EIA Report - Part 2 Section13 Annex B

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EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B
epd.gov.hk/eia/register/report/eiareport/eia_1252006/html/eiareport/Part2//Sec2_13_AnnexB.htm
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1INTRODUCTION
ThisannexcoversdetailsoftheQuantitativeRiskAssessment(QRA)forthesubseapipelinefromSouthSokotoBlackPointPowerStation.Details ofthemethodologyarepresentedherewhilsttheresultsandconclusionsaregiveninthemainreport,section13.
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2DATACOLLECTIONANDREVIEW
Thefollowinginformationwasreviewedandformedthebasisofthestudy: BasisofDesignReport,AkerKvaerner[1] Drawing8028PLD008detailingthepipelineroute,trenchingandbackfillingdetails,AkerKvaerner[2] InputtoEIAStudyReportonpipelinedesign,AkerKvaerner[3] Marinevesseldensitydata,BMT[4] MarinetrafficdatainHongKongwaters,MarineDepartment(MD)[5,6] UKLossofContainmentDatabaseforOffshorePipelines[7]and Hydrographic&GeophysicalSurveyoftheSeabed,EGS[8].
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3PIPELINEANDMARINEDATA
Thissectionofthereportdescribesthesubseapipeline,itsenvironmentanddetailsofmarinetrafficalongtheproposedroute. 3.1SUBSEAPIPELINE TheproposedpipelinetakesasubsearoutefromtheLNGterminalatSouthSoko,passingaroundthewesternedgeofLantauIslandtoBlackPoint PowerStation(Figure3.1).ThepipelinewillcrossthewaterwaysoftheAdamastaChannelandUrmstonRoad(notadesignatedchannel)andhave atotallengthofabout38km.Theseabedformuchoftherouteisclassedasverysoftclay[8]. Theproposedpipelinesystemwillconsistofasingle30OD(762mmouterdiameter)API5LGradeX65pipeline,withwallthicknessof1(25.4mm). Itisdesignedtohaveapeakflowrateof1000MSCFD(millionstandardcubicfeetperday)withasupplypressureof101barg.Thepipelinewillhave anasphaltenamelcoatandwrapandsacrificialanodesforexternalcorrosionprotectionandanouterlayerofreinforcedconcreteforbuoyancy controlandtoprovidemechanicalprotectionduringpipelineinstallationandtrenchingoperations.Thepipelineisdesignedinaccordancewiththe DNV1981designcode[9].AsummaryofthepipelinedetailsisgiveninTable3.1. Table3.1SummaryofPipelineDetails
Parameter Location Length Outsidediameter Nominalwallthickness Linepipegrade Externalcoating Internalcoating Cathodicprotection Designflowrate Designpressure LNGterminaldeliverypressure Minimumterminaldeliverypressure MinimumdeliverypressuretoBPPS Pressureassumedforanalysis Minimumoperatingtemperature Maximumoperatingtemperature Temperatureassumedforthisstudy Waterdepth Seabedsoil Pipelineprotection Designlife Details SouthSokoIslandtoBlackPointPowerStation 38.3km 30(762mm) 1(25.4mm) API5LgradeX65 Asphaltenamelcoat&wrapandsteelreinforced concrete Epoxy Aluminiumbasedsacrificialanodes 1000MSCFD 111barg 101barg 85barg 38barg 101barg 5C 85C 20C 1.625m Verysoftclaybecomingfirmerwithdepth 3mcoverwithrockarmourbackfillofvaryingthickness 30years
Thecompositionofthegasismainlymethane(87.5796.13mol%).Thecompositionofthegasissuchthatnointernalcorrosionisexpected. Thewaterdepthalongtheroutevariesbetween1.6and25m,withmuchoftheroutecharacterisedbyshallowwaterbelow6mdeep.Thepipelinewill beburied3mbelowtheseabedwithvaryinglevelsofrockarmourprotection(Figures3.1and3.2).Type1Btrenchingwillbeusedfortheshallow waterareasawayfromthebusymarinefairways.Thetype1Btrenchinvolvesjettingwith1mofrockarmourbackfilland2mofnaturalbackfill(tothe topofthepipeline).Thisprovidesprotectionforanchorsupto2tonnes,essentiallyprotectingagainstanchorsfromallshipsbelowabout10,000dwt. Trenchtype2AisusedontheshoreapproachtoSouthSokoIslandandconsistsofpretrenchingwith3mofarmourrockbackfill.Trenchtype2B, usedontheBPPSapproachutilizes1.5mofrockbackfill.Thesearealsodesignedforprotectionfrom2tonneanchorsandanyfuturedredgingwork. ThewaterwaysofUrmstonRoadandtheAdamastaChannelwillhavetype3Aor3Btrenches.Theseconsistofpretrenchingwith3mofrock backfill.Theonlydifferencebetween3Aand3Bisthattheseabedwillbedredgedsothatthetopoftherockarmourisatleast17mfortype3A.For thepurposeofthisstudy,theyareessentiallysimilarandaredesignedtoprotectagainst20tonneanchors.Thiscoversthefullrangeofships currentlyoperatinginHongKongandalsothoseexpectedinfuture. Figure3.1PipelineRoute
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Figure3.2PipelineTrenchTypes
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3.2MARINETRAFFIC Themarinetrafficinfluencestherisksfromthepipelineintwoways: Itincreasesthepotentialfordamageduetointerferencesuchasanchordrop/dragincidentsand Intheeventofapipelinefailure,marinetrafficcouldexacerbatetheconsequentialeffectscausingfatalities. ThemarinevesseltrafficvolumewassurveyedbyBMT[4]usingtracksofvesselmovementsobtainedfromradar.Theimportantdetailspertinentto thecurrentstudyarerepeatedhereforcompleteness. 3.2.1MarineVesselActivityalongPipelineRoute Themarinetrafficreport[4]dividesthepipelinerouteintosectionsusinggatepoststhatroughlycorrespondtokeylocationsalongthepipelineroute. Thesesamegatepostsareadoptedinthecurrentstudy(Figure3.3). TheSouthSokoapproach(LP2IP1)ischaracterisedbylocalfishingactivitiesandthemovementofsmallcraft.Thepipelineheadswestwardsand crossestheAdamastaChannelbetweengatesIP2IP4.Themarinetrafficinthisareaisdominatedbyfastferriesandrivertradeactivity.Thesefast ferriesserviceMacauandZhuhaiandtravelat4045knots.Thereisalsoatrafficseparationscheme(TSS)andturningbuoyinthisarea.Section IP4IP5aaroundthewesternedgeofLantauIslandconsistsmainlyoffishingvesselscurrently.IP5aIP7passesbytheY3Anchoragearea.Itis understoodthatthisanchorageisusedbylargeoiltankerstransferringtheirloadtosmallervesselsthatservicethePearlRiver[10].Thereisvery littleinformationavailableregardingthissincetheanchorageisoutsideHongKongwaters,butthepresenceofsuchactivityisconfirmedbythe existenceofanchormarksontheseabed[8].Therearealsoplanstodevelopacontainerterminal(CT10)inthisarea.Althoughtheseplansarevery tentativeatthemoment,ahighlevelofpipelineprotection(type3B)ismaintainedthroughthissection. IP7IP10isusedbyfishingvesselsandrivertradevesselsenroutebetweenTuenMunandMacau/Zhuhai.Thewaterisshallowinthisregion, rangingfrom48mdeep.Thisprecludesitsusebylargedraftvessels.ThissectionalsorunsalongtheedgeoftheShaChau/LungKwuChauMarine Park. GatepostIP10aliesnearthecentreofUrmstonRoad.Thisisthemainrouteforcontainerships,rivertradevesselsandfastferriesplyingbetween HongKongandtheportsoftheEasternPearlRiverDelta. Figure3.3ReferencePointsforProposedPipeline
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3.2.2VesselTypes Themarinetrafficconsultanthascalculatedthemarinetrafficvolumebetweenpairsofgatepostsbasedonradartracks[4].Thevesselspeedsand apparentsizefromtheradarreturnsareinterpretedinto6marinevesselcategories(Table.3.2).Thesamecategoriesareusedforthecurrentstudy. Table3.2VesselClassesAdoptedforAssessment
Basedonthisvesselclassification,thepopulationusedinthisstudyareasgiveninTable3.3.Themaximumpopulationoffastferriesisassumedto be450,basedonthemaximumcapacityofthelargestferriesoperatingonroutestoMacauandPearlRiverports.However,theaverageloadfactor offastferriestoMacauis52%andPearlRiverportsis37%[11]whiletheoverallaverageloadfactorconsideringallferriesisabout50%[10].Hence, adistributioninferrypopulationwasassumedasindicatedinTable3.3.Thisdistributiongivesanoverallloadfactorofabout58%whichis conservativeandcoversanyfutureincreaseinvesselpopulation.ThereisanadditionalcategoryinthetrafficvolumedatacalledOthers(see Section3.2.3).Theseareassumedtobesmallvesselswithapopulationof5. Table3.3VesselPopulation

Class Population
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Fishingvessel Rivertradecoastal vessels Oceangoingvessels Fastlaunches Fastferries Other

5 5 21 5 450(largestferriesinpeakhours,4hoursaday) 350(averageferryinpeakhours,4hoursaday) 280(80%capacity,peakhours,4hoursaday) 175(50%capacity,daytimeoperation,9hoursa day) 105(30%capacity,lateevening,4hoursaday) 35(10%capacity,nighttime,7hoursaday) 5 3.75%oftrips 3.75%oftrips 22.5%oftrips 52.5%oftrips 12.5%oftrips 5.0%oftrips
3.2.3TrafficVolume ThetrafficvolumeasprovidedbyBMT[4]isgiveninTable3.4.Thisisfortheyear2003.BMTalsoprovidepredictionsfortheyears2011and2021 (Table3.5).Inthisstudy,2011isusedasthebasecaseand2021asthefuturescenario.Twofuturescenariosareconsidered:withandwithoutthe developmentoftheTongguWaterway. ThedatainTable3.4requiredfurtherinterpretation.VesselclassA2isdescribedasfastlaunchesandfastferries.Thepopulationofafastlaunchis verydifferentfromthatofafastferryandsoamoreprecisebreakdownisrequired.SomeoftheseA2fastferriesclearlybelonginclassB2withthe otherfastferries.TakingintoconsiderationthetimetableofferriesservingMacauandthePearlRiverportsandinformationprovidedbythemarine consultant[10],itwasassumedthat55%offastvesselsalongUrmstonRoadand75%offastvesselsalongtheAdamastaChannelarefastferries. Forintermediatesections,suchasnearShaChau,anintermediatevalueof65%wasassumed. ClassC2isdescribedasfastferriesandoceangoingvessels.Sinceallfastferrieshavenowbeenaccountedfor,classC2areassumedto compriseofcargoshipsonly.Thisisconsistentwithassumptionsmadeinthemarineactivityreport[4,10]. Thedatashowsasmallnumberofoceangoingvessels(classC1andC2)alongtheroutebetweengatesIP6andIP10.Theshallowwateralong thesesectionsnegatesthepossibilitythatthesearelargevessels.Theymustbevesselsatthesmallestendofthedistributionofoceangoing vessels,nomorethan100mlong[10].Morelikely,theyarerivertradevessels.Theywerethereforetreatedassmallervesselsintheanalysisby reclassifyingthemaseitherrivertradeorothervessels. Table3.4TrafficVolumeacrossGateSections(DailyAverage,2003)
Table3.5TrafficGrowthForecast
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VesselType OceangoingVessel RivertradeCoastalVessel FastFerry FishingVessel/SmallCraft/Fastlaunch Others

