, 12 Lightning F.Mk.53s were purchased, together with two T.55 trainers, however, they were not to become fully operational for years. For example, in late 1968 a contract was signed with BAC for the purchase of 12 Strikemaster Mk.83s, that should give the Kuwaitis better initial training. Also, several former British MoD officers were contracted to organize a company which would organize and supervise the training of Saudi and Kuwaiti pilots and ground personnel: this company, however, was paid by the British government, and already by 1970 there were complaints that the UK never earned even a Pound Sterling from the whole sale of the Lightnings, as all the profit was spent for secondary projects needed to make the type operational in the two Gulf air forces. By 1970, the Kuwaits armed forces consisted of an army of about 4.500 men, organized as a brigade group with 50 Indian-built Vijayanta medium tanks, a battery of 25pdr howitzers, armoured cars, and Vigilant antitank guided missiles. At the time, the KAF counted 900 men, organized into one fighter-bomber squadron (equipped with Hunters and Lightnings), and a support squadron (with six BAC Strikemasters, two Lockheed C-130 Hercules transports, two Whirlwind and six Agusta-Bell AB.205 helicopters).

"415" was one of the two retired KAF Lightnings that survived not only the years of service with the KAF in the 1970s, but also the Iraqi invasion and then the whole II Persian Gulf War, in January/February 1991. The Lightnings were acquired by the KAF in a controversial deal, and it seems the Kuwaitis never managed to make them fully operational alone: although using them well into the 1980s, some help from the British instructors was always needed. (KAF)

Kuwaits relations with Iraq remained tense and in March 1973 Baghdad tried to force Kuwait to concede area opposite to the then newly built naval base at Omm ol-Qasr. Brief border skirmishes demonstrated the need for a well equipped Kuwaiti Air Force and the Emir immediately launched a comprehensive reequipment programme. As first, in early 1974, the Kuwaitis ordered 18 Dassault Mirage F.1CK and two (two-seat) Mirage F.1BKs, as well as 24 SA.342L/K Gazelle in France, some of which have had the ability to fire HOT anti-tank missiles. As delivered to Kuwait, Mirage F.1CKs were equipped with the basic Cyrano-IV radar, without any more sophisticated additions later introduced on F.1EQs of the neighbouring Iraq. The main equipment of new interceptors were AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles of US-production, replaced by Matra R.550 Magic Mk.Is in the early 1980s.

KAF Mirage F.1CK "714"; the first batch, serialed 701 thru 718, was delivered between 1977 and 1979. The accompanying two-seaters were designated Mirage F.1BK, and serialled 771 and 772. All were very potent interceptors for their time, equipped with Matra R.530 and R.550 Magic missiles. During the 1980s the whole fleet was upgraded to the F.1CK-2 standard, which added the Super 530F capability, and the examples surviving the Iraqi invasion in 1990 were once again upgraded, this time with Super 530D capability. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

Meanwhile, in March 1974, an order for 30 McDonnell Douglas A-4KU Skyhawks and MIM-23 HAWK SAMs was issued to Pentagon, and on 20 January 1975 McDonnell Douglas was authorized to launch production of

these aircraft for Kuwait. All A-4KUs were to be newly-built, and similar to the A-4M Skyhawk II standard as delivered to the USMC at the time, powered by the powerful P&W J-52-P-408 engine, with a larger cockpit hood and a squared-off fin-tip, but without any classified electronic equipment or provision for AGM-45 Shrike and AGM-62 Walleye missiles, or equipment needed for delivery of nuclear weapons. The two-seat TA-4KUs were powered by the same engine, had the same payload capability and have also kept all the other elements of the A-4KUs, including the dorsal avionics hump behind the cockpit. Most of the new aircraft and helicopters for KAF were delivered between 1976 and 1978, by which time the crews for them were trained in Kuwait by French and Pakistani instructors.

Originally, the Kuwaiti A-4KUs should have been painted in the camouflage pattern shown here, which should have been a mix of sand and Dark Olive Green. Their original serials should have been in the range 500-530. Kuwait placed its order for Skyhawks in late 1974, ordering a total of 30 A-4KUs and six TA-4KUs (the first of which flew on 14 December 1976). The aircraft were all newly-built and delivered via the UK in 1977 and 1978. Intended to provide a measure of strike capability against the permanent threat from Iraq, they served with two squadrons, and initially saw not much use: in fact, by 1984 their utilisation was so low, Kuwait intended to sell them to a third party. After some negotiations with the USA, however, the type was held in service and both squadrons moved to the newly-built Ahmad al-Jabar AB, in the same year. (artwork by Tom Cooper)

Once all the Mirages and Skyhawks were delivered, in 1983, the KAF issued an order for 13 additional Mirage F.1CK-2s and four Mirage F.1BK-2s, together with orders for six AS.332F Super Puma helicopters, equipped with Exocet anti-ship missiles. Despite its official "pro-pan-Arab" stance, in the same year Kuwait also turned down an Egyptian offer for purchasing Alpha Jets assembled in Egypt under license, and instead ordered 12 Hawk T.Mk.64s from the UK. From 1987, however, Kuwait was increasingly associated with the USA for its defence needs, and this cooperation resulted in an order for 32 McDonnell Douglas F/A-18C Hornet single-seaters, and eight F/A18Ds two seaters. Together with Hornets, the USA were to deliver 120 AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, 344 AGM-65G Mavericks and 40 AGM-84D Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Two years later, when production of first Hornets for Kuwait was about to be finalized, the first out of 12 Hawks arrived, while the KAF issued an order for 12 Shorts Tucano T.Mk.52s in the UK, to act as basic and advanced trainers. By the time, the KAF was best equipped of all military branches and this for several reasons: the ruling alSabah family always counted on help and support from one of superpowers and therefore only a small and relatively poorly trained army (this was also a precaution against a possible disloyalty of its armed forces); the air force was considered the only serious mean of defence for the small country, wile the Land Forces were little more but a speed-bumper for any potential invaders, designed to hold an eventual aggression for few days. Afterwards, it was expected that the help from abroad would arrive. As of 1989, the Kuwaiti Land Forces were still generally equipped and trained by the British, but a modest modernisation program was launched in 1988, with Kuwaitis selecting Russian BMP-2s infantry-fighting vehicles and Yugoslav M-84 MBTs. The first of newly-ordered vehicles were about to arrive in the autumn of 1990. Together with selection of a number of other systems from the USA, UK, France, Germany, and Yugoslavia, the small size of the Kuwaiti armed forces created a logistical nightmare and required a considerable number of foreign instructors, as well as relatively sizeable foreign liaison teams to be

