Norms, Institutions and Social Learning

Norms, Institutions and Social Learning
Melissa Gabler
Norms, Institutions and Social Learning: An Explanation for Weak Policy Integration in the WTOs Committee on Trade and Environment
Melissa Gabler*
Introduction
This article explores the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to determine why actors efforts to integrate environmental norms in trade governance have resulted in weak policy outcomes. At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), states made a commitment to adopt environmental policy integration (EPI), involving institutional changes to promote dialogue across sectors and levels of governance to reconcile norms in policy formulation. In response, WTO members established the CTE in 19941995 to consider issues such as eco-labeling and the relationship between WTO rules and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Over the past fteen years, however, there has been little progress in the deliberations, which have produced minimal results. Trade-regime outputs stress the positive interactions or win-win opportunities in the trade-environment nexus, yet ignore norm contradictions and marginalize environmental ideas. For example, CTE reports acknowledge certain complementary objectives between the WTO and MEAs, but subordinate MEAs trade-related environmental measures (TREMS) to trade obligations. Similarly, the Doha Ministerial Declaration mandates the CTE Special Sessions (CTESS) to enhance the mutual supportiveness of MEAs TREMS with WTO rules, yet veers away from discussions of potential disputes and norm hierarchy.1 Consequently, trade-environment conicts are neither addressed frankly
* I am grateful for comments received on an early draft at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association. I also wish to thank William D. Coleman, Steven Bernstein, Mark Sproule-Jones, Jordi Dez, Craig Johnson, Candace Johnson, and the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and valuable feedback on this work. I acknowledge support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, McMaster University, the Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition, and the University of Guelph. 1. WTO 2001; and ICTSD 2008.
Global Environmental Politics 10:2, May 2010 2010 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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nor resolved, and inconsistency and ineffectiveness plague domestic implementation and international negotiations. It remains an open question whether the TREMS of certain MEAs will be challenged in the WTO. To explain the CTEs poor performance, I offer a social learning-theoretic account of EPI. Policy integration refers to changes to the norms that constitute various policy outcomes and result from different forms of learning. Although scholars recognize that learning about norms matters for policy change, scholarship has been criticized for neglect of theory.2 Supranational and national studies of learning and EPI stress that varied results depend upon normative, institutional, and agent-specic factors.3 However, EPI scholars fail to clearly specify either analytical frameworks for norms or theory to guide empirical investigations of how they matter. Only recently in International Relations (IR) and European Union (EU) studies have constructivists theorized when, how, and why norm-induced learning and policy change occurs, specifying actors and mechanisms inuencing change and conditions under which they operate.4 EPI studies require theory that can describe and explain policy and structural changes resulting when actors identities and interests are transformed through deliberation and learning. In this article, I present a framework for analyzing norms and examine the conditions under which they shape learning-induced policy change. I further introduce a middle-range, social learning theory for policy integration as hypotheses that can be explored in empirical cases. By examining the CTE from 1995 to the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference, I then argue that low levels of both compatibility between trade and environment norms and institutional capacity for learning contributed to what I refer to as simple learning and weak integration. To develop this argument, I propose that identifying normative frames, which ultimately constitute policies, is useful for assessing levels of compatibility and changes made in learning processes. Second, I describe two conditions that determine whether and when learning about frames produces policy integration: rst, perceptions of (in)compatibility between principles and norms; and second, the institutional capacities of the policy environments for learning. Finally, I suggest that different integrative changes to policies occur through different types of learning that happen in distinct policy environments under different amounts of normative conict and institutional capacity. Specically, I hypothesize that various styles of learning, which are dependent upon particular levels of normative compatibility and institutional capacity, explain resulting forms of policy integration. These styles of learning may take place within a single policy community, or across multiple communities. Within single communities, I distinguish between simple and complex learning. Across communities,
2. Checkel 1998. 3. Lenschow 2002. For a review of EPI literature see Persson 2004. 4. Checkel 2003; and Checkel 2005.
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I differentiate between conictual and reciprocal learning. I also differentiate social learning from strategic calculation and coercion. In investigating the hypotheses, the study uses narrative explanation and process tracing. I describe the methods and techniques below. The WTO is the hard, supranational case of EPI for a social learning argument; in a larger, mostdifferent-systems comparative study of which this work is a part, I contrast it with the EU.5 I selected the WTO and EU for comparison on the basis of variation in the initial conditions or independent variables : normative frame compatibility and institutional capacity for learning. I exploited this variation to inform the hypotheses, but the goals for this article are modest: to describe the CTEs Singapore negotiations and its rst report on the WTO-MEA relationship and to explain the outcome, that is, why the dog didnt bark.6 Few constructivists tackle these hard cases, despite their importance to theory development. Using the analytical framework, I then detail the international environment and trade frames and assess their compatibility. Next, I tell the CTEs story, exploring how well the social learning conditions and mechanisms explain the events and weak EPI. I nd that low perceived compatibility between trade and environment normative frames and low institutional capacity supported predominantly simple learning, leading to the weak outcome. Neither complex/ reciprocal learning, nor the WTOs traditional incentive-based bargaining and power dynamics, prospered under these conditions to produce a different result. Further, I examine the prospects for EPI in the CTE and CTESS in the Doha Round. Currently, the WTO is at a crossroads with EPI. On the one hand, institutional capacity for complex/reciprocal learning has increased in the CTE to potentially provide discursive opportunities for resolving norm conicts. On the other hand, CTESS institutional developments run counter to the building of capacity for learning and integration. I argue that until EPI becomes central to WTO governance and actors remedy the normative and institutional conditions that inhibit learning, the possibilities for stronger integration are limited.
Theorizing Social Learning and EPI

Normative Frames, Compatibility, and Change Constructivists argue that national and supranational actors identities and interests are inuenced by prevailing social ideas resulting in institutional and policy change. They focus on what ideas are (their ontology or content and structure), how they operate (their meanings and capacities), and how they interact (compatibility or t) and change through communications (framing).7
5. Gabler 2006. 6. By this phrase, Checkel refers to those cases where [the majority of] state[s] identities/ interests, in the presence of a norm, do not [substantially] change. Checkel 1998, 339. 7. Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Schn and Rein 1994; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Wendt 1999; Bernstein 2001; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; and Hoffmann 2005.
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Ideas can provide actors with understandings of their identities/interests (they constitute them). They can also shape the possibilities for policy formation; the capacities or framings of ideas facilitate or constrain policy change. Finally, ideas can make behavioral claims on actors and outcomes; they cause actors to behave in certain ways or inuence them to make changes to policies/institutions.8 These assumptions follow from a mutually constitutive ontology and permit an open epistemology (including the use of standard (positivist) methods alongside interpretive methods).9 This middle ground constructivist study focuses on social learning as the source of policy integration.10 Learning implies actors improved understanding of alternative ideas, reected in changes to frames that underlie identities, interests, policies, and institutions.11 When investigating ideas, I identify normative frames: the principles and norms that govern behavior and practices in particular policy or issue areas.12 Principles are beliefs of fact, causality or rectitude.13 Standards for behavior constitute norms.14 Standards of validity are normative criteria for evaluating and adjudicating between principles/norms. To varying extents, these components are embodied in domestic and international law and policies, and embedded in governance institutions. Principles/norms are arranged as central, secondary, or peripheral in importance to a frames underlying purpose. Salience is related to the extent to which actors intersubjectively agree on the status and meaning of principles/ norms. Principles/norms generally enjoy either low or contested acceptance (norm emergence or norm cascades) or high intersubjective agreement (norm institutionalization).15 Discovering the degree of salience and agreement that actors attribute to principles/norms offers insight into their degrees of frame compatibility and susceptibility to change. Principles/norms are highly compatible if they are mutually included as priorities in frames and, if actors convincingly frame mutually benecial or harmless connections. Conversely, principles/norms are highly incompatible if they are mutually excluded or contested in frames and if actors have difculty establishing convincing, mutually supportive connections. Social learning processes produce changes to frames and to levels of compatibility. If conicting principles/norms from distinct frames enjoy high intersubjective agreement among different actors, obstacles to framing are high (but not impossible). Alternatively, learning about principles/norms is increasingly possible when intersubjective agreement is low or unstable. Table 1 summarizes low and high normative frame compatibility. Table 2 presents normative change scenarios between two frames. I call the varying
8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Yee 1996. Adler 1997, 335, cited in Bernstein 2001:23. Adler 1997. Schn and Rein 1994; and Wendt 1999. Krasner 1983; and Surel 2000. Krasner 1983, 2. Krasner 1983, 2. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895.
