JENS ERIK FENSTAD

NOTES ON SYNONYMY

I. There are some perpetual disputes in philosophy. One is the discussion on the general principle of induction; another is the controversy, or rather uncertainty, clustering around the concept of synonymy. The first is perhaps a philosopher's problem. The second is also of concern to e.g. linguists and language-conscious people in general. 1 The debate on synonymy has witnessed a revitalization in recent years, starting partly from the famous G o o d m a n paper: On Likeness q f Meaning. 2

In our opinion there are some important assumptions underlying the discussion, and it is the awareness of these assumptions that has shaped our approach in these Notes. First, as the discussion refers indiscriminately to "natural language", a "correct usage" seems to be presupposed, i.e. a uniform, relatively stable system of "natural language" having fixed rules of syntax and semantics, a and it is for this "natural language" system that an explication, leading up to a definition, should qe given. The term "natural language" is vague. The answer to what is a natural language, is apparently very difficult to furnish. We shall not attempt to give the answer, but some preliminary comments may seem in order, - the more as we shall use "natural language" freely in the subsequent discussion. One may concentrate the attention on two ways of delimiting the use of this term. One may be called internal, e.g. by describing some structural requirements a laugnage should measure up to in order to be called a natural language. Another way of characterization may be called external, e.g. by reference to historical-geographic and other factors outside the language system. A first difficulty is whether a language primarily should be determined as something spoken or through a Book o f Rules, i.e. a system presented in writing. These two approaches may be non-equivalent; the linguists give primacy to the first, whereas the logicians often refer to language as a system written down. 35

Synthese 14 (1962) 35-77; D. Reidel Pub. Co., Dordrecht - Holland

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We do not attempt to give an intrinsic characterization of a natural language, just note the extreme difficulty of the task. Some external characteristics may consist in reference to a group of users (indiscriminately or to some special competence group), or in reference to the possibility of intercommunicability to some certain degree. ]'his last perhaps offers more difficulties than it solves. We would, for example, get different results whether we considered classical Chinese as written or spoken. We could perhaps use the rather rough external characterization through historical-geographic factors. In section VI we shall consider a natural language as a bundle of sublanguages satisfying some, not very precisely specified, requirements. At this moment this remark may be less than helpful as "explication". We have only been interested in exposing the vagueness of the term "natural language" in connection with the assumption listed above. To highlight the difficulties we may mention the situation in Scandinavia. Are the languages of Denmark, Norway and Sweden different natural languages or some, more or less differing subspecies of a common natural language? And, with reference to Norway, how to classify the two different official "languages" of this country? In view of these difficulties we find the reference just to "natural language" in discussions of synonymy somewhat peculiar. We here reckon the construction of counter-examples to some proposed definition as references to natural language. There is a seemingly wide-spread view that definition schemes and criteria should, in some sense, be "effective" in order to be acceptable. When two language fragments (words, sentences, etc.) of which it is meaningful to ask whether they could be synonymous, are given, then, the belief states, we should not only possess the knowledge that an answer exists, but should actually be able to know the answer. 4 This is the second assumption. We do not want to plunge into the discussion as referred to above, but would rather start from an exposition of two extremes. We select a linguist and a formal logician and retell their schemes of semantics. Our linguist will be S. Ullmann giving his systematization in Ullmann [16], but there will be some other references. The logician is J. G. Kemeney 36

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with his "new approach" set forth in Kemeney [5]. Corcerning formal semantics, we should not omit reference to Carnap [1] and Tarski '~, both a sine qua non of Kemeney [5]. Are our choices representative? We believe so, without adducing any arguments pro et con. A brief outline of the paper will be given. In sections 1I and 111 we give the systems of Ullmann [16] and Kemeney [5]. This is done to make the article relatively self-contained, as we have frequent references to these systematizations in our subsequent discussion. It also is of 11o small interest to juxtapose two such systems of semantics! In section IV we comment on the interrelationship of philosophical semantics and the semantics of linguists. First we stress the differences, then we show the close relationship of conceptual framework and methods existing between linguistic semantics and the "empirical" brand of philosophical semantics as presented in, for example, Nzess [12]. At the heart of our exposition is section V. Here we first give the not very original view on "natural language" as a bundle of sublanguages. This view is elaborated in some detail, and we argue that this gives the ground for claiming that natural language is "locally formal" - thu'~; opening a way of rapprochement, to some, yet slight, degree, of formal and linguistic semantics with due emphasis on empirical consideration,~. This view on natural language gives occasion to an "existential" scheme of synonymy-definition (applicable to the various sublanguages), and we conclude this section with several comments on this scheme. The last section is given to a discussion of different types of criteria: existentiul ones versus eJ]~ctive ones. And we show (intuitively) how the desire to bring forth the effective content, to present effectivisations of pure existential definition schemes, underlies much of the discussion on, for example, synonymy (but is in no sense restricted to this concept nor semantics as a whole). We also contend that these effectivisations are in general only partial, some definitional equivalence may be destroyed; and referring to the semantics of some language in use, inductive arguments enter. As we shall argue, this gives one, but not the only, theoretical background for the construction of synonymy-questionnaires. Our last thesis will be, that whereas there may be one "pure eistential scheme" of' synonymy-definition, uniformly 6 applicable to various sublanguages of some natural language, there is, in general, a multitude of effectivisations, ~ach adapted for some specific sublanguage, and such 37

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that two effectivisations for the same sublanguage usually are nonequivalent and not coextensive with the pure existential scheme, this latter rendering our intuitive idea, sameness of "meaning". II. Semantics, the study of meaning within language, is the youngest branch of linguistics. But, as Ullmann writes ([16] p. 24): The role of meaning is so fundamental to the language system that its study must constitute one of the main divisions. As argued above, we have found it of sufficient interest to give the Ullmann scheme of linguistics, in particular his systematization of semantics. However, this scheme is no more than a working hypothesis consistent with our present state of knowledge; it is a division, not the division, of the domain of linguistics ([16], p. 39). According to Ullmann, who in turns follows Richards and Ogden, 7 there are three basic terms of symbolization: sign, a stimulus similar to some part of an original stimulus and sufficient to call up the engram formed by that stimulus; symbol, those signs which men use to communicate one with another; engram, the residual trace of an adaptation made by the organism to a stimulus. ([16], p. 27). These characterizations, we believe, do not in any way remove the ambiguities and vaguenesses of the three terms involved. But in this section we are "playing the game" of the linguists. A central distinction within linguistics stems from F. de Saussure's duality of 'la langue' versus 'la parole'. In Ullmann's terms: The latter (la parole), it will be recalled, means individual speech-activity and its result, the concrete act of speech . . . . 'La langue' is a system of symbolengrams stored in the minds of members of the speech-community. It is vested in the community, not in the individual speaker. ([16], pp. 27-28). The subject matter of linguistics is 'la langue'. Following Ullmann we may subdivide the study of linguistics in three branches: (1)phonology, the study of phonemes, i.e. the engrams left behind by the smallest acoustic units of 'la parole" in ']a langue': (2) lextcology, the study of words, i.e. the engrams corresponding to the smallest semantic units of 'la parole'; (3) ~yntax, the study of syntagmas, pattern symbols designed to convey relations coused by the arrangements of 'la parole' left behind in engraphic patterns in 'la langue', and which provide ready-made moulds into which words may enter ([16], pp. 29-30). 38

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Lexicology and syntax may be subdivided into a morphological and semantic part. Lexical morphology is concerned with the investigation of word-forms, whereas lexical semantics is the study of word-meanings. Syntactic morphology is given to the study of formal devices employed by language in conveying relations, and the semantic part investigates the functions discharged by these devices. A third line of division is embodied in the synehronistie or descriptive versus the diaehronistie or historical approach to language. This distinction was emphasized by Saussure who enunciated four "axioms" concerning the relationship of the synchronistic and diachronistic point of view: (1) There are two different ways of approach to language, one synchronistic, the other diachronistic: (2) The synchronistic approach is completely independent and self-contained, and has absolute primacy as the only one congenial to the subject matter of linguistics: (3) The two methods must be kept scrupulously apart. (4) Synchronistic linguistics deal with systems, diachronistic linguistics with single elements. ([16], p. 142). As with most classificatory principles within an empirical science in its earlier developments, these "axioms" have been contested in several ways. The primacy given to the synchronistic approach as in (2), has been protested. (3) is discredited by Ullmann through various examples, and in contradiction to (4) we have witnessed the fertile theory of semantic fields ([16], pp. 152-170). Our main concern is the study of semantics. On the two approaches Ullmann writes ([16] p. 17l): Synchronistic semantics is the science of meaning, diachronistic semantics the science of changes of meaning . . . . the latter is concerned with semantic change . . . . If meaning is conceived as a reciprocal relationship obtaining between name and sense (cf. the discussion o f " m e a n i n g " below), then a semantic change will occur whenever a new name becomes attached to a sense and/or a new sense to a name. Of special relevance for the following development (sections IV-VI) is the subject of synchronistic semantics, of which we now give a brief outline of the systematization set forth by Ullmann ([16], pp. 43-138). The first controversial point is the word and its autonomy. In several schemes of linguistics the word as unit has disappeared, but Ullmann argues in favour of a certain measure of word autonomy, concluding 39

JENS ERIK FENSTAD

([16], p. 65): The context theory is perhaps the most influential single factor in the growth of twentieth century semantics. It makes itself felt at all stages of synchronistic investigation, and underlies the whole structure of diachronistic analysis. All the most promising discoveries and most fruitful methods of modern research, the study of emotive elements, the pathologies of meaning, the theory of semantic fields, the very concept of semantic laws, can be traced to this source. It is also calculated to emphasize the borderline character of linguistic semantics, its links with the psychology and philosophy of symbolization on the one hand, and with literary criticism on the other. There is thus no risk of underestimating its significance by asserting that it is perfectly compatible with a certain measure of word-autonomy. This quote is given not so much for the autonomy it asserts of words, but for the great emphasis it places upon the contextualisation within studies of language, i.e. a word does not only have a meaning of its own, but the full sense is derived through consideration of the context in which it appears. The central issue of synchronistic semantics is the analysis of meaning. Ullmann introduces the name-sense terminology ([16], p. 69): We shall say, then, that the acoustic shape of the word, the string of phonemas of which it is composed, constitute the n a m e . . . . Similarily, the mental content called up by the name will be termed the s e n s e of the word. This leads up to the functional definition of meaning, as Ullmann terms his definition ([16], p. 70): Meaning is a reciprocal relation between name and sense, which enables them to call up one another. Commenting upon this definition he writes ([16], pp. 74-75): Nothing indeed could be more fundamental, and more generally accepted, in dealing with semantic situations than the reciprocal relation between name and sense. Whether this relation should be called 'meaning' is a question of little but terminological importance. 8 Ullmann argues ([16], pp. 71-72) that the linguists need not take into account the third factor of the meaning situation: the thing meant or referent. 9 The ideal relationship in the meaning situation is, of course, one sense - one name, or simple meaning. Some factors of relevance modifying this scheme are: (1) the conventionality of the name, i.e. "the absence of any intrinsic motivation or justification, any 'natural' connection between the 40