stationed in Kuwait. within the small Kuwait Land Forces, consisting of three mechanized brigades (including 24th and 35th). These were supported by a small team of the United States Liaison Office Kuwait (USLOK), which was focusing on logistical support. Kuwait and the I Persian Gulf War As a monarchy with a large minority of Shi'a sect, Kuwait was particularly susceptible to threats from Iran, which early after the Iraqi invasion, in September 1980, understood the importance of Kuwaiti support (mainly financial) for the Iraqi war effort. In the following months and years Tehran repeatedly warned that it would "take appropriate action" against any regional state that backed Baghdad actively. Indeed, to show that it meant business, Iran launched air raids on Kuwaiti border posts on 12 and 16 November 1980, in retaliation for alleged Kuwaiti involvement in the Iraqi military effort. The attacks - all executed by the F-4E Phantoms of the TFB.6, stationed in Bushehr - saw repeated use of the AGM-65A Maverick air-to-ground missiles. Usually, the Iranian pilots would first thunder low over the Kuwaiti posts, so to scare the officers working there - or any civilians - away, and then rocket and strafe buildings. The third such attack was flown in April 1981, by three Phantoms. Both the Iraqis and the Kuwaitis later claimed to have shot down one of the attackers each, but in fact not a single bullet was fired against the Iranians: the Iraqi air defences were foremost concentrated in the area between al-Faw and Basrah, and were taken by surprise, while the Kuwaiti air defences were not active at all. However, the Kuwaitis were not to change their politics despite such direct Iranian warnings. In autumn 1981, they granted another interest-free loan of $2 billion to Iraq. In response, on 1 October 1981, the oil refinery at Umm Aayash was hit in another raid by Iranian Phantoms. Though Tehran denied responsibility, it was not only so that the Saudi-based US AWACS tracked the attacking planes from their base in Bushehr, but both the Kuwaitis and the Iranians knew very well who flew this attack and why. The situation of Kuwait was clear now, and the country had to pay a price, periodically, if it persisted in sit policy of allowing Iraq to use its airspace, ports, airfields and highways. Nevertheless, the Kuwaitis increased their support for Iraq, especially in the wake of the Iranian offensives in 1986 and 1987, which captured the Faw Peninsula, thus effectively cutting off the Iraqi entrance into the Persian Gulf, and almost cutting off the southernmost Iraqi communications with Kuwait. In 1986, the Iraqis signed a contract with several other Gulf states - foremost Kuwait and Saudi Arabia which permitted them the use of airspace along the western coast of the Persian Gulf for attacks against Iran. This contract not only permitted armed Iraqi fighters to fly inside the foreign airspace while underway to attack Iranian oil installations, but also to land and refuel in the case of emergency - and if the Iraqi fighters were not armed any more. Needless to say, this contract saved lives of dozens of Iraqi pilots, and the Iranian interceptor-pilots which were hunting them over the Gulf soon enough noticed a particularly strange behaviour of the Iraqi pilots once they would be caught by the Iranian Phantoms and Tomcats: the Iraqis would jettison their ammunition, turn towards west - instead towards north (i.e. back towards Iraq) and try to disappear flying at max speed and lowest possible level, obviously not carrying about their fuel consumption. In at least two cases, Iraqi fighters landed in Dhahran (Saudi Arabia), and at least once on Kuwaiti air bases after experiencing problems during their in-flight-refuelling operations deep over the Persian Gulf. Theoretically, the Kuwaitis counted that such help and support for the Iraqi war effort secured them not only against Iran, but also in the face of Iraq, which - despite the long and bloody war against Iran - never changed its stance towards Kuwait: Baghdad still considered the small country as a part of Iraq, and every now and then the crews of the Iraqi helicopters operating over the Bubiyan Island when asked about flying inside the Kuwaiti airspace would explain to foreign reporters that this was "their" (i.e. Iraqi) airspace, and "that one day it would be turn on "them" (the Kuwaitis) as well". Besides, all IrAF pilots operating in the area have had Bubiyan marked as Iraqi soil on their tactical charts. Believing all the differences could be solved by other foremost monetary means, the Kuwaitis never took such behaviour or Iraqi threats seriously enough, however, and the Iraqi attack against Kuwait surprised quite a few observers and involved parties.

KAF Mirage F.1CK-2 "722" seen sometimes in the 1980s. The Mirage F.1 was one of the most widespread interceptors in the air forces of the Persian Gulf of the time, and used by Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar. Without surprise, the Iraqis were swift to take Mirage F.1CKs and F.1BKs they found in Kuwait and integrate them into their air force. Before the Iraqi invasion, the KAF was swift to equip its Mirages with the Matra R.550 Mk.2, which was introduced in service only in the late 1980s, and proved excellent during the short war. Even more so, there was a considerable alarm within the USAF when a report became known that the Iraqis have captured 50 R.550 Mk.2s in KAF depots. (KAF)

The Kuwait Business Tensions between Iraq and Kuwait began to increase already in 1989, when the regime in Baghdad issued a number of statements towards Western powers, its Arab neighbours, and Israel. Most of Iraqi threats were targeting Kuwait. Iraqis have had at least five reasons for their behaviour towards the smaller neighbour: Iraq could not repay about $80 billion that had been borrowed to finance the war with Iran. While, arguably, this war was in Kuwaiti and Saudi interests, Kuwait decided to not forgive Iraqs $65 billion debt, thus providing economic and emotional justification for an Iraqi attack. Kuwaitis were incredibly rich and have had huge investments abroad: access to this wealth could resolve Iraqs financial problems. The third reason was alleged Kuwaiti oil drilling in the Rumaylah oilfield, which lay in disputed border territory, and the fourth was Kuwaiti overproduction of oil. Gulf revenues were depressed as a result of an oil glut on the spot market in the late 1980s, forcing Iraq to threaten with the use of force as retribution for Kuwaiti overproduction and underpricing. An additional justification for an Iraqi military action was the fact that the Emir of Kuwait and the whole royal family were immensely unpopular outright hated among Arabs and Moslems. Described in the Arab world (but also outside) as degenerates, complete parasites and nepotists, owners of a harem and slaves, the Kuwaiti royals ran their country as their private enterprise. Without surprise, by comparison to feudal Kuwait, Iraq was a modern, secular state, with most advanced status of women in the region and extensive religious freedoms, high rates of economic growth, and some of the highest standards of living and literacy rates in the Arab world. In February 1990, the Iraqi President Saddam Hussayin demanded US warships to leave the Persian Gulf: this demand passed almost unobserved in the West, which was all too busy with the developments in the Europe and dissolution of the USSR: subsequent Iraqi actions did not, and it was soon obvious that some kind of an armed conflict had to occur. Namely, by March 1990, US intelligence learned about Iraq building permanent missile launching sites in the west of the country, facing Israel. Almost like in reaction to this finding, already on 2 April, Saddam Hussayin announced that Iraq was in possession of binary chemical weapons and that, By God, we will make the fire eat up half of Israel, if it tries to do anything against Iraq. During the Arab Leage Summit, held in Baghdad, in late May 1990, the Iraqi President furthermore called for the liberation of Jerusalem, attacks on the USA and Israel, and demanded $27 billion from Kuwait, while blaming Kuwaiti and Saudi greed for oil, and equating them with an act of war against Iraq. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) responded that they would lower their oil output, but in essence all the corresponding Iraqi demands were in vain: Arab countries continued producing more oil than assigned to them by the

