Playing the 'Green Card' - Financing the

Provisional IRA: Part 1

JOHN HORGAN and MAX. TAYLOR
_______________________________________________________________
Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol. 11, No.2 (Summer 1999).
pp. 1-38 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
_______________________________________________________________
In the first of two articles on the fundraising activities of the
Provisional IRA (PIRA), the extent and nature of the PIRA's finance
operations are described. The areas of kidnapping for ransom, armed
robbery. extortion and drug trading, although very specific, serve to
illustrate the nature and potential complexity of fundraising activities,
the general issues that surround them, as well as specific internal
organizational issues and factors indicative of an acute awareness by
PIRA leaders of the environments within which they and members of
their organization operate. How the PIRAs involvement in certain
kinds of criminal activities can and does influence not only their
operational development and successes but also the development and
sustenance of support for the PIRA's political wing, Sinn Fein, is
discussed. It is clear that the absence of direct PIRA involvement in
certain forms of criminality is imperative for the development of Sinn
Fein's political successes. In the second article, which describes how
and why PIRA financing operations have evolved into a much more
sophisticated and technical set of activities (including money
laundering), what emerges is a picture of the PIRA and Sinn Fein
which serves to portray one of the most important long-term,
fundamental, limiting factors for the development of a large,
sophisticated terrorist group (and its political wing) as finance, and
not solely the personal or ideological commitment of its active
members. Both of these articles will illustrate the PIRA leadership's
many internal organizational concerns relating to fundraising, the
links between the PIRA's militants and Sinn Fein - and between PIRA
and Sinn Fein fundraising - and the relative sophistication of the
Republican movement as a whole. Aiding these illustrations will be
case study material, interview data and both public and privately-held
documentation. The descriptive data, surrounding issues and its
implications presented here, along with case-study material,
discussions and interpretations presented in a second article serve to
illustrate the many more general and conceptual issues emerging from
terrorist financing.

Over ten years ago, the Sunday Times correspondent James Adams
correctly identified a fundamental weakness in our perception of
terrorism by observing:
Terrorism is generally perceived as being the pursuit of political ends
through violent means and certainly, in the popular perception,
involves such things as bank robberies and the kidnapping or killing
of innocent civilians. In part, this remains true, but a high degree of
sophistication has been added to this so that the terrorist is now more
likely to conform to the image of a middle-ranking clerk than to a gun-
toting hoodlum.1

All too often, we are beguiled by the rhetoric of political violence into
focusing on the political agenda of terrorism, but in doing so we
frequently fail to appreciate the sometimes substantial organizational
and financial context to terrorism and terrorist campaigns.2 Moreover,
this has especially been the case in Ireland, where images often
substitute for reality at all levels of the political process. Terrorist
groups from both Nationalist and Loyalist sides of the Northern Irish
community may well have their roots in ideological and historical
processes, but they exist very much in the here and now, and have
required considerable financial resources to sustain their existence.3
Stating that terrorist groups need financial support to maintain their
existence is fraught with difficulty, and always runs the risk of
misperceiving the nature of the terrorist threat. Terrorism is clearly
not just a cost-effective means of political representation at a broad
level, but terrorist tactics can be inexpensively implemented in terms
of finance. Amid the current plethora of discussions on nuclear
terrorists and their apocalyptic array of high-tech weaponry, terrorist
tactics utilize cheap tools in practice. Fertilizers and other
commercially available chemical compounds found in household
products will for a long time remain part and parcel of the basic
devices of even the most powerful terrorist groups. While finance does
not strictly curb the ability of an organization, such as the PIRA, to
conduct a terrorist campaign per se (as indeed many terrorist groups,
notably EOKA in Cyprus have sustained their campaigns on
shoestring budgets), rather the extent and sophistication of a terrorist
organization's activities, and, furthermore, the activities of its political
wing are clearly restricted by financial resources. Another example,
which predates the IRAs current campaign, relates to the older
original Irish Republican Army. During the 1950s, when the IRA's
'border campaign' was in full flight, even IRA members themselves
recognized that their campaign would not amount to the kinds of
changes for which the present day IRA appears to have been a
catalyst. The movement was poorly organized, had problems with
resources (arms, money, and other supplies), had problems even in
the identification of opportunities, and the organization clearly did not
make enough of an impact to gather popular support. Not all of this
can be explained through simple finance, but it remained a significant
factor.

In this, the first of two articles on the fundraising activities of the

Provisional IRA (PIRA), the extent and nature of the PIRA's finance
operations are discussed. The areas of kidnapping for ransom, armed
robbery, extortion and drug trading, although very specific, will serve
to illustrate the nature and potential complexity of fundraising
activities, the general issues that surround them, as well as specific
internal organizational issues and factors indicative of an acute
awareness by PIRA leaders of the environments within which they and
members of their organization operate. How the PIRA's involvement in
certain kinds of criminal activities can and does influence not only
their operational development and successes, and the development
and sustenance of support for the PIRA's political wing, Sinn Fein,
also emeregs. It is clear that the absence of direct PIRA involvement in
certain forms of criminality is imperative for the development of Sinn
Fein's political successes. Much descriptive material is furnished in
the present piece because the richness and depth of activity is so often
glossed over and referred to in very general terms throughout
discussions of PIRA fundraising in attempts to support some wider
political viewpoint. This happens invariably in the context of black
propaganda aimed at terrorists. In the second article, we describe how
and why PIRA financing operations have evolved into a much more
sophisticated and technical set of activities. including money
laundering. What will emerge is a picture of the PIRA and Sinn Fein
which supports the notion that finance is one of the most important
long-term, fundamental, limiting factors for the development of a
large, sophisticated terrorist group and its political wing. Very often, it
is easy to see why finance for a terrorist group is necessary, but
difficult to establish with any degree of certainty why or how it is a
sufficient limiting factor for the development of a terrorist group. Part
2 of this article supports this view with evidence of its relevance to the
development of both PIRA and Sinn Fein from the early 1980s. Both of
these articles will illustrate the PIRA leadership's many internal
organizational concerns relating to fundraising, the links between the
PIRA's militants and Sinn Fein - and between PIRA and Sinn Fein
fundraising, and the relative sophistication of the Republican
movement as a whole. Aiding these illustrations will be case study
material. interviews and both public and privately-held
documentation.

The 'Needs'

Weapons and Munitions

Conducting a terrorist campaign requires human resources (in terms
of individuals prepared to take the risk of planting a bomb or aiming
and firing a weapon) but it also requires material resources: bombs,
rifles or other forms of weaponry. Meeting this fundamental
requirement for munitions has always been one of the major priorities
of the Provisional IRA, to the resources of a campaign of violence and
maintain the
motivation of its volunteers.4 From the earliest days of the present
IRA campaign, security forces in Northern Ireland, the Republic and
across the world have recognized the significance of monitoring,
controlling and eliminating the supplies of weapons.5

Police on both sides of the Irish border have often stated that the PIRA
has sometimes employed substantial weaponry throughout the
organization's struggle for an end to the British presence in Northern
Ireland. Such munitions are often difficult to obtain and expensive if
bought on the open market through arms traders. Throughout the
PIRAs operational areas, be they inside or outside of Ireland, the
organization has employed the use of surface-to-air missiles ('SAM')
and their launchers, Russian-made rocket-propelled grenade ('RPG')
launchers, assault rifles and machine-guns from the USA, Libya and
Russia, and many smaller arms including shotguns and pistols. The
PIRA is said to have procured many heavy machine-guns (a number of
which are believed to have been supplied by Libyan support), and its
arsenal of heavy weaponry further (and more notoriously) includes at
least one Barrett Light-50 heavy machine-gun. Security sources 6
believe a single PIRA sniper has used such a weapon since the early
1990s to kill ten British soldiers, including Lance Corporal Stephen
Restorick, the last soldier to be killed by the PIRA before its 1997
cease-fire.

Often equally as effective, but certainly far cheaper, are the home-
made munitions which the PIRA has increasingly manufactured
throughout its campaign.7 PIRA 'engineers' have demonstrated the
ability to make home made mortar bombing equipment and home-
made bombs. PIRA bombs have been made from commercial and
home-made explosives, employing their own radio-controlled
detonation devices, or 'sleeper' devices, enabling bomb detonation
after a long period. The PIRA has also used different 'vehicle' bombs
with cars, trucks, buses, or vans. These are either 'attached' in order
to kill the occupant (such as the type used by the PIRA to kill Ulster
Defence Association (UDA) chief John McMichael in December 1987),
or are 'loaded' on to a vehicle for delivery to a target,8 as
demonstrated when the PIRA bombed the centre of Manchester in
June 1996, using a bomb stored in a van, with commercially available
fertilizer as the home-made device's main component.9.

Of course the attack and its aftermath are usually the only aspects of
terrorist operations which we see, through the media or unfortunate
firsthand experiences, and on which we subsequently concentrate.
What we do not have access to is a view of the sometimes
considerable, and almost always costly, planning and preparation
which goes into paramilitary operations. For the Provisional IRA, the
structure and kinds of demands on the organization, whether they be
training, procuring and buying weapons or transport and equipment
storage, results in the PIRA running up huge costs. There are
numerous and some quite obvious indicators of this. The evident
operational successes of the PIRA has often involved sophisticated
equipment such as rocket launchers or heavy machine-guns. Whether
explosives or other armaments are manufactured and purchased
through international arms dealers, or made 'at home', the logistical
costs involved can be quite substantial, even when home-made
equipment consists of raw materials (when not stolen) purchased
through legitimate builders' suppliers.10

During the PIRA campaign leading up to the recent cease-fires,

homemade equipment appeared to have become increasingly
important for the organization. 11 This is not surprising given both
the cost of munitions and the security risks involved in obtaining
munitions from third parties (as illustrated by the trawler
interceptions) which inevitably arise. Moreover, since home-made
weaponry is usually made up of components that can be obtained
quite legitimately, security may not be compromised in the purchase
of such parts. In fact, security sources in the Republic of Ireland
believe that between 1996 and late 1997, the PIRA did not see a need
to spend as much money on explosives, machine-guns and rifles. Of
course, we need to consider the prevailing political climate for Sinn
Fein at this time also, but presumably the PIRA followed this concern
because the organization at least appeared to be well-stocked.

As far as explosives are concerned, sources note that these were

almost exclusively being made by the PIRA themselves in recent times.
Garda 12 operations, such as 'Operation Silo' in 1992, had seemingly
stunted the PIRA's arsenal of weapons - it was estimated that
following this operation in the Republic, aimed at finding the imported
armaments, the Gardai had actually recovered 45-60 per cent of the
weapons acquired from Middle Eastern countries such as Libya
throughout the 1980s.13 It is still believed, however, that the PIRA
retains about 100 tonnes of weapons and explosives, and in any
event, the frequency and ferocity of PIRA operations since 1992 up to
and during the recent cease-fires, suggest that past arms 'recovery'
operations were effectively useless in limiting the operational potential
of the PIRA. 14 This often cited '100 tonnes' retained by the PIRA is
said to include at least 500 rifles, 450 handguns and over 2,500kg of
Semtex. Security forces in the Republic believe that the PIRA has at
least five bomb-making factories, which can be operating at any one
time 15 spread throughout all 32 counties of Ireland. Of course, the
PIRA has to keep these facilities safe, secret and very secure.
Considerable effort has gone into this and the extent and nature of
these efforts was seen through uncovered arms dumps which a
building contractor is believed to have constructed some years ago.16
That these are indeed well-hidden, fortified bunkers became evident
more recently again following the discovery of a PIRA bomb-making
factory near Clonaslee, Co. Laois (again in the Republic) in 1996.17
However, although PIRA weaponry has certainly undergone
substantial development and evolution, both in its type and usage, the
importance of strong financial support for a large, hierarchically-
organized and sophisticated terrorist organization, such as the
Provisional IRA, extends far beyond the purchase of a gun and bullets
which culminate in an attack. Transport costs for example are
incurred in many ways: this includes everything from petrol for the
car used in a robbery or for transportation of weapons to an
operational area - to some of the more sophisticated operations which
include the incursion of PIRA terrorists into another country.
Transport costs may well involve the purchase of a train, bus, or even
airplane ticket, food and accommodation for living in the operational
area for perhaps up to a week or sometimes longer, but often without
the support of the traditional 'safehouse'. Further to this, the PIRA is
believed to run six to eight 'permanent' cars of their own in the
Republic 18 whose purpose is believed to be solely that of arms
transportatio 19 from the south to the border areas if and when
necessary. These cars do not include stolen vehicles sometimes kept
on farms for use in robberies. Radio equipment is another commodity
of vital importance in allowing the PIRA to monitor security force
movements, and has evolved considerably for the PIRA since the early
1970s, but it is also often very expensive, and in the main has to be
purchased.

Human Resources

Terrorist campaigns are not run on weaponry alone. Personnel are

required to use the weaponry, and they alone can generate enormous
financial costs for the PIRA. Men known to the security forces need
support to exist within clandestine lives, and a permanent cadre of
volunteers (albeit small in number relative to the overall level of
Republican supporters in their continuum of 'activity') needs to be
maintained for operational needs. Various types of safe houses have to
be maintained, 20 both to secure men on the run, but also to offer
active terrorists opportunities to relax and unwind away from the
threat of the security services. Cost in this respect can involve
payment of money to some safehouse owners who provide meals or
lodgings to PIRA members, or who provide a temporary resting place
for periods ranging literally from minutes to weeks.21 It also
translates into the purchase of alcohol and other gifts for the house-
owners at Christmas as tokens of appreciation for their 'goodwill' 22
Other safehouse owners who perhaps stored weaponry, or parts of
weaponry for the PIRA would be paid 'not to ensure that they kept
their mouths shut, but also because of the considerable risks they
faced ... consequently, many of those who agreed to hide weapons
were widows or young, unmarried mothers who desperately needed
the money' . 23 A further major concern for the PIRA leadership is the
welfare of prisoners' relatives, the support of men 'on the run' and
their families, as well as 'recently released IRA men who had served
long prison sentences and had little or no chance of securing a proper
job'.24

An issue of some debate is the extent to which PIRA Volunteers are

'salaried'. Up until the 1994 cease-fire, many Active Service Unit (ASU)
members were estimated by some sources 25 to be receiving £30-£40
per week, but others describe different amounts, sometimes higher,
sometimes lower.26 The amounts involved are difficult to establish
with any certainty, and presumably differ from 'role' to 'role'
depending on the extent and nature of individuals: activities
(McGartland 27- describing the need to pay for 'full-time IRA staff who
were too busy to hold down regular jobs') and in some cases,
geographical location. With informed estimates of 400-500 PIRA
members, weekly payouts could at the very least, amount to anywhere
from £12,000 upwards 28 Of course, this excludes the 'support' which
volunteers receive for their families at Christmas, and indeed the
support which prisoners' families receive on a weekly or monthly
basis, which is very difficult to estimate. One senior figure within the
PIRA's southern command based in Dublin was said to receive a figure
close to £6,000 at one Christmas during the 1994-96 cease-fire 'to
keep him happy', i.e. it was seen as a form of control and effectively
safeguarding against dissent against the continued cease-fire. 29

We should note too that the costs incurred by the PIRA's legitimate
political wing, Sinn Fein, are equally extensive. For the PIRA,
legitimate political representation by Sinn Fein has become an
increasingly important aspect of the overall Republican movement in
recent years. At the level focused on for the present article 30
however, financial sustenance is needed for everything from the
maintenance of premises (from the Sinn Fein Headquarters in 44.
Parnell Square, Dublin, and in Belfast, to the Regional offices around
the 32 counties, to public meetings in hotels or pubs even in rural
areas) and costs incurred during elections (for posters, advertising,
etc., travelling expenses, promotion and' highlighting of the anti-drugs
campaign in the South 31). The links between the PIRA and Sinn Fein
in the context of funding are illustrated and discussed in Part 2, two
detailed case studies of recent PIRA fundraising operations in the
Republic of Ireland.

How is PIRA Income Generated - and How Much ?

The income generating activities of the PIRA remain to this day no

different from other terrorist organizations except in scale, although
the PIRA probably shows more sophistication and specialization than
most. Security sources in Northern Ireland and in the Republic gather
equally as much intelligence on the Provisional IRA's 'incidental'
activities - the purpose of which is to raise funds for the organization.
Sources descriptions vary, from at least one clear example of 'riding
shotgun' (providing an armed escort for payment) on an international
drugs shipment, to money- laundering schemes in the US, Northern
Ireland, and the Republic. The latter involves the purchase of
legitimate businesses with illegally obtained funds. Such businesses
may then be run as commercial concerns, yielding 'legitimate' profit
which finds its way back to the terrorist organization, or the
businesses may be exploited using fraudulent or other means to
maximize returns and avoid tax, the business then having been 'run
into the ground', abandoned and/or sold on. An examination of one
such business located in the Republic of Ireland is the focus of one of
our case studies.

Legitimately-owned businesses have included private security firms,

the 'black' taxi cabs in Belfast (one co-operative of over 300 taxis
located on the Falls Road is estimated to have had an annual income
of about US$1m 32 - income which is legally reported to the British
taxation authorities). They also include at least two known hackney
cab services in Dublin, construction firms, shops, restaurants, courier
services, guest houses, cars and machinery, pubs which at one time
or another have included at least one in Boston in the United States,
two small pubs in Finglas, Co. Dublin, two in Coolock, also in Dublin
with several more in the city centre, three in Letterkenny, Co.
Donegal, three in Cork (including one Cork hotel), and more small
pubs 'scattered about' the country. The 'mini empire' also includes
social clubs (with some illegally installed slot machines to augment
income from the legal ones 33), illegal drinking clubs or 'shebeens',
and antiques (sometimes having been stolen in the Irish Republic and
resold at various markets in Britain 34). Social welfare fraud is
reported as particularly common, and protection rackets and extortion
(from pubs and clubs, shops, business people), as described in detail
by James Adams,35 are nothing less than a fact of many people's lives
in certain areas. Support groups, such as NORAID (the Northern Aid
Committee) and FOSF (Friends of Sinn Fein), the Irish-American
fundraising bodies, and others, local collections in pubs and clubs in
Ireland and voluntary private donations (including cheques of £100-
£150 having been frequently given by businessmen across the 32
counties) are further sources of funds - this last source is one not to
be underestimated amid hurried and almost automatic suspicions of
more sophisticated forms of raising money including money-
laundering.36

Other activities include income tax frauds involving the use of false
tax exemption certificates (on Northern Ireland building sites),37 the
smuggling of livestock grain, cattle and pigs (even the smuggling of
bovine antibiotics 38), the pirating of video and audio tapes (including
in isolated cases pornographic materials, although security forces in
Dublin believe the official IRA (OIRA) to be more closely involved in
these activities), pirating of computer games, trading in livestock
growth promoters and the theft of cars (including about whatever else
is needed at one time or another, for operational duties). Fundraising
has included the sale of contraband cigarette lighters in Belfast, and
in the past, major areas of concern have involved kidnapping for
ransom. One of the best known and certainly widely-reported sources
of funds have come from armed robbery. Such activity in Northern
Ireland, the Republic and England has long played a major role in
obtaining hard cash for the PIRA.
This wide array of activities leads to some specialization of function
within the organization, mirroring a broader theme in PIRA terrorism,
which was also illustrated in an earlier description of the PIRA
command and functional structure. 39 As we shall see in Part 2, the
PIRA's Finance Department, with its Director and support staff,
presently draws on the experiences and consultancy of experienced
bank managers and at least two accountants (one practising perfectly
legitimately in the Dublin area). Specialization leads to highly effective
and well co-ordinated efforts and results not from any particular
pressures related to terrorism as such, but more from factors related
to organizational change and development. For example, we know that
some ASUs are task- specialized. This is especially the case for some
PIRA members based in the Republic, such as in Munster, where an
ASU is said to have 'handed up £60,000' to senior figures in Dublin at
the beginning of the 1994-96 cease-fire. 40 Furthermore, the extent to
which the PIRA has become involved in some of the above activities for
a relatively short period of time illustrates an opportunistic, almost
entrepreneurial quality to this aspect of the organization. Identifying
areas of opportunity within the market available has added to its
'source pool', which (with the emergence of newer avenues) is an
indicator of the exceptional adaptability to which the organization's
financing co-ordinators appeared to have achieved. This particular
quality of PIRA behaviour is one deserving far more attention.

The Balance Sheet: How Much Does the PIRA Earn?

Although this cannot be an exhaustive list, some estimates (by source)

of the PIRA's annual income are listed in Table 1.

Without a doubt, these figures are necessarily tentative, and are

largely based on informed guesses, including those stated by the
security forces. On the other hand, they do show a certain uniformity
and illustrate the enormous financial commitments involved in
sustaining the PIRA
ANNUAL PIRA INCOME
TABLE 1 ESTIMATES BY SOURCE
(1978-98)
Year of estimate Amount (millions) Source

1978 £STGO.95 The Glover Report 41

1988 IR£7 An Garda Siochaiia 42

The Independent and

1990 £STG5.3 Northern Ireland Office 43
1994 £STG7 Irish Independent 44

1994 US$10 Anderson 45

1994 £STG10.75 The Sun 46

 1995 US$6 Associated Press 47

1995 US$15 Sunday Times 48

An Garda Siochana 49
1996 IR£6-8
Royal Ulster
1996 £STG10 Constabulary(RUC) 50 (see
endnote)
1997 IE£10
Sunday Times 51
1996-98 IR£5-6
Interviews conducted by
authors 52

campaign. One inevitable issue which arises however, and which

appears to have been overlooked by many of these same sources, is
there have been no attempts made to cheek as to whether the
amounts raised equal the estimated size of the PIRA's budget. 53 On
the basis of the above, it seems that they do not. Security forces often
cite that the PIRA needs about IR£5m per year to keep the
organization running effectively. 54 Therefore if income exceeds
expenditure, questions naturally arise as to what happens to their
surplus.

While global figures are of value in general terms, the sophistication of

the organization is better illustrated by examining particular illegal
activities in which the PIRA has developed competence. We do not
attempt to present an authoritative overview of PIRA fundraising, as
attempting to do so would be over-ambitious and probably foolhardy
even in the present political climate. Instead we focus on examples,
and although they are very specific, these will illustrate the nature
and complexity of fundraising activities and some of the issues
surrounding them in general. The specific areas chosen are
kidnapping for ransom, robbery, extortion, drugs and money
laundering.

Kidnapping for Ransom

As with robbery, kidnapping for iansoni is a traditional method of
raising funds for many terrorist organisations around the world. Some
groups are more successful than others; the Basque Separatist group
ETA (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna - Basque Homeland and Freedom) has
relied considerably on this practice to raise funds, and some groups
engage in this tactic more than others do for varying reasons. A
popular avenue has been the kidnapping of wealthy businessmen, or
of executives of large cornpanies. 55

However, unlike the PIRA's successes through other fundraising

avenues, the organization's experiences at kidnapping for ransom did
not have such a thoroughly auspicious life-cycle. In October 1979, the
PIRA kidnapped Ben Dunne from his home in Dublin. A member of
the Dunne family, owners of an extensive chain of retail stores in
Ireland, he was released five days later in south Armagh, amid
'considerable controversy' 56as to whether or not a ransom was
actually paid by the Dunnes to the PIRA. Coogan ,57 who provides an
overview of PIRA kidnappings, describes having heard 'the sum of
£750,000 being discussed in Republican circles'. The Dunne
kidnapping was the first of several such operations undertaken by the
PIRA. Two months later saw the kidnapping of Margaret Fennelley, the
wife of a Cork bank manager, in December 1979. Then, in a series of
raids in Dublin and Wicklow directed at the families of bank
managers, ransom payments were delivered to the PIRA before the
Gardaf could become involved. Coogan describes such activity as
being considered 'common' in Northern Ireland for a long time,
'though ... officially denied by the banks'..58 In the case of Margaret
Fennelley and her £60,000 ransom, however, the Gardai actually
succeeded in rescuing the woman before the payment could be made.
This was not the case for all kidnappings however as demonstrated
when the daughters of two bank managers, were abducted, from
Dundalk and Ardee, in Co. Louth. just across the border from Co.
Armagh in the north, when two ransoms of £50,000 each were
delivered before the police could act.59

What Coogan describes as 'one of the most celebrated kidnappings to

occur' took place on 8 February 1981. when Shergar, the
thoroughbred horse and Derby Winner, was taken from the
Balleymoney Stud at the Curragh (near the Irish Army headquarters).
Although 'the Shergar affair' (or perhaps more accurately, mystery')
has never fully been resolved. Coogan notes that the horse was
'apparently Put down by his kidnappers when the syndicate which
owned the horse led by the Aga Khan, failed to pay the ransom'. There
was also some speculation that Shergar's kidnappers could not handle
the animal and consequently killed him. Shergar's body has not been
found, but Interest in the case continues. In April 1996, it was
announced that the investigation was to reopen with an examination
of forensic evidence to establish a DNA link between an alleged
carcass of Shergar and hair samples from the horse. 60 Thus far, this
seems inconclusive.

If anmials proved troublesome to handle, it was time to go back to

what terrorists kidnap best, people with a lot of money. In 1983, five
PIRA members were charged and convicted of the attempted
kidnapping of Galen Weston, a multi -millionaire from Canada.
Gardai, acting on information supplied to them, simply laid in wait
until the PIRA gang arrived at Weston's house in Co. Wicklow. Also, in
October 1983, Alma Manima was kidnapped from Greystones, Co.
Wicklow. Although Manima was released and a number of local PIRA
members were arrested, Coogan noted 'it is not clear what happened
to the £60,000 ransom'.61 Furthermore in 1983, a tragic event was to
contribute to the eventual long-term decline of kidnapping for ransom
by PIRA active service units. Following the kidnapping of Associated
British Foods executive Don Tidey, an Irish soldier and a Garda were
both killed as police and army personnel surrounded the PIRA unit
and their hostage in Ballinamore, Co. Leitrim, engaging in a fierce
shootout. 62

Coogan subsequently describes the PIRA as having gone 'cold' on

kidnapping after the Don Tidey abduction, 63 noting a cessation of
kidnapping for ransom until a criminal gang kidnapped Jennifer
Guinness, the daughter of a Dublin merchant banker, from Dublin in
April 1986.64However, it is obvious that 'non-ransom' kidnappings
are not infrequent for the PIRA, many resulting from internal security
concerns. This mainly relates to suspected informers, be they PIRA
members or members of nationalist communities, when individuals
are kidnapped, tortured, and sometimes killed. In July 1994, before
the PIRA's 17-month cease-fire was to begin, an ASU kidnapped
Caroline Moorland, a 34-year old mother of two, reinforcing the view
that the PIRA has never felt it necessary to excuse its often brutal
interrogations and subsequent executions' of infiltrators other than
through a statement of allegations. In this case, Moorland was
suspected of working as a low-level informer for the British security
forces. The PIRA later claimed that under interrogation (and as
Cusack 65pointed out, 'probably accompanied by torture'), Moorland
admitted to receiving a weekly wage for being an informant. After
being held for two weeks, she was shot in the head and her body was
dumped on a side-street.66

Non-ransom related incidents aside, however, it has not been

uncommon for many terrorist groups, and the PIRA in particular, to
extort money under the continuing threat of kidnap, long before the
security forces have any knowledge of the event. Although we can
point to examples (as will follow), the true nature and extent of this
will probably unfortunately remain unknown.

However, if kidnapping was to decrease, the PIRA's involvement in

robbery certainly would not.

Robbery

The PIRA, or indeed most terrorist groups operating from Northern

Ireland, are not alone in their fundraising exploits with respect to
robbery. Taylor 67 draws on examples from Northern Spain, where
ETA is known to have committed a number of successful robberies to
raise funds for its operations. He cites Clark, 68 a long-time
commentator on ETA affairs, noting that during 1967-77, ETA raised
the Spanish equivalent of over $1 m from bank robberies alone. In a
more dramatic illustration, ETA is believed to have committed over 50
robberies in 1978, netting the terrorists the equivalent of over $4m in
a single year.69
Although it is difficult to quantify the number of PIRA-related
robberies in Northern Ireland and the Republic, robbery certainly
appears to be one of the PIRA's main 'outwardly' sources of funding, if
not the single main source.70 Such incidents illustrate part of a
consistent series of well executed robberies, but it is probably
impossible to gauge the numbers of robberies for which the PIRA have
been responsible over the years, both North and South. We usually
only hear more of foiled robberies than of the successful operations.
Presumably success for the PIRA in these cases implies there has
been no detection by the security forces. The number of robberies in
Ireland in which the PIRA have been suspected, but for which no-one
has ever been charged, is immense. Of all the reported armed
robberies which have taken place since the early 1970s, it is
reasonable to assert that PIRA-related robberies represent some of the
most valuable and well organized of these.