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Table 1 Normative Frame Compatibility Low Compatibility Inclusiveness/ Exclusiveness Causal Connections The salient principles/norms of one frame are primarily excluded in the other The salient principles/norms of one frame appear to have primarily adverse or uncertain effects on the others Rankings of principles/norms in one frame marginalize the priorities of the other The standards of validity of one frame are excluded, or included but marginalized, in the other Salient components from the frames that are in conict enjoy high intersubjective agreement High Compatibility The salient principles/norms of one frame are primarily included in the other The salient principles/norms of one frame appear to have primarily benecial or no effects on the others Rankings of principles/norms in one frame accommodate the priorities of the other The standards of validity of one frame are included and more equally prioritized in the other Salient components from the frames that are compatible enjoy high intersubjective agreement
Salience
Standards of Validity Intersubjective Agreement
frame transformations, which ultimately constitute policy changes, levels of policy integration. If social learning and frame change do not occur, outcomes will not be integrated (given initial low compatibility). If social learning takes place, frame change is more likely, enhancing the prospects for stronger levels of integration. Social Learning and Policy Integration Building on this framework, I classify four ideal-types of social learning and policy integration, summarized in Figure 1. I distinguish two forms of learning that occur within a policy community and two that occur across communities. I dene policy communities as supranational, state-based, and nonstate actors interested in and dealing with policy problems.16 In both institutional environments, social interactions about new norms might produce signicant changes to actors identities/interestswhat I term complex learning when it occurs within a policy community and reciprocal learning when it occurs across two or more communities. Alternately, such substantial changes may not occur, which
16. Coleman and Perl 1999, 696.
Melissa Gabler Table 2 Scenarios of Normative Frame Change* No Policy Integration Inclusiveness/ Exclusiveness Continued or increased exclusiveness of principles/norms Policy Integration
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Greater inclusiveness; compatible connections stressed between certain principles/norms (weak) Connections between principles/norms that previously appeared incompatible are convincingly framed to be more compatible; stubborn contradictions are frankly recognized (moderate) Rankings of principles/norms change to accommodate alternative priorities better (moderate) or equally (strong) Increased inclusiveness and acceptance of standards of validity (strong) Changes occur in intersubjective agreement on principles/ norms that were previously in conict
Causal Connections
Connections between certain principles/norms remain incompatible or uncertain
Salience
Continued or increased marginalization of principles/ norms Ongoing exclusion or increased marginalization of standards of validity No real change in intersubjective agreement on principles/norms in conict
Standards of Validity Intersubjective Agreement
* starting from low compatibility
I refer to as simple learning when within a community and conictual learning when across communities. In complex and reciprocal learning, actors seek a reasoned consensus and are open to preference change driven by problem-solving and persuasion.17 In simple and conictual learning, in contrast, actors positions remain mostly xed on extant frames during distinct, non-reective communications; they are not open to be persuaded by the better argument.18 Ultimately, I relate the types of learning (the mechanisms19) and levels of policy integration (the outcomes) to varying normative frame compatibility and institutional capacity conditions. Within a policy community, policy integration advances when learning
17. Nye 1987; Risse 2000, 7; Checkel 2003, 212; and Checkel 2005, 812. 18. Nye 1987; Risse 2000; and Checkel 2005, 809 and 812. 19. Mechanisms are processes connecting specied initial conditions to outcomes. Checkel 2006.
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Figure 1 Types of Social Learning and Policy Integration
moves from simple to complex. No policy integration occurs when there is no clear logic of appropriateness or when a dominant frame governs and is thoroughly internalized.20 In the latter, the extant, institutionalized frame constitutes actors identities/interests and shapes outcomes. Simple learning may lead to weak policy integration. Actors acquire inde20. March and Olsen 1998.
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pendently new perspectives about alternative frames. Although enabling actors to address and include compatible aspects of the new frame, there are no deep constitutive effects. Simple learning is about actors accommodation of alternative norms, to improve the realization of identities/interests centered on an extant frame. It results in instrumental identity reection and minor policy change, but no major change in interests. Risse suggests that many argumentative processes begin as simple rhetorical actionwhere new norms are used strategically to justify extant interestsbut often evolve toward complex reasoning.21 Complex learning, facilitated by higher levels of normative frame compatibility, characterizes medium policy integration. Complex learning has deeper socialization and constitutive effects. Actors operating predominantly within their policy communities question foundational norms (as institutional conditions are not conducive to reciprocal learning). This confuses and complicates identities and interests. In response, actors become open to constructive communications about norm compatibilities and incompatibilities. This may lead to identity adaptation and interest change, reected in moderate outcomes. Risse argues that taken-for-granted, norm-regulated behavior (the logic of appropriateness) changes under conducive normative and institutional conditions to conscious truth-seeking (the logic of arguing).22 Once two policy communities engage (as institutional conditions for joint interactions become more conducive), policy integration increases when conictual interaction gives way to reciprocal learning. Here, two policy outcomes are likely. First, no policy integration may occur. Perceptions of norm conict in communications result in defensive frame resistance. In conictual learning, actors identities/interests remain entrenched in extant, institutionalized frames. Hence, they react in joint interactions by primarily rejecting and resisting new norm connections. This is evident in identity differentiation and no real interest change. Consequently, outcomes reect intractability or uncertainty about norms. Second, strong policy integration may occur when normative frame compatibility and institutional capacity conditions are conducive to reciprocal learning. Under enabling circumstances, different policy communities deliberate about frames, including norm hierarchy. Actors may reach agreement on a more balanced accommodation of norms or common standards of validity. Reciprocal learning results in identity internalization and interest change, mirrored in strong outcomes. I differentiate the ideal-types of social learning from communications inuenced by overt coercion or strategic calculation/bargaining on the basis of xed material preferences and incentives. When the latter mechanisms operate alone, there is no social learning, and norm incompatibilities are unlikely to be
21. Risse 2000, 9. 22. Risse 2000.
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addressed reciprocally and effectively.23 Real-world communications involve evolving or multiple interaction styles shaped by varying normative and institutional conditions. Thus, they neither resemble ideal-types exactly nor occur in linear progression. Risse advises that the empirical question . . . is . . . which mode captures more of the action in a given situation.24 Normative Frame Compatibility and Institutional Capacity for Learning To understand when varying styles of social learning lead to particular levels of policy integration, I postulate the compatibility of normative frames and the level of institutional capacity as scope conditions. Scope conditions are elaborated in hypotheses to answer questions of when and under what conditions.25 I advance the following propositions that link normative and institutional conditions to integration outcomes through mechanisms of learning.26 The posited relationships are explicit in Figure 1. Moderate to strong policy integration is likely to result from interactions among policy communities when institutional capacity for complex and reciprocal learning is high and perceived compatibility of normative frames is high. Weak policy integration is likely to result from simple learning among policy communities when institutional capacity for complex and reciprocal learning is low and perceived compatibility of normative frames is low. No real integration in policies is likely to result from conictual learning among policy communities when perceived incompatibility of normative frames is high, even if institutional capacity for reciprocal interactions is rather supportive. Collectively, these hypotheses constitute the social learning explanation for policy integration. First, I hypothesize that the level of (in)compatibility between normative frames determines, in part, the type of learning and form of integration. Complex learning is increasingly likely under conditions of high ideational compatibility because actors with fewer incompatible prior cognitive commitments are more amenable to arguing and framing.27 Risse notes the importance of a common lifeworld as an antecedent condition for truth-seeking behavior.28
23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. Coleman and Gabler 2002, 503; and Checkel 2005, 809. Risse 2000, 18. Checkel 2005. Checkel 2006, 363. Checkel 2005, 813. Risse-Kappen 1996, 70.
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Scharpf argues that as divergence between norms declines, the likelihood increases that actor interactions will evolve from instrumental bargaining to problem-solving.29 Second, I suggest that the relationship between the level of normative frame (in)compatibility and the type of learning is inuenced by institutional factors. If institutional conditions are sufcient to support complex learning, then even actors with conicting prior cognitive commitments could reframe norms to be less divergent. On the one hand, normative frame (in)compatibility and contextual factors are crucial conditions that determine the likelihood for certain types of learning and integration. Risse hypothesizes that ideas and institutional structures can be more or less conducive to processes of deliberation and communication.30 On the other hand, certain types of learning lead to actions that alter ideational and institutional conditions, changing possibilities for further interaction and integration. Risse suggests that communicative action and its daily practices [create and] reproduce the common lifeworld.31 March and Olsen add the observation that increasing interdependence, interaction, and communication lead to shared experiences and hence to shared meaning, to a convergence of expectations and policies, and to the development of common institutions.32 Building upon IR and EU studies, I advance contextual conditions that facilitate or obstruct various forms of learning. Presented in Tables 3 and 4, I call them low and high institutional capacity for complex and reciprocal learning. Table 3 depicts four institutional conditions under which a policy community is more open to complex learning and stronger integration. Table 4 offers ve enabling conditions for learning between policy communities as high institutional capacity for reciprocal learning. In the absence of high institutional capacity for complex/ reciprocal communications, a social learning theory anticipates that policy deliberations about norm conicts will produce weak outcomes at best.