OPEC, thus lowering the price. The result was that the Iraqi economy experienced increasing problems while attempting to recover from the long war with Iran. The first round of talks between Iraq and Kuwait, held in June 1990, in Kuwait City, resulted in no agreement. The following month, all OPEC members agreed to cut production and increase prices, but most of the countries failed to observe the OPEC quota agreement, causing the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, to send a letter to Chedli Klibin, the Arab League Secretary General, accusing Kuwait of stealing oil from the Rumailah oilfield and adopting a policy of harming Iraq and conspiring with the UAE to glut the world oil market. Aziz specified, that this is forcing Iraq to retrieve, stolen funds and recover territories. In the following days, Aziz openly attacked Kuwait for direct aggression and refusal to honour oil production reductions, while Saddam Hussayin then threatened military action against the neighbour, demanding the return of the Rumailah oilfield and $2.4 billion compensation. The Kuwaiti cabined rejected all these claims, instead accusing Iraq of violating Kuwaiti territory, and demanding arbitration by the Arab League. With a whole Iraqi Republican Guards 1st Hammurabi Armoured Division a total of some 10.000 troops with 350 T-72 tanks - massed on the Kuwaiti border and a second division being in the process of getting there, Kuwait placed its armed forces on alert, while Washington declared that the US commitment to protect Kuwait remains in force, and six US Navy warship in the Persian Gulf were moved into the northern Persian Gulf. With hindsight, it should be mentioned that Iraqi accusations of Kuwait were reasonable: Kuwait was stealing Iraqi oil and selling it at low prices, by pumping bellow the border from Iraqi soil. This surplus oil was keeping the oil price low and indeed causing damage to the Iraqi economy. However, the development was playing in hands of the regime in Baghdad, which was interested in obtaining better control over additional oil resources as well as the USA, interested in obtaining the Saudi permission to base their troops in that kingdom already since the times of the World War II. With more readiness for negotiations, an armed conflict could have been averted already at the time, but neither Kuwait nor Iraq were ready to give up, and through the summer the concentration of Iraqi ground forces along the mutual border continued increasing. By mid-July 1990, the situation was reaching the boiling point. One of crucial moments occurred on 25 July, when during a meeting between Saddam and the US Ambassador in Iraq, Glaspie, the Iraqi President stated that he will not use force against Kuwait, as well as that he wants better relations with Washington. In response, Glaspie stated that the USA had no opinion on disputes between Arab nations. The Iraqis misunderstood this quiet stance as a sign that the Americans would not oppose an invasion of Kuwait. What followed, was extremely unusual: while at previous times Kuwait was often described as vital for national security of the United States, and the Administration of the US President Bush launched a policy review of Iraq after evidence was offered that Baghdad was accelerating efforts to build nuclear, as well as more advanced chemical weapons, and despite Iraqis meanwhile concentrating 100.000 troops and over 1.000 tanks on the border to Kuwait, as well as in spite of warnings from own intelligence services and the Saudis about an Iraqi attack being imminent, the US government publicly sent the USS Independence carrier battle group away from the Persian Gulf, and would not change this decision even after the last round of negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait failed, due to the Emir of Kuwait failing to consent to faceto-face peace talks, preferring Arab League mediation, on the evening of 1 August 1990. Thus, instead of issuing a clear warning to Iraq to stay out of Kuwait, and backing this with serious, highprofile military demonstrations, the US Administration maintained a public silence. The few public statements issued after 24 July 1994, in fact stressed time and again that the USA have no defence treaties or special defence or security commitments with Kuwait. Without surprise, Iraqi and Kuwaiti Planning The Iraqi plan for the operation against Kuwait was actually based on the combination of old British plans from the 1950s, "updated" on the basis of the lessons from the last 18 months of the war against Iran, with various new elements - with one exception: no chemical warheads were to be used, even if the use of chemical weapons was a standard part of Iraqi tactical doctrine already since the late 1987. Besides, the Iraqi leadership understood the importance of capturing the Kuwaiti government, in order to be able to replace it legally by a body that would support the Iraqi cause. The Iraqis attempted to made the least use of force possible: instead of starting their invasion by powerful air strikes and artillery bombardments their military could mount, they planned to deploy command units into Kuwait City, with the task of capturing the royal family. Simultaneously, four Iraqi Republican Guards divisions would drive deep into Kuwait: two were to occupy the capital, while another two would execute an enveloping manoeuvre and cut off communications between Kuwait City and the Saudi border. Therefore, after the first counter-air strike

against the Kuwaiti airfields by Iraqi long-range artillery and fighter-bombers of the Iraqi Air Force (IrAF), the Iraqis planned to deploy commando units into Kuwait City, with the task of capturing the royal family. Air and artillery strikes would be undertaken only in so far to keep the KAF on the ground. For this operation, the Iraqis deployed four divisions of their Republican Guards Command (RFGC): - 1st Hammurabi Armoured Division (with 8th and 17th Armoured Brigade, and 15th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, equipped with a total of some 350 T-72 MBTs and 100 BMP-2 APCs) and 6th Nebuchadnezzar Motorized Infantry Division (with 19th and 22nd Motorized Infantry Brigades, and one armoured brigade), were deployed north of Kuwait, along the Highway 6, connecting Basrah and Kuwait City; they were to strike directly on Kuwaiti capital. - 2nd al-Medinah al-Munawera Armoured Division (with 2nd and 10th Armoured Brigades, and 14th Mechanized Brigade, equipped with T-72 MBTs and BMP-2 APCs) and 3rd Tawalkalna al-Allah Mechanized Infantry Division (with two mechanized and one armoured brigade) were deployed north-west of Kuwait; they were to attack from north-west, across the Wadi al-Batin, charge towards south and then east, thus cutting off all land connections between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. - The Iraqis also deployed RGFC and Army commando units in equivalent of a full division for this operation. Although based south-west of Basrah, and thus relatively far away from Kuwait, these were to play an important role through heliborne deployment. In support of these units, the Iraqi Army Aviation Corps (IrAAC) was to deploy a squadron of Mil Mi-25 (ASCC-Code Hind) helicopter gunships, several units of Mi-8 and Mi-17 transport helicopters, as well as a squadron of Bell 412STs. The task of helicopter units was foremost to transport and support Iraqi commandos into Kuwait City, and subsequently to support the advance of ground troops. The IrAF has had at least two squadrons of Sukhoi Su-22 and one of Mirage F.1EQ fighter-bombers at asShoibiyah AB (former RAF Shaybah), 45km south-west of Basrah, and two squadrons of MiG-23BN deployed at Ali Ibn Abu Talib AB (better known in the West as Tallil), south of an-Nasseriyah, where a squadron of Sukhoi Su-25K fighter-bombers had been deployed as well. In addition, it was to make use of a Boeing 727 passenger aircraft, equipped with powerful stand-off communications- and radar-jammers. Main task of the IrAF was to establish air superiority through limited counter-air strikes against two main air bases, to provide close air support and reconnaissance as necessary. On the Kuwaiti side, there were no serious plans for defence at all. While tensions were increasing already since months, the level of alertness within the Kuwaiti armed forces was low. It was only for one week in mid-July 1990 that the Land Forces and the KAF were put on any kind of alert: subsequently, like the rest of the country, they were ordered to stand down, pending the hottest times of the year, when most of people in Kuwait attempt not to work. Correspondingly, the Emir of Kuwait issued no orders or prepared plans for defence of the country and only usual patrols were assigned to border areas, even if these could clearly see the Iraqi troops deployed within their sight. small detachments were deployed along the border. By 1990, the KAF was already a well-developed air force, planned to be used as the first line of defence of the country. As already mentioned, it had only two main air bases: Ali al-Salem Sabah AB, outside Kuwait City to the south, and Ahmad al-Jaber AB, some 50km due south. Its strength lied in five squadrons of combat aircraft and helicopters and crews considered proficient on their aircraft. As of 1 August 1990, KAF units were deployed as follows: No.9 Sqn: 14 A-4KU/TA-4KU at Ahmed al-Jaber AB No.12 Sqn: 12 Hawk T.Mk.64 at Ahmed al-Jaber AB No.18 Sqn: 13 Mirage F.1CK/F.1BK at Ali al-Salem Sabah AB No.25 Sqn: 15 A-4KU/TA-4KU at Ahmed al-Jaber AB No.33 Sqn: SA.342K Gazelle at Ali al-Salem Sabah AB No.41 Sqn: L-100-30, DC-9-32CF at Ali al-Salem Sabah AB No.61 Sqn: 12 Mirage F.1CK-2/F.BK-2 Ali al-Salem Sabah AB No.62 Sqn: SA.330H Puma and SA.330F Super Puma at Ali al-Salem Sabah AB