2011comparedto 2003 5% +5% +10% +5% +5% 2021comparedto2003 +10% +15% +30% +15% +15%
3.3SEGMENTATIONOFTHEROUTE Basedontheabovediscussions,thepipelineroutewasdividedinto12sectionsforanalysis(Table3.6,Figure3.4).ThefirstsectionisfromLP2to IP1,namedSouthSokoApproach.SimilarlythesecondsectionischosenbetweengatesIP1andIP2,andnamedWestSoko.TheAdamasta channelspansIP2toIP4andsothesearegroupedintoonesectionforanalysis.Similargroupingisperformedfortheremainderofthepipeline. GateIP10awarrantedextrainterpretationsinceitliesinthecentreofUrmstonRoad.ThesectionfromIP10toIP10aspansachangeinrockarmour protectionfromtype1totype3A/B.Acarefulexaminationoftheradartracksfrommarinevessels(overlaidinFigure3.4)showsahigherdensityof vesselsalongthissectionpassclosetogateIP10ai.e.withinUrmstonRoadwherethereisgreaterrockarmourprotectiononthepipeline.This sectionwasthereforesplitintotwo,denotedNorthLungKwuChauandUrmstonRoadWest,andsomeassumptionsmaderegardingthedistribution ofvesselsbetweenthetwoparts.Itwasassumedthatroughlyequalnumbersofvesselstraverseeachpart,theshorterlengthoftheUrmstonRoad Westsectionthereforegettingahigherdensityofshipsasobservedintheradartracks.Largevesselssuchasoceangoingvesselswereassumed topassentirelythroughUrmstonRoadWestsincethewaterwouldbetooshallowinNorthLungKwuChau. Similarly,thefinalsectionofpipelinefromIP10atoLP1wassplitinto3subsectionstoreflectchangesinrockarmourprotectiononthepipeline. ThesewerenamedUrmstonRoadCentral,UrmstonRoadEastandBlackPointApproach.Basedontheradartracks,about95%ofvesselswere assumedtopasswithinUrmstonRoadCentral.Oftheremaining5%ofvessels,mostwereassumedtotraversetheUrmstonRoadEastsection. Table3.6PipelineSegmentation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Section SouthSoko Approach WestSoko AdamastaChannel WestLantau TaiO NorthLantau ShaChau NorthLungKwu Chau UrmstonRoadWest UrmstonRoad Central UrmstonRoadEast BlackPointApproach Gate KilometrePost From To From To LP2 IP1 0 1.6 IP1 IP2 1.6 4.5 IP2 IP4 4.5 9.8 IP4 IP5a 9.8 14.2 IP5a IP7 14.2 19.5 IP7 IP7a 19.5 22.2 IP7a IP10 22.2 31.6 IP10 31.6 33.5 IP10a 33.5 34.7 IP10a 34.7 37.0 37.0 37.8 LP1 37.8 38.3 Length (km) 1.6 2.9 5.3 4.4 5.3 2.7 9.4 1.9 1.2 2.3 0.8 0.5 Typ.Water Trench depth(m) type 5 2A 8 1 25 3B/3A 20 3A 17 3B 7 1 6 1 4 1 20 3B/3A 20 3A/3B 5 1 4 2B
Figure3.4SegmentationoftheRoute
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Basedontheabovediscussion,themarinetrafficvolumeusedinthepresentanalysisissummarizedinTable3.7.Additionaloceangoingvessels wereinjectedintoUrmstonRoadasindicatedinthemarineconsultantreport[4]. Table3.7TrafficVolumeAssumedforBaseCase2011

Section 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 SouthSokoApproach WestSoko AdamastaChannel WestLantau TaiO NorthLantau ShaChau NorthLungKwuChau UrmstonRoadWest UrmstonRoadCentral UrmstonRoadEast BlackPointApproach Total Fishing 0 21 126 11 42 37 79 21 21 250 11 2 621 Trafficvolume(shipsperday) River Ocean Fast Fast trade going Launch ferry 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 6 16 7 83 260 2 3 4 9 1 4 7 12 12 0 5 11 22 0 28 44 3 0 24 31 2 6 23 30 265 144 117 150 13 0 5 7 3 0 2 0 339 164 301 560 Other 0 4 4 4 4 6 27 8 2 5 2 0 66 Total 1 33 496 33 70 71 200 87 84 931 38 7 2051
Tablesoftrafficvolumeforthe2021futurescenarioswerecreatedinasimilarmanner.Thesearegiveninthemaintext(Section13.9.3). 3.3.1OceanGoingVesselDistribution Allclassesofship,withtheexceptionofoceangoingvessels,haveanchorsizesbelow2tonnes(Table3.2),anditisnotedthattheentirelengthof theproposedpipelinewillhaverockarmourprotectiondesignedtoprotectagainstatleast2tonneanchors.Oceangoingvesselscoveraverywide rangeofsize.AbreakdownofthesizedistributionforthisclassofmarinevesselsisgiveninTable3.8[4,10].Thesevesselsarepredominantly foundinUrmstonRoadwhichhastype3A/Brockarmourprotectiontoprotectagainstanchorsupto20tonnes.Fromthesizedistribution,itcanbe seenthatthemajorityoftheseshipsarebelowabout100,000tonnesdisplacementandsothemajorityofanchorsarebelowabout10to12tonnes. Table3.8SizeDistributionofOceanGoingVessels

SizeRange Displacement Length AnchorSize (tonnes)* (m) (tonne) (dwt) 1,50025,000 1,50035,000 75200 25 25,00075,000 35,000110,000 200300 512 75,000 110,000 300350 1215 100,000 150,000 DeadWeight(dwt)=Cargo+Fuel+Water+others ProportionofShips(%) 60 35 5
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*Displacement=TotalWeight=Hull+Machinery+Outfit+DeadWeight Displacementhasbeenassumedtobe~1.4xdwt
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4HAZARDIDENTIFICATION
Thissectionidentifiesthemainhazardsfromthesubseagaspipelineduringtheoperationalphase.Hazardidentificationisbasedonaliterature reviewaswellasHAZIDstudiesconductedfortheproposedpipeline. 4.1LITERATUREREVIEW 4.1.1IncidentDatabasesandPipelineReports TheConsultants(ERM)haveexaminedincidentdatabasessuchastheMHIDAS[12]andtheIChemEAccidentDatabase[13].Onlytwopipeline incidentsinoffshoreVietnamhavebeenreportedintheAsiaPacificregion.TheseoccurredatWhiteTigerandVungTau,bothin1994andbothwere causedbyanchordamage.Noinjurieswerereported. Relevantreportsonmajorsubseapipelinefailures(thatcausedfatality)bytheNationalTransportationSafetyBoardhavealsobeenreviewed[14, 15].Asummaryofafewmainincidentsfromthesesourcesareincludedinthefollowingparagraphs. TigerPass,Louisiana,1996 OnOctober23,1996,inTigerPass,Louisiana,thecrewofthedredgeDaveBlackburndroppedasternspud(aspudisalargesteelshaftthatis droppedintotheriverbottomtoserveasananchorandapivotduringdredgingoperations)intothebottomofthechannelinpreparationforcontinued dredgingoperations.Thespudstruckandruptureda12"diametersubmergednaturalgassteelpipeline.Thepressurised(about930psig)naturalgas releasedfromthepipelineenvelopedthesternofthedredgeandanaccompanyingtug.Withinsecondsofreachingthesurface,thenaturalgas ignitedandtheresultingfiredestroyedthedredgeandthetug.All28crewmembersfromthedredgeandtugescapedintowaterorontonearby vessels.Nofatalitiesresulted. Theincidentoccurredduetoincorrectinformationonthelocationofthegaspipelinethatwaspassedonbythegascompanytothedredging operator.Theinvestigationreportontheincident(bytheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard)recommendedthatallpipelinescrossingnavigable waterwaysareaccuratelylocatedandmarkedpermanently. MississippiRiverDelta,1979 InanincidentintheMississippiRiverDeltain1979,fourworkersdrownedattemptingtoescapeafirethatresultedwhenacranebargedroppeda mooringspudintoanunmarkedhighpressurenaturalgaspipeline. Louisiana,1987 InJuly1987,whileworkinginshallowwatersoffLouisiana,afishingvessel,themenhadenpurseseinerSeaChiefstruckandrupturedan8"natural gasliquidspipelineoperatingat480psi.Theresultingexplosionkilledtwocrewmembers.Diversinvestigatingfoundthatthepipe,installedin1968, wascoveredwithonly6"ofsoftmud,havinglostitsoriginal3footcoverofsediments. SabinePass,Texas,1989 AsimilaraccidentoccurredinOctober1989.ThemenhadenvesselNorthumberlandstrucka16"gaspipelineinshallowwaternearSabinePass, Texas.Thevesselwasengulfedinflames11ofthe14crewmembersdied.Thepipeline,installedin1974with8to10feetofcover,wasfoundtobe lyingonthebottom,withnocoveratall. 4.1.2PipelineFailureDatabases Thereareafewinternationalfailuredatabasesforgasandliquidtransmissionpipelineswhichareusefulinidentifyingpotentialhazardsand estimatingthefrequencyoflossofcontainmentincidents. ThemostcomprehensivedatabaseonoffshoregaspipelinefailuresisavailableinareportpublishedbytheUKHealthandSafetyExecutiveentitled 'PARLOC2001'[7].Themostrecentversionofthisdatabasecoversincidentsfromthe1960supto2000.Theinformationinthisdatabaseisbased ondataobtainedfromregulatoryauthoritiesintheUK,Norway,theNetherlands,DenmarkandGermany,OperatorsintheUK,DutchandDanish sectorsandpublishedsources.Themaincausesofpipelinefailure,asidentifiedfromareviewofthePARLOC2001data,arelistedinTable4.1. Basedonthis,itcanbeseenthatanchor/impactfollowedbyinternalcorrosionarethemaincontributorstosubseapipelinefailures. AsimilardatabaseonincidentsinvolvingoffshorepipelinesintheUShasalsobeenreferredto[16].Thisisbasedonincidentsthatarerequiredtobe reportedtotheUSDepartmentofTransportation(DOT)undertheFederalRegulations.Outof109incidentsreportedduringtheperiod1985to1994, onlyoneincidentinvolvedafatality,andonlyoneincidentinvolvedleakignition.Themaincausesofpipelinefailure,asidentifiedfromareviewofthe USDOTdatabase,arelistedinTable4.2.Basedonthis,itcanbeseenthatthirdpartydamageandinternalcorrosion(characteristicofwellfluid pipelines)arethemaincontributorstosubseapipelinefailures. Table4.1CausesofSubseaPipelineIncidentsfromPARLOC2001[7]
Maincause ANCHOR IMPACT Detail SupplyBoat RigorConstruction Other/Unknown Total Trawl DroppedObject Wreck Construction Other/Unknown Total No.ofIncidentsofLossofContainment PlatformSafety SubseaWell Midline Zone(1) 6 0 6 1 1 SafetyZone(2) 2 2 6 1 1 8
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CORROSION Internal 3 4 7 External 1 2 Unknown 1 2 Total 5 4 11 STRUCTURAL Expansion Buckling Total MATERIAL WeldDefect 2 1 SteelDefect 2 1 1 Total 4 1 2 NATURALHAZARD Vibration Storm Scour Subsidence Total FIRE/EXPLOSION Total CONSTRUCTION Total MAINTENANCE Total OTHERS Total 2 1 4 TOTAL 18 6 27 (1)Platformsafetyzoneandsubseasafetyzonerefertopipelineslocatedwithin500mofan offshoreplatformandsubseawellrespectively (2)Midlinereferstopipelineslocatedmorethan500mfromaplatformorsubseawell.
Table4.2CausesofSubseaPipelineIncidentsfromUSDOTDatabase[16]
CauseofFailure DescriptionofCause No.of Incidents 25 2 1 21 1 45 3 42 4 2 %ofTotal Incidents 29.8% 2.4% 1.2% 25.0% 1.2% 53.6% 3.6% 50.0% 4.8% 2.4% Incidents Considered(1) 24 2 21 1 3 3 4 2
1.EXTERNALFORCE EarthMovement Subsidence,landslides HeavyRains/Floods Washouts,floatation, scouring ThirdParty PreviouslyDamaged Whereencroachment Pipe occurredinthepast 2.CORROSION ExternalCorrosion Failureofcoating/CP InternalCorrosion 3.WELDS&MATERIALS DefectiveFabrication Weldsinbranch Weld connections,hottaps, weldolets,sleeve repairs DefectiveGirthWeld 4.EQUIPMENT&OPERATIONS EquipmentFailure Malfunctionofcontrol orreliefequipment, failureofthreaded components,gaskets& seals 5.OTHERS Unknown TOTAL
2 3 3
2.4% 3.6% 3.6%
7 7 84
8.3% 8.3% 100%
7 7 38
1.Onlytheseincidentsareconsideredrelevanttotheproposedpipeline.
4.1.3IncidentRecordsandProtectionMeasuresforPipelinesinHongKongWaters AreviewofexistingandproposedsubseapipelinesinHongKongwatersincludingthelevelofprotectionprovidedarereviewedinthefollowing paragraphs. SubseaPipelines ExistingsubseapipelinesinHongKongwatersareasfollows: The28"naturalgaspipelinefromYachengField,SouthChinaSea(90kmsouthofHainanIsland)toCLPsBlackPointpowerstationwasconstructedin 1994/95.Thetotalpipelinelengthis778km.WithinHongKongwaters,thelengthofpipelineisabout5kmandthewaterdepthvariesfrom4mto25m. Thepipelineistrenchedwithaminimumof1mrockarmourprotectionatsectionswhereitcrossestheshippingrouteUrmstonRoadandatthe anchorageareasneartheshore.Similarprotection(i.e.1mrockarmourand1mbackfill)isalsoprovidedoutsideHongKongwatersattheLingding channelcrossingandJiuzhouchannelcrossing.Thepipelineislaidontheseabedfortheremaininglength.Therehasbeennoincidentofdamage reportedinHongKongwatersalthoughanincidentoccurredduringconstructionwhentheunprotectedsectionofthepipelinewasbuckledbytheanchor linesofthebargelayingtherockarmour. the20"dualaviationfuelpipelinesbetweenShaChaujettyandtheairport(about5kmlength),installedin1997,arelaidina2.2mtrenchandprovided withsandcoverplusrockarmourprotection.Thewaterdepthalongtheroutevariesfrom47m.Therehasbeennoincidentofdamagereported theAirportAuthorityproposetoconstructanother5kmsubmarineaviationfuelpipelinefromShaChaujettytothenewtankfarminTuenMun.The pipelinewillbecrossingtheUrmstonRoadshippingrouteandsimilarprotectionasfortheexistingpipelines(i.e.rockarmourprotection)isproposed.It
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isunderstoodthattherockarmourprotectionwillbedesignedfor22tonneanchors thetowngassubseapipelinesarealsoreportedtohavenodamagerecord.Thesepipelinesarelaidatadepthof2to3mbelowseabedandprotected byengineeringbackfillmaterials theHongKongElectricCompanyrecentlylaidapipelinefromitsLammaPowerStationExtensiontoShenzhenLNGTerminal.Thepipelineisjettedto 3mbelowseabedandprotectedwithrockarmourinhighriskareasneartheanchoragesandshoreapproachesand therecentlyinstalledtowngassubseapipelinefromShenzhentoTaiPoisjettedto3mbelowseabedwithadditionalrockarmourprotectioninhighrisk areas.
Bycomparison,theproposedCAPCOpipelinewillbelaidinwatersbetween4and25mdeep.Thepipelinewillbeprovidedwith3mofrockcover exceptinareasofshallowwaterwhereitwillhave1mofrockcover.Theserockcoverrequirementsarebasedonwaterdepth(whichdeterminesthe sizeofvessels)andmarinetrafficvolume.Themeasuresproposedareinlinewith,orexceed,comparablepipelineinstallations. 4.2HAZIDREPORT AHazardIdentification(HAZID)workshopwasheldon15thFebruary2006aspartofthisQRAStudyforthepipeline.RepresentativesfromCLP Power,ExxonMobilandBMTparticipatedinthehazardsessions.Varioushazardsconsideredrelevantforthispipelinearediscussedinthe worksheetspresentedinTable4.3. Table4.3HAZIDWorksheet