Fundraising Implications: A Closer Look at Kidnapping and

Robbery

An authoritative account of terrorist-related robberies is lacking, but it

is clear that much greater analysis of particular situations is
necessary to fully understand some of the broader issues and
implications involved. Events surrounding the highly-publicized
attack in Adare, Co. Limerick in June 1996 for example, in which an
ASU shot and killed a Garda during a robbery attempt, raise a
number of questions relating to the efficacy of the command and
functional structure of the PIRA, and terrorist fundraising at a
broader level. Had this robbery been successful, and had it not been
for the presence of the Gardai and the shooting attack which ensued,
then the Adare incident may have been seen as just another criminal
robbery. Certainly, the PIRA members in Adare did not foresee such a
risk in what they had intended to be just another robbery, an activity
in which this ASU specialized. The ASU presumably did not purposely
intend to bring pressures on the Republican movement to prompt
increased security in the Republic and politically on Sinn Fein to
condemn the attack and reassure its Political counterparts in
Northern Ireland of the Republican party's commitment to the
Northern Ireland peace process. A discussion of events surrounding
the Adare incident illustrates the potential complexity of analysis
involved for this particular terrorist group.

The Murder of Garda Jerry McCabe

At 6.50am, on Friday 7 June 1996, Detective Garda Jerry McCabe,

and Detective Garda Ben O'Sullivan, both Special Branch officers of
An Garda Siochdria were sitting in their unmarked police car, in
plainclothes, as the post office van which they were escorting stopped
outside the post office in Adare village in Co. Limerick. The van driver,
William Jackson, was in the process of taking the post, which
included pension and unemployment benefits, from the van into the
post office, when he beard the sound of another vehicle crashing into
the detectives' car. Three men wearing balaclavas and army-fatigues
jumped out of a Mitsubishi 'Pajero' jeep and stood at either side of the
police car. The detectives were still in a sitting position inside the car
when the masked men opened fire, using Russian AK-47 Kalashnikov
assault rifles. As gunfire raked the detectives' car, McCabe was shot
eight times with rounds from the Kalashnikovs and died in his seat.
The raiders immediately fled in the 'Pajero' and ignored a £ 100,000
cash haul in the post office van .71
While O'Sullivan underwent emergency surgery at Limerick Regional
Hospital, Garda road-blocks were set up throughout Limerick County
with Air Corps helicopters joining in the search for McCabe's killers.
By that afternoon, the Gardai had discovered incendiary devices in
two vehicles which pointed to Provisional IRA involvement. A
Mitsubishi 'Lancer' was found in an isolated lane beside a derelict
cottage, about one mile from Granagh village, near Adare. It appears
that the 'Lancer' was driven up this lane, out of sight, and abandoned
immediately. On the 6 o'clock news on Irish television that same
evening, Gardai reported the discovery of the incendiary devices in two
vehicles used by the four-man gang, the jeep vehicle (Pajero) used to
ram the car, and an abandoned suspected getaway car (the Lancer).
These developments, in conjunction with the use by the gunmen of
'the favoured tool of the [P]IRA over 25 years of fighting' - the
Kalashnikov automatic rifle weapon - and the paramilitary nature of
the attack was seen as pointing to only one possibility, that of PIRA
involvement. 72

The PIRA soon acted swiftly to distance themselves from the shooting
when the Gardai said they strongly suspected PIRA involvement. A
statement was telephoned to the RTE 73 offices with the caller using a
recognized PIRA codeword, saying 'None of our volunteers or units
were in any way involved in this morning's incident at Adare ... there
was absolutely no IRA involvement'. 74 A written statement issued to
RTE was signed 'P. O'Neill. Irish Republican Publicity Bureau, Dublin'.
Reporters described the speedy response of the PIRA as a 'damage-
limitation exercise' in view of the possible impact of the killing on the
fragile Northern Ireland peace process'. Initially, it was believed the
killing was the result of a raid that went badly wrong. But later, when
it was found that the big cash haul was ignored, Gardai began to
speculate that the gang could have been on a 'more sinister
straightforward murder mission' targeted at the two detectives. It
emerged that both were friends of former Irish Minister for Justice and
local politician Des O'Malley. O'Malley said, 'This was a calculated
attempt to kill the men. Because the money was not taken it makes
me wonder whether the primary intention was a desire to murder the
police'.
On Monday 10 June, Irish Times journalists Jim Cusack and Suzanne
Bree 75 reported Republican sources in Belfast confirming that the
'Munster unit led by senior IRA figures was behind the killing'. They
said that the men were members of an officially approved PIRA unit
and did not belong to a breakaway faction. According to one of the
journalists' sources, 'these are seasoned IRA activists who are
respected in the Republican movement. The source said that their
'evident access to IRA arms' showed they were not rebels outside the
movement. He added that they seemed to have been indifferent to the
effects the incident would have on the peace process: 'I don't think
that Gerry Adams' difficulties are first and foremost in their minds ...
they would be out to do what they had to do'. This same source also
pointed to the PIRNs 'Green Book' '76 forbidding members from
opening fire on Gardai. Cusack and Breen cited several Republican
sources as saying 'harsh disciplinary action against the leaders of the
unit was unlikely. The IRA members involved were of too high a
standing for that. There was no question of the Army Council ordering
[the] execution [of the PIRA members]. The journalists proceeded to
quote a Sinn Fein source as saying even if the IRA expressed regret
and said it was an operation which went wrong, there would be
complete political upheaval ... our relationship with Dublin [the Irish
Government] would be placed under severe strain'.

By Sunday 23 June, Gardai had finally established that the 'bungled

robbery' was sanctioned by the then Operations Commander of the
PIRAs Southern Command in Dublin. That same day, the Sunday
Independent journalist Veronica Guerin 77 reaffirmed the thought
that much-needed support for Sinn Fein and the PIRA had indeed
gathered momentum during their recent 17 month cease-fire, but she
cited her own Garda sources noting that 'a lot of ground was lost
when they murdered Jerry McCabe and it will be hard for them to get
it back'. This was effectively illustrated with an anonymous call from a
member of the public to the Gardai, disclosing the secret site of a
huge bomb-making factory in Co. Laois in the Republic, a severe blow
to the PIRA's arms stocks. Guerin reported a police source as noting:
'We keep saying that it is neighbours and friends who are protecting
the Provos. People have to realize they are murdering innocent
civilians and Gardai. 78 With the Gardai closing down their bomb-
making factory, the PIRA leadership would soon realize the effects that
this single shooting would have on what relatively little active support
the organization had in the Republic.

McCabe was a native of Ballylongford, Co. Kerry, and was married

with five children. McCabe's son is also a Garda, stationed in Co.
Monaghan. O'Sullivan is a native of Mallow, Co. Cork and is married
with two children. McCabe and O'Sullivan were long-time partners,
well known in the Limerick area. They both had been in the Garda
Siochana for more than 30 years, and O'Sullivan was awarded the
Scott Medal for bravery in 1994 for disarming a man with a gun in Co.
Limerick. The attack on the two detectives was the first time a Garda
on duty had been shot in the Republic for more than a decade,79 but
marked the thirteenth Irish police fatality since the start of the
Northern Ireland~linked troubles.

If we begin without assumption and ask why exactly terrorist

robberies are committed, we must bear in mind that generally
speaking, individuals do not join political terrorist organizations for
money. In the case of the PIRA, we know that individual ASU
members do not live lavish lifestyles, the kind sometimes observed in
other, even some local, terrorist groups at one time or another.80
Certainly, from the perspectives of researchers with first-hand
experience of PIRA lifestyles and interviews with leadership figures,
'certainly these very often cramped "kitchen houses" of back street
Belfast [where interviews were conducted] showed no sign of affluence,
nor did the lifestyle of their occupants'.81 After a robbery has been
committed, the haul can be collected by a person (not necessarily a
member of the ASU who committed the robbery) and is sometimes
stored locally, for use against local costs. The loot is often passed
along a chain to designated individuals, for storage sometimes in
office safes for similar uses (or to finance bigger operations), or the
money is stored so it can be submerged through moneylaundering at
a present or later date.

The weekly income for an ASU member, from his superior(s) is low,
and although reported to vary from member to member in different
areas, it is certainly not enough to sustain family living. Weekly PIRA
wages only supplement social welfare payments, or income from part-
time or full-time employment, varying from member to member, as
operational roles are likewise varied. 82 The prospect for 'earning'
more money is obviously therefore quite tempting. It appears that this
particular ASU, as was illustrated in previous commentary, did not
indeed seem 'too concerned' about the implications which this kind of
activity had on anyone, be it on the organization which these
individual members claimed to represent or on members of the
terrorist audience in general (the disillusionment of one of whom led
to their telephone call to the Gardai about the Laois site). A perennial
problem for security forces in speaking of PIRA robberies is the
difficulty in assessing whether any robbery involves units indulging in
local fundraising (either to sustain local activities or to supplement
their own pockets or to submit money to their finance department) or
if the robbery is an example of a breakaway act of unsanctioned
Republican activity, even while having the purpose of raising funds
'for the good of the Movement'. Indeed, some PIRA OC's 83 have
spoken of their volunteers' tendency in 'going for it' (i.e. robbing
without permission from higher source). However, as British
intelligence agent and PIRA informer Martin McGartland 84 describes:
'most of the IRA men who handled income from whatever source
seemed to be meticulous in their accounting. There were also
examples of punishment beatings handed to those few who misused
IRA funds for their own ends. Those men would not only be beaten
but would also eam the scorn and contempt of their IRA mates,
friends and often their families.' This is just one illustration of the
close relationship between the 'controllers and the controlled' in the
context of Irish terrorism and emerges because the PIRA leadership
has certainly learned the advantages of controlling its members. And
as we shall see later, this is a point of strong consideration for both
PIRA and Sinn Fein figures. Another former PIRA member, Eamon
Collins (murdered in January 1999), spoke of the breakdown of his
'romantic image' of the Republican campaign when, during a bombing
operation in Warrenpoint, Co. Down, his colleague 'robbed the tills ...
took the shine off the operations and made the IRA look like common
criminals'. 85 Control is an extremely pervasive element of Republican
terrorism. During the period before the elections to the Irish Dail and
to Westminster, the PIRA leadership called on its members to cease all
activities. Three days later, however, following the election to the Dail
of Caoimahghin O'Caolain, operations resumed, and the PIRA shot
dead two RUC constables shortly afterwards.86

Coogan 87 reports one senior PIRA figure as noting 'if some

"loosehorse" IRA men did decide to go in for bank robberies, with their
training they'd be inclined to go for a million' rather than much
smaller amounts. Why incur the planning, intelligence-gathering,
operational preparation and Post-operational procedures, but above
all, the risk involved to rob an amount such as £10,000, and then to
have to share it between maybe six or seven people? This logic in this
is indeed arguable to a degree. Yet, in general, the bigger the
operation, the greater intelligence, preparation and planning is
required, which perhaps contradicts the 'going it alone' aspect of what
Coogan's source describes, since it would be much more difficult for
leadership or authority figures not to know about such a planned
operation. Paradoxically then, it probably pays 'loose-horse IRA men'
to go for the smaller, or 'in-between' targets (such as rural post offices,
perhaps, as it was In the case discussed here).

How leadership can view maverick acts of robbery was illustrated

during the PIRA 'damage-limitation' exercises after the Adare attack. It
is easy in retrospect for leadership figures to describe their own ASUs
behaviour as 'unsanctioned' or 'breakaway' (even when such
behaviour is actually sanctioned or not). This has particular usage
during sensitive times, as was demonstrated on more than one
occasion during the 1994-96 ceasefire, an example of which became
apparent when the PIRA denied it had authorized a robbery in Newry,
Co. Down. when an ASU killed an elderly postal worker. The
revolutionary theorist Regis Debray 88 noted that whenever terrorist
organizations cease to have clearly defined political objectives, the
movement may indeed continue to exist, but its activities tend to drift
in focus towards other things they do well. For terrorist organizations
such as the PIRA, these tend to be robberies, increases in the level of
punishment attacks as a form of 're~directed violence' and other
criminal acts. For the PIRA organization as a whole, it only emerged a
week after the Adare shooting that the Southern Cornmand OC,
operating from his Dublin base, had indeed endorsed the operation.
Even if the leadership had known about the OC's approval earlier
there still would have been denials of PIRA involvement throngh its
Publicity Bureau. The PIRA leadership had to deny knowledge of PIRA
involvement in the Adare shooting until the Gardai uncovered the
relevant forensic and other evidence.

The Adare robbery serves also as an example in which organizational

communication appears to have broken down and was proven to be
highly embarrassing for the PIRA leadership priding itself on control
and discipline. The Southern Command OC apparently permitted the
robbery without the expressed consent of either peers or the superiors
who expressed anger at his decision. For all intents and purposes
then, the Adare attack is still seen as an unsanctioned. breakaway
act, but committed by seasoned PIRA activists and it is important to
note not a Republican breakaway group. The Southern Command OC
in question apparently remained 'Officer Commanding Southern
Command' up until September 1996, and frequently attended anti-
drugs meetings held and organized by inner-city community
movements in Dublin. On one Such meeting. which took place in early
October 1996, accompanying him were what was described as three
'hitmen' frorn Northern Ireland (they were in effect, all three men
carrying Walther PPK pistols. However, to replace the existing
Southern Command OC, the Northern Command and Army Council
bodies elected another man as the new Southern Command OC, and
who now also operates from PIRA GHQ (General Headquarters) in
Dublin. This man. originally from Belfast retains very close
connections with senior PIRA and Sinn Fein figures. Republican
sources describe him as having very strong connections with the Sinn
Fein leadership. Of course communication breakdown is commonly
found in clandestine oroanizations, but the significance of this
particular breakdown in communication is that it is one of the few
clear examples which not only led to an internal organizational re-
shuffle of members, but equally significantly to other changes. In the
months following the Adare shooting, the PIRA leadership took the
unprecedented step of changing the command and functional
structures of the organization. The details remain unclear, but it led
to the establishment of more regional command areas under the tight
control of trusted brigadiers, with long experience in the PIRA. This
move was to ensure that an Adare could not be sanctioned again.
Thus control over particular groups of ASUs has been tightened, and
members have been more accountable to regional commanders
apparently much more so than previously.

At another level, we must refer to the PIRA's Green Book. The section
entitled 'General Order No. 8' disallows military operations to be
conducted against the 'Free State', i.e. the Irish Republic, stating:
Volunteers are strictly forbidden to take any military action against 26
County forces under any circumstances whatsoever. The importance
of this order in present circumstances especially in the border areas
cannot be over-emphasised .... At all times, Volunteers must make it
clear that the policy of the Army [PIRA] is to drive the British forces of
occupation out of Ireland.

In effect, General Order No. 8 appears to be a reminder to PIRA

members either based in the Republic or who travel to the Republic
for operations, to keep a low profile. Of the 26 counties in the
Republic of Ireland, 21 fall into the PIRAs 'Southern Command' area.
As described elsewhere, 89 Southern Command, like Northern
Command, refers to a distinct operational area and command
structure. Excluding the five border counties, Southern Command
areas consist of the remaining 21 counties in the Republic of Ireland.
Its command structure consists of 'Brigadiers', OCs, and ASUs.
Security forces in the Republic describe the Southern Command as
functioning as the 'logistic support' for Northern Command, acting
mainly in what is referred to as a 'Quartermaster' role. Its principal
activities include volunteer training, funding, and the storage and
movement of armaments.90 The relevance of Southern Command
areas to Northern Command's operational successes largely translates
into offering logistical support in the form of safehouses and arms
storage to Southern and Northern ASUs.91 Without the traditional
stringent pressures in the form of intense security hampering
activities in Northern Command areas, police sources describe
Southern Command leadership as 'less cohesive" and it is seen to play
a 'much lesser role in major decisions' than both Northern Command,
or General Headquarters (GHQ), even though GHQ has often been
based in Dublin.

From the perspective of the PIRA leadership, the Southern Command

area encompasses a population whose general passivity to the PIRA is
to be manipulated. For the PIRA, the repercussions of killing a
member of the Gardai are tremendous, and have wide-ranging
implications, not just in terms of how the localized passive support for
the PIRA (frequently found in areas all over the Republic) could turn
against them, but in terms of how the PIRAs more active support
would suffer also. This 'active' support covers everything from a more
general kind of sympathizer who could be persuaded to allow the PIRA
to keep a stolen car on his farm, to those whose Republican
sympathies play a role in the potential development of their own
future terrorist behaviour with the appropriate organization. For those
opposed to the killing of Gardai, the PIRA's practical assistance would
suffer in the wake of the shooting - again as demonstrated by the
anonymous disclosure of the Clonaslee bomb-making factory in Co.
Laois.

Such 'support' factors have almost certainly played a part in the

decline of kidnapping. As kidnapping for ransom by the PIRA has now
effectively disappeared in the 1990s, its decline is equally indicative of
a number of issues emergent within the PIRA command structure
relating to logistic and 'support' factors. The outrage expressed by the
general public in the Republic of Ireland during and after the Don
Tidey kidnapping was considerable, and indeed some would say
considerable enough to force PIRA leaders into rethinking about the
utility of this tactic. Would the potential for short-term financial gain
outweigh the potential for possibly longer-term security and practical
political support? Surely not. If it did, it would in turn have further
implications for the PIRA:s use of Southern Command areas for
logistic utility (which could translate into the compromising of security
in training and safe-house resources, arms dumps and so on, which,
as we know, frequently relies on the passivity and implicit support of
local communities). Similarly, with the killings of Gardai such as
Francis Hand and Jerry McCabe, surely the PIRA would be met with
increasingly heavy pressure from the security services in the Republic.
In any event, overt kidnapping operations appear to have ceased
outright and General Order No. 8 appears to have been stressed
increasingly by PIRA leaders from the mid-1980s onwards. Again, this
illustrates how the PIRA is not simply an organization which raises
and spends a lot of money, but is very much in touch with the here
and now, and susceptible to the influence of external factors related to
'support' at many levels. There have been many discussions about
what is perceived to be an 'acceptable' level of paramilitary violence
(regardless of whether or not cease-fires officially exist) and clearly,
killing Gardai does not qualify.

Extortion

Some of the earliest examples of extortion date back to the PIRA's first
attempts at fundraising. The PIRA began in the early 1970s to demand
'protection' money from publicans, local businessmen, shopkeepers
and so on in Northern Ireland, through intimidation and in some
cases, quite overt threats. As Adams 92 described in 1987:

Ten years ago protection would be demanded in a quite

straightforward manner. The gang, typically three or four strong,
would march into the premises, brandish a weapon and demand
money; if the owner did not pay up they might break a few windows or
beat him up.

This rather heavy-handed practice appears to have subsided

somewhat. The 'greening' of the PIRA with the birth of more covert
fundraising activities, including money laundering (as we shall see in
Part 2), appear to have overshadowed overt extortion. In the North, the
establishment of PIRA-controlled security companies has emphasized
that to survive any local 'security threats', hiring the right company to
control security could be a wise choice:
Today, the whole operation has become more sophisticated and
gentlemanly. Any contractor or business new to an area controlled by
one of the paramilitary organizations is approached by representatives
of the group concerned, but now the approach is generally made by an
apparently legitimate security company that has been established by a
terrorist group to provide a legitimate veneer for what remains a
simple racket. These new and apparently legitimate sources of funds
have been increasingly popular among the terrorists. The Belfast
Yellow Pages in 1970 listed only seven security firms for the city but
today there are more than sixty. Of course, the legitimate security
firms have had extraordinary difficulties competing with
terroristsupported ones. Although they may be able to match the
price, they do not benefit from the concealed threat of a beating or
shooting to back up a profit bid.93
In the Republic, the link between the kidnapped Don Tidey, his
employers Associated British Foods, and the PIRA did not end with
the killings in Ballinamore, but extended to what proved to be an
extremely successful attempted extortion directed against Tidey's
employers. The PIRA initially demanded a £5m ransom from Tidey's
company for his return, but this was later reduced to £2m. At the time
of the kidnapping and subsequent rescue of Tidey, Associated British
Foods denied that it had paid a ransom to the PIRA.94 It later
emerged however that in 1984 (the kidnapping occurred in November
1983) the company had actually paid the £2m ransom into a
numbered account at the Swiss Bank Corporation in Zurich.95 The
PIRA had threatened to conduct more attacks and kidnappings
acyamst senior officials of Associated British Foods unless their
demands were met. The money was subsequently transferred to
Ireland through the Bank of Ireland's New York Branch. In November
1985, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, following requests for
information from New Scotland Yard police officials in London,
ordered the Zurich authorities to disclose details of the transactions
involving the extortion. Following a brief appeal from the Swiss Bank
Corporation on the grounds that releasing such information could
endanger the lives of the extortion victims, the Federal Court decided
the release of the details overshadowed such concerns, but that the
obvious security precautions would be adopted.

In that same year, 1985, the Irish government took drastic action and
passed emergency legislation 96 enabling the government to seize
IR£1,750,816.27 from an account in the Navan, Co. Meath, branch of
the Bank of Ireland. Initially neither the Government nor the bank
disclosed the name(s) of the account holders or the actual branch
name, government officials believing that the owners of this money
was the PIRA.97 At the time, the chairman of Associated British Foods
publicly denied that this money was part of the ransom paid by the
company to the PIRA for the release of Tidey,98 although highly-
placed security forces to this day continue to pronounce otherwise.99
Then in 1988, two men claimed ownership of the money, and
proceeded to challenge the constitutionality of the Irish Government's
actions in seizing it. 100 Alan Clancy, an Irishman, and David
McCartney, a Scottish man living in New York, claimed that it was
their money which was in the bank for use in establishing a pig
exporting business. Clancy had approached the Industrial
Development Authority in Ireland about such a business. Clancy is
reported to have had 'a reputation for doing business deals with large
sums of cash'.101 He had in his possession twelve pubs in New York,
and it is said in Republican circles that some of these were actually
paid for in cash. He is described as having been a 'staunch
Republican', well known in NORAID circles, and his New York pubs
have been used on more than one occasion for Republican fundraising
collections. Joseph Doherty, the PIRA member who was wanted on
charges in the UK for shooting a British Army captain, was arrested in
one of Claney's pubs in 1983. Doherty, who was arrested by the FBI,
had been working in Claney's bar under an assumed name.

Unfortunately for Clancy and McCartney, their bid to retrieve their

money failed in the High Court in Dublin. Neither the Irish
Government nor Clancy have ever clarified the 'exact origin of the
sum',102 Clancy apparently not being able to convince the court of
the legality of his holding of the money. Evidence surfaced in 1987,
however, to suggest that the money was to be used for the PIRA and
Sinn Fein in the council elections campaigns of 1985. This would be
one of the first clear examples of PIRA money used by Sinn Fein, and
also one of the first examples from which we have evidence as to how
the financing of a terrorist organization actually limits the potential
success of its political wing. This we will elaborate on in Part 2 in
much more detail. Adams, Morgan and Bambridge write:

The Dublin Government believed the [Bank of Ireland] money had

been earmarked to finance Sinn Fein's council election campaign in
May that year [1985]. Its loss led to a bitter struggle within the IRA
that almost saw [Gerry] Adams' demise. Four hardline members of the
IRA's ruling elite opposed Adams' ballot box strategy, arguing that it
was contributing little to the removal of British rule in Ulster. Only a
special army convention called by Adams and his supporters staved
off defeat; and then only after he had prepared the ground by
expelling four hardliners, including his one-time friend and fellow
Belfast brigade commander Ivor Bell. The victory was a resounding
endorsement of Adams' long-term strategy and increased his grip on
the Republican movement to the extent that the 1988 revenue of £7
million 103 would be split 80%-20% in favour of political activity.104
The important theme of a Sinn Fein-PIRA linkage across financial
dimensions is one much deserving of attention and we will return to
it. Another clear example of attempted extortion became evident in
1988, when the Bank of Ireland in the Republic issued the following
statement to all of its branches:105
SECURITY ALERT - STAFF BRIEF
The Bank has received a demand for £2 million from a paramilitary
group which has identified itself as the Provisional IRA. The demand
was accompanied by an unspecified threat against the Bank. We are
satisfied that this threat should be taken seriously. The Bank's
priority in the face of any threat is the safety of our staff and the
public. This priority can only be effectively served by not acceding to
demands of this nature. We believe that if we ever acceded to such a
demand, we would be placing our staff at greater ultimate risk. The
best advice available to us strongly supports this policy. While it is not
easy to gauge precisely the substance of any threat received, it would
be prudent for all of us to exercise extra vigilance in the weeks ahead
and to adhere fully to security procedures in the interests of both staff
and public.

Extortion is not solely a practice that holds dangers for those on the
receiving end of threats, but also can have wide-ranging implications
for the terrorist group itself. As we have seen, the public image of
paramilitaries in the eyes of the terrorist audience often changes and
widely differs from group to group, and while within a specific group
can change from time to time as was often the case with some of the
Loyalist terrorist groups.106 Internal dissent regarding tactics is not
alien to many terrorist groups -even dissent within the Republican
movement became clear in the wake of the first Enniskillen bombing
in November 1987, when Gerry Adams announced at the party's Ard
Fheis 107 later that such activities (referring to the bombing) would
'have to stop'. Sinn Fein President Adams foresaw the risk of the
Republican movement being portrayed in the same light, or rather
lack of it, as their Loyalist counterparts. This is probably why overt
extortion threats in conjunction with what James Adams described as
'thuggery' in the name of the PIRA appear to have decreased
considerably. This contrasts considerably with the popular image of
the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) which has been seen as a group
of gangsters or 'hoods', with the caricatured image of sun-tanned,
jewellery-wearing 'players', hellbent on gaining easy extortion money
to fund their campaign and holidays in Florida.

James Adams' comment is useful when discussing the metamorphosis

of terrorist movements, particularly the PIRA. The PIRA fundraiser has
become typified as somewhat of a 'bank-clerk' rather than a 'masked
thug'.

To survive, terrorist groups need to cross an economic divide that

separates those who live a hand-to-mouth existence from those who
can actually plan ahead. All those groups who have come and gone ...
have failed to cross that divide. 108

And as we know, with the help of the Cook Report in 1987, the UDA's
involvement in organized criminal acts almost lead to their downfall'
109 - the movement being so fragmented and in such complete
disarray, from which, one could argue, it has never completely
recovered.

Of course, explicit extortion threats still do exist, and it is firmly

believed by security forces on both sides of the border that the PIRA's
alleged involvement in the drug trade relates not to drug dealing, but
directly to extortion of local drug dealers. At another level, the RUC
reported in 1995 that despite the Republican and Loyalist cease-fires,
extortion of money from building contractors and businesspeople
showed a slight increase,110 as did the abuse of tax exemption
procedures and counterfeiting of brand name items. This, also
according to the same report, has been supplemented with a 50 per
cent increase in the number of voluntary disclosures to the police by
representatives of financial institutions regarding what is deemed to
be 'unusually large' financial transactions, or bank accounts denoting
financial transactions which appear inconsistent with personal
income.

To conclude our rudimentary analysis of some initially explored

fundraising areas, it is certain that kidnapping for ransom served as a
lucrative source of PIRA funds until the practice began to cease
following the Tidey incident. Extortion, as with robbery, is yet another
example of a fundraising activity, the true extent of which we may
never know. Kidnapping for ransom is an example of fundraising
which has been specifically chosen by us, not because it is an activity
traditionally associated with terrorist fundraising in Ireland, but
because it is an example of an activity that the PIRA has stopped for
specific reasons. These reasons are indicative of the PIRA's ability to
organizationally and tactically adapt (even in the face of continued
needs (i.e. money) demonstrating an acute awareness of the possible
implications of external influences on the support and security (and
ultimately, survival of) the organization. This is an aspect of PIRA
terrorism more generally illustrated in the development of the PIRNs
command and functional structure, and is part and parcel of PIRA
thinking that will become more evident as we proceed through our
description of its fundraising operations. It seems likely that in the
event of continuing PIRA activity, the organization will continue to use
robberies as a means of gaining funds, but lessons have been learned
from Adare.