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name and the sense" ([16], p. 84). Further: The conventionality of tile semantic relationship is reflected synchronistically in the possibility of multiple meaning (synonymy, polysemy, homonymy); dischronistical[y, in the possibility of linguistic change, phonetic as well as semantic: panchronistically, in various languages having different names for the same, or nearly the same, sense; and the same, or nearly the same, name for different senses ([16], p. 85). Within "well established" language systems the pure conventionality no longer obtains, changes and new adapt~tions may have some motivation. (2) The vagueness and complexity of the sense: (The sense is not) delimited by any clear-cut demarcation-lines, except in the case of scientific concepts; it is essentially 'open', asking for supplementation . . . . This openness and lack of firm contours is reflected in the 'zonal' structure of the sense, the belts of varying determinateness clustering around its inner core . . . . ([10], p. 93). (3) Emotive factors, standing for all non-cognitive factors entering into verbal configurations. The affective side of language is just as fundamental as its cognitive function (cf. [16], p. 97). One of the most interesting and important substudies within synchronistic semantics is the investigation of multiple meaning and semantic pathology. Normally we have, according to the definition of meaning, a relation between o n e name and o n e sense. " M o r e often than not, several semantic relations are telescoped, with the result that more than one name is attached to one sense, and more than one sense to one name, within the synchronous system. This complication of semantic patterns will henceforth be referred to as multiple meaning" ([16], p. 106). (The vagueness of the sense and emotive factors) tend on the whole to generate the 'one name-more sense" variety of multiple meaning, and to mitigate its other type, the 'one sense-more names" situation: they eliminate total synonymy by introducing subtle shades of connotation, referential or emotive differentiation, stylistic and aesthetic discrimination into synonymic series ([16], p. I07). Synonymy belongs to the 'one sense-more names" variety of multiple meaning. Above it was argued that the other brand of multiple meaning by far is the most common. " . . . , it is almost a truism that total synonymy is an extremely rare occurrence, a luxury which language can ill afford. Here is yet another consequence of the vagueness of the sense: two names can easily be ascertained as identical, but it is hard to prove that 41

JENS ERIK FENSTAD

any two sense are coextensive" ([16], p. 108). And here is Ullmann's definition of synonymy: Only those words can be described as synonymous which can replace each other in any given context, without the slightest alteration either in cognitive or in emotive import ([16], pp. 108-109). We h ave a threefold division of synonymy: (1) Pure synonyms: coextensive and interchangeable in intellective and affective value. (2) Pseudo-synonyms or homoionyms (a) Coextensive and interchangeable in some ontext. (b) Coextensive and interchangeable from the cognitive but not fromthe emotive and evocatory angle ([16], p. 109). The technique of synonymic analysis will probe interchangeability by various methods. The simplest of these is substitution in different context . . . . A complementary procedure . . . consists in casting around for suitable antonyms ([16], p. 109). l It is the 'one name - more senses' variety of multiple meaning that is of greatest interest to linguists. Ullmann even contends that "this is in many ways the central problem of all semantic studies, linguistic and others ([16], p. 114). 11 There may be distinguished several types of the 'one name with several senses' type of multiple meaning. (1) More aspects of one sense: shift in application as in 'healthy climate' - 'healthy complexion'. (2) Several senses of one word: polysemy; e.g. 'human head' - 'head of department' - 'bridgehead'. (3) Several words: homonymy; e.g. 'sea' - 'to see' - 'a see' ([16], p. 114). There are, of course, no sharp distinction between these various types, there are all kinds of intermediate stages. Concerning the relevance of these factors to the study of semantics, Ullmann writes: Polysemy is the pivot of semantic analysis. Couched in synchronistic terms, it means that one word can have more than one sense. Translated into diachronistic terminology, it implies that a word may retain its previous sense or senses and at the same time acquire one or several new ones ([16], p. 117). Polysemy may create semantic pathology but " . . . the fact remains, however, that polysemy is an indispensable resource of language economy. It would be altogether impracticable to have separate terms for every referent; as we have seen in the section on the vagueness of the sense, such an eventuality would land us in the over-concrete and unbearable cumbersome speech-habits of primitive races" ([16], p. 118). There is one department of semantics recognized by Ullmann, that we have not yet touched upon. It is the panchronistic approach or general 42

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semantics, the investigation of common features and tendencies similar within various 'langues'. This part of semantics is still in its infancy, so we merely note its existence, These few lines complete the background from linguistic semantics, w 111. Turning to our formal logician and his scheme, we should not forget his predecessors, especially Carnap [1] and Tarski ~. The Kemeney approach, however, stands in close rapport with the newer algebraic tendencies in mathematical logic, specifically the theory of models? :j Indeed, the concept of model is central in the development of [5]. "'The novelty in the approach is that the concept of an interpretation of a logical system is taken as the central concept of Semantics" ( [5], p. 1)2' Here an interpretation is a special kind of model, an intended model. The necessity of singling out tile subclass of interpretations for consideration, ties tip with tile basic results within modern logic on incompleteness and noncategoricity of e.g. comprehensive arithmetical axiom systems (within first order logic). 1'~ The approach via interpretations replaces the method of Carnap using state-descriptions, 15 the latter giving occasion to some rather intricate difficulties. Kemeney believes that his approach is applicable to "presunlably any formalized language - given a sufficiently strong metalanguage" ([5], pp. 1-2). In this paper he only uses extensional languages, just, as he writes, to remove one additional source of criticism from, we may add, nominalistic quarters (Quine, Goodman, White). At the outset he imposes certain requirements on Iris languages and on the relationship between object language and meta-language, 16 which imply as he then will show: that the interpretations are completely determined if we have two things given: (1) A translation of the object language in the meta-language. (2) A division of the primitive constants into those that are logical and those that are extralogical ([5], p. 3). Concerning the semantic definitions he is about to give, Kemeney writes : What is important is whether they (i.e. the definitions) reproduce the intuitive meaning, and whether they are based on sound concepts. The former question each reader must judge for himself. 17 For the latter it is sufficient to decide whether we have a right to expect that a translation into the meta-language and a division of the primitive constants is a reasonable requirement for an'/formalized language ( [5], p. 3). It may 43

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be remarked that it is the requirement of translatability that necessitates that the meta-language must be, in a technical sense, "essentially" stronger than the object language, is The concept of language is very sharply delimited within Kemeney [5], (and it is somewhat different from the symbol-engrams stored in the minds of members of the speech-community constituting 'la langue' of linguistic semantics.) The languages (symbolized L, with subscript added if several languages are considered simultaneously) are of the type variety ([5], pp. 4-5). As it will not be essential to us to take into regard the structure of such languages, we shall not give a full description here, but just note that they are given through a Book of Rules completely describing the symbols used, the rules for formation delimiting an admissible class of signexpressions and rules of derivations (the rules of the logic incorporated in the language). A category of special formulae, the admissible class of sign-expressions of the considered L, is distinguished. Well-formed formulae, abbreviated wff's, are the special formulas which under the interpretation can be "true" or "false". Wff's without free variables are called sentences. A special category of signs ranging over the class of individuals 19 for the given L, is also given. Having fixed the language frame L, the first important concept introduced is semi-model. M is a semi-model of L, if, roughly, it assigns a domain of individuals, R~ to L and a set to each constant of L through a recursive definition, such that to each individual is assigned an element of R/, to each wff an element of the set R0 = {0, 1}. if a ~, where ~ is the type symbol of a, then the element assigned to this constant by M is denoted by a ~ and a ~,t~e R~. We shall not enter into a more accurate description of the definitions of the various R~, starting from the basic ones Rl and R0, but refer to [5], p. 5. "A semi-model makes an assignment to the constants of L that is closely related to an assignment of denotations. This assignment must be extended to all special formulae, leading to the concept of a value of a special formula. The value must be relativized not only to the semimodel, but also to an assignment to the free variables (of the considered special formula) ([5], pp. 5-6)." The definition, through recursion on the structure of L, of the value-function, then follows assigning to each 44

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special tormula A~, a suitable value, i.e. an element o f R,~, depending upon the assignment o f the free variables o f A~. This element of R~ is then the value of Aa in M relative to the given assignment to the free variables. A wff has the value O or I, relative to an assignment to its free variables. If this value is always O, the wff is said to bc valM in M; if it is always I, the wff is called contravalid. Now, a sentence is a closed wtL i.e. one without fi'ee variables, thus a sentence is always either valid or contravalid in a given senti-model. A semi-model M o f L is called a model o f L if: (1) Every axiom o f L is wdid in M. (2) If a rule allows us to infer Ao from B, . . . (7,, and if B, . . . . . Co are all valid in M, then A0 is valid in M. (3) It is not the case that all wff's are valid in M. If two models of L have coextensive classes o f valid wiT, then the models are called equivalent: and the language L is called consistent if it has a model. Kemeney proves that if L contains the lower functional calculus, then there is only one assignment to negation and material implication in a model, and the assignment to universal quantification is unique relatively to a fixed Ri. In giving a model of L we have furnished an extensional assignment to each term o f L. This could be deemed insutficient as one might require to know the intensions or senses of the terms. On this Kemeney comments ([5], p. 7): E.g., in constructing a model for a formalized version of English, we may consider assigning to 'man" either the set o f all human beings, or the set o f human beings under 10 feet tall. It is true that the two models would be identical, since the two sets arc co-extensive; but this identity is not analytically true. Hence, while the two rules of denotation determine the same model, they determine two different rules o f sense: The former makes "man" synonymous with ' h u m a n being', the latter with ' h u m a n being under l0 feet tall'. Thus, while the models themselves do not determine the interpretations uniquely, the rules giving a model do determine the interpretation. Starting with the semantic definitions proper Kemeney considers the notion of interpretation as primitive (further explanation o f these "intended" models is reserved for later). He feels justified in "identifying a description of a Leibnizian possible world with one o f my interpretations" ( [5], p. 10). The constants are, as mentioned above, subdivided 45

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in two classes: the logical constant, designated through the characteristic that they have the same interpretation in every possible world as in the actual one, and the extra-logical constant S, the category to which most terms of natural language belong. -~ Two types of semantic concepts are distinguished: (1) Those defined in terms of the interpretation describing the actual world. (2) Concepts defined without special mention of this interpretation. Kemeney points out that the concepts of the first type belongs to what Quine has termed the theory of reference, while the second type belongs to the theory of meaning, el The actual definitions start with the concept of analytic truth: Definition 1 : A wff of L is analytically true (A-true) if it is valid in all interpretations of L ([5], p. 11). Then Kemeney defines in an obvious manner the concepts 'self-contradictory', 'analytic', 'synthetic', and some simple theorems on these concepts are stated. Definitions 5 and 6 introduce the relations 'implies' and 'equivalent', two sentences are said to be equivalent if they are valid in the same interpretations. All these are concepts of the theory of meaning. In order to obtain a workable theory of reference or theory of truth, we must state, as already pointed out by Tarski, as a necessary condition that L should be translateable into ML, the recta-language, implying that the semi-model M of L should be definable in ML. M L must be stronger than L. Kemeney defines the translation of every special formula A~ of L relative to some semi-model M, the translation of A~ being denoted by A ~t~. Now A0 (a wff) is O if and only M if the (intuitive) translation has truth-value truth. 2~ Therefore, A~t -- O may be adopted as translation of A0 by M. Kemeney then continues: We certainly want our official translation provided by a semi-model that is an interpretation. Hence we ask our author to designate some interpretation, call it M*, for the purpose of translating from L to ML. Then he proceeds to the very important definition: Definition 7. For each wff A0 of L the corresponding wff AM* =- O of M L is designated as its translation. We will call this translation simply A 0 ([5], p. 14). The interpretation M*, and thus the choice of it when applications are considered, is of prime importance in the Kemeney scheme. Beside providing the translation of L into M L it is given a second important role. Kemeney surprisingly argues that it is the interpretation describing the actual world, quite an obvious fact to Kemeney. He adduces two 46