Methods
The argument developed here is part of a larger project that examines two tradeenvironment issues, eco-labeling and the WTO-MEA relationship, in the context of a comparison between the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/ WTO and the European Community (EC)/EU. In this article I consider the CTEs work on the WTO and MEAs.33 First, I discern the capacities/compatibilities of frames that constitute interests/outcomes. Second, I perform narrative
29. 30. 31. 32. 33. Scharpf 1989, 159. Risse-Kappen 1996, 70. Risse 2000, 11. March and Olsen 1998, 959. The analysis covers the Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade (GEMIT) (1971, 1991), sub-CTE (1994), CTE (1995) and CTESS (2001).
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Table 3 Institutional Capacity for Complex Learning High

Actors have balanced access to discussions The community exhibits high openness in
Low
Openness (The degree of exibility in the policy communitys boundary rules) deliberations deliberations
Actors have unequal access to discussions The community exhibits low openness in
Boundary rules are less exible/ more rigid
Boundary rules are more exible/ relaxed Linkages among community actors are
Linkages among community actors are
Density (The interconnectedness of the policy community, the degree to which all possible relations are present; the regularized nature of frame exchanges) highly connected
highly dispersed Frame exchanges are less frequent
Frame exchanges are more frequent
Community interactions are absent or oc-
Community interactions occur in highly in-
Formality (The degree to which interactions in the policy community are formalized) cur predominantly in less institutionalized settings
stitutionalized, formal settings (with explicit rules), providing the stability necessary for additional regularized, informal interactions
The formal/informal institutional rules pre-
The formal/informal institutional rules
Equality (The degree to which relations between policy community actors are non-hierarchical)
prescribe predominantly hierarchical relations
scribe predominantly non-hierarchical relations
Melissa Gabler Table 4 Institutional Capacity for Reciprocal Learning Low Openness (The degree of exibility in the policy communities boundary rules)
Policy communities actors
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High
Policy communities ac-
have unequal access to each others discussions The policy communities exhibit low degrees of openness in their deliberations Boundary rules are less exible/more rigid
Actual ties are less inclu-
tors have balanced access to each others discussions The policy communities exhibit high degrees of openness in their deliberations Boundary rules are more exible/relaxed
Actual ties are more inclu-
Density (The degree to which the policy communities are interconnected through actual linkages (compared to potential ties); the regularized nature of frame exchanges) Formality (The degree to which interactions between the policy communities are formalized) Equality (The degree to which relations between the policy communities are nonhierarchical) Institutional Integration (The degree to which the policy communities institutional arrangements and venues are integrated; the degree to which the policy actors roles are integrated)
sive of all potential actors Frame exchanges are less frequent
sive of all potential actors

Frame exchanges are more
frequent
Linkages are absent or
Linkages are formalized
based on informal arrangements inhibiting regularized cross-community interactions

The informal institutional
(based on explicit rules) enabling high informality in regularized crosscommunity interactions

The formal/informal insti-
rules governing crosscommunity interactions prescribe predominantly hierarchical relations

Institutional arrangements
tutional rules governing cross-community interactions prescribe predominantly non-hierarchical relations

Institutional arrangements
with an integration or cross-sectoral remit are absent to minimally present Institutional venues are separate/sector-specic Actors roles are predominantly sector-specic
with an integration or cross-sectoral remit are prevalent Institutional venues are common/ cross-sectoral Actors roles are more integrated/cross-sectoral
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explanation34 and process tracing of the casual mechanisms to assess the hypotheses.35 I operationalize the methods through qualitative analysis of legal/ policy documents and interview transcripts.36 In the latter technique, I conducted 25 semi-structured interviews in June 2001 with WTO Secretariat ofcials (4), CTE chairs and representatives (17) and observers from international organizations (IOs) (4). Most interviewees were selected because they had normative and institutional memories of the pre-andpost-Singapore CTE. Interviewees were probed about the meanings of principles/norms and their changing identities/interests.37 However, most questions elicited aspects of the theoretical framework lacking from the documentary research. Interviewees were asked to characterize their evolving interactions in different WTO/CTE settings. They were also asked what effects their interactions had on outcomes and what conditions contributed to learning styles. Interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim, and analyzed qualitatively.38 Finally, interview and document analyses were checked against one another. Methodologically, the analysis is stronger pre-Doha: the interview technique veries observations from the document analysis. (Re)interviewing postDoha would increase the validity of the contemporary account. I take sole responsibility for reliability.
Social Learning and EPI in the WTO: The Singapore Ministerial

Following the analytic and theoretical approaches, I explore the following questions: How has EPI developed in the WTO/CTE? And why: what explains the extent of EPI? I begin by presenting the normative frame of the 1992 UNCED. It is necessary to discuss this historical context before analyzing EPI in the WTO. Sustainable, Equitable Growth and Fair Trade Principles of sustainable, equitable growth and fair trade provide the central focus for the UNCED frame summarized in Table 5. State and nonstate actors participating in the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm (1972) and UNCED (1992), along with the report of the UN-sponsored World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) which introduced the concept of sustainable development (SD), created the normative foundations. After these events, the UN Environment Program (UNEP) and Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) were established as the relevant institutions.
34. Narrative explanation connects conditions and events through time, ultimately conguring them into a coherent explanation. Ruggie 1998, 94. 35. Process tracing investigates the processes by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes. Wendt 1999, 86; and Checkel 2006. 36. See Gabler 2006, Appendix 1 for questions used in document analysis. 37. See Gabler 2006, Appendix 2 for the interview questions. 38. Gabler 2006, Appendix 1.
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Collectively, the conferences produced seven outcomes: the 1972 Declaration on the Human Environment and Action Plan for the Human Environment, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, a statement on forest principles, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Although the latter two treaties are legally binding, the rest are not.39 Our Common Future and the Earth Summit documents best espouse the current frame to guide states goals and actions. Moreover, as Rio 5 and Rio 10 were summits of norm afrmation and implementation rather than formulation, this frame remains relatively unchanged.40 This is evidenced in the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development and the World Summit on Sustainable Development Plan of Implementation. Central to the frame is the principle that global economic growth should be revived to eradicate absolute poverty, in accordance with the principle of intragenerational equity and the norm of accelerated development.41 Prioritizing economic growth, however, does not marginalize ideas about limitations of the environments capacity to meet present and future needs such as the intergenerational equity principle.42 Hence, there must be equitable, sustainable changes in the quality of growth, leading to the reduction and elimination of both the Souths impoverishment and the industrialized Norths unsustainable production and consumption patterns.43 First, the secondary principle of equity is stressed to qualify economic growth and liberalized trade in order to promote a fairer global distribution of wealth, development, and market access.44 The view is that world trade expansion under the GATT in the 1970s and 1980s was neither reciprocal nor evenly spread: only a limited number of developing countries [were] . . . capable of achieving appreciable growth in . . . exports.45 Northern countries trade restrictions and economic policies are seen as depressing and destabilizing the global economy and harming the Souths development, poverty reduction, and selfreliance.46 For example, developed countries are called to make reciprocal reductions in the support and protection of agricultural, manufacturing, and other sectors.47 The frame also encourages peripherally the harmonization of standards for environmental product and non-product related process and production methods (NPR PPMs) through multilateral bodies, to avoid a situation in which varying regulations would impair access for developing countries to industrialized countries markets.48
39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. Some of these have subsequently entered the realm of hard law, via protocols. Pallemaerts 2003, 2. WCED 1987; and UN 1992b, Principles 1,3,5,6 and 12. UN 1992b, Principle 3. UN 1992b, Principle 8. UN 1992a, Chapter 2.9a. UN 1992a, Chapter 2.8. WCED 1987. UN 1992a, 2.7. UN 1992b, Principle 11.
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Second, integral to sustainable growth are the central principles of environmental protection and the central/secondary norms of preventive action, transboundary harm prevention, and EPI.49 States are obligated to take domestic regulatory action to prevent environmental harm. States are also responsible for ensur[ing] that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.50 Multilateral action is seen as optimal to prevent transboundary harm and overcome free-riding/cheating.51 MEAs TREMS are envisaged as core policy instruments to help states solve transboundary environmental problems. However, states have peripheral obligations to ensure that measures minimally impact trade.52 They should also avoid unilateral trade restrictions as means to address extra-jurisdictional environmental challenges or offset cost differentials and competition dilemmas resulting from different environmental regulations.53 Instead, developed countries should take positive measures to build capacity in developing countries to undertake environment and development programs and meet international obligations.54 This secondary norm on resource and technology transfer stems from the principle that developed and developing countries have common but differentiated responsibilities for the states of the global environment and economy.55 Third, the frame addresses principles about the trade-environment relationship, informing integration norms in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. On the one hand, Agenda 21 states:
An open, multilateral trading system (MTS) makes possible a more efcient allocation and use of resources and thereby contributes to an increase in production and incomes and to lessening demands on the environment. It thus provides additional resources needed for economic growth, development and improved environmental protection.56
This central view emphasizes compatibility between the goals/policies of liberalized trade and environmental protection. On the other hand, Agenda 21 stresses that without a sound ecological basis, the resources needed to sustain growth and trade expansion will not be available.57 For example, the frame recognizes the negative consequences of trade activities to human health and the environment.58 In this secondary view,
49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. UN 1992b, Principles 14, 2, and 4. UN 1992b, Principle 2. UN 1992b, Principles 12 and 13. UN 1992a, Chapter 2.22c and 2.22f; and UN 1992b, Principle 12. UN 1992a, Chapter 2.22e; and UN 1992b, Principle 12. UN 1992b, Principle 9; and UN 1992a, Chapter 2.22d. WCED 1987; and UN 1992b, Principle 7. UN 1992a, Chapter 2.19. UN 1992a, Chapter 2.19. UN 1992b, Principle 14.