Does the PIRA Profit from Drug Dealing?

The three examples discussed above, of all the fundraising avenues
explored by the PIRA, do not match allegations of drug dealing in
terms of the controversy and propaganda frequently associated with
terrorist fundraising. Any discussion of profiting from drugs within the
context of the activities of the PIRA raises controversial issues, as do
any allegations of PIRA influence on the behaviour of anti-drugs
community movements in the south of Ireland in recent times. One
major form of PIRA community activity has been its involvement in
anti-drug activities in inner city Communities, and there is no doubt
that Sinn Fein has gained political benefit from such involvement in
areas including Dublin. 111 On the other hand, there are enormous
financial profits to be made from the drug trade, and any involvement
in the control and distribution of illegal drugs would clearly net the
PIRA much financial gain. This, when taken with other more
traditional terrorist fundraising activities such as robbery, can only
contribute towards the movement's financial survival. However, there
remains considerable evidence to suggest that it is unlikely the PIRA
is involved in direct drug trading. An analysis of internal and external
mitigating factors helps to understand this, primarily related to the
increasing policy since the early 1980s of Sinn Fein to extend its
political base in Ireland through community involvement. The drugs
'issue' has served as a highly effective political rallying point.

Political support for Sinn Fein has grown with its increasingly
consistent stand against drugs in the Republic of Ireland. Martin
Ferris, the senior Sinn Fein member and alleged PIRA strategist,
received over 5,800 first preference votes in his North Kerry
constituency during the 1997 local elections - an unexpectedly high
level of support for this small region. Ferris is known locally for his
fervent anti-drugs campaigning. It seems likely, at least for the
foreseeable future, that the PIRA and Sinn Fein will continue to use
this anti-drug stand as a means of gaining political support in the
Republic. In the long term this greatly offsets any potential loss of
income not being involved in the drugs trade might produce. It is also
important to see, and a worrying potential development, that visible
high profile activity against drug dealing also serves to introduce and
entrench an urban role for PIRA and its associates outside of the
traditional terrorist context, giving it a populist base from which to
develop its activities in the Republic of Ireland. Long term strategic
planning to develop this base is entirely consistent with Sinn Fein's
objectives.112 This is an issue which we expect to receive more
attention amid the formation of the Northern Ireland Assembly
following the Referendum results on the Good Friday Agreement.

Is PIRA In volved in the Drug Trade?: A Further Anallysis of

Internal and External Factors

The issue of the PIRA's alleged involvement in the drug trade is, and
probably will remain, a hazy one. However, we can identify both
internal and external factors that will help understand the nature of
involvement (or lack thereof) in narcotics dealing for a paramilitary
organization such as the PIRA.

One set of factors has more to do with what it is generally believed the
PIRA is involved in. In a sense this is the 'outsider's' view of the PIRA's
involvement in druos, and it is one that is often used as an issue for
propaganda purposes. After all, who is going to believe terrorist
denials of responsibility for drug dealing, when they are so evidently
involved in many other illegal and abhorrent activities? Reasons
suggesting PIRA involvement in drug trading are numerous: Robinson,
113 an expert commentator on financial crimes, has argued that
terrorist groups such as the PIRA demonstrate their ability to be just
as skilled at involvement in money-laundering and organized crime as
do the more traditional 'criminal' gangs such as the oriental Triad and
Yakuza gangs. According to Robinson, the Metropolitan Police in
Britain think that the PIRA does not deal in drugs. He says that
although the Garda Siochana in the Republic has ,openly
contradicted' the London police, referring to instances of marijuana
trafficking in which the PIRA have been involved, 114 there's probably
every reason to believe that the IRA deal in whatever they need in
order to finance their struggle ... and drug dealing is now a
conventional means of turning dirty money into guns'. Robinson does
not clarify PIRA involvement for us, but argues that 'the betting line
must be on the Irish police'.115

However, contrary to Robinson's argument, reasons for the Provisional

IRA not to be involved in drugs are equally numerous, and relate to
the PIRA's strong political and community dimension and their
internal organizational concerns. We have evidence of this internal
view from PIRA intelligence documents obtained by the authors,
including A Reporter's Guide to Ireland (an extremely detailed
intelligence and training manual written and developed by the Official
IRA in the mid-1970s (which later became the basis for the PIRA's
Green Book), but adapted and is still used by the PIRA), which refer to
drugs not in relation to what we might expect to be ideological issues,
but in relation to the organization's internal security and the
leadership's necessary concerns about infiltration and intelligence
procedures:

Drug taking is a hazard, not alone from a health viewpoint, but also
from because of the danger to security and because of the possibility
of infiltration by police agents in the guise of pushers, a technique
frequently employed in other countries and coming into practice here.
If any member is suspected of taking or pushing drugs, careful
inquiries should be made and the matter reported fully as soon as
possible, to the section, unit and command I.0.'s [Intelligence
Officers]. Anyone in any doubt should immediately consult his I.O.

The manual states that in both cases of drugs and infiltration:

The greatest care and tact must be applied to investigation and no
action must he taken without consultation with the D.O.I. [Director of
Intelligence]. This is essential to security and discipline and must not
be disregarded in any way.

In a similar vein, the dangers of alcohol are emphasized:

Volunteers who drink should be warned of the serious dangers of loud
talk in pubs and the likelihood of being indiscreet while drunk. Very
often men under considerable stress drink and relieve their tension by
talking of the problems they are facing. Under no circumstances must
the actions, policies or attitudes of the Movement be discussed in this
fashion. It is dangerous for the man involved and could be disastrous
for his comrades and the actions on which they are engaged.
The Gardai have continuously stated their belief, both publicly and
privately, that one of the two main aims of the PIRA in the Republic of
Ireland is to expand and build on a potential political base, by being
publicly observed and, through Sinn Fein, to be involved in important
and contentious social issues. Such social issues incorporate, as we
have noted, anti-drugs campaigns, housing matters, unemployment
issues, etc., thereby apparently '[enhancing] the organization's
chances of political advancement by winning seats at local council
and parliamentary level.116 By their own reckoning, Sinn Fein
councillors are said to have one of the most, if not the most,
committed records for a political movement in tackling drugs issues:

If we've succeeded in anything like, we've succeeded in focusing

attention on the drug problem, know what I mean? ... and you can't
do much more than that ... because ... our priority is the national
struggle, and we can't allow ourselves be side-tracked then down to be
the police people of the state ... but we have no involvement in drugs.'
117

This man proceeded to illustrate his argument with an example:

A Sinn Fein councillor [was] caught ... Hugh Brady in Derry ... was
caught ... couple of joints in his pocket for smoking - he was expelled
from the movement. The movement doesn't tolerate it.

The movement certainly does not tolerate it. On his release from RUC
custody, Brady received a savage beating at the hands of his PIRA
colleagues. In a case similar to this, but on a much larger and more
significant scale, in October 1992 the PIRA took action against the
drugs problem' when a senior member of the Irish People's Liberation
Organisation (IPLO), a Republican splinter group, was killed and eight
others were wounded following PIRA claims that the IPLO was heavily
involved in drug trading. The IPLO has since been disbanded.

Another related example is worthy of note. What Coogan describes as

a 'highly embarrassing' moment for the PIRA leadership occurred in
August 1979, when the Gardai seized about £1 m worth of cannabis
near Naas in Co. Kildare. 118 One of the men arrested was James
'The Fox' McCann, known as the 'Green Pimpernel' in Republican
circles because of his escape from the Crumlin Road Prison in Belfast.
After arrest, and McCann's transportation to Portlaoise prison in Co.
Laois, the Green Pimpernel was 'badly kicked and beaten by
Provisional prisoners.' 119 The PIRA leadership subsequently issued a
statement denying involvement with McCann or with the incident in
Kildare.

However, while the PIRA may not be directly involved in drug dealing,
many allegations of involvement in drug trading certainly do arise
from the involvement of some former paramilitary figures who become
attracted to more overtly criminal acts:

I know people that were Republicans that are ... there running drugs
... they haven't been members of the Republican movement nearly for
ten years ... right ... there's two or three from Cork ... ex ... ex-IRA a
couple of years .......120

The following statement is from a senior Sinn Fein member,121 and

according to the Irish police, a 1997 Army Council delegate:

Regarding drugs ... if I thought for one minute that the Republicans
were involved with drugs ... or anything to do with drugs ... I would be
straight out of it ... and I have been involved in it 26 years like ... I can
honestly say ... and I have my hand on my heart here, and my heart
to God ... that I have never ever ... I never knew of any Republican, as
a Republican, being involved in any of that kind of stuff ... I know
people who were Republicans ... they left the Republican movement,
and they became involved in drugs.

Coogan 122 recommends that:

The constant black propaganda about drug-trafficking may be
discounted ... the fact of being implicated through the capture of a
man once prominently associated with the IRA in gun-running was
both infuriating, and particularly where their conservative supporters
both in Ireland and Arnerica were concerned, was potentially highly
damaging to the Provisionals.123
The man in question was Joseph Paul Murray who pleaded guilty with
two others in a Boston court to charges of smuggling arms to the PIRA
on board the Marita Ann and its supply ship Valhalla, along with the
trafficking of marijuana into the United States (the 'riding shotgun' on
a drug shipment referred to earlier by Robinson). Murray, a well-
known Boston crime figure, and his colleagues pleaded guilty to
'lesser charges' while impending charges of racketeering were dropped
along with promises to lower the recommended sentences.

The image of the PIRA as popular protectors from the drugs epidemic
in urban areas can be seen through some of their operations. On 31
March 1996, the PIRA intercepted a drug cache destined for south Co.
Down, and alerted the RUC to the whereabouts of the hijacked
shipment that contained an estimated £20,000 worth of cannabis. The
RUC was quoted as being 'very pleased' at this recovery, and it is
believed this was not an isolated incident. However, some recent
events indicate a somewhat more accurate witness to the complex
nature of the strong opposition of the PIRA to the drugs scourge, and
relate to the group 'Direct Action Against Drugs' or DAAD. A string of
brutal deaths indicated that a systematic effort was made during
1995-96, and again in February 1998 to target known, or presumed,
drug dealers. This seems to have been a reflection of a change of
policy by the PIRA leadership in Northern Ireland, taking a clearer and
more energetic stand against drug activity, and using a front name of
Direct Action Against Drugs to claim responsibility. In February 1998,
the DAAD killed drug dealer Brendan 'Bap' Campbell, whose murder
formed half of the case (the killing of UDA member Robert Dougan
was the second half) for Sinn Fein's expulsion from the multi-party
political talks later that month.124

It is clear therefore that the PIRA does have a strong relationship with
the drug trade per se. It remains unclear, however, not only
concerning the PIRA's murder of Northern Ireland drua dealers, but
regarding incidents which have involved the PIRA with criminals in
the Republic, as to the principal reason why these drug dealers are
either threatened or killed. Is it primarily related to extortion or
attempted extortion (which would almost effortlessly gain much
reward for the PIRA), or does this primarily happen so that the PIRA
can raise support at a 'ground level' among the communities from
which come PIRA members, both Northern and Southern? Or perhaps
it has the dual purpose of both outcomes? Certainly, extortion from
drug dealers as part of fundraising modus operandi has received
much media attention. Tommy 'The Boxer' Mullen, a notorious Dublin
drug dealer, fled to England in 1996 while claiming that he was on the
run from the PIRA.125

According to the Royal Ulster Constabulary 126 (RUC), the PIRA

involvement in the drug trade relates to a far more 'detached' practice
than some of their Loyalist counterparts demonstrate:

They [the PIRA] attempt to adopt a public stance that they abhor the
use of drugs ... that belies the fact that they have in the past, and
certainly do at present, derive funding from the drugs trade ... the
Loyalist paramilitary organizations are much more directly involved in
the straightforward drugs dealing. The IRA tend to be two or three
steps removed.

This 'removed state' is deemed by the RUC to be 'licensing' some of the

Northern Ireland drug gangs to deal in drugs, while the PIRA
subsequently profits from extortion. Vincent Kearney elaborates on
what he terms the 'hidden agenda to IRA hits on drug dealers': 127

There is evidence that DAAD is being used not to eliminate the sale of
drugs, but to enable the IRA to control the lucrative trade. Police and
dealers say the IRA controls the distribution of drugs to criminals on
both sides of the border. Narcotics are smuggled into Ireland through
Dublin and Cork and distributed after prices and quantities are
agreed at meetings in hotels in Dundalk and Drogheda. The IRA does
not handle the drugs, but oversees the operation and takes a
percentage from each deal. In return, it sanctions the dealers'
activities and moves against their opponents.

An associate of Brendan Campbell, the drug dealer killed by DAAD,

points to a police seizure of ecstasy tablets with a street value of over
£67,000 found in a PIRA stronghold area of west Belfast,
Ballymurphy, once the home of Gerry Adams. Kearney quotes sources
as saying:

He [Campbell] was not killed because the IRA is opposed to drugs but
because he wouldn't play the game by their rules ... the IRA is up to
its neck in drugs. Nobody would even think of selling drugs in west
Belfast unless it [the PIRA] gave the ok. The IRA could wipe out the
drugs scene in nationalist areas in a very short time, but it doesn't
want to. It only wants to wipe out the opposition.

For the moment, we can conclude, as a Research Institute for the

Study and Conflict and Terrorism (RISCT) report has done in 1991
128 that regarding alleged PIRA involvement in drugs, 'until there is
clear cut evidence to back up these allegations it would be wise to
suspend judgement'.

Conclusions

One aspect of writing about terrorism, and perhaps especially on

terrorist organizations, is that we have a tendency sometimes to
overestimate the threat posed. We, having a background in academic
psychology, do not share the opinion that we can overestimate the
abilities of the Provisional IRA as an effective terrorist organization.
This, to some, may seem superfluous to mention, but it does merit
careful consideration. Certainly, the PIRA is an organization in
constant flux, and researchers and PIRA/terrorism commentators as
much as law enforcement officials should be equally as open to
acceptance of the implications.
Here in Part 1 of this article, we have begun to describe a set of
activities that have, to say the least, traditionally not received very
much attention in the terrorism literature, except by way of anecdotal
evidence or black propaganda. Admittedly, very little is actually known
by way of empirical research about terrorist fundraising as a whole,
let alone those 'local' operations in Ireland which the Provisional IRA
has organized, or gained from, and the kind with which this article
concerns itself. We already know that a complex administration and
support network is necessary for any of the 'bigger' terrorist
organizations such as the PIRA and ETA to live, survive and evolve. As
we will see, the funding of terrorist acts ranges from the much
simpler, straightforward and 'public' act of robbery or extortion
described here, to the more secretive and certainly much more
sophisticated, yet still surprisingly straightforward, money- laundering
operations, details of which we will describe in Part 2.

From discussion of some of the PIRA's fundraising operations and

using specific examples, the relative complexity of the issues
surrounding involvement in certain forms of fundraising (e.g. armed
robbery) to the exclusion of others (e.g. drug trading) has hopefully
been illustrated. Some of the specific internal organizational issues
(e.g. following the Adare shooting) and factors surrounding
involvement in such activity are indicative of an acute awareness by
PIRA leaders of the environments within which they and their
members operate. It is clear also that the PIRAs involvement in drug
trading may not only affect the PIRA's operational development and
successes in terms of potential 'active' support in the South, but also
in the development and sustenance of public popular support for Sinn
Fein. Part 2 of this article builds on the descriptive material presented
here, with an explanation of how and why the PIRA's leaders have
decided to create money-laundering schemes to sustain the
organization's finances. Money laundering illustrates how the PIRA
have evolved into a sophisticated money-making organization, and
how that organization understands the implications of tactical and
strategic planning and adaptation in the face of continuous internal
and external pressures.

Whatever the case, it is clear, however, that we have very often been
guilty of misperceiving the terrorist threat. Perhaps this may be
changing. As the RUC Chief Constable's Report of 1994 states,
'further progress was made in 1994 in stemming the flow of funds and
in securing convictions. Extensive investigations into this multi-
million pound area of criminality are continuing and further
prosecutions are anticipated. It is an understandable worry that one
legacy of terrorism will be the entrenchment of organized crime in
Northern Ireland and the RUC is fully alive to this public concern. It is
our intention that the sophisticated resources brought to bear on
terrorists' financial crime will be applied to preventing the
continuation and development of racketeering in peace-time.'
Hopefully, this kind of recognition that terrorists no longer simply
shoot and bomb, will effectively grow. Their activities can be, and are,
much broader in their scope and nature.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to express our gratitude to the editor, David Rapoport,

and to three anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments and
suggestions for improving this article.

NOTES

1. J. Adams. 'The Financing of Terror'. in P. Wilkinson and A.M.

Stewart (eds), Contemporary Research of Terrorism (Aberdeen:
Aberdeen UP 1987) p.401. Although over 10 years old. Wilkinson and
Stewart's collection of contributions remains a cornerstone of
academic and policy-oriented research. Within this volume is
presented James Adams' research on terrorist fundraising - probably
the most detailed descriptions and analyses of this topic, including
the fundraising activities of the Provisional IRA. Adams' account
remains unrivalled.

2. A preliminary attempt to address the organizational context to

Provisional IRA terrorism was described in J. Horgan and M. Taylor.
'The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional
Structure.' Terrorism and Political Violence (TPV) 9/3 (Autumn 1997)
pp. 1-32. For a similar look at Loyalist terrorism, see J. Cusack and
M. Taylor. 'Resurgence of a Terrorist Organization Part 1: The UDA, a
Case Study', TPV 513 (Autumn 1993) pp. 1-27.

3. This has been the case even for the older. original IRA and their
sporadic 'Border campaign' of the. 1950s. Although several reasons
contributed to the nature and extent of this short period of guerrilla
activity for the IRA, the question of resources was always a very
practical concern to the organization at this time. For a worthy
discussion of Loyalist fundraising efforts, refer to Steve Bruce. The
Red Hand: Protestant Paramililitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford:
OUP 1992) and for an insightful account of fundraising issues and
developments within the Ulster Defence Association up to 1993, see J.
Cusack and M. Taylor (note 2). Also for a detailed look at specific
examples, see A. Silke, 'In Defence of the Realm: Financing Loyalist
Terrorism in Northern Ireland, Part One: Extortion and Blackmail',
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 2 1/4 (1998). pp.331-61.

4. The PIRA itself owes its origins to a split in which the future PIRA
divided from the older, original IRA in a dispute largely centred
around the then IRA leadership's invocation of an increased socialist
political struggle throughout Ireland.

5. For example, in 1971, the Dutch police foiled an attempted

shipment of 166 crates of arms to the PIRA from Schipol airport near
Amsterdam (T. P. Coogan, The IRA (London: HarperCollins 1995)
p.433). Two years later. in March 1973, the fishing trawler Chiltdia
was apprehended in Irish territorial waters following a concerted
multi-agency intelligence effort. On board the trawler was not only,
the then PIRA chief Joe Cahill, but over five tonnes of arms and
ammunition given to the PIRA by Libyan sympathisers (J.
BoxkyerBell, The Secret Army: The IRA 1916-1979 (Dublin: Poolbell
Press Ltd 1989) p.398). The shipment contained over 450 rifles and
small arms, explosives and anti-tank mines. More arms shipments
were intercepted by police in Canada in 1975 (Coogan, p.433) and
Dublin in 1977 (ibid.) and in Sept. 1984. another huge seizure saw
the Irish Naval Service intercept the trawler Marita Ann. off the south
west coast of Ireland near Co. Kerry. The boat contained 7 tonnes of
arms, including over 160 pistols, machine guns and rifles, 11 bullet-
proof vests, over 70.000 rounds of ammunition. rockets, weapons
Manuals and grenades, de-bugging equipment and voice distortion
equipment ('Three jailed for smuggling arms to IRA', trish Times
(Dublin), 1 July 1984). One of these men. Martin Ferris. from Ardfert
in Co. Kerry, later became (and remains to this day ) a senior Sinn
Fein member). At least two, but perhaps up to four arms shipments
from Middle Eastern sympathisers, primarily Colonel Ghadaffi
(encouraging the PIRA's campaign against Britain following the
American bombing of Libya in 1986, using British-launched jets)
preceded the capture of yet another vessel: 0n 1 Nov. 1987, French
customs officials seized the Eksund off the coast of Brittany, north-
west France. Over 150 tonnes of aims were aboard the trawler,
Composing of twenty SAM-7s [surface-to-air missiles], 1.000 AK-47s.
600 grenades, ten heavy duty machine-guns. anti-tank guns, Beretta
machine-guns, 50 tons of ammunition and two tons of the powerful
plastic explosive, Semtex H' (J. Adarns, R. Morgan. and A. Bambridge.
Ambush: The Secret War between the SAS and the IRA (London: Pan
Books 1988) P. 185). To date, this has been the largest ever shipment
of PIRA arms ever seized.

6. Interview with the first author. Unless otherwise indicated,

references to security forces denote that material is sourced from
direct interviews conducted by one or both of the authors.

7. For good examples. see M. Carolan, 'Huge explosive haul dwarfs

seizures unearthed in Ireland'. Irish News, 24 Sept. 1996: E. Keogh,
'Explosives found as Garda search extended in Louth', Irish Times
(Dublin), 28 Nov. 1996: and L. Clarke, 'Farmland conceals huge IRA
arsenal', Sunday Times (London and Dublin). 2 Jan. 1994.

8. See CM. Drake. 'The Provisional IRA: A Case Study' TPV 3/2
(Summer 1991) pp.43-60.

9. For a excellent general overview of the activities of the PIRA, see

Drake (note 8).

10. See L. Allen. 'IRA units are still 'alive and kicking'. The Sunday
Tribune (Dublin). 23 June 1996, p. 12. Allen cites Gardai as noting
'They are now going to legitimate engineering works and placing
orders as if in the building business'.

11. See, e.g.. D. Ljunggren. 'London security measures stepped up

after blast'. Reuters, 10 Feb. 1996, and J. Cusack, 'Surveillance pays
off with Garda bomb find'. Irish Times (Dublin). 19 Feb. 1997.

12. A 'Garda' or 'Garda Siochana' is an Irish police officer. 'An Garda

Siochana, is the Irish police force.

13. M. Crenshaw. 'Decisions to Abandon Terrorism: A Preliminary

Case Study of the IRA' (paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association. Chicago Hifton. 31 Aug-
3 Sept. 1995) p.5.

14. See M. Taylor and J. Horgan. 'The 1994-96 Provisional IRA Cease-
fire in Northern Ireland', TPV. forthcoming.

15. A similar figure was reported by Allen (note 10). Liz Allen, a
respected crime journalist in Ireland, draws on material from what she
describes as 'well placed, senior intelligence sources in the Republic'.

16. Interview with security forces in the Republic.

17. See V. Guerin, 'IRA used cease-fire to plan bomb campaign',

Sunday Independent (Dublin), 23 June 1996, p.7. This is one of the
few reliable media articles to describe PIRA fundraising activities.

18. A similar figure again was reported by Allen (note 10).

19. See note 2.

20. J. Horgan, J. Cusack and M. Taylor. 'The 'Kevin Brady Manual: An
Example of Terrorist Training Material' (Department of Applied
Psychology. University College Cork). Copies available on request from
the first author.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.
23. M. McGartland, Fifty Dead Men Walking (London: Blake
Publishing Lid 1997) pp. 182-3.

24. Ibid., p. 182.

25. Interviews conducted by first author with security forces.

26. For a different set of estimates, see McGartland (note 23) p. 182,
noting that 'all IRA cell members received £10 per week and the cell
commanders received between £30-£50 per week'.

27. Ibid., p. 182.

28. At least 400 members receiving at least £30 amounts to £ 12.000.

29. See Taylor and Horgan (note 14). The cost of this man's views
becoming known to other 'doubters' of the peace process could have
been phenomenal, as happened with the PIRA's Quartermaster
General who, with a small cadre of dissenters, left the PIRA to form
the 'Real IRA', responsible for the Omagh bombing in 1998.

30. Part 2 of this article discusses in greater detail the association

between what has been virtually sectioned as 'Sinn Fein-IRA' and the
mutual membership by individual, in both organizations'. In some
cases, this is seen to be especially true with respect to Republican
fundraising.

31. See Taylor and Horgan (note 14).

32. S. Anderson, 'Making a Killing', Harpers Magaine 288. 1 Feb.
1994.

33 See Adams (note 1 ) p.397.

34. See McGartland (note 23).

35. See note 1.

36. The first author attended many Republican fundraiser 'functions'
in pubs in Cork to observe the different amounts of cash being gained
from very legitimate activities (perhaps in 3-4 hours, the Sinn Fein
purse would easily net £1,200).

37. For a very detailed account of these procedures refer to Adams

(note 1)

38. The Garda Siochina has often referred to examples of this.

39. See note 2.

40. Interviews conducted by first author with security forces and
members of the PIRA in the Republic. Also see notes 2 and 14.

41. Cited in S. Cronin, Irish Nationalism: Its Roots and Ideology

(Dublin: Academy Press 1980).

42. interview conducted by first author with security forces. This was
all official estimate for 1988 made by, An Garda Siochana in 1990.

43. See 'MP calls for tough laws against IRA racketeering', The
Independent (London), 6 Nov.1990. This estimate is from the Northern
Ireland Office, as described in 'Northern Ireland: Reappraising
Republican Violence - A Special Report'. Conflict Studies 246, Nov-
Dec. 199 1. pp. 1-29.

44. T. Brady, 'Era of the Renegade IRA', Irish Independent (Dublin). 23

Dec. 1994.

45. Anderson. 'Making a Killing' (note 32),

46. 'IRA rackets busted'. The Sun (London). 20 April 1994.

47. S. Pogatchnik. 'N. Ireland - Law Vs. Order'. Associated Press. 21
Dec. 1995.

48. See Sunday Times (London and Dublin). 12 March 1995. in

Crenshaw (note 13).

49. Series of interviews conducted by the first author.

50. D. Henderson. 'Cash-hit Loyalists behind security raid', Press
Association News. 14 April 1996. This estimate of £10m covers the
PIRA and the then principal Loyalist terrorist groups, the UDA/UFF
and the UVF

51. M. Shechan. 'Police move to seize IRA businesses'. Sunday Times

(London and Dublin).30 April 1996.

52. These specific interviews were with security forces based in the
Republic of' Ireland.

53. See B. Cordes. B. M. Jenkins and K. Kellen, 'A Conceptual

Framework for Analysing Terrorist Groups'. RAND Corporation (Jun.
1985) esp. p.106.

54. This figure has been repeated throughout the course of interviews
conducted by the authors with different members of the security
forces North and South.

55. M. Taylor. The Terrorist (Brasseys: London 1988) p.52.

56. See Coogan (note 5) p.522.

57. Ibid., p.522.

58. Ibid., p.522.

59. Ibid., p.523.

60. See C. Parkin, 'New hope of solving Shergar mystery'. Press
Association News, 4 April 1996.

61. See Coogan (note 5) p.523.

62. Ibid., p.523.

63. Ibid., p.524.

64. Guinness was released without injuries and without a ransom

having been paid. Coogan (note 5. p.524) concludes, 'the only good
thing to be said about kidnappings in the period is that the Gardai
showed a consistent and successful record against them. Throughout
the 1980s, INLA Units. as well as some particular criminal gangs were
seen to mirror Provo kidnappings (as demonstrated through the
Guinness kidnapping). not only through actual kidnapping itself but
also through the frequent issue of kidnap threats, (ibid.. pp.52 1-4).
The Loyalists were not unaware of the effectiveness and potential
profit of such exploits. Soon after the Don Tidey incident, Loyalist
paramilitaries 'promptly counterattacked by, demanding a like
amount of money from stores owned by Associated British Foods in
Ireland. There were some reports of vegetables being poisoned,
causing the Quinnsworth chain to install videos carrying warnings to
shoppers and requests to report anything suspicious. This episode
petered out without it being ascertained whether or not the Loyalists
had received any money' (ibid.. p.524).

