Famous Case Law

Summary of Balfour v. Balfour, 2 K.B. 571 (1919).

Facts
Mr. Balfour (D) and Mrs. Balfour (P) lived in Ceylon and visited England on a vacation. The plaintiff remained in England for medical treatment and the defendant agreed to send her a specific amount of money each month until she could return. The defendant later asked to remain separated and Mrs. Balfour sued for restitution of her conjugal rights and for alimony equal to the amount her husband had agreed to send. Mrs. Balfour obtained a decree nisi and five months later was granted an order for alimony. The lower court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and held that the defendants promise to send money was enforceable. The court held that Mrs. Balfours consent was sufficient consideration to render the contract enforceable and the defendant appealed.

Issues
1. Must both parties intend that an agreement be legally binding in order to be an enforceable contract? 2. Under what circumstances will a court decline to enforce an agreement between spouses?

Holding and Rule

1. Yes. Both parties must intend that an agreement be legally binding in order to be an enforceable contract. 2. The court will not enforce agreements between spouses that involve daily life. Agreements between husband and wife over matters that affect their daily lives are not subject to contractual interpretation, even when consideration is present. Spouses normally intend that the terms of their agreements can be varied as situations develop. The court held that it was presumed that the parties made the agreement as husband and wife and did not intend that it could be sued upon. The court held that as a matter of public policy it could not resolve disputes between spouses.

Disposition
Judgment for plaintiff Mrs. Balfour reversed.

Note
Contracts related to the social aspect of marriage will not be enforced by the courts. Contracts between spouses related to business relationships can be enforced, however. Courts are willing to support negotiated divorce settlements and written statements of support.

Summary of Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1893] Q.B. 256 (C.A.).

Facts
Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (D) manufactured and sold The Carbolic Smoke Ball. The company placed ads in various newspapers offering a reward of 100 pounds to any person who used the smoke ball three times per day as directed and contracted influenza, colds, or any other disease. After seeing the ad Carlill (P) purchased a ball and used it as directed. Carlill contracted influenza and made a claim for the reward. Carbolic Smoke Ball refused to pay and Carlill sued for damages arising from breach of contract. Judgment for 100 pounds was entered for Carlill and Carbolic Smoke Ball appealed.

Issue
Does one who makes a unilateral offer for the sale of goods by means of an advertisement impliedly waive notification of acceptance, if his purpose is to sell as much product as possible?

Holding and Rule (Lindley)

Yes. One who makes a unilateral offer for the sale of goods by means of an advertisement impliedly waives notification of acceptance if his purpose is to sell as much product as possible.

The court held that a person who makes an offer may decline to require notice of acceptance if he or she wishes. One who makes an offer dispenses with the requirement of notice of acceptance if the form of the offer shows that notice of acceptance is not required. To accept an offer, a person need only follow the indicated method of acceptance. If the offeror either expressly or impliedly intimates in his offer that it will be sufficient to act without giving notice of acceptance, performance is sufficient acceptance without notification. The court held that an advertisement is considered to be an offer when it specifies the quantity of persons who are eligible to accept its terms. If such an advertisement requires performance, the offeree is not required to give notice of his performance. The court addressed the issue of whether the ad was intended to be a promise or whether it was merely puffing. The court pointed to Carbolic Smoke Balls claim in the advertisement that it had deposited 1000 pounds with Alliance Bank, which the court decided was intended to demonstrate the companys sincerity in paying the reward.

Concurring (Bowen)
Notification of acceptance is required under our law. The person who makes the offer may dispense with notice to himself if he thinks it desirable to do so. He may expressly or impliedly create any method of acceptance for his offer. An offeree need only follow the method indicated for acceptance. The requirement of notice of acceptance to the offeror must be determined by an objective reasonable person standard. In the advertisement case, it seems to me that an inference may be drawn from the transaction itself that a person is not to notify his acceptance of the offer before he performs the condition, but that if he performs the condition notification is dispensed with. We must look to the essence of the transaction and what the offeror is bargaining for under the circumstances. Under these facts, the defendant impliedly indicated that it did not require notification of acceptance of the offer.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed.

Fisher v Bell (1960)

A shopkeeper was convicted of offering for sale a flick knife contrary to the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 s.1(1); he had displayed the knife in his shop window. The shopkeeper appealed. The shopkeeper was successful in his appeal and was acquitted. Lord Parker CJ 'The sole question is whether the exhibition of that knife in the window with the ticket constituted an offer for sale within the statute. I think that most lay people would be inclined to the view (as, indeed, I was myself when I first read these papers), that if a knife were displayed in a window like that with a price attached to it, it was nonsense to say that that was not offering it for sale. The knife is there inviting people to buy it, and in ordinary language it is for sale; but any statute must be looked at in the light of the general law of the country, for Parliament must be taken to know the general law. It is clear that, according to the ordinary law of contract, the display of an article with a price on it in a shop window is merely an invitation to treat. It is in no sense an offer for sale the acceptance of which constitutes a contract. That is clearly the general law of the country...' ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------High Court In this case (Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394) the defendant, a shopkeeper, was prosecuted for displaying an illegal flick-knife for sale. Because it is an offense to offer such an item for sale Restriction of offensive weapons act (1951) he was convicted. On appeal, however, it was held that offer for sale has a technical meaning in law, and a a shop window display is an Invitation to treat, not an Offer in contractual terms. The conviction was therefore quashed. In 1961 a further Act was passed making it an offense to 'expose for the purpose of sale' an offensive weapon.

Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists Ltd (1953)

Certain brand name medicines were displayed for sale in a self service store. The issue arose as to when and where the sale of the medicines took place. Was it when a customer put the medicines in her shopping basket or was it when she presented the goods to the cashier? The reason this was an important issue was because the Pharmacy and Poisons Act 1933 s.18(1) provided that it was unlawful to sell such medicines unless the "'sale is effected by, or under the supervision of, a registered pharmacist.' If the sale took place when the customer put the medicines in her shopping basket the sale would not take place "under the supervision of, a registered pharmacist' because no pharmacist was present at that time. If, on the other hand, the sale took place when the customer presented the goods to the cashier the sale would take place "under the supervision of, a registered pharmacist' because a pharmacist was present at the checkout desk.

Somervell LJ: 'One of the duties of the plaintiffs, the Pharmaceutical Society, is to take all reasonable steps to enforce the provisions of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933. The provision of that Act here in question is s.18(1).

The point which is taken by the plaintiffs is this. It is suggested that the purchase is complete if and when a customer going round the shelves in this shop of the defendants takes an article and puts it in the receptacle which he or she is carrying, and, therefore, when the customer comes to the pay desk, the registered pharmacist, even if he is so minded, has no power to say: 'This drug ought not to be sold to this customer.'

Whether the plaintiffs' contention is right depends on what are the legal implications of the arrangements in this shop. Is the invitation which is made to the customer to be regarded as an offer which is completed so that both sides are bound when the article is put into the receptacle, or is it to be regarded as a more organised way of doing what is already done in many types of shops -- and a bookseller is, perhaps, the best example -- namely, enabling customers to have free access to what is in the shop, to look at the different articles, and then, ultimately, having taken the one which they wish to buy, to come to the assistant and say: 'I want this'? Generally speaking, the assistant will say: 'that is all right', the money passes, and the transaction is completed' [I]n the case of the ordinary shop, although goods are displayed and it is intended that customers should go and choose what they want, the contract is not completed until the customer has indicated the article which he needs and the shopkeeper or someone on his behalf accepts that offer. Not till then is the contract completed, and, that being the normal position, I can see no reason for drawing any different inference from the arrangements which were made in the present case.'