A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit' Author(s): Richard Schacht Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophical Studies: An International

Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 23, No. 1/2 (Feb., 1972), pp. 1-31 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4318695 . Accessed: 16/04/2012 09:55
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RICHARD SCHACHT

A COMMENTARY ON THE PREFACE TO HEGEL'S 'PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT'

(Received21 September,1971)

Hegel'sPhenomenology Spirithas come to be regarded manyHegelof by scholarsas his most importantwork- even thoughit was his firstbook, to andin manywaysis moredifficult readthanany of the othershe wrote. And it is a matterof further that widespread agreement the Prefaceto the Phenomenology the most importantpart of it. This may be illustrated is by the remarksof some eminentHegel-scholars concerningit, cited by
Walter Kaufmann in his introduction to his translation of it': "... it is not

sayingtoo muchwhenI claimthatanyoneunderstands Hegel'sphilosophy if he completelymastersthe meaningof this preface."(Rudolf Haym,

1857). "... [It is] the most important of all Hegel texts .... Whoever has

understoodthe preface to the Phenomenology understoodHegel." has (HermannGlockner, 1940) "The Phenomenology precededby a reis markablePreface,which is a literaryas well as a philosophicalmasterpiece."(J. N. Findlay,1958)And: "ThePrefaceof the Phenomenology is one of the greatestphilosophicalundertakings all times." (Herbert of Marcuse,1941) Kaufmannhimself also thinks it is of the greatestimportance,as is shown by his publicationof his own translationof it by itself, togetherwith a commentary it. on So I will take the importance the Preface,at least in the contextof of Hegel'sphilosophy,to be establishedon good authority.I myselfthink that, if one can understand one will have understoodHegel's basic it, conceptionof what philosophyis and how it ought to be done, and the essentialsof his metaphysics well. It is in my view the best summary as of his philosophyhe everwrote;evenif it does not containhis argumentsfor his views. (And, after all, one should not expectto find arguments a in In I Preface.) this commentary, shallattemptto expoundandclarifysome of the basicpoints Hegel is makingin it, in orderto facilitatethe understandingof it. Sucha commentary needed,becauseit is verydifficult is to understand. Ultimately,of course,the important thingis for one to come
PhilosophicalStudies23 (1972) 1-31. All RightsReserved CopyrightV 1972 by D. ReidelPublishingCompany, Dordrecht-Holland

RICHARD

SCHACHT

to some conclusionaboutthe meritof what Hegelis saying;but one cannot do that until one achievesan understanding what he is saying. of
I

Near the beginningof the Preface,Hegel says: "Thetrue form in which truthexistscan only be the scientificsystemof it." (p. 12) First:the term 'scientific' shouldnot be understood its usualsense,as referring the in to empirical sciences. it in Rather, shouldbe understood the senseof Hegelian philosophyand 'logic'.And secondly:Hegel'spointhereis that, sincethe Truthor the essentialnatureof thingsconsistsin a networkof logicallyrelatedconcepts,it can onlybe grasped and accurately completely through a philosophical mode of thoughtwhichis rigorously rationaland logical, andsystematic well.So also,whenhe saysa few pageslater,"Truth as finds theelementof its existence onlyin theConcept[Begriff (p. 14),he means, ]" first,thatthe Truthor essential natureof realityis theBegriff(or systemof reason); and secondly,that it can be graspedonly throughthe mode of thoughtappropriate it - namely,throughconceptual, to rationalthought. Those againstwhomHegel is speakinghereare not firstand foremost previousphilosopherslike Hume and Kant; though he wouldwant to criticisethemtoo alongtheselines, for not recognizing whatthe essential natureof realityconsistsin, and for failingto see both that the basictask of philosophyis to comprehend in conceptualsystematic it thought,and that it is possiblefor philosophyto do this. But those whom Hegelhas in mindareaboveall the Romantics, thoseassociated or withtheview- widely prevailing the time, and to some extentonce againtoday- that the at ultimateand true natureof realityis to be apprehended (and can only be apprehended) throughsome sort of intuition feeling.The Romantics or had seen- rightly,in Hegel's view- that mere analytical,empirical,or criticalthought is not capable of revealingthe true ultimatenatureof reality;but from this they had proceededto what Hegel regardsas the erroneousconclusionthat thereforesomethingaltogetherdifferent from rationalthoughtis required revealit. to This way of thinking, Hegel says, characterizes "the stage the selfconsciousspiritoccupiesat present" 14)- in otherwords,the situation (p. as he entersthe picture.The humanspiritwhichhas reachedthe stage of Romanticism in its intellectual has, development, passedbeyondimmedi-