65. J. Cusack. 'Co-ordinated British effort to combat IRA is paying

off". Irish Times (Dublin), 28 Sept. 1996.

66. Her case is not isolated. In 1996. PIRA member and Brixton Prison
escapee, Nessan Quinlivan was charged in Dublin with falsely
imprisoning a man in Limerick. and in Nov. 1995, a five-man PIRA
ASU. armed with hammers and pistols, kidnapped a 19 year-old man
from Strabane. in Co. Tyrone. tying him up and forcing him into a car
which was later found burned out in the countryside near the border.
This type of behaviour is commonly seen among Ireland's paramilitary
groups, and often in the context of internal security matters.

67. See Taylor (note 55) p.52.

68. Robert P. Clark, The Basque Insurgews. ETA: 1952-1980
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1984).

69. See Taylor (note 55) p.52.

70. In 1974. PIRA active service unit hijacked a priceless art collection
owned by Lady Clementine Beit, the widow of former Tory MP Sir
Alfred Beit. The gang broke into their home, the Russborough
mansion in Blessington, Co Wicklow, bound and gagged the couple
and stole 19 paintings worth over £8m (Coogan (note 5) p.406). On 31
March 1976, a PIRA unit robbed the Cork-Dublin train at Co. Kildare
of over £220.000 in an operation planned by, the PIRA long in
advance of the actual robbery, a raid that was even considered by the
INLA because of the nature of the potential reward. In 1979. Patrick
Aaron 'Arnie' O'Connell from Cork was charged with the inurder of
Eamonn Ryan, shot dead in a robbery in the Bank of Ireland. in
Strand Street. Tramore. Co. Waterford on 7 Aug. 1979. O'Connell was
also charged with the armed robbery, of' £5.400 from the bank and
membership ofthe PIRA (also charged with the robbery, front the bank
was, William Hayes from Waterford. Hayes was also charged of being a
member of PIRA). In Aug. 1984. an ASU robbed a cash delivery van ill
Drumcree. Co. Meath. and in doing so, Shot dead Garda Francis Hand
(See 'A dozen other Gardai killed in last 26 years'. Irish Times
(Dublin). 8 June 1996). In May 1990. a 6-member ASU attempted to
rob a bank in Enniscorthy, Co. Wexford. The ASU was led by one of
the relatively few female Irish terrorists. and opened fire on Garda'
during the raid (J. Cusack. 'IRA unit caused Gardai increasing worry',
Irish Times (Dublin). 8 June 1996). In June 1994. the head of the
PIRA in Minister was believed to have been responsible for the robbery
of £95.000 in Co. Limerick. He was also believed responsible for a
double bank raid in neighbouring Co. Cork in Jan. 1994 (see Allen.
note 10). In Nov. 1994. three months inside the PIRA cease-fire, an
ASU shot and killed postal worker Frank Kerr. in Newry. Co. Down
during a post office raid (J. Cusack. 'Armed robberies persisted during
cease-fire'. Irish Times (Dublin). 10 June 1996). Within two months.
PIRA members in Co. Monaghan conducted all armed robbery, of a
local Cash and Carry, outlet (ibid.). In June 1996 in Adare, Co.
Limerick in the Republic of Ireland, a small ASU of the Munster
Brigade shot two Garda detectives, killing one of' them (Detective
Garda Jerry McCabe) in a botched raid. The gang had intended to rob
the post office delivery van of its contents. Pearse McCauley. the
Brixton Prison escapee was charged in Dublin on 4 Dec. 1997 with
the murder of McCabe. and of' conspiring with Michael O'Neill.
Jeremiah Sheehy, Pat Walsh and others to commit the robbery (see
'MCCauley charged with murder of Garda McCabe'. Irish Times
(Dublin). 5 Dec. 1997). The Munster Brigade ofthe PIRA's Southern
Command, including the ASU that killed McCabe, is one of the main
units in the country responsible for robberies. a unit believed to be
generally quite proficient at this.

71.Compiled front: J. Cusack and M. M. Tynan. 'Government accepts

IRA killed Garda in Adare'. Irish Times (Dublin). 14 June 1996: C.
Parkin. 'Police shooting: second man in court'. Press Association
New's. 12 June 1996: other Irish Times excerpts front 8, 10. 11 June
1996.

72. See C. Parkin. 'IRA denies killing Irish policeman'. Press

Association News. 7 June 1996.

73. Radio Telefis Eireann. the Irish state broadcasting agency.

74. See Parkin (note 72). and 'IRA denies involvement in Limerick
shooting,'. An Phoblacht/Republican (Dublin and Belfast). 13 June
1996.

75. J. Cusack and S. Breen. 'Reputed head of Minister IRA arrested

over killing'. Irish Times (Dublin). 10 June 1996.

76. The Green Book is the PIRA's training manual, issued to each new
recruit and the material front which is used as a basis for lectures in
training.

77. V. Guerin . IRA used cease-fire to plan bomb campaign'. Sunday

Independent (Dublin), 23 June 1996.

78. Ibid.
79. The mandatory sentence for murdering a Garda is 40 years
imprisonment without remission.

80. See Silke (note 3) and Cusack and Taylor (note 2).

81. Coogan (note -5) p.581.

82. Our use of apparent generalities. e.g.. when we mention the

variety, of distribution (of financial income for each 'PIRA member')
should riot be seen as a form of safeguarding against incorrectness -
rather it should be seen as a real and practical aspect of life, for any
Republican, be he/she an active member of the PIRA or not. This
'heterogeneity mirrored when we discuss the psychology of the
terrorist and examine the false assumption of the existence of so-
called terrorist 'profiles'.

83. Officer Commanding or Officer Commandeering.

84. See McGartland (-note 23) p. 183.

85. E. Collins and M. McGovern. Killing Rage (London: Granta Books

1997) p.103. Collins was found dead with multiple stab wounds on
Wednesday. 27 Jan. At the time of writing, responsibility for the
murder has not been attributed.

86. J. Cusack, 'IRA killed more during cease-fire than since ending'.
Irish Times (Dublin), 19 July 1997.

87. Coogan (note 6) p.480.

88. R. Debray. Revolution in the Revolution (New York: MR Press
1967).

89. See note 2.

90. See, e.g.. E. Keogh. 'Explosives found as Garda search extended in

Louth", Irish Times (Dublin), 28 Nov. 1996.

91. One security force member in the Republic described areas, of Co.
Limmerick as 'worse than Crossmaglen' (interview conducted by the
first author). Also see M. Taylor and J. Horgan 'The 1994-96
Provisional IRA Cease-fire in Northern Ireland' (note 14).

92. Adams (note 1) p.394,

93. Ibid.

94. See 'Swiss bank ordered to disclose IRA fund details', Irish Times
(Dublin), 21 Nov. 1985.

95. Ibid.
96. Offences Against the State Act (Amendment) 1985.

97. E. Shanahan, 'Bank transfers £1.7m IRA funds to court". Irish

Times (Dublin). 21 Feb. 1985.

98. Ibid.

99. Interviews with the first author.

100. See 'Court to decide oil £ 1.75m'. Irish Times (Dublin). 27 April
1988.
101. J. Cusack. Money lot pig exporting or funds to help the IRA?'.
Irish Times (Dublin), 5 May 1988.

102. Ibid.

103.This source's estimate is not included in Table 1.

104. J. Adams. R. Morgan and A. Barnbridge, Ambush: The War
between the SAS and the IRA (London: Pan Books 1988). pp.38-9.

105. Document show n to the authors.

106. See Bruce (note 3) and Cusack and Taylor (note 2).

107. Annual Party Conference.

108. Adams (note 1 ) p.401,

109. See Cusack and Taylor (note 2).

110. Royal Ulster Constabulary Chief Constable's Report 1995.
Published by the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

111. See Taylor and Horgan (note 14).

112. Throughout discussions such as this, many commentators argue

that Sinn Fein politicians become involved in anti-drugs activities
because of 'caring for their communities'. While the issue of
motivation as it might relate to fundraising will be addressed in Part 2
of this article, there is a considerable body of evidence (apart from the
nature and extent of paramilitary punishment attacks and killings of
suspected drug dealers) to Support an altogether more practical and
realistic view.

113. J. Robinson, The Laundrymen (London: Simon & Schuster Ltd

1995).

114. Ibid., p. 213.

115. Ibid.

116. Interview conducted by first author.

117. Interview with Sinn Fein Ard Comhairle member.

118. Coogan (note 5) p.430.

119. Ibid. Back

120. Interview with senior PIRA member.

121. Interviewed by the first author in 1997.

122. T.P. Cougar. The Troubles.. Ireland's Ordeal 1960-1995 and The
Search for Peace (London: Hutchinson 1995) p.213.
123. Coogan (note 5) p.430.
124. The RUC said in 1996 that it "was in no doubt that the DAAD
killings were sanctioned by the PIRA leadership. One officer said that
the PIRA increased its attacks on alleged drugs dealers because they
feared they were losing their grip on nationalist areas in the light of
the 1994-96 cease-fire. Other observers in Belfast believe that the
1994-96 shootings were a way of 'letting off steam' among PIRA
activists, deemed to be frustrated at the slow pace of the peace
process. The much forwarded suggestion however, that Loyalist
paramilitaries would have wasted little time in retaliating if this were
so has some credibility. Security sources in the Republic have
commented on the concern which the PIRA Southern Command have
had about 'unleashing' their activists in the south. Information from
the families of the DAAD victims helps in understanding the
development of DAAD. Some family members of victims denied
outright their loved ones' involvement in the drug trade, but others
more interestingly point to 'personality clashes' with some PIRA
figures in positions of authority. Veronica Guerin has argued that
PIRA supporters are apparently exploiting Dublin city's drug epidemic
through exercising their 'Republican muscle' in order to drive drug
dealers out of communities. Guerin believes that these supporters are
playing to a plan devised by PIRA strategists. She cites Gardai as
saying that even these vigilantes are 'made to feel important': The idea
is they will encourage support for Sinn Fein at the next election
because they will have driven the pushers out' (see V. Guerin. 'IRA
used cease-fire to plan bomb campaign', Sunday Independent
(Dublin). 23 June 1996). Subsequent electoral results seem to have
upheld this assertion.

125. R. Balls, 'No hero in communities which he exploited',Irish Times

(Dublin) 16 Jan. 1998.

126. H. MacDonell, 'MPs told of paramilitary ecstasy rake-off-. Press

Association News, 1 May 1996.

127. V. Kearney, 'Hidden Agenda to IRA hits on drug dealers", Sunday

Times (London and Dublin), 15 Feb. 1998.

128. 'Northern Ireland: Reappraising Republican Violence - A Special

Report'. Conflicl Studies (note 43).
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Playing the 'green card' - financing the provisional IRA: part 2

John Horgan; Max. Taylor

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 152tpv01.qxd 20/10/03 11:15 Page 1

Playing the ‘Green Card’ –

Financing the Provisional IRA: Part 2

J O H N H O R G A N A N D M A X . TAY L O R

This is the second of two articles detailing aspects of the financial operations of the
Provisional IRA (PIRA). While the first article highlighted some of the socio-
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organizational factors both underpinning and limiting the nature and extent of certain
fundraising activities by the PIRA, this article presents details of activities traditionally
elusive to empirical enquiry. Two case studies conducted between 1996 and 1999 – of
domestic money laundering and money-lending activities by the PIRA in the Republic
of Ireland – are summarized here and highlight a number of themes deserving of
further exploration. These include the opportunistic nature of some PIRA strategies,
the entrepreneurial nature of its financial investments, and significantly, the relatively
unsophisticated nature and mixed successes of some of its money-laundering
practices. Based on the analysis presented, the emergent challenges posed by such
activities for counter-terrorist, societal, and civil efforts, while numerous, are not
insurmountable in light particularly of the PIRA’s failure to effectively manage its
financial activities as successful as it might be assumed.

Introduction
Northern Ireland has seen significant change since the mid-1990s. The
terrorist ceasefires, initially greeted with a sense of euphoria by the greater
populace, have over time introduced relative stability and increased
prosperity to the region. Such progress continues to be greeted by
international support of the peace process, despite ever-present local crises
and drama. But as with so many ethno-nationalist conflicts, the underlying
forces sustaining the bases to the conflict – particularly those of ethnic and
socio-political identity, mutual mistrust reinforced by a variety of stressors
on both sides – remain challenging and continue to fuel civil and political
unrest at local levels. As a result, and despite the largely inevitable token
gestures of arms decommissioning following the events of 11 September
2001, unfamiliar audiences need be wary of what progress is truly being
made by the paramilitaries and their political fronts in Northern Ireland:
Reports that some weapons have been put beyond use are, of course,
welcome. But when acts of decommissioning are swiftly followed by
further evidence of continued gunrunning, intimidation and brutal
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.15, No.2 (Summer 2003), pp.1–60
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
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2 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

physical assaults, including on children, by paramilitary organizations

that have declared themselves to be on ceasefire, it is difficult not to
feel a sense of hypocrisy.1
This quotation was used to set the scene for a recent, yet obscure discussion
found in a report published on 2 July 2002 by the House of Commons
Northern Ireland Affairs Committee on terrorist fundraising, which the
report describes as one of the enduring legacies of the conflict. The report
details, with frank testimonials, the array of organized criminal activity in
which paramilitary groups on both sides remain rooted, despite the political
advances made by their respective front organizations.
The present article describes some of the results of a research study
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conducted from the Department of Applied Psychology, University College,

Cork on the financial operations of the Provisional IRA in the Republic of
Ireland. It is the second of two articles, the first of which was published in
this journal in 1999. While the first article addressed better-known methods
of raising terrorist monies, this article illustrates fundraising activities that
have not received empirical investigation from scholars to date. It is
modestly hoped that the conclusions from both this and the first article will
serve to fuel further interest particularly from the research community into
these complex activities.

The Study
Between late 1995 and 1999, the first author employed a variety of research
methods to investigate several organizational themes thought to both
underpin and limit the operations of the Provisional IRA. Whilst the overall
purpose of the research was to illustrate how psychological approaches to
terrorism frequently fail to adequately incorporate such themes into their
models, two major aspects of the PIRA formed the basis of three case
studies. The first involved a case study of the PIRA’s command and
functional structure.2 The second involved a detailed examination of the
PIRA’s financial operations: two case studies on the latter were
reconstructed over the research period in an attempt to present an insight
into the nature of what some assume to represent the most sophisticated of
all terrorist financing activities.
While the research process employed is described in detail elsewhere,3
case-study and archive research, participant-observation, and semi-
structured and structured interviews with over 300 participants from a
variety of backgrounds in the Northern Ireland conflict (for example, police
officers, academics, journalists, paramilitaries, politicians and others)
provided the details from which the case studies are reconstructed.
Throughout the research, and under close academic scrutiny, the highest
 152tpv01.qxd 20/10/03 11:15 Page 3

PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 3

possible level of rigour was employed to ensure the validity, reliability and
accuracy of the case studies, both with respect to individual details and
overall conclusions. In keeping with ethical concerns, the identities of those
interviewed, or described, and/or specific businesses described have been
substituted with pseudonyms – unless otherwise stated, or in the case of
examples taken from existing open sources. In all other instances in which
individuals are identified by name, such names are fictitious. While the
reader may thus question the veracity of any of the material presented, it
must be stated that the entire research process was closely supervised from
the authors’ academic institution. It must also be stated that An Garda
Siochana, the Irish police force, were already aware of details of the case
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studies provided.
The origins of the cases selected for further exploration were rather
auspicious. While the original research questions, developed in 1995,
incorporated a large case study of the PIRA’s organizational structure, the
study was gradually extended in early 1996 to include PIRA financial
operations. Despite the scarcity of data on paramilitary fundraising, a brief
but fascinating glimpse into PIRA financial operations slowly emerged
from the research effort. In fact, this effort at systematically examining
PIRA fundraising in the Republic of Ireland began following a fortuitous
informal discussion with a Garda in the Republic of Ireland in early 1996,
upon which an internal document was subsequently made available to the
first author for study.
The statement had been made by a man identified as ‘an important
intelligence agent’ – a PIRA member working as an informer for the Gardaí.
The Garda added that the details in the statement were ‘no secret’ as,
apparently, ‘the stuff is going to appear in a book sooner or later… anyway,
it’s old… we use it for some in house training’. The statement was dated to
the ‘mid-1980s’, but no exact date was provided. Another Garda, a detective
with long counter-terrorist experience, recalled that the statement relates to
a known PIRA meeting held in 1981 in a pub in Bundoran, Co. Donegal,
and that one of the main concerns of that meeting related to the future
financing of the PIRA. It is worth including part of the statement to
understand the specific concerns of the then PIRA leadership. Permission
was granted to use the following opening section of the statement, and the
Gardaí said that the remainder of it (not cited here) could be examined for
‘personal interest’. Where appropriate, names have been replaced with
descriptions of their role within the organization:
‘[D] opened the meeting by stressing… [that there were]… serious
financial difficulties. The Belfast Brigade was supplying all the finance
for Northern Command, GHQ [General Headquarters] and most other
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4 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

areas save southern command and the south Armagh areas. The Belfast
money was mainly obtained from the clubs, gaming machines and tax
fiddles. [D] said it was necessary to put the finances on a professional
basis. He said that [B] had been taken from an important position in the
Belfast brigade to put the finances on a professional basis. Monies in
the past had simply been obtained but had not been invested to make
more money. The southern command obtained finance through armed
robberies but these often went wrong. The result was that it was costing
PIRA to support the families of members imprisoned for armed
robbery offences. [D] gave an example of a robbery in Tralee which
had obtained £92,000 and compared it to a pub bought for £17,000
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which was then worth £200,000. [D] stated that monies could be
obtained from slot machines if sites could be obtained. He noted that
materials such as car batteries, electric goods and tractor and car tyres
could be stolen; forged paperwork could then be provided so as to then
sell these goods legitimately… At the meeting, [C] did not provide
exact figures but he stated that the PIRA was not receiving enough
money. He stated also that the Belfast Brigade was still providing the
bulk of finance’.
It can be said that the statement came from Sean O’Callaghan, the PIRA
informer, since in 1998 a paraphrased version of these and similar events
appeared in the autobiographical account of his life in the PIRA.4
O’Callaghan’s statement led to a demand in the British House of Commons
to adopt measures to block IRA funding: British MPs were cited as having
‘praised a [then] recent exposure of how the IRA at the initiative of Sinn
Féin’s Gerry Adams in the early 1980s modernized itself into a
sophisticated business’.5 There may be some dispute between academics,
but the birth of PIRA’s careful financial planning can be traced by the most
experienced anti-terrorist police to this particular meeting. One detective in
the Irish Republic, who himself investigated financial crimes, gave the
following comment via interview:
‘This was really the start of it... They knew what they were up to, and
it was clear what they had to do, in ah... a professional sense. The
general assumption in place was that the war was not going to go on
as long as it has… in hindsight… but to ensure that there was a steady
flow of money when it would be needed, it was… necessary to do
some serious planning. There were all sorts of schemes going of
course… I mean the Provos are masters of… scheming… if you shut
down one operation, like the smuggling, they’ll just improvise and get
involved in something else… that was the beginning of the serious
planning… to… invest the money into things… And it obviously paid
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 5

off. Once Bobby Sands died, all this money poured into the IRA, but
that kind of dried up after a while… it’s the need for regular, steady
income is necessary’.
This comment was made in 1997. Another detective recalled in 1998:
‘Yeah, I saw that… O’Callaghan talked about that meeting, and it was
interesting to see how they were thinking you know. Just like
businessmen when you think of it. And I suppose you’ve got to know
a bit about business too… both to get them… and… to see how they
make decisions you know?’
While the murder of Garda Jerry McCabe in Adare, Co. Limerick in 1996
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(described in Part 1) continues in some ways to be unrelated to PIRA

financial activity, except in the sense that it may have been ostensibly
related to an aborted robbery, it effectively served to open up a wide area to
public scrutiny for the first time. The glare of the media spotlight fell on the
relevance of the Republic of Ireland for the Provisional IRA. Although the
six counties of Northern Command remained the PIRA’s principal
operational area both up to and during its most recent ceasefires, many of
the PIRA’s activities that were incidental to their primary modus operandi
have been conducted in the Republic, especially activities associated with
fundraising. As reported by Veronica Guerin6 in the wake of Garda
McCabe’s murder:
‘These activities include extensive property holdings, guest houses,
pubs, taxi and hackney services, courier services and a number of
video outlets... these businesses provide a regular cash income and are
an ideal cover for laundering stolen cash. The true ownership of these
businesses is concealed in a myriad of holding companies in a
complex scheme devised by an accountant well known to the Gardaí.
The accountant operates from an office in Dublin’s northside. He is
described as “extremely bright, with no convictions. All of his work
is legal, except that it is done on behalf of an illegal organization”’.
The Republican leadership’s plans in 1980–81 thus certainly appear to have
since been realized. Again, the PIRA’s involvement in organized criminal
activity, especially money laundering, appears to have become more openly
discussed, and with slightly more detail than had previously been provided.
In 1994, Taylor and Quayle7 wrote that the PIRA:
‘are... thought to operate a chain of at least 25 pubs in the Dublin area,
possibly with others in other parts of the Republic... these pubs raise
cash for the organization through the profits they make, but they also
serve as a base for money laundering, enabling the IRA to transfer the
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6 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

proceeds of robberies into the licensed trade. Cash passed through the
pubs’ accounts is then transferred into secret bank accounts and then
into the terrorist organization. Hundreds of thousands of pounds are
thought to have been used to buy the pubs, and care has been taken in
using nominees, to ensure that there are no objections by the
authorities to licencees. Professional and careful accounting practices
have to be used to manage the cash flow generated by the pubs, and
to ensure that the operation remains viable’.
These two citations warrant inclusion because they reflect the view of the
security forces in both Britain and Ireland on just what the PIRA were
thought to control during the period 1995–1998 at least. An important
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interviewee of the present research expressed the following statement:

‘There are about twenty pubs at one time or another they’ve controlled
in Dublin. There are several more in Donegal… there’s actually a
whole series of pubs in Donegal. There are a few scattered in more
remote areas, but they’re for the most part centred in urban areas where
there’s lots of people… this relates to customer bases and stuff, but
really, it’s where they themselves [the PIRA] are based more or less all
the time, so… that’s one reason. I can’t think of all the figures at the
minute, but they certainly have in excess of maybe about 30 pubs in the
whole country. And… even when there is this crackdown, if there is
one… and people… the CAB [Criminal Assets Bureau8] do come in
and start asking questions, then they [the pubs] [will] still be some left
standing because they’ve been there for such a long time now…’.
To begin building on these otherwise general accounts, it is worth now
detailing the PIRA’s Finance Department and the role it plays in particular
in these activities which in turn will set the scene for the case studies to
follow.

The PIRA’s ‘Finance Department’

From interviews with security force members, Republicans and former
Republicans, one of the other few points of consensus between both ‘sides’
about PIRA fundraising is that, despite the relative fluidity of the PIRA
command structure (the divisions of which might lead one to assume strict
structural rigidity but this is rarely the case), the overseeing of both the
PIRA’s financial operations, and subsequent management and use of funds
has been entrusted to very few individuals within the organization. These
individuals, it appears, are collectively referred to as the ‘Finance
Department’. One police source described in February 1999:
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 7

‘From our experience, there have only been four or five people that
have been called the IRA’s ‘finance director’… or ‘director of
finance’… there’s the director, who is responsible for making sure that
the money is spent wisely, and there are a few ah… not really sub-
directors, but people who report to him with news of money or
possible uses for money, or ways of earning more money. But ah…
most of the time the finance director is [names Sinn Féin member]
down there in Dublin… of course there are a few in Belfast and South
Armagh who have a role in finances, but they’re not ah… responsible
for holding the same type of responsibility as [Dublin-based Sinn Féin
member as above]… they report to him… ’
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There has only been one high profile and well-publicized revelation about
PIRA financing, which relates to the South Armagh examples the above
officer spoke about, and these have been written about9 in more detail than
previous accounts.10 Some of this stems from a high profile court case of Mr.
Thomas Murphy vs. The Times Newspaper Ltd. Murphy, of Co. Louth, took
a libel action against The Times and a number of its journalists over an
article published in the Sunday Times on 30 June 1985. In an article entitled
‘Portrait of a Check-In Terrorist’, which dealt with a campaign to bomb
English seaside resorts, it was stated that:
‘The IRA’s Army Council last February appointed a farmer in the
Republic called ‘Slab’ Murphy (which is not his real name) to be its
operations commander for the whole of Northern Ireland. He has no
convictions for terrorist activities and this, plus the fact that he is on
the other side of the Border, makes him a security headache hard to
cure’.
Murphy said he was known locally as ‘Slab’ Murphy and, on reading the
article, understood it to refer to him, and subsequently launched the libel
case. When the case came to Dublin High Court, the first author attended
the proceedings. While the case progressed, two high profile PIRA
informers, Sean O’Callaghan and Eamon Collins, bore witness to details of
Murphy’s connections and dealings with the PIRA in his role of Chief of
Staff, and further details emerged throughout the court proceedings linking
Murphy to other senior members in the Republican movement. The Court
found in favour of the newspaper group, and in 1999, Daily Telegraph
journalist Toby Harnden provided a detailed examination of Murphy’s
involvement in South Armagh PIRA in a book, and the view that Murphy
remains an important Republican figure is continuously expressed in the
Irish and British print media. A security source interviewed, made reference
in August 1998 to the South Armagh PIRA’s involvement in financial
activities:
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8 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

‘We know that he [Murphy] has been on the Army Council from
1992-1994 at least, apart at all from the earlier stuff in the 1980s,
when he was stuck in all the smuggling…’
… it was all tit-for-tat for a long time. Apart at all from the stuff on
the farm, [the IRA] also controlled a stretch of road in Armagh. They
stopped everything coming through, y’know, and they obviously
knew who was using the roads around there. They actually imposed a
kind of a ‘tax’ on criminals they knew were coming up and down.
These boys then thought that they were under the protection of the
IRA or something.
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… don’t get me wrong, I mean cooperation between [the RUC] and

the Gardaí has always been excellent, but the money-making hadn’t
really been looked at to any great degree, especially not in the south.
We knew about the robberies of course, and the Provos were always
doing that in the south, but this was strategic stuff… the smuggling
was… brilliant’.
In the context of the present article, the main reason that the South Armagh
PIRA are regarded as being important to fundraising relates to cross-border
pig smuggling schemes and animal subsidy fraud during the 1980s in which
the PIRA extensively exploited the unusual fact that Murphy’s farmyard
actually straddled the border between North and South. While it is now
possible to refer to Murphy and the PIRA’s activities in this way because of
the outcome of the libel case and subsequent publications, it is obviously
not possible in the context of the research presented here for several other
individuals who are known to have a more direct and present involvement
in PIRA financing operations, especially money lending and laundering.
These will each be described briefly before we present the case studies that
illustrate the particular extent and nature of their roles and interactions with
each other and various other people.