System:1.PipelineGeneral Subsystem:1.Thirdparty
Hazards/ Keywords 1.Anchor Drag
Description/Causes 1.Emergencyanchoringfor vesselunderwaydueto lossofsteerage,poweror control,eitherdueto mechanicalproblemsor duetocollisionevents.
Consequences 1.Possibilityofdamageto externalcoating,damageto piperequiringremedialaction.
Safeguards 1.Engineeredrockprotection withrespecttovessel sizes/types. 2.Depthofcover.
Recommendations 1.Periodicsurveyalong theroutetobecarriedout toensureintegrityofthe protection.
2.Dragfromanchorage areasunderstorm condition.
2.Potentiallossof containmentleadingtogas release.Impactonpassing vesselsandshorepopulation. Vesselinvolvedinthe incidentsmaysinkdueto lossofbuoyancycausedby thegasbubbling.
3.Routeavoidinganchorage areas.
4.Concreteexternalcoating. 5.Heavywallpipeinshore approaches.
3.Disturbancetotherock coverprotection.Possible exposureofthepipe.
6.Markingmarinechartsofthe pipelineroute. 7.Shorepopulationisatleast 3kmawayalongtheroute exceptneartheshore approach.
3.Anchoringbyvessels outsideanchorages.
2.Anchor Drop 3.Dropped Object
1.Sameascause1&3of anchordraghazard 1.Lossofcargo 2.Constructionactivities
1.Sameasconsequence1,2 &3ofanchordraghazardbut lesssevere. 1.Sameasconsequence1,2 &3ofanchordraghazardbut lesssevere. 1.Minorsurfacedamage.
1.Sameasforanchordrag hazard. 1.Sameassafeguards1,2,4, 5,&7ofanchordraghazard.
4.Dumping
1.Dumpingofconstruction wasteandotherbulk materialsoutsideof designateddumping grounds. 1.Navigationerror,lossof controlduetomechanical oradverseweather.
1.Sameassafeguards1,2,4, 5,&7ofanchordraghazard.
5.Grounding
1.Sameasconsequence1,2 &3ofanchordraghazard. 2.Displacementofthe pipelineleadingtoexposure 1.Sameasconsequence1,2 &3ofanchordraghazard.
1.Burialdepthappropriateto thetypeofshippingactivities
6.Vessel Sinking
1.Collision,foundering.
1.Routeavoidsshipping channelwherepossible.
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7.Fishing& Trawling

1.Operationoftrawlboard andotherfishing/trawlgear. 1.Nodamagetothepipeline. 1.Pipelineisburiedto3m belowtheseabedwithrock coverflushwithseabed.With respecttoshoreareaatBPPS, itisburiedto1.5mwithrock coverflushwithseabed. 1.Burialdepthappropriateto thetypeofshippingactivities. 2.Engineeredrockprotection withrespecttovessel sizes/types. 3.Depthofcover. 4.Markingmarinechartsofthe pipelineroute. 5.Concreteexternalcoating. 9.Service crossingor other servicesin thevicinity 10.HZMB Construction 1.Nocrossingsenvisaged
8.Dredging
1.Impactfromdredge bucketordraghead. Expectedlocationof maintenancedredgingare AdamastaChannel,along theUrmstonroad,along theTSS
1.Sameasconsequence1,2 &3ofanchordraghazardbut lesssevere.
1.Pilingforbridge structuresnearthe pipeline,dredging, constructionvessel movement,anchoringand droppedobject
1.Sameasconsequence1,2 &3ofanchordraghazard
1.InterfacewithHZMBproject ownertocoordinatedesigns andschedule 2.Engineeredrockprotection withrespecttovessel sizes/types. 3.Depthofcover. 4.Concreteexternalcoating.
2.Developandimplement proceduresfor safeguardingthepipeline duringHZMBconstruction
11.HZMB Operation
1.Vehiclefalloffthebridge
1.Sameasconsequence1& 3ofanchordraghazard
1.Sameassafeguards1,2&4 ofanchordraghazard
System:1.PipelineGeneral Subsystem:2.Natural
Hazards/Keywords 1.Scouring
Description/Causes 1.Currentandwaveactions
Consequences 1.Possiblereductionofcover
Safeguards 1.Alignmentisawayfromareasof highcurrents 2.Engineeredrockcover 3.Periodicsurveysalongtheroute
Recommendations
2.Seismicevent 3.Subsidence
System:1.PipelineGeneral Subsystem:3.Construction
1.Lowseismicarea 1.Noissue
1.Nodamage
1.Nonerequired
Hazards/Keywords 1.Damagetopipelineduring construction
Description/Causes 1.Damageafterpipelay
Consequences 1.Possiblereleaseifgastaken in
Safeguards 1.Precommissioningprocedures toensureintegrityofpipeline beforegasin
Recommendations
System:1.PipelineGeneral Subsystem:4.Operational
Hazards/Keywords 1.Internalcorrosion
Description/Causes 1.Noissueforregassified LNGsinceitiscleananddry gas 1.Seawatercorrosive environment
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
2.Externalcorrosion
1.Lossofwallthicknessleading topotentialleak
1.Coatingsystem 2.Sacrificialanodesystem 3.Designedforintelligentpigging
3.Pressurecycling 4.Materialdefect/ constructiondefect

System:1.PipelineGeneral
1.Pipelinepressurewillvary withtimeofday,loadsetc
1.Metalfatigueleadingtocrack 1.Possibleleaks
1.Designwillconsiderpressure cycles 1.Qualitycontrolduring manufactureandconstruction
Subsystem:5.InterfaceatTerminalEnd
Hazards/Keywords 1.SouthSokooptionwill includeapiglaunching
Description/Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
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facility.Thisincludespiping andvalvingwhichiscovered intheTQRA
System:1.PipelineGeneral Subsystem:6.InterfaceatGRSEndinBPPS
Hazards/Keywords 1.Tobecoveredaspartof GRS
Description/Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations
System:2.PipelineFutureDevelopments Subsystem:1.All
Hazards/Keywords 1.PotentialfutureCT10 construction
Description/Causes 1.Dredgingtocreateanew accesschannel,buildingof seawallinproximitytothe pipeline,construction vesselmovement, introductionofmore shippingactivity,anchoring 1.Ascurrentlyshown,this channelisoutsideHK waters
Consequences 1.Damagetopipeline
Safeguards 1.Currentalignmentisbased onexistingseabedprofile. Flexibilityforalternative measurestobedesigned
Recommendations
2.Tongguchannel
1.Noimpactalongthe proposedroute
System:3.GRS Subsystem:1.All
Hazards/Keywords 1.Leakfromtappings, flangesandpiping
Description/Causes 1.Corrosion,mechanical failure,etc 2.Maloperationduring maintenance(including droppedobject),pigging
Consequences 1.Potentiallossofcontainment
Safeguards 1.Gasandfiredetection 2.Shutdownsystem 3.Operatingandmaintenance procedures
Recommendations
2.Overpressuredownstream ofletdownvalve
1.Potentiallossofcontainment
1.Active/monitorandslamshut system
4.3HAZARDOUSPROPERTIESOFNATURALGAS Thenaturalgastobetransmittedbythepipelinepredominantlycontainsmethane(87.696.1mol%).Othercomponentsofthegasincludeethane (3.47.6mol%),propane(0.43.1%)andbutane(0.071.7%).Itisaflammablegasthatislighterthanair(buoyant).Thepropertiesofnaturalgas aresummarisedinTable4.4. Table4.4PropertiesofNaturalGas