A COMMENTARY

and thinking consciousness; beyondthestageof uncritical ate, unreflective thinkingto graspthe natureof the naivefaith in the ability of uncritical reality;and also beyondthe stageof skepticalthinkingwhichdespairsof nature reality all. Butit now of at the beingableto apprehend fundamental the attemptsto proceed,accordingto Hegel, "not by returning chaotic to consciousness the orderof thoughtand the simplicityof the Concept, the concept,and by establishbut ratherby ... suppressing discriminating ing thefeeling of the essence."(p. 16) Againstthe Romanticswho take this stance,Hegelcontendsthat mere for 'enthusiasm' 'the beautiful,the holy, the eternal,religion,and love' is of far from sufficientto yield an adequateapprehension the nature of reality.(p. 16) It took a long time for men to rise above meremythical of thinkingabout reality,and to achievea recognitionof the importance and clarityof understanding of carefulattentionto the actualcontentsof of This development the abilityto think analytically represexperience. evenif also a stagewhichitselfmustbe enteda step in the rightdirection, if surpassed genuineknowledgeof the natureof realityis to be attained. But instead of surpassingthis stage of analyticalthinkingin the right negated it, direction,Romanticismmerely recognizedits insufficiency, to moreprimitivesort of thinking and in doing so reverted an essentially - and therebyriskedlosing what had been gainedin the development of the sort of thinkingagainstwhichit was reacting.Its protestagainstthe criticalthoughtwas basedupon the adequacyand ultimacyof analytical, a of apprehension somethingtrue about it; but it did not itself represent positiveadvancebeyondthis mode of thought.(Indeed,in Hegel'seyes, stateof of to Kant himselfhad contributed the emergence this deplorable affairs,with his suggestion that faith and faith alone could penetrate wherethe understanding that "I have ... couldnot go; recallhis assertion foundit necessary denyknowledge, orderto makeroomforfaith."to in KRV,B p. xxx) In the Preface,however,Hegelis concerned criticisenot only Hume, to Kant, and the Romantics,but also his immediatephilosophicalpredecessorsand contemporaries and in particular,Schelling.Schelling,he beyondboth Kantandthe Romanfeels,hadmovedin the rightdirection, philosophystill leaves a good deal to be tics; but his sort of speculative philosophymust desired.AgainstSchelling, Hegelarguesthat speculative certainlybe able to come to termswith the varioussciences,and incor-

RICHARD

SCHACHT

poratetheirfindings;but one does not arriveat a satisfactory speculative them undera philosophysimplyby takingthese findingsand arranging and few abstract formulas (such as 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis'), subsumingthem under a single generalabstractprinciple(namely,that of identify, or 'A=A'), which is then given the status of the Absolute or fundamentalprinciple of reality. This, in Hegel's view, is an empty which- insofaras it goes beyondthe varioussciencesat all formalism contents itself merely with vague and empty principlesand vacuous formulas.(pp. 24-6) He thus implies that in his version of speculative philosophy,the connectionshe proposes will be more significantthan and his conceptionof the Absolutemore substantial. Schelling's,
II

Withregardto the natureof the Absoluteor 'the True'as he conceivesit, ... as but Hegel says: "We comprehend the true not [merely] substance,
just as much as Subject .... The living Substance is ... that being, which is

in truth Subject."(p. 28) As Kaufmannobserves,thereis an allusionto and Fichte Spinoza(with his conceptionof the Absolute as Substance) (with his conceptionof the Absoluteas Ego or Subject)here. The contrastin question- both sidesof whichHegelwantsto affirm is between a conceptionof the Absolute as somethingwith an unchanging,determinate character, and a conceptionof the Absoluteas pure activityor dynamicagency. On Hegel's view, each conception,taken by itself, is inadequateto the true nature of the ultimateprincipleof reality (the 'Absolute'); althougheachconception does bringout an important aspect of the Absolute.Retainingthe traditional terminology, Hegel maintains that the Absoluteis to be conceivedas bothSubstance Subject that and is, bothas havinga determinate nature,andas beingactive.Its substantial aspect,he holds,consistsof the 'systemof reason',the systemof thoughtforms which constitutethe Begriffor 'Concept'.And its subject-aspect consistsof its dynamic,self-realizing impulsewhichaccountsboth for the of unfoldingof this 'systemof reason'as such,and also for the emergence concretely existingconsciousness, whichit is concretely in embodied,and ultimatelyactuallythought. A conceptionof the Absolutewhichfocussessolely on its substantial aspect,according Hegel,failsto dojusticeto theinterrelation thevery to of