The PIRA’s Finance Department: ‘JR’

Others have played more important roles than those exposed in the Sunday
Times High Court case. The first of these, ‘JR’, is a long-standing member
of Sinn Féin: the first of many simple facts that make any distinctions
between the IRA and Sinn Féin moot at some levels. He is a former IRA
member from the 1940s and 1950s, a former PIRA leader during the 1970s
and early 1980s, and a member of the Army Council for several years:
security forces concur that he was, until late 1996, a member of the PIRA
Army Council and sat on the 1997 Army Executive for a time. JR is
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 9

described by several as a ‘highly prestigious member’ of the PIRA and is a
well-known Republican. He is internationally recognised as a figure in the
Republican movement, and Republicans see JR as a link with the PIRA’s
‘former self’ (the older original Irish Republican Army).
On a more pragmatic note, JR was a PIRA representative to the United
States in the time leading up to the 1994–96 ceasefire, and has been
responsible for organising fundraisers and trips for Americans to Northern
Ireland. JR’s role in the US before the announcement of the 1994 PIRA
ceasefire was, according to a Republican interviewee, ‘a way of reassuring
[Irish-Americans sympathetic to IRA terrorism] that there was no sell-out’.
Security sources describe JR as having regularly received money from
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certain Active Service Units (ASUs) – PIRA cells consisting of 3–5

operatives – from armed robberies. He is also described as responsible for
money being distributed to other ASUs for other operations, which included
on some occasions, bombings. The following comment came from an
experienced observer in late 1997, which is to remain non-attributed:
‘JR oversees all the funds and has done for a long time now. There are
some operational people who do things, but he oversees everything…
everything in Sinn Féin and the Provos. When money would be
collected from Sinn Féin fund-raisers... armed robberies and so
forth… it didn’t make a difference where it was coming from, it was
all going to the same use anyway. Some of it would be kept locally for
local operations and stuff… but the most of it… it would be brought
eventually to JR in Dublin… and it would be literally put into a safe,
in the upstairs office of the building in the headquarters office. He
would know how much was coming in from whoever, and would…
more importantly, as he was concerned… he would know how much
was going out… he would be the one that would give the money out
for operations… if there was a job that needed cash, to finance an
operation, he would give it out to the OC. There would be a weekly
payout to the OC, but all the time there was the emphasis on having
… there was an emphasis on units having to come up with their own
money. He was a bit thick… about that… he was always very mean
with the money and wouldn’t be willing to keep giving it out if he
thought you weren’t making the effort’.
A security force member in the south of Ireland has described JR (in
January 1999) as:
‘… one of the meanest people you’re ever likely to meet. He’s so tight
with the money. He even doesn’t eat fancy meals himself. There’s a
lot of people make fun of him for it, but it shows you what his priority
is. He just doesn’t waste money, and doesn’t like people who do’.
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10 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

His reputation within Republican circles is similar. A former PIRA member

interviewed said:
‘Whenever he comes down for a meeting or to give a speech or
something, he always insists that there’s a door collection for people
to give on the way out… you know, give money towards his travel
down. If it cost him he wouldn’t do it. And when he does come down,
he’ll eat sandwiches and that’s that. There’s no wining and dining with
grand meals there. I don’t think it rubs off on anyone to the same
degree, but you’ve got to admire his attitude to money. You’ve got to
respect it’.
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While engaging in participant observation, the first author observed JR’s

parsimony first hand. Upon attending a Sinn Féin meeting in the Republic
of Ireland in late 1999 (by which time the majority of the research had been
completed), during which several local PIRA figures voiced their dissent at
the prospect of weapons decommissioning, the meeting Chairperson, a local
Sinn Féin member, called on all those attending the meeting to: ‘please give
what you can now, to support [JR’s] trip down here today’.

The PIRA’s Finance Department: ‘NN’

The second significant figure in the PIRA’s Finance Department to emerge
from the research is ‘NN’. While JR was said by Gardaí in 1996–1997 to
have moved into ‘more of an advisory role’, with Sinn Féin duties taking
more prominence, NN was described by several as the ‘finance operations
man’. NN appears to have been the second most senior finance figure in
Southern Command following the death (from natural causes) of the person
he has replaced, BJ, an ‘immensely successful’ Director of Finance during
the early to mid-1980s. NN was a long-standing Sinn Féin member, also
based in Dublin, and was a senior member of PIRA during the research
period. Republicans and security force members alike describe NN as having
links to almost ‘every significant figure in the Republican movement’.
After being incarcerated for several years on arms charges and
membership of the PIRA he emerged from prison to take a formal role in
Sinn Féin’s activities. Although in 1999 he was not a member of any branch
of the formal Sinn Féin structure, Gardaí and a small number of Republicans
described him as playing a strong role in guiding Sinn Féin’s initial anti-
drugs activities during the 1990s in areas of the Republic of Ireland.
Republican interviewees (including one former senior PIRA figure) were
particularly open about this and praised him for ‘doing some good work’.
Like JR, NN refused to be interviewed, and a Republican source in 1998
said that it was inadvisable to pursue the initial request (sent by letter to NN
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 11

through another PIRA member interviewed by JH earlier) for an interview.
However, several people familiar with NN were interviewed. One of them
spoke at great length about him, but remarked in particular:
‘Yes. He’s been with them for a long time. He’s one of the most hard
men you’re ever going to meet. Totally ruthless and dedicated to the
IRA. I’d personally be very surprised if he wasn’t promoted after [the
then O/C11 southern command] is stepped down because of the
shooting [the Adare murder]’
NN was not promoted to this position, and a younger, Belfast PIRA man
was. At the time of the research, NN was seen as Southern Command ‘no.
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3’ under two senior PIRA members (including the Belfast man). NN also
had another important role in the PIRA, and this relates directly to his role
in the Finance Department:
‘NN runs a small taxi company out there in [city]. It’s fairly lucrative,
but the money he started it out with definitely didn’t come from his
own pocket, ‘cos he isn’t exactly the man about town. He’s just like
any other Provo in that sense. The money came from the Sinn Féin
office… The money then just ‘went to work’. It’s not NN’s money, or
his company, that’s for certain, but again, for all intents and
purposes… it is’.
The ‘small’ taxi company became a relatively successful business and had
a popular customer base in the area in which it is located. The business was
listed in the golden pages telephone directory, and advertised locally in
newspapers. It was in this sense no different to any other taxi company. It
remained the case, however, until late 1999 at least, that NN and JR were
seen to work closely together and hold regular consultations about money
matters: ‘how much is coming in, how much is going out… what things
need to be talked about, all this stuff’. According to security forces in the
Republic, JR is ‘like a schoolmaster’ and NN, according to one detective
with a dislike for NN, ‘tries to identify opportunities all the time’.

The Accountants
JR and NN represented important PIRA finance figures – in essence, it
appears that they were the Finance Department at the time of the research.
It emerged through several interviews, however, that they were not alone,
and it is in this context that the PIRA, and specifically JR and NN, have
made use of the services of at least four accountants when financial advice
and assistance has been necessary from the limited role played by at least
one of these accountants, it appears that four is probably an underestimate.
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12 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

Use has been made of accountants in particular with respect to

money laundering. These we will identify as ‘Accountant W’, ‘Accountant
X’, ‘Accountant Y’ and ‘Accountant Z’. Three of these have
Republican sympathies (X, Y, Z), and one (W) appears in actual fact to
have unwittingly been in the service of the PIRA, or at least that is
what W has directly suggested to the authors and several others.
This is also the view of knowledgeable security force members operating
in the same jurisdiction as W. The first author was able to procure
interviews with W, and some of W’s revelations are described below.
These accountants have all worked in the service of the Provisional IRA at
one stage or another, but an important assertion that must be made is
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that none of these accountants occupies a formal role in the PIRA’s

command structure.
According to security sources, and one Irish detective in particular:
‘They’re outsiders… called in to do jobs’. Each of these accountants has
had a principal source of income, which related to their own otherwise
apparently legitimate work – that is, they were primarily involved in private
accountancy, insolvency, and financial advice services and firms. These
were operating fully and openly, and one of these continued to do so at least
until 1999.
It has been difficult to ascertain whether the accountants are or were
employed in tandem, or are summoned to do individual jobs on their
individual merits: this did not emerge in any clear sense during the research,
but the view of police force personnel is that one principal accountant
occupies a somewhat temporary full-time role (in that X has been described
as a ‘PIRA accountant’ for nearly 10 years), and the services of other
accountants are merely supplemental, depending on the specific context and
situation in which their services are required (this applies particularly to W,
as will become clear from his marginal involvement). Since one of these
four accountants, ‘Accountant X’, is at the centre of one of the case studies
to follow (with a fringe involvement in the other), the others will be
described briefly first.
Y was based in the PIRA’s Northern Command area for several years as
a chartered accountant and subsequently departed to live in the Republic
following death threats, from, according to him, ‘the UDA’ and rogue
elements of ‘the RUC’.12 While he is said by Irish police to have played a
role in the procurement of at least three pubs in Belfast in the early 1980s,
interviewees do not describe him as the most significant financial expert
whose services the PIRA have utilized. He has been described as ‘an IRA
accountant’ by several knowledgeable sources, both inside and outside the
security forces. Some Republicans described Y as ‘paranoid’, while the
Gardaí described Y as ‘mentally unstable’. A security source that
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 13

investigated the background of Y in the months before the 1994 PIRA
ceasefire recalls the accountant as:
‘… all too willing to take the Provos’ money, but when he was written
about… recently, he went even more mad. He’s not a Provo per se, but
he’s kind of willing to stay well in with a few Sinn Féiners since he
gets on socially very well with them. Well, he thinks anyway. He
doesn’t want anything to do with them anymore now though’.
The only certainty by late 1999 was that Y was no longer in the paid
services of the PIRA, and was ‘not an IRA accountant any more’, according
to various interviewees.
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W is an accountant who practiced from a legitimate and well-known

base in the Republic of Ireland. W falsified tax returns and numerous other
documents with a bookkeeper specifically for two PIRA-controlled pubs in
the Republic. Although the security forces believe that W’s services were
employed specifically so that he could be ‘encouraged to fiddle the books’,
W himself claims adamantly that he did not initially know that the pubs
were PIRA-controlled, and his claims do appear valid. Several months after
having asked W for an interview, the first author was successful in
conducting two interviews with him, one of which is quoted in detail later.
The first interview lasted about an hour, and the second lasted 20 minutes.
W was specifically asked about the nature of fraudulent activity in pub
management as well as his view on his previous ‘part-time’ employment as
the ‘accounts-person’ for one of the pubs:
‘Well, you’re gonna help your employer out, naturally, but while he
would… he would have Republican sympathies, I mean everything
was up front as far as who owned the pub… I’m just there do to the
job like, and while I wouldn’t have any time for Sinn Féin or any of
that… I wouldn’t ever bring it up in conversation or anything… It’s
never brought up anyway… but I was asked to do the job… I was
recommended by [name of another person for whom W had ‘prepared
books’] and the money was good, so I did it. I stayed working for
[name of pub manager] for about 2 years, and made some good money
out of it… But ah… I have no sympathies with [name of pub
manager]’s cause at all… It was never brought up in the … the bar
though… I was there to do my job, once a week for a couple of hours,
and that was it’.
W was hired as the accountant for two small but initially popular pubs in
urban areas in the Southern Command region. W was paid in cash for one
night of work per week in each pub. During one of the interviews with W,
he briefly wrote down weekly and monthly financial figures on a piece of
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14 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

paper, denoting how £1200 per month was being ‘creamed off and put into
the back pocket of the [boss]’ of one of the pubs he worked in. An important
assertion to make here is that W is not a Republican – he could perhaps be
best described as having been an opportunistic, freelance accountant, whose
services (and his willingness to conduct services of this particular nature –
that is, overseeing fraudulent tax returns, and so on) probably owed more to
word of mouth than anything else.
W himself described how publicans and shopkeepers, when seeking the
‘right person’ to do a job, will go through the ‘correct channels’ – in other
words, if a publican wants to defraud his own business, he will employ a
fraudulent accountant, and pay him well, to help him do so. W will be
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returned to shortly, with reference to his descriptions of the procedures

necessary to launder money. While it is certain that W did not have any role
in the actual establishment of either pub for which he worked, he played an
instrumental role in preparing the ‘books’ and in supplying financial advice
to the manager of one particular pub – a convicted PIRA member whose
pub, according to a senior Irish detective, was at the time owned and
controlled by the PIRA.
Accountant Z, on the other hand, played a much more important role in
PIRA financing, especially in the mid-late 1980s and early 1990s. Security
forces and, significantly, a small number of Republicans, described him as
directly owning a ‘mini-empire’ of pubs in the northwest of Ireland as well
as being a qualified accountant. One financial crimes investigator in Ireland
brought up the activities of Z during a conversation in which it was asked
whether the PIRA made use of accountants:
‘He… was responsible, we believe, for fronting many pubs in [county
in northwest of Ireland]. He brought in no-one that didn’t have some
connection to the Republican movement to run the pubs, and most of
his bar staff were all ex-prisoners, and so forth… there certainly was
an interest from [the RUC] and more so also from the Gardaí about just
where he did get the money to start all these places up from, and I’m
sure that that’s going to be the Provos’ downfall if the proper
legislation is introduced in the south. He was big into finances and
controlled much of the money from the pubs with BJ [the senior PIRA
member described earlier, now deceased]. From money from pubs, and
all the one-armed bandit machines, they were taking in a tidy profit…
And of course, it’s what we believe it is – a veritable pension fund for
senior Sinn Féin and IRA members if they ever do decide to… stop’.
Overall, this accountant was said to be no longer involved with the PIRA’s
Finance Department. From interviews beginning in June 1996, Irish
security sources identified X as being ‘the IRA’s accountant’. X is an
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 15

accountant in the PIRA’s southern command area, and he also has offices in
other cities in the Republic. X is middle aged, and has a reputation among
Gardaí for being a ‘hard man’:
‘Oh he’s really tough [mockingly]… or he’s got the attitude anyway.
He definitely doesn’t like to be seen backing down from anyone. I’ll
give you an example. During the time I was investigating him and his
business dealings about the ‘Ravendale’ [a business – not its real
name - which is the subject of one of the case studies described later],
he was still up to all sorts. One girl came to me saying how he had
swindled her out of money, and that she was finding things hard to
make ends meet. My heart went out to her… So I traced a few
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numbers, and ah… got his number anyway. I knew that he stayed in
[name of town] with his girlfriend, his ah… ‘mistress’ so I knew I’d
surprise him by ringing him up. So I got the number and rang them.
She answered and I asked to speak to X. X came on the phone and I
said, plain and simple, ‘You took money from a girl… in [county]. I
want you to give it back to her or I swear I’ll make trouble for you,
make no mistake of it’. He went mad [laughs], started swearing and
blinding. ‘Who… is this?’ he says, ‘what do you think you’re doing
threatening me?’ and all this. I said the same again to him, ‘You’re
after fiddling a girl out of her money, and I’m telling you now, you’d
better give it back to her, or I’ll make it my business to stay on your
case till the day you die… ’. Well, the next day, what happens? He
went back down and gave her the money’.
X acted as a ‘front man’ for PIRA members in the Republic of Ireland who
sought to purchase businesses for the purpose of money laundering. In one
southern command county in particular, X himself bought one hotel and two
pubs for the PIRA, licensing the hotel under his own name. On numerous
other cases, which were referred to in more general ways by Republican
interviewees and a small number of security force interviewees, he has
provided substantial financial advice to the PIRA’s Finance Department, and
particularly to NN. Most Republican and former-Republican interviewees
did not discuss anything whatsoever relating to X or any of the accountants,
with some exceptions. In the majority of cases, however, this apparently
related to not knowing anything about these people (or at least claiming not
to). It appeared that in some cases this was something that was of no
significance at all. One former PIRA activist interviewed reported that:
‘It’s not something you’d hear about. I mean you’ve got enough to be
worried about without asking about other stuff like that, and when it
clearly doesn’t concern you, well, then it doesn’t. I’d imagine you’d
end up looking kinda suspicious if you go from your lessons [training]
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16 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

to asking, well, who’s actually handling the money…? It’s not

something you’d be concerned about. But I know there are very
trusted people in charge, and it kind of stops at that you know? You
probably shouldn’t be asking those questions anyway… ’
This lends tentative support to the existence of need-to-know principles as
illustrated through the formulation and development of the command
structure. A man, whom the Gardaí and Police Service of Northern Ireland
(PSNI) have both described as an Army Council member, was certainly
more forthright when interviewed about alleged PIRA fundraising, and
especially when asked whether the PIRA uses ‘outside people’. Having
been asked about the PIRA’s financial operations, his answer (to JH) did not
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in any way refer to one or any accountant or any similar details:

‘All this stuff about fundraising. It’s just black propaganda. That’s
what it is, plain and simple. It’s common knowledge on both sides of
the border that the republican movement have been taking on the
drugs issue’.
This senior figure went on to describe one Republican who was well known
to the public but subsequently became:
‘… discredited... he has also discredited Republican sympathy with
his activities. And what that fella is… what he’s involved in… at the
moment he’s involved in a criminal gang… Just tied in with the
criminal gangs down in Dublin. The problem which we have… is that
he’s perceived in public eyes to be a republican, as part of the
republican movement, and those activities he’s involved in is just…
he just says, ok, ‘I’ll be part of the republican movement’. I can assure
you categorically like that... under no circumstances does he have any
involvement with the republican movement’.
The above statement reflected a common theme with those Republicans
who agreed to be interviewed – when asked about specific fundraising
details, answers or comments usually were quite general in nature and were
expressed within a clear political context. That some of the alleged-PIRA
interviewees were long standing members of Sinn Féin added to their ability
to respond to such questions with their own particular type of answers.
However, the resulting conclusions from the types of statement as above are
as significant as the conclusions from those instances in which no answer
was given at all.
Within the context of the research presented here, in the early to mid-
1990s, X, along with a bank manager and personal friend, MU, played his
part in the management and co-ordination of some of the Provisional Irish
Republican Army’s income from illegal activities (primarily armed robbery
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 17

and extortion). X and this bank manager friend were close associates who
used each other as references in business dealings. They worked closely
with NN. The relationship between NN and X will become clearer within
the case studies that will now be summarised.
In the first case study summary, an account of a PIRA money-lending
scheme will present details of the interconnections and dealings
surrounding a series of events, people and places. All of the following is
reconstructed from the interviews, archive material and documentation, and,
unless specifically indicated, we keep most of the details non-attributable.
Most interviewees from security or paramilitary backgrounds who agreed to
be interviewed expressed that they not be identified in any possible way.
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The reader should be aware that the cases to follow are already known by
the security forces.
To reiterate the point made earlier in the discussion of methodology, the
veracity of these accounts (and the details given from key interviewees),
and their completeness, has been checked as much as practically possible
with several sources upon completion of the reconstructed details presented
here.

Fundraising Case Study 1: PIRA Money-Lending And Attempted

Money-Laundering
‘Joseph’ was born in the late 1950s in the Republic of Ireland. He was raised
by his parents at their suburban home where Joseph’s mother and father still
live. The family was small, middle-class, and respected in the local
community. Joseph and his family were certainly unremarkable in any
obvious respect from any other small Irish family. Joseph attended
secondary school but: ‘… didn’t really like it that much, and… I think he
was just bored’.
After secondary school Joseph took up a number of small, part-time
jobs, mostly based around the locality, before gaining work for a number of
larger companies. Joseph worked in an industrial plant for a year or so, but
began to become interested in developments in technology. Particularly,
however, Joseph saw this, especially in the late 1970s as a lucrative means
of financing what was becoming an increasingly expensive lifestyle:
‘Joseph liked the good life, and still does. He’s a bit of a man’s man
when it comes to the ladies, and he likes to show his pals and
colleagues a good time. If you’re potentially valuable to him, in no
matter what way, he’ll take a shine to you. A real charmer’.
In 1980, Joseph gained work experience in a technology business, where he
learned about business in general as well about various types of electronic
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18 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

technology. He left this company a few years later, however, and went to
work in a company that specialized in selling security alarms to businesses
and residences. Joseph’s role in this job was to sell car telephones and ‘two-
way radios’. Joseph still saw opportunities elsewhere however, and joined
what has now become a major Irish company where he spent some years
before leaving this job also.
In 1988 Joseph joined a Dublin company that specialized in
communications technology. The company, which we will refer to as ‘Konic
Systems’, hired him, apparently, on the basis of his experience, but as was
more gradually revealed, probably his personality also: ‘I think he was kind
of a charmer if you know what I mean. A good salesman, very persuasive;
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he had a kind of an Arthur Daley buzz about him. He was always very good
with people’.
However, Konic Systems, like innumerable other small businesses, did
not flourish. The company Director, who had taken the decision to employ
Joseph, decided in 1990 that he no longer wanted the business, as it was: ‘a
company which really never did any good. Actually, relatively speaking, it
was a total failure’. Joseph saw an opportunity, and took it. He decided:
‘… to take control of the business. He was adamant he was going to
be successful with it. So much so, that not only did he want to take
over, but he even used the same trade name in all subsequent
dealings’.
Joseph’s reign as Director was not successful, however, and soon after the
original Director left, he found himself in January–March 1990 with an
unsuccessful business ‘tied around his neck’. Around this time, Joseph
sought other sources of finance for Konic, however. He was ‘adamant that
he wasn’t going to get a loan from [the bank]. I mean, it [Konic] was really
looking [bad] at that stage’. At this time, Joseph decided to make enquiries
about procuring a loan from unofficial sources.
He made informal enquiries through some of his business
acquaintances that he had built up during recent years, as to who, in the
Dublin area in question, could be in a position to loan the kind of money
Joseph was looking for. He indicated that he was seeking £20,000 to
finance his company and he attempted to approach business people in a
similar business to himself, but was, by all accounts, very unsuccessful in
convincing them to invest in Konic. Joseph did not see this as the end of
the road, however, and through a number meetings with several people
whom Joseph had come to know about through his acquaintances, there
appeared to be some light at the end of the tunnel. These people were
described thus:
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 19

‘… none of whom you could really describe as, I suppose, typical
criminals. I mean that had access to big bucks, and they were hardly
charities. But if you’re stuck, and you need funds, y’know it’s not that
hard to ask around as to where you should go’.
After several meetings, of varying lengths and with varying perceived
degrees of success, Joseph quickly discovered that there was a man near
where his business operated that could provide a loan for Joseph’s business.
This man was HC, who was in turn an associate of NN, the PIRA member
and community activist described earlier. HC is described as NN’s ‘right
hand man. He accompanies him to all the anti-drugs meetings, and is very
close to him’. Joseph had identified a possible solution to his problem:
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‘The meeting between Joseph and NN was set up. Joseph was told by
friends of his down the pub that HC was … in the Republican
movement, and that so was NN. I think he was kind of dismissive
about the whole thing. I know for a fact there was no way he thought
he was actually dealing with the IRA. In hindsight, it was kind of
stupid, but he definitely underestimated who they were from day one.
I’d say to be honest, all that was going through his head was “where
do I get some money from?”’
HC introduced Joseph to NN one evening and, following the meeting, NN
agreed to help Joseph. NN was described as being ‘apparently impressed.
He must have been or otherwise he’d not have given yer man the… time of
day’.
NN expressed a great interest in Joseph’s business and equally expressed
enthusiasm that such a business might actually do quite well. All relevant
interviewees were adamant that NN strongly wanted to see funds from JR
and NN being invested in Konic. About a week after this meeting, NN and
HC supplied Joseph with a sum total of just over £19,000 in cash and bank
drafts. The person who supplied approximately half of this sum in cash was
JR. The nature of the bank drafts remains unclear, but there have been
suggestions from interviewees that half of the bank drafts were short-term
loans issued by business ‘friends’ of NN, not associated with the PIRA in
any formal sense. The rest of this money had been stolen in an armed
robbery in a neighbouring county.
An important point, which might appear obvious but nevertheless needs
to be restated, is that both NN and HC were, it seems certain, under the strict
understanding that the money was to finance Konic. NN’s enthusiasm
became clearer, however, when in addition to being Joseph’s source of
finance, he also began to give Joseph some helpful advice on the evening of
the first meeting. Joseph was told that he was going to have a contact
telephone number to call if any problem arose during the ‘revival’ of Konic.
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20 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

This referred to possible inquiries by the Gardaí or if Joseph was having

particular problems with Konic.
NN continued to show a strong degree of enthusiasm in the development
and growth of Konic in the presence of Joseph, and according to one
interviewee: ‘he was sure he wasn’t going to let the company go downhill
if he could help it. Not only was he obviously looking for his money back,
but he was looking for it back reasonably quickly, or at least signs that the
business was a sound “investment” if you know what I mean’.
NN, the second in charge of the PIRA’s Finance Department, had
identified a source to launder PIRA money. NN’s appreciation of Konic as
a potential business investment for the funds he had provided is clear. The
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contact supplied by NN that Joseph was to call was a woman, ‘Maria’, who
lived in the opposite side of the city. Because of NN’s insistence
and through Joseph’s practical knowledge and experience in
telecommunications technology, Joseph had a telephone line connected
directly to Maria’s house.
Through subsequent meetings with NN, both NN and Joseph agreed that
everything possible needed to be done to promote Konic Systems. With
NN’s direction, Maria was going to promote Konic Systems in the Dublin
area. Maria lived with her boyfriend, who worked for a telephone company,
and to whom Joseph was introduced one evening, in the company of NN.
NN and Maria were concerned about security, however, and her boyfriend
was introduced to Joseph under a false name. Maria’s boyfriend was a hated
figure amongst Gardaí in Dublin because he was apparently able to avoid
being arrested and charged for his involvement in criminal activity.
Just as plans for Konic were about to be put into practice, events took a
completely bizarre twist. In June–July 1990 Joseph ‘took holidays’ from
Konic and went to Italy with friends. A member of a Garda team
investigating the PIRA’s financial crimes in the Republic provided the
following comment during interview:
‘That was it then. I think that was the first time that NN knew
something was going seriously… wrong. Joseph didn’t use the money
for Konic at all. He blew the lot on the World Cup. Took a load of
friends out there, and got tickets to the matches when they went out.
Had a ball. Don’t be fooled that for one minute… that the money was
for the good of the business. He was never going to use it for it’.
Joseph’s unpopularity was reflected through several subsequent interviews
with those whom he has had ‘chasing after him’ (the words of the detective
who finally apprehended him on related charges). A detective investigating
organized crime in the Republic of Ireland noted that:
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 21

‘It was complete rubbish. He’s a through and through conman. He was
never, not in a million years going to use that money to finance Konic.
Or if he did, there was something very odd going ... He’s devious, and
completely underhanded. No-one could trust him. All money, money,
money and having a good time, that’s his prerogative at the end of the
day, but it didn’t emerge until much later that that’s where the money
from NN and HC was spent’.
When the holiday was over, a few weeks later, Joseph returned to Dublin,
and realised he would have to eventually start paying back NN’s money. In
the coming months, however, Joseph would find it increasingly difficult to
meet the monthly repayments to NN and HC. Konic Systems had been a
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complete failure, despite two different Directors and the £19,000 input,
much of which had now been spent on financing Joseph’s affluent lifestyle.
Joseph’s activities were certainly not then in the interests of the almost-
bankrupt business.
One evening, about nine weeks after having returned from his
extravagant holiday, Joseph received a telephone call from HC and was told
to ‘report to NN’ to find out what was happening. Why were repayments not
forthcoming? NN was said to have been furious with Joseph and wanted to
see all the accounts for Konic. NN apparently still did not know that the
money had been spent on the World Cup: ‘He told Joseph he was going to
have his own accountant in to have a look at what was going on. And that
was it. Joseph didn’t have any say in the matter’.
The accountant was accountant X. Increasing pressure from NN and HC,
in the form of telephone calls and regular visits to Joseph’s home and to
Konic Systems, resulted in Joseph panicking. He left Dublin, fleeing to
another county in the Republic with his wife and two young children. He
told his wife that they simply had no choice because of ‘threats… that there
were criminals who didn’t want him doing business… ’. Joseph revealed
that he thought that his problems with NN and HC were over at that point.
Almost as soon as Joseph’s arrival in the new county, he became
involved in a number of small companies that he established himself: ‘he
was very resourceful. He obviously sees money as no object, but I think it’s
a matter of when he wants money, not if he wants it, or if he needs it… ’. In
late 1990, Joseph opened an office in an industrial estate, from where he
would attempt to establish a small communications business. He employed
only one person, a young secretary, ‘Joan’, from the local region. After
about two months, Joseph suggested that Joan should enter into partnership
with him. With the aid of £14,000 from Joan’s mother, Joseph started
another company, and closed down the one that he initially established. He
and Joan moved business to another business park and ‘set up shop’.
Unfortunately for Joan and her mother, she unwittingly was to obtain further
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22 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

loans to aid Joseph’s business. And unfortunately for Joseph, this eventually
stopped when Joan’s mother received bills for hired cars, which, at least
until late 1996, had not been repaid:
‘He was very persuasive. And he really manipulated Joan. She was
very hurt, mentally, after she realised just what he was like, and… I
don’t think… that Joan has really come to terms with it yet. He’s just
a sly… there’s no other way I’d describe him. A conman, 100%… ’.
Although it was still not clear perhaps to Joseph that he did not make a good
businessman, his life was soon to change dramatically, and his past in
Dublin would catch up with him:
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‘NN, in 1991, finally traced Joseph to [county]… he didn’t do

anything at first, because he knew where he was. But ah… NN and
HC… but mostly NN, began keeping tabs on Joseph’s dealings… he
took a real keen interest in what Joseph was doing… or what he was
trying to do more like… NN was convinced he was going to get his
money back in one form or another, and for one reason or another, NN
was still going to try to get the money put to some use, like investment
in something… Don’t ask me, I don’t know, but he definitely wasn’t
going to go shooting him… I suppose he wanted to ah… get all of his
money back first… ’
NN and a gang of five PIRA members approached Joseph’s house one
night, and knocked on the door. Joseph answered and was ‘very surprised’
to see NN:
‘Joseph’s activities were always bordering on the fraudulent from an
outside point of view, but one thing for sure was that he definitely
underestimated the impact of his association with NN and HC and the
IRA people that were his to use as contacts [Maria and her
boyfriend]… I’d say the money distracted him a bit… I mean the
prospect of him getting that much… he thought he was going to screw
them over just like everyone else he’d done it to… Joseph was… from
the moment they called out to his house, with his wife and children
inside… he was terrified of them… absolutely terrified of what could
happen to him… ’
The men accompanying NN on his visit were Dublin PIRA members. They
all, including NN, wore balaclava masks, but Joseph recognised that it was
NN. NN told Joseph that he would be paying close attention to him. He said
that he would have to pay back the loan with added interest for all the
trouble he had caused. They left quickly but the visit appeared to have
worked. By 1994, Joseph had paid £15,000 to NN over a 15-month period
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 23

but it is not known how much was left to pay off this loan, given that by then
NN was looking for added interest.
By mid-1994, NN once again began to express ‘interest’ in Joseph, and
suggested that they discuss ‘business again’. NN was about to learn a lesson
too, however, and found out rather quickly that not only was Joseph
unwilling to foster NN’s business concerns, but also certainly was not
interested in paying off his PIRA ‘bank manager’ (NN) any longer. Joseph
abandoned his wife and children and left Ireland. He went ‘on the run’ with
his ‘mistress’, a woman with whom he had struck up a relationship after
having left Dublin for the other county. Much of Joan’s money (the secretary
he employed) had been lodged into a savings account under four different
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names, and detectives investigating Joseph stated that over £4,000 was taken
out of one of these accounts days before he left with this woman. A detective
who investigated Joseph’s dealings made the following comment:
‘We don’t know where he is now… when he immediately left
[county], he went over to [country] with one of his girlfriends from
[county]… he obtained a couple of false American Express credit
cards through a friend of his who specialized in them… the friend was
working in a travel agency and spilled the beans about everyone he’d
prepared cards for. We had information passed onto us then about
Joseph from some of the local Garda. We traced him… and put out a
small bit of surveillance on him. We nabbed him one evening in a flat
where he was with the girlfriend… he’d been living there under an
assumed name… ’
While in police custody, Joseph spoke of his dealings with NN and HC. He
emphasized that he himself was ‘never a member of the IRA’, and,
according to detectives who interviewed him, was quite emphatic that they
believe him on this point. Joseph’s wife and children moved back to Dublin.
Joseph himself, after having been released from Garda custody, left Ireland
using a false passport:
‘… Joseph was not, nor ever was a Provo. He’s a lot of things but is
not a Provo. He was terrified of them. It was clear that NN wanted to
do things through Joseph’s business, but it’s probably going to be
impossible to figure out what exactly he had in mind, apart from the
obvious, [which would] be just having a front company to put some
money into, which is, ah… money laundering’.