Property Synonyms State MolecularWeight Density(kg/m3 ) FlammableLimits(%) AutoignitionTemperature(C) NaturalGas Methane Gas 16.718.7 0.55(atatmosphericconditions) 515 540
4.4DISCUSSIONONSUBSEAPIPELINEHAZARDS Theincidentrecordshighlightthepotentialfordamagetosubseapipelinesfrommarineactivitysuchasfishing,dredgingandanchoringaswellasthe potentialforthevessel(thatcauseddamage)tobecomeinvolvedinthefirethatfollows. AreviewofsubseapipelineincidentsinEuropeandtheUSsuggeststhatthirdpartydamage(includinganchorandimpactincidents)andinternal corrosionarethemaincontributorstosubseapipelinefailures. Itisnotedthattheabovedatabasescoversalargeproportionofwellfluidpipelineswhereinternalcorrosionisrelevantascomparedtocleannatural gastransportedfromanLNGterminalasconsideredinthisstudy. MostexistingpipelinesinHongKongwatershavesomerockcoverprotectioninadditiontobeingburies,althoughitisnotedthatthesepipelinesare eithercrossingshippingchannelsorlaidinwaterswithhighlevelsofmarineactivity. Abriefdescriptionofthemaincausesoffailureofasubseapipelineisincludedinthefollowingparagraphs. 4.4.1ExternalImpacts Anchordrop/dragisthedominantcauseofpotentialfailureordamagetoasubseapipeline.Thisoccurswhenashipanchorisdroppedinadvertently acrossthepipeline.Thetypeofdamagethatcouldbecausedwillvarydependingonthesizeofanchorandotherfactorssuchaspipelineprotection.
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AnchorDrop
Thedecisionforamarinerwhentodropananchordependsontheparticularcircumstancesandtheproximityofthepipelineroutetotheflowof marinetraffic,port/harbourareasanddesignatedanchoragelocations.Infairways,trafficwillnormallybeunderwaywherethenecessitytodrop anchorisexpectedtobelow.Consistentwithnormalpractice,thepipelineroutewillbeidentifiedonnauticalcharts.Themarineristhenprovidedwith thenecessaryinformationtoavoidanchoringwherethepipelinecouldbedamaged. Emergencysituationsmayarisesuchasmachineryfailureorcollisiontherebylimitingthechoicewheretodropanchor.Suchadecisionwill,aspart ofamarinersresponsibility,beinfluencedbytheparticularcircumstancesandthepipelineroutedelineatedonthenavigationchart. AnchorageareaY3isbelievedtobeusedbyoiltankerstransferringtheirloadtosmallervessels.Althoughitisexpectedthatvesselsshouldbe awareofallsubseainstallations(includinggaspipelines)sincethesearemarkedontheadmiraltynauticalcharts,erroneousdroppingofanchor(i.e. errorinpositionatthetimeofdeployment)areknowntooccur.Underadverseweatherconditions,itisalsopossibleforavesselanchoredatthe anchorageareatodriftwithitsanchordraggingalongtheseabed. Anchoringactivityalongthepipelinerouteistakenintoconsiderationintheanalysiswhenassigningfailurefrequenciesforanchordamage(Section 5.3) AnchorDrag Anchordragoccursduetopoorholdinggroundoradverseenvironmentalconditionsaffectingtheholdingpoweroftheanchor.Thedragdistance dependsonpropertiesoftheseabedsoil,themassofshipandanchorandthespeedofthevessel.Ifthereisasubseapipelinealongtheanchor dragpath,anchordraggingontothepipelinemayresultinlocalisedbucklingordentingofthepipeline,oroverstressingfrombendingifthetensionon theanchorissufficienttolaterallydisplacethepipeline.Adraggedanchormayalsohookontoapipelineduringretrievalcausingdamageasaresult ofliftingthepipeline. Anchordraggingistakenintoconsiderationwhenassigninganchordamagefrequenciesintheanalysis(Section5.3). VesselSinking Vesselsinkinginthevicinityofthepipelinemaycausedamagetothepipelineresultinginlossofcontainment.Vesselsinkingwilldependonthe intensityofmarineactivityinagivenarea.Fortheyears1990to2005,therewere446incidentsofvesselsinkinginHongKongwaters[17].This averages28casesperyear.MostoftherecordedincidentsoccurredinVictoriaHarbourandtheMaWanChannelandinvolvedmainlysmaller vesselsoflessthan1,000dwt,whichwillhavelessimpactonapipelineburied3mbelowtheseabed.Theprobabilitythatavesselsinkingincident willimpacttheproposedpipelineisthereforeconsideredtobelow,incomparisontoanchorimpactdamage.Additionally,pipelinedamagedueto vesselsinkingisincludedinthehistoricalpipelinefailuredataforexternalimpactusedinthisstudy(seeTable4.1). DroppedObjects Objectsotherthananchorsmaybedroppedfromvesselspassingoverthepipelineorvesselsoperatinginthevicinity,e.g.thosecarryingout constructionofnewsubseainstallations,newharbourdevelopments,etc.Thedroppedobjectsmayincludeconstructiontubulars,shipping containers,construction/maintenanceequipment,etc. Thepipelinewillbeloweredto3mbelowseabedandprotectedbyatleast1mofrockarmour.Giventhelikelysizesofdroppedobjectsandthelevel ofpipelineprotectionprovided,lossofcontainmentduetodroppedobjectsisnotconsideredtobeasignificantcontributortotheriskandisnot includedintheanalysis. AircraftCrash Thepipelinerouterunswithin3.7kmofthethresholdofrunway07LatChepLapKokAirport.Althoughrare,thepossibilityexistsforaircrafttocrash onfinalapproachtolanding,orshortlyaftertakeoff.Suchacrashmaybeontothepipeline,albeitwithasmallprobability. Thewateralongthissectionofthepipelinerouteisabout7mdeepwiththepipelineburied3mbelowtheseabedandprotectedby1mofrockarmour and2mofnaturalbackfill.AircraftareconstructedfromlightweightmaterialssuchthatevenafullyloadedBoeing747weighsonly400tonnes. Aircraftalsoreadilybreakuponimpactwithwater,scatteringthedebrisoveralargerarea.Giventhatthepipelineisburiedandprotectedandaircraft havelimitedweight,itisconsiderednotpossibleforanaircrafttodamagethepipeline. FishingActivity BasedontheBMTreport[4],thereisactivefishingalongmuchoftheproposedpipelineroute.Manyofthetechniquesinvolvetowingofavarietyof equipmentalongtheseabed.Pipelinedamagefromfishinggearcanoccurduetoimpact,snaggingofnetsortrawldooronthepipelineora"pullover" sequence.Impactloadsmainlycausedamagetothecoatingwhilstpulloversituationscancausemuchhigherloads,whichcouldleadtodamageof thesteelpipelineitself. Thevesselsofconcernaresterntrawlerswithlengthsupto30m.Consideringthesizeandweightoftrawlgearandsincethepipelinewillbelowered to3mbelowseabedandprotectedbyrockarmourfortheentireroute,pipelinedamageduetotrawlingactivitiesarenotpossibleandarenot consideredfurther. DredgingActivities Dredgingvesselscouldcausedamageduetodredgingoperationsinvolvingcuttingheads.Theycouldalsocausedamagetothepipelineby anchoring. Itisassumedthatdredgingoperationswillbecloselymonitoredandcontrolledandthereforethereisnopotentialforpipelinedamageduetodredging. 4.4.2SpontaneousFailures Corrosion Corrosionisoneofthemaincontributorstopipelinefailures.Corrosionisattributedmainlytotheenvironmentinwhichtheyareinstalled(external) andthesubstancestheycarry(internal).
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Theproposedpipelinewillbeprotectedagainstexternalcorrosionbysacrificialanodesinadditiontoanasphaltcoating.However,ineffective corrosionprotectionduetoafailureorbreakdownoftheprotectionsystemcouldcauseexternalcorrosionresultingingeneralorlocallossofwall thicknessleadingtopipelinefailure. Historically,internalcorrosionisagreatercauseofpipelinefailurecomparedtoexternalcorrosion.However,theproposedpipelinewilltransportgas thatdoesnotcontaincomponentsthatinducecorrosionsuchaswater/moisture,carbondioxide,hydrogensulphide,etc.Thiswilllargelyalleviatethe effectsofinternalcorrosion. Despitetheseconsiderations,lossofcontainmentduetocorrosion(bothinternalandexternal)remainsapossibilityandisincludedintheanalysis. MechanicalFailure Mechanicalfailureofthepipelinecouldoccurforvariousreasons,includingmaterialdefect,weldfailure,etc.Stringentproceduresforpipelinematerial procurement,weldingandhydrotestingshouldlargelymitigateagainstthesehazards.Inanycase,itremainsacrediblescenarioandisincludedin thefrequencydata.
4.4.3NaturalHazards Naturalhazardssuchassubsidence,earthquakeandtyphoonmaycausevaryingdegreesofdamagetopipelines. Softsoilcansometimessufferfromlocalisedliquefactionwhichcanresultinpipelinesfloatingoutoftheirtrenches.Thepipelinewillbedesignedto withstandsuchloads,basedondetailedseabedinvestigations. Environmentalloads(currentsandwaves)onthepipelineduringtheconstructionphasecancompromisethelateralandverticalonbottomstabilityof thepipelineontheseabed.Thisproblembecomesmoreacuteinshallowerwaters(neartheshore)wherethepipelineattractsahigherlevelof environmentalloads.Thepipelinewillbedesignedtowithstandtheseenvironmentalloads.Onceitisjetted/loweredto3mbelowtheseabed,itwould notbeexposeddirectlyto100yearreturnwaveloads. Basedontheaboveconsiderations,pipelinedamageduetonaturalhazardsisconsiderednegligibleandisnotassessedfurtherinthisstudy.
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5FREQUENCYANALYSIS 5.1OVERVIEW
ThissectionpresentsthebasefailurefrequencydataforthehazardsidentifiedashavingdamagepotentialinSection4.Theapproachtofrequency analysisisbasedontheapplicationofhistoricaldataworldwideforsimilarsystems,modifiedsuitablytoreflectlocalfactorssuchasproximityofthe pipelineroutetobusyshippingchannelsandanchorages. Eventtreeanalysiswasusedtodeterminetheprobabilitiesofvarioushazardoutcomes(suchasflashfire)occurring,followingarelease. 5.2HISTORICALDATA TheinternationaldatabasethatismostcomprehensiveinitscoverageofsubseapipelinesisPARLOC2001[7].Themostrecentversionofthis databasewhichwasusedinthisstudycoversincidentsfromthe1960suntil2000.Incidentsrecordedinthedatabasehavebeenclassifiedaccording toseveralcategories,including: Failurelocation,i.e.risers,pipelineswithin500mofanoffshoreplatform,pipelineswithin500mofasubseawellandmidline(pipelineslocatedmorethan 500mfromaplatformorasubseawell).Failuredatapertainingtorisersisnotrelevanttothisstudyandhasthereforebeenexcluded Pipelinecontents.Thedatabaseincludesbothoilandgaspipelines.Wherethecontentsinthepipelinehaveanimpactonfailurerate,suchascorrosion, onlyincidentspertainingtogaspipelinesareconsideredand Pipelinetype,i.e.steelpipelines(bothpipebodyandfittings)andflexiblelines.Onlyfailuresinvolvingthepipebodyofsteelpipelinesareconsidered here. AbreakdownoftheincidentsrecordedinPARLOC2001byfailurelocationisshowninTable5.1.Thenumberofincidentsoflossofcontainmentthat haveoccurredwithin500mofaplatformorasubseawellisalmostequaltothenumberofincidentsthathaveoccurredawayfromit(i.e.midline). Thehigherfailurerateinthevicinityofanoffshoreinstallation(anorderofmagnitudehigherthanmidline)isduetotheeffectofincreasedship/barge movementsinthevicinityandthepotentialforanchordamageasaresult. Theproximityofsomesectionsoftheproposedpipelineroutetohighmarinetrafficenvironmentcouldberegardedassimilartotheenvironmentin thevicinityoftheplatformsafetyzonealthoughitisnotstrictlycomparable. Table5.1FailureRateBasedonPARLOC2001[7]
RegionofPipeline Midline Platformsafetyzone Subseawellsafetyzone OperatingExperience 297,565kmyears 16,776years (8,388kmyears)* 2,586years (1,293kmyears)* Total 307,246kmyears* 51 6 No.of Incidents 27 18 FailureRate 9.1x105 /km/year 1.1x103 /year (2.1x103 /km/year) 2.3x103 /year (4.6x103 /km/year) 1.66x104 /km/year
*Thenumberofyearsinthecaseofplatformandsubseawellsafetyzoneismultipliedby0.5kmofsafetyzonetoobtaincorrespondingkmyears
ThemaincausesofpipelinefailurearesummarisedinTable5.2,basedonthecausesidentifiedinPARLOC2001.Asdiscussedearlier, anchor/impactfollowedbyinternalcorrosionarethemaincontributorstopipelinefailure. Table5.2MainContributorstoSubseaPipelineFailure(PARLOC2001)

Cause Anchor/Impact Internalcorrosion Corrosionothers Materialdefect Others Total PlatformSafety Zone 7(39%) 3(17%) 2(11%) 4(22%) 2(11%) 18 SubseaWell SafetyZone 4(67%) 1(17%) 1(17%) 6 Midline 10(37%) 7(26%) 4(15%) 2(7%) 4(15%) 27 Total 17(33%) 14(27%) 6(12%) 7(14%) 7(14%) 51
5.2.1AnalysisofFailureCauses ThefailurefrequencyderivedfromthePARLOC2001dataisfurtherfilteredtodiscountthosefactorsthatdonotapplytotheproposedpipeline.Inthe caseoffactorsthatcouldhavegreaterinfluenceonthefailureratefortheproposedpipeline(suchasanchor/impact),appropriateincreasefactors areadopted. CorrosionandMaterialDefect BasedonexperienceinEurope(Table5.2),internalcorrosiontendstobeagreaterproblemthanexternalcorrosion.Fortheproposedpipeline, failuresduetointernalcorrosionareexpectedtobelesslikelyasthegashandledisclean,unlikegastransportedfromwells/platformswhichmay containmoistureandhydrogensulphide.Also,itisassumedthattheconditionofthepipelinewillbemonitoredperiodicallyandmaintenancework carriedoutasnecessary. Failuresduetodefectsinmaterialsandweldsarealsoexpectedtobelowerthanimpliedbythehistoricalrecordduetotechnologicalimprovements. ThedatabaseforPARLOC2001datesbacktothe1960stherehavebeensignificantimprovementsinpipematerialandweldingoverthelast10to 20years.An80%reductionisthereforeassumedforallformsofcorrosionandmaterialdefects.
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Takingthemidlinedataasthemostrepresentativefortheproposedpipeline,thefailurerateisthereforederivedas13incidencesin297,565km yearswith80%reduction,giving8.7x106/km/year. ThePARLOC96report[18]providesabreakdownoflossofcontainmentincidentsduetocorrosionandmaterialdefectforgaspipelinesgreaterthan 5kminlength.Thefailurerateforsuchpipelinesislowerat5.9x106/km/year(0.7failuresin119,182kmyearsthekmyearsarelowerbecause onlygaspipelinesareconsidered).Thisvalueisconsideredmoreappropriatefortheproposedpipeline.Unfortunately,amorecurrentvaluecouldnot beextractedfromPARLOC2001duetoadifferenceinpresentationformatofthedata.However,adownwardtrendinfailurefrequenciesistobe expectedastechnologyimprovesandso5.9x106/km/yearisconsideredtobereasonable.Incorporatingan80%reductionagaingivesa corrosion/defectfrequencyof1.18x106/km/year. Anchoring/ImpactIncidents Thereisasignificantdifferenceinthefailurerateduetoanchor/impactincidentsforpipelineswithin500mofanoffshoreplatform(8.3x104/km/year) ascomparedtomidline(3.4x105/km/year).AfurtherbreakdownofincidentsbasedonpipelinediameterisgiveninTable5.3. Table5.3FrequencyofLossofContainmentIncidentsduetoAnchor/ImpactBreakdownbyPipeDiameter&Location
Location Midline Safetyzone Frequency(perkmperyear) <10"diameter 10to16" diameter 1.53x10
4
18to24" diameter 1.76x10