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arguments in favour of this conclusion. We reproduce the first argument : If the official translation of bo~ into English is "bachelor", it mcans that bo~ denotes the class of bachelors in our world. Hence it must be this class that is assigned as denotation to boi by lhe interpretation describing the actual world. And since the same holds for other constants of L, we see that the interpretation giving us the translation into M L is also thc one describing the actual world. 23 Having fixed M* and thus the official translation of L into ML, we are ready for the theory of reference. First, in Definition 8., a wff is said to be true if it is valid in M*. This gives another important theorem. Theorem Schema 15, which asserts that A is valid in M if and only if AM O, and the corollary that A is true if and only if A*. This constitutes the Tarski schema of truth 24. Kemeney believes that because of the provability of this scheme within his system, the adequacy of the theory is secured. Detining a constant as logical if it has the same element assigned by any two interpretations with the same R~- (domain of individuals), and a constant as extra-logical if it is not logical, the first partial delinition of' synonymy reads: Two constants are synonymous if the same elelnent i,~; assigned to both by any interpretation. And, as Kemeney stresses, he will assume that the author of L specifies, as part of the language-construction, which constants are extra-logical. This constitutes the general part of the semantic definitions. For the further development, especially for the delimination of the class of interpretations, he imposes some new restrictions. The first restriction is to the effect that all interpretations have thc same set R~; the other is that if a model differs from an interpretation only in the assignment to the extra-logical constants, then it is also an interpretation. The first is motivated by the view that a language, as formal system, is "the formalization of the abstract structure of a given set of individuals ([5], p. 17). Thus to give a language of sociology we would consider as our domain of individuals only the set of all human beings, "5 And, as Kemeney emphasizes, it is not required that the domain Ri should be determined by "pure logic'". Commenting upon these restrictions, Kemeney writes: "Logic ought to tell us everything about the former (i.e. the logical constants) and nothing about the latter (i.e. the extra-logical constants). But there are 47

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difficulties about both these requirements. What logic tells us about the logical constants is contained in the so-called logical axioms and in the rules. While these ought to tell us everything about the logical constants, they cannot surmount the difficulty raised by GSdel's incompleteness theorems . . . . Hence we are forced to allow for models that were not intended as models, i.e. models that arc not interpretations . . . . 26 Similarily, it is not true that logic tells us nothing about the extra-logical constants. Here we are overlooking linguistic usage. If bo~ is to denote the set of bachelors, and cot the set of women, then we know from the way these words are to be used that the two sets are mutually exclusive. This can be assured in the system by adding a suitable axiom, (xd [boix~ ~ ~ coixd in this case, to L. These special axioms are usually called meaning postulates. Since such linguistic usage has a purely conventional status, we may always take the given meaning postulates to be all meaning postulates . . . . the author must give us a complete set of meaning postulates (as part of his axioms) - and I see no objection to this requirement" ([5], pp. 17-19). This argumentation leads up to the key theorem of the Kemeney scheme: Theorem 16. The interpretations are those models that differ from M" only in the assignment to the extra-logical constants. We note that this theorem is derived under the assumption of the above stated restrictions. Theorem 16 further leads Kemeney to consider what he calls semantically determinate languages, languages for which we have in addition to the formal presentation also given (1) a model M for the translation of L into M L and (2) a description of which constants are extralogical. Then it follows that if we only consider semantically determinate languages, then Theorem 16 can be adopted as definition of interpretations. Thus the primitivity of the concept of interpretation disappears for semantically determinate languages, but we need hardly remind the reader, that perhaps the central problem as viewed from the acceptability angle and the possibility of application, remains, viz. the choice of a
M*.27

If attention is restricted to semantically determinate languages, the Kemeney scheme is applicable. If we call those special formulae that have no free variables, phrases, we may state the full definition of synonymy within the Kemeney scheme: Definition 18. Two phrases are synonymous if they have the same value in every interpretation. It is then 48

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easily shown that two constants are synonymous phrases if', and only if, they are synonymous constants, and two sentences are synonymous if, and only if, they are equivalent. ~8 IV. Parts of two systems both called semantics have been outlined in sections 11 and Ill. The first section offered the systematization of a linguist, the second that of a formal logician. The differences are striking: especially considering that they both have 'language' as their key term. The differences have by some been considered so deep that no rapprochement would be possible. Ullmann in [16] stresses the empirical character of linguistic semantics, and, presumably, in contrast to the theoretical character of philosophical semantics, especially the one of the logicians (as in [1] and [5]). Let us review some of the differences as embodied in the descriptive versus the normative approach to language. The linguist studies language taking the spoken presentation as his datum. His study is largely determined by this initial empirical condition. He studie,s open systems. :~ The study of systems in change is the very subje~'t matter of diachronistic semantics, but as Ulhnan n [ l 6] emphasizes, changes must also be cared for in purely synchronistic studies. The rules of syntax :~t and semantics :~1 as laid down by the linguist are revised from time to time. l-he notions of pragmatics must always be taken into consideration, the notion of contextualization gives an indication thereof. The study of different uses must come prior to the attempt to extract a usage. And the notion of one pure and correct invariant usage is not corroborated by linguistic findings. "Every word has once changed its sense", is a favorite slogan of diachronistic semanticists. The basic and initial study of spoken languages is inseparable from pragmatics, and this study is, in some sense, the study of linguists. The linguist is not happy to separate non-cognitive meanings from cognitive aspects and study these latter in isolation. Informative and affective meaning factors are tied up in natural language, and cannot very well be separated. Philosophers who like to join forces with scientists approach language in a more theoretical and normative manner. He is, primarily, interested in the semantic reconstruction of natural language or rather of fragments 49

JENS ERIK FENSTAD

thereof, to forge systems applicable e.g. to the formalization of some branch of science or to develop an instrument for the (syntactic and semantic) study of some norm systems. 3z The list could easily be enlarged. Such a philosopher is not interested in formalizing the grammatical and syntactical peculiarities and caprices of natural language. His emphasis is on language as a means of communication. Now it is our turn to do a little emphasizing. The term "communication" is intended to be used in a rather broad sense, including both informative and affective aspects of communication. This generates an interesting problem, which, quite likely, may force our philosopher to restrict his claims as to the possibility of semantic reconstruction of communication (in the broad sense) through the construction of formalized versions. To what degree is the affective side of communication dependent upon the syntactical peculiarities, the accident of changes through time and space in the considered natural language? The uncertainties on this point may determine in how extended a sense we may use the term "communication", and it has bearings upon the analysis of the next section as to the tenability of the view of natural language as "locally formal". Further, this uncertainty presents a line of future research, blending to some degree, the formal and empirical approach to language. - But lest it should be forgotten, we remind the reader that modern logic is something more than the propositional calculus: a whole array of extentional and intentional systems may, now or in the future, be placed at our command. In distinction to the openness of the linguistic systems, those of our philosopher are essentially closed, the syntax and semantics of such systems are fixed, and they are presented through some Book of Rules (in some suitable meta-language). (But this point will be modified through the discussion of next section.) Often has this "rigidity" of formal systems, alien as this characteristic is to the flux of natural language, been taken as a decisive " p r o o f " that "the applicationless mathematics" of formal logician 33 has nothing to do with "language", in the every-day sense, or in the sense of 'la langue'. Nowadays linguists are giving equal prominence to the panchronistic as to the synchronistic or diachronistic approach to language. Our philosopher, if we are going to exploit a parallel, approaches language panchronistically, formalizing fragments common to several natural lan50

N O I E S ON SYNONYMY

guages. He is not forced to comply with the initial empirical condition of the linguists: a natural language as datum, as the object of study. It may be interesting and of relevance to hear what Ullmann [16] has to say on the interrelationship of his study of semantics and that of the philosopher. He lists f o u r , llot exclusive, points of difference ([16], pp. 12-14). The first is that ordinary language a4 never is uniJbrm: It is intersected by horizontal and vertical lines of division, differences between dialects on the one hand, and between the speech-habits of professional, occupational and social groups on the other. Recent studies in linguistic geography have revealed the full magnitude of these discrepancies ([16], pp. 12-13). a5 The second difference concerns the assumption of a perfectly stable language: Shift and changes, long-term and short-term, are at work all the time, and the peculiar conditions under which language has to be acquired afresh by oncoming generations make for further departures from the ' n o r m ' . . . . "Synchronous' does not, however, mean 'immutable' in language. Every synchronous state contains the seed of development; the equilibrium is disturbed and restored all the time. No such variability is compatible with the principles of formal systems ([16], p. 13). The third difference hinges on the emotive and dynamic side of language: . . . agreed on the omnipresence of affective connotations in everyday language, in contrast to the standards which logical and scientific discourse strives to attain and which can only be completely secured in the formal symbolism of mathematics and logics ([16], pp. 13-14). The fourth difference concerns the illogicalio, of human speech : The intrusion of feeling and volition into the 'cognitive design' of ordinary language is only one aspect of what has been called the 'illogicality' or 'alogicality' of human speech . . . . The issue is rendered somewhat elusive by the ambiguity of the word 'logic'. It is obvious enough that language is not governed by the same rigorous discipline as the various branches of deductive logic. On the other hand, it is a vehicle of communication, and, as such, it has to maintain some minimum standards of intelligibility, clarity and consistency. Language too has a logic of its own, in every sense of term. True, it is a rough-andready kind of logic, a logic of expediency, variable in space and tilne ([16], p. 14). Arguing further, Ullmann finds that everything points to the conclusion that "logic and epistemology are only indirectly relevant to linguis51

JENS ERIK FENSTAD

tics: they can only reach it via psychology. Nor could this be otherwise if we conceive language as a system of symbols imprinted on the minds of all members of a speech-community" ([16], p. 24). These two lists of differences between philosophical and linguistic semantics are, we believe, expressions of the same or closely similar differences, e.g. the last quote above plays up to the prominent role given to pragmatics in most linguistic studies of semantics, a point emphasized above. But, and this is a wonder of no little importance to our further discussion, does not the rather categorical comments of Ullmann, indicate that the juxtaposition of the two schemes of sections II and III only has a curiosity interest? May be these two studies should be complementary within some general Science of Communication? To begin with we shall comment upon certain aspects of empirical semantics, showing how this branch of philosophical semantics 36 stands in close relationship with the activities of linguists in their roles as semanticists. Like most broad classifying terms, "empirical semantics" is vague and has largely heuristic value. We may refer to some works of empirical semantics 37, and broadly say that within empirical semantics, the investigations of usage through such instruments as occurrence analysis and questionnaire methods, are given a prominent place, distinguishing it from more common varieties of philosophical analysis through the belief in and willingness to carry on methodologically explicit empirical investigations of language as contributions to the discussion on the notion of truth in ordinary language. We shall briefly review some concepts and methods proposed and used within empirical semantics and point out the connections with linguistic semantics as presented in section II. First the concept of synonymy as treated in N~ess [12], may be mentioned. This relation is given in symbolic form as Syn (aMlbM2), i.e. a in M1 is synonymous to b in M2. The constituents M, gives the marginal references, the qualifying phrases of the synonymy assertion. Such marginal references may be use occurrences in some well specified test of texts, may be references to some definite group of users, e.g. the person P in situation S, in this case modifying the symbol to Syn (aP1S1 : bPeS2), giving thus occasion to distinguish between various types of intrapersonal versus interpersonal, and intrasituational versus intersituational types of 52