Intermediate Conclusions Of Case Study 1

1. Even from the summary of this case study, there is clear evidence that the
PIRA are willing to engage with those outside its formal organization in
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24 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

financial dealings when it appears that the PIRA might be able to benefit
financially from such contacts. The fact that HC appears to act as an
identifiable (but unofficial) go-between for the PIRA’s Finance
Department and those seeking financial assistance (at least in this area of
Dublin) is significant in itself, demonstrating that the PIRA has an
unofficial banking system in operation, whereby in contrast to extortion,
money appears to be actually given out to those whose usage of that
money may benefit the PIRA’s concerns and practical needs.
It is not clear whether this relates to a broader process of money
lending in general – or perhaps some form of informal banking – but the
perception of there being potential advantages appears central to the
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decision to lend. NN, by giving Joseph £19,000, much of it in stolen

money, clearly identified an opportunity to be exploited: by lending
money to Joseph, the PIRA would, through NN and HC, be laundering
its funds from armed robberies and other illegal activities into a
legitimate company. This company, with the right support (illustrated
through the use of NN’s contacts – for example, Maria and her
boyfriend) might actually begin to make a profit. That NN did not make
such a wise choice, to say the least, is an issue that is of interest in itself
(and will be returned to). What might have happened if Joseph did not
leave the country and entertained NN’s further suggestions in 1994 is
only a matter of conjecture, but again does not lend support to the idea
of NN as a completely sound financial investor, at least in this case.
2. There is a level of preparedness and expertise in the non-terrorist world,
which Joseph clearly inhabits, that the PIRA is able to draw on and
utilize in the planning and execution of its involvement in business. This
is illustrated through the details about NN’s contacts, Maria and her
partner, who were identified to Joseph as sources of expertise for the
development of his business. This is although the Gardaí continue to
describe them as ‘members of PIRA’.

Although NN featured prominently in this short case study, the only

reference made to X was that NN wanted to introduce X into Joseph’s
business to oversee the management of Joseph’s otherwise hazardous
accounting procedures. X’s role is more adequately illustrated in the next
case study.

Fundraising Case Study 2: PIRA Money-Laundering in the Republic

of Ireland
‘The Ravendale Hotel’ (fictitious name) was built in the late 1950s in the
Republic of Ireland. It lies about 8-9 miles outside a major urban area. It
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 25

was a popular social location during the 1960s and 70s, often the regular
home to several Irish showbands, which saw big crowds in regular
attendance. The Ravendale was probably no different to any other popular
social club in the Republic of Ireland except for the change in ownership
that occurred in the 1990s that led to the social club being under the
ownership and control of the PIRA’s Finance Department.
The first owners of the Ravendale Hotel were ‘very decent men. Very
respectable, and never had any dealings in crime at all. They were a father
and son who operated the hotel on a strictly legal basis’. These men were
described as having managed the hotel well, and were responsible for
success during this time. An equally ‘respectable’ owner took over from
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these proprietors, and remained in place from the late 1970s to 1980. This
owner was a man who was later to become the manager of a busy city-
centre nightclub. The Ravendale saw much success during this time also,
and its owner became ‘a very wealthy man because of it then’. This man left
the Ravendale with the specific purpose of establishing his club. Although
this man did not, and does not, have any involvement in the PIRA, he is
aware of the nature and identity of the subsequent owners of the
establishment.
When this man left the hotel, the Ravendale was officially bought in 1980
by ‘Mayflower Ltd’, a company that had their offices at an accountants’ firm
in a town not 30 miles away from the hotel. The director of Mayflower Ltd
was ‘Lloyd’, not an accountant, but an interior decorator. Lloyd had originally
come from a town in this same county, and had been a suspect in early-1970s
PIRA circles both in the Republic and Northern Ireland.
Details remain very unclear about Lloyd’s source of funds for the hotel,
but interviewees from two police forces claim that Lloyd possessed this
money himself, and that it was not the PIRA’s Finance Department (with JR
and NN) who provided the initial money for purchasing the Hotel.
However, as we will see, JR would provide some money at a later date
(described below) when Lloyd wanted to give up the business. After legally
acquiring the Ravendale Country Club Hotel, Lloyd employed his brothers-
in-law, the McGartlands, in it. These two men were both from a border
county within Northern Ireland. Gardaí had arrested one of these brothers in
the Republic in 1980 under Section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act
(anti-terrorism legislation in the Republic of Ireland). Both men had long
been affiliated with the PIRA. One of them was convicted of robbery on
more than one occasion. According to one detective:
‘They are IRA members. And they’re not Sinn Féin members either.
They’re still of interest to us since they’ve come down here [to the
county in the Republic where the Hotel is located] as they’ve more or
less settled down here now’.
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26 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

Although it would appear reasonable to suspect that the hotel was being
bought at this stage as a ‘PIRA business’, it has not been possible to
establish this with certainty. What is certain is that in 1981 the McGartland
brothers bought the Ravendale Hotel from Lloyd. Gardaí in three counties
in the Republic of Ireland are of the strong opinion that Lloyd bought the
hotel for the distinct purpose of later leaving it, to be sustained by the
brothers, although it has not been possible to establish this with certainty:
‘It was a Provo job. There’s no point denying that. It looked
completely legit because of the firm [Mayflower] in [town] being the
sole proprietors, but when Lloyd… aah… officially opted out, and the
brothers took over, it ahh… was a bit obvious like… but it was
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completely legit what they were doing, because the cash that was put
up for it first day came from a legit source, so why are anyone going
to be bothered with something that looks straight on the books?’
What is certain is that Lloyd did not make a financial profit from the
transfer of the hotel to the McGartland brothers. The latter having now
officially been put in place as the legitimate owners and managers of the
hotel, the running of the Ravendale did not last long, to say the least. Under
the control of the McGartland brothers, the hotel had, according to one of
the detectives who investigated suspicious activities surrounding the
hotel’s business, ‘subsequent difficulties’ in trading and was soon closed
for the main period of ownership of the McGartlands, up until 1991. The
brothers were described as ‘poor managers’. A detective who spent three
years investigating PIRA involvement in the hotel recalled during
interview that:
‘You’d kind of wonder what… they were up to at all like. I mean I
suppose the thought of being hotel managers was enough for them to
be happy like, but that doesn’t mean that you’re automatically going
to be a good one [manager]. What would Provos know about running
a business anyway? Sure all they’re good at is take, take, take…
ripping off post offices and banks like… ’
The McGartlands were consequently a laughing stock among Gardaí.
Despite the brothers’ failed attempt to manage and run the hotel, they did
not attempt to sell it on the open market. The events that followed illustrate
NN’s opportunity-seeking nature.
NN drove to the hotel from Dublin where he stayed for three days, and
asked the brothers to ‘retain ownership’ of the hotel. This was apparently
not the first time that NN had contact with the brothers but it appears to have
been the most significant in terms of what NN was planning. NN made
known to the brothers his desire to acquire the business, and ‘put it to them
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like he was going to take a weight off their shoulders as it were… which
they obviously weren’t going to say no to’. An non-attributed source gave
the following short comment:
‘Everyone around thought it was closed down for good. Just with bad
management. And also that there were more and more places
springing up in the city, so why would many people come out here
y’know? But that was the feeling at the time. No-one expected it to be
re-done’.
The brothers retained the hotel, although by now they had taken the
decision, with advice from NN, to keep the hotel closed and to cease trading
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altogether ‘to avoid even more loss’. This was even after the McGartland
brothers began to contemplate reopening just the bar section of the hotel.
NN advised them not to and it is clear that they heeded his advice. It was
not until 1994, however, that NN’s intentions towards the hotel became
clearer. It was time for a new owner and manager:
‘NN had a hand in it. He saw an opportunity… it was a potential
investment, but I think he saw it as a challenge too. This place was big
in the 60s and 70s and he wanted to bring it back to life as it were. It
would be a good investment and would be a profitable investment if
it was handled right’.
In 1994, NN approached an accountant with whom the PIRA had had some
previous contact through consultation about potential purchases in the
Dublin area. This was accountant X. X was described as being ‘very
excited’ about the prospect of ‘getting the hotel up and running’:
‘NN more or less offered him the job. NN was to supply the money
and the contacts obviously, but X was to use his own contacts also to
make the whole thing look legit. They met and held long meetings
about the right way to proceed. And X being an accountant, he already
knew the procedures and everything, but the Ravendale Country Club
Hotel was going to be bought in his own name’.
X agreed to the deal and made it known to several close colleagues,
including a Dublin bank manager who was later to provide fraudulent bank
references for X (to be sent to a local bank manager in the urban area near
the hotel - from whom X would attempt to procure a loan), that he was
going to be ‘buying a hotel’. He advised people who associated with him to
state that if anyone asked, that he had absolutely no interest whatsoever in
the hotel:
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28 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

‘He was kind of … not paranoid about it… but I think he’d prefer
someone else to go down if anything happened y’know? [laughs] I
mean, after all, he’s an accountant, so he’s earning a nice bit already.
The last thing he wants is to lose his letters [academic qualifications]’.
X ensured that he would be physically distant from the actual running of the
hotel by employing some practical measures. He quickly identified:
‘… potential managers who he located through a contact in Dublin.
‘Charlie’ and ‘Pamela’… from [city in England] were brought back
from England specifically to manage the hotel. They had been good
business people and had run a pub before, a big pub… They had met
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X socially about a year before and had gotten to be friendly with him,
but definitely had no idea that he was a crook or anything of the sort…
they had no reason to think he would try to con them or take their
money you know? They hadn’t kept in contact so X had to do a bit of
digging around to find out where they were living at the time… it
wasn’t very long before X got their [telephone] number… ’
X told them that there was going to be a reopening of a hotel in that county
of the Republic and that they would be X’s ‘first choice as managers’:
‘I think X struck gold really… he had something in mind when he
chose them all right, whether he thought then that he was going to
screw them out of cash later or not… but Charlie was out of real work
at the time and was a bit itchy to get going in a project… so ah… it
looked rosy for all of them… ’.
NN informed X that he had located managers for the hotel, and X and NN
remained in very close contact over the days and weeks that followed.
The next step was for NN and X to procure the finances for tangible
capital support for the hotel. This would be a necessary next step since
finance would be needed to ‘finally take over the hotel from the previous
boys [the McGartlands] and to re-do the place [refurbishments and
improvements etc.]’. NN recommended that X try to raise as much money
as ‘investment cash’ as practically possible. The plan was that NN would,
having arranged this with JR, provide the bulk of the money which would
be transferred into X’s firm’s bank account - the accountancy firm. X would
be the legal owner of the hotel, and therefore he needed to be seen as having
enough capital to effectively finance what was already a business which had
been ‘run into the ground’ (i.e. by the McGartlands’ poor management), and
the hotel was already on account of that not looking like the most promising
business to invest in.
X, although primarily based in Dublin at the time, had a small office in
the county in which the hotel was located and he approached the manager
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 29

of a major branch of one of the leading Irish banks. Unidentifiable
representatives from a law enforcement agency made available to the
researchers a considerable amount of documentation in relation to the hotel
that was seized in a coordinated series of anti-racketeering raids in late
1994. These sources, senior detectives, said that they could be used as we
wanted, providing that we act ‘responsibly’ with these documents. Copies
of this extensive documentation made available to the researchers have
since been destroyed, but we have decided (with expressed and informed
consent) to include details of one of the letters that were seized in their raids.
The following is an amended transcribed copy of one of the letters that X
sent to the bank manager:
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F I GURE 1
LE T T E R F ROM P I RA ACCOUNTANT ‘X ’ TO BA N K MA N A G ER
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30 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

We chose to include this letter because, with additional description to follow

now, it illustrates just how well organized a network of contacts X has at his
disposal. MU, as described earlier, is the Manager of a branch of the same
bank in which X sought the loan from the bank manager above. MU,
however, has long been a contact of X and has provided several references
for him. MU is described by security services as:
‘… a strong contact for the PIRA’s finance people [i.e. X]. If you need
people in the private sector that can make sure that deals go through,
then he’s one of them. He’s known X for a long time now, and you can
be sure he got a nice backhander [cash payment] for that business in
the hotel’.
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The mortgage documents and valuation report of the hotel supplied by the
particular financial institution X referred to in his letter were prepared by a
long time contact of X’s who was working in this institution until his arrest
for embezzlement in a non-PIRA related case (in late 1996) by Gardaí.
‘George’ received a ‘backhander of £10,000’ from Accountant X simply for
supplying the false documentation for presentation by X to the bank
manager who would approve the loan. Furthermore, yet another
‘backhander’, this time of £3,000, was given to an Auctioneer’s
representative (a contact of George) in the county in which the hotel is
located to furnish a ‘proper’ valuation for Accountant X for the hotel. The
hotel was ‘undervalued to the tune of about £100,000’. The amounts given
as ‘backhanders’ therefore (£10,000 and £3,000) are relatively small sums
in comparison with the savings X would make in purchasing the hotel.
George and the auctioneer’s representative are also not PIRA members, but
have long been associated with X. It is very likely that they know for whom
X was conducting the hotel business, although it has not been possible to
establish this with certainty.
The solicitor referred to in the letter (who provided confirmation of the
relevant transactions) is yet another example of a well-placed contact for X.
Security force personnel declined to allow the use of more specific details
due to a then ongoing investigation.
While the legal procurement of the hotel seemed a certainty, X
meanwhile managed to persuade Charlie and Pamela, his managers, to
invest ‘at least £20,000 in shares in the hotel’ under the premise that X had
himself provided the bulk of the finance through his own personal
investment in the hotel. X did not reveal any of the specific details conveyed
in the letter to the bank manager (above): in other words, neither Charlie nor
Pamela knew that the hotel was not only undervalued for the mortgage
evaluation, but they also had no idea about the extent of fraud which had
culminated in X’s approach for the loan. It should be reiterated that they
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 31

believed X to be nothing more than a good business partner, and it became
obvious throughout the interview process that neither Charlie nor Pamela
had any suspicion whatsoever that X was connected to the PIRA.
The loan was approved. The Ravendale had been saved from extinction
and began to operate its business. It is still unknown to the McGartland
brothers what exactly happened to the hotel subsequent to their
relinquishing it, as one was imprisoned for robbery (not while a member of
the PIRA) and the other brother went back to Northern Ireland, where he
works to this day. It is certain that the brothers made a financial loss, as
emerged from interviews that focused on the nature of the transaction from
the brothers to X, but the brothers claimed that this was due to their poor
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business sense. Both brothers feel that they have been manipulated by X and
NN for their own ends. It has not been possible to establish just how much
the brothers lost in the transaction, although it is estimated as at least several
thousand pounds. This is not surprising, however, given that the business
remained closed for such a long period of time, and would have been subject
to devaluation anyway.
Unfortunately for its new owners – and perhaps more so for NN – what
happened in the next 4–6 months was to lead to the eventual downfall of the
hotel. This, again, was apparently due to poor business sense rather than any
other reason in particular. One interviewee emphasized that the managers’
attempts to ‘run the hotel competitively met with a series of obstacles’,
which were to lead to it yet again being ‘run into the ground’:
‘Well… the business started off again, and opened up fine… they got
some bar people from the local area, and got a couple of outsiders in
too… place looked all nice and shiny again… but ah… well, talk
about a mess. X must have thought they [Charlie and Pamela] were…
stupid or something. Money was needed for various bills, and
equipment, wages, etc. and Charlie got X to write cheques himself
with the understanding that there would be just a simple transfer after
that… but joint cheques with X soon began to bounce. They [Charlie
and Pamela] went ballistic and knew something was seriously amiss.
They thought of themselves obviously and wanted out – in other
words, they wanted their 20 grand back, and they wanted it now… ’
The money that X had persuaded his new managers to invest in the hotel
had been taken by X and put into a secret, offshore account, which to this
day has not been traced by Irish law enforcement efforts. The managers left
the Ravendale in late 1994 following a serious dispute with Accountant X:
‘Charlie wanted to make a go of it, but I think he just didn’t have a
very good business sense… All the money… he’s still not over it. He
got some of it back all right, but by no means all of it. I really think
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32 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

he would have killed him if he stayed on in the Ravendale… Charlie

just had no idea at all that X was a fraud… all he saw was an
opportunity, which he took… ’
Events began to take on a particular momentum of their own. X did not yet
inform NN about the specific reason why the hotel managers left. X did not
waste any time though and offered Lloyd his old job back as manager,
which he accepted. A detective described:
‘As soon as he [Lloyd] was brought back in, it was… open day. We
kept the place under surveillance there was so many Provos coming in
and out… He [Lloyd] gave bar jobs to Provos he knew that were
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looking for work… I think he thought he was doing them a huge

favour, which he was I suppose, but its because they were known that
… it’s because they were known to us that brought even more pressure
down on them… we started eyeing up the place from top to bottom…’
Another officer added:
‘NN was coming down a lot from that point on, keeping things in
check ‘cos I think he was thinking that the place wasn’t being run as
well as it should have been you know? And when NN was coming
down… obviously there was two or three more Provos coming down
with him too… he wouldn’t come down alone… ’.
NN began to meet X in person in Dublin as well as in the hotel itself at
weekends and wanted to be kept abreast of details on a very close basis.
When X told NN that the managers left because they ‘thought some of their
money was gone’, X did not tell NN how much they had given X on the first
day (this will be returned to shortly).
X and Lloyd became very ‘close’ associates and X was particularly
anxious that the Ravendale should become successful. However, this was
not enough to save the hotel and, in early 1996, following increasing Garda
attention and NN’s increasing suspicion and frustration, X was ‘officially
ordered’ by NN to sell the hotel:
‘It was make or break, and NN was sick of trying to get more money
put into it. He was, I’d say [laughs] a bit [annoyed] with the whole
thing, and it was time to move on. He knew that the cops were taking
an interest in the place now too, and that was unwanted attention,
which he wouldn’t be that used to in a personal sense… ’
The Ravendale was sold on the open market and was bought by someone
completely unrelated to all of the previous owners. It was sold at a loss of
approximately £60,000.
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 33

Reflections
There are several issues that it has not been possible to fully ‘close’, but one
which was brought to our attention in 1999 by a former interviewee is that
X’s offshore bank account was thought to contain much of Charlie and
Pamela’s money – originally supposed to have been invested in the hotel. X
continued to practice at least until 1999 as an accountant in Dublin and was
described as still working closely with NN on occasion.
On reflection, what is striking about the Ravendale is that on the one
hand, it appears to have been a complete failure as far as the prospect of it
being a sound business investment was concerned. Several reasons can be
clearly identified for this, but more closely relate to X’s involvement in
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overseeing issues of management. We might conclude that X is not a good

businessman; or perhaps the issue is that he certainly is not a trustworthy
one, at least not as trustworthy as NN appears to have assumed, given their
prior contact and cooperation. A ‘criticism’ of NN is perhaps that he did not
play a greater role in monitoring the activities of all of those involved in the
hotel, especially X, but overall this illustrates just how difficult it is to
effectively monitor such activities and to detect ‘sticky fingers’, even for
experienced PIRA personnel such as NN. This point will be returned to.
On the other hand, however, that the hotel did in itself allow the PIRA
to submerge funds means that it inevitably was a success as far as the
laundering of its money was concerned. Although the hotel was sold at a
loss, this loss can only be considered in the context of already illegally
obtained money. The operation was a success if only judged from this
perspective: it initially fulfilled one core objective and important task for
NN and the PIRA’s Finance Department. That it did not return a profit is a
separate issue.
What is probably the most significant factor to emerge from the account
is that a very successful attempt was made to procure the hotel and, if for
nothing else, this is clearly something that X and NN are ‘good at’ - and this
warrants further discussion. Although security forces North and South
believe the Ravendale to be one of many PIRA investments, what is notable
about this example is that it is one that eventually failed. Why the
Ravendale was ‘allowed’ to fail is an emergent question. Several authorities
with expertise in investigating the PIRA’s financial dealings were asked
whether NN is not merely a ‘bad investor’, but all responses pointed to the
opposite. One source recommended that we remember that since the PIRA
are thought to have over £30 million in assets, that to make generalisations
on the basis of events surrounding a single case (in this case, a failure) is a
mistake. Garda sources have supported the view that the Ravendale’s
business failed because of X’s personal greed, which was detrimental to the
success of the business.
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34 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

Further Issues, and Implications for Law Enforcement

In 1997, we had begun to attempt to extract more general views as to what
the most pertinent issues were for law enforcement in investigating this type
of activity. One of the most experienced anti-terrorist detectives in Ireland
stated that:
‘the most important thing to remember is that they do the basics…
they do the basic stuff very well. What we’re interested in more than
anything is trying to get them on the basis of their start-out money.
Where do they get the money? Who is the front man? And also where
are both the money and the managers from?’
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It is clear from the example of the Ravendale that the initial step in
procuring the business was neatly done - the appropriate stages were taken,
the appropriate documents were furnished, and the appropriate people saw
that this was done. In essence, with perhaps better management and more
care in managing the Ravendale, it might have been ultimately more
successful than the financial disaster it proved to be.
With this in mind, we regard it as necessary to include the following,
which is taken from an extensive interview with Accountant W, who was
interviewed in connection with his views on Accountant X’s involvement in
laundering money through purchasing and investing in the Ravendale. W no
longer works in the PIRA-controlled pub. He was very open and frank about
how such procedures operate (emphasizing that they are not exclusive to
PIRA practices), and gave other examples of just how different businesses
can be adopted:
‘… Setting up a bar is easy… say if you wanted me to front the bar,
well let’s just say the bar was going for about half a million, they [the
financial backers] would come up with 400,000, you’d go to the bank
to make your business look legit... .You borrow 100,000… all right.
Up till recently you didn’t have to declare it to the bank where you got
this money from, you just tell them you had it… it’s easy… ’cos your
400,000 is paid to the man selling the bar anyway… so there’s a only
a balance of £100,000 due on a bar worth of half a million and they
[the bank] are quite happy to lend you another hundred thousand for
that bar because they know they’ll get it back out of it… they’re
holding the deeds in any case so they can’t go wrong. The next step is
that you buy it in your name, you’ve then got a sound name and no-
one’s gonna be doubting you that you’re this or that… and that’s...
that’s basically it… officially I own the bar even though I don’t… I
might never be there, I don’t have to go near the place’.
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 35

The initial procurement of the Ravendale Hotel, and subsequent loans, were
arranged with the assistance of X’s own bank manager as a referee, the
fraudulent valuation estimates provided by the consultant, and of course, the
initial finance provided by NN. As W continues:
‘The starting out is the absolute doddle part. Up until recently, the
only people that would be interested are the Revenue Commissioners.
They’d be the only ones who would be interested in who owns a bar.
They’d have the records of every pub in Ireland ’cos you’ve to apply
to the Revenue Commissioners for a license. Getting the
documentation in order is the most important stage here, and unless
you get this right, you’re leaving yourself open from day one like. You
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need to show them a tax clearance certificate… in your name… or in

the owner’s name. I’d have to have a tax clearance certificate before I
could hold a license anyway. A worry is being audited, to see if
everything adds up, but ah… chances are you’re only going to be tax
audited once in seven years. So I can go in and front the bar, and I’m
only fronting it, and ahh, it’s a safe bet that you’re gonna have a
successful operation for 3 or 4 years, I mean, the most you’re likely to
have in that length of time is a basic VAT [Value Added Tax] check-
up, which is only a routine check-up, when they check PAYE [Pay As
You Earn] returns, PRSI [Pay Related Social Insurance] returns, and
VAT returns, which is very basic. The pub could be running for up to
seven years without a tax audit and have anything up to three to seven
percent of a cream-off off the profit, undetected by the Revenue
Commissioners in which case the pub might be sold on… I’d be out,
someone else in… ’
According to a security source in the Republic:
‘There have been only a few pubs that we know of at the minute that
the Provos have kept a firm hand on… some of them they’d leave go
after a few years, but if the place’s doing well, why get rid of it… ah…
even if it looks like the cops are coming? They’ll do everything they
can to keep control of it, so someone else comes in to take charge as
it were. The owner officially changes, but the same guys are in
control… it’s just the name down on the paper that changes… so
they’ll have a new license, and ah… more to the point, on paper it
looks like there’s a new pub there… ’
According to W, the key to maintaining a ‘front’ is to manage and conduct
one’s business as a business, and not to engage in excessive personal
enrichment:
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36 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