A COMMENTARY

aspectitself;and also, to the fact that this componentsof this substantial aspectcomesto attainthe form of expurelyformal,abstractsubstantial actualonlyinsofaras it does so. istingself-consciousnessandis something of Onthe otherhand,Hegelholdsthata conception the Absolutewhich does not do justice to the fact that focusses solely on its subject-aspect whichit acquires an accidental in is determinateness not merelysomething is an essentialfeatureof but way in the courseof its actualization, rather simplyin itself as pureBegriff. the Absoluteeven when considered And finally,as the case of Schellingshows, Hegel feels that it is also possiblefor a philosopherto graspthat the Absoluteis to be conceived and both as Substance as Subject,andyet to fail to conceivethe natureof these elementsof it and their relationto each other properlyand adeselfof quately.In his ownconception theAbsoluteas theself-determining, Hegelfeelsthathe makesgood all theseshortcomings. realizing Begrigf, Hegel's argumentfor his conception of the Absolute, stated very inquiryreveals briefly,would seemto be the following:(1) Philosophical has the essential characterof a 'system of that reality fundamentally can that existsconcretely and must reason',in termsof whicheverything left with no materialist Kantian'thingsin themselves' or be understood, And (2) the fact that thereare natural remainder. over as a meaningful this and historical whichmanifest 'systemof reason',andthat phenomena in apprehended, activity whichit is moreor less accurately thereis thinking cannot be explainedexcept by attributingto the Absolute an impulse toward the attainmentof concrete,and ultimatelyself-conscious,existence.And from this it followsthat the Absolutemustbe conceivedboth and as Subject,in the above senses. as Substance of to the description the Absoluteas it is in itself- whichinvolves Thus, settingout the 'systemof reason'or the Begrif in all its determinateness and detail- it mustbe addedthat it is of "the natureof this life to befor itself" (p. 30), that is, to achievethe form of existingself-consciousness. Onlywhenit is for itself whatit is in itself- and so is in andfor itself- is it fully actual.Only then is it actuallywhat it is implicitly essentially. or This is what Hegel has in mind when he says that "the form is no less essentialto the essencethan the essenceitself," and that "the essenceis
to be comprehended ... not merely as essence ..., but just as much as

form- and in the whole Wealth the developedform. Onlyas suchas it of (p. comprehended ... in its actuality." 30)

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So, according Hegel,the Absoluteis not presented its actuality' to 'in in philosophicallogic; there only its essence- its skeleton- is indicated. It is presented'in its actuality'only in a Phenomenologyof Spirit,in form'- thatis, the variousstages which'thewholewealthof the developed of consciousness throughwhichthe essenceof the Absolutecomes to be and explicitlymanifested adequately graspedin actualconsciousness is taken into consideration. Hegelgoes on to observethat "theresultis the sameas the beginning," and that "the actualis the same as its Concept"(p. 34) - at least, in a sense.Theyarethe same,in the sensethat, consideredformally, essenthe tial structureof 'the actual' or 'the result' of the whole developmental of processwillcorrespond exactlyto the structure theAbsoluteconsidered merelyin itself, as Begriff.But thereis a profoundly important difference between'theactual'and 'its Concept',at the existential level- veryliterally, all the difference the world. For at 'the beginning', in nothingexists; 'the Concept'merelyby itself is nothingreal at all. Whereas'the result' does exist; 'the actual'is somethingreal, somethinghavingthe 'form'of existence.
III

