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Being defeated is not a good time for any people.

Much more so when you were defeated with barely firing a shot; so utterly outmaneuvered and outclassed that no fallback plan can exist to this state. In 1940, France experienced the most embarrassing defeat in her military history. The French were highly divided on the issue, some openly resentful of the occupation and some taking the bitter pill instead of potential occupation by the Soviets. Before the war, The French penned their hopes on the Maginot line, a line of defenses which would hopefully be impregnable by the Germans. This was an evolution of the First World Wars line of thought, and was woefully unprepared for the mobile warfare of German military. Instead of battering themselves against the defenses of the enemy, the Germans simply went around the line, through Belgium and the Ardennes forest. Lacking the proper supply structure and mobile forces, France chose to surrender instead of facing another bloody war. This created a crisis in the French peoples spirit greater than anything before, including napoleons march back home and the failures of the French revolution. For the last 20 years the French have been preparing for this war, and now they were being told to quit while they were ahead. The reactions ran the gamut from the bitter acceptance of a lesser evil to active resistance to the regime. At a time that dictators united entire peoples, France was a house divided. There exists a myth about the great French resistance, encompassing all the people of France in a romanticized struggle against their oppressors. This is no more than a fabrication, however: created by DeGaulle in the wake of WWII in an attempt to repair the French spirit. In reality, much more Frenchmen supported the regime then acted out against it. They did not like their defeat, but were either complacent or actively supportive of the Germans. This is best illustrated in a 1940 speech by Petain. Within sentences, he goes from praising the military to accepting the governments failure and giving up entirely (Document 1). This was a practical

decision to preserve the most French life. France lost half its male population in WWI, and the leadership was not ready for another war on that scale. Knowing about the implications of such a surrender, the French government used propaganda to delegate the blame on the weakness and defects of the former regime (Document 2) and look forward to the national revolution and bright future. A Vichy poster reflects this sentiment; it shows the wrecked house of the former ideals of democracy and internationalism contrasted to the new house of labor and family (Document 6). Before his execution in 1945, the prime minister talks about an enormous propaganda campaign (Document 11) led by Marshal Pierre to get the people to accept his decision. In large part, the Marshal was successful. When the marshal visited Marseilles, he was surrounded not by derision but by applause. The French people had lost the war, but, by and large, they were ok with it. A significant reason for this acceptance was the rise of socialism in Europe during the early 20th century. In 1917 Bolsheviks seized control of Russia. By the 1940s, they had the ability to project power on their neighbors, and their strength appeared to be only ever increasing. There was an information shortage on what was happening inside the Soviet Union, creating fear and resentment. Although not as great as in Russia or Germany, France also had a socialist movement. A large portion of the government propaganda played on that fear. A newspaper article at the time stated The remedy would be worse than the disease if the communists took power over France (Doc 8). Granted, the man who wrote the article was a fascist, but he reflected to concern of a larger population. Military propaganda tried to refocus the enemy in the peoples eyes from Germany to the Soviet Union (Doc 9). All the struggles of the government were not enough to calm the entire populace. Geopolitically, the French surrender was a disaster, with Germany taking control of half of French

lands. Framing such an event in a positive light was a daunting task for the French government, and many people remained convinced in the erroneous ways of the people that led them. Lots of people criticized the government behind closed doors, with friends or relatives, but turned a blind eye to it when out in the open. A cartoon drawn by Jean Pennes shows his true sentiments, but was unpublished for years after its penning (Doc 4). A small minority allowed itself to be outspoken in public. Charles de Gaulle called France a demented slave in Hitlers grip ( Document 3), but himself remained in West Africa, away from the reach and concerns of the Germans. He derides the government, but he ran away from battle, and doesnt get a large part in the outcome of the struggle until the very end. Another one of those who were part of the French resistance was Francois Valentin, who talked about the inability of the French government to protect itself (Document 7). But he was also not located in France, preferring to talk bad about the Vichy regime across the English Channel. These men were not there and were fairly nave of the situation on the ground. Philippe Petains goal was then preservation of French life, and he succeeded. While the germans, Russians, Americans and English were throwing their young men into the blender, the French were kept relatively intact. Although hated by the European leaders, he was not repentant in his opening statement to his trial on July 23, 1945 (Document 10). The crisis of spirit that the French experienced was rivaled only by the Russian depression after the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. It has kept a footprint over all French actions since. The image of the French military cowardice was created after this moment in history, and has branded them for the next hundred years. Although the French resistance existed, its myth was greatly bolstered by post WWII propaganda to alleviate the feelings of remorse. Petains actions were instrumental in preserving France, but were a final chamberlain like concession to a mad

dictator. Had France struggled on, the outcome of history would be widely different, possibly limiting the ambitions of Germany.

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