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Ramin Chitsaz Humanities Core Professor Christian 22 March 2012 Counterargument: Plessy v. Ferguson The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most common instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced (Thomas 44). The opinion, in support of the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana, presented by Mr. Justice Brown on behalf of the court, argues that the separation of the two races is constitutional on the grounds that it does not violate the true intention of the 14th amendment, it does not suggest the inferiority of either race, and it is also a police power granted to the states. The opinion begins by presenting the interpretation and application of the 14th amendment. Brown clarifies that while the object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races, it does not justify the enforcement of social equality nor does it abolish distinctions that are constructed by color (Thomas 44). This argument assumes that the equality before the law is the only right protected by the United States, which can be labeled as the courts first premise. The second premise is the claim that the separation does not create or imply the inferiority of either race to the other. The court justifies this claim because in the Louisiana law, it states that all railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in this

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State, shall provide equal but separate accommodations for both races (Thomas 41). The court found that although there would be a separation between the races, the phrase equal accommodations permits this law to be practiced without implying the superiority of one race over the other. Their third premise is the claim that this act of segregation has been generally accepted as a police power of the state legislature. After these three claims are presented, Brown does not conclude his argument with the courts opinion, but rather presents a broad example of this practice in play. He infers that separate schools in places where black rights have been longest and most earnestly enforced supports the courts decision because it implicitly expresses that this practice has been found valid in all states, not just southern states (Thomas 44). After the presentation of the three premises and this example, it is evident the court is in support of the constitutionality of this law. In the evaluation of the courts opinion, there is an affective fallacy in the passages opening statement. The guilty words are undoubtedly and could not have been intended (Thomas 44). Both these claims are made with the assumption that everyone agrees the sole object of the 14th amendment was to present equality only before the law and can therefore be classified as a hasty generalization. Moreover, the courts interpretation of the 14th amendment also assumes that the previous ruling in the Slaughter-House Cases was a valid precedent in its definition of citizenship. This case distinguished between the citizenship of a state and that of the United States. In summary, the court decided that the 14th amendment protected the privileges and immunities granted to all citizens of the United States, but did not have the power to protect or enforce the privileges or immunities granted or withheld by a state as long as they did not abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States (Thomas 43). Therefore, the constitutionality of this law is being invalidly supported by an interpretation of the 14th amendment during a case that had

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nothing to do with race but rather companies and government regulations over companies within a state. Moreover, Brown justifies his argument by saying that the commingling of the two races is unsatisfactory to either group (Thomas 44). This premise however is false because the very incident that is being presented shows that Plessy, being only 1/8th black, wanted to sit in the white section of the train. This incident itself refutes the claim that the commingling is unsatisfactory for either race. Browns claim can therefore be defined as a hasty generalization because he is assuming that both sides would find the amalgamation of the two races unfavorable when there are many instances where segregation is not supported by either race. The most important fallacy presents itself when Brown states that separation laws do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other (Thomas 44). Firstly, this statement holds no value because it lacks evidence to back up the argument. Secondly, it lacks certainty because Brown says not necessarily, showing that there was no sureness in his claim. Although the majority presents the matter of inferiority, they lack to correctly reject it because their statement is merely an opinion. Therefore, the court neglected to address this topic with sufficient evidence and allows this continuum fallacy to reject a very crucial counterargument to their decision.The court also tries to support their claim on the basis of tradition and a general acceptance of these separation laws, which appeals to a selective audience and abuses the majority consensus. Just because something has been accepted or is custom to certain regions doesnt justify its constitutionality nor its morality. Finally, the example that Brown presents in support of his conclusion does not directly support his opinion. Brown is implying that the constitutionality of separate schools is justified because it has been a tradition in places where the civil rights of blacks has been for longest time upheld. When examined closely, this example does not actually support the courts claim and it dis-