The Kuwaiti Land Forces consisted on three brigades, including the 15th Mechanized Brigade, based in southern Kuwait City; 35th Fatah Mechanized Brigade, equipped with Chieftains, based in the west of the country, and the 6th Mechanized Brigade, also equipped with Chieftains, based in the north. All of these were in their bases, with a significant number of tanks and other vehicles stored. In essence, both the KAF and the Land Forces were operating under routine, peacetime conditions, with most of their officers and a better part of enlisted ranks at leave. In addition, the Westinghouse Company was contracted to operate a radar observation balloon, which was positioned south of the Iraqi border: it was its crew this aerostat radar

that reported the first movement of Iraqi units directly towards the border, at 23:00hrs, on 1 August 1990.

Plan of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, on 2 August 1990, showing main directions of attack. (Map by Tom Cooper, based on Encarta 2003 software)

2 August 1990: Iraqi Invasion The Iraqi attack had been launched at 01:00hrs of 2 August 1990, with the T-72s and mechanized infantry of the al-Medinah al-Munawera Division rolling over the border south of Safwan and along the Highway 6 towards Kuwait City. There was no opposition: although informed, the royal family and Kuwaiti officials did nothing to warn their armed forces, instead being busy with preparations for a hasty departure. The Iraqis swiftly bypassed the base of the 6th Kuwaiti Mechanized Brigade, and rushed towards south, reaching the outskirts of Kuwait City already by 05:00hrs, few minutes before the dawn. Simultaneously, the al-Medinah al-Munawera Armoured Division entered the Rumaylah oilfields and raced towards the south, bypassing the base of the Kuwaiti 35th Mechanized Brigade in the process.

It was only around 05:00hrs that the first Kuwaiti Land Forces unit roughly a battalion of Chieftain tanks from the 35th Mechanized Brigade, led by Col. Salem al-Srour has moved out of its base and towards Jahra, with intention of mounting delaying action. At dawn, both sides brought their air forces into action, and it was around this time shortly after 05:00hrs that the Kuwaiti air defence units were activated. Shortly before the first wave of IrAF fighter-bombers arrived, two KAF A-4KUs were scrambled from the Ahmed al-Jaber AB. They attacked the front column of the al-Medinah al-Munawera Armoured Division, making two strafing passes each, causing little (if any) damage before escaping undamaged. Due to chaos and break down of its chain of command but at least as much due to the fact that none of its Pakistani, Indian and Bengali officers and NCOs that managed the armament and technical support of the KAF units was available the KAF was not yet able of mounting additional sorties before larger formations of Iraqi fighter-bombers and helicopters reached Kuwait City. This meant that none of KAF was caught literally with its trousers down. Nevertheless, there was an active MIM-23B I-HAWK site at Bubiyan island, controlled by a US contractor, who ordered it into firing action after detecting the first formations of Iraqi aircraft and helicopters approaching. Despite the Kuwaitis subsequently claiming their SAM-sites to have shot down up to 14 Iraqi aircraft and helicopters, only two HAWK-kills can be confirmed: a Su-22 and MiG23BN were shot down while approaching over the northern Persian Gulf at dawn. These two planes belonged to formations that took off from Wahda AB (better known as as-Shoibiyah), and were underway to attack Kuwait IAP, along the route as-Shoibiyah - al-Faw - Kuwait IAP. The Su-22 belonged to the No.109 Squadron, and the MiG-23BN to the No.49 Squadron IrAF, and both fighters were flown by young 1st Lieutenants. Both planes were shot down around 05:00hrs, and the Iraqis found no trace of them subsequently. In reaction to activity of the Kuwaiti MIM-23B I-HAWK site at Bubyan, one of Su-22s from the No.109 Squadron IrAF (based at as-Shoibiyah AB), fired a single Kh-25MP anti-radar missile, forcing the site to shut down its radar. Although the IrAF has had Kh-25s since several years, it never used them against Iran, and this was the first combat firing of this weapon ever. The results of this strike remain unknown. Later in the day, around 09:00hrs, when Iraqi special units arrived on Bubyan Island to capture the I-HAWK site, they found out that it was set on "automatic" mode of operation. The US contractor had fleed, leaving startled Kuwaitis to give up: they have just raised their hands on the sight of the first Iraqi.

IrAF MiG-23BNs are known to have participated in the first series of strikes against Kuwait, on the morning of 2 August 1990. (artwork by Tom Cooper)

On the contrary, some 50 IrAAC Mi-8/17 and Bell 412ST commandos-carrying helicopters, escorted by Mi25s and Bo.105s reached Kuwait City almost unopposed: at the time they arrived no KAF aircraft were airborne. The Iraqis did lose several helicopters when these have hit high tension wires: this caused significant losses and some chaos, at least in so far that Iraqi commandos were prevented from capturing Emirs Palace and also failed to intercept the members of the royal family. Contemporary rumours within the US military personnel in Kuwait were that the operation to seize the Emir of Kuwait had failed because Iraqi planners failed to coordinate the one-hour time difference between Kuwait City and Baghdad, resulting in an uncoordinated attack by Iraqi special forces, the Republican Guards forces, and the navy the ships of which were used not only to carry commandos to assault the city, but also attacked government buildings

and Emirs Dasman and Bayan palaces with artillery fire. From conventional standpoint, the Iraqi counter-air strike was only marginally successful, but it should be mentioned that the IrAF was interested in capturing as many KAF aircraft in intact condition as possible. Nevertheless, air strikes, and shelling of Ali al-Salim Sabah AB did cause some damage: the Mirage F.1CK serialled 712 (wrongly reported as 516 in several Western publications) was hit and reduced to little more but remnants of the rear fuselage, fin, and the starboard wing, while another unknown Mirage was damaged as well, and rendered inoperational. Ahmed al-Jaber AB, as well as Kuwait International Airfield have been hit by IrAF fighters as well, and at the later the British Airways Boeing 747 G-AWND was destroyed on the ground. Fighting the ensuing chaos, the KAF scrambled to bring as many aircraft into the air as possible not to fight the Iraqis, but to evacuate them to Saudi Arabia. Despite Kuwaiti claims that their interceptors were scrambled and engaged Iraqi helicopters at low level over Kuwait City, downing up to 15 of these in the process, no eyewitness reports exists for such an engagement. On the contrary: it is obvious that KAF Mirage F.1s fled to Saudi Arabia, unarmed and without any fight. In fact, the IrAF monitored their activity with the help of ESM-equipment on its Boeing 727 that patrolled inside the Iraqi airspace, at medium level. This recorded a number of Mirages and Skyhawks taking off from KAF air bases and disappearing towards south. Only one KAF Mirage attempted to lock-on his radar at the IrAF Boeing for a short period of time, after launching from Ali al-Salem AB: the lock on was broken when the Kuwaiti banked sharply towards the south and disappeared. Iraqi MiG-29s and Mirage F.1EQs were airborne inside the Kuwaiti airspace, and their pilots reported sightings of KAF Skyhawks at least once, but there were no air-to-air combats.

The Invasion of Kuwait, in August 1990, was already the second war to see the participation of the IrAF MiG-29s. The type was by the time in service with two units, one of which was forward deployed at Tallil AB, south of an-Nasseriyah, and used for interception and escort duties. However, just like previously against Iran, 1987-1988, the type failed to score even in the face of vivid activities of the Kuwait Air Force, especially on the early morning of 2 August 1990. Subsequently, IrAF MiG-29s were several times noticed by KAF pilots while these were pounding Iraqi units on the ground, but Iraqi MiGs never got involved in any air combat. The MiG-29 shown hear was seen wearing the serial "29040", and belonged to the third batch, delivered to Iraq only in the spring of 1990. Iraq had over 130 MiG-29s on order by the time, but barely more than 30 examples were eventually supplied. (artwork by Tom Cooper)

The al-Medinah al-Munawera Armoured Division entered Kuwait City by 05:30hrs, its T-72s and BMP-2s racing down the main streets, only to become bogged down in a series of traffic jams. The failure of this unit to drive through the Kuwaiti capitol, and the slow pace at which the Hammurabi Armoured Division followed, permitted the bulk of the Kuwaiti 15th Brigade, located south of Kuwait City, to escape to Saudi Arabia with most of its assets, and also permitted the KAF units at Ahmed al-Jaber AB to prepare additional aircraft for evacuation. At Bayan Palace, the Emiri Guard supported by several Saladin armoured cars fought delaying action, but was soon overwhelmed. Between 09:00 and 10:00hrs in the morning, an IrAAC Bell 412ST helicopter was lost over the Persian Gulf, off Kuwait City, under unclear circumstances. Few hours later, a Mi-25 and a Bo.105 failed to return from mission over Kuwait. IrAF SAR helicopters found no survivors. Except for two fighter-bombers shot down early in the morning, these are the only Iraqi losses to at least to some degree confirm Kuwaiti claims, then all three helicopters are suspected by the Iraqis to have been shot down in air-to-air combats. However, the Iraqis never identified the aircraft that attacked these helicopters: they speculated that some of KAF Mirages that landed in Saudi Arabia then returned to attack dozens of IrAAC helicopters that operated at low level between Basrah and Kuwait City. Kuwaiti claim as many as 23 kills against Iraqi helicopters, including 13 scored by Mirage F.1CK and three by A-4KU pilots. However, they neither specify the type of helicopters

shot down or provide any other kind of reference that would enable a closer cross-examination. The IrAF speculated that some of KAF Mirages that landed in Saudi Arabia have returned back to attack dozens of IrAAC helicopters flying at low level over the Gulf, or that one of Royal Saudi Air Force F-15s might became involved. Therefore, the KAF claims for this war, and the history of IrAAC helicopter losses remain to be more closely examined. By the noon, the Iraqis were in full control of Kuwait City and Kuwait International Airport, except such key locations like the Bamyan Palace. The assault on the last complex was launched at 13:00hrs with artillery support. The Emiri Guard fought back already the whole morning, but was now silenced within just an hour. At Doha, the Kuwaiti special forces offered some resistance as well, while the single battalion of Chieftains from the 35th Mechanized Brigade did cause some delays in advance of Iraqi units in the west. But, this unit was soon encircled and then run out of ammunition. Its surviving elements then retreated into the neutral zone between Iraq and Saudi Arabia: the Iraqi units that pursued them into this area were later wrongly perceived to have been deployed as a spearhead of a possible invasion of Saudi Arabia. Elsewhere, a number of surviving Kuwaiti officers had made calls to various members of USLOK, desperately asking for help. None came, however: while the US Administration condemned the Iraqi invasion, there was no decision yet as about what to do about it. What happened subsequently is not known in great detail, mainly because the Kuwaiti military resistance had almost come to a standstill, with what remained of Land Forces being preoccupied by attempts to escape to Saudi Arabia. The KAF did attempt to put up some fight, all the time evacuating additional aircraft towards the south. Three Gazelle helicopters deployed to attack Iraqi armour were reportedly shot down after taking off from Ali al-Salem Sabah AB, while six Hawks were evacuated from Ahmed al-Jaber AB to Bahrain: one of them, serialled 142, was damaged during the landing there. The later air base was subsequently obviously disabled either through artillery shelling or additional IrAF air strikes, as the few Skyhawks that remained there are known to have operated from the highway nearby in the following two days. This also points at the fact that some units of the Kuwait Land Forces did concentrate in the area and offered resistance; otherwise the Iraqi advance would make such operations impossible.

KAF SA.342 Gazelles were armed with HOTs and also saw some action during the short war. (KAF)

3rd and 4th of August With most of Kuwait swiftly overrun by the Iraqi military, the second day saw only limited action. During the night, the Iraqis finally put the Kuwaiti TV out of operation, while several KAF SA.432C Super Pumas were used for transporting ammunition to isolated pockets of Kuwaiti Land Forces still resisting the Iraqi onslaught. One of them, serialled 545 was destroyed in an explosion while landing at Ali al-Salim AB, while two others 541 and 544 were lost on the same airfield under unknown circumstances. On the ground, scattered Kuwaiti units were still fighting delaying actions along chocke points in the south, until being overrun or running out of ammunition. Those that could have then retreated into Saudi Arabia,

leaving plenty of equipment back. Meanwhile, a total of 18 Mirages were flown to two Saudi airfields where they were serviced and armed by French contract- and Saudi military personnel. Few of them flew some missions over Kuwait on 3 August as well. Overall, however, the KAF Mirage-fleet was out of business. Subsequently, the survivors were concentrated at al-Ahsa AB, near Hufuf, in Saudi Arabia, where they formed a joint wing with French Mirage 2000s and Mirage F.1CRs. The remaining Skyhawks at Ahmad al-Jaber AB flew several air strikes in the morning, subsequently departing for Saudi Arabia, where a total of 24 A-4KUs and TA-4KUs were concentrated at King Abdul Aziz AB, near Dhahran. During their final operations from the highway near Ahmad al-Jaber AB, at least two Skyhawks overshoot, ending in soft sand. Another A-4 crashed during a take-off at night, while four were confirmed as lost by Kuwaitis, albeit under unknown circumstances. A US commercial enterprise was immediately contracted to maintain and service survivors evacuated to Saudi Arabia, and some were in action over Kuwait the same afternoon, at least trying to offer some kind of resistance. The last A-4-sortie from highway near Ahmad al-Jaber AB is said to have been flown on the early morning of 4 August 1990, the aircraft then departing for Saudi Arabia. The last few Kuwaiti Chieftain tanks of the 35th Mechanized Brigade have fought until the afternoon of 4 August; left without ammunition and fuel, they were then forced to pull back into Saudi Arabia as well.

Sometimes during the 1980s the KAF Skyhawks were apparently repainted in a new camouflage pattern, better fitting to the baren Kuwaiti landscape over which they usually operated. Since the procurrement of A-4s for Kuwait ws accomplished via US Navy channels, all the KAF A-4s wore the standard USN BuAerNos, A-4KUs being 160180 thru 160209, and TA-4KUs being 160210 thru 160215. After being repainted in a new camouflage pattern, probably sometimes in the mid-1980s, KAF A-4KUs were allocated serials 801 thru 830, while TA-4KUs became 881 thru 886. At around this time many of Kuwaiti Skyhawks have also got the ALR-45 antenna retrofited to their avionics hump. At least one A-4KU was lost in a flying accident sometimes in the early 1980s, but otherwise the attrition was very low - until the Iraqi invasion, in August 1990. Then, and during the IIPGW, in 1991, the Kuwaiti Skyhawks proved their worth. (artwork by Tom Cooper)

Bean-Counting After the war, Iraqi armament specialists from the al-Kut AB were flown to both KAF air bases, to inspect the captured equipment and armament. There they have found up to 14 intact Mirage F.1CKs (reports differ, with most Western sources citing five F.1CK/CK-2s and three F.1BKs to have been captured by Iraqis, while Iraqis report that the number was between 12 and 14), at least five Skyhawks, six Hawk T.Mk.64s, and a single Lockheed L-100-30 transport (a civilian version of the C-130 Hercules). Also captured was the whole equipment for four or five MIM-23B I-HAWK batteries and one battery of Skyguard SAMs (together with some 12 SAMs), and either 180 or 240 Matra R.550 Magic Mk.II air-to-air missiles. Iraqi armament specialists verified that the manufacturing dates of the Kuwaiti Magic were earlier than the first batch of these missiles supplied to IrAF, back in 1980. Although some US intelligence documents like SPEARTIP 014-90 (released to author in response to FOIA inquiry) mention that the Iraqis captured even Magic Mk.II missiles in Kuwait, the Iraqis found none. Furthermore, the IrAF pilots and technicians concluded, that the Cyrano IV radars of Kuwaiti Mirages were older and less capable than those mounted on aircraft delivered to Iraq, having a lower number of working modes even when compared to oldest, early-

mark Mirage F.1EQ interceptors and fighter-bombers delivered to IrAF. All the KAF Mirages were subsequently transported to Abu Ubaida AB, where they were used extensively for training purposes, between August 1990 and January 1991. The USA observed this development and this airfield was heavily targeted by USAF, during the following II Gulf War, in late January 1991, with result that most of hardened aircraft shelters housing Kuwaiti Mirages were hit, destroying eight or ten aircraft inside. Kuwaiti Hawks were slightly more lucky: they were all transferred to Rashid AB, in southern Baghdad, and added to the Flying Leaders School the fighter-weapons school of the Iraqi Air Force. Five were to survive the following war between Iraq and the US-led Gulf Coalition, in January and February 1991. In total, the KAF came away in a pretty good shape and only days later the exiled Kuwaiti government claimed that during the invasion a total of eight Mirages, three or four A-4KUs, five Gazelle helicopters (three shot down by Iraqis and two lost on the ground), and three Super Pumas were lost in combat, while no less but 80% of KAF assets - including six Hawk T.MK.64s, three Lockheed L-100-30s, and most of the helicopters - were evacuated to Saudi Arabia, where they and their crews were to be reorganized into a "Free Kuwait Air Force". In total, the Kuwaitis claimed the KAF to have shot down no less but 37 Iraqi helicopters and two fighters in two days of battle, as well as numerous armoured vehicles. No less but 15 of these should have been shot down during the first morning of the fighting, while alone the Kuwaiti MIM-23B I-HAWKs should have shot down 23 Iraqi aircraft and helicopters. However, except for names of nine KAF Mirage and A-4KU pilots that should have scored a total of 16 air-to-air kills, no other specific details about these claims were ever published, and their validation is therefore impossible.

One of four KAF Lockheed L-100-30s was captured by the Iraqis during the invasion and taken away. The plane was later destroyed by the RAF Buccanneers, using LGBs. (KAF)

Far-Reaching Consequences Despite mishaps, the overall success of the Iraqi invasion was never in question: it had to succeed already due to simple numbers. The Iraqis have, namely, obviously drawn important lessons from their invasion of Iran, in September 1980. Instead of advancing as casually, and without obtaining numerical superiority, this time they have left no doubts about the outcome. There were two crucial mistakes, however: the first was the failure to capture the Emir of Kuwait, or at least the other higher members of the royal family, and the other was their inability to sack the rest of the KAF on the first day of the war. Thus, while many observers in the west have describe their action as being executed flawlessly, this invasion did not proceed as easy as expected. Especially attacks on the Bayan Palace and Kuwaiti airfields, as well as several other key installations are often described as uncoordinated and haphazard. In fact, it seems that especially the troops of the vaunted Republican Guard have not taken the Kuwaitis particularly seriously: they repeatedly showed the lack of discipline of a well-trained and combat-hardened army, frequently resembling a motley force without orders. Much too often they were involved in scavenging food from the locals and stealing bedding items for their hastily constructed fighting positions. Without surprise, thousands of Kuwaitis and foreigners managed to escape over to Saudi Arabia before the border

was finally sealed, on 11 August. As the Iraqis began replacing their Republican Guard units in Kuwait by four Army formations already by the 5 August, to the US military analysts, it appeared that the Iraqis would now be preparing for an invasion of north-eastern Saudi Arabia, which was for all practical purposes defenceless. In fact, the swift Iraqi operation exhausted its ability to support the advancing troops during this drive, and the Republican Guard was pulled back into southern Iraq. In fact, Baghdad even promised to withdraw all its forces from Kuwait by 5 August. Instead, a puppet government was installed, headed by Alaa Hussein Ali. Already two days later, Iraq annexed Kuwait, installing Hussein as a new provincial governor and describing its operation as liberation of the county from the Emir of Kuwait. This, as well as the fact that the US intelligence was uncertain about Iraqi intentions, but also the US interest to finally obtain the rights to base troops in Saudi Arabia, led to the US decision to launch a military intervention. During negotiations on 5 and 6 August, they managed to convince Saudi royals about necessity to deploy large contingents of US Army troops and US Air Force aircraft in the country. Learning about this, the Iraqis were curious about the speed of this deployment and US intentions. Therefore, during the following days, IrAF reconnaissance aircraft flew a number of recce sorties over Saudi Arabia, obviously searching for traces of Saudi or US military reaction. They were not to find much, then US troops began arriving in Saudi Arabia only on 8 August 1990. Nevertheless, in at least two cases IrAF aircraft were turned back by RSAF F-15s while well inside the Saudi airspace. Thus began the direct military confrontation between Iraq and the USA, which in various forms is continued until our days.

The loss of Major Anderson and his U-2

The Big Brother

As most readers are familiar with the Cuban Missile Crisis a lengthy introduction can be dispensed with. It is sufficient to say that other than the nuclear tipped missiles, the Soviets also deployed conventional forces to Cuba including substantial aviation and AD elements. The former included the Kubinka based 32nd Guards Fighter Regiment [1] which had MiG-21F/F-13 fighters on charge while the latter comprised the 11th Rocket (i.e. missile) Air Defense Division [2] equipped with S-75N Desna (SA-2c Guideline Mod 2) surface to air missile systems. Since the deployment codenamed "Operation Anadyr" was judged to be of strategic importance the units send to Cuba were elite by Soviet standards. Fighter pilots from Kubinka were considered the Soviet aviation's cream of the crop while the AD division selected had achieved good results in training and a large part of its personnel were members of the Party or Komsomol. Aircraft, missiles, auxiliary equipment and last but not least the personnel were send to Cuba by ship. [3] The fighter regiment left for Cuba from Baltiysk aboard the ships "Volgoles" [4] and "Nikolayevsk". Before embarkation the 32 GIAP left its files and other documents as well as the regimental colors in the Soviet Union becoming the "new" 213 Fighter Regiment [5] for the purpose of its overseas deployment. [6] It appears that the AD divisions unit designation was not changed in similar fashion but its assignment was nevertheless also handled in a very secretive manner. Personnel and equipment were loaded onto the merchant ship "Latvia" (her master was captain Gogridze) in Feodosiya and sailed for Cuba crossing the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The destination was kept secret until the vessel passed the Straits of Gibraltar. Only after entering the Atlantic Ocean did the ship's captain open a sealed envelope and inform those onboard (senior officers first) where they were actually going. [7] Once in Cuba the 213 IAP was based at Santa Clara military airfield while the 11 AD division established its HQ in Camaguey. Covering Cuba's airspace, or at least as much of it as possible, required to deploy air defense units across the island. For this reason SAM sites dotting the countryside were placed 60 to 80 kilometers away one from the other. However, other than taking up positions, the ground defenses would for the time being stand down. In contrast MiG pilots were much more active - they took to the skies for the first time on 18 September 1962 and were from then on flying a lot. Since US reconnaissance aircraft were monitoring the Soviet build-up encounters between "Cold War warriors" were unavoidable.

Cold War encounters

The first encounter took place in October when a flight of MiGs led by Lt.Col. Sergey Perovsky [8] came across two RF-101s. [9] Despite the fact that the Soviets were just relocating from Santa Clara to San Antonio, their aircraft carried live R-3S air to air missiles. Upon sighting the American aircraft Lt.Col. Perovsky asked ground control for permission to engage them but was categorically forbidden to do so. Another incident took place on 4 November. This time a MiG with Major Dmitry Bobrov at the controls was returning from a training mission when he was ordered by ground control to intercept and chase away two RF-101s. The Soviet pilot maneuvered to gain an advantageous position and once the Americans realized that they had unwelcomed company both turned in the direction of Florida leaving Cuban airspace at high speed. It should be added that since maj. Bobrov was conducting a training mission his fighter carried only captive training missiles and the MiG's gun was not loaded either. A third encounter with US aircraft involved Major Shtoda. Its circumstances were similar to previous ones - the Soviet pilot was flying between Camague and Santa Clara when he spotted a pair of RF-101s. Wasting no time he maneuvered to attain an advantageous position in the rear hemisphere of the US aircraft. The Americans did not take any chances and decided that leaving Cuban airspace at high speed would be the most prudent thing to do under the circumstances. To the author's knowledge no more aerial incidents involving Soviet and American aircraft took place during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Before moving on an important issue needs to be adressed first. Namely some aviation writers in the former Soviet Union want their readers to believe that Soviet pilots deployed to Cuba had shot down three US aircraft: a single "Vodoo" on 18 October 1962 as well as two "Starfighters" on 20 and 26 October (one F-104 on each day). Let it be clearly stated that Soviet pilots never made such claims, in fact they did not fire even a single shot in anger. [10] Those who promulgate reports of aerial victories that never took place confuse both professional researchers as well as amateur aviation enthusiasts, make laughing stock out of the

airmen who supposedly attained these "achievements" and last but not least seriously undermine the credibility of writings on aviation subjects originating in the former Soviet Union. It would serve much better the readership, aviation veterans and finally the authors themselves to write about facts rather than invent fiction, especially that many interesting stories are still waiting to be told. The events described so far may convey a false impression that the whole Cuban affair was not much more than a Soviet overseas excursion resulting in some of the usual Cold War games. Nothing could be further from the truth as the situation was very serious to the point of being grave. The United States made it clear that Soviet nuclear missiles right at its doorstep are not acceptable and will have to be removed from Cuba in one way or another. At the same time the Cubans, with the Bay of Pigs invasion fresh in their memory, were very nervous especially that Moscow did not bother to inform them about the ongoing Kennedy Khrushchev negotiations.[11] The Soviets on the island also felt a great strain for they clearly understood that they were at the very front line of the Cold War which could turn really hot at any moment. To complicate the matters even more Moscow kept them in the dark about how the situation was developing [12] while the instructions given were vague in many crucial aspects. Concerning the actual use of weapons, permission to open fire was granted only in the case of manifested attack. The trouble was that "manifested attack" was not defined in any way. It could be when bombs were already being dropped by hostile aircraft or when an incoming formation of aircraft was detected as well as everything inbetween. Such lack of clarity was not accidental but resulted from what can be called Soviet "political culture". On one hand Moscow wanted to maintain tight control over unfolding events but on the other hand decisionmakers in the Soviet capital desired to have convenient scapegoats in case anything went wrong. The former required issuing instructions with many restriction but the latter called for purposeful vagueness so as to enable to put the blame on the people in the theatre of operations who "did not act according to the orders".

The shootdown

Taking the above mentioned circumstances into account a serious incident was hardly avoidable. As already previously noted Soviet air defenses were standing down. The 11 AD division turned on its radars for the first time on 22 - 23 October but most of the time they were off. On the evening of 26 October Fidel Castro visited the Soviet headquarters at El Chico arguing that considering the situation - multiple aerial incursions by US aircraft on a daily basis and the threat of an invasion - air defenses should be activated. The Cuban leader gave orders to his country's forces to fire at American aircraft and, as subsequent events demonstrated, the Soviets went along with him. Meanwhile preparations for another day of activity were also taking place across the Florida Strait. Originally as many as four U-2 missions were planned for 27 October but in the end only a single U-2F serial 56-6676 with Major Rudolf Anderson Jr. at the controls received the order to fly over Cuba, taking off from McCoy Air Force Base in Orlando, Florida. When in the morning of 27 October Maj. Anderson entered Cuban airspace the Soviet radars were tracking his U-2 which for those on the ground become Target 33. Soviet radar operators and their superiors nervously watched his aircraft's progress with missile batteries across the island being put on full combat alert but Maj. Anderson was totally oblivious of the mortal danger he was exposed to. Others however knew, for apart from high altitude and tactical photographic reconnaissance aircraft which were actually flying over Cuba the US also deployed SIGINT assets in the vicinity of the island. The latter comprised RB-47 electronic reconnaissance aircraft belonging to the 55 Strategic Reconnaissance Wing as well as an appropriately equipped naval vessel, the USS Oxford. Soviet radar activity did not escape their attention and a report was swiftly dispatched, which went up all the way to Washington, alas there were no means to alert Maj. Anderson. At the same time the Soviet forces' deputy commander Gen. Leonid Garbuz and the deputy commander responsible for air defenses Gen. Stepan Grechko were debating how to handle the situation. They wanted Gen. Issa Pliyev who was in overall command of Soviet forces deployed in Cuba to make a decision on what to do with the US aircraft. Unfortunately it proved impossible to get hold of him because he was away - at least this is what his aide-de-camp stated. One should however keep in mind that Gen. Pliyev was suffering from serious health problem in particular the kidneys were giving him trouble. It is therefore likely that he was not gone but might have been incapacitated by his illness. Meanwhile the U-2 overflew the area of Guantanamo [13] after which it turned in a northwesterly direction taking it on a course that would eventually lead back towards the USA. Since the aircraft's progress was steadily reported Generals Garbuz and Grechko understood at this point, that the time to make a decision was running out. Because their superior could not be reached they took the responsibility upon themselves.

Both generals agreed that the U-2 has to be shot down and decided to take responsibility for this act. Once that happened events moved quickly. Gen. Grechko issued the order to destroy Target 33 via telephone to the CO of the 11 AD division Colonel Georgi Voronkov, the latter repeated the order to his superior [14] and than related it to the CO of the 507 AD regiment Guseinov (rank ?) who in turn did the same passing down the order to Major Ivan Gerchenkov, the commander of the regiment's 1 battalion. The actual shooting was the work of a SAM site located in the vicinity of the town Banes in Oriente province. As a result of a three missile salvo fired the U-2 was hit, coming down near the village Veguitas with Major Andersons body still strapped in the cockpit. It transpired that his pressure suit was pierced by fragments causing a rapid decompression at high altitude - needles to say Maj. Anderson did not survive. Soviets SAM operators reported to have fulfilled the task assigned (i.e that the US aircraft was shot down) up the chain of command with the timing of the event being put at 10 : 19 a.m. Curious villagers quickly flocked to the crash site and Cuban military personnel also appeared at the scene. In no time the Cuban radio, soon to be followed by the press, boasted of a great victory over the "Yankee imperialists". Understandably the mood across the Florida Strait was not that ecstatic. The news of the U-2's downing reached Washington just as president Kennedy was holding another meeting in the White House. Beforehand the US president and his close circle agreed that if an American aircraft was shot down the US would attack Cuba. Fortunately the Americans changed their mind not least because they thought that the decision to fire on US aircraft was not a deliberate provocation by Moscow but was made locally. As we now know their assessment was correct for this was indeed the case. In no small part due to president Kennedy's ability to resist being carried away by sudden developments, no retaliatory action took place, negotiations with the Soviets continued and nuclear war was avoided.

Scans of contemporary press reports about the downing of Anderson's U-2. (DAAFAR Museum)

The aftermath

Let it be added that the US came close to loosing a second aircraft. Castro did not make an empty threat the

previous evening for he indeed ordered Cuban air defenses to shoot at US aircraft. Several hours after the U-2 was brought down a US Navy RF-8 on a low level photoreconnaissance missions was hit by a 37 mm shell. Fortunately this time luck was on the pilot's side for he managed to fly the damaged aircraft back to base. Since no loss of life took place and the material damage was limited the White House choose to completely ignore this incident. Therefore it had no impact on the situation's development during the Cuban Crisis whatsoever. [15] The downing of the U-2 caused different reactions among the Soviets. Those deployed in Cuba, while not gleeful, felt a sense of having done a good job - they had shot down an aircraft which was after all their "field of business". Col. Voronkov visited the SAM site congratulating Maj. Gerchenkov and his men. Perhaps a little surprisingly the whole affair made almost no impression in Moscow. USSR's defense minister at that time Marshal Rodion Malinovski laconically remarked that it was done a little too early. Arguably the Soviet leadership was preoccupied with the ongoing negotiations and since this incident did not derail them it did not warrant much attention. Once the Cuban Missile Crisis ended Major Rudolf Anderson's body was returned to the United States and laid to rest on 6 November at Woodlawn Memorial Park. Major Anderson who paid with his life for the superpowers' brinkmanship, deserves not to be forgotten as all the other victims of the Cold War. Concerning the aircraft in which he flew his final mission the remains of the shot down U-2 are on display at the Museum of the Revolution in Havana. Some parts are also at the Playa Girn museum though of course the U-2 had no connection of any sort with the earlier Bay of Pigs affair. Looking back at the events described above it can be stated that on one hand the shooting down of a reconnaissance aircraft was almost a "typical" Cold War incident but on the other hand it was unique, not only because every case is unique but also for the circumstances of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Namely it was one of those situations when the Cold War could have turned really hot with an exchange of nuclear missile strikes between the superpowers being a realistic possibility. This particular incident illustrates well various dangers, difficulties and problems faced by all sides: the assessing of what was actually going on, what were the other side's intention, what to do in case of sudden developments, how do deal with a lack of vital information and how to interpret instructions that are either vague or do not fit the circumstances, just to name a few. Fortunately the parties involved were able to restrain themselves and the U-2's downing remained an isolated incident which did not result in an escalation or we might not have been reading this piece now.

Above: left wing and part of the tail of the downed U-2 as preserved in DAAFAR Museum. Below: the engine of the same aircraft. (Olivier Fourt & Alain Cuenca)

Footnotes

[1] 32 GIAP to go by its Russian abbreviation - let it be added that the unit was not a stranger to overseas deployment ("fraternal help" as the Soviets preferred to call it) for it had already send a squadron to Indonesia [2] The 11 AD division was headquartered in Volgograd; it included the 507 Air Defense Regiment [3] with the exception of some of the fighter regiment's personnel who were flown to Cuba on board a passenger plane [4] she was also one of the vessels which ferried the nuclear missiles from Cuba back to the Soviet Union once the crisis was over [5] the Russian abbreviation being IAP [6] Once the Cuban deployment was over the regiment's personnel returned to the Soviet Union with the 32 GIAP being "resurrected". As for the aircraft and ground support equipment it was left over to the host nation becoming the nucleus of the Cuban air arm's "Fishbed" force. [7] let it be pointed out that having made the round trip Soviet Union - Cuba and back for a few times (it took several shiploads to move an entire AD division) capt. Gogridze knew the destination but each time maintained secrecy [8] he was the 213 IAP's deputy commander [9] On this as well as on other occasions Soviet pilots identified US aircraft encountered as "Voodos" which may or may not be the case. In Vietnam the Soviets frequently referred to American aircraft as "Thunderchiefs" or "Phantoms" regardless of their actual type. Similarly Western pilots would often call any Eastern military aircraft a MiG. [10] A small correction is necessary for two shots were actually fired though not in the air but on the ground. Namely a late night intruder, who could not be identified because of darkness, failed to stop when challenged by a Soviet guard. The man fired a warning shot but since it was ignored a bullet was sent in the direction of "the menace hiding in the dark". As a result the intruder was "dropped" and the first glance at the cadaver revealed that it was ... a cow ! The net result of the incident was positive - at least from the Soviets point of view - for 213 IAP's personnel could enjoy some fresh beef. [11] According to Aleksandr Alekseyev who was at that time the Soviet Union's ambassador to Cuba he briefed the country's leader on each exchange of massages between Moscow and Washington but if it is to go by most sources Fiedel was kept in the dark about the ongoing negotiations. Ambassador Alekseyev's claim is doubtful for it taking into account his rank and posting is unlikely that he would receive informations (detailed ones in particular) about the Kennedy - Khrushchev correspondence. [12] This is illustrated best by the fact that an important source of information for the Soviets in Cuba were the "Voice of America" broadcasts (sic !). [13] It is important to note that the U-2 had overflown a Soviet FKR cruise missile site in the village of Filipinas to the west of Guantanamo. The missiles had nuclear warheads and were meant to "neutralize" the US base at Guantanamo in the case of an American invasion. Since the missiles were moved into position on the night of 26-27 October their presence could not have been revealed by earlier reconnaissance missions therefore they were still a secret to the Americans (their discovery came about on the 28 October but the missiles were not identified for what they really were). The fact that Maj. Anderson overflew the area in question was arguably one of the main reasons behind the Soviet Generals' decision to down the U-2. [14] It was a standard procedure for the recipient to repeat the order received so as to ensure his superior that it was clearly understood. [15] While the Cubans had no means to effectively engage high flying targets such as the U-2 their numerous AA guns posed a serious threat to low flying aircraft. However despite opening fire on a few occasions they made relatively little use of them. As a result other than the damage inflicted to the "Crusader" no more serious incidents took place. One reason is that ambassador Alekseyev was pressuring Castro to refrain from shooting at US aircraft in order not to aggravate the already strained situation.