NOTES ON SYNONYMY

synonymy. The problem of presentation of marginal references may be a (sub-)branch of study, and empirical investigations have amply shown that the assertions of synonymy are highly dependent upon the specification of the marginal situation. It is an open question whether tile component of marginal reference in the synonymy relation is but a counterpart within empirical semantics of the outspoken trend of contextualization within linguistic semantics. Also the introduction of marginal references gives the possibility of empirical investigation of the synonymy-situation. Tile application of various empirical procedures is in close harmony with the outspoken empirical trends in Ullmann [16], e.g. when the latter quotes Bloomfield that the only generalizations within linguistics are inductive generalizations. Applications of questionnaires to probe synonymy have been attempted. Commenting upon concepts of synonymy introduced through questionaires :~, Nmss writes in [15], p. 473. that these concepts "should not be viewed as concept(s) of synonymity in the narrow sense of an adequate definiens or explieatum of "synonymity', but as concept(s) belonging to an open family of concepts of smallness of meaning distance which is (at the present time) lYLfitful in empirical studies of the heterogeneous phenomena vaguely and ambiguously referred to as synonymity". Later on he writes: "Whatever the direction of explication, any concept of synonymity should be constructed with careful reference to research techniques that have already been tested in studies of natural languages ([15], p. 477). The first research technique that suggests itself, is the analysis of use occurrences of some definite term or classes of terms, a technique which has been elaborated into the method of occurrence analysis. This method will be mentioned below. Here we give a quote from Nmss ([14], p. 17) on use occurrences and to bring forth "interesting" new occurrences: Unhappily, even if one finds as much as 100 use occurrences, most of them will turn out to furnish very little evidence - provided the designations seem sufficiently close in meaning to make us wonder. The problem tends to arise, how to elicit decisive or hi,~hl), relevant use occurrences on the part of the person whose terminology is under investigation. This leads us to an interview technique . . . . . which in turn suggests the use of questionnaires. We may remark that the technique of questionnaire construction is far 53

JENS ERIK FENSTAD

from reaching a final state, and that we here have a central methodological problem-field of empirical semantics. Questionnaires so far used have been of a relatively simple type, more complex constructions are in order to make the approach fruitful. Also different types of questionnaires may be necessary for investigation of synonymy in relation to different marginal references, z9 Recently the notion of meaning distance has replaced the concept of questionnaire-synonymy in empirical synonymy investigations. 4 The notion of meaning distance is quite a natural generalization in view of the techniques to investigate the synonyms outlined above. Some attempts have been made to introduce a quantitative concept of meaning distance, but so far this is in an experimental stage, and the technique so crude that they are no more than pilot studies. 41 On relevance of the technique of measuring meaning distance to (semantic) lexicography, provided this technique is developed to a satisfactory level, Hiorth writes in [4]: When lexicographers are going to describe the meanings of a word, they usually face the following problem. Among how many meanings shall we distinguish in the article on this word? If one distinguishes among too many meanings, the dictionary article becomes too cumbersome and will not give an adequate description of the distinctions in meaning which are actually made by the language users. If too few meanings are distinguished, other or the same undesirable consequences follow. Faced by the above problem, lexicographers have attempted to give rules concerning how many meanings are desirable in each particular article. But no lexicographer has made explicit how one might decide whether a given lexicographer follows a particular rule or not. It is possible that the proosped technique, if further developed, may increase the testability of rules as to the desirable meaning distances between different dictionary definitions ([4], p. 57). And, we may add, it is possible that the technique of measuring meaning distances through e.g. questionnaires, may in general be of relevance to the "identification of indiscernibles" - type of problems. But this is pure speculation. Above we have mentioned the technique of occurrence analysis. This method, with an example elaborated in detail, is presented in N~ess [12], chapter VI. In short, the method consists in ascertaining the meaning of 54

N O T E S ON S Y N O N Y M Y

a term through the analysis of the term in use. 42 The analysis proceeds normally through 4 steps: (I) Identification and specification of occurrences to be analysed. Here it is of importance that the class of use occurrences of the considered term should be effectively specified, and that this class, if the analysis shall terminate, be finite. (2) Listing of occurrence implications. Here we, the analysts, still operate within the terminology of the author to be analysed, and we list "immediate" inferences from the use occurrences, i.e. inferences with a high degree of certainty, stated within the language of the author. (3) Interpretation of occurrence implications, construction of other inferences from the list of occurrences (and possibly frown other sentences of the text than occurrence sentences). Here we pass to the terminology of the analyst and interpret 4~ possibly along the conflicting lines consistent with the use occurrences, the occurrence implications of step 2 and other excerpts of the specified text judged to be of relevance. (4) The formation and testing of hypotheses about usage in the form of descriptive definition. This should be the central step, stating the conclusion on how the term under investigation is used in the considered text. In practice carrying through a full occurrence analysis is a long and extremely laborious task, and more often than not the results are meagre, as many occurrences elucidate very little of the meaning(s)(if any)intended. '~1 The non-categorical character of occurrence analysis in general is expressed through the following "theorem" of Nmss [13]: Given a use occurrence of an expression "a". It is then possible to formulate an unlimited set of rules R~, R2 . . . . . R,, . . . . satisfying with approximately the same degree of certainty the following requirements: (a) The rules can be transformed into definiens-expressions, which then express between them different cognitive significations (No pair R~, Rj with i j contains expressions like in cognitive meaning). (b) All occurrences al, a2 . . . . . an can be s u b s u m e d under all the rules. By this it is meant that if the occurrences are conceived to follow the rules, then they satisfy the rules of subsummation. (They give e.g. "good meaning", "true assertions", "the intentions of the author"). 45 The technique of occurrence analysis is closely related to the lexicographical analysis of linguists. And in Hiorth [4] it is argued that this method may advantageously be used by linguists in their semantic studies. 46 55

JENS ERIK FENSTAD

This argument may be extended to a general claim of relevance of concepts and methods of empirical semantics to linguistic semantics. This claim is, as we have tried to emphasize, reciprocal. V. In this section we present the hardly original, view that a natural language 47 may profitably be studied, and consequently justifiably considered as a "bundle" of sub-languages or sub-language fragments. This view is elaborated in some detail and utilized to present a scheme of synonymy definition applicable uniformly to the various sublanguages of a natural language. First we have to introduce a technical term "language', an abbreviation for 'formal language'. We think of it as a system presented through two sets of rules, one giving the syntax, the rules of formation and transformation, the other giving the semantics, the rules of truth and meaning. The first set of rules determine a calculus, an uninterpreted system, such calculi we symbolize by L~.4s It should be remarked that the rules of transformation endow a L~ with a logical calculus, an uninterpreted logic. The second set of rules determines an ordered pair of a calculus Li and its interpretation in relation to some specified group of users for use situations (the marginal reference). This, an interpreted language system, is rendered through < L,, M~ (Pj) >.49 The statement that natural language is a bundle of sublanguages accordingly means here that it may be represented through two families {Li}~ , I and {M~(Pj)} < i,j > ~i a with all combinations < L~, M; (Pj) > , i E I and j E J, in principle possible. 5 Our duty is now to consider the crucial questions: How adequate is this idealization? Where and how does pragmatics enter? First we remark that, as our philosopher of section IV, we are primarily interested in a semantic reconstruction of natural language, thus disregarding the categories of natural language grammatics, which by the linguists themselves are considered to be in chaos. The syntactical presentation of a given natural language is, so to say, an accident of history and tradition, and we feel to be under no obligation to render these peculiarities in a semantic reconstruction. A mark of uncertainty, however, is to what degree is the success of communication conditioned by these peculiarities. Next some comments on the degree of "formalism" involved in the 56

NOTES

ON SYNONYMY

determination of a Li and a M~* (Pj). We aim in principle at a full descriplion of the rules of formation and the "logic" within the language L~, and of the interpretation M~ ~ (Pj), including the delimination of the users P]. It is difficult to lay down precise general requirements, and we shall not decide upon this matter here, but assume that the various L; and M i* (Pj) are so given as to make the subsequent discussion valid. Speculating within the tradition of modern logic, we have some definite ideas of whal constitutes a L~ and an interpretation thereof to guide us through the following development. 51 The relation to pragmatics enters through the reference to the Pjconstituent of the language < L;, M,~ (Pj) > and its study will be the study of the interplay of the various < L~, M~ (Pj) > , the study of sameness and difference in interpretation. The subdivision of a natural language envisaged above is closely related to the linguist's panchronistic conception of semantics and to his study of 'le language' rather than 'la langue'. Some calculi L,: and pairs < L~, M~ ( P j ) > may be found or constructed within various natural languages. Examples abound in scientific literature, but such possibilities may occur within such professions as the military. Also the L; abstracted from one natural language may be different from a corresponding LAabstracted from another, but there are several "natural" definitions which nevertheless would make two systems < L~, M~.(P]) :- and < L~, M z (P~) ;- "equivalent", e.g. various notions of translation, s'-' which would then make the study of the two interpreted languages essentially the same. By formalizing lhe various L~, however, the chances of avoiding these complications is greater by far. Thus the "uniformisation", as we may call il, of essentially equivalent sublanguages of different natural languages through the techniques imagined in this section may be a panchronistic subdivision of a general study of communication alluded to in' section IV. And such a study evidently calls for some sort of empirical semantics, knowing what to uniformise, and judging the acceptability of such uniformity relative to our initial intentions. A weak point of the approach outlined above has been the lack of means to determine the degree of formalism involved in the description o[" various sublanguages L~. We may open a door of escape from the difficult task through the introduction of "language fragments": we call M a 57