5
24to40"diameter 1.37x105 8.6x104
2.26x10
6.68x104
1.94x103
4.24x104
Itisseenfromtheabovethatthefailurerate(formidline)forlargerdiameterpipelinesislowerbyanorderofmagnitudeincomparisontosmaller diameterpipelines. Asdiscussedpreviously,itisconsideredthatthelikelihoodofpipelinedamageduetoanchor/impactincidentsmayberelatedtothelevelofmarine activity(thisistakentobeacombinationofmarinetrafficandanchoringactivity).Thefrequencyofpipelinefailureduetothesecauseshastherefore beenderivedasafunctionofthreelevelsofmarineactivity:high,mediumandlow.Frequencyvaluesarebasedonthelargediameterspipesof24 40asgiveninTable5.3sincethesearethemostrelevanttotheproposedCAPCOpipeline. Forlocationswithhighmarineactivity,afrequencyof8.6x104/km/yearisadopted.Forlowmarineactivity,1.37x105/km/yearisused.An intermediatevalueof104/km/yearisalsoappliedtolocationswithmediumlevelsofmarineactivity.ThisisdiscussedfurtherinSection5.3where alternativecalculationsbasedonemergencyanchordeploymentfrequencyarealsopresentedforcomparison. ThesefailurefrequenciesfromPARLOCassumeminimalprotectionforthepipeline.TheproposedCAPCOpipelinewillbeprovidedwithrockarmour protectionoveritsentirelength.Toallowforthis,thefailurefrequenciesarereducedbyappropriatefactorsasdiscussedinSection5.4. OtherCauses Othercausesincludeblockages,proceduralerrors,pressuresurgesetc.Aswithcorrosion,improvementsintechnologyandoperatingpractices areexpectedtoreducethissignificantlyandsoageneral90%reductionisassumedforfailuresduetoothercauses.Thisgivesafrequencyof 1.34x106/km/year(4casesin297,565kmyearswith90%reduction). 5.3ALTERNATEAPPROACHTOANCHORDAMAGEFREQUENCY WhileinternationaldataiscommonlyappliedtoinferfailureratesforHongKongsubseapipelines,inthissectionanalternativeapproachisadopted forcomparison.Thisisbasedonthemarinetrafficincidentrate,sincesuchincidentsaremorelikelytoresultinemergencyanchoring.Inthefirst instance,theeffectsofrockarmourprotectionareneglectedtoallowthesecalculationstobecomparedwithhistoricaldatafromPARLOC.The effectsofrockarmourprotectionarethenincorporatedasdescribedisSection5.4. 5.3.1FrequencyofAnchorDrop EmergencyConditions Vesselsmaydropanchorduetoemergencyconditionssuchasfog,storm,orduetocollisionsormachineryfailure.Thelikelihoodofanchoringdue toadverseweatherconditionsisexpectedtobelowespeciallyforthelargervesselswhowilldeterminewhetherdroppingananchoristhesafest option.Furthermore,knowledgeofvesselpositionfromonboardnavigationsystemsshouldpreventinadvertentdroppingofananchorontoapipeline delineatedonthenavigationchart. Toestimatethefrequencyofemergencyanchoring,datafromtheMarineDepartmentofHongKong[6]isused.Thedistributionofincidentsofall types(Figure5.1)showsthatmostincidentsareconcentratedintheharbourregionsnearYauMaTei,TsingYiandTuenMun.Theregionnearthe proposedpipelineindicateslowincidentratesformuchofthepipelinebutslightlyhighervaluesnearUrmstonRoad.Thisisduetothehighertraffic densityinthisarea.Anaveragevalueof0.3fortheperiodfrom2001to2003clearlyreferstoasingleincidentthatoccurredduringthis3yearperiod. ThesizeofeachcellinFigure5.1isonearcminuteoflatitudeandlongitude,orapproximately1.86x1.73=3.2km2.Avalueof0.3refersthentoan incidentfrequencyrateof0.09/km2/year.Forcomparison,thetotalnumberofincidentsfrom19902004inthe1830km2areaofHongKongwaters was5161[17].Thisgivesanaverageof0.19/km2/year.So,theincidentratealongmuchoftheproposedpipelinerouteislowerthanaverage,while thefairwayofUrmstonRoadisalittlehigherthanaverage. Basedontheabovediscussion,anincidentrateof0.1/km2/yearisassumedformostofthepipelineand0.3/km2/yearisassumedforUrmston Road.AlthoughfewincidentsareshownfortheAdamastaChannel,thehighertrafficvolumehereisassumedtogiveahigherincidentrateandso 0.3/km2/yearisassumedforthisregionalso. Figure5.1AverageAnnualIncidentDistribution(20012003)
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Thedistributionbytypesofincidents(Figure5.2)showsthatmostincidentsarecollisionsorcontact.Notallincidentswillresultinananchordrop. Mostcollisions,forexample,arenotserious.Itisassumedthereforethatonly10%ofincidentswillresultinanemergencyanchordrop. Figure5.2DistributionofIncidentTypes(19902004)
Oncetheanchorisdropped,itmayfalldirectlyonthepipelinecausingdamage.Agreaterconcernisthepossibilityofananchorbeingdragged acrosstheseabedandintothepipeline.Inanemergencysituationsuchasmechanicalfailure,itispossiblethatthevesselisstillmovingwhenthe anchorisdeployed.Sinceanchorscanbedraggedsignificantdistances,theresultingpipelinecontactfrequenciestendtobehighercomparedtoa simpleanchordrop.Inmostinstances,however,theshipmastersfirstactionwillbetoreducespeedtonearstationaryandthendropanchorif necessary.Forthepurposeofthisanalysis,itwasassumedthat90%ofshipsdropanchoratnearrest(1knot),whiletheother10%dropanchorat4 knotsduetomechanicalfailureandtheuncontrolledadvanceofthevessel. Theefficiencyofananchorisdefinedaccordingtoitsholdingcapacity: Holdingcapacity=anchorweightefficiency Theefficienciesfordifferentclassesofanchor[20]aregiveninTable5.4.ItisbelievedthattypesEandFarecommononlargecommercialvessels. Table5.4AnchorEfficiency
Class A B C D E F G Efficiency 3355 1725 1426 815 811 46 <6
Thisdefinitioncanbeusedtocalculatethedragdistance.Theworkdoneindraggingananchorthroughsomedistancemustbeequaltothechange inkineticenergyinbringingtheshiptorest. Anchorsaredesignedtopenetrateintotheseabedformaximumholdingcapacity.Asananchorisdraggedacrosstheseabed,itwillbeginto penetrateintothemudthesofterthesoil,thegreaterthepenetration.Maximumholdingcapacityisonlyreachedoncethemaximumpenetration depthhasbeenreachedi.e.theefficiencyisafunctionofpenetrationdepth.Asaconservativeapproach,thelowestefficiencyanchor,typeE,is assumedforthecalculations.Theefficiencyishalvedagaintoallowforthevaryingrestrainingforcewithdepth.Theefficiencyisthereforeassumed tobe2.Table5.5givessomedragdistancesresultingfromthesecalculations. Itcanbeseenthatmostvesselswilldragananchorforlessthanabout20m.Oceangoingvesselscandragananchoroversignificantlygreater distancesduetothelargermassandhencekineticenergyoftheship.Thisclassofshipissubdividedintodifferentsizestoreflectthedistributionof shipsexpectedalongtheproposedpipelineroute(seeTable3.8).A150,000tonneshipisthelargestofshipsvisitingHongKongandthisprovides theupperlimittothedragdistanceofabout170m. Table5.5DragDistances
Class SizeRange (dwt) Displacement (tonnes) Anchor DragDistance (tonnes) (m)
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Fishingvessel Rivertradecoastal vessels Oceangoingvessels FastLaunches Fastferries Other

400 1,500 1,50025,000 1,50035,000 (60%) 25,00075,000 35,000 (35%) 75,000 110,000 (5%) 100,000 110,000 150,000 150 150 200 1 2 25 512 1215 0.1 0.5 0.2 7 13 13118 118154 154168 25 5 17
Thefrequencyofanchordragimpactcanthenbecalculatedas: Impactfreq= incidentfreq(/year/km2)probabilityofanchordropdragdistance/1000(1) wherethedragdistanceisinmeters.Thisgivestheimpactfrequencyperkmofpipelineperyear.Ifanimpactoccurs,thedamagemaynotbe severeenoughtocausecontainmentfailure.BasedonPARLOC2001,approximately22%ofanchor/impactincidentsresultincontainmentfailure whenconsideringallpipediameters.Largerpipes,however,failthreetimeslessoften.Thissuggeststhat7%ofincidentswouldresultinalossof containment. Thisapproachwasappliedtoeachsectionofthepipelineandtoeachclassofvessel.Themarinetrafficincidentratewasassumedtoapplyequally toallclassesofvessel. Thehydrographicsurvey[8]identifiesseabedconditionsasverysoftclayformostoftheroute.Undertheseconditions,significantanchor penetrationcanoccur[20].Forexample,a15tonneanchorcanpenetrateto17m,anda2tonneanchorcanpenetrateto9m.Thesedataapplyto highefficiencyanchorsandlesspenetrationistobeexpectedforthecommonlyusedtypesEandF,butnevertheless,itislikelythatawiderangeof anchorssizeswillbeabletoachieve3mpenetrationduringemergencyanchoringscenariosandhencemayinteractwiththeproposedpipeline. MARADStudy AnalternativetousingtheincidentfrequencyfromFigure5.1istousedatafromtheMARADstudy[19]whichreportedthatthefrequencyof collisionsinHongKongwatersofoceangoingvesselsas56permillionvesselkm.Sinceonly71%ofincidentsarecollisions,thisvalueof56per millionvesselkmwasscaledupwardstoestimatethenumberofincidentsofalltypes.90%oftheseincidentsresultedinonlyminordamageandso againitisassumedthatonly10%willresultinanemergencyanchordrop.Theapproachisthensimilartothatdescribedaboveforanchordragging. RoutineAnchoring Estimatinganchordropfrequenciesfrommarinevesselincidentsfailstotakeintoaccountroutineanchoring.Routineanchoringisnotexpectedinthe busyfairwaysbutmaytakeplaceatotherpositionsalongthepipelineroute.TheEGSseabedsurvey[8]indicatesthepresenceoftrawlingmarks fromfishingactivitiesandalsoanchormarks.Thisdatawasusedalsotoestimateanchoringfrequencies. Itwasassumedthatanchormarkspersistfor2yearsandsothefrequencyofanchoringdamageforeachkmofpipelinewasestimatedas: Routineanchoringdamagefreq= numberofanchormarks/2x(anchorwidthx0.64+0.762)/500msurveywidth/lengthofpipelinesection. (2) AnchordimensionswereestimatedfromtheVyrhofanchormanual[20]foreachclassofship.Thefactorof0.64arisesbecausetheanchormayfall atsomerandomanglerelativetothepipelinesothewidthoftheanchoriseffectivelysmallerbyafactorequaltothemeanofcosineoftheangle= 0.64.Itwasassumedthatthefrequencyofanchoringwilldecreaseby90%oncethepipelineisinstalledandmarkedonnavigationcharts.Also,it wasassumedthatonly7%ofimpactswouldresultinlossofcontainmentasbefore. TheresultsfromthisanalysisarecomparedinFigure5.3.AlsoshownarethelossofcontainmentfrequenciesobtainedfromPARLOC2001forthe platformsafetyzoneandmidline.Theseareassumedtoberepresentativeofareasofhighandlowmarineactivityrespectively.Itcanbeseenthat thereissomespreadinthepredictions.Theplatformsafetyzoneandmidlinefrequenciesdifferbyalmosttwoordersofmagnitudebuteffectively boundmostoftheotherpredictions. Figure5.3AnchorDamageFrequencyBasedonMarineIncidents
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PredictionsbasedontheMARADcollisionrateareregardedasbeingalittlehighbecausetheyaresimplyproportionaltovesselkm(andhencethe trafficdensity)anddonottakeintoaccountlocalconditionsalongtheroute.ThemarineactivityinUrmstonRoadforexampleisabout19timeshigher thanShaChau,butaccordingtoFigure5.1,themarinevesselincidentrateisonlyaboutthreetimeshigher.Ontheotherhand,calculationsbasedon emergencyincidentsarelikelylowbecausetheyneglectindiscriminateanchoringoranchoringduetomistakenlocation. Theanchormarksontheseabedaretheleastreliableindicatorofanchoringactivityduetothelownumberofmarks,thedifficultyindistinguishing anchormarksfromnumeroustrawlingscarsandtheuncertaintyoverhowlongthemarkswillpersistinthesoftseabed.Nevertheless,anchormarks ontheseabeddoshowtwoareasofhighactivity:TaiOandShaChau.TheY3anchorageareanearTaiOaccountsforoneofthesehighactivity areas.ThesecondoccursnearShaChau.Thisismostlikelyactivityfromsmallervesselssincethewaterisshallowinthisregion. ThecalculationsarebroadlyconsistentwithfailurefrequenciesfromPARLOC2001.ThefrequencyobtainedfromPARLOC2001forthemidlineis appropriateforregionsoflowmarinevesselvolumeandlowanchoringactivity.Theplatformsafetyzonefrequencyisregardedasamore appropriatechoiceforthefailurefrequencyinlocationsofhighmarinetrafficornearanchorageareas.Somesectionshaveintermediatelevelsof marineactivityandsoafrequencyof104perkmyearisadoptedforthesesections. Basedontheaboveconsiderations,thefailurefrequenciesduetoanchorimpactusedinthisstudyareassummarizedinTable5.6.SouthSoko ApproachandWestSokoshowsomeanchormarksbutthesearefewinnumberandarefromtheanchoringofsmallvesselsintheshallowwater. Themarinevesselactivityislowntheareasothesesectionswereassignedalowanchordamagefrequency.TheAdamastaChannelisborderline betweenamediumandhighfailurefrequencyandFigure5.1suggeststhatthemarineincidentrateisactuallylowinthisregion,perhapsbecauseof thetrafficseparationscheme.However,asaconservativemeasure,ahighfrequencyisassignedtothissection.TaiOhasafairlylowvolumeof trafficbutitspositionnexttotheY3anchorageandthenumerousanchormarksobservedontheseabedwarrantedahighanchordamagefrequency assignedtothissection. Table5.6AnchorDamageFrequenciesusedinthisStudy
Pipelinesection SouthSokoApproach WestSoko AdamastaChannel WestLantau TaiO NorthLantau ShaChau NorthLungKwuChau UrmstonRoadWest UrmstonRoadCentral UrmstonRoadEast BlackPointApproach Frequency (/km/year) 1.37x105 1.37x105 8.6x104 1x104 8.6x104 1x104 1x104 1x104 8.6x104 8.6x104 1x104 1x104 Comment Lowmarinetraffic Lowmarinetraffic Highmarinetraffic Mediummarinetraffic Nexttoanchorage Mediummarinetraffic Mediummarinetraffic+someanchoring Mediummarinetraffic Highmarinetraffic Highmarinetraffic Mediummarinetraffic Mediummarinetraffic
5.4PIPELINEPROTECTIONFACTORS Manypipelinesaretrenchedtoprotectthemfromtrawlingdamage.InthepipelinedatabaseinPARLOC2001,57%bylengthofalllineshavesome degreeofprotection,eithertrenching(lowering)orburial(covering)overpartoralloftheirlength.Consideringlargeandsmalldiameterlines,the proportionoflineswithsomedegreeofprotectionare59%bylengthforlines<16"diameterand68%forlargerdiameterlines.Itis,however, concludedinthePARLOCreportthattherehavebeeninsufficientincidentstodetermineaclearrelationshipbetweenfailurerateandthedegreeof protection. ThelossofcontainmentfrequenciesgiveninTable5.6assumeminimalprotectionsincetheyarebasedonthePARLOCdata.Theproposed CAPCOpipelinehasrockarmourprotectionspecifiedforitswholelength.Toallowforthis,protectionfactorswereapplied.Basedontheclassesof marinevesselfoundalongtheproposedroute(Table3.2),mostclassesofshiphaveanchorsbelow2tonnesinweight.Onlyoceangoingvessels
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haveanchorsupto15tonnes.Therockarmourprotectionalongtherouteisdesignedtoprotectagainsteither2tonneanchors(trenchtype1and 2A/B)or20tonneanchors(trenchtype3A/B).Rockarmourprotectionfactorswerethereforeappliedbasedonwhetherashipsanchorissmaller thanorlargerthan2tonnes. Trenchtypes1and2A/B(designedtoprotectagainst2tonneanchors)wereassumedtoprovide99%protectionforanchorssmallerthan2tonnes. Thistrenchtypeshouldalsooffersomeprotectionagainstlargeranchors.Foroceangoingvessels,60%ofthemhaveanchorsbelowabout5tonnes (Table3.8)andsotrenchtype1shouldofferreasonableprotectionagainstthesevessels.50%protectionwasassumedforoceangoingvessels. Trenchtype3A/B(deignedtoprotectagainst20tonneanchors)wasassumedtoprovide99%protectionforanchorsgreaterthan2tonnes,and 99.9%protectionforanchorsbelow2tonnes.
5.5SUMMARYOFFAILUREFREQUENCIESFORCAPCOPIPELINE Basedontheabovediscussions,thefailurefrequenciesusedinthisstudyareassummarizedinTable5.7. Table5.7SummaryofFailureFrequenciesusedinthisStudy