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incompatibility in goals and policies of liberalized trade and environmental protection are frankly addressed, and states are encouraged to undertake policy integration to make them mutually supportive.59 Agenda 21 denes the problem as separate systems for decision-making and the solution as improv[ing] or restructur[ing] the decision-making process so that consideration of socio-economic and environmental issues is fully integrated and a broader range of public participation assured.60 Here, two beliefs about policy integration are evident. First, without appropriate policies considering effects of environmental measures on trade and economic growth, environmental protection efforts could lead to unintended and unwarranted social costs, especially for developing countries (socio-economic and trade policy integration). Second, unfettered trade and economic growth is detrimental to the environment unless there are proper policies in place to consider sustainability (EPI). The former norm appears peripheral, the latter central. Agenda 21 further calls on governments, through national and multilateral forums, to promote dialogue between trade and environmental communities; to clarify the trade-environment relationship, including with regard to conciliation and dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs); and to take integration efforts to make policy goals as mutually supportive as possible in favor of SD.61 The responsibility for policy integration lies with governments in partnership with the private sector and local authorities, . . . in collaboration with national, regional and IOs.62 Finally, the frame endorses secondary norms and standards of validity to guide policy actors pursuing EPI: economic-cost benet analysis and environmental impact assessment,63 non-subsidization and cost internalization (polluter pays),64 and science and precaution in risk assessment/management.65 Trade Liberalization Sustaining Development and Environmental Protection: Low Compatibility of Normative Frames Before UNCED, GATT Contracting Parties did not incorporate signicantly the norms of international environmental governance into liberalized trade (no integration). This frame gave precedence to free trade principles and nondiscrimination norms over environmental objectives earning the no green protectionism label (19711985). However, during the Uruguay Round and WTO creation (19861994), Members/Secretariat ofcials responded to UNCED with a frametrade liberalization sustaining development and environmental
59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. UN 1992a, Chapter 2.20. UN 1992a, Chapter 8.23. UN 1992a, Chapter 2.22b and 2.21b. UN 1992a, Chapter 8, Objective 8.2. UN 1992a, Chapter 8, Objectives 8.2 and 8.5b; and UN 1992b, Principle 17. UN 1992b, Principle 16. UN 1992b, Principles 17 and 15.
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protectionthat peripherally accommodated environmental ideas (weak integration). This is evidenced in the legally binding 1994 Marrakesh Accord Agreements and other GATT/WTO documents. Table 5 summarizes the GATT-WTO frame change, the UNCED frame, and the level of compatibility. The table highlights that when the CTE began, overall frame incompatibility was high and collective trade outcomes were weak. Indeed, there was a low level of compatibility between WTO and UNCED principles/norms, despite the efforts of some trade actors to highlight compatibilities. The central principle that international trade furthers economic growth and development, and thus promotes improvement in global standards of living, employment, income, and demand, is framed as compatible with the UNCED core principles of sustainability and equity.66 First, trade expansion is seen to allow for optimal use of the worlds resources and environmental protection.67 Second, the frame highlights the crucial need for trade liberalization and reciprocal market access to generate equitable growth and accelerated development.68 The contributions of trade to the priority of alleviating poverty are stressed and secondarily/peripherally emphasized for reasons of intragenerational equity and reducing poverty-induced pollution and environmental degradation.69
There should not be . . . any policy contradiction between upholding and safeguarding an open, non-discriminatory and equitable MTS . . . and acting for the protection of the environment, and the promotion of SD.70
The following are telling compatibility stories. In an UNCED submission, the GATT Parties/Secretariat argue there is no reason . . . growth of per capita income necessarily, or even on average, damages the environment.71 The belief is that economic growth and development provide resources to counteract the effects of environmental damage, and that trade disperses environmentally friendly technology.72 Further, as per capita income rises from trade, the average citizen is convinced . . . to devote more material and human resources to the environment . . . [which leads] to increased expenditure on the environment.73 As with UNCED, this discourse focuses centrally on the positive impacts of liberalized trade on the environment and constitutes the Marrakesh Agreements. Similarly, the GATTs UNCED submission argues that the elimination of trade restrictions and distortions produces developmental and environmental benets by allowing a more efcient allocation and use of resources.74 This sec66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. WTO 1994c, Preamble. WTO 1994c, Preamble. WTO 1994c, Preamble. GATT 1991a; and WTO 1994c, Preamble. WTO 1994f. GATT 1991a, 19; and GATT 1991b. GATT 1991a, 1920. GATT 1991a, 20. GATT 1991a, 28.
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ondary norm that subsidies causing harm to trade should be discouraged or prohibited informs the 1994 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) and Agreement on Agriculture.75 Reductions in farm support and increases in market access to the highly protected agricultural sectors of developed countries, which would cause a global shift of agricultural production to more efcient and less environmentally intensive producers in developing countries, is framed as equally positive for trade/development and environmental protection.76 This win-win rhetoric incorporates partially the polluter-pays norm of UNCED (non-subsidization). Despite these areas of compatibility in principles/norms, upon closer examination, the WTO and UNCED frames are largely incompatible. Dening SD as the peripheral principle of intergenerational equity and the norm to internalize costs (polluter pays), the GATT Parties/Secretariat argue that
Neither aspect of SD is intrinsically linked to international trade. A failure to place a value on environmental resources . . . undermine[s] SD even in a completely closed economy. Trade is seen rather as a magnier. If the policies necessary for SD are in place, trade promotes development that is sustainable. If SD policies are lacking, the countrys international trade may contribute to a skewing of the countrys development in an environmentally damaging direction, but then so will . . . other economic activities.77
The frame thus neutralizes the connection between liberalized trade and environmental degradation, ignoring the UNCED principle that trade activities themselves can be environmentally harmful. The Marrakesh Agreements also portray trade-environment relationships as neutral or broadly compatible, marginalizing the need for the UNCEDs cost internalization and EPI. For example, the 1994 Decision on Trade and Environment denes EPI as policy coordination to enhance positive interaction[s] between trade and environmental measures.78 Unlike the UNCED, the WTO frame stresses socio-economic and trade policy integration, stemming from the secondary principle that environmental protection measures can negatively impact trade. This logic incorporates the GATTs no green protectionism: pollution control measures regulating domestic products should be based on scientic considerations, and not be used as disguised protectionism. It also recognizes that even when environmental measures are legitimately developed and used, integration is necessary to minimize negative impacts. Accordingly, the environmental protection principle regarding pollution from products is subsumed in the trade frame under the human health and safety exceptions of Article XX (b) of the 1947 GATT and the 1979/1994 agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade. However, this goal is marginal to the central/secondary norms of ND (minimal impacts on trade),
75. 76. 77. 78. WTO 1994d, Article 8.2(c); and WTO 1994a, Part IV, Article 7.1. GATT 1991a, 38. GATT 1991a, 20. WTO 1994f.