‘The most important thing is that you’ve got to be careful not to attract
attention. If you’re careful you’ll get away with it… but as soon as
there is even a hint of trouble and the Gardaí are in, then it’s time to
run. The tax audit basically has to make sure that there’s nothing
illegal going on. It cuts into severe details like… proper margins,
control of stocks, your own lifestyle. They go into your private house,
walk through your private house, they check your passport, how many
times have you been foreign, ah, if you’re going foreign… you… I’ve
come across situations where you had a fella running a business…
supposedly taking £150 a week for himself [his officially designated
salary] and he’s gone on three foreign holidays a year! Now on £150
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a week going out of the business for yourself, ’twould hardly … pay
the [electricity] and telephone and feed you… ’twouldn’t even feed
you yeah, let alone send you foreign three times a year like. Unless
alone that you could prove that you had a private account somewhere,
and that ’twas above board anyway, but what are you supposed to pay
for your trips with like? You can’t expect to make any money once
there’s that kind of stuff going on, and you can’t expect people not to
wonder, well, what’s going on…?’
To restate the above assertion, security forces believe that the PIRA have
over £30 million in assets based on the mortgage value of pubs and clubs
such as the Ravendale, and several other types of small businesses. This
excludes the profits made from the actual money laundering process itself
(when profits do emerge, examples like the Ravendale aside), and the
subsequent fraudulent activities regarding documentation. W gave some
insight into the nature of the documentation:
‘They’re actually falsifying the documents. They’re fraud… the
books are completely fraud. They’re fictitious rather than fraud.
They’re both, I suppose, they’re fictitious and fraud. I mean, a pub...
certain pubs can trade and turnover for argument’s sake, £10,000 per
week, which’d be a pretty good turnover for a pub. They pay their
expenses out of that, they know they’re making in the region of two
and a half, £3,000 and they say ‘we’re not gonna… pay the tax on that
kind of money, so we’ll cream off £700 or £800 for our… pocket’, put
down the rest as what we took in, provided that the place isn’t over-
mortgaged… and provided that there isn’t any heavy short-term
repayments due on lease, you can cream off in a good way, in both
pubs and restaurants’.
According to the security services, the Ravendale was only one of several
such hotels in the Republic which the PIRA attempted to procure and run in
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 37

the mid-1990s, significantly predating the momentum gathered in the
‘peace process’. According to one detective:
‘Some are big and some are small, but generally they tend to be fairly
small, short-term investments… or rather short-term in the meaning
that if there’s trouble, they can either bail out, or transfer the details of
the license. And that is what’s happened in several cases here in the
Republic. The licences of three bars changed across 6 or 7-year
periods. When they’re afraid of being audited or checked out on the
basis of start-out money, they’ll change their front man, and that’s
what happens. I’ve seen several cases in which that has happened...
now that being said there are a few bigger establishments… ah here…
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I mean forget about Belfast… that’s another kettle of fish altogether…

but here [the Republic] there are a small few bigger places that are
netting quite a tidy profit… ’
W gives a more brash account about the police response to PIRA money
laundering:
‘The [police] will never shut them down because they can’t even
prove that they exist in the first place. It all relates to having your
contacts in gear first day. If I was going to do something similar to that
in the morning, I could own a pub in Dublin no problem. The only
thing I’d have to say is where did I get the money to buy it, which is
why half the time, they bring in foreigners. There were some people
in the Republic from the Isle of Man recently… brought in to front a
pub for them. The IRA would have supposedly money invested over
in the Isle of Man, and probably still have, and they can introduce it
into the business quite legit. If the front man is asked, they’d have to
say, right, that money’s from the Isle of Man, ‘I brought it across’ or
whatever, but there’s no tax payable on it, there’s no VAT return on it
or anything like that... and I’ve seen that happening in one
establishment, where money was introduced from the Isle of Man
supposedly for investment to the company in Ireland... ’
Accountant W’s comments on strategy and choice considerations finished
with a recommendation and some hypothetical scenarios worthy of note:
‘Basically, all you’re going to arrive at is details that are just pie in the
sky. Unless you have intelligence. Unless you have real intelligence,
you can be surmising, you can say, right, they might make this, they
might make that, but unless you have an individual that’s running a
place like that, fronting a place like that, and you’re never gonna find
out that no matter where you go. I mean, am I gonna come up to you
now… I’m running a pub in Dublin... and to all intents and purposes
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38 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

I own it... Am I gonna tell you, ah… I don’t own it at all, I’m only
fronting it for the boys. I can’t give a **** who you are. I can’t… It’s
as simple as that. No matter who you are or what you do, you’re not
going to get that information out of me. I may as well hang myself,
same thing. For this kind of thing, you’re definitely wasting your time
asking for examples like. You’re not gonna get examples… iron-clad
examples. If you’re still lucky you might get people like me that’ll tell
you… ah… how it can be done, how they can make money, and they
do make it like, huge money, but as for getting actual facts, well,
you’ll never get them… ’
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Intermediate Conclusions of Case Study 2: Overview of Key Points

It is useful at this point to review the issues presented through the details in
both case studies, but especially those issues that might have become
particularly clear through the second case study. The examples presented
highlight a number of key issues related to the conclusions of the first
article, and as related to both articles, may be summarised as follows:

1. PIRA fundraising is organized. Although there are numerous activities

with the potential for being encompassed under the description ‘PIRA
fundraising’, their heterogeneity is united by an organizational context.
While the initial cash to finance PIRA terrorism may derive from sources
including robberies, private and public donations via various public, private
and semi-private fundraising functions, there are specific organizational
influences that underpin how and why the PIRA obtains this immediate
funding from such traditionally associated sources of terrorist fundraising –
this is clear from some details in the first article.
Details of a ‘next step’ however, have emerged from both case studies
presented here. Although much of the obtained cash appears to meet other
equally identifiable sources of cost and expense, there is evidence that some
of this money is made available to the PIRA’s Finance Department for
‘investment’. This is illustrated both through NN’s loan to Joseph, and
through NN’s movement towards obtaining control over the Ravendale
Hotel.

2. A point related to this is that PIRA fundraising appears to be task

specialized and person-centred. Active Service Units of the PIRA have
often been task specialized, a theme reflected more generally upon closer
examination of the PIRA command structure. Although ASUs often appear
to have to self-finance certain local activities there are ASUs who specialize
in armed robberies. With respect to the management and implementation of
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strategy concerning money, the PIRA’s Finance Department, controlled by
NN and JR, is characterized by its specialization in this context. For the
most part, these two men oversaw PIRA financing operations and clearly
these men were trusted with the PIRA’s money at least during the time
frame in question. They were also marked by at least some degree of
business sense. Although the two ‘investment’ examples described here
appeared unsuccessful, it is unreasonable to assume that the events
surrounding both case studies can be characterized simply as clear successes
or clear failures.
Although there appears to have been a misjudging of the situation with
Joseph, the case of the Ravendale (despite the problems) cannot be
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described as wholly unsuccessful. If the purpose of money laundering is to

hide stolen money, then the PIRA succeeded in this. Because there was a
failure to run the Ravendale like a successful business, this cannot be
assumed to reflect the PIRA’s sense of organizational planning and task
specialization per se. Similarly, it is unreasonable to assume (at least
without detailed examination and analysis of other detailed examples) that
the failure to make a successful business out of one of the PIRA’s
investments is a theme that is persistent.
Clearly the men responsible for the PIRA’s Finance Department have
occupied this role for their perceived efficiency in financial matters and a
generalisation on the basis of what might appear to be poor ‘performance’
in both of these cases cannot be established within the inevitable limitations
of the data presented here. If the results of the cases presented here were
representative of the Finance Department’s performance, it is clear that
JR and NN would probably not have retained the roles they occupied for
very long.

3. PIRA funds are centralised for operational use and organizational

survival, and funding activities do not, in the main, serve the purpose of
enriching individual members for non-operational reasons. This is an
important assertion that serves to distinguish the PIRA from other terrorist
groups who have not been so successful in their persistence and longevity,
particularly in the context of fundraising. This assertion mirrors a broader
theme in Republican terrorism, emphasizing the personal sacrifices of
potential and actual PIRA members. It is misleading to view the weekly
wage that the PIRA are purported to have paid their members as a ‘lure’ or
a significant motivational factor in the context of becoming and remaining
a terrorist. The special relationship that the terrorist has in his or her
community is of particular relevance here and explanations emphasizing the
role of material goods as a motivator of Republican terrorism clearly are at
odds with the true nature of PIRA fundraising operations.
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40 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

4. PIRA fundraising operations draw on considerable and influential

resources and contacts in the non-terrorism world. This is a significant
assertion and one of the most important of the research, as it raises broader
issues relating to the identification and nature of both the terrorism process
and the range and nature of participants encompassed by it. This assertion
is clearly illustrated through the extensive range of fraudulent contacts that
the PIRA’s financial controllers have outside the main Republican family.
NN’s employment of X’s services in procuring the Ravendale hotel
illustrates this, but it is further emphasized by the degree to which this
particular procurement was facilitated by the use of false documentation and
testimony on the part of X’s colleagues, who included a bank manager to
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provide references, and an auctioneer to provide appropriate estimates for

the mortgage arrangements.
There is a network of individuals, each of whom has his or her own
particular role to play, and each of whom may be drawn upon in the
execution of a specific fundraising operation, as seen in both case studies.
That one of the accountants, W, whom the first author was fortunate to
briefly interview, was apparently not aware initially of the true nature of his
work for the manager of the pub for which he supplied fraudulent tax
returns, merits further investigation. The need to describe and contrast the
accountants and the nature of their contacts with the PIRA would represent
a desirable next step. Although X clearly is sympathetic to the aims of the
PIRA, having maintained close links with NN for several years, it appears
that this is by no means a prerequisite for ‘employment’ by the PIRA in
facilitating its financial operations in legal business.

5. PIRA funding operations are opportunistic, adaptive and sensitive to

internal and external instrumental and organizational factors. This
assertion is significant, not least within the broader study of terrorism which
to date has been unable to assert such a claim with any degree of certainty.
This assertion was illustrated particularly through the discussion presented
in the first article, emphasizing a number of clear issues, including: a) the
PIRA’s refusal to tolerate its members’ use of drugs. This has implications
for the ‘pull’ factors which motivate individuals to join a group such as the
PIRA, and has equally important factors in creating and sustaining public
support for PIRA activities, and b) the PIRA’s public ‘zero tolerance’ stance
against drug dealers, illustrated through the series of murders committed by
DAAD – discussed in Part 1 – fuels point [a]), as well as having more
immediate practical benefits, that is, money extorted from drug dealers adds
to the PIRA’s funding resources and has the secondary benefit of not
extorting (or not being forced to extort) that same money from the
communities in which terrorists depend on passive and active support.
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From the detail presented in the case studies here, PIRA fundraising is
clearly adaptive in that it has been marked by opportunistic development
and progression. This also has implications for the ‘public image’ of the
PIRA and our understanding of the role that the PIRA hold within their
constituent communities. The case studies represent the simplest glimpse
into what is clearly a murky world of complex activity.

Discussion
Although an analysis of the implications of terrorist fundraising for law
enforcement efforts is worthy of a lengthy paper in itself, it is useful to
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briefly address some key issues, particularly in light of the proposed

establishment of the Assets Recovery Agency in Northern Ireland.
The Cook Report (details of which are cited in Cusack and Taylor13) was
instrumental in uncovering the nature of UDA fundraising schemes in 1987
and it is clear that this was one of a number of factors that proved
instrumental in the downfall of the UDA before its resurgence. The RUC
launched several high-profile anti-racketeering operations in the 1980s and
1990s, including ‘Operation Whiplash’, ‘Operation Christo’ (in which, as
Maguire14 describes, several PIRA members were arrested), and Maguire
argues that Noraid has also been the subject of closer scrutiny in recent
years in an effort to establish the true nature and direction of the funds being
transferred to Ireland.
However, despite increasing attention to the suspected extent of
fundraising activities including money laundering in the Republic, there
have been no properties seized with connections to the PIRA. The response
to terrorist fundraising in Northern Ireland has been seen as weak and
limited in its effectiveness.15 When the Irish government seized the PIRA’s
extortion payout in the Republic in 1985, as described in Part 1, it
represented an encouraging step forward, and perhaps the success of the
response to terrorist fundraising reached its pinnacle in 1994 when
‘Operation Madronna’, a coordinated multi-jurisdiction effort by the Garda,
RUC and British police services seized extensive amounts of
documentation and financial records of several businesses suspected of
being under the control of the PIRA.16
Specialized units were developed in Northern Ireland that dealt
specifically with this kind of crime. The RUC’s Anti-Racketeering Squad,
C13, ensured that over 500 people faced charges since the unit’s inception
in 1987,17 and the Terrorist Finance Unit (ibid.), a Governmental body
managed by a ‘top civil servant’, drew on experts in taxation, organizational
management, economics, banking and accountancy, and the unit’s members
included specialists in company law. Another welcome measure against
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extortion came in 1996 when the then Security Minister for the British
Government announced proposals for new measures via the Draft Proceeds
of Crime Act (Northern Ireland), to combat racketeers by seizing illicitly-
gained assets, thereby making it difficult for ‘drug traffickers and terrorist
racketeers… to profit from their crimes’.18
Complementing this was the 1994 Criminal Justice Act19 and the 1996
Proceeds of Crime Act,20 in operation in the Republic of Ireland, which has
dealt a hammer blow to Irish criminals. The Criminal Assets Bureau, part of
the National Bureau of Criminal Investigation in Dublin, equally continues
to enforce very effective measures to combat illegal activities of this nature,
and it is hoped that the Assets Recovery Agency will merit the same broad
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level of support from the public and Government alike in the coming
months and years.

The Studies: Methodological Issues

Although it could be argued strongly that only one instance of money
lending and one instance of money laundering were examined here, these
particular cases examined were inadvertently of special benefit. Rather than
provide broad generalizations about fundraising activities which are usually
based on guesses in any event, there is special value in examining particular
cases as those described here, and although the details are not complete,
there is a strong case to be made that this represents an encouraging start.
Systematic analyses have been few21 – and certainly this is so in the
context of Irish Republican terrorism. That this can only change for the
future should serve as an impetus for further research efforts particularly in
this area. With respect to Accountant W’s concluding comment from the
interview cited earlier, it is difficult to get ‘actual facts’ about terrorist
fundraising: it is extremely difficult, but it has not been impossible.
It remains the case, however, that pressing questions, such as: ‘how
much money do the PIRA possess now?’ or ‘how much money does the
PIRA receive from Irish Americans?’ are probably inappropriate if not
impossible to answer, certainly by any academic. The research process and
interviews for the original research yield data that has been reconstructed
with the highest possible methodological rigour to produce the accounts
given here, and despite any methodological shortcomings that have
inevitably truncated the level of ‘completeness’ of any case study, a number
of highly significant conclusions have emerged and more importantly, have
been derived from empirical research.
The case studies in their entirety, that is, the command structure and two
fundraising case examples, provide a valuable, if inevitably incomplete and
time-constrained view of the complexity and fluidity of this particular
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organization. It is inescapable, however, that the nature of the data collected
in the research process adopted for this exercise needs addressing and some
commentary. Perhaps nowhere more clearly do the limitations of the
methodology appear than in the relatively minor level of direct commentary
that has been produced verbatim from participants.
Although the case study accounts that were reconstructed are indeed
valid accounts, having been subjected to verification to varying degrees, to
have had all such commentary in respondents’ own words would have
proved perhaps more valuable in acquiring a qualitatively better perspective
of the overall accounts. However, most respondents would not speak if
recorded. Given the nature of the research area, this should be seen as a
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necessary and understandable limitation. In perhaps different circumstances,

the ‘illustrative’ uses of such data might be questioned rather more
vehemently. And again, indeed it might well be that if perhaps a different
area, even still encompassed within the ‘terrorism’ sub-areas, had been
studied (if only slightly less thorny and difficult an area as terrorist
fundraising) then perhaps this might have changed the nature of the
constrictions on the data collection procedures themselves, which overall
would certainly have improved the level of perceived methodological rigour.
The method of ‘snowball sampling’ (when one participant is asked to
assist in the identification and ‘recruitment’ of another etc.) used in the case
studies needs brief reference also. Although it is clear that this method has
proven immensely helpful in similar contexts, mostly involving sensitive
research, a reliance on this technique can inadvertently, and very quickly,
lead to a somewhat skewed set of views.
The participants interviewed in both terrorist and police contexts do not
necessarily have experience of other similar networks operating within the
broader terrorist or police movement, however. Breakwell, Hammond and
Fife-Schaw22 warned that sometimes an over-reliance on the ‘gatekeepers’
in such research could lead to too narrow a focus and involve the researcher
falling into the conceptual traps illustrated by Crelinsten23 and White.24 The
‘gatekeepers’ are the ones who inevitably select those who will talk – we
were mindful of this, and the use of snowball sampling in both the law
enforcement and terrorist context was employed, both formally and
informally, to achieve a wider range of approaches to identifying and
approaching participants.
Furthermore, especially given that a small number of interviews with
Irish security forces led to the decision to develop two particular fundraising
cases, it is clear that if these ‘stories’ had not been focused on, different case
studies might have emerged, which may have led to different conclusions.
For this reason, caution must be used in attempting to extract generalized
principles from these case studies. The heterogeneity of terrorist
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44 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

organizations has already been highlighted and this concern must be

expressed here.

Implications for Understanding the Nature and Identification of

Terrorism
In the context of understanding the nature of terrorism, the most significant
points to emerge from analyses of terrorism is that often our perception (and
ultimately, understanding) of the terrorist and the processes of terrorism is
shaped by the drama of the events surrounding a small range of activities
with which terrorists are most often associated – violent activities.
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However, those who commit the violence that is synonymous with terrorism
represent but one element of a much wider set of activities and context-
specific functions that exist and operate within a broader organizational
setting.
Fundraising illustrates one such set of broader activities. Indeed, when
one looks closer at the range of activities encompassed under the label
‘terrorist fundraising’, there is almost a sense of heterogeneity of function
and activity even within this single category. It is in this sense that our
understanding of the wide-ranging and complex nature of both the
processes within and functions of such an organization is actually limited by
the use of the label ‘terrorist’. Clearly the PIRA is not just an organization
concentrated on terrorist activities, and the sense of forward planning and
opportunistic decision-making styles illustrated through its financial
activities, indicates that the organization is much more than that.
It is clear that, unless one appreciates the wider variety of activities that
may be observed as playing a functional role for a terrorist organization, our
ideas about what terrorism involves will be underdeveloped and narrow. We
may even take this argument one step further. Although it is true that most
terrorist movements have some form of organizational capabilities attached
to them (even at a very rudimentary level for the smallest of groups), few
have aspired to the capacity that the PIRA appear to hold, at least in a formal
sense. Without necessarily commenting yet on the actual effectiveness of its
physical structural and strategic planning, we must appreciate the
complexity and heterogeneity of activity inherent in this one organization.
This can inform our understanding of the nature of terrorism, as well as
raising questions not only about the definition of terrorism (in an academic,
social and political sense as much as a legal one) but also about the
identification of terrorism and terrorists. The implications of this are wide-
ranging and important, particularly in terms of formulating responses.
The problem of the identification of the terrorist is illustrated when the
more specific issue of PIRA membership is considered. There is a strong
sense of a ‘continuum of membership’ within the PIRA. The term terrorist
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 45

(when it is used) always applies to the person committing violent acts. It is
also often used as a term for those who direct the violence – the leadership.
How those involved in the fundraising activities might be thought of is a
different matter, however. While the two principal members of the Finance
Department clearly occupy a role in the PIRA organization (as finance
‘personnel’), the role of the accountants clearly marks the beginning of a
‘grey area’. Accountant X might not be referred to as a terrorist for obvious
reasons. He does not occupy a formal role within the command structure –
he is in this sense, an outsider who is ‘employed’ to perform certain
activities. Secondly, X operated a legal business and did not devote all of his
available time to the PIRA, and yet he was intimately involved in, and
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responsible for, an essential support activity.

The continuum of activity does not stop there. With reference to the
money-lending case study, Maria and her partner would probably not be
referred to as terrorists either, and indeed probably even less so than X
would. However, a step further again could be illustrated by thinking about
the identification of the role of the bank manager whom X called upon to
provide assistance in the procurement of the loan for the Ravendale Hotel.
For him, being a colleague of X’s represents another step beyond ‘true
membership’. So, although there is a certain blurring of the boundary
between accountant and the PIRA, this blurring is made even greater
between, for example, the bank manager and the PIRA. Richardson25
remarked that the relationships between states and the terrorists they often
sponsor could be characterised by seven degrees of separation. On a much
smaller scale, there appears to be several states of separation within this
small circle of people, although they are still united by a single purpose.
From the PIRA’s perspective, and the perspective of the Finance
Department, they all perform and sustain a vital function within the overall
purpose of raising and managing money for the PIRA.
Furthermore, some of the details described here on the whole appear so
far removed from the processes we assume to be characteristic of terrorism
per se that it may appear unusual or even inappropriate to discuss such
matters under the description of ‘terrorism’. The involvement of the PIRA
in such activities also serves to blur the distinction between terrorism and
other types of illegal activity, contributing to a potential problem of
identification – this time between terrorism and organized crime. If we try
to isolate the activities of those financial figures outside the PIRA command
structure (accountants, bank manager, and other professional contacts), their
behaviour appears criminally oriented. That the nature and direction of their
activities reflects, upon closer inspection, the PIRA leadership’s fundraising
strategies, only becomes clear when the relationships between all of the
figures involved is examined.
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46 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

Implications for Understanding Terrorist Fundraising

Adams,26 Anderson27 and Maguire28 emphasised that terrorists who do not
properly organize their fundraising operations inevitably suffer as a
consequence. Anderson emphasizes a point about Republican fundraising:
‘the Provisionals no longer have to live the hand-to-mouth existence of most
guerrilla groups; through prudent financial planning and entrepreneurial
acumen, they have achieved long-term fiscal security, a solid base of
investments to draw on’. Anderson cited estimates of the value of these to
be up to $60 million (highlighting the variation in ‘guesstimates’ of PIRA’s
wealth) and concludes that the purpose of this money is simply ‘an
endowment fund for the waging of future war’. While a terrorist movement
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may conduct terrorist attacks using very little financial sustenance, the point
to make here is that the extent and nature of those activities (as well as the
range of other activities engaged in by the group) is limited by finance. The
PIRA leadership appears to have formalized this concern and the degree to
which the PIRA’s financial strategies have become elaborate reflects a basic
consideration towards future planning.
It is clear that, at least up to and during the 1994–96 ceasefires, the PIRA
raised and spent a lot of money. It has not been established whether PIRA
income matches PIRA expenditure. However, the income estimates
available at the time of the research far exceeded expenditure estimates.
This may be a reflection of both law enforcement’s need to err on the side
of caution in tackling these activities (and contributing to the public’s
awareness of such activities) as much as the media’s dramatic speculation
of just what terrorist ‘godfathers’ earn through their illegal activities.
Investment in the types of businesses described in this article is not
simply for laundering this money, but both case studies described here at
least tentatively suggest forward planning. Not only this, but the PIRA
finance department could have been characterised by a sense of
entrepreneurship that initially appeared surprising given how the PIRA are
assumed to value their traditionally limited resources. Given the nature of the
‘investments’ in both case studies, it appears that the PIRA not only grew
substantially in its financial acumen, but also was actually willing to invest
its money in what amounted in these cases to speculative, almost
adventurous, enterprises. This suggests that it was, and possibly remains, an
organization that is certainly not short of money, while seeking opportunities
which yield as high a return on that investment as possible.
Certainly NN’s undertakings with Joseph appear in hindsight rather
bold, and despite the problems that emerged when Joseph attempted to flee
his debtors, NN’s continued attempts to sustain a business partnership with
him reflected a level of concern both to ‘invest’ money (laundering) but also
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to seek a tangible return on that investment. The second case study, the
investment in the Ravendale, was at least marked by a level of professional
assistance from financial experts (particularly X), although ironically, the
accountant’s personal greed appears to have served as a catalyst for the
eventual downfall of that particular enterprise.
Again, it must be reiterated that it is dangerous to attempt to extract too
many generalized principles from these cases, but if we are to make but one
conclusion in the present context, it is that the PIRA has had a considerable
amount of disposable income to seek investments with. This alone sets the
PIRA apart from the many terrorist organizations who have come and gone
and have failed, as James Adams memorably put it, to look forward.
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Another interesting finding, and a point raised in Part 1, from the

interviews is that many PIRA units appeared to be self-financed. One might
ask then why this is so if the organization is already supposed to have such
financial resources at its disposal. There are several possible answers to this,
and include the possibility that funds are differentially designated and funds
from specific sources are used for specific purposes. Funds submitted to the
Finance Department appeared to serve a different purpose than funds kept
for local use against local expenses. A valuable interview revealed that
£60,000 from a Cork-based Active Service Unit was submitted directly to
the PIRA’s ‘General Headquarters’ around the time of the 1994 ceasefire.
To take a further example: at the time, the thinking behind the Adare
shooting appears to be that the PIRA were somehow ‘starved of cash’ and
sought to replenish what were thought to be diminishing coffers. However,
we can now reassess the Adare shooting as an example of how, despite the
necessary political conditions being in place (that is, the ceasefire was in
existence) this specialist ASU (specialized in money raising) maintained its
activities during this time. This is also illustrated by the Newry robbery
described in Part 1 when a different ASU robbed a post office in Newry, Co.
Down, and killed a worker in the process. This can represent a fundamental
difficulty for the terrorist leadership, and no more clearly is this illustrated
than in the events that followed in the week after the Adare shooting.
An internal problem that Bruce29 claimed dogged the UDA in their own
fundraising activities was a failure to adopt suitable mechanisms for the
management of their illegal monies. The problem of ‘sticky fingers’,
according to Bruce, was partly due to the organization’s failure to draw on
specialised expertise and function to handle money gained from extortion,
racketeering and robberies. To an outsider, terrorist activities are secretive
by their very illegal nature.
However, within the PIRA’s command structure, and certainly as far as
the rank and file members of the ASUs are concerned, there is evidence to
suggest that some intra-organizational activities are even more secretive
than others. Finance falls into this category, and it is perhaps a purposeful
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48 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

strategy of the Republican leadership that this has been the case. The PIRA
certainly does not want its membership (and potential future membership)
to consider financial lures a possible reality during their membership. This
is an issue that posed considerable internal difficulties for the UDA, and
goes a long way towards understanding how the PIRA’s attitude and
reaction to those who have siphoned off funds for their own benefit was
expressed in practice by swift punishment.
There are other types of benefits for keeping such activities hidden from
the rank and file members as well as the broader movement and
communities that the leadership claim to represent. These activities conflict
considerably within the context of both Sinn Féin’s leftist ideological
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dogma on the one hand, and within the more tangible and practical concerns
surrounding the support for the Republican movement from the urban
communities in which most Republican support is found. To illustrate this
important point, it is worth reflecting on the role of the terrorist group
within the communities it claims to represent.