Pipelinesection Trench Corrosion Anchor/Impact Others Total type /defects Frequency Protectionfactor(%) /km/year /km/year (/km/year) (/km/year) anchor<2 Anchor>2 SouthSoko 2A 1.18x106 1.37x105 99 50 1.34x 2.66x106 Approach 1 99 50 106 1.18x106 1.37x105 2.66x106 WestSoko 3B/3A 99.9 99 1.34x 6 4 AdamastaChannel 3A 1.18x10 8.6x10 99.9 99 3.49x106 106 WestLantau 3B 1.18x106 1x104 99.9 99 6 1.34x 2.70x10 TaiO 1 99 50 6 4 1.18x10 8.6x10 3.82x106 NorthLantau 1 99 50 106 ShaChau 1 1.18x106 1x104 99 50 1.34x 3.52x106 NorthLungKwu 3B/3A 1.18x106 1x104 99.9 99 106 3.52x106 Chau 3A/3B 99.9 99 1.34x 3.52x106 1.18x106 1x104 UrmstonRoadWest 1 99 50 106 UrmstonRoad 2B 1.18x106 8.6x104 99 50 3.93x106 1.34x Central 6 4 1.18x10 8.6x10 4.58x106 UrmstonRoadEast 106 6 4 6 1.18x10 1x10 BlackPoint 1.34x 3.52x10 Approach 1.18x106 1x104 106 1.34x 106 1.34x 106 1.34x 106 1.34x 106 1.34x 106 3.52x106
5.6SCENARIODEVELOPMENT Theoutcomeofahazardcanbepredictedusingeventtreeanalysistoinvestigatethewayinitiatingeventscoulddevelop.Thisstageoftheanalysis involvesdevelopmentofthereleasecasesintodiscretehazardousoutcomes.Thefollowingfactorsareconsidered: Failurecause Holesize Vesselpositionandtypeand Ignitionprobability. Theprobabilitiesusedintheeventtreesarediscussedbelow. 5.6.1FailureCause Failuresduetocorrosionandothereventsareconsideredseparatelyfromfailurescausedbyanchorimpact.Thisisbecausetheholesize distributionisdifferentinbothcases,asdescribedbelow.Also,intheeventoffailureduetoanchorimpact,theprobabilityofvesselpresenceis assumedtobehigher,asdiscussedlater. 5.6.2HoleSizeDistribution ThedataonholesizedistributioninPARLOC2001issummarisedinTable5.8. Table5.8HoleSizeDistributionfromPARLOC2001
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Thisdataonholesizedistributionisclearlylimited,particularlyforlargediameterpipelines.Oneapproachistocomparethisdistributionwiththatfor onshorepipelines,whichincludeamuchlargerdatabaseofoperatingdataandfailuredata.Forexample,theUSGasdatabase[16]isbasedon5 millionpipelinekmyearsofoperatingdataascomparedto300,000kmyearsinthePARLOCstudy. AnanalysisofholesizedistributionforonshorepipelinesasgivenintheUSGasdatabase[16]andEuropeanGasPipelinesdatabase[21]provides aholesizedistributionasgiveninTable5.9. Table5.9HoleSizeDistributionAdoptedforCorrosionandOtherFailures
TheabovedistributionislargelysimilartothedistributionderivedinthePARLOCreport[7].Theonlydifferenceistheconsiderationofasmall percentageofruptures.Itisamatterofdebatewhetherrupturescouldindeedoccuralthoughrupturesextendingoverseveralmetresarereportedin thevariousfailuredatabases. Inthisstudy,itisproposedthattheholesizedistributiongiveninTable5.9beadoptedforfailurescausedbycorrosionandotherfailures(including material/welddefect).Inthecaseoffailurescausedbyanchordamage,theholesizesareexpectedtobelarger.ThedistributiongiveninTable5.10 isadopted. Table5.10HoleSizeDistributionforAnchorImpact