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language fragment if it is possible to extend M t o a pair < L~, M~ (Pj) > ; hence a language interpreted always is a fragment. Our interest, however, is in fragments M, which allow extension to various non-equivalent pairs < L~, M~(Pj) > , i.e. does not admit a unique reconstruction as a language. There may be several such types of non-categorisation of fragments, which then, in general, consist of both a fragment of a syntax and semantics: (a) the syntactical part of M extends to various L~; (b) the systems L~ admits non-intended models; (c) there are various possibilities of choosing interpretations M~ (Pj) differing in assignment to the category of "extra-logical" constants. Now, we may well imagine that there is a minimal syntactic extension of a fragment M, the "intersection" of all possible extensions Li of M. 53 Concerning point (b) this type of non-categorisation may be avoided through the adoption of "official translations" through some model M*, i.e. the assignment to our 'logical" constants may be unique. '~4 It is then type (c) we normally would encounter in the reconstruction of a fragment M. The fragment does not allow a unique set of rules of denotation compatible with the fragment M: there are various and conflicting sets of such rules. The recognition of language fragments M, in addition to language systems in the analysis of a natural language, gives some latitude in the specification of the degree of formality involved in the description of the system interpreted, < Li, M~. (Pj) >. We may now, using extensively the category of fragments, place rather severe requirements on the syntax and semantics of sublanguages. With this terminology we may single out some types of sublanguages of a natural language. First, with each speaker at each time is associated an instantaneous sublanguage (or in some case, a fragment) < L~, M~ (Pj) > , where Pj designates a person at a time point, or in a particular situation. Then we may have stable sublanguages, i.e. languages invariant over some time period and relative to some group of users. Languages of this type may be the various languages of science, and also, to give a somewhat different example, the languages of various norm systems, as the one of a Gandhian type of ethics (referred to in note 32). Another extremely common type, we believe, is the notoriously vague languages, i.e. language bundles {L~} 4,1, {M~ (Pj)} < i, j > , i j, 58

N O T E S ON S Y N O N Y M Y

where, in interesting cases, the set I consists of only one index, whereas J may have greater cardinality. Here we may mention the languages of some well delimited social group, of some professions (i.e. the language of their occupation) etc. '~,~' Our elaboration of the view that natural language is a bundle of sublanguages and fragments of such, has some connection with two trends, one from linguistics, the other from formal quarters. The first concerns the emphasis on the method of contextualization apparent within linguistics (cf. the exposition of" section II): in fact our analysis may be viewed as a further development along this line, giving the "marginal references" of empirical semantics the status of independent languages within a heterogeneous field of communication. The second concerns the distinction between the total versus the local point of view in the application of formal methods, s6 L6b in his paper [7] contends that natural languages may be locally formal he then seems to consider the instantaneous sublanguages as formal, i.e. formal methods are applicable to them. We have modified this view; on the one hand we may have instantaneous fragments extendable to distinct languages, this in some sense weakens the claim of local formality; on the other hand we have singled out the category of stable sublanguages, application of formal methods to which seem p~lrticularly fruitful, especially if our stable languages are panchronistic. This more flexible analysis of the "formality" of natural languages may stand the criticism of linguists against the excesses of formalism of logical semantics. We may again emphasize that underlying our approach is the goal of semantic reconstruction. And as there are differences between the descriptive or empirical part and the theoretical part of physics, both are necessary to understand the "laws of nature", so we should not only consider the differences between the descriptive or empirical semantics of linguists and the theoretical semantics of logicians, but, so we believe, both studies may be complementary within some General Science of Communication, designed to understand the complex phenomena of human communication. But then, old compartments of study may have to be broken down. All of traditional linguistics may not be relevant to the study of communication, all of formal logic may not be relevant, whereas the study of information theory certainly will be. We take the above discussion as justification of the thesis that local 59

JENS ERIK FENSTAD

applications of formal methods are relevant in the study of natural languages, at least when language is considered solely as a means of communication. This thesis does not prejudge the issue whether a total and uniform symbolization of natural language is possible, i.e. of presenting it as one pair < L, M* > . This may be unlikely in view of the existence of notoriously vague sublanguages, but may be rendered possible through some well developed scheme of pragmaticsY Having presented in outline and partly through suggestions a view on natural language, motivated by the expositions of the linguistic scheme of Ullmann [16] and the scheme of Kemeney [5] representing the formalists, we will try to apply this analysis to some concepts of semantics. Let us select the concept of synonymy as a kind of pilot-term. It is all but explicitly stated within the systematization of [5] that two phrases are synonymous if, and only if, the value of every phrase remains unchanged for every interpretation upon the substitution of the one phrase for the other. (Cf. [5], p. 22). In Ullmann [16], p. 109 pure synonyms are defined through the property of being coextensive and interchangeable in intellective and affective value. Both these definitions require the invariance under substitution of some value. And such a scheme of synonymy definition has frequently been proposed in previous discussions, the value to be left invariant specified as e.g. truth, sameness of extensions (of several levels) as, cognitive meaning, both cognitive and emotive meaning. This seems to suggest a definitional scheme for synonymy along the interchangeability line. Arguments against interchangeability seem to hit only special varieties, not the class as a whole. (In order to state our definition scheme, we introduce some symbolism.) Let the category of admissible signs within a L~, where it is permissable ask whether two members are synonymous or not, be called 'phrases'. Let the synonymity relation be symbolized by A Syn B (L~). We assume that the notion of interpretation of a L~ and of a value function defined on the ordered pairs of phrases of L~ and interpretation of L~ is defined it will be rendered through Val < C, M ~ , C ranging over the class of phrases, M over the class of L~-interpretations. Further we assume as defined a substitution operator, Sub (C, A, B), standing for the result of substituting B for A in C. Then we may write the scheme as follows: 60

N O Y E S ON S Y N O N Y M Y

(~)

A Syn B (Ld <~ (C) (M) { Phrase (C) & L~ - interpr. (M) ~ Val < C, M z> - Val :~ Sub (C, A, B), M > I

Tiffs ~cheme is equivalent to the somewhat simplcr one, coinciding with the definition of synosymy in [5]: (*)"

L~-interpr.

A Syn B (L0 <> (M) (M) ~ Val < A, M > V a l < B, M >

We have here assumed that A and B range over the class of phrases. In the subsequent discussion '(*)' refers either to '(*)' above or to 'C)". ,~s~ This is not a definition of synonymy, but a scheme turning into a definition, when language L~ and the notion of value-function for L~, i.e. of a model of interpretation of L~-, are given. The production of counterexamples to some proposed definition of e.g. synonymy is usually carried out indiscriminately within some natural language. We have given a scheme defining synonymy relatively to some language L~. Ours is not a definition of synonymy within natural language, but within sublanguages of a natural language; it is, however, a definition scheme uniformly applicable to every sublanguage Li. If we were to introduce a definition of synonymy within a natural language presented through the families { L ~ } i ~ i and { M * ( P : ) ] < i,.i~ ~1 J then it would be the following derivation from (*):
A Syn B ~> (L~) (C) (M) [AeLi&BEL~&Phrase(C)&L~interpr.(M) > Val< C,M> Val < Sub (C, A, B), M > }~so

:-

This, we would believe, is the counterpart within our scheme of the unrestricted interchangeability. And it would be a very plausible hypothesis, that such a pair of phrases A and B does not exist that would satisfy A A],n B, a conjecture corraborated by the views of linguistic semanticists. (Cf. [J6], p. 108). If we imagine as a L~ the propositional calculus in one of its many representations, then consider the scheme (*) and discover that, with the obvious definitions, two phrases (here truth-functional expressions) are synonymous if and only if they are materially (truth-functionally) equivalent, we may be inclined to blame our definition scheme that never in 61

JENS ERIK FENSTAD

any "spoken" language was the relation of synonymy conceived to be identified with truth-functional equivalence. We may reply that it is not necessary to assume that our scheme is to blame, but rather the poverty of the language considered. Considering a sublanguage of some natural language, e.g. the propositional calculus, we believe that such a language cannot allow indefinitely strong synonymity definitions. (Strength measured within the natural language.)As regards the propositional calculus, we suggest that the relation of material equivalence is the "natural" explication of synonymy within that language. As regards the first order functional calculus, here also we do not believe in a stronger synonymy definition than afforded by our scheme (*).59 A stronger notion of synonymy would require more refined languages, of extentional or intentional varieties. This ends our discussion of tile scheme (*) for the time being. In the terminology of the next section the scheme (*) provides an instance of a pure existential definition scheme, and is thus non-effective in general. In the next section we shall consider the attempts at effectivization of this scheme. In his paper [7] LSb offers an example on how the analysis of natural language as locally formal may clarify the issue of antinomies within natural language, and he shows that the generally accepted assertion that natural language is inconsistent needs some modification. In our terminology we may say that natural language as constructed from families { Li } and { M~ (Pj) }, may be inconsistent. There may appear incompatible assertions in interpreted subsystems < L~, M~ (Pj) ~> and < Lk, M k (Pe) ~ , but there is no reason to expect that every language ~ Li M t (Pj) > is internally inconsistent. Natural language is quite likely externally inconsistent, to adopt a well suited terminology. Another example of how some clarification can be obtained through the above analysis. We present a variant of the well known and extensively discussed Quine puzzle. Suppose: (l) Mr. Smith believes that Stockholm is the capital of Norway. (2) Stockholm ---- the capital of Sweden. Then we may infer: (3) Mr. Smith believes that the capital of Sweden is the capital of Norway. This puzzle leads us to the oddity that from two assumed true assertions we derive a false one, given some additional hypotheses, e.g. that 62

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Mr. Smith knows that Norway and Sweden are independent and different countries. 6 Thus the rule of substitution of identicals (in extension) seems to break down in belief-contexts. We are not, however, forced to draw this conclusion. We may introduce and construct the languages << Li, M~ (Smith) ~> and - i L, M~ (we) assuming on the basis of samples furnished by tests that the syntax, Li, is the same for the two. Now, in o u r system (2) is valid, and (3), interpreted from our point of view, also becomes valid. But (2) is nor valid in Mr. Smith's language, unless it is inconsistent, hence the falsity of (3) as viewed within -< &, M, (Smith) > is no great surprise. But natural language is "in itself" neither one system nor a multiplicity. It is the fallacy of assuming natural language to constitute one uniform system that is responsible for the air of paradox in the inference of (3) from (I) and (2). Indeed, (1) and (2) belong to < L , M~ (we) i> whereas (3) is interpreted within < L;, M~ (Smith):~. We may close this section with some reference to empirical semantics. Above it has repeatedly been stressed that considerations of empirical content are necessary in conjunction with the formal analysis to render the result, e.g. the semantic reconstruction and structural investigation of some norm system, acceptable or intuitively plausible? ~a There will always be a residual of plausibility considerations; how relevant and satisfying is the systematic treatment of our vague and ambiguous initial problems. 61 And in the analysis of notoriously vague sublanguages, the greater flexibility of methods of empirical semantics is particularly appropriate. VI. Our synonymy definition scheme (*) may bc charged with meaninglessness on account of its platonistic implications. This leads to a consideration of different types of criteria: existential versus effective ones. Prior to a closer determination of what to understand by "cfl'cctivc", the central word above, we may draw a parallel from a discussion within mathematics, the controversy on the axiom of choice within set theory. 62 The axiom of choice has a purely existential character: by it various sets are asserted to exist (within the frame of the theory) but there are no methods to present effectively the set (e.g. the set being given as the range of some general recursive function on the natural numbers, to impose a 63