At this point somethingshould be said about a notion which recurs in frequently Hegel'sdiscussionin connectionwith the subject-aspect of the Absolute,the processof its actualization, consciousness: and namely, 'negativity'.How is 'negativity'to be understood,in relation to these othernotions?To beginwith:'negativity' Hegel- reasonably for enoughis the oppositeof 'positivity'; as Hegelusesthe latterterm,something and has the character 'positivity', is 'positive',to the extentthat it has a of or determinate contentor form.Now, in the contextof the substance-subject distinction,the aspectof the Absolutewith the character 'positivity' of is its substance-aspect. Hegel wishes to distinguishbetweenit and the subject-aspect the of Absolute,eventhoughhe also holds that they are simplydifferent aspects of one and the sameultimateprinciple.So: if the substance-element may be in appropriately characterized termsof 'positivity', whatbetterway to characterize subject-element in termsof 'negativity'? by so the than For one brings out the differencebetweenthe latter as a characterizing it, dynamic impulsewhichimpelsdevelopment beyondall determinate forms

A COMMENTARY

which are incomplete and which thereforeis in a sense opposedto all (limited)determinateness and the former,whichis nothingif not determinate, and which as such contains no impetus toward actualization. The Absolute-qua-subject 'negates'the abstractpurityof the Absolutequa-substance, impellingit in the directionof actualization,and it by 'negates'each merelytransitional stagein the courseof its actualization, the more by impelling processin the directionof a modeof consciousness adequateto the Begriff.And so it is quite understandable that Hegel in characterizes subject-aspect termsof 'negativity'. this in He also characterizes 'consciousness' termsof 'negativity', equalfor ly good reasons.Considerthe distinctionbetweenthe contentsof consciousness, whatever theymaybe, andconsciousness itself.Consciousness itself is to be distinguished from each and everypossibledeterminate (or 'positive') content of consciousness;though of course it cannot exist without some such content. All consciousness consciousness someis of but consciousnessas an activity is not to be identified thing; with its contentswhichare the objectsof that activity.The contentsof consciousness are alwayssomething moreor less determinate, 'positive';and so, or in relationto its contents,consciousness is something indeterminate, itself non-'positive',or 'negative'.In short, in relation to its contents, consciousness itselfhasthe character 'negativity'. is something of It morethan they are, somethingwhichtranscends themin the directionof otherpossible contents; but even so, it is not itself somethingdeterminate not anotherdeterminate object,in the sense in which anotherpossiblecontent or objectof consciousness anotherdeterminate is object.In this sense, it is something'negative', the subject-aspect the Absolute,and for like of basically,similarreasons.And this result should not be surprising; for accordingto Hegel, consciousness the subject-aspect the Absolute and of are not unrelated.On the contrary,he regards consciousness the exisas - theformit takes, of of ting manifestation the subject-aspect theAbsolute in which its substanceor essential contentbecomes somethingactual. (More will be said about 'negativity' 'the negative'below.) and
IV

Next, let us turn to Hegel's use of the term 'spirit',in relationto the expressions'the True', 'actuality','science','the Absolute', 'substance',

RICHARD

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and 'subject'.Hegel says: "That the True is actual only as [scientific] system, or that the substanceis essentiallysubject,is expressedin the conceptionwhich speaks of the Absoluteas spirit."And further:"The spiritthat, so developed,knows itself as spiritis science.Scienceis the actualityof the spiritand the realmthat the spiritbuildsfor itself in its own element."(p. 38) the prinHegel has alreadycharacterized Absolute- the fundamental ciple of realityor 'the True'- as both substanceand subject.Here he is it suggestingthat since the Absolute has both of these characteristics, be might more informatively referredto as 'spirit'.For this term more than does the merelyformal adequatelyexpressesits subject-character term 'the Absolute'. He also has alreadysaid that 'the True'- or the Begriff,the 'systemof reason'- is 'actual'only when it is actuallythought;only, that is, when of contents.Now 'science', thereexistsan actualconsciousness its essential or 'scientificsystem', as Hegel uses these expressions,is precisely a or of consciousness explicitapprehension the Begriffor systemof reason; it is 'the True'graspedcompletelyin actualconsciousness. it follows So that 'the True is actual only as [scientific]system'- only when it is in comprehended scientificor philosophicalthinking.And 'science'so as conceivedcan also be characterized 'spiritknowing itself as spirit': that is, as spirit-as-subject knowing(or attainingthe form of consciousness of) itself-as-substance i.e., its essentialstructures, the 'system or of reason'or Begriffwhichconstitutesits substantial aspect. "Science", Hegelsays,"is the actualityof spirit."Thatis, it is a formof existingconsciousnessin which the substantialcontent of spirit or the Absoluteis actuallythought.And 'science... is the realmthat the spirit buildsfor itselfin its own element.'For spirit's'own element'is thought, or consciousness;since spiritis essentiallysubjectas well as substance. And 'science'or systematic thoughtis that form achievedby consciousness in whichthe substantial contentof spiritmay be graspedclearlyand that completelyby spirit-qua-subject; is, in which spirit becomes conscious of its essentialsubstantive nature.This is what Hegelmeanswhen he saysthatspirit'mustbecomean objectfor itself';its substantial content must become an object of knowledge somethingexplicitlyand adequatelygraspedin consciousness. Whenthis happens,spirit's'being-in-itself', essentialnature,is then or