Terrorists and their Communities

Larger terrorist groups need numerous sources of support to survive. Not
least, potent support has to come from the local communities where the
terrorists themselves live, survive and operate, and this is clear from the
perspective of Sinn Féin and the PIRA. Such support can be expressed
(from the perspective of the terrorists) as simply as turning a blind eye to
illegal activity within the community, by not calling the police when one
witnesses a weapon being moved, or other suspicious activity occurring.
It is not always so easy to encourage passive acceptance of such
activities, however, and sometimes the terrorists have to adopt measures to
persuade and coerce the communities within which they operate so that the
security of the terrorists and their operations is not compromised. As
Taylor30 noted, ‘the terrorist must exercise some control over that
community to protect himself and his organization, however large or small’
and the PIRA have recognized this. In 1997, the PIRA stuck posters on
walls in West Belfast threatening to kill anyone who reports suspicious
activity in their area to the police. Clarke31 noted that the warning illustrates
how ‘the [then] recent upsurge in terrorist violence has alienated people in
nationalist areas’. The PIRA’s statement read as follows:
‘The Belfast Brigade of the IRA has become aware that a number of
people in the Belfast area have compromised operations and placed
the lives of volunteers in danger. These individuals have informed the
RUC of the presence of volunteers in our area… The IRA will take
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action against anyone placing the lives of our volunteers in danger in
this way’ (ibid.).
According to Clarke, the IRA’s statement is based on the ‘assessment that
Catholics living in Belfast’s ghettos can no longer be trusted to turn a blind
eye’ (p.24). The local population is certainly not encouraged to call the
official police force to deal with problems, or to report ‘suspicious’ activity,
be it from the PIRA or anyone else.
The relationship which terrorist groups have with their surrounding
communities is central to understanding the public image of terrorism as
well as the sustenance of terrorists. Morrissey and Pease32 described what
they termed the ‘Black Criminal Justice System in West Belfast’,
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illustrating the nature of the control exercised by the Provisional IRA over
its community. The Black Criminal Justice System, according to the
authors, runs parallel to the ‘black economy’, and the PIRA’s role of
‘service’ providers is illustrated by them having nominated themselves as
the local law enforcement, judiciary, and penal enforcers in their
communities.
The important point here is that punishment assaults are not solely used
to intimidate communities and maintain a level of control, but they are also
used to maintain an explicit level of support. It seems likely that the
significant rise in punishment assaults during the ceasefire (and afterwards)
relates to the preservation of good order on behalf of those same
communities as much as control and maintenance factors (illustrated by the
posters in West Belfast in 1997).
Punishment assaults are a visible indication of the continuing presence
of the terrorist organizations as functioning organizations in their
communities, and as such may well go some way to addressing the
problems of perceived lack of focus and activity, particularly during
ceasefires, when the immediate objectives of the terrorist organization
may become blurred. It is clear that the PIRA are serious about their
role as a local police force in not only the detection and punishment of
crime and criminals but also in its deterrence. The PIRA have seen
themselves in West Belfast as a veritable alternative to the existing state
structures33 and thus ‘a demand had grown for a better system of justice and
the IRA was the only organization with the resources to develop an
effective one’.34
These communities represent the most important ground for the
Republican movement, and the social and economic hardship that was often
synonymous with such areas is something that the Republican movement is
careful not to exploit, regardless of its own need for raising hard cash.
Formally speaking, Sinn Féin has a developed outlook on the economic
system of Northern Ireland35 and firmly advocates several revisions and
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50 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

improvements on employment practices in Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin’s

economic policy objectives include:
3. ‘… to provide sustainable and dignified livelihoods for all its
citizens;
4. to develop economic resources, human and material to their fullest;
and
5. to create an economic base which reflects the social and cultural
values of all the Irish people and which fulfils their material needs and
aspirations… ’
It is in stark contrast to this then that the PIRA engaged in explicit criminal
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activity to the degree that it has. One of Morrissey and Pease’s interviewees
commented that the PIRA had rather inadvertently provided the model for
the very behaviour against which the movement was purporting to act as
judiciary and law enforcement. Given the PIRA’s extensive track record of
criminal activity, it seems rather ironic that they should see fit to act in such
a role in their local communities. Clearly, PIRA fundraising activities are at
odds with the aspirations described above, and, although the Ravendale
Hotel provided employment for several former Republican terrorists, it is
perhaps not what Sinn Féin’s statement refers to. Nor is Sinn Féin referring
to PIRA fundraising as helping the Irish people to ‘fulfil their material needs
and aspirations’. Indeed, it is even more ironic that Sinn Féin’s attempts to
attract investment and business to Northern Ireland were for a long time
unsuccessful due to the fear of those same businesses and potential investors
being the next victims of terrorist extortion and racketeering activities.
It is perhaps the scale of such activities however that have, for one
reason, served to distinguish the PIRA from the Loyalist groups, in
particular the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Freedom Fighters.
If the extent and nature of PIRA fundraising activities were exposed to the
degree it has in other organizations (even local ones) the PIRA’s image
would undoubtedly be tarnished. Considerable external support can be lost
through involvement in certain types of fundraising activities, and this was
illustrated through the PIRA’s decision not to continue with its kidnapping
operations, as well as having the strategic wherewithal to actually use the
drugs issue to its own political advantage.
Although the PIRA derived considerable money from extortion
practices, it is unlikely that such practices played a strong role in raising
money from its own localised areas. The kinds of practices as described by
James Adams36 appear much more plausible, suggesting that the bulk of
extortion and racketeering by the PIRA has become more subtle, with
outright extortion having been curtailed since the earlier days of the
movement. That the UDA did not appear to share the same concerns as the
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 51

PIRA in this regard alone contributed to the way in which the movement has
been portrayed, both within and outside of its local communities.37
One conclusion we may draw from this is that the successful terrorist
group will have to impose restraints on both its instrumental and
organizational activities in the context of fundraising, but must be sensitive
to practical environmental consideration. This is an assertion we can derive
clear support for in the analysis of the Adare robbery.

Internal Organizational Implications: Effects on the Individual

Terrorist
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Bruce38 identified other specific problems related to fundraising that became

evident in the pro-state UDA. Because of their frequency and nature, UDA
fundraising operations (e.g. extortion and racketeering) had clear effects on
the public image of the UDA (exacerbated by the Cook Report), and this
subsequently had ramifications for the morale of the organization, the
quality of recruits, and the sense of ‘self-worth’ of existing terrorists.39
The UDA found it difficult, Bruce argued, to allay the argument from its
enemies and other observers that the organization consists of nothing more
than ‘unprincipled gangsters… and, back to the pro-state problem, the
unionist people are more responsive to the views of the state than are
nationalists…’.40 The Loyalists’ involvement in these activities was clearly
misjudged on that basis alone. But fundraising activities were also seen to
‘exacerbate’ tensions at various levels of the organization, especially at
leadership level, about the degree to which individual members were
involved procuring personal gain from the procedures of the Loyalists’
activities. These included, according to Bruce, the hijacking of alcohol,
‘bank robberies, extortion, prostitution, pornography, and drugs’.41
Personal morale of membership was one particular issue of interest, with
Bruce describing how many Loyalist terrorists had ‘personal problems with
their self-image’ following involvement in these types of fundraising
activities. The implications of this for the success of subsequent police
interrogations were evident, he argued. The subsequent quality of new
membership could suffer, and recruits with perhaps different ideas about
what it ‘means’ to be a member of the UDA, rather than some of the older,
‘more principled Loyalists who did not become paramilitaries in order to rob
banks, threaten building contractors, and sell pornography’,42 may join.
Perhaps the most concise conclusion one might suggest here is that the
UDA would have done better to heed the practices of the PIRA as far as all
issues relating to fundraising are concerned. Certainly the opposite appears
to have happened – the PIRA are well aware of how inadequate fundraising
measures have affected the UDA. When the first author asked one leading
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52 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

PIRA member about the PIRA’s involvement in fundraising, his denials that
the PIRA were involved in criminal activity did not appear surprising.
However, his subsequent comments were of greater interest:
‘You’re better off looking at the Loyalists. Drugs, extortion, and all
that. It’s a definite means for them to raise funds. Drugs have always
been a means of raising finance for the UDA. Now, from studying
criminal psychology and so forth, it’s easy to see how this kind of
activity has developed. The UDA has sort of originated out of some
of the real poor areas of East Belfast, the Shankill road and areas like
that and in a sense, although it’s… although the fundraising maybe
politically orientated to a part, it’s certainly criminally orientated as
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well. They’re… I, I don’t want to be putting the Republican

movement on a pedestal, d’you know what I mean? But I mean, we’re
not involved in that stuff… ’
The PIRA is certainly not involved in ‘that stuff’ – at least not in the same
ways the Loyalists have been. Rather43 it is the case that the PIRA was
involved in similar activities, but it has developed a sense of strategy within
the context of fundraising operations alone. The conclusions outlined at the
end of the case studies contrast strongly with those that might be drawn
from the UDA’s involvement in what has, to a large extent, involved the
same type of activities.
The PIRA has apparently placed a stronger emphasis on not being seen
to be directly involved in some types of activities (such as the drug trade) as
well as being involved in money laundering. It clearly has the professional
expertise in the non-terrorist world to facilitate and sustain these activities;
this contrasts sharply with the types of traditional fundraising activities
associated with the Loyalist groups. It is reasonable to assume that the PIRA
is involved in these activities per se, but it is not easy to see that they are.
For example, in the context of the case studies presented here, Joseph was
the owner of Konic, and Accountant X was the owner of the Ravendale. On
the surface, there was nothing that appeared illegal in any way about these
businesses, and who in reality controlled them.
As to whether it is likely that a ‘Cook Report’ could uncover PIRA
fundraising activities to the same extent as the Loyalist terrorists, it is
probably unlikely, unless the network interactions between the terrorists,
their controllers, and their contacts in the non-terrorist world, are uncovered
and illustrated in the context of the types of investment concerns and
procedures outlined here. Also the PIRA’s specialization of function and
professionalism would probably mean that the movement would rarely
leave itself open to the extensive humiliation suffered by the UDA when the
Cook Report exposed crude extortion attempts. Certainly, the level of
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 53

internal corruption frequently seen within the ranks of the UDA would not
even be considered, let alone tolerated, within the ranks of the PIRA. As
Clarke44 tellingly states: ‘People like [Martin] McGuinness are no pushover.
They are not motivated by the desire for fame, fortune or political
recognition. They are a lot more resolute, more capable of keeping their
eyes on the big picture and a lot less corruptible than most constitutional
politicians’.
Returning to the point about ideological control, the ‘atypical’ PIRA
activist may have been protected in some ways from what Bruce suggested
as a problem of ‘self-image’ identity crisis for UDA members, because of
the particular ways in which task specialisation works within the
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Republican terrorist movement. The interview material for the present

research supports the notion that PIRA activists in general genuinely did not
seem to be aware of the processes involved in the transfer of funds and
investment in properties. While they may be aware of whether or not some
property is owned or controlled by the ‘Republican movement’, that is
probably the sum total of what is known.
The need-to-know principles of security apply to fundraising as much as
they do to other activities. And this appears to work in reverse. The
accountants did not occupy any formal role within the PIRA’s command and
functional structure, and one of the one-time accountants interviewed
claimed to know little about his own boss’s activities at all. Certainly he did
not have access to any knowledge or information related to the activities of
the Provisional IRA.
As we have seen, however, the necessary secrecy imposed as a result of
leadership concerns does not always work to their own advantage. The
second fundraising case study illustrated that the problems of failure to
adequately manage funds is difficult to counter even for the PIRA. In a
scenario perhaps reminiscent of the UDA’s internal theft which catalyzed
the movement’s fall from what little grace it had towards the late 1980s, X’s
involvement in the ‘mismanagement’ of the Ravendale illustrates just how
his PIRA bosses in the Finance Department remained unaware of the fact
that his efforts at personal enrichment apparently allowed the organization
per se to suffer. This is yet another example of how, despite several
underlying strategic and organizational concerns and practical measures,
secure organizational functioning is difficult to enforce even with the years
of experience that many veteran PIRA members have.

The Longevity of Terrorism as a Function of Terrorist Fundraising

Anderson45 argues that financial gain is the incentive that keeps terrorism
going in Northern Ireland. Indeed, Maguire46 suggests the radical hypothesis
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54 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

that finance holds the central role in explaining the longevity of terrorism in
Northern Ireland, since terrorist organizations have (true to the nature of
organizations more generally) become ‘self-sustaining entities within their
own ethnic communities… by providing a range of inputs to their
communities’.47 For example, Anderson emphasizes the nature of the
service which the PIRA’s security companies provide with their protection
money scams, in that the owners of businesses under the protection of the
PIRA are: ‘probably grateful on one level… now firmly under [the PIRA’s]
protective wing, he won’t be leaned on or bombed by another paramilitary
organization’. This theme needs some further exploration before
conclusions about the assertions of Anderson and Maguire can be evaluated.
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Maguire’s conclusions are, on the surface, recommendations for

studying terrorism with a particular emphasis on the surrounding
environments within which terrorist movements exist and thrive. In
Maguire’s analysis, as with Adams’, by focusing on the provision of ‘goods
and services’ to constituent communities, this might go towards explaining
why at least some level of support exists for the terrorists. Less clear is the
role of goods in light of the increasing number of accounts emphasizing the
particular types of ‘services’ provided by the paramilitaries since Morrissey
and Pease’s early account of how the PIRA have provided an informal
justice system (also Pyle48 and Silke49). Maguire’s thesis is based on the
assertion that the reason why terrorists go into business involves playing ‘a
more active role in the formal economy’.50
Such arguments do not only apply to Republican terrorism. The
provision of services by the Loyalist paramilitaries to their communities
was very evident in the early days of the campaign,51 and particularly during
the Workers’ Strike of 1974. Tommy Lyttle, a senior UDA member in West
Belfast reported that the UDA were ‘buying large supplies from Northern
Dairies’ and that the UDA had so much in stock that they would actually be
distributing some of it free of charge.
A UDA statement,52 following Lyttle’s announcement that the UDA was
not making any profits from the sale of the milk, read: ‘We know we have
your full support and we will make every effort to ease the situation as
regard milk and food supplies. Any hardship should be reported to your
local paramilitary commander or welfare unit. We will try to help where
possible’. Such hardship resulted from the strike that the UDA had
organized, resulting in lack of pay for workers and families.
Hence the UDA, although not making a profit in a financial sense,
clearly mitigated against any potential backlash for its role in the strike by
the families of the workers. In 1974, the UDA, still a legal organization,
answered claims that it was trying to move into the ‘liquor business’.53
Following allegations that the UDA purchased three bars in Belfast, ‘run
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 55

along commercial lines, with the profits being used for the benefit of
loyalist prisoners and their dependants’, the UDA admitted: ‘We have three
bars now, two in West Belfast and one in the East’.
Anderson54 takes Maguire’s argument and makes it more explicit,
describing factions of the PIRA in Belfast as having ‘a very good reason for
wanting to sabotage any prospect of peace, one that has less to do with flags
and more to do with money’.55 Anderson’s argument does not address the
apparent inconsistency, however. He argues that financial reward is a strong
incentive for terrorists to remain conducting a terrorist campaign,
particularly with respect to the PIRA. Yet on the other hand he goes to great
lengths to emphasize that this money goes into the ‘war effort’, and not to
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fund individuals, as in the case of the Loyalists.

If the majority of this money goes into funding the PIRA’s campaign of
violence, one would imagine then that sustaining finances for personal gain
during ceasefires should not be such a great, or realistic, concern. This would
assume of course, that during ceasefires the terrorist group has the intention
to pursue the achievement of its own stated aims, and returns us to Maguire’s
central assertions. It is clear therefore that in the current climate, and
especially given the details that have emerged recently from the
extraordinarily detailed House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs
Committee report, there are worryingly ambiguous answers to such
questions.
Far too little is known about the black economy in Northern Ireland, how
much of it involves terrorists and how much involves non-terrorist criminals,
and perhaps whether some or all involves both groups. It might be attractive
to attempt to formally measure the extent and ‘size’ of ‘black economies’,
but perhaps to the detriment of examining just why and how they develop.
Certainly an effort to strengthen the social and civil bases from which
responses to these problems must develop must occur in order to debase
continued terrorist involvement in organized crime in Northern Ireland.
From the accounts presented here, the PIRA’s investment (and their
seeking of investments) does not appear to be determined by a concern to
play an active role in either formal or informal economies. It is perhaps
made more relevant by the fact that both the case of money lending to
Joseph (and NN’s subsequent interest in the development of his business)
and NN and X’s involvement in the Ravendale Hotel, took place in the
Republic of Ireland, away from the urban base of Belfast and other
Republican areas. There are no ‘services’ and ‘goods’ to be provided of the
type Maguire presents to us, apart from providing the basic hotel and bar
services which any other hotel and bar provides. The costs are the same –
not cheaper, not more expensive, and we may have to rethink just what the
criteria for success is as far as terrorist money laundering is concerned.
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56 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

It is clear that actual profiteering by the PIRA from such pubs or other
businesses is probably overestimated. Unless the PIRA effectively run a
well-managed and successful business venture for several years, it is
unlikely that profits from money laundering will play a substantial role in
meeting the real expenses of the movement.
There are several outstanding issues from discussing fundraising,
however, all of which provide fruitful areas for further investigation. One
particular theme that emerges is the level of expertise that the PIRA appears
to display in contrast to their Loyalist counterparts. A major conclusion
Bruce56 points to about the differences between UDA and PIRA fundraising
is that during its campaign, the PIRA had access to a recruitment and
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support base which is far wider than that available to the Loyalist terrorists:
‘The IRA is able to recruit across a far wider spectrum of the class structure.
Although it is primarily a working-class organization, it has some support
from the university-educated middle classes and hence access to the
accounting, legal, and business skills required to “launder” its funds’.57
Bruce argues that this is why the UDA raised and managed its financial
resources in a less professional manner. It is difficult to say whether the
PIRA’s financial sustenance was or is solely due to its greater
professionalism, especially when one looks at how ‘professional’ the
PIRA’s accountant X was in the management of the Ravendale, it does not
appear very promising for the GHQ Finance Department. The lack of
expertise that Bruce refers to might more adequately be compensated for if
other terrorist groups adopted similar internal organizational measures to
those of the PIRA – specialization of function is one that particularly
applies, but accountability and discipline represent the practical measures
which most terrorist organizations at least in principle aspire to.
Another inescapable fact is that it is difficult to make generalizations
about PIRA fundraising across time. If we compare and contrast the PIRA’s
fundraising activities in the early days of the movement and those it was
involved in at the time of the current research, the differences are many, as
far as both the nature and extent of those activities are concerned. The
heterogeneity in the nature and range of fundraising activities necessarily
requires us to examine particular fundraising activities within specific
organizational, social and political contexts. The examples of the Adare
robbery (and activities against the Gardaí in the Republic more generally)
illustrate one set of concerns (clearly related to internal organizational
pressures that needed attention) while the strong evidence for lack of
involvement by the PIRA in the drug trade represents another set of
concerns, this time directly related primarily to the political process. Indeed,
at this point it may be useful to briefly broaden the discussion to a
consideration of the PIRA command structure in this light.
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PLAYING THE GREEN CARD 57

Organization of structure and function
There is a need for future research to reflect a greater appreciation of the
wide diversity and differences encompassed by terrorist activities, and the
implications of this. When we initially speak about the individual involved
in terrorism, we know now that there are many different kinds of
involvement. Active service is only one of many, and it is increasingly
obvious that the reasons people join a terrorist group can have little bearing
on what they subsequently do as terrorists (or as something else). Having
appreciated the organizational context to PIRA terrorism, we can see that,
despite (or perhaps because of) the fluidity of the movement, there is
extensive differentiation and specialization of function. Even the persons
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who commit the terrorist ‘act’ may be characterized as differing in the level
of activity in which he/she engages – be it full-time, part-time, or the very
part-time, as epitomized by ‘sleepers’. There may be individuals who
directly aid and abet the offence itself – the driver, the lookout, the carrier
or storer of weapons. There may be the individual who offers support
indirectly, for example, by allowing the PIRA to use his/her home as a ‘safe
house’, providing respite and sustenance.
It is clear that the PIRA invested in the development of contextual and
often context-specific internal and external support as a reflection of the
concerns of the leadership. On the one hand, the direct procurement of funds
was ensured by engagement in explicit terrorist moneymaking procedures,
for example, armed robberies. The accountants and money ‘managers’ who
were put in place to manage and invest this money represents another
different side to this, one that the ‘procurers’ were not necessarily aware of.
The hidden supporter represents another element in this chain, which is not
unimportant by any means, as the PIRA rely on both hidden and passive
contributors and supporters. This may range from the donation of small
amounts of money in subscriptions to An Phoblacht or by the support of the
Republican cause through attending benefit dances and other fundraising
events. This part of the Republican ‘universe’ is important in other tangible
ways – through, for example, the active support for the families of prisoners
or those killed on ‘duty’.

Conclusion
Parts 1 and 2 of this article have modestly attempted to argue a case for
greater investment of researchers into a poorly understood set of terrorist
activities, traditionally elusive to empirical enquiry. There is no doubt that
law enforcement and intelligence agencies have access to data which would
greatly benefit research efforts, and while we have hopefully demonstrated
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58 TERRORI S M A N D P O L I T I C A L V I O L E N C E

that it is possible for academic researchers to access primary data on terrorist

fundraising, the issue of access and cooperation needs greater discussion.
Furthermore, despite some difficulties given the nature of the area under
investigation, attempts to strengthen both the internal and external validity of
any conclusions we may draw from the data were paramount in the current
effort. Given the current climate and the ways in which the role of the
terrorism researcher is rapidly changing, any efforts to collect and interpret
primary data on issues such as terrorist fundraising ought to be encouraged if
we, as scholars, are to seriously entertain the possibilities of greater
conceptual development in the broader area of political violence research.
One final point may be made. Unusually, the work reported in this paper
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(and its predecessor) has a discipline base in psychology, rather than in

sociology, anthropology or political science. The significance of this lies in
an openness to move beyond social constructions of terrorism to embrace,
within a social context, a sense of the individual exposed to, and reacting
within, dynamic environmental forces. Notions of process, flexibility and
reactivity therefore become increasingly significant factors in our
understanding. Further explorations of the significance of these constructs
in understanding the ‘process’ of terrorism may well improve our
conceptual capacity in this area.58

NOTES

Acknowledgement: We would like to thank the following for comments on earlier drafts: Jim
Cusack, Graeme Steven, Paul Wilkinson, Andrew Silke, David O’Sullivan and Sean Hammond.

1. House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee. Financing of Terrorism in

Northern Ireland: Fourth Report of Session 2001–2002. Volume 1: Report and Proceedings
of the Committee (2 July 2002), p.53.
2. For a summary, see J. Horgan and M. Taylor, ‘The Provisional Irish Republican Army:
Command and Functional Structure’, Terrorism and Political Violence 9/3 (Autumn 1997)
pp.1–32.
3. J. Horgan, ‘The Case for First–Hand Research’, in A. Silke and G. Ilardi (eds.), Researching
Terrorism: Trends, Successes, Failures (London: Frank Cass in press).
4. S. O’Callaghan. The Informer (London: Granta Books 1998).
5. D. McCartan, ‘Commons move to block IRA funding’. Belfast Telegraph (1 Nov. 1996).
6. V. Guerin, ‘IRA used ceasefire to plan bomb campaign’. Sunday Independent (23 June 1996)
p.7.
7. M. Taylor and E. Quayle, Terrorist Lives (London: Brassey’s 1994), p.46.
8. The multi-agency investigative body established in 1996, whose primary role involves ‘the
identification of assets, wherever situated, of persons which derive or are suspected to derive
directly or indirectly from criminal activity’. See http://www.garda.ie/angarda/cab.html for
further details.
9. T. Harnden, Bandit Country (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1999).
10. J. Adams, The Financing of Terror: How the Groups that are Terrorising the World Get the
Money To Do It (London: New English Library 1986).
11. Officer Commanding.
12. The Royal Ulster Constabulary, now the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).
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13. J. Cusack and M. Taylor, ‘Resurgence of a Terrorist Organization: Part 1 – The UDA: A Case
Study’, Terrorism and Political Violence 5/3 (July 1993) pp.1–27.
14. K. Maguire, ‘Policing the Black Economy: The Role of C13 of the RUC in Northern
Ireland’, The Police Journal LXVI/2 (1993) pp.127–35.
15. Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, ‘Northern Ireland: Reappraising
Republican Violence’, Conflict Studies 24 (Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and
Terrorism 1991), pp.16–17.
16. P. Norman, ‘The Terrorist Finance Unit and the Joint Action Group on Organized Crime:
New Organizational Models and Investigative Strategies to Counter Organized Crime in the
UK’, The Howard Journal 37/4 (1998) pp.375–92.
17. Henderson, cited in Horgan, 1999, p.12.
18. Connolly, cited in Horgan, 1999, p.11.
19. Government Publications Office, Criminal Justice Act 1994 (No.15) (Office of the Attorney
General, Government of Ireland 1994). Retrieved on 13 March 1999 from the World Wide
Web: http://www.irlgov.ie:80/ag/.
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20. Government Publications Office, Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 (No. 30) (Office of the
Attorney General, Government of Ireland 1996). Retrieved on 13 March 1999 from the
World Wide Web: http://www.irlgov.ie:80/ag/.
21. See Adams, ‘The Financing of Terror’ (note 10), S. Bruce, The Red Hand: Protestant
Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992); A.P. Silke, ‘In
Defence of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland – Part One:
Extortion and Blackmail’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21 (1998) pp.331–6; A. Silke,
‘Drink, Drugs and Rock ‘n’ Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland – Part
Two’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 23/2 (2000) pp.107–27.
22. G.M. Breakwell, S. Hammond, and C. Fife-Schaw, Research Methods in Psychology
(London: Sage 1995) p.25.
23. R.D. Crelinsten, ‘Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship between the
Controller and the Controlled’, in P. Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart (eds.), Contemporary
Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press 1987) pp.3–23.
24. R.W. White, ‘Issues in the Study of Political Violence: Understanding the Motives of
Participants in Small Group Political Violence’. Paper presented at The Future Developments
in Terrorism Conference, University College, Cork, 3–5 March 1999.
25. L. Richardson, ‘Terrorists as Transnational Actors’, in M. Taylor and J. Horgan (eds.), The
Future of Terrorism (London: Frank Cass 1999) pp.209–19.
26. Adams, ‘The Financing of Terror’ (note 10); also J. Adams, ‘The Financing of Terror’, in P.
Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (pp.393–405).
(Aberdeen: Aberdeen University 1987) pp.393–405.
27. S. Anderson, ‘Making a Killing’, Harper’s Magazine, 288 (1 Feb. 1994). Retrieved on 8 July,
1996 from the Electric Library Database on the World Wide Web: http://www.elibrary.com.
28. K. Maguire, ‘Fraud, extortion and racketeering: The black economy in Northern Ireland’,
Crime, Law and Social Change 20 (1993) pp.273–92.
29. Bruce, ‘The Red Hand’ (note 21).
30. M. Taylor, The Terrorist (London: Brassey’s 1988) p.56.
31. L. Clarke, ‘IRA Threatens to Kill Informants’, Sunday Times (12 Jan. 1997) p.24.
32. M. Morrissey and K. Pease, ‘The Black Criminal Justice System in West Belfast’, The
Howard Journal XXI (1982) pp.159–66.
33. Ibid., p.163.
34. Ibid.; also see J. Darby, Intimidation and the Control of Conflict in Northern Ireland (New
York: Syracuse University Press 1986) pp.158–62.
35. Sinn Féin, ‘Building the Economy, Building the Peace’. Paper Presented at the Washington
Conference on Trade and Investment in Ireland, May 1995 (Dublin: Sinn Féin National
Headquarters 1995).
36. Adams, ‘The Financing of Terror’ (note 10).
37. Bruce, ‘The Red Hand’ (note 21).
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p.283.
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40. Ibid., p.284.

41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. It might appear obvious to draw attention to the recent case of alleged PIRA activity in
Colombia, but details remain very unclear.
44. L. Clarke, ‘Sinn Féin tiger will not be tamed’, Sunday Times (4 May 1997) p.13.
45. Anderson, ‘Making a Killing’ (note 27).
46. Maguire, ‘Fraud, Extortion and Racketeering’ (note 28).
47. Ibid., p.273.
48. D.J. Pyle, Tax Evasion and the Black Economy (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1989).
49. A.P. Silke, ‘The Lords of Discipline: The Methods and Motives of Paramilitary Vigilantism
in Northern Ireland’, Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 7/2 (1998) pp.121–56;
A.P. Silke, ‘Rebel’s Dilemma: The Changing Relationship between the IRA, Sinn Féin and
Paramilitary Vigilantism in Northern Ireland’, unpublished draft paper.
50. Maguire, ‘Fraud, Extortion and Racketeering’ (note 28), p.289.
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51. Belfast Telegraph, ‘Milk: Selling at 4p a bottle – UDA’, Belfast Telegraph (22 May 1974)
page number unavailable; Belfast Telegraph, ‘UDA running three Belfast public houses’,
Belfast Telegraph (6 August 1974) page number unavailable.
52. Copy in authors’ possession.
53. Belfast Telegraph, ‘UDA running three public houses’ (note 51).
54. Anderson, ‘Making a Killing’ (note 27).
55. Ibid.
56. Bruce, ‘The Red Hand’ (note 21).
57. Ibid.
58. For a development of this theme, see J. Horgan, ‘The Social and Psychological
Characteristics of Terrorism and Terrorists’, paper presented at the Root Causes of Terrorism
Conference, Oslo, 9–11 June 2003 (available from the author).