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Table 5 Normative Frame Change and Levels of Compatibility Sustainable, Equitable Growth and Fair Trade (UNCED) 1. Central 2. Central 3. Central 4. 4a. Secondary 4b. Peripheral 5. Central 6. Central 6a. Central 6b. Central 7. Central 8. Central 9. Secondary 10. Secondary Free Trade Sustaining Development and Environmental Protection (WTO) 1. Central 2. Peripheral 3. Secondary 4. 4a. * 4b. Secondary 5. Central 6. Peripheral 6a. Peripheral 6b. * 7. Central 8. Central 9. Secondary 10. Peripheral
Normative Frame Components 1. Central 2. * 3. Peripheral 4. 4a. * 4b. Central 5. * 6. Peripheral 6a. Peripheral 6b. * 7. * 8. * 9. Secondary 10. Peripheral
No Green Protectionism (GATT)
Principles 1. Multilateral Cooperation 2. Intergenerational Equity 3. Intragenerational Equity 4. Economic/Trade-Environment Incompatible 4a. Negative Impacts of Trade Activities on Environment 4b. Negative Impacts of Environmental Measures on Trade 5. Economic/Trade-Environment Compatible 6. Environmental Protection 6a. Product-related Measures 6b. NPR PPMs 7. Sustainable, Equitable Growth 8. Sustainable, Fair Trade 9. Reciprocity 10. Special and Differential Treatment/Common and Differentiated Responsibilities
Norms 1. Restrain Growth 2. Revive Growth/Accelerated Development 3. Preventive Action 4. Prevention of Transboundary Harm 5. MEA TREMS 6. Unilateral Trade Measures 7. EPI 8. Socio-Economic/Trade Policy Integration 9. Resource and Technology Transfer 10. Minimal Impacts on Trade** 11. Harmonization 12. Polluter Pays 12a.Non-subsidization 12b.Internalization of Costs 13. Science-based Risk Assessment 14. Economic-Cost Benet Analysis 15. Precaution in Risk Management 1. * 2. Central 3. * 4. * 5. * 6. * 7. * 8. * 9. Peripheral 10. Central 11. Secondary 12. * 12a. * 12b. * 13. Secondary 14. Secondary 15. * 1. * 2. Central 3. Central 4. Central 5. Central 6. * 7. Central 8. Peripheral 9. Secondary 10. Peripheral 11. Peripheral 12. Secondary 12a. Secondary 12b. Secondary 13. Secondary 14. Secondary 15. Secondary (In contest)
1. * 2. Central 3. Peripheral 4. Peripheral 5. Peripheral 6. * 7. Peripheral 8. Central 9. Peripheral 10. Central 11. Secondary 12. Peripheral 12a. Secondary 12b. Peripheral 13. Secondary 14. Secondary 15. Peripheral (In contest)
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science and harmonization through international standards. Further, to uphold non-discrimination norms and the related concept of like products, trade discrimination in domestic environmental policies based on product differentiation by NPR PPMs is restricted.79 As such, there is a peripheral accommodation of environmental protection in the WTO frame, including NPR PPMs and TREMS. Similarly, the 1994 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and PhytoSanitary Measures (SPS) adopts the Article XX approach to accommodate UNCED peripherally: measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life and health are acceptable if they are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, minimally impact on trade, and are developed multilaterally. It further integrates secondarily the validity standards of science and economics, and marginalizes precaution: SPS measures should be based on scientic principles and only maintained when there is sufcient evidence of risk, taking into account the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks.80 Finally, in peripheral support of resource and technology transfer, the WTO frame acknowledges UNCEDs common and differentiated responsibility and its compatibility with special and differential treatment.81 Therefore, although the WTO and UNCED frames share central purposes on the surface, the meanings and salience trade actors attribute to environmental protection principles/norms appears very different. The hard-law status and general acceptance of WTO norms compared to several of their contested, soft UNCED counterparts (e.g. precaution) further lends support to an overall assessment of incompatibility. Indeed, many CTE actors perceived signicant incompatibilities as they prepared positions on the WTO-MEA relationship and for the Singapore Ministerial. Such cognitive dissonance decreased possibilities for normative accommodation through EPI and institutional development supportive of learning. Weak Policy Integration The Decision on Trade and Environment directed the General Council to establish a temporary CTE in January 1995. It was to examine the trade-environment relationship and recommend whether any modications to the trade frame were needed, provided they were compatible with the open, equitable and nondiscriminatory . . . system and enhance[d] positive interaction[s].82 This mandate and a ten-point agenda should be addressed without exceeding the competence of the MTS, . . . limited to trade policies and those trade-related aspects of environmental policies which may result in signicant trade effects.83
79. The meaning of like products behind national treatment and most-favored nation norms excluded consideration of how products are produced. GATT 1947, Article III. 80. WTO 1994b, Articles 5.3, 3.3, and 5.7. 81. WTO 1994c, Preamble; and WTO CTE 1996i, Section III, Paragraph 173. 82. WTO 1994f. 83. WTO 1994f.
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The 1996 CTE Report and Ministerial Declaration (Trade and Environment section) were the outcomes of this process. Items one and ve directed the CTE to explore the WTO-MEA relationship and their respective DSMs. Many developed countries representatives espoused two main concerns: TREMS in MEAs could conict with WTO provisions, and WTO provisions could prevent desirable conclusions for future MEAs. Eventually, the Chair and these representatives framed the problem as the conditions under which MEAs principles/norms can be accommodated in the WTO frame.84 Representatives/Trade Ministers agreed to three solutions at the Singapore Ministerial. First, the CTE recognized the need for MEAs TREMS to pursue environmental goals and prevent harm to transboundary/global resources.85 However, representatives determined that TREMS must minimally impact on trade (i.e. they are subject to Article XXs conditions).86 Second, representatives stipulated that MEAs TREMS were permissible under WTO rules if Environment Ministers specically agreed upon them and how they will be used.87 Finally, Representatives encouraged WTO members who are parties to MEAs to resolve disputes through MEAs compliance and DSMs.88 They also afrmed members rights to bring an MEA-related trade dispute to WTO panels, presumably in disputes between two members, one who is a non-party to the MEA.89 Here, the onus of proving that an MEAs TREM is justied as a deviation under Article XX is the responsibility of the defendant or party to the MEA. Overall, representatives approved a peripheral accommodation of the UNCED and MEAs where WTO principles/norms and DSMs prevailed. This outcome exemplies weak integration. Conversely, some developed countries representatives proposed more integrated solutions that recognized the need to clarify the WTO-MEA relationship and that existing WTO provisions did not have adequate scope to accommodate MEAs TREMS. The strongest positions suggested an ex ante MEA accommodation through a formal amendment or collective interpretation of Article XX. Essentially, these approaches proposed the creation of an environmental window by dening principled conditions for MEAs TREMS, which, as long as they were met, would guarantee WTO accommodation. One principle, for example, recognized that the UNCED/MEAs and WTO are equal frames. From these perspectives, uncertainty surrounding how Article XX might be interpreted in an MEA-related trade dispute fails to provide MEA negotiators with high degrees of predictability and security. Accordingly, the weak MEA accommodation was seen as an ex post solution, neglecting concerns about potential disputes and the debilitating affects of uncertainty on MEA negotiations (the shadow of the WTO or chill ef84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. Grifth 1997, 8. WTO CTE 1996i, Section III, Paragraph 171. WTO CTE 1996i, Paragraph 174(ii). WTO CTE 1996i, Paragraphs 173, 174(iii). WTO CTE 1996i, Paragraph 178. WTO CTE 1996i, Paragraph 178.
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fect).90 The recommendations also biased WTO Members who are non-parties to MEAs and provided incentives for challengers to seek the stronger WTO DSM. Other moderate approaches combined ex ante and ex post features, proposing informal understandings or guidelines and retaining members rights to WTO DS, but reversing the burden of proof so as to ensure that non-parties to MEAs would not be privileged in proceedings. Ostensibly, the weak solutions advantages were that it was more compatible with GATT philosophy and that it did not require elaborate changes to the trade frame and institutions.91 First, the stronger ex ante and combination approaches would have required representatives to better include UNCED principles/norms and alter their hierarchy. Representatives would have had to recognize the negative impacts of liberalized trade on the goals and policies of environmental protection and the need for strong EPI and an ex ante solution. Second, the ex ante proposals would have required WTO/CTE institutional changes to better include environmental actors in policy processes and enable joint ownership of principled and normative conditions.92 However, the WTOs peripheral norm of EPI as policy coordination to enhance existing synergies contrasted with the UNCEDs central obligation to restructure policy processes to more fully integrate environmental actors and ideas. Simple Learning and Normative Frame Incompatibilities Normative incompatibilities and institutional difculties created conditions in the CTE that were mainly conducive to simple learning and weak integration. The Canadian Representative Grifth identied four deliberative phases surrounding the Singapore Ministerial: 1) information provision and positioning; 2) problem-solving and position (re)formulation; 3) counter-reactions to new positions, and 4) nal preparations and negotiations.93 Interviews with other CTE actors conrm Grifths account. I characterize the learning phases and discuss how they were conditioned by normative and institutional factors. First, information exchange about national positions to achieve bargained forms of consensus on concessions exchanges or single undertakings is normally a dominant mechanism characterizing the MTS. Bargaining also happens in the shadow of power, with decisions reecting the invisible weighting of the material power of the largest participants.94 Unsurprisingly, representatives began in 1995 with information provision and positioning . . . for future generation of a position with some acknowledgement of newly received information.95 Grifth indicates that this resulted in negotiating markers . . . rather
90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. Eckersley, 2004; and Tarasofsky and Palmer 2006, 904. Grifth 1997, 9. WTO CTE 1996b, Paragraph 17. Grifth 1997, 6. Steinberg 2002. Condential interview with a CTE representative, 15 June 2001.