JENS ERIK FENSTAD

rather strong condition of "effective" representability). According to A. Fraenkel, confusion has resulted from blurring the lines between that which is purely existentially ascertained and that which is effectively constructible. Some critics, not entirely confined to the intuitionistic camp, maintain that when a subset of a certain set is said to exist, its existence should be understood as its being, in some sense, effectively given. And the category of "purely existential" object is rejected as meaningless. And indeed, we may add, the ontological problem of existence is not easy to handle, once we leave the realm of the effectively constructible or representable. Thus in connection with our scheme (*) we are led to distinguish between the two types of criteria: the purely existential ones versus the effective ones. 63 Our first problem is to decide what will be understood by "effective". At present it seems natural to use the notion of general recursive functions, a precise form of the idea of effectiveness, in spite of the objections referred to in note 61. Some purists may prefer to restrict attention to a smaller class, but we do not wish to complicate the discussion at this point, just to assert that there are well defined and almost universally accepted "technifications" of the intuitive idea of effectivity.64 It may perhaps be relevant to give some examples from the field of semantics to show how the distinction between purely existential and effective schemes comes into play. Within the Kemeney systematization, if the languages L to which the system is intended to be applied (as in the example of section 6 of [5] are "sufficiently" strong, most of the semantic definitions are highly nonconstructive, because of the translateability of L into ML, which in the example of section 6, [5] necessitates the definition of the set Val in the meta-language, i.e. the set of value functions needed for the definition of the notion of model. From this we may infer in general the purely existential character of our synonymy definition scheme (*), i.e. for "sufficiently strong" languages L~ there is in general no decision procedure to ascertain of given phrases whether they are synonymous or not. ~5 A further reference may be made to L/3b [7]; he tries to build a theory of constructive truth. We will reproduce his definition of 'Event (p; qS, n)' to show that the idea of a decision procedure essentially enters into the 64

N O T E S ON S Y N O N Y M Y

definition. Let (Ooin~state that the object n~ has the property q~o;. Further assume that to each phrase of L corresponds a unique natural number in ML, the so called GSdel-number of the phrase, thus ~oi is the G6delnumber within ML ofq~oi within L, and similarily for tT, and n. Then by value (h, M, y) we understand that y is thevalue of phrase number h of L in the semi-model M 66. Finally, RF(q~,M) means that ~b is general recursive in the GSdel-numbers of the sentence of the semi-model M, which in rough terms means that q5 is effective relatively to the semimodel M. With this terminology, Event (p; q~, n), to be read as "p is (the G6del-number of the sentence describing) the event determined by q~and n", can be defined as: (E@-'~o0(Eti~) { p . = ~ & Synth (p) & value (~, M*, n) & value (~--~o~,M*, (9) & RF (q~, M*)} W e presuppose a ML strong enough to allow for the definition of RF(,M). Here we have an explicit example how the constructive element enters ~b must be generally recursive in the sentences of the official interpretation M*, which with the interpretation of qbo~n~ given above, that the object n~ has the property expressed by o~, implies a decision procedure for an empirical assertion, which then "is completed by observational confrontation" (cf. [7], p. 165). In addition to the explicit reference to the effectively decidable in the above example, we may cite another where the notion of decidability lurks in the background. Here are some quotes from McGee [8]: "The question that remains is this : How, in equally extensional terms, could we decide whether or not the required extensional circumstances did obtain ? How could it be known whether any two terms did or did not have extensions thus related? Goodman may indeed have given us an impeccably extensional definition of 'synonymy', but one which also leaves us with no way of knowing whether or not the term thus defined ever applied to anyone's use of language" ([8], p. 5 in proof). Or this somewhat pessimistic conclusion:'So regrets would seem again in order: who ever 'we" may be, we shall have to say, in reference to the question of likeness of meaning in a natural language, that one of the latest answers is to the effect that two predicates have the same meaning if they have the same primary and secondary extension; but this does not seem to help very much unless we know, as I am afraid we do not, how to find out whether two terms have the same primary and secondary extension" ([8], p. 13 in proof). 65

JENS ERIK FENSTAD

Let us accept the above as a heuristic demonstration that the Goodman definition of likeness of meaning is non-effective. Then McGee rejects the Goodman definition, which, according to him (but in our terminology) may be quite sound and intuitively acceptable as a purely existential definition, because it is not effective. A last illustration may be taken from the domain of empirical semantics. In N~ess [12] on page 57 we find the definition of the relation 'more precise than' :

Pr (aM1 bM2) =D (x)(i) " Synalt (xM~ aM1) ~ Synah (xM~ bM2) (2) &" (Ey)(Ej)" Synah (yMj bM2) & - Synalt (yMj aMx) &" (Ez)(Ek)" Synah (zMk aMa)
Here Synalt (aM1 bM2) says that the expression " a " within the marginal reference M1 can be used as a synonymic alternative for the expression "b" within the marginal reference M2, i.e. for some users in some kinds of situations " a " within M1 may be used synonymously with "b" within M2. "Roughly, (2) says that within a particular subclass of "a"-occurrences, " a " is more precise than "b" in relation to a particular subclass of "b"-occurrenees when, 1) there is no expression of any subclass whatsoever which is a synonymic alternative to the " a " ' s under consideration, but not to the "b"'s, 2) there is such an expression which is a synonymic alternative to the " b " ' s and not to the " a " ' s , and 3) the expression " a " has at least one synonymic alternative" ( [12], p. 57). It should not need many comments to point out that the definition (2) is non-constructive, especially as the reference to "any subclass whatsoever" does not refer to any special L~ within a natural language, but to natural language in some general unspecified sense We shall, however, return below to some proposals of N~ess [12] on "effectivization" of this pure existential scheme. The efforts toward effectivization may be motivated through some philosophical conviction or through the desire to construct decidable predicates adaptable to empirical research of e.g. language as a means of communication between human beings, and not merely as an idea among theorists. This latter attitude amply justifies the attempts at effectivization according to our point of view. We may also add that efforts to bring forth "the constructive content" of existential notions increases our knowledge of the subject studied. On the other hand, we do not reject 66

NOTES

ON SYNONYMY

as "meaningless" the purely existential schemes, we allow just as much naivet6 in this matter as ordinary working mathematician~ in their study of "classical" mathematics. We thus admit the striving for effectivization as legitimate, even on the whole desirable, but what about the possibility of satisfying this striving? Our synonymy definition scheme is an equivalence within some suitable ML, semantic definitions are so. It is to be expected that various effectivizations of an existential definition scheme of that kind destroys the definitional equivalence. The new, effective concept introduced will, for sufficiently strong and therefore for most languages of interest, not be coextensive with the old notion. In general, an effectivization will be partial, and we may expect that the "new" notion, e.g. in relation to ti~e synonymy scheme, may allow for a larger class of synonyms, although the converse also could be imagined. We give below an example on an effectivization from Ntess [12] in connection with the definition of the "more precise than' - relation given above. One may draw an parallel tom the distinction between the deductive and inductive mode of reasoning. Working with a sch,,zme such as (~) we have a definitional equivalence which, in general, is non-effective. There may be various effectivizations introducing decision procedures, but then there is an inductive assumption, within the meta-languagc used, or maybe we shall have to proceed to a meta-meta-language, with the consequence that our effective counterpart is "equivalent" or rather, in some suitable sense, "approximatively equivalent" to the original non-cffecti~,e one. Or, if we prefer this way of saying it, the purely existential scheme of some definitions corresponds to a "'vague and ambiguous" preformal, initial notion, the variot, s effectivizations correspond to different methods of rendering "formal", "precise" or "intelligible", our initial notion, qhi~ mode of expression does not give the purely existential scheme "equal acceptability ' and may be preferred at some quarter's;. Our hypothesi:~ i:, then that these "formal", "precise" or "'intelligible" efl'ectivizations do not adequately render the sense of the initial notions, when viewed within some common and sufficiently strong metalanguage. Following the general discussion above, we give some examples of effectivization from N~ess [12]. We consider first the concept of'reference class' ([12], pp. 84-88). Nress writes: "Distinctions between classes of occurrences, between sender interpretation and receiver interpretation 67

JENS ERIK FENSTAD

and many others, are convenient in reformulating unspecified synonymity sentences so that their claim can be tested. The making of such reformulations is facilitated by concepts of 'reference class'. Even a highly specified statement about a preciseness relation, e.g. of the kind Pr (aMlbM2), is defined by use of the expression "there exists no synonymic alternative such t h a t . . . ,,6v The concept 'reference class' is introduced: By "reference class" in general in this work is meant a set of two or more numbered designations or declarative sentences in relation to which a property of something is asserted". Here, in order that strict effectivity shall be obtained, we must in general, but not necessarily always, restrict our attention to finite reference classes. We quote further from [12]: " A list of expressions will be said to constitute an intrapersonally heteronymous reference list for the persons P1, P2, .. under conditions $1 if for each person under condition $1 no member of the list is a synonymic alternative of any other. The list is called "intrapersonal" because it is not contended that some or all expressions, as interpreted by one of the persons, are heteronymous in relation to some or all expressions as interpreted by another person ([12], p. 85). Thus we may state an effectivization of the relation 'more precise than' existentially defined above in (2): Let To, 7"1 . . . . Tn be an intrapersonally heteronymous reference list, Ra. An expression U will be said to be "intrapersonally more precise than an expression T in reference to the list RI", if, and only if, there are no interpretations of U among the members of the list, which are not also interpretations of T; and there is at least one interpretation of T within the list which is not an interpretation of U; and at least one member of the list is an interpretation of U. Special interest is attached to what may be termed "representative reference lists", allowing the inductive inference that if U is more precise than T in relation to such a list, then U remains more precise than T by passing to a more extensive reference class. This, of course, expresses a well known point of the methodology of empirical sciences. Occurrence analysis consists, roughly speaking, in ascertaining the meaning of some expressions through the analysis of a finite number of its use occurrences. " T o ascertain the meaning" may be a non-effective operation, "to ascertain the meaning through analysis of a finite class of use occurrences" may, in a certain sense, be an effective operation. Above 68

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ON SYNONYMY

we have quoted from Na~ss [13] on the restricted claims of occurrence analysis (cf. section IV). In the terminology of section V, we see that in general an occurrence analysis allows us only to reconstruct a fragment M, exlendable to various non-equivalent languages interpreted ~z L.i, M** (Pi): . To know the meaning of a term A, this makes sense only in relation to some system 14, then the "meaning" of A is given through the value-function determining the official interpretation M*(P;). To know the meaning of A within some natural language would consist in knowing the meaning of A, in the above sense, in every -~ Li, M~ (P;) > of the natural language in which A is an admitted sign-expression. In this the indeterminacy of occurrence analysis consists, that, when given a finite list of use occurrences of an A within some natural language, we are not in general able to reconstruct unique < L~, M~, (Pj) > compatible with the list of occurrences given, - although in some cases this may be possible. What we may obtain, and even this seems quite unlikely, when considering some finite occurrence list, is a specification of classes of sublanguages compatible with the use occurrences. And here inductive inferences and hypotheses in our recta-language reappear. This leads us to the final discussion of the concept of synonymy of this p~q)er. There may be one pure existential scheme for defining the concept 'synonymy", uniform(~, applicable to every sublanguage l_~ of a language bundle: [ L i } i ~ l a n d [M~(P~.)] , : i , ; > ~ z ~ j viz. our scheme (*) in the one formulation :

(*)

n Syn B (L~) ~> (C) (M) { Phrase (C) & L~-interpr. (M) ~ V a / < C, M > Val < Sub (C, A, B), M > } 6s

