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Thu Nov 17 5:01:09 EST 2011 CSA Marked Records Last Search Query: (ti=((Collective action* or right* or mobili*

or protest* or empower* or communit* or resilience or collaborative or conflict* or advoc* or participatory or empower* or equit* or inequit* or disput* or discord* or diverse interest* or uneven power or disagree* or oppos* or struggl* or revolution* or war or wars or law* or enforcement* or court* or tribunal* or reform* or concession* or Governance or decision mak* or institution* or decentrali* or transbound* or organization* or organisation* or agenc* or bureau* or commit* or gender* or woman or women or femin* or electricity or electrical power or electrical energy) and water) or ab=((Collective action* or right* or mobili* or protest* or empower* or communit* or resilience or collaborative or right* or conflict* or advoc* or participatory or empower* or equit* or inequit* or disput* or discord* or diverse interest* or uneven power or disagree* or oppos* or struggl* or revolution* or war or wars or law* or enforcement* or court* or tribunal* or reform* or concession* or organi*ation* or Governance or decision mak* or institution* or decentrali* or transbound* or organization* or organisation* or agenc* or bureau* or commit* or gender* or woman or women or female lab* or femin* or electric power or electricity or electric* energy) near water)) and de=(Bangladesh) Record 1 of 6 DN: Database Name EconLit TI: Title Political Altruism of Transboundary Water Sharing AU: Author Bhaduri, Anik; Barbier, Edward B SO: Source B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy, vol. 8, no. 1, 2008 AB: Abstract In the paper, using a political altruism model, we make an attempt to explain why an upstream country might agree to a treaty that recognizes and enforces the water claims of a downstream country. In a natural extension of the standard economic model, it is possible to explain the above phenomena, by allowing for altruism between countries. The altruistic concerns of the countries are dependent on other country's willingness to have a good political relationship. If both the countries maintain favorable political relations with one another, then the upstream country will care about the impacts of its water diversion on the downstream country's welfare. The paper also illustrates the case of water sharing of the Ganges River between India and Bangladesh. The Ganges River, like many other rivers in the world, ignores political boundaries. In Bangladesh, the final downstream country along the Ganges, freshwater availability depends on the share of water diverted by the upstream country, India. For decades, India and Bangladesh failed to resolve the water-sharing issues of the Ganges River. However, in 1996, both India and Bangladesh signed a major new agreement on water sharing (Ganges River Treaty) in an effort to resolve the dispute. Using the political altruism model developed in the paper, we examine why despite needing more water than is available under the treaty, India has adapted to shortages instead of resorting to conflict with Bangladesh. Record 2 of 6

DN: Database Name EconLit TI: Title A Study on Coordination Effect of a Third Party in a Water Resources Conflict. (In Japanese. With English summary.) AU: Author Sakamoto, Maiko; Hagihara, Yoshimi SO: Source Studies in Regional Science, vol. 35, no. 2, October 2004-2005, pp. 295-308 AB: Abstract The graph model for conflict resolution is used to formally analyze an ongoing conflict between India and Bangladesh over the regulation of the Ganges River in order to illustrate the crucial role a Third Party can play in resolving the dispute. Because a Third Party can assist in resolving a dispute in a variety of ways, a general systems approach to conflict management with a Third Party is devised. The strategic analysis of the India/Bangladesh conflict using the graph model clearly shows that one can determine, in advance, exactly how a Third Party can influence potential resolutions to the dispute. In this study, one of the roles of a Third Party Coordinator, is focused on. As a result of applying the procedure of the conflict management with a Third Party to the India/Bangladesh conflict, it is shown that mutual belief between Bangladesh and India is built up, and the outcome which means the improvement of the conflict situation can be realized although the outcome cannot be achieved under the settings of the actual ongoing conflict without a Third Party. Furthermore, when stakeholders compose a hierarchy system, the regulation effect of the hierarchy system is considered using the concept of Stackelberg Equilibrium, and it is shown that the system would bring positive effect for improving the actual conflict situation under a certain condition. Record 3 of 6 DN: Database Name EconLit TI: Title Does Cage Aquaculture Address Gender Goals in Development? Results of a Case Study in Bangladesh AU: Author Brugere, Cecile; McAndrew, Kenneth; Bulcock, Paul SO: Source Aquaculture Economics and Management, vol. 5, no. 3-4, 2001, pp. 179-89 AB: Abstract In order to assess whether gender differences affect uptake and participation in aquacultural activities, a study of a cage aquaculture development project managed by a non-governmental organization (NGO) in Bangladesh was undertaken. CAGES project (Cage Aquaculture for Greater Economic Security) aims to promote the use of low input cage systems for the benefit of the rural resource poor, including women. Using a participatory approach involving semi-structured questionnaires complemented by group discussions with mapping exercises to cross-check information, the role of women was investigated. Distance of the household from the water body was revealed as a major constraint to the full participation of women, especially in the more conservative areas of the country. Time-consuming activities such as the collection and preparation of

feed were generally the responsibility of women as part of their "household" tasks. The influence women held over post-harvest decisions varied between region, villages and households, with women in the Jessore area appearing to become more empowered from cage aquaculture activities. The implications of these findings are discussed with reference to the CAGES project and gender goals in development. Record 4 of 6 DN: Database Name EconLit TI: Title Distribution of Rent in the Inland Fisheries of Bangladesh AU: Author Toufique, Kazi Ali SO: Source Bangladesh Development Studies, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2000, pp. 77-97 AB: Abstract This paper estimates rent in the inland fisheries of Bangladesh by identifying three important determinants of its distribution: the access rights of the fishers to fishing grounds of differential quality, the differentiation among the fishers in terms of ownership of fishing assets and the nature of contractual structure. Fishing grounds have been classified as those that are rich in quality and those that are poor and the fishers have been classified as those who own fishing assets and as those who do not. We present three major findings. First, the fishers as a whole received a large amount of rent. Second, access rights of the fishers to the type of water body and the degree of ownership of fishing assets are important determinants of the amount of rent they receive. Third, the distribution of rent was found more egalitarian in the richer water bodies. Record 5 of 6 DN: Database Name EconLit TI: Title Contesting Water in Bangladesh: Knowledge, Rights and Governance AU: Author Wood, Geof SO: Source Journal of International Development, vol. 11, no. 5, July-August 1999, pp. 731-54 Record 6 of 6 DN: Database Name EconLit TI: Title A Simple Model of Power and Property Rights in the Inland Fisheries of Bangladesh AU: Author Toufique, Kazi Ali SO: Source Bangladesh Development Studies, vol. 25, no. 1-2, March-June 1997, pp. 1-29 AB: Abstract The problem of appropriators to maintain property rights over resource

systems is generally considered secondary to the problem of developing institutions that can internalise externalities associated with resource systems. It is assumed that the appropriators maintain property rights over resource systems at zero or negligible costs. In some practical setups this sequence is often reverse--i.e., the appropriators find it increasingly difficult or costly to maintain their rights over resources. We provide such an example from inland fisheries of Bangladesh where the fishers have in general failed to establish property rights over water bodies despite being explicitly sponsored by the state. Property rights over water bodies are transferred to socially powerful agents coming from outside the fishing community. We relate power and enforcement costs to explain this transfer of rights.