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than undertaking a more objective working through of the issues or better appreciating the real environmental concerns.96 Many representatives simply learned about UNCED norms to justify extant trade interests. However, without the traditional incentive of enhanced market access to drive negotiations in the CTE and no non-trade-environment negotiations to balance off for concessions, some representatives saw no reason to participate.97 There were basically two baselines for developed countries preferences. Many representatives recognized incompatibilities between the UNCED and WTO frames that required EPI and specic resolution to the WTO-MEA relationship. However, one camp argued that incompatibilities required weak EPI on an ad hoc basis, without WTO frame change. Members could use existing GATT/WTO waivers to approve temporarily MEAs TREMS that met specied criteria.98 Ultimately, any MEA waived was subordinate and challengeable in dispute settlement. This ex post approach t well with extant trade interests and seemingly offered a strategic environmental solution: members could waive MEAs to which they were parties and reject others. Still, uncertainty arose over countries interests (there were 18 MEAs with TREMS to consider) and disagreements over selection criteria. Canada, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, ASEAN, and others constituted this camp.99 Another group, led by the EU, EFTA and Nordic countries, thought that incompatibilities required moderate to strong EPI on a universal basis, necessitating an ex ante solution and Article XX amendment. Compared to the rst, weak camp, their preferences were already moderately to strongly integrated.100 At the other extreme, some developed and most developing countries perceived no problem: MEAs TREMS were not incompatible with WTO provisions and there was no need for EPI and accommodation. These preferences were trade-oriented, entirely informed by the GATT or WTO frames. For example, in the GATTs standing trade-environment body, the Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade (GEMIT) (19711972, 19911993), which preceded the sub-CTE (1994) and CTE (1995-), India was unconvinced in the early 1990s that MEAs TREMS were necessary to address environmental problems. In fact, India perceived MEAs TREMS and national NPR PPMs as threats to the GATT.101 Later in the CTE, India argued that WTO agreements contained more than enough room to accommodate TREMs and NPR PPMs, and thus there was no conict.102 Second, a shift from simple to complex learning occurred among some developing countries in proposal (re)formulation in early 1996. Grifth explains:
96. 97. 98. 99. 100. Grifth 1997, 6. Grifth 1997, 45. GATT 1947, Article XXIII(b); and WTO 1994c, Article IX. GATT GEMIT 1993b; and GATT GEMIT 1993c. GATT 1991c, 24; GATT GEMIT 1992a; GATT GEMIT 1992b; GATT GEMIT 1993a; and GATT GEMIT 1993c. 101. GATT GEMIT 1993b. 102. WTO CTE 1996g.
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This was . . . the most creative phase . . . when delegations made . . . serious efforts at policy integration in their domestic policy process[es], necessary . . . to table formal or informal proposals. This phase allowed for some real debate (in capitals as well as in the CTE) over various options . . . although the debate [in CTE meetings] was overly formal and ritualistic.103
Several developed countries positions changed during domestic policy processes and/or informal deliberations surrounding CTE meetings from less integrated options. Commonly perceiving that incompatibility created a problem, they engaged in interest redenition and solution construction. There are many telling examples. Japan and Korea rejected the ex post waiver option (weak integration) in favor of combination approaches (moderate integration).104 New Zealand and Switzerland also presented combination approaches.105 Considering position changes in the 1990s from the GEMIT to the sub-CTE to the CTE, the strongest example is the EU. Proposals included the waiver option (weak integration); an ex ante collective interpretation of Article XX (strong integration), and a combination approach, involving Article XX amendment and a reversal of the burden of proof (moderate integration).106 The EU changed the latter proposal to safeguard the scrutiny of MEAs TREMS in dispute settlement to address developing countries concerns about green protectionism and unilateralism.107 The US added support for moderate to strong integration, but later disengaged.108 Grifth recalls: we internally realized . . . our position was neither coherent nor consistent with trade and EPI . . . The policy challenge was to develop a . . . position that satised both our trade and environmental interests.109 Accordingly, Canadian positions on the WTO-MEA relationship and eco-labeling changed (albeit weakly) to acknowledge that WTO agreements needed better to accommodate MEAs TREMs and NPR PPMs. The new proposals resulting from interdepartmental consultation were presented to the CTE and discussed informally, with some gaining support. The more balanced representation in domestic and supranational policy processes paid dividends in promoting more integrated policies. Third, developing and some developed country delegations with no policy coordination counter-reacted to these proposals during a simple learning phase in the spring of 1996. Their minimally integrated positions based on unchanged interests reected a defensive, largely trade Ministry perspective.110 Grifth describes: the contradictions between the positions taken by the same governments in environmental fora . . . and . . . the WTO, became even more ap103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. Grifth 1997, 6. WTO CTE 1996c; and WTO CTE 1996d. WTO CTE 1996a; and WTO CTE 1996e. GATT 1991c, 24; GATT GEMIT 1992a; and WTO CTE 1996b. WTO CTE 1996b, Paragraph 15. Condential interviews with CTE Representatives; and WTO CTE 1996h. Grifth 1997, 12. Grifth 1997, 67; WTO CTE 1996f; and WTO CTE 1996g.
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parent.111 Many developed countries that changed interests to accommodate more strongly the UNCED norms had to reduce goals for substantive results.112 However, the logic of strong EPI for delegations like the EU made revising formal positions difcult.113 Finally, in September, Ministerial preparations commenced with bilateral meetings and the Chairs conclusions. In response, there was a near revolt by representatives: they instructed the Chair to work closely with the Secretariat on a consensual draft.114 Afterwards the Chair tabled a substantially different draft with the weak Article XX accommodation. Recall that its solution made compatible MEAs TREMs in a manner that t well with the extant WTO frame. The draft was more ambitious than a neutral text the Secretariat constructed, although far from the stronger ex ante and combination positions of the EU (and, originally, the US).115 Regardless, developing countriesholding divergent perspectives and with growing distrust fueled by the power playwere livid. Grifth details: they view[ed] the document as [still] pandering to US and EU interests. The middle countries (e.g. Canada, Brazil, Australia, Korea, New Zealand, Japan) . . . [were] relatively comfortable.116 In October, the developing countries, led by India and Egypt, tabled an alternative, no-integration draft. In October/November, Ministerial negotiations began differently: the Secretariat directed informal deliberations and working groups. All [were] working to see if consensus [on the Chairs draft] was possible.117 However, discussions . . . [did] not go well: Developing and some developed countries remained xed on negative or weak positions, while other delegations tried to rewrite history.118 On 6 November, the Chair held a drafting marathon.119 Grifth recalls that it was akin to . . . sectoral negotiation [but] . . . there was no negotiating coinage outside the process or the pressure of nongovernmental organizations [NGOs] and intergovernmental environmental bodies to provide balance.120 Accordingly, the Chairs weak solution came to provide the foundation around which these divergent interests could converge and a consensus text could be constructed. On 8 November, representatives approved the non-binding, weakly integrated report. On 13 December, Trade Ministers endorsed it. Overall, the style of interaction that dominated CTE meetings and Ministerial negotiations was simple learning about environmental norms to satisfy xed trade interests, resulting in weak conclusions. Evidently, the more complex
111. Grifth 1997, 6. In environmental fora, it is often developing countries that support strong TREMS in MEAs. 112. WTO CTE 1996h. 113. Grifth 1997, 6. 114. Grifth 1997, 7. 115. Grifth 1997, 7; and condential interviews with CTE representatives. 116. Grifth 1997, 7. 117. Grifth 1997, 18. 118. Grifth 1997, 7. 119. Grifth 1997, 7. 120. Grifth 1997, 5 and 19.
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answer is a mixed one. There was complex learning in capitals and in informal sessions in Geneva surrounding CTE meetings and position (re)formulation, as well as power plays in Ministerial preparations, occurring largely in the absence of the WTOs traditional incentive-based bargaining dynamics. However, if the alternative mechanisms of complex learning and power-based bargaining had been able to thrive under different conditions, outcomes would have likely resembled a better balance in the former and reected the preferred interests of powerful countries in the latter. Instead, the WTO-compatible framing of the weak MEA accommodation came from the Chairs (and Secretariats) leadership in what was predominantly a simple learning process.121 Of course, the possibilities for any solution were constrained by the WTO frame and marginal interpretation of EPI. Most of all, representatives highlighted the differences of views that contributed to dynamics and tumultuous sessions.122 There was not enough of a common lifeworld to sustain complex learning about stronger EPI. One representative from a developing country described the debate as follows:
What we were discussing were some fundamental views of seeing how trade and environment interact . . . Can we say that trade and environment are mutually supportive? Some countries rejected the idea . . . Others were very stubborn in their views in favor . . . It was very difcult.123
Low Institutional Capacity In addition to normative frame incompatibilities, the low institutional capacity of the CTE to support complex/reciprocal learning inhibited stronger MEA accommodation. First, institutional capacity for reciprocal learning at the WTO and between trade and environmental communities was low. WTO members adopted a conventional, sectoral strategy rather than a horizontal approach to address trade-environment issues across committees and councils. Accordingly, CTE discussions occurred separately from other WTO bodies.124 There were also no institutional arrangements or venues to facilitate EPI, such as coordination between chairs and joint workshops. Institutional roles and responsibilities were typically trade-specic. Many representatives of developed and developing countries believed EPI meant improving the cross-sectoral and participatory capacities of domestic policy processes.125 It did not entail the restructuring of WTO sectoral and intergovernmental decision-making. Second, institutional fragmentation was high between domestic/international trade and environmental communities. Although representatives recognized the value of a coordinated approach that draws on interdisciplinary ex121. 122. 123. 124. 125. Grifth 1997, 18. Grifth 1997, 17. Condential interview, 12 June 2001. The exception was one CTE-TBT eco-labeling session on 27 February 1996. Condential interviews.