This scheme is but the expression of invariance of some value under substitution, and it depends upon the language considered, more specif~ ically the notion of L~-interpretation, what kind of value is left unchanged through substitution. Our scheme has applicability to a wide range of "formal" languages, and may even be said to be "embryonically" present in notoriously vague sublanguages (cf. the definition of synonyms in Ullmann ([16], p. 108). The scheme (*) is, in most interesting cases purely existential and may be rejected either because of some philosophical conviction or on account 69

JENS ERIK FENSTAD

of its non-effectivity, i.e. given two phrases, A and B, they platonically are or are not synonymous, but in general we have no method by which to ascertain which is the case. A concept such as furnished by (*) is not made for direct application. Hence the effort to produce effective notions. Hence effectivizations both for languages < Lt, M1, ( P j ) > , i.e. for systems with fixed syntax and rules of semantics, and for larger bundles { L~ }, (M* (Pj)}, notoriously vague systems, where effectivizations may be obtained through the use of synonymy-questionnaires or other tests. We contend that there may be a multitude of non-equivalent effectivizations, and no one equivalent 69 with the purely existential one. This gives a theoretical background, as yet rather crude, for the construction of synonymy tests. These are primarily intended for notoriously vague sublanguages, i.e. natural language subjected to some restrictions through marginal references. They are thus not intended as definitions of the concept of synonymy (cf. the discussion of N~ess [14] and [15]), but are effectivizations adopted to measure approximative synonymy, or, in the terminology of Hiorth [4], the meaning distance of natural language expressions in relation to some marginal reference. This gives the "why" of synonymy questionnaire construction; not less essential is the " h o w " of the approach; that is a program of research. 7 We may conclude with the thesis, obviously vulnerable as long as the basic notions of Ll and Mi (Pj) are left vague, but none the less, we feel, heuristically significant: there is no effectivization of the synonymy definition scheme (*) uniformly 71 applicable to every < L~, M~ (Pj) > and even less to the notoriously vague language bundles, including the various natural languages. 7e And a notion of synonymy, in order to be adequate, should within some suitable metalanguage be equivalent to our scheme (*).

Added in proof" This paper is the printed version of a preliminary

draft, originally not intended for publication. This partly accounts for large number of footnotes and too frequent quotes. Concerning the quotes it is seen after re-reading that they are not always marked as clearly as they should have been. It is hoped that this causes no misgivings.

Institute of Mathematics, University of Oslo

70

NOTES ON SYNONYMY NOTES 1. Cf. Ullmann [16] p. 113: A purely synchronistic indication that speakers are synonymconscious is provided by the frequent collocation of synonyms. - Note : a reference in square brackets is to the Bibliography. 2. This paper and further articles appearing in this discussion is reviewed in Journal of Symbolic Logic 21, 79-82. Full bibliographical references are there given. We should also mention Quine, From a Logical Point of View, Harvard, 1953. A recent voice in the dispute is McGee [8]. 3. Outside section 11, the terms "syntax" and "semantics" is used in tile philosopher's sense, as in Carnap [I]. 4. We may refer to the pessimistic conclusion of McGee [8]: . . . ; but this does not seem to help very much unless we know, as 1 am afraid we do not, how to find out whether two terms have the same primary and secondary extension. 5. The classic of formal semantics is Tarski, A, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Studia Philosophica I (1936). Cf. also his shorter exposition: The semantic conception of truth, reprinted in Lindsky, Semantics, Urbana, 111.. 1952. 6. The word "'uniformly" is here important. 7. In their well-known book, The Meaning of Meaning, London, 1923. 8. This last sentence may call for some comments, ls the proposed sense of "meaning" in accordance with the intuitive use of "meaning" among linguists? And is the proposed use the same as the one in the quote [16] p. 24 reproduced in the first lines of this section. In our opinion there is much vagueness left behind in the exposition of Ullmann, e.g. the use of "'sense". But as we are occupied with the task of retelling his scheme, we shall refrain from commenting upon the commenls. 9. The three factors, in Ullmann's terminology: name, sense, thing-meant, are the three corners of the Ogden-Richards "basic-triangle". G. Stern in Meanblg and Change of Meaning, GSteborg, 1931, has presented an analysis building upon Ogden-Richards's book The Meaning of Meaning, referred to in note 7. His view may perhaps be indicated through the quote (op. cit. p. 91: . . . . and meaning is instead regarded as a psychic act through which the word (the sign) is referred to that which it denotes (the referent . . . . ). 10. The view on synonymy presented by Ullmann is amply corroborated by the discussion of H. Vogt in his Forelesninger i ahnen sprdkvitenskap, Oslo, 1945, Mimeo. 11. 'This assertion may not pass without objections from a formal semanticist, e.g. within the Kemeney scheme [5], synonymy occurs, but not polysemy or homonymy. 12. it should be remembered that the terminology introduced in this section only has, unless explicitly stated, this section as field of application. The notion of'language' ('langue') in sections II and II1 is qttite dissimilar (cf. for the discussion of differences, section IV). 13. Some references are Tarski, Contributions to the theory of models, bldg. Math. (1954-5), 572-588, 56-64, and for an introductory survey: Lo~, The algebraic treatment of the methodology of elementary deductive systems, Studia Logiea, 2 ( 19551. 14. 1o get some insight into the difficulties motivating the passage from models to interpretations, and in general to get acquainted with one of the most fascinating developments within foundational research, one may consult the two expository papers Kemeney. J., Undecidable problems of elementary number theory, 71

JENS ERIK FENSTAD

15. 16.

17.

18.

19.

20. 21.

22.

23.

24. 25.

26.

Mathematische Annalen 135 (1958) and Fenstad, J. E., Ikke ordin~ere modeller for aritmetiske aksiomsystemer, forthcoming in Nordisk Matematisk Tidsskrift. Cf. [1] and also Carnap's book Meaning and Necessity, Chicago, 1947. In this section, if we use some terminology not explained, it is used in the current sense within logic and analytic philosophy, e.g. this applies to "object language'" and "recta-language". An empirical semanticist may contend that the acceptability problem contained in this assertion is a concern of empirical semantics. This will be taken up below, section V. This is a requirement specific for semantics; the syntax of "sufficiently" rich languages is expressible within that language itself (through the device of GOdel numbering). It may be added that R. M. Martin has attempted a non-translational semantics (ef. the review section of Journal of Symbolic Logic for further reference). Further development of this type of semantics may be of great relevance to our discussion. I.e. when a model of L is given. The domain of individuals belongs to the model, L contains symbols which under the assignment of a model, express the individuals of the model. Kemeney uses the term "natural language" without further discrimination. We shall have occasion to comment upon this in later sections. This distinction is set forth and discussed in great detail in the book of Quine referred to in note 2. We may mention that while Quine finds the theory of reference unobjectionable, he is very suspicious of the theory of meaning which includes concepts such as 'analytic truth' etc. This remark may be a little more intelligible if we remember e.g. truth and falsity are replaced by sets 0 and 1, sets of individuals by their characteristic functions etc., because of the definition of semi-models and value with respect to semi-models. Thus Kemeney speaks of e.g. quasi-denotations etc. instead of denotation. We shall not be so strict in this outline, as it is a biunique correspondence between the "ordinary" concepts and the "quasi-concepts", the latter giving the characteristic functions of the former (el. [5], p. 14). This fact is also expressed in the following quote from the proof of Theorem Schema 15 (below): Given A and given M . . . we find an assignment of a function F t o each special formula part Be of A. We want to show that if x ~ , . . . Yv are the bound variables of A, in that order, then (x~,M)... (yvM) F[(x~ M. . . . . y M) _ BoM] ([5], p. 16). This is especially valid when M* replaces M, and A replaces Be; then A M* is the translation of A by M*, and as F is the value function giving the "denotation" of A, we have that M* "'determines the actual world", as it determines the "official" rules of denotation. We add, "the actual world" must be understood as the world experienced by tile author of M* and written down in M*. As set forth in the famous article referred to in note 5. We could conceive of situations where it would be desirable to use some form of Sortenkalkiil, e.g. in the type of normative logic outlined in Fenstad, J. E., Notes on normative logic, Vitenskaps-Akademiet, Oslo, 1959. But there are well-known techniques to cater for this situation, and we do not feel that this is any argument against the first restriction. On these matters the reader should consult the excellent textbook by Kleene, [6],
72

NOTES ON S Y N O N Y M Y and also, on developments relevant for this expositions, the papers referred to in note 14. Familiarity with these papers could give a most desirable depth of intention in connection with the discussion o f models versus interpretations. And this choice, involving all investigation of meaning postulates within the domain considered, is of great concern to an empirical semanticist. His task is helping us know what to formalize. "Equivalent' as defined above in Definition 6. Cf. [5], pp. 159-196. The notion of free translations is defined, a phrase B of a language L2 is a free translation of a phrase A o f the language Lt if the translations (in the sense of translation from L into ML) o f the phrases into a common ML, specified at the outset, are synonymous. Then the notion of invariance is the quite limliliar, if n phrases of Ll stand in a semantic relation, the n translations stand in the corresponding semantic relation within Lo~. "System" obviously at this point, used in a rather loose manner. l tere we use the vocabulary of the analytical philosopher. Wc may refer to N~ess : A systematization of Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution, Conflict, (1958) where, informally, some fragments of Gandhian ethics are systematized with view to a further formalization and thereby a logical analysis of problems of compatibility, cxtendability etc. 'fo borrow the somewhat derogatory term o f S. r o u h n i n in his recent book f/w Uses of Arguments, Cambridge, 1958. Needless to say, we do not agree with louhnin in his evaluation of modern logic in applications. In fact, one of our beliefs is that modern logic, through the logician's brand of semantics, is of relevance to the general study of communication. But, of course, wc do not believe the matter to be as simple as in the hey-days o f philosophical analysis. May we suggest, that Toulmin believes that the logicians believe that the matters still appear so simple? l h i s term seems in t[lis connection to be used in the sense o f natural language. This quote may be remembered when elaborating the view on natural language as a bundle of "sublanguages". "Philosophical semantics" does not here indicate some exclusively mcta-semantic ~ariety o f study, but rather refers to the classification of those who carry on this special type of study. Wc may refer to the items [2], [3], [4], [9], ]10], [11 ], [12], [I 3], [14] and [15] o f the Bibliography. The rnost extensive work to consult on the concepts and methods is N~ess [12]. Two terms are synonymous, relative to a specified questionnaire, if eaci/response tq~ the questionnaire lists a "'positive" answer, e.g. that the two terms are interchangeable in the answerer's interpretation in some given context. Examples of questionnaires with the result of some investigations are given in N~ess [12], chapter Vlll. - This is not a precise reproduction o f the concept of questionnairesynonymy as given ill Ntess [12] pp. 360-366, but it would carry us too far to introduce the necessary terminology to render the definition completely. We may remark that the above concept introduces one extreme ('each response'). Obviously, wc may introduce concepts o f degree of synonymity in relation to various empirical procedures. Ill this section we are commenting upon empirical semantics as presented through the works referred to in note 37. It should be added that we return to the problem o f questionnaire construction and the use of such devices in investigation of 73

27.

28. 29.

30. 31. 32.

33.

34. 35. 36.

37.

38.

39.

JENS ERIK FENSTAD

40.

41.

42. 43. 44. 45.

46.

47. 48.

49.