A COMMENTARY

also 'for-itself',or somethingof whichthereexistsan explicitconsciousness. In short, it then is 'in-and-for-itself'. (And Hegel believesthat, in him,this goal at last has beenreached.) Beforethis happens, is whatit is it only 'in-itself',but not 'for-itself'.At the intermediary stage in which consciousness graspsthe substantial natureof the Absolute(whatit is initself) more or less adequately, does not yet see that it itself is really but the subject-aspect the same fundamental of realityof whichits objectis the substance-aspect, thereis for it a subject-object split. Here spirit-assubjecthas its own contentbeforeitself in consciousness (for-itself),but it is not recognizedas such. Consciousness does not realizethat what it has beforeit (for-itself)is what it itselessentially is (in-itself).Onlywhen consciousness recognizes - onlywhenit seesthat'subject' 'object' this and are but two sides or aspectsof the samefundamental reality(viz., spirit, which is both substanceand subject) is the appearanceof a subjectobjectsplitovercome. Thengenuine self-knowledge whichis alsogenuine knowledgeof the nature of reality generally is at last achieved.Only then is it appropriate speak of the existence,not merelyof 'spiritinto itself' and 'spiritfor-itself',but of 'spiritin-and-for-itself'. with this, And the end of the processof spirit'sself-realization reached. is It is the secondof thesestageswhichHegelhas in mindwhenhe speaks of 'pureself-recognition absoluteotherness', in which'is the groundand basis of science or universalknowledge',and which "the beginningof philosophy[proper] presupposes." 40) That is, the philosophywhich (p. is going to usherin the thirdand finalstage,according Hegel(namely, to his own), presupposes the secondstagehas beenreached.This is the that same'presupposition philosophy' of (thatis, of philosophy proper)which Hegelhad spokenof in his earlier discussion 'theNeed for Philosophy', of in his essay on Fichte and Schelling2:namely,what he therecalled 'the bifurcation subjectand object',which needsto be overcome. of
v

AlthoughHegelfeels that,in his philosophy,spirithas finallyreached the third stage of 'knowingitself as spirit', and of being both 'in-and-foritself', there still remainsthe practicalproblemof how otherindividuals maybe broughtup to thislevelor standpoint AbsoluteKnowledge of too. He says: "Theindividualhas the rightto demandthat scienceshouldat

10

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least furnish him with the ladder [from his initial naive state] to this us standpoint." 40) And Hegelfeels that he is furnishing with such a (p. ladder, by writing the Phenomenology. Startingwith ordinary senseexperience whichis the simplest,lowestform of humanexperience he proposesto lead the individual the hand all the way up to the level of by AbsoluteKnowledge, retracing leadinghimthroughthe dialectical and by development whichthe humanspirit(or at least its advanceunits)has by reachedthis goal. or Hegel's point in speakingof 'self-certainty', of consciousnessbecoming 'certainof itself', is that if the individualis really to reachthis goal, he must not simplybe confrontedwith the resultsof this developin ment,i.e., with AbsoluteKnowledge its finalform.Rather,he mustbe brought to the point that he is completely certain that what Hegel's philosophical'science'says about realityand spirit both is an accurate andadequate accountof themand appliesto him.He mustbecomejust as certainof this as he is certainof himselfin his initial, naive, commonsenseunderstanding himself.His initial'self-certainty' disappears, of soon once his self-consciousness his understanding and becomemore sophisticated- and it mustdisappear, he is everto reachthe level of Absolute if Knowledge;but so also must that doubtbe dispelled,which he surely would feel if he were suddenlyconfronted,completelyunprepared, with or Hegel'sLogic or Encyclopedia the final chapterof the Phenomenology on 'AbsoluteKnowledge'. is only by beingproperly It prepared them for that he will ever be able to be certainof theirtruth.And it is only when this new and ultimateform of 'self-certainty' achievedthat he really is will have ascendedHegel's 'ladder',and attainedAbsolute Knowledge. This is one way in which Hegel intends the Phenomenology be to viewed- as an educationaldevice enablingthe individualto attain Absolute Knowledge.But he also intendsit to be viewedin anotherway. For it may also be conceivedwith reference simplyto its content,as well as withreference educational functionit mayperform theindividual. to for So Hegel says: "Thisphenomenology the spiritpresentsthe becoming of (or actualemergence] scienceor universal of knowledge." 42) Thatis, (p. it describesthe developmentof consciousnessfrom its most primitive form to its highest,final form, in which it achievesan adequatecomboth of itself and of the truenatureof the Absolute(whichis prehension simplyto say the samething in different ways).