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pertise, institutional integration was rare.126 Most WTO missions were solely comprised of representatives from foreign affairs, trade, or economic ministries. A developing countrys representative commented: The Ministry of Environment was out there, and the Ministry of Trade was out here, and they rarely met: Each one was doing its job within their own remit and jurisdictions.127 Further, institutional ties between the CTE and environmental IOs (EIOs) were non-existent or informal, creating hierarchy and formality in infrequent interactions. The CTE met twice annually. Eleven IOs were ad hoc observers, including UNEP and the CSD. However, MEA secretariats were largely excluded and formal boundary rules for observer status were unclear and contested. Observers did not participate beyond formal reporting.128 As one representative described it, You [gave] them a ag. They [came] to the meetings and they [sat] there. That [was] it.129 Third, the CTEs mandate (item ten) requested representatives to make appropriate arrangements for relations with NGOs . . . and transparency documentation.130 Yet General Council decisions in July 1996 reinforced intergovernmental decision-making and low openness.131 The rst decision encouraged the Secretariat (not members) to engage NGOs at the supranational level.132 However, the resulting arrangements were ad hoc and informal, maintained through briengs, reports, annual symposia, and limited NGO attendance at plenary sessions of Ministerial Conferences. The criteria for NGO accreditation were further disputed. The second decision requested the Secretariat to de-restrict documents automatically or after 60 days.133 However, members maintained the nal say regarding whether they would allow de-restriction. Consequently, CTE representatives concluded: closer coordination and cooperation with NGOs can . . . be met constructively through appropriate processes at the national level where primary responsibility lies for taking into account the different . . . interest[s] which . . . bear on trade policy-making.134 Institutional capacity for complex learning was also low. First, CTE representatives met infrequently in temporary, formal, intergovernmental sessions. Environmental experts were not regularly involved, and thus representatives made decisions in isolation. Further, although the Decision on Trade and Environment mandated the CTE open to all members (113 in January 1995), the active membership consisted of trade associations, interested developed countries and
WTO CTE 1996i, Section III, Paragraph 168; and condential interviews. Condential interview, 29 June 2001. Condential interviews with CTE representatives and observers. Condential interview, 12 June 2001. WTO 1994c, Article V(2). Article 13.2 and Appendix 4 of the DS understanding do allow panels to seek outside technical advice from NGOs. WTO 1994c, Annex 2. 132. WTO 1996b. 133. WTO 1996a. 134. WTO 1996i, Section III, Paragraph 213. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131.
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larger developing countries. Countries did not participate equally. If a developing country had a CTE representative, it was typically a junior ofcer covering ve or more councils/committees, compared to the specialized and perhaps interdisciplinary delegations of their developed-country counterparts. A developing countrys representative explained: The problem . . . [was] one of resources and a question of knowledge.135 Here, the technical trade-environment discourse acted as an exclusionary device to hinder active participation. Accordingly, many developing countries took a defensive role, reacting to the agenda from narrow trade perspectives rather than actively shaping it. Second, according to the WTO agreements and CTEs Rules of Procedure, representatives were to make recommendations for interpretation or rule changes through consensus.136 In formal CTE meetings and Ministerial negotiations, sovereign equality in decision-making predominated in shaping discussions and decisions. In informal consultations and Ministerial preparations, a small inner core of countries drove deliberations and drafting. GATT/WTO practice was that consensus in formal meetings legitimized outcomes that resulted, in reality, from informal bargaining processes often characterized by power asymmetries and weighted decision-making.137 Indeed, the CTEs Ministerial preparations were invisibly weighted in bilateral and other consultations before outcomes were presented to the wider membership for formal approval by consensus. Although the power plays in proposal development were unsuccessful, they created atmospheres in formal meetings that were unsupportive of arguing and learning. Therefore, WTO/CTE informal institutional arrangements promoted hierarchy and hypocrisy in formal stages, contributing to intense conict. Combined with a lack of domestic/supranational EPI, the low institutional capacity merely supported simple learning and the weak outcome. Considering further the normative frame incompatibilities, and their mutually constitutive relationship with these poor institutional conditions, the weak EPI becomes more fully understood. In sum, a social learning framework explains well the CTEs poor performance.
Social Learning and EPI in the WTO after Singapore

I now address the WTOs ongoing EPI. Have normative and institutional conditions changed since Singapore? If so, what have been the effects on learning and integration? Evolving Normative Conditions The normative direction of EPI has not substantially changed through WTO negotiations since Singapore. Outcomes at Doha (2001) and Hong Kong (2005)
135. Condential interview, 29 June 2001. 136. WTO 1994c, Article IX; and WTO CTE 1995a. 137. Steinberg 2002, 368.
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have reinforced the frame of trade liberalization sustaining development and weak integration. Other events constitute non-outcomes, such as the breakdown or suspension of deliberations in Seattle (1999), Cancn (2003) and Geneva (2006, 2007, 2008). The last WTO report on trade-environment further frames trade not as a causal factor, but rather as a magnier: trade liberalization could potentially exacerbate the consequences of poor environmental policies.138 The argument is still that strong EPI is unnecessary to ensure that the environmental outcomes from trade liberalization are positive.139 Consider the Doha Declaration, adopted by trade ministers on 14 November 2001. The Preamble reafrms SD, yet there is no further movement toward the UNCED frame.140 In fact, the EU, Norway, Switzerland, Brazil and others had to push hesitant countries hard in negotiations to maintain the peripheral inclusion of environmental norms.141 Ministers also commenced Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations on trade-environment issues in the CTESS in parallel with a restructured CTE mandate. Ministers approved negotiations on two MEA issues: rst, the relationship between WTO rules and specic trade obligations [STOs] set out in MEAs; and second, procedures for regular information exchange between MEA Secretariats and . . . WTO Committees and criteria for granting observer status.142 Ministers also conducted the CTE Regular to work on its remaining mandate.143 The mandate of the CTESS indicates that the possibilities for substantial EPI will be very limited. First, Ministers stated that negotiations shall be limited in scope to the applicability of . . . existing WTO rules as among Parties to the MEA in question. The negotiations shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that is not a Party to the MEA.144 Second, outcomes must not add to, diminish or alter the balance of the rights and obligations of Members under existing WTO Agreements.145 The fact that negotiations now exclude the most hazardous scenario of a WTO dispute between two members (one a party to an MEA and the other a non-party) creates an extremely limited problem denition. So too does the language on STOs: only those trade measures expressly required by an MEAas opposed to those that might be permitted or implied from the MEAs objectivewill be covered by negotiations.146 Ostensibly, restrictions narrow the parameters of discussion so much that nding a more balanced ex ante or combination solution appears out of the realm of possibility. This assures the current weak, ex post accommodation will prevail.
138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. WTO 1999, 2 and 26. WTO 1999 and 2001, Paragraph 31. WTO 2001, Preamble, Paragraph 6. Von Moltke 2004, 45. WTO 2001, Paragraph 31, iii. WTO 2001, Paragraphs 32 and 33. WTO 2001, Paragraph 31, i. WTO 2001, Paragraph 32. Tarasofsky and Palmer 2006, 905.
