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This information was last updated on 24 APR 2012, 1:49 PM EDT (17:49 GMT)
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Inflation is expected to spike temporarily owing to the governments planned changes to energy prices, but the increase does not destabilize the currency. Profit taking following two years of excellent stock market returns does not evolve into large-scale capital flight. Domestic political stability is maintained over the forecast horizon; there will be no major outbreak of ethnic or religious violence.
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Economic Growth Indicators 2009 Real GDP (% change) Real Consumer Spending (% change) Real Government Consumption (% change) Real Fixed Capital Formation (% change) Real Exports of Goods and Services (% change) Real Imports of Goods and Services (% change) Nominal GDP (US$ bil.) Nominal GDP Per Capita (US$) 4.6 4.9 15.7 3.3 -9.7 -15.0 2010 6.1 4.6 0.3 8.5 14.9 17.3 2011 6.6 4.8 3.2 8.8 13.9 13.4 2012 6.2 5.2 2.8 9.8 7.6 7.6 2013 6.2 5.1 3.1 9.0 7.8 7.6 2014 6.3 5.3 3.1 8.6 7.7 7.1 2015 5.9 5.5 4.2 7.9 5.8 6.4 2016 5.7 5.4 4.5 7.3 5.6 6.2
539.4 706.6 846.9 917.3 1,067.6 1,229.4 1,358.7 1,477.6 2,272 2,946 3,495 3,748 4,319 4,926 5,394 5,814
Source: Historical data from selected national and international data sources. All forecasts provided by IHS Global Insight. Table updated on the 15th of each month from monthly forecast update bank (GIIF). Written analysis may include references to data made available after the release of the GIIF bank.
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The investment spending acceleration has been a multi-year phenomenon, reflecting the extreme declines in investment in the immediate post Asia-crisis period on one hand and the genuine improvement in Indonesias business environment in recent years on the other. As a result, the share of fixed investment to GDP reached a new historical high of 32% as of 2010 (prior peaks were in the 3031% range), having fallen to as low as 19% of GDP in 2002. We anticipate this ratio to continue rising, though at a much slower pace, over the next decade or so, as the drive to upgrade outdated infrastructure continues and multinational corporations establish more substantial manufacturing facilities in the country. Investment growth picked up considerably in 2010. Favorable base effects, improved business confidence, and easier access to credit steadily lifted investment spending over the course of 2010, resulting in an 8.5% expansion. Higher inflows of capital from abroad also supported investment spending as FDI inflows surged 173% in 2010 to reach USD13.3 billion.
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Recession slowed but did not stop investment spending. Real investment spending grew 3.3% in 2009a far cry from the double-digit rates recorded during the same period in 2008, but nonetheless impressive in the context of a severe global recession. In fact, Indonesia was almost an exception in Southeast Asia, as investment spending in many countries in the region plunged severely during 2009.
Inflation: Outlook
Inflation is under control, but changes to energy prices will cause inflation to rise again. Rising food and commodity prices lifted inflation during the early part of 2011, but the trend reversed during the last part of the year and moderated
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further in early 2012. Earlier plans to reduce fuel subsidies have been watered down so much recently that it is now unlikely they would be implemented until the last few months of 2012, if at all. Therefore, in the April forecast round, we have reverted to our 4.5% 2012 inflation forecast.
Inflation Indicators 2009 Consumer Price Index (% change) Wholesale-Producer Price Index (% change) 4.8 -1.8 2010 5.1 4.9 2011 5.4 7.5 2012 4.5 4.8 2013 5.3 5.1 2014 5.8 5.9 2015 4.0 2.4 2016 4.2 3.3
Source: Historical data from selected national and international data sources. All forecasts provided by IHS Global Insight. Table updated on the 15th of each month from monthly forecast update bank (GIIF). Written analysis may include references to data made available after the release of the GIIF bank. Download this table in Microsoft Excel format
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A strong disinflationary trend took hold in 2009. The year 2009 brought much improved news on the inflation front. If one were to look for a silver lining in the cloud of global recession, it would have to be the correction in commodity prices from overextended levels, which allowed inflationary pressures to diminish sharply, not just in Indonesia or Asia, but across the world. As a result, the CPI inflation rate fell to just 2.4% y/y in November 2009the lowest since 2000. This directly reflected trends in producer prices, which by July 2009, were experiencing double-digit declines from year-earlier levels. For 2009 as a whole, consumer price inflation averaged 4.6% (versus 10.1% in 2008), while producer prices actually declined 1.2% (having surged 26.2% the previous year).
