Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program

May 2012

Summary: The Central Asian ruling circles continue to view Moscow as a flagship that signals general evolutions in the postSoviet space, even if they do not avow it publicly. After the Arab Spring, which deeply marked the Central Asian political elites, the message from Russia was well interpreted: regimes can be challenged from the inside by leaderless movements independent of opposition political parties. Even if the Putin political regime stays afloat in the coming decade and the democratization of Russia does not come onto the agenda, Moscow is at risk of becoming an uncertain actor for the Central Asian ruling circles as much due to its economic as to its strategic commitments in the region.

Russia is a Delicate Matter? The View from Central Asia of Putins Commitment to the Region
by Marlne Laruelle Contrary to the expression the East is a delicate matter, the view from Central Asia is that Russian policy appears uncertain, complex, and subtle. Russian President Vladimir Putins 2007 announcement that he would respect the letter of the Constitution and not run for a third successive mandate took the Central Asian elites by surprise. This decision was tantamount to political suicide for the Central Asian heads of state, who consider themselves presidents for life and seek to pass on their power to those closest to them. Putins wager was thus followed closely throughout the region, and especially in Ak-Orda, the Kazakh presidential palace, where a special commission has been studying the succession issue in Russia. There was no question that President Nursultan Nazarbayev would follow the model of his neighbor. Vladimir Putins official return to the head of the Russian state on May 7, 2012 is thus viewed reassuringly by Central Asian leaders insofar as it reinforces their belief in the personification of state power. All the same, for the current regimes there is still no lack of disquieting signals emanating from Russia. The Central Asian ruling circles, even the staunchest anti-Russian, notably Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, continue to view Moscow as a flagship that signals general evolutions in the post-Soviet space a fact they do not publicly avow. They thus correctly perceived the significance of political demonstrations in December 2011: the sudden emergence of an opposition movement based on a demand for good governance. After the Arab Spring, which deeply marked the Central Asian political elites, the message from Russia was well interpreted: regimes can be challenged from the inside by leaderless movements independent of opposition political parties. At the same time, Kazakhstan recently faced its first socioeconomic demonstrations in the small town of Zhanaozen on the Mangystau Peninsula. Here too, the symbol bore significance: the questioning of Nazarbayevs regime did not occur via democratic opposition, nor did it take the form of an Islamic revolution, and was ultimately not fomented by Russian or Uzbek national minorities sometimes seen as fifth columns but by ethnic Kazakhs in areas supposedly under Astanas

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control. Suddenly the western part of the country, where the national oil wealth is concentrated and income inequality is significant, became the symbol of the countrys evils. This presents a stark contrast from the traditional vilification of the Uzbek south or the Russian north. These two political shocks came on top of a series of factors that have weakened Central Asian governments. Notable examples of this are: the 2008 economic crisis, the increasing number of allegedly Islamist incursions into the Tajik Rasht Valley in 2009 and 2010, the transition of power in Kyrgyzstan and subsequent interethnic riots in Osh in 2010, the Arab Spring of 2011 and the reappraisal of the Central Asian situation they implied, and of course the preparations for the post-2014 situation in Afghanistan. In this context, the role of Russia in the region has been questioned. Contrary to popular belief in Western countries, the Central Asian regimes are not worried that Russia will exert renewed power over the region. Nobody believes in the likelihood of falling back into the exclusive clutches of Moscow, which is deemed far too weak for such an eventuality. Instead, the threat is seen to come from the risk of more chaotic, more uncertain, and more inefficient Russian policy, such that the gap between the projection of power and real capability is even greater today.

For all of the Central Asian regimes, the risk of Russias democratization would have an indirect immediate impact on their own regime security.
Even the Uzbek and Turkmen regimes both radically anti-Russian have every interest in Russian policy having clearly identified its main stakes and drivers, such as maintaining its presence on the Turkmen gas market and growing gas cooperation between Tashkent and Moscow. The Kremlins desire to have a right to oversee the post-2014 strategic development of Uzbekistan further complicates the issue. In fact, Central Asian regimes have been able to manage the pressures placed on them by external actors with relative ease and to play these actors off against each other. Over the last two decades, they have built their foreign policy autonomy on this balancing game. It is, by contrast, much more difficult for them to ensure their own security if they are unaware of which stakes Russia sees as crucial in the region, where Moscows limits are, and of whether or not they have to build new networks and lobbying strategies within the Kremlin. For all of the Central Asian regimes, regardless of their strategic positioning towards Moscow, the risk of Russias democratization, whether from the top down or the bottom up, would have an immediate impact on their own political security. It would imply a multiplication of sites for decision-making in Moscow, a weakening of the role of the security services, and more contradictory policies due to the diversity of actors in short, disturbing factors for their own stability. Ashgabat would feel obliged to orient itself more directly toward China, which is already in the process of becoming its main ally, thus reinforcing the discrete but marked Chinese footing in the country. Tashkent would view it as implying a greater political risk for its