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Indeed, since 2002, CTESS discussions have been side-tracked from the important WTO-UNCED norm conicts. Deliberations revolve around questions such as what constitutes an STO and whether the phrase set out in MEAs applies solely to the text of the original agreements or includes subsequent developments such as decisions by Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and institutional mechanisms.147 There remains great divisiveness over even these denitional issues, with the majority of developing countries and some disengaged developed-country members (e.g. the US and Australia) favoring weak integration.148 Moreover, the underlying normative tensions pervade these technical talks regardless of the exclusionary mandate. EU positions keep raising the problem of potential disputes and the need for an ex ante solution. They press that universal principles should be mutually agreed upon by trade and environment actors to govern the WTO-MEA relationship and to ensure the equality of their bodies in international law.149 Despite support from Switzerland, Norway and some other OECD members, the view that stronger EPI is required remains the minority opinion.150 A major risk for the DDA is that outcomes ignore environmentally progressive WTO jurisprudence since Singaporefor example, the Appellate Body reports US-Shrimp I and II (1998/2001) and EC-Asbestos (2001). These decisions clarify somewhat what Article XX means for MEAs TREMS and what the like products norm underpinning non-discrimination means for NPR PPMs. Some interpret the decisions as allowing WTO members justiably to discriminate, multilaterally and even unilaterally, against otherwise like products that are produced by environmentally harmful PPMs.151 Therefore, they provide useful guidance for representatives and ministers to integrate more strongly the WTO and UNCED frames. That outcomes have not acknowledged this evolving jurisprudence is concerning for EPI.152 It is further worrisome that any weak result achieved through Doha negotiations could be less integrative than the existing piecemeal arbitration. Evolving Institutional Conditions With no frame change and marginal EPI, members have not undertaken signicant institutional reform to further learning. The DDA has actually run counter to building capacity, with deadlines missed and talks failed or suspended.153 In fact, the institutional capacity of the CTESS resembles that of the CTE pre-Singapore. Although the CTESS was originally closed, documents became de-restricted and ad hoc invitations to some negotiations were issued in
147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. WTO 2001, Paragraph 31, i. Eckersley 2004, 32; ICTSD 2004, 12; and ICTSD 2008. EU 2002, 6, 9; WTO CTESS 2004; WTO CTESS 2005; and WTO CTESS 2006. Eckersley 2004, 3233. Tarasofsky and Palmer 2006, 902903. Von Moltke 2004, 7. The original DDA deadline was 1 January 2005.
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2003 to UNEP and six MEAs, primarily due to pressure from the EU. After Cancn, this invitation was extended.154 However, many MEA and other observership requests are pending. Balanced outcomes toward institutional integration and stronger MEA accommodation seem unlikely without moves toward openness and reciprocity. Politically weighted, conict-laden consensus also dominates decisionmaking surrounding WTO negotiating bodies, including the CTESS. Accordingly, they suffer from low institutional capacity for complex learning.155 Outcomes are still presented to many developing countries as faits accomplis, decreasing trust in the MTS. Indeed, norm-driven deliberations are unlikely to thrive if members perceive the decision-making rules as deeply unfair or the environment becomes used as a bargaining chip in negotiations.156 For discussions to move forward, institutions must evolve in ways that are equally acceptable and benecial to developing countries. Greater inclusion of countries with a Southern trade-environment agenda post-Doha is a start, but more change is needed. Given that stronger normative and institutional outcomes through the DDA and CTESS are unlikely, the CTE might offer long-term hope for EPI. Although institutional integration in the WTO, and in the governments of most of its 152 members, remains low overall,157 institutional capacity for learning is increasing in the CTE. First, following Singapore, the CTE was permanently established, meeting three times annually, raising somewhat its institutional capacity for complex learning in terms of formality and density. There is also increased participation and a growing voice for developing countries as membership expands. Second, CTE and EIO interactions are more open, dense, and formal. Representatives granted permanent observership to eleven IOs that had previously participated in an ad hoc manner, including UNEP and the CSD. They also approved fourteen requests for observer status from other IOs and MEA secretariats. Furthermore, WTO Secretariat ofcials have an open invitation to participate in EIOs. Thus, relations between the CTE and many EIOs have been formalized. For example, the WTO-UNEP relationship became formalized at the Seattle Ministerial Conference in November 1999. Benets include information exchange and consultation, annual UNEP-CTE meetings, and authoring of joint papers on work program items. Since Doha, UNEP has noted improved WTO document de-restriction and information provision to its Governing Council and to the COPs and subsidiary bodies of MEAs.158 The WTO Secretariat has also increased cooperation with UNEP, UNCTAD, and MEAs in technical assistance and building capacity. Their Secretariats organized regional seminars to improve coordination between Trade and Environment Ministries and joint
154. 155. 156. 157. 158. WTO 2003, Paragraph 10. Steinberg 2002, 368; and Von Moltke 2004, 12. Neumayer 2004, 7; and Tarasofsky and Palmer 2006, 909910. McCormick 2006, 110. WTO CTE 2002.
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CTE participation, educational events at MEAs COPs, and the sharing of expertise on environmental reviews of trade negotiations. Here, the CTEs capacity to promote reciprocal learning is increasing. One factor inhibiting institutional development is political blockage to the admission of observers to WTO councils and committees.159 Boundary rules are under negotiation in the General Council (for regular committees), in the Trade Negotiations Committee (for negotiating bodies), and in the CTESS. Slow progress in clarifying procedures for frequent and dense information exchanges between the WTO-UNEP/MEAs is occurring.160 UNEP and EU ofcials desire institutional arrangements, venues, and roles that encourage EPI and less hierarchy.161 Despite these setbacks, overall, institutional fragmentation between the CTE and EIOs is declining. With formal negotiations now in the CTESS, formal and informal CTE decision-making rules also mirror consensus more closely. Increasingly, the CTE provides a less politicized forum to discuss an issue so that it can gain wider acceptance.162 Then, when a problem denition and solution are collectively constructed, the issue migrates to the council or committee that administers the relevant agreement or negotiates the rules. The advantage is that initial discussions are de-coupled from conictual sectoral negotiations and the hypocrisy and hierarchy of standard WTO decision-making rules. The disadvantage is that the CTEs mandate to recommend interpretation or rule changes to agreements becomes moot and the body, further marginalized. Important trade-environment decisions ultimately occur in committees, councils, and negotiating forums that are disconnected from the environmental community and UNCED norms. This is disappointing for EPI. Potential gains in institutional capacity for learning and accommodation in the CTE are easily offset by developments in the CTESS and other fora. The WTO is at a crossroads with regard to EPI. At present, it promotes two opposite institutional practices, as illustrated in the divergent approaches of the CTE and CTESS. This disjointed EPI occurs because WTO governance has no central commitment to an UNCED-compatible version of the norm obligating actors to make institutional arrangements. Given these structural trends, and the limited potential for Doha negotiations to reconcile frame incompatibilities, the future for EPI seems unpromising.
Conclusion
This article has contributed a framework for analyzing norms and a social learning theory of policy integration emphasizing the importance of normative and institutional conditions. I argue that, despite the WTOs rhetoric of mutual com159. 160. 161. 162. Eckersley 2004, 33. Another obstacle is that CTE boundary rules for NGOs remain rigid. ICTSD 2007, 1. Condential interviews. Condential interview with a WTO Secretariat ofcial 11 June 2001; and McCormick 2006, 110.
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patibility in the 1990s, many trade actors perceived low frame compatibility between UNCED and the WTO. Combined with low institutional capacity in the CTE, these conditions contributed predominantly to simple learning and weak integration. The minimalist solution of the Singapore Ministerial to make compatible MEAs TREMs solidied agreement because it t best with the extant WTO frame and the xed interests of many actors. Neither complex/reciprocal learning, nor the WTOs traditional incentive-based bargaining and power dynamics, thrived under these circumstances to produce a different result. Conict between UNCED and WTO norms, including varying versions of EPI, was a major bottleneck obstructing strong integration and institutional development. In the absence of the requisite normative and institutional conditions for complex/reciprocal learning, actors could not bridge incompatibilities and agree to strong MEA accommodation. After Singapore, there is increased institutional capacity in the CTE for complex/reciprocal learning that creates possibilities for reducing normative incompatibilities. This trend, however, cannot be extended to Doha negotiations on the MEA-WTO relationship nor to the wider WTO. CTESS developments prevent discussion of important incompatibilities in principles and norms. They also limit gains in, and perhaps even decrease, institutional capacity for learning and integration. Moreover, prospects for strong EPI are not only dependent on the creation of institutional conditions to promote constructive communications about norm conicts, but are also tied equally to cognitive factors. Different lifeworlds contribute to divisive deliberations, especially when institutions are unsupportive. As EPI in the CTE and CTESS illustrates, these factors operate in mutually reinforcing ways to make learning and policy change more or less possible. This is the value of constructivism and the social learning approach: it captures systematically the varying normative and institutional factors that condition possibilities for different socialization processes and different forms of policy change. Until scholars and policy-makers fully understand these structural factors and their connections to agents and learning mechanisms, EPI will remain an oft-stated, but poorly achieved, norm. To further EPI in the WTO, actors must address the normative and institutional conditions obstructing reexive and reciprocal learning. Lenschow has learned from the EU that only a mix of strategies, tackling the conceptual, institutional and actor-specic bottlenecks, will succeed in triggering a learning process and . . . achieving wider compliance with the [norm].163 Further, if normative problems persist, actors must construct and communicate in cross-sectoral processes to nd joint solutions and validity standards. In WTO governance, a rst step is the elevation of EPI to create possibilities for institutional integration and the development of a common lifeworld. Until then, norm incompatibilities prevail and integration of policies and institutions will be limited. As the argument implies, if normative and institutional conditions at Singapore could not facilitate the strong learning and integration necessary to resolve
163. Lenschow 2002, 232.
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trade-environment conicts, it is unlikely that current conditions and processes in the WTO/CTESS will succeed.
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