A COMMENTARY

11

in "Knowledge its initialform,"Hegelsays, "is ... the consciousness of the senses"- a form of consciousness,he adds, which "lacks spirit" (p. 42); that is, which does not in fact constitutegenuine knowledge. "Tobecometrueknowledge," continues, hasto workits waythrough he "it a long journey."(p. 42) This is what the human spirithas done in the courseof its development; this is what the individualalso must do, and if his own consciousnessis to reach that highest level of development whichthe humanspirithas reached whichis that of 'true'or 'Absolute' knowledge.There is no other way it can be reached,Hegel says- no whichwouldsparethe individual necessity 'royalroadto knowledge', the of followingthe long, hardpath leadingto it. He mustworkthroughthe interveningstages of intellectualdevelopmenthimself; for there is no otherwayin which'self-certainty' the levelof AbsoluteKnowledge at and a completeand adequatecomprehension its contentscan be achieved. of Of the variousstagesin the development describes, he Hegelsays: "every momentis necessary." 46) For eachlaterone presupposes (p. thosewhich preceded and could not haveemerged it, withoutthem.3And fromthis it follows that, for the individual,'the [whole]length of this way must be endured",i.e., gone through.(p. 46) Yet, fortunately the individual, for this is easierfor him than it was at first;for those who have gone before him have done the work of initial discovery,and haveleft a well-marked andrelatively clearpathfor him to follow. So Hegelsays:"Theindividual must also pass throughthe contents of the developmentstages of the generalspirit,but as forms that have long been outgrownby the spirit, as stages of a way that has been prepared and evenedfor him." (p. 44) And this makes it possible for an individualtoday to work througha developmentin a relativelyshort time which initially took the human spiritthousandsof years. Thisprocessor development be viewedfromtwo different can perspectives. From one perspective that of the individual it is the process throughwhichhe 'acquires whatis givento him',andmakesthe hard-won knowledgeof the content or 'substance' spirithis own. As such, it is of the process throughwhich the individualconsciousnessbecomes 'universal'- an existinginstantiation spiritwhichis 'in-and-for-itself'. of And from the otherperspective, 'fromthe point of view of the generalspirit
as substance, this means ... that this [substance] acquires self-con-

sciousness', and so becomes 'actual' - or, if the individual is not

12

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the first to do it, renews and more firmly establishesits 'actuality'. the Or, as Hegelsays on anotheroccasionin the Phenomenology, result is a 'twofold actuality':an individualwho is universalspirit, and universal spirit which really exists. Unless and until this point is reached, neither the individual consciousnessnor spirit generally is anything
'actual'; the individual consciousness, because it has not yet become in

it realitywhatit is essentially (namely, universal spirit):andspirit,because has not yet attaineda form of existencewhich fully corresponds its to formalessence.'Actuality' achievedonly with the emergence a form is of of existingconsciousness whichthe essenceof spiritis fully manifested. in
VI