The threat is seen to come from the risk of more chaotic, more uncertain, and more inefficient Russian policy, such that the gap between the projection of power and real capability is even greater today.
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preparation for President Islam Karimovs succession, likely to be more challenging than the peaceful one that took place in Turkmenistan between Saparmurat Niyazov and Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov in 2006. For the three other countries, which are markedly more dependent upon Moscow, a democratization of Russia would have an even more significant impact on the legitimacy of the current presidents, and in particular of Nursultan Nazarbayev and Emomali Rakhmon of Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan, in accordance with its own dynamics, would probably see the parliamentary nature of its regime enhanced, even though the political forces calling for a power vertical based on the Russian model are still numerous. Even if the Putin political regime stays afloat in the coming decade and the democratization of Russia does not impede his rule, Moscow is at risk of becoming an uncertain actor for the Central Asian ruling circles. This potential uncertainty is due as much to its economic influence as its strategic commitments in the region. Economically, the low level of trust held in the Kremlins effective capabilities and management potential is a key element of prevailing skepticism about Russian-led integration logic. Gazprom, for example, has resisted meeting the commitment it made with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan concerning pipeline renovation, driving them to seek alternative partners in Asia and in the Gulf. The projects for the Common Economic Space with Kazakhstan, and potentially also Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are yet to become a reality.

The Central Asian governments now question Moscows logistical capability and political will to make a concrete commitment to the region.
No credible supranational mechanisms have emerged or proven their effectiveness of yet, and it is still too soon to know whether the Customs Union can actually become an efficient tool and have an impact on Central Asian economies. On the strategic level, Russias commitments to Central Asia also raise doubts, which were galvanized by its refusal to intervene during the events of Osh, Kyrgyzstan, in June 2010. Russias hesitation was legitimate, since the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) do not make provision for it to intervene in case of domestic conflict. However, the Central Asian governments now question Moscows logistical capability and political will to make a concrete commitment to the region. Russia continues to train the majority of Central Asian military personnel, and notably Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks. It sells military material at domestic prices to these regimes, offers joint air defense and satellitebased communication systems, and has revived local military-industrial complexes. However, is it ready to go into action should the need arise? The CSTO Rapid Collective Intervention Force has never had to face any real heat on the ground and it can be legitimately asked whether it has the capability to intervene. The likelihood of Russian border guards regaining control of the Tajik-Afghan border is not going to prevent drug trafficking from corrupting all the post-Soviet law enforcement agencies. Will the Russian intelligence services be prepared to intervene at the sides of their Central Asian counterparts in case of terrorist actions, civil war, or popular uprising? There is room for doubt.

Economically, the low level of trust held in the Kremlins effective capabilities and management potential is a key element of prevailing skepticism about Russian-led integration logic.
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The last consideration is clearly a troubling one for the Central Asian ruling circles: in the years to come they will probably be obliged to deal with domestic changes by themselves, whether through political succession, a popular uprising, or spillovers from Afghanistan. In theory, even Russia, their most committed common neighbor may well either refuse to intervene in their favor for political reasons (should the Kremlin be less supportive of the local regimes), for better or for worse, or be unable to do so due to logistical limitations (weak capability of the Russian army and services). In a context where which China is at least for the moment reluctant to make greater commitments to the region, and in which the strategic uncertainty will increase in the post-2014 situation, the Central Asian regimes are right to question the nature of the commitments of their two main external partners in the region. The Arab Spring showed that, despite common strategic interests, regimes considered too illegitimate will no longer obtain U.S. or European support. It is perhaps time, then, to reopen a transatlantic dialogue with the Central Asian regimes over their preparations for future changes, and, in doing so, give priority to long-term strategies over short-term and transactional relationships.

About the Author

Marlne Laruelle is a Director of the Central Asia Program, and a Research Professor of International Affairs, The Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES), The Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. She is also a member of Europe-Central Asia Monitoring (EUCAM).

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

About the On Wider Europe Series

This series is designed to focus in on key intellectual and policy debates regarding Western policy toward Wider Europe that otherwise might receive insufficient attention. The views presented in these papers are the personal views of the authors and not those of the institutions they represent or The German Marshall Fund of the United States.