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tracts from the topic of the argument, which is the constitutionality of the document, not its acceptance in society. This example can actually be defined as begging the question because rather than addressing the main argument, Brown is presenting this example hoping to support his opinion by an appeal to tradition. Therefore, in the evaluation of this passage, there are actually many fallacies and assumptions made or implied that show the lack of evidence and clarity of the decision made by the majority. In a counterargument to the majority opinion, it is important to refer back to the founding documents of the United States. In the 14th amendment, the definition of a citizen was altered, and blacks were given equal rights by the law. Therefore, at this point in time, we are considering blacks as equal citizens in comparison to other whites in the United States. We must therefore refer back to the constitution and interpret it with this new definition of citizen in mind. First, let us observe the three natural rights Jefferson derived from John Locke: Men are created equal... with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness (HCC 230). In the case of Plessy, how can the court see this law as justifiable when it is clearly denying Plessy of his right to the Pursuit of Happiness? His happiness of sitting where he pleases does not in any way harm or put others in danger so it can not be justified by the government to withhold this right from him. Now although some would argue that his presence amongst another race puts some whites at a discomfort, how can the government assess whos comfort is more important? What characteristic or quality determines the importance of a mans comfort? In the incident of Plessy, it was determined by color, violating the equality of black citizens. The law also comes in conflict with the 13th amendment, which was better interpreted and defined in the 1879 case of Strauder v. West Virginia. The case determined that the 13th amendment carried the necessary implication of a positive immunity... for the colored race,-the right to

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exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored,-implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discrimination which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race (Strong). By permitting a law that designates where a black man must sit on a train is clearly an unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored because it only takes into account their race (Strong). The Louisiana law also takes away their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy by punishing any person of the black race who wants to exercise his right to sit in a white passenger cart (Strong). Moreover, this segregation law is also guilty of reducing the African Americans to a subject race by discriminating and segregating against them solely upon race (Strong). Therefore, it is evident that this law is unconstitutional in relation to the established interpretation and intent of the 13th amendment. The argument of the law comes down to the question, is separate but equal unequal or equal? The answer stems from the soundness of the statement of separate but equal. The Louisiana law, or any other law for the matter of fact, can not be just claimed to be separate but equal; they must be closely examined in practice to be assessed whether or not it can be granted the title of equal. There are many incidents where there is separation without equality. For example in Alamogordo, New Mexico, there were assigned times each race could swim in the local municipal pool: The sign on the outside of the pool read: Hours 10am to 6pm Tuesday - Sat. Colored: Sunday from 1pm-5pm (Stewart). This rule is clearly a practice of unequal segregation. The black race were only allowed 4 hours out of the entire week to swim while the white race was granted the entire week. Moreover, the operators of the pool would drain it every Monday because the colored people were unclean and this would kill any bacteria that they would bring in (Stewart). This practice advocated prejudices towards the black race, therefore creating a feeling of inferiority in

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the black race. Another incident of unequal segregation appears in Alexandria, Virginia where the public library did not admit black people (even though their taxes help support it) and that there was no separate public library for the black population (Stewart). These occurrences are just a few of many unequal practices of segregation. This shows that with the existing prejudices against the black race, it is nearly impossible to enforce and practice complete equal separation of the two races and is therefore, in practice, not equal, and a direct violation of the 14th amendment. Consequently, although segregation laws can be argued to be read as equal, in practice, they are essentially and almost indefinitely unequal. In conclusion, the majority opinion was in no way valid to grant this law constitutional because it lacked verifiable evidence and relied on poorly chosen interpretations and assumptions that favored one side. The opinion appealed to tradition and a selective audience of whites in order to justify its claims rather than a careful reading and correct interpretation of the true intention of the Constitution as well as the 13th and 14th amendments. The counterargument shows the correct interpretation and true intention of these documents and how, if read correctly, it is obvious that this Louisiana law is in direct violation of the basic laws that this country is governed on. It is also even more obvious that in practice, these laws are not being upheld with equality of both races. It was the fault of the majority in allowing this law to be deemed constitutional under the false pretext of interpretations of the amendments, general assumptions, and claims that were not supported. The court did not assess the true gravity of declaring this law constitutional and the domino effect it had on establishing other segregation laws that led to the increase in prejudices against the black race in America. If it was not for the new evidence presented in the court case of Brown v. Board of Education, who knows how long segregation could have continued on.

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Works Cited The Constitution. Humanities Core Guide and Reader. Ed. David. T. Pan. Boston: Pearson, 2010. Stewart, James. "Remembering Jim Crow : Presented by American RadioWorks." American RadioWorks from American Public Media. Web. 24 Mar. 2012. Strong, William. "Strauder v. West Virginia." Justia US Supreme Court Center. Web. 24 Mar. 2012. Thomas, Brook. Plessy v. Ferguson: A Brief History with Documents. Boston: Bedford, 1997. Print.

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