At thispoint,however,a numberof questionsstillremainto be answered, suchas: Whatis it thatmovesthe humanspiritfromone stageof spiritual development the next? How are the varioussuccessivestagesrelated to to each other? And, given that Hegel says that 'every moment is a is necessary one', and that the sequencehe describes that whichspiritual developmentnecessarilymust follow, what accountsfor the necessity? In answerto the first question,Hegel says that it is "the power of the negative"which drivesthe development onward.His meaningbecomes clearer whenthis statement takentogetherwith his view that each stage is in the developmentshort of the final one turns out to involve certain internalcontradictions inadequacies. each particular or As level of consciousnessemergesand becomesfully explicit,these contradictions and inadequacies becomeapparent.When they becomeapparent,those features of the particulartype of consciousnessin questionwhich are responsiblefor the difficulties identified 'negated'; as a resultof are and and this 'definitenegation',a new level of consciousness achieved.It is the is 'negation'of the previouslevel, but it is not merelythat; for in 'negating' the previous levelin a 'definite' 'determinate' or manner, goes beyondit. it It is a higher thanthepreviousone, because levelor modeof consciousness whichis not characterized the it is a positivemode of consciousness by specificinadequaciesof the previous one which led to the difficulties withit. Butit itselfthenturnsout to haveothershort-comings, associated and and whichresultin otherdifficulties; so it is eventually 'negated', yet anotherlevel of consciousness achieved.And so it goes, until finallya is

A COMMENTARY

13

And is level of consciousness reachedwhich has no such shortcomings. this level, almost by definition,is that of AbsoluteKnowledge. to Whatdoesthe negating, according Hegel,is not something altogether different fromconsciousness. Rather,it is an elementof the humanspirit featuresor determinate form at any whichis distinctfrom its particular whichHegel sometimes refersto givenpoint. It is its puresubject-aspect, it modesof as the 'pureego', to distinguish from the variousdeterminate to whichemerge,are subjected criticism,and are then left consciousness to behind.But it is important see that, for him, the 'pureego' is no thing and apartfrom variousexisting which has any real existenceseparately modesof consciousness. Botharesimplydifferent aspectsof the spirit- the one beingits determinate format anyparticular point,andthe otherbeing its abilityto criticiseand transcend such forms that are limitedand any incomplete. In short: each subsequentstage in the developmental sequenceHegel is describes viewedas the positiveresultof a specific,definitenegationof the stagepreceding The subsequent it. stage,as the resultof the negation of the previousstage,presupposes previousstage,and cannotemerge the until the previousstagehas beenreached. And, sincefor each stagethere which surfaceas it becomesfully explicit, are certainspecificdifficulties the stagewhichsucceedsit by negatingthose specificfeaturesof it giving rise to those difficulties, itselfhavea specificcharacter, will be its will and successor.In this way, each stageis necessarily necessary relatedto that which precedesit as its inevitableand indeed 'logical'outcome; and it inevitably givesriseto thatwhichfollowsit, by virtueof its own particular It shortcomings. is for this reasonthat Hegelholdsthat 'everymomentis a necessaryone', and that the sequencehe describesis the one which mustfollow. And it is in this sensethat spiritual development necessarily theterm'dialectical' to beunderstood, is whenHegelrefersto thisdevelopment generallyas one whichproceeds'dialectically'. This all sounds quitelogical; but what reasondoes Hegel give for his contentionthat this in fact is the way in whichthe humanspiritreallyhas In developed? the Preface,he only says that it is. It is in the body of the on Phenomenology, the other hand, in which he actually sets out the variousstagesof spiritual that development, he triesto showhow theyare actuallyrelatedto each otherin the mannerhe describes. And so the only of puttinghis theoryto the test is to ask oneself,as one readsthe way

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Has the described variousstages through Phenomenology: he accurately whichthe humanspirithas passedin the courseof its development? Does the historyof humanthoughtactuallyconstitutethe sort of development relatedto he describes? And, if so, are the variousstageshe distinguishes from each to the each otherin the way he says they are?Is the transition next necessary,in the sense that they could not have occurredin any other order,and that the humanspiritcould not have developedin any otherway? Theseare difficult questions;but thesearethe kindsof questions which must be answered,before a final verdicton the validityand successof in Hegel'senterprise thePhenomenology be given.And Hegelcertainly can wouldseemto bejustifiedin sayingthatone has no rightto passjudgment on himunlessone meetshimon his ownground;andthat,if one dismisses what he is sayingand tryingto do simplyout of hand,as absurdor ridicbut ulous, one is no true philosopher, ratherthe willingvictimof mere or prejudice, at the very least a captiveof unsubstantiated preconceived ideas.
VII