50. 51.

synonymy in the last section, giving there, we believe, an added theoretical background to such constructions. Reference may be made to Hiorth [4], also the idea of meaning distance underlies the discussion of Naess [14], [15], as more relevant in the investigation of'qikeness of meaning"-situation, than an "absolute" concept of synonymy. A pioneer study is Hiorth [4]. In relation to a questionnaire and a group of persons (marginal reference) the meaning distance of two "crucial terms" is obtained through the formula: meaning distance = (100 -- ~o conf.) : 100. Cf. [4], p. 49. A short exposition of the technique is given in Hiorth [3]. Several methodological points of occurrence analysis is discussed in Mel6e [11]. 'Interpret' used in the technical sense as in N~ess [12], pp. 45-51. Cf. the above quote from N~ess [14] on the need to elicit highly relevant occurrences, and Mel6e [ 1] on a family of concept 'more elucidative context than'. This quote is translated from Norwegian. - If we conceive of the text embodying the occurrences of " a " as a formal system and the various Re as models of this system (in the terminology of section 1I), then the above may be expressed through the assertion that the formal system, "a", admits in general non-isomorphic models, indeed a denumerable class of such models. The system " a " is thus noncategorical. That this is more than an external analogy will be argued in the last section. Die Vorkommensanalyse wird niemals die Aufgaben der Lexikographie iibernehmen kOnnen, . . . Aber berechtigt ist die Annahme, dass sie als linguistische Disziplin einen Platz auf gleicher Ebene mit der Lexikographie einnehmen kann ([3], p. 22). On the vagueness of the term "natural language", reference is made to the (preliminary) discussion of the introduction. Here we use the symbolism of Kemeney [5], as elsewhere possible to show the connections with the systematization of section III. We do not, however, restrict attention to the type theoretic variety of extentional languages Kemeney considers. As he himself points out, the semantic definitions as given in [5] is in no way dependent (in their structure) on the special type of languages there considered. What is important is that we possess the notion of model of a formal language. Here we also use M*, as the intended interpretation of L~ by the users Pt. For greater preciseness we could perhaps subdivide the P~ in a pair P~ and S~, thus obtaining the interpreted language through < Li, M~* (Pj S k ) > . For expediency we suppress the Se in general, interpreting the Pj as a Pj in some $1~, i.e. not having in mind that the same PI have the same M*, all the time. Here I and J are some sets of indices, finite or denumerable; IxJ is the set of all ordered pairs < i , j > with i ~ I a n d j E J ('E" : is element of). Concerning a L~ we demand that there shall be given a recursive class of symbols, that the rules of formation shall be given through recursive functions, also that the rules of transformation be effective, such that the class of theorems (of the "logic" embedded in the language) be a recursive enumerahle class. We shall consider the language to be about some set of individuals (using techniques well known to obtain a set of individuals), so that an interpretation is given through a domain of individuals and functions and relations defined in this set, and in sets of subsets, etc., of this set. Also we suppose a given set of values for the sentences of our language. We assume that it is possible to define a "value-function" assigning values to every admissible sign-expression (a recursive class) dependent upon

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NOTES ON SYNONYMY the "free" variables of that admissible expression. We then may assume a semantics developed analogous to the Kemeney scheme of section I1, although in general we shall not assume more that the notion of value of an admissible signexpression relative to a M** (Pi) and an assignment of "free" variables, is given. Concerning the constituent P; of :'vl~" (PD there are well known techniques to build this into e.g. the formalism of Kemeney [5], the example of section 6. We then have to lay down some rules of manipulation, such as M~* (Pj) is "equivalent" Ma-* (P~) if and only if i k and j e, or perhaps stronger that if P7 : Pc, then Me (Pj) is "'equivalent" to M~~ (Pe), representing thus the language Lz of a group by the system of one or some of the users. - Perhaps these remarks may help us escape the "'so vague that less than helpftfl" - charge; and surely they crave for further investigations. Cf. note 29. This is in some external features analogous to a typical algebraic construction idea. Maybe this should be a requirement on the L~, the common part of Li and L~ should again be a language L~. If this is satisfied, the non-categoricity of type (al is ruled out. - We note that this requirement on "'intersection" of languages automatically calls for the notion of "'empty" languages. This calls for some comments; using the symbol M~* (P~-) for an allowable interpretation of a language La we intend to indicate that between two interpretations M~* (Pj) and M~* (Pk) there shall not be too many anomalies, both shall be "'intended" in some suitable sense; within the Kemeney scheme this means that of a L we will only consider the various interpretations. This again is a point of uncertainty, we could imagine situations where non-intended models naturally need to be considered within the class of interpretations M~* (Pj). We could, however, distinguish in such a case between various languages L~ and Li', one for each class of interpretations, then within each class the non-categoricity of type (b) could not appear; but this is just an "escape" through change in terminology. As an actual example of a notoriously vague sublanguage we may take the language of the "'test" persons of H. T6nnessen's investigation: "'Private Enterprise". A Semantical Study, The Psychological and Sociological hnplications of Economic Planning in Norway. Mimeo. Oslo, 1949. Here we may conceive of one L~ and a multitude of pairs < L , Ms* (Pj) > , assigning, for different j J, different values to the "extra-logical'" term (it may not be an original constant) "'private enter- prise". Both the works L6b [7] and Fenstad [2] have given prominence to this distinction. Probably, it is our meta-study of the interplay of various < L ; , ?vii* ( P j ) > that is incorporated into the system. As in the Goodman scheme in his: On Likeness of Meaning, referred to above, cf. note 2. Our dependence upon Kemeney [5] is particularly apparent at this point. "A e L~ signifies that the expression A is admissible within L~. As the first order functional calculus is complete, in the technical sense, the relation of synonymy according to the scheme (*) for sentences coincides with the relation of interdeducibility. And we may add, that we are referring to the situation after 1905, as Norway and Sweden were united until then with Stockholm as the capital of the twin countries. This to illustrate empirical "'tinged" hypotheses entering in most examples of logical analysis. On the hypothetical character of logical analysis, reference is made to Mel6e [9]. 75

52. 53.

54.

55.

56. 57. 58. 58a. 58b. 59.

60.

JENS ERIK FENSTAD 60a. We reiterate our reference to Mel6e [9] and [10]. 61. As we in the last section shall have occasion to refer to the notion of effectivity, we shall give an example of the type of plausibility arguments we here have in mind. To borrow some mathematical terminology, we have a kind of "commutativity" problem (cE Fenstad [2] p. 63 on this point). There is given, on the preformal stage an initial problem. Some formalism may be proposed to treat it. On a postformal stage the query arises: Putting our initial problem into the formalism, obtaining an answer there, and interpreting the answer within our (ultimate) intuitive metalanguage: is the answer obtained through the formalism an acceptable answer to our initial problem? The plausibility considerations as to whether general recursiveness is an adequate mathematical notion of the premathematical idea of effective operations have occupied a prominent place in recent discussions on the foundation of mathematics. We may refer the reader to Kleene [6] and also papers of Kalm~r and P6ter in the book edited by Heyting referred to under item [7] in the Bibliography. Quoting from Kleene [6], p. 318: While we cannot prove Church's thesis (that every effectively calculable function is general recursive), since its role is to delimit precisely a hitherto vaguely conceive totality, we require evidence that it cannot conflict with the intuitive notion which is supposed to complete; i.e. we require evidence that every particular function, which our intuitive notion would authenticate as effectively calculable, is general recursive. The thesis may be considered a hypothesis about the intuitive notion of effective calculability, or a mathematical definition of effective calculability; in the latter case, the evidence is required to give the theory based on the definition the intended significance. 62. This topic is treated in great detail in the recent book by A. Fraenkel: Fraenkel and Bar-Hillel, Foundation of Set Theory, Amsterdam, 1958. 63. The condition of effectivity in application of formal methods to the "soft" sciences has been discussed in Fenstad [2], then in conjunction with the total versus local point of view. Local applications enhance the possibility of effectiveness in formal methods applied. (Cf. [2], pp. 36-37). 64. Concerning the theory of recursive functions and predicates the reader may be referred to the standard text of Kleene [6]. On some further discussion of effectivity within mathematics we refer to the papers cited in note 61. 65. With L~ as the pure first order functional calculus, the notion of synonymy according to (*) coincides with interdeducibility. And as well known, Church has shown that the notion of theorem for this language is non-effective (cf. the exposition in Kleene [6]). 66. These are notions from Kemeney [5], or definable within his scheme. 67. We have here changed the "Pr(aP1SlbP~S2)" of [12], p. 84 to "Pr(aMlbM~)'" in conformity with our illustration above; this change has, of course, no significance for our purpose. 68. We may introduce a more restrict notion of L~-synonymy by the further relativization to some group of users, P~, i.e. replacing the predicate 'L~-interpr. ( )' by a predicate 'L~, Pj-interpr ( )'. There are various methods of defining such a predicate in a sufficiently strong metalanguage. 69. 'Equivalent', that is within some common meta-language. 70. The procedures of empirical semantics have far from reached a final, or satisfactory stage, however, there are several pilot-investigations giving promising possibilities for further research. Reference is made to N~ess [12] and the works 76

NOTES ON SYNONYMY there cited, the papers of N~ss, Mel6e and Hiorth listed in tile Bibliography. 71. The even stronger assertion obtained by dropping the word "uniformly" would be tenable for large classes of languages ~L~, M~* (Pj)2~. 72. If we accept the verdict that according to e.g. the Goodman scheme there are no synonyms, the notion is trivially effective - but uninteresting. We have tacitly assumed that for considered systems < L~, M~* (l'j)~., there exist "'non-trivial". i.e. others than "A Syn A (Li)'" synonyms.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] Carnap, R., Introduction to Semantics, 4th ed., Harvard, 1959. [2] Fenstad, J. E., Notes on the application of formal methods in the soft sciences, Inquiry 2 (1959). [3] Hiorth, F., Was ist Vorkommensanalyse? Die Spraehe 4 (1958). [4] Hiorth, F., Distances of meaning and semantical tests, Synthese 11 (1959). [5] Kemeney, J., A new approach to semantics, Journal of Symbofic Logic 21 (1956). [6] Kleene, S. C., httroduetion to Metamathematics, Amsterdam, 1952. [7] LOb, M. H., Constructive truth, Constructivity in Mathematics, (ed. by Heyting), Amsterdam, 1959. [8] McGee, C., Who means what by 'Synonymy'? Inquiry 2 (1959). [9] Mel6e, J., Dialogue on the hypothetical character of logic analysis, htquiry 1 (1958). [10] Mel6e, J., Notes on Emph'ieal Semantics and Philosophical Analysis. ( Unpublished). [1 I] Mel6e, J., Five Notes on Occurrence Analysis. (Unpublished). [12] N~ess, A., htterpretation and Preciseness, Oslo, 1953. [13] N~ess, A., Forekomstanalysens grunneproblemer, Semantiske Prohlemer, Milneo. Oslo, 1953. [14] N~ess, A., Syuonymity and empirical research, Methodos 13 (1956). [15] N~ess, A., Logical equivalence, intentional isomorphism and synonymity as studied by questionnaires, Synthese 10a. [16] Ullmann, S., The Principles of Semantics, 2nd ed., Glasgow, 1957.

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