Category Rupture(FullBore) Major Minor HoleSize Fullbore 15"or381mm(halfbore) 4"or100mm Proportion 10% 20% 70%
5.6.3VesselPosition Inthecaseoffailuresduetocorrosion/otherevents,theprobabilityofavesselbeingaffectedbytheleakiscalculatedbasedonthetrafficvolume andthesizeoftheflammablecloud.DispersionmodellingusingPHAST[22]isusedtoobtainthesizeoftheflammablecloudforeachholesize scenarioandfourweatherscenarioscoveringatmosphericstabilityclassesB,DandF.Oncethecloudsizeisknown,theprob abilitythatapassingmarinevesselwilltravelthroughthisareawithinagiventimecanbecalculated.Atimeperiodof30minutesisusedsinceitis assumedthatifaleakoccurs,warningswillbeissuedtoallshippingwithin30minutes.Furtherdetailsonthedispersionmodellingaregivenin Section6. Inthecaseoffailuresduetoanchorimpact,thefollowingtwoscenariosareconsidered: Vesselsinvicinitythevesselthatcauseddamagetothepipeline(duetoanchoring)isstillinthevicinityoftheincidentzone.Theprobabilityof thisisassumedtobe0.3and Passingvesselsshipsapproachorpassthesceneoftheincidentfollowingafailure.Inthiscase,theprobabilityofavesselpassingthrough theplumeiscalculatedusingthesamemethodasforacorrosionfailurei.e.basedoncloudsizeandtrafficvolume. EventtreesshowingthesescenariosaregiveninFigures5.4and5.5.Ifavesselpassesthroughtheflammablegascloud,adistinctionisfurther madebetweenvesselspassingdirectlyoverthereleaseareaandvesselspassingthroughotherpartsofthecloud.Thisisdiscussedfurtherinthe followingsection. Itisassumedthatatmost,onlyonevesselwillbeaffectedbyapipelinefailure.Oncetheflammableplumeisignited,theresultingfirewillbevisible andothershipswillnaturallyavoidthearea.Giventhelikelysizeofplumeandseparationofshipping,thelikelihoodthattwoshipswillbeaffectedis deemed negligible. As an example, the highest density of marine vessels occurs along UrmstonRoad. Assuming an average speed of just 5m/s givesamarinevesseldensityof0.7ships/km2.Thehazarddistancesfortheflammablecloudfromapipelineleakaretypicallyoftheorderof30 60m, with the largest being 130m. It is unlikely that two vessels will be within such close proximity, particularly for oceangoing vessels and fast ferrieswhicharethemoreimportantcategoriesfortheriskanalysis. Figure5.4EventTreeforExternalDamagefromAnchors
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Figure5.5EventTreeforSpontaneousFailures
5.6.4VesselType Thecategorisationofvesseltypesfollowsthoseidentifiedfromtheradartracks(Table3.2),namely: Fishingvesselsandsmallcrafts Rivertradecoastalvessels Oceangoingvessels FastLaunches Fastferries Others(assumedtobesmallvessels) Therelativeproportionofthedifferentvesseltypeswillvaryalongthepipelineroute,asindicatedinTable3.4. 5.6.5IgnitionProbability Ignitionofthereleaseisexpectedonlyfrompassingshipsorshipsinthevicinity.Ignitionprobabilitiesderivedforoffshorepipelinereleasesinthe vicinityofanoffshoreplatformisgiveninTable5.11[23].Similarvaluesareadoptedinthisstudy,asgiveninTable5.12.
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6CONSEQUENCEANALYSIS 6.1OVERVIEW
Intheeventoflossofcontainment,thegaswillbubbletothesurfaceoftheseaandthendisperse.Ifitcomesincontactwithanignitionsource,most likelyfromapassingmarinevessel,itcouldleadtoaflashfirewhichwillpropagatethroughthecloudtothepointofreleaseandresultinagasfire abovethewatersurface. Ifamarinevesselpassesintoaplumeofgasandignitesit,thenthereisthepossibilityoffatalitiesonthatshipduetotheflashfire.Ifavesselpasses throughthereleaseareaoftherelease,thevesselwilllikelybeaffectedalsobytheensuingfireandtheconsequenceswillbemoresevere.Ifthe releasegetsignited,itispresumedthatnofurthershipswillbeinvolvedbecausethefirewillbevisibleandothershipswillnaturallyavoidthearea.In otherwords,itisassumedthatatmost,onlyoneshipwillbeaffected. Furtherdetailsaredescribedinthefollowingparagraphs. 6.2SOURCETERMMODELLING Thereleaserateisestimatedbasedonstandardequationsfordischargethroughanorifice.TheempiricalcorrelationdevelopedbyBellandmodified byWilson[24]isadopted.Amaximumoperatingpressureof101bargisassumed. TheresultsarepresentedinFigure6.1.Forholeswithequivalentdiametersmallerthanabout100mm,thedischargeratediminishesratherslowly becauseofthelargeinventoryinthepipeline(about1,200tonnes).Forhalfandfullborefailures,thedischargeratediminishesmorequicklyovera periodofabout3060minutes. Figure6.1VariationofReleaseRatewithTime
6.3DISPERSIONMODELLINGFORSUBSEARELEASES Intheeventofareleasefromthesubseapipeline,thegasjetisexpectedtolosemomentumandbubbletothesurface.Thesimplestformof modellingappliedtosubseareleasesistoassumethatthedispersingbubbleplume(drivenbygasbuoyancy)canberepresentedbyaconeoffixed angle(Figure6.2)[24].Thetypicalconeangleisbetween10to12.However,BilleterandFannelop[24]suggestedthatthe'releasearea'(where bubblesbreakthroughthesurface)isabouttwicethediameterofthebubbleplume.Hence,anangleof23wasrecommendedandisusedinthis study. BasedontheEGSSurvey[8],thewaterdepthisbetween58mformuchoftheproposedpipelineroute,increasingto20minUrmstonRoadand25m intheAdamastaChannel.TheshallowestwateroccursontheSouthSokoapproachandisabout1.6mdeep.Forthisrangeofwaterdepths,the conemodelpredictsthereleaseareatobeintherangeof0.6to10mdiameter. Figure6.2SimpleConeModelforSubseaDispersion
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6.4DISPERSIONABOVESEALEVEL Thegaswillbegintodisperseintotheatmosphereuponreachingtheseasurface.Thedistancetowhichtheflammableenvelopeofgasextendswill dependonambientconditionssuchaswindspeedandatmosphericstabilityaswellassourceconditions.Theextentoftheflammableregionistaken asthedistanceto0.85LFL(LowerFlammableLimit). Conditionsatthesourcesuchasmomentumandbuoyancyareimportant.Atlowerdepthsandhighreleaserates,thegaswillhavealarge momentumattheseasurfaceresultinginaplumeextendingrapidlyupwardsintotheatmosphere.Forsmallerreleases,thegaswillloseall momentumbythetimeitreachestheseasurfaceresultinginaplumeofgreaterhorizontalextent.DimensionalanalysisusingtheFroudenumber[24] suggeststhatmomentumandbuoyancyarebothimportantovermostreleasescenariosconsideredinthecurrentstudy.Onlyfullborerupturesin shallowwaterresultinamomentumdominatedjetrelease. TheaboveseadispersionwasmodelledusingPHAST[22].Basedontheabovediscussion,toachieverealisticsimulationsitisimportanttogivedue considerationtothemomentumandbuoyancyofthesource.Thegaswasassumedtogainheatfromtheseawater,duringtransportandfollowinga release.Thegaswasthereforeassumedtobereleasedat20Cand101barg.Beinglighterthanair,naturalgasliftsawayfromtheseasurfaceunder allatmosphericconditions. Theconemodelisbelievedtobeareasonableapproachforestimatingthereleaseareaforsmalltomoderatereleases.Theworstscenarioisdeep water,whichproducesalargereleaseareaandhenceloweffluxmomentumforagivenmassreleaserate.Thedeepestwatercaseof25mwas thereforechosenforanalysis.Alowmomentumgivesalowerplumeriseandhencealargerhazardousareaneartheseasurface.Theconemodel, however,hasnotbeenvalidatedformassivereleasessuchaswouldoccurinahalfboreorfullborerupture.Toerronthecautiousside,alarger releaseareawasassumedformassivereleases.Thediameterofthereleaseareawasincreasedby50%forhalfboreruptureandby100%forfull borerupturescenarios.Thislowersthesourcemomentumandgivesconservativeresults. PHASTwasusedtomodeltheplumedispersionasanareasourceonthesurfaceoftheocean.Themassreleaserate,thereleasevelocityand temperaturewerespecifiedandthereleasewasassumedtobevertical.Thesurfaceroughnessparameterwasassumedtobe0.043,avalue appropriatefordispersionoverwater.Eventhoughthereleaseisatransient,particularlyforthelargereleasescenarios,thetimeconstantforthe releaseisstilllongerthanthedispersiontimescale.Themodellingthereforeassumedasteadyreleaseofgasatthemaximumreleaserate.Again, thisisconservative.SimulationswereperformedforatmosphericstabilityclassesofB,DandFtocovertherangeofmeteorologicalconditions expected.Giventhattheplumeinallcasesliftedawayfromthesurfaceduetobuoyancy,thelengthoftheplumewastakentobethemaximum extentoftheplumeinthewindwarddirectionuptotheshipheightwhichisassumedtobeamaximumof50m. Therelativeoccurrenceofweatherconditions2F,3D,7Dand2.5Bweretakentobe0.1654,0.1023,0.6333and0.099respectivelytomatch conditionsmeasuredattheShaChaumeteorologystation. 6.5IMPACTASSESSMENT 6.5.1ImpactonPopulationonMarineVessels Thehazardousdistancewastakentobethedistanceto0.85LFLasdiscussedabove.Itwasassumedthatshipswouldbeatriskfor30minutes beforewarningscouldbeissuedtoadvicevesselstoavoidthearea.Knowingthemarinevesseltraffic(inshipsperdayperkmofpipeline),the probabilitythatapassingshipwillcrossthroughtheflammableplumeduringthis30minutesiscalculatedas: Prob.=traffic(/km/day)xlengthofplume(km)x0.5(hour)/24(hour/day)(3) Ifamarinevesselcomesincontactwiththeflammableplumeandcausesignition,theresultingflashfiremayleadtofatalitiesdependingonthetype ofship.Smallopenvesselssuchasfishingboatsareexpectedtoprovidelessprotectiontoitsoccupants.Largeoceangoingvesselswillprovide betterprotection.Fatalityfactorsarethereforeappliedtoeachclassofvesseltotakeintoaccounttheprotectionofferedbythevessel.Thesetake intoconsideration: Theproportionofthepassengerslikelytobeondeckorininteriorcompartments. Thematerialsofconstructionofthevesselandthelikelihoodofsecondaryfires. Thesizeofthevesselandhencethelikelihoodthatitcanbecompletelyengulfedinaflammablegascloud. Thespeedofthevesselandhenceitsexposuretimetothegascloud. Theabilityofgastopenetrateintothevesselandachieveaflammablemixture.
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Consideringfastferriestheyareairconditionedandtravelathighspeedsinexcessof30knots(15m/s).Iftheoccupantsaretobeaffectedbya flashfire,gasmustpenetrateintotheinteriorofthevessel,achieveaflammablemixtureandignite.Thetimetotransitthelargestgascloudof130m isoftheorderof10seconds.Assumingtypicalairventilationratesof6to10volumechangesperhour,atimeconstantforchangesingas concentrationwithinaferrycanbederivedas6to10minutes.Thisimpliesthatitwouldtakeseveralminutesforthegasconcentrationwithinaferry torespondtochangesinconcentrationintheambientair.Giventhattheexposuretimeismereseconds,itbecomesapparentthatitisverydifficultto achieveaflammablemixtureofgaswithinaferry.Basedontheseconsiderations,thefatalitiesassumedinthecurrentstudyforfastferriesandother vesselsareasgiveninTable6.1. Ifashipentersthereleaseareaandignitesthegascloud,thevesselismorelikelytobecaughtintheensuingfire.Thisisassumedtoresultinmore severeconsequenceswithpotentialfor100%fatalityofoccupants.Theprobabilityofthisiscalculatedusingasimilarequationasabove(Equation3) butreplacingthecloudsizewiththereleaseareadiameter. Table6.1FatalityProbabilities
Class Fishingvessels Rivertradecoastalvessels Oceangoingvessels Fastlaunches Fastferries Others Fatality Releasearea 1 1 1 1 1 1 Cloudarea 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.9
Ifthefailureiscausedbycorrosion,apassingshipmaypassthroughtheflammableplumeorreleaseareawithaprobabilitygivenbyEquation3.If thefailureiscausedbythirdpartydamage,thentwoscenariosareconsideredasmentionedinSection5.Thevesselthatcausedtheincidentmay stillbeintheareaandmayignitetheplume,orifthisvesselisnolongerpresent,apassingshipmaypassthroughtheplume.Theprobabilitythatthe vesselcausingtheincidentisstillpresentisassumedtobe0.3andthisisassumedtoresultin100%fatality. Theanalysislimitsthenumberofshipsinvolvedtoone.Itisassumedthatoncetheplumeisignited,othershipswillavoidthearea. 6.5.2ImpactonPopulationonHongKongZhuhaiMacauBridge TheproposedHongKongtoZhuhaiMacau(HKZM)bridgewillstraddletheCAPCOpipelinewithintheTaiOsection(Figure3.1),althoughthe precisealignmentandconstructionscheduleofthebridgehasyettobefinalised.Itisassumedthatthepipelinecanbelaidbetweenbridgesupport columnsorthatbridgeconstructionprocedureswilltakethenecessaryprecautionstoavoiddamagetothepipeline.ItisnotedalsothattheTaiO sectionofthepipelinewillbeprovidedwith3mofrockarmourprotection.Thebridge,therefore,isnotexpectedtohaveanyeffectonpipelinefailure frequenciesduringconstructionoroperation. Ifapipelinefailuredoesoccurforotherreasons,suchasexternalcorrosionoranchorimpact,thetransientroadtrafficpopulationonthebridgemay beaffected.ThisscenariowasconsideredintheconsequenceanalysisfortheTaiOsectionofthepipeline. Therearenoofficialestimatesavailableforthevehicletrafficexpectedonthebridgeitwasthereforeassumedthat20,000vehiclesperdaywill traversethebridge.Thisisequivalentto50%ofthevehiclescrossingalllandborderscurrently[25].Thesamevehiclemixwasassumedas currentlycrossingthelandborders,namely:24%cars,9%coaches/shuttlebusesand67%goods/containervehicles.Itwasfurtherassumedthat carsandgoodsvehicleshaveapopulationof2,whilebuseshaveapopulationof50. Consideringthevehicletrafficvolume,thesizeofgascloudsexpectedfromvariousreleasescenariosaspredictedbyPHAST,andassumingan averagevehiclespeedof80km/h,itwascalculatedthatbetween1to2vehiclesmaybeaffectedbytheflashfirefollowingignitionofthegascloud. Theignitionprobabilityisassumedtobeoneduetothehightrafficonthebridge.Thepossibilityofbothvehiclesbeingbuseswasalsoconsidered, withanassociatedprobabilityof0.0081.50%fatalitywasassumedforthevehicleoccupants. 6.5.3ImpactonAircraftApproachingChepLapKok TheNorthLantausectionofthepipelinepasseswithinabout3.7kmofthethresholdforrunways07Land4.5kmfromrunway07RatChepLapKok InternationalAirport.Commercialaircrafthaveanapproachangleofabout3whichputstheiraltitudeabovethepipelineatabout200m.Largegas releasesfromthepipeline,suchasthosethatoccurfromafullboreorhalfborerupture,havethepotentialtoproduceagascloudthatextendshigher than200m.Itisthereforepossiblethataircraftontheapproachtolandingmaypassthroughagascloudwithintheflammabilitylimits.Thisscenario wasconsideredintheanalysis.Aircrafttakingofffromrunways25Land25Rarenotaconcernbecausemoderncommercialjetsgainaltitudevery quickly. Ifacommercialairlinerdoespassthroughaflammablegascloud,itcouldbeimpactedinseveralways.Thejetengineswouldverylikelyignitethe cloudbutsincetheflamespeedinnaturalgasisabout10m/sandtheaircraftspeedonapproachistypically160knots(80m/s),theplaneisunlikely tobecaughtintheflashfire.Thedifferenceindensityofnaturalgascomparedtoairwouldimpacttheaircraftinamannersimilartoturbulence.The flowofnaturalgasthroughtheenginesmayalsoupsetthecombustionprocessalthoughtheconcentrationofnaturalgasataircraftaltitudeswillbe low.Thereisuncertaintyintheseissuessoforthepurposeofanalysis,aconservativeapproachisadoptedandthegascloudisassumedtocause sufficientupsettoresultinanaircraftcrashwith100%fatality. Thehazardousdistanceistakenasthemaximumsizeofthegascloudabove200mfromtheseasurface.Theprobabilitythatthegascloudwill crosstheapproachflightpathiscalculatedfromthishazarddistance.Ifagascloudispresentontheapproachpath,theprobabilitythatanaircraft willflythroughthecloudistakentobe1,sinceaircraftarelandingeveryfewminutesatChepLapKok.Inasimilarmannerasbefore,itisassumed thatatmostoneaircraftwillbeaffected. Adistributionofpopulationisassumedintheanalysistotakeintoaccountthevaryingsizeofaircraftusingtheairport.AccordingtotheCivilAviation DepartmentAnnualReport[26],thereare263,506takeoffandlandingsperyearand39,799,602passengers.Thisgivesanaveragepopulationof 151passengers,pluscrew,oneachflight.Itisfurtherstatedthat16%offlightsarecargoflights.ThedistributionassumedisgiveninTable6.2.This distributiongivesanaveragepopulationperflightas165whichisclosetothe151+crewpublishedbytheCivilAviationDepartment. Table6.2AircraftPopulationDistribution
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6.5.4ImpactonMacauHelicopters HelicoptersshuttlingtoandfromMacaupassovertheAdamastaChannelsectionofthepipelineatabout500feet(150m)altitude.Inthesameway thataccidentalgasreleasesmayaffectaircraftontheapproachtotheairport,areleasefromtheAdamastaChannelsectionmayimpacton helicopters.Thehazarddistanceistakentobethemaximumwidthofthegascloudabove150maltitude.Althoughthereisonlyoneflightevery30 minutesandthereturnflightspassfurthersouthmissingthepipelineroute,itisagainassumedthatonehelicopteriscertaintobeaffectedifthegas cloudliesacrosstheflightpath.Themethodologyisthesameasthatusedforaircraft(Section6.5.3).Itisfurtherassumedthatallhelicoptersare filledtocapacitywith12passengersandcrew. Thisisaconservativetreatmentforhelicoptersbutgiventhattheyarenotexpectedtomakeasignificantcontributiontotheriskresults,thissimple approachissufficient. 6.6CONSEQUENCERESULTS Hazarddistancesaredeterminedfromthedispersionmodellingforbothmarinevesselsandaircraft(Figure6.3).Thehazarddistanceformarine vesselsisdefinedasthemaximumwidthofthegascloudbelowaheightof50mabovesealevel.Similarly,thehazarddistanceforcommercial airlinersisdefinedabove200mandhelicoptersabove150mfromsealevelsincethisistheexpectedaltitudeoftheseaircraft.Basedonthis,the hazarddistancesobtainedfromdispersionmodellingaresummarisedinTable6.3. Figure6.3HazardDistanceDefinitions
Table6.1HazardDistancesforGasCloudDispersion
MarineVessel HelicopterHazard AirlinerHazard CloudMaximum Hazard Distance Distance Height Distance(m) (m)* (m)* (m) Weather Weatherconditions Weather Weatherconditions conditions conditions 2F 3D 7D 2.5B 2F 3D 7D 2.5B 2F 3D 7D 2.5B 2F 3D 7D 2.5B Full LFL 61 62 108 69 216 154 158 125 180 138 0 113 260 350 185 360 bore 0.85LFL 65 68 115 75 261 187 194 140 220 173 84 130 290 380 210 390 Half LFL 54 55 121 54 0 45 0 38 0 0 0 0 147 165 95 170 bore 0.85LFL 60 62 131 60 67 72 0 51 0 0 0 0 155 185 102 185 100 LFL 54 51 74 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 42 24 43 0.85LFL 60 59 84 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 48 27 47 50 LFL 35 36 48 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 20 12 20 0.85LFL 38 40 55 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 24 13 22 25 LFL 21 24 33 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 11 5 10 0.85LFL 25 29 36 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 11 6 11 *Valuesofzeroforaircrafthazarddistancesmeanthatthegasclouddoesnotreachsufficientheighttoaffectaircraft Hole End Size Point mm Criteria
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7RISKSUMMATION
Thefrequenciesandconsequencesofthevariousoutcomesofthenumerousaccidentscenariosareintegratedatthisstage,togivemeasuresofthe societalrisk(FNcurvesandPotentialLossofLife)andindividualrisk. RiskresultsarecomparedwiththecriteriaforacceptabilityaslaiddownintheHongKongPlanningStandardsandGuidelines,chapter12[27]and alsoinAnnex4oftheTechnicalMemorandumofEIAO.However,theseriskguidelinescannotbeapplieddirectlyfortransportoperations(suchas pipelinetransport).Sincetransportoperationsextendoverseveralkilometresandcommunities,theycannotbeequatedwithrisksfromfixed installations(suchasanLPGplant,refineryorapetrochemicalplant)whichhaveadefinedimpactzone.Asaresult,apipelineof1kmlengthis consideredasequivalenttoafixedinstallationfortheapplicationofriskcriteria.Thisapproachisadoptedinternationally[28]andwasadoptedbythe consultantinsimilarstudiesforonshoreandoffshorehighpressuregaspipelines.Basedonthisapproach,theresultsarepresentedonaper kilometrebasisforeachsectionofthepipeline. Theindividualrisk(IR)criterionforapotentiallyhazardousinstallationspecifiesthattheriskoffatalitytoanoffshoreindividualshouldnotexceed 1x105peryear.ItisgenerallyacceptedthatthesameIRcriteriashouldalsoapplyfortransportoperations. Riskresultsaregiveninthemaintextofthisreport(Part2,section13.11).
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REFERENCES
[1]KvaernerPetromincoSdnBhd,LNGReceivingTerminalProjectOffshorePipelinefromSouthSokoIslandtoBBPS,BasisofDesignReport, 2005. [2]KvaernerPetromincoSdnBhd,Drawing8028PLD008,revision3,2006. [3]KvaernerPetromincoSdnBhd,LNGReceivingTerminalProjectOffshorePipelinefromSouthSokoislandtoBPPS,InputtoEIAStudy,17th Feb2006. [4]BMTAsiaPacificLtd,MarineImpactAssessmentforBlackPoint&SokosislandsLNGReceivingTerminal&AssociatedFacilities,Pipeline Issues,WorkingPaper#3,Issue6,Sep2006. [5]MarineDepartmentPortStatistics,2004http://www.mardep.gov.hk/ [6]MarineDepartment,MarineTrafficRiskAssessmentforHongKongWaters(MARAStudy),March2004. [7]Health&SafetyExecutive,PARLOC2001TheUpdateofLossofContainmentDataforOffshorePipelines,5thEdition,2003. [8]EGSEarthSciences&Surveying,HydrographicandgeophysicalSurveyforProposedLNGTerminal,FinalSurveyReport,2005. [9]DnV,RulesforSubmarinePipelineSystems,1981. [10]PersonalcommunicationwithBMT. [11]MarineDepartment,HongKongGovernment,PassengerArrivals/DeparturesandPassengerLoadFactorsatCrossBoundaryFerry Terminals,JanuaryDecember2005.www.mardep.gov.hk [12]UKAEA,MajorHazardIncidentDatabase(MHIDAS)SilverPlatter. [13]InstitutionofChemicalEngineersUK,TheAccidentDatabase,Version2.01. [14]NationalTransportationSafetyBoard,NaturalgasPipelineRuptureandFireDuringDredgingofTigerPass,Lousiana,October23,1998. [15]NationalResearchCouncil,ImprovingSafetyofMarinePipelines,1994. [16]PRCInternationalAmericanGasAssociation,AnalysisofDOTReportableIncidentsforGasTransmissionandGatheringPipelinesJanuary 1,1985ThroughDecember31,1994Keifner&AssociateInc.,1996. [17]MarineDepartment,HongKongGovernment,StatisticsonMarineAccidents,19902004,www.mardep.gov.hk. [18]HealthandSafetyExecutiveUK,PARLOC96:TheUpdateofLossofContainmentDataforOffshorePipelines, [19]MarineDepartment,TheMARADStrategyReportComprehensiveStudyonMarineActivitiesAssociatedRiskAssessmentandDevelopment ofaFutureStrategyfortheOptimumUsageofHongKongWaters,1997. [20]Vryhof,VryhofAnchorManual,www.vryhof.com,2005. [21]EuropeanGasPipelineIncidentDataGroup3rdEGIGReport19701997. [22]DnVTechnica,PHASTReleaseNotes,DnVTechnicaInc.,Temecula,CA.,1993. [23]CentreofChemicalProcessSafety,GuidelinesforUseofVapourCloudDispersionModels,1996. [24]PJRew,PGallagher,DMDeaves,DispersionofSubseaReleases:ReviewofPredictionMethodologies,HealthandSafetyExecutive,1995. [25]TransportDepartment,MonthlyTrafficandTransportDigest,March2006,2006. [26]CADAnnualReport2004/5,www.cad.gov.hk [27]PlanningDepartment,HongKongPlanningStandards&GuidelinesChapter12,HongKongRiskGuidelinesforPotentialHazardous Installation,1992. [28]MJPikaar,MASeaman,AReviewofRiskControl,MinisterieVROM(1995/27A),1995.
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EIA Report - Part 2 Section13 Annex B

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EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

Basedontheabovediscussion,themarinetrafficvolumeusedinthepresentanalysisissummarizedinTable3.7.Additionaloceangoingvessels wereinjectedintoUrmstonRoadasindicatedinthemarineconsultantreport[4]. Table3.7TrafficVolumeAssumedforBaseCase2011

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

2.4% 3.6% 3.6%

8.3% 8.3% 100%

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

Hazards/ Keywords 1.Anchor Drag

Description/Causes 1.Emergencyanchoringfor vesselunderwaydueto lossofsteerage,poweror control,eitherdueto mechanicalproblemsor duetocollisionevents.

Consequences 1.Possibilityofdamageto externalcoating,damageto piperequiringremedialaction.

Safeguards 1.Engineeredrockprotection withrespecttovessel sizes/types. 2.Depthofcover.

Recommendations 1.Periodicsurveyalong theroutetobecarriedout toensureintegrityofthe protection.

2.Dragfromanchorage areasunderstorm condition.

2.Potentiallossof containmentleadingtogas release.Impactonpassing vesselsandshorepopulation. Vesselinvolvedinthe incidentsmaysinkdueto lossofbuoyancycausedby thegasbubbling.

4.Concreteexternalcoating. 5.Heavywallpipeinshore approaches.

3.Disturbancetotherock coverprotection.Possible exposureofthepipe.

6.Markingmarinechartsofthe pipelineroute. 7.Shorepopulationisatleast 3kmawayalongtheroute exceptneartheshore approach.

2.Anchor Drop 3.Dropped Object

1.Sameascause1&3of anchordraghazard 1.Lossofcargo 2.Constructionactivities

1.Sameasconsequence1,2 &3ofanchordraghazardbut lesssevere. 1.Sameasconsequence1,2 &3ofanchordraghazardbut lesssevere. 1.Minorsurfacedamage.

1.Sameasforanchordrag hazard. 1.Sameassafeguards1,2,4, 5,&7ofanchordraghazard.

1.Dumpingofconstruction wasteandotherbulk materialsoutsideof designateddumping grounds. 1.Navigationerror,lossof controlduetomechanical oradverseweather.

1.Sameasconsequence1,2 &3ofanchordraghazard. 2.Displacementofthe pipelineleadingtoexposure 1.Sameasconsequence1,2 &3ofanchordraghazard.

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

1.Impactfromdredge bucketordraghead. Expectedlocationof maintenancedredgingare AdamastaChannel,along theUrmstonroad,along theTSS

1.Sameasconsequence1,2 &3ofanchordraghazardbut lesssevere.

1.Pilingforbridge structuresnearthe pipeline,dredging, constructionvessel movement,anchoringand droppedobject

1.InterfacewithHZMBproject ownertocoordinatedesigns andschedule 2.Engineeredrockprotection withrespecttovessel sizes/types. 3.Depthofcover. 4.Concreteexternalcoating.

2.Developandimplement proceduresfor safeguardingthepipeline duringHZMBconstruction

Safeguards 1.Alignmentisawayfromareasof highcurrents 2.Engineeredrockcover 3.Periodicsurveysalongtheroute

Hazards/Keywords 1.Damagetopipelineduring construction

Safeguards 1.Precommissioningprocedures toensureintegrityofpipeline beforegasin

Description/Causes 1.Noissueforregassified LNGsinceitiscleananddry gas 1.Seawatercorrosive environment

1.Coatingsystem 2.Sacrificialanodesystem 3.Designedforintelligentpigging

3.Pressurecycling 4.Materialdefect/ constructiondefect

1.Designwillconsiderpressure cycles 1.Qualitycontrolduring manufactureandconstruction

Hazards/Keywords 1.SouthSokooptionwill includeapiglaunching

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

Hazards/Keywords 1.Tobecoveredaspartof GRS

Hazards/Keywords 1.PotentialfutureCT10 construction

Safeguards 1.Currentalignmentisbased onexistingseabedprofile. Flexibilityforalternative measurestobedesigned

Hazards/Keywords 1.Leakfromtappings, flangesandpiping

Description/Causes 1.Corrosion,mechanical failure,etc 2.Maloperationduring maintenance(including droppedobject),pigging

Safeguards 1.Gasandfiredetection 2.Shutdownsystem 3.Operatingandmaintenance procedures

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

ThemaincausesofpipelinefailurearesummarisedinTable5.2,basedonthecausesidentifiedinPARLOC2001.Asdiscussedearlier, anchor/impactfollowedbyinternalcorrosionarethemaincontributorstopipelinefailure. Table5.2MainContributorstoSubseaPipelineFailure(PARLOC2001)

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B

18to24" diameter 1.76x10

24to40"diameter 1.37x105 8.6x104

EIA Report Part 2 Section13 Annex B