Havinglaid at least some of his cardson the table,Hegelat this point in the Preface turnsto a further statement whathe is andis not goingto be of "Whatis no longernecessary the pointat whichwe arehere at discussing: of takingup this movement[i.e.,the development spirit]is the Aufhebung of [supersession] [mere]existence.But what remainsand still requiresa is higher transformation the notion of and familiaritywith the forms [whichemergein the courseof this development]." 48) He thusis not (p. of going to deal with the questionof the initialemergence consciousness. This is, to be sure, a very importantmetaphysical issue, which he does but discusselsewhere; a discussionof it would obviouslybe out of place in a work entitledThePhenomenology Spirit.Instead,he is going to of in beginwith consciousness, its basicforms,and traceits development or transformation from these basic forms into higherones. And he also is withthe explication translation appropriate or into goingto be concerned terms or conceptsof a varietyof common notions (e.g., God, subject, object,Nature,society,etc.),whichemergein the courseof this development and are centralto variousstagesof it; and which, while spokenof are frequently, seldomproperlyunderstood.For, he observes,"Whatis

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familiaris not knownsimplybecauseit is familiar." 48) And this holds (p. no true in the case of philosophers less than in the case of ordinary men; for philosophers often as guiltyas anyoneelse of simplytakingover are themin the discussion of from ordinary expressions usageand employing philosophicalissues, without first subjectingthem to careful scrutiny. form of scrutiny does not Hegel maintains, however,that the requisite consist simply analyzing or breakingdown such notions into simple components(in the mannerof Hume), so that the familiarform of the notionis replaced a formin whichcertainsimplecomponents made by are of differentiating," Hegeltermsit, is all well and as explicit.This 'activity good; but it is not the end of the matter.(p. 50) For analysisof this sort and only leaves one with a set of representations (Vorstellungen); it is furthernecessary proceedto supplantthem with the appropriate to pure thoughts the mannerof Kant). But this is not the end of the matter (in either;for one must then introducein theirsteadthe appropriate philoIn sophicalor 'logical'concepts(Begriffe). this way, he says, "the pure thoughtsbecomeConceptsand [so] come to be what they are in truth." (p. 52) For then they no longer are regardedas fixed and opposed or unrelatedto each other, but ratherare graspedin their interconnection with each other.Thus Hegel speaksof "makingfixedthoughtsfluid",by themto the by "sublimating fixed,determinate thoughts" throughrelating appropriate Concepts.(p. 52) TheseConcepts,in turn,form "an organic whole." (p. 52) And it is only when the originalnotions have been replacedby conceptsof the appropriate sort, whichin turn are graspedin theirinterrelation with the other elementsof this 'organicwhole' (which is nothingotherthanthe Begrif proper,or 'systemor reason'),that one's task of analyzing notionswhichcome to lightat different the stagesin the of development the spiritis finished.
VIII

Thereis a seemingly curiouspassageabout 'death'whichoccursjust before this discussion(on p. 50), which becomes comprehensible only if in understood relationto it. In thispassage,the term'death'is to be understood metaphorically; the passageitself constitutesan obliquecritiand cism of mereunderstanding analyticalthinking,mere 'differentiating or activity', in terms of what it can and cannot accomplish,and what its

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in as resultsare.Hegelspeaksof 'thenegative' thispassage well,becausehe views the drawingof distinctionsas somethingessentiallynegative- a matterof sayingwhat thingsare not, and what is not the same as something else. And when he says: "Death ... is what is most terrible,and to the hold on to whatis deadrequires greateststrength" 50), he means (p. in that analyticdifferentiating itselfis negativeand destructive relation by to that whichis so analyzed;and that greatmentalpowersare necessary in orderfor one to be ableto go beyondit and see the underlying unityof the elements which are differentiated which as such are lifeless or 'dead', as opposed to the underlyingunity, which is the living reality. This theme is reminiscentof Hegel's discussion of 'The Need for Philosophy'in his essay on Fichte and Schelling.But here as in that essay, he goes on to affirmthe necessityof such 'differentiating activity' and 'death'.He says (revisingKaufmann's infelicitousrendering):
But the life of spirit is not one which shrinks from death and keeps itself from being defiled by devastation, but rather one which endures death and preservesitself in devastation.(p. 50)

consciousness Hegel furthersays that the trulyphilosophical "looks the negativein the face and abideswith it." (p. 50) In fact, it mustdo this in to orderultimately arriveat the full truthin all its structural complexity, