INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO THE EVENTS FROM THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT

Todd R. Flowers 2011 Science Teachers Workshop

Key Points to Remember

The strength of the Japanese earthquake was at least 1,000 times more powerful than any earthquake ever recorded near any of our nuclear facilities Dominions nuclear power stations are built to withstand any seismic event conceivable for their locations Our stations are designed and maintained to protect critical safety systems against flooding and we have multiple redundant systems to provide backup electricity Dominion has a robust emergency plan designed to protect the public. This plan is exercised routinely with the state and local emergency management agencies Section B.5.b of NRC Interim Compensatory Measures Unique to the U.S. The primary design and safety philosophy in engineering nuclear plants is called defense in depth
There are multiple, redundant safety systems to make sure plant personnel and the public are protected from any dangerous release of radiation

Dominion Response
Established a multidiscipline team to respond to the event Programs in place to respond to natural events or significant loss of critical unit systems reexamined Stations maintain high levels of readiness to respond to all events Worst-case accidents and acts of nature have been considered and procedures are in place to respond
Innsbrook Kewaunee Millstone

North Anna

Surry

Dominion Response
Dominion established a multidiscipline team to respond to the event Dominion offered equipment, material and our knowledge from Millstone Unit 1 to the Japanese nuclear industry

Millstone Unit 1, which was shut down permanently in 1998, is similar to the damaged units at the Fukushima Daiichi power station in Japan

INPO Industry Report 11-1

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Caused by Earthquake and Tsunami
Initiated new reviews of our equipment, training & procedures Verified the companys ability to mitigate events that are considered to be beyond the design of the reactors
Total loss of offsite power Internal and external flooding events Other potential vulnerabilities

Followed the guidance provided by INPO Coordinated with our industry peers

INPO Industry Event Report 11-2

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Spent Fuel Pool Loss of Cooling and Makeup
Verifying the actions of a previous Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) 09-1, Shutdown Safety, have been implemented as they relate to the safety functions associated with Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) cooling and inventory makeup.
INPO SOER 09-1 provided guidance on industry best practices regarding shutdown safety during a refueling outage.

Establishing controls to identify and protect systems and equipment required to maintain the functions of SFP decay heat removal and inventory control
For on-line periods when the time for the SFP to reach 200 degrees Fahrenheit upon loss of normal cooling is less than 72 hours.

Establishing, for all plant conditions, the time for the North Anna and Surry SFPs to reach 200 degrees F in the event that normal cooling is lost.
This time is intended for information purposes only in case a sustained loss of SFP cooling or inventory occurs. Dominion will verify the adequacy of station abnormal operating procedures (AOPs) for responding to the loss of SFP cooling and/or inventory. R

Revising station emergency operating procedures (EOPs) to include a precautionary statement that SFP level and temperature should be monitored.

NRC Bulletin 2011-01

Mitigating Strategies
Dominion has prepared an initial response to the NRC Bulletin that confirms mitigative-strategy equipment is in place and available and confirms that the strategies can be carried out with current plant staffing. A subsequent response was submitted to the NRC to respond with further information including:
how essential resources are maintained, tested and controlled to ensure availability; how strategies are re-evaluated if plant conditions or configurations change; and how arrangements are reached and maintained with local emergency response organizations.

Other NRC Activities

NRC information Notice 2011-05 and Temporary Instructions 2515/184 and 2515/183
TI 2515/183
Obtained a high-level look at the industrys preparedness for events that may exceed the design basis for a plant and to independently assess the adequacy of actions taken by licensees in response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear station fuel damage event.

TI 2515/184
Assessed the availability of severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs), how these guidelines are updated and how plants train their personnel on the guidelines.

INPO Industry Event Report 11-3

Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals
Evaluating our operator training programs against an INPO created selfassessment guideline Evaluating operator fundamentals against an INPO created selfassessment Implementing all suggested organization and leader behaviors and practices to reinforce operator fundamentals Verifying current training highlights the importance of control room teamwork.

NRC 90-Day Report

Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century
The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima-Daiichi Accident Dominion is participating in industry led dialogue with the NRC regarding the recommendations of the 90-day report Dominion is taking action to plan for any foreseeable plant modifications which will increase the safety of the public resulting from the report recommendations.

NRC 90-Day Report

Specific recommendations identified in the report

Require GE Mark I & Mark II BWRs to have hardened vents Require plants to have reasonable backup emergency equipment protection Require plants to have sufficient safety-related instrumentation to monitor SFPs Require plants to have earthquake-resistant and easily accessible measures for spraying water into SFPs Revise regulations to require nuclear plants to reevaluate hazards from flooding and seismic events every 10 yrs Revise regulations to ensure equipment, procedures, & training is in place to support a loss power event for a minimum of 8 hrs and to maintain safe operation or bring it to a safe shutdown within 72 hrs for the reactors and SFPs Revise emergency preparedness procedures to enhance safety for sites with multiple reactors at one location Increase inspections of seismic and flood protection equipment Require plants to have spent fuel pool back-up water supplies sources & plans

INPO Industry Event Report 11-4

Extended Loss of Power (Issuance expected early to mid August)
Explaining the strategies for extending availability of on-site emergency power to 24 hours or more assuming loss of emergency diesel generators and permanently installed station black-out equipment Explaining the strategies for powering critical instrumentation in the event of an extended loss of power Ensuring an available source of fuel oil for diesel operated emergency equipment Developing a method for on and off-site communications in the event of an extended loss of power (assume nearby cell-towers have failed)

In Closing
Protection of the health and safety of the public is at the forefront of Dominions nuclear operations The company demonstrates the highest levels of safety and reliability in operating its nuclear stations Dominion and its industry peers will continue to share information and will work to learn from the events in Japan Dominion, the industry and federal regulators will assess lessons learned and incorporate additional actions that can be taken to enhance our readiness to respond to severe accidents

Questions