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Exchange Rate Indicators 2009 Exchange Rate (LCU/US$, end of period) Exchange Rate (LCU/US$, period avg) Exchange Rate (LCU/Euro, end of period) Exchange Rate (LCU/Euro, period avg) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
9,400.00
8,991.00
9,068.00
8,850.73
8,629.07
8,455.81
8,633.07
8,719.92
10,389.90
9,090.43
8,770.43
9,041.80
8,719.85
8,542.41
8,588.45
8,677.69
Source: Historical data from selected national and international data sources. All forecasts provided by IHS Global Insight. Table updated on the 15th of each month from monthly forecast update bank (GIIF). Written analysis may include references to data made available after the release of the GIIF bank. Download this table in Microsoft Excel format
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instance, fell from 35.7% of the total market on 9 September to 31.4% by 29 September. The large depreciation forced the central bank to intervene in the market and increase its own purchases of government bonds to the highest level since December 2010. Contagion from the Eurozone situation kicked up again in November, causing the exchange rate to end the month at IDR9,170/USD1the first close above 9,000 since January. It ended 2011 at IDR9,066/USD1 and stood at IDR9,180/USD1 at the end of March 2012. Improved risk appetite and carry trade lifted the rupiah since spring 2009. Despite favorable fundamentals, the rupiah was hard hit by the indiscriminate flight to safety that accompanied the onset of the global credit crisis in the fall of 2008. Within a few weeks, the rupiah lost more than 25% of its value against the dollar. Nevertheless, once it became evident that the world was, in fact, going to survive the recession, risk appetite began building anew. The exchange rate reached IDR9,433/USD1 at end-2009, compared with more than IDR12,000/USD1 at the height of the crisis. The rupiah remains among the most volatile emerging-market currencies. Despite improving macroeconomic fundamentals that should support the rupiah, trading in the currency is thin, and the rupiah is seen as one of the riskiest in Asia. As such, it tends to suffer more than others in periods of market turbulence and risk aversion. Nevertheless, just as it has historically experienced bouts of severe depreciation, it has also gone through several rapid appreciation runs. Generally, both the currency and the economy as a whole have become much more resilient to shocks, and we believe that although depreciation episodes are possible, they should be brief.
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Monetary Policy Indicators 2009 Policy Interest Rate (%, end of period) Short-term Interest Rate (%, end of period) 6.50 9.28 2010 6.50 7.02 2011 6.00 6.93 2012 6.00 6.17 2013 6.25 6.04 2014 6.25 6.22 2015 6.22 6.38 2016 6.19 6.45
Source: Historical data from selected national and international data sources. All forecasts provided by IHS Global Insight. Table updated on the 15th of each month from monthly forecast update bank (GIIF). Written analysis may include references to data made available after the release of the GIIF bank. Download this table in Microsoft Excel format
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2011. With supply limitations pushing consumer price index inflation to 7.0% in January 2011, Bank Indonesia finally tapped the brakes and announced a 25-basis-point interest-rate hike in early Februaryjust as we had anticipated, but then remained on hold through August. The 200809 financial crisis necessitated a quick shift to easing. As it became clear that the global economy was entering a serious recession, the central bank (Bank Indonesia) quickly changed course and responded to the new reality by initiating a moderately aggressive easing cycle. The extent of the rate cuts was initially limited by still high inflation (11.4% in the fourth quarter of 2008), but this was subsequently compensated by a longer easing cycle than elsewhere in the region. Thus, between December 2008 and August 2009, the policy interest rate was lowered nine times by a total of 300 basis points. It then remained at 6.50% between August 2009 and January 2011. Inflation-targeting framework improves policy transparency. In July 2005, Bank Indonesia moved to an explicit inflation-targeting framework, replacing base money with interest rates as its operational targets. The new policy framework is believed to allow for a more transparent and effective conduct of monetary policy. With the country's banking and financial system becoming more complex, base-money growth had become a less effective way of guiding overall credit or money-supply growth, making inflation targeting difficult. The new monetary policy framework has been launched concomitantly with a new plan to further consolidate the banking sector and improve its efficiency.
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Trade and External Accounts Indicators 2009 Exports of Goods (US$ bil.) Imports of Goods (US$ bil.) Trade Balance (US$ bil.) Trade Balance (% of GDP) Current Account Balance (US$ bil.) Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 119.6 88.7 30.9 5.7 12.4 2.3 2010 158.1 127.4 30.6 4.3 7.5 1.1 2011 201.4 172.6 28.9 3.4 3.1 0.4 2012 216.4 192.7 23.7 2.6 2.7 0.3 2013 251.4 222.8 28.6 2.7 6.6 0.6 2014 298.8 268.2 30.6 2.5 7.2 0.6 2015 319.3 290.6 28.7 2.1 2.6 0.2 2016 340.8 314.8 26.0 1.8 -1.3 -0.1
Source: Historical data from selected national and international data sources. All forecasts provided by IHS Global Insight. Table updated on the 15th of each month from monthly forecast update bank (GIIF). Written analysis may include references to data made available after the release of the GIIF bank. Download this table in Microsoft Excel format
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The current-account surplus vanished in 2008, but revived in 2009. Surging import costs, particularly for food and energy, led to Indonesia's current-account surplus to effectively disappear over the course of 2008. A roughly USD10-billion decline in the merchandise-trade surplus from USD32 billion to USD22 billion was translated essentially dollar-to-dollar into the current account. The current-account surplus fell from USD10.5 billion in 2007 to a mere USD300 million in 2008. In 2009, the situation improved considerably as import demand took a dive and terms of trade improved, with the current account back into surplus of USD10.7 billion, or 1.9% of GDP. Trade surpluses widened after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Export-oriented policies and bountiful natural resources have allowed Indonesia to maintain healthy trade surpluses (of about 45% of GDP) for most of the past 20 years. The magnitude of these surpluses expanded greatly following the 1997 crisis, as the massive depreciation of the rupiah inhibited demand for imported capital and consumer goods. Even after the economic situation stabilized, import growth continued to lag exports, so the trade surplus widened from USD10 billion in 1997 to USD25 billion in 2000equivalent to 15% of GDP. Trade surpluses remained very high relative to GDP for several years thereafter, averaging 13% of GDP during 200003. Growing import demand in more recent years, as domestic demand recovered, has led to a smaller trade surplus, but it has still averaged 6.8% of GDP between 2004 and 2008.
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From import substitution to export-led manufacturing. Indonesia began an industrialization process in the 1960s under the centralized planning of Suharto's New Order. As with many developing countries at the time, policy was initially focused on economic self-sufficiency through the development of import substitution industries. A wave of reform began in the second half of the 1980s after oil receipts, which had dominated export earnings and government revenues, fell dramatically. Indonesia then joined other Asian countries in encouraging export-led manufacturing sectors while domestic industry was fostered by the state under a protective regulatory shield. Liberal investment laws were enacted, bureaucratic red tape reduced, and duty-free zones established. Foreign investment rose sharply in the late 1980s, focused mostly on labor-intensive light manufacturing processing sectors, and Indonesia became one of the successful "tiger" economies. Structural problems persist despite rapid economic growth. Although socioeconomic indicators improved dramatically through the 1980s and early 1990s, the model was riddled with structural problems. Control over key corporations and industries remained concentrated in a handful of politically influential families, encouraging corruption and moral hazard. State interventionism was also high (a legacy of the command economics of the New Order) undermining efficient resource allocation. Lack of an independent central bank resulted in weak oversight of the banking system, politically motivated landing, and a gradual deterioration of the banking sector's balance sheet. Descent into crisis and policy reaction. Liberalization of capital flows resulted in sharply higher exposure to foreign debt in the early to mid-1990s. Encouraged by the exchange-rate peg, domestic corporations financed investments by borrowing abroad in hard currencies. This currency mismatch had steadily worsened as weak banking-sector supervision and moral hazard exacerbated systemic risk. Once the rupiah was devalued, most of these loans soured and the financial house of cards crumpled. In the event, recourse was made to the IMF, which responded with a USD4.3-billion bailout program. The strategy involved stringent austerity measures to curb inflation, stabilize the exchange rate, and redress fiscal and external imbalances. Recapitalization of the banking sector, disposal of non-performing loans, and foreign debt forgiveness were key elements of the program.
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central bank governor (who has since left to join the World Bank as a managing director). The quality of monetary policy has also increased greatly, particularly since 200607, as the central bank has increasingly focused on strengthening the regulatory framework to minimize exposure to sudden shifts in capital flows.
Source: World Industry Service, IHS Global Insight, Inc. Updated: 18 Apr 2012
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EXPORTS
IMPORTS
Country
Country
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EXPORTS
IMPORTS
Country
Country
Japan United States Singapore South Korea China Malaysia Netherlands Hong Kong Australia United Kingdom
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade
14.4 8.5 6.6 4.3 2.8 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5
23.2 13.7 10.6 6.9 4.5 3.2 3.0 2.5 2.4 2.4
Japan Singapore United States South Korea China Australia Saudi Arabia Germany Malaysia Thailand
5.4 3.8 3.4 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.1
16.1 11.3 10.1 6.2 6.0 5.1 4.8 3.7 3.4 3.3
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Indonesias economy is expected to grow by 4.8% annually over the long term (201241). This would be about two and a half percentage points lower than the average growth rate prior to the Asian crisis, but still a respectable performance by any standard, especially since the economy has become much larger since then. Our projection rests on several assumptions, of which continued economic openness and relatively stable politics are perhaps the most crucial. The country's positive outlook is supported by superior factor endowment, including abundant natural resources and favorable demographics. Proximity to Asia's largest sources of capital (Japan, China, and Singapore) and to the region's fast-growing markets is another valuable asset. Finally, economic openness has been one of the main reasons for strong growth in the past and should remain an important advantage in the future, especially as the regulatory and legal environment gradually improves. Indonesia is rich in natural wealth and has significant deposits of oil and gas, minerals, and agricultural resources. As OPEC's only Asian member, it produces about 1.0 million barrels per day of crude oil, but proven reserves have fallen by half over the past two decades. The country's main strength lies in natural gas exports (reserves are the sixth-largest among OPEC members), which are directed mainly to regional powerhouses like Japan and Singapore. Indonesia is also actively seeking to secure long-term contracts to supply liquid natural gas to China's growing market. Other exports include tin, nickel, timber, bauxite, and copper, as well as precious metals like gold and silver. The country is also among the top three exporters of cocoa and natural rubber in the world. Indonesia's insular structure (there are over 15,000 islands forming the largest archipelago in the world) means that most urban and manufacturing centers have easy access to ports. This tends to lower transport costs and improve export competitiveness. Moreover, fish stocks and some of the largest coral reefs in the world add to the country's natural resources. Many small islands are currently uninhabited, but hold tremendous tourism potential, and niche tourism could become a growing industry in the future. With the world's fourth-largest population, Indonesia has an abundant labor supply. In fact, it has been exporting labor to countries like Malaysia and Singapore for many years. This could become an even greater advantage in the future, given graying populations in some regional economic powerhouses. At the same time, however, recent developments highlight new risks. After decades of little labor-market regulation and union activism under former dictator Suharto, labor has become increasingly organized and vocal. Sometimes violent protests over the past few years have helped push through substantial wage increases and generous severance packages, which are among the highest in Asia. With a general shift toward more direct political participation, organized labor's political influence will probably increase over time. This could result in excessive regulation and diminished competitiveness. One characteristic setting Indonesia apart from other developing countries is the presence of a large and highly entrepreneurial Chinese community within its borders. Despite a period of heightened anti-Chinese sentiment and even violence in the second half of the 1960s, relations have improved greatly since then. Indonesia's Chinese community has historically been a source of innovation and entrepreneurship, and has acted as a bridge to China's business community. This has made Indonesia a preferred destination for Chinese investment, with highly beneficial effects on economic growth. Yet, it was economic reform and liberalization in the aftermath of the second oil crisis that set the stage for two decades of rapid economic growth. Under International Monetary Fund/World Bank supervision, the government decided to diversify the economic base, open up most sectors to foreign participation, and limit the state's economic role. These policies have helped Indonesia avoid the fate of other OPEC countries and instead grow into one of Southeast Asia's largest and most dynamic economies. The ability to retain openness in trade, further deregulate its markets, engender savings growth, and provide a suitable environment for technology transfer and investment will determine Indonesia's future advancement. Some medium- and long-term constraints to growth include Islamic militancy and terrorism as well as the potential for ethnic violence and political instability. Although considerable progress has been made in recent years, Indonesia still remains in the bottom half of countries rated by the World Bank's Doing Business Surveys. The shaky legal
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system and still-opaque regulatory environment constrain growth by stymieing foreign investment and threatening international competitiveness. The country's shaky transition to democracy, after more than three decades of authoritarian rule, will also shape its long-term potential. So far, developments on this front have exceeded expectations in that elections have been deemed fair and free of violence. Nonetheless, there is no room for complacency, as the risk of reforms falling victim to entrenched vested interests remains ever present.
Economic 2. April Data Suggest Indonesian Inflation Has Bottomed 02 MAY 2012
Economic - Sovereign Risk 3. High Imports Result in Another Low Trade Surplus in Indonesia During March 02 MAY 2012
Economic 4. FDI Inflows Near Record Highs in Indonesia During Q1 24 APR 2012
Economic 5. Bank Indonesia Leaves Interest Rate Unchanged, Eyes Fuel Prices and Global Growth 13 APR 2012
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Economic 6. Jump in Indonesia's IP Growth During February Overestimates Sector's Strength 12 APR 2012
Economic 7. Indonesian Inflation Accelerates But Outlook Improves Without April Fuel Price Rise 03 APR 2012
Country - Economic 8. Fuel Hike Protests Hit Indonesia and More Expected 22 MAR 2012
Economic 9. Indonesia Maintains Interest Rates, Points to Inflation Risk from Reduced Fuel Subsidies 09 MAR 2012
Economic 10. Inflation Continues to Ease in Indonesia As Trade Surplus Improves 02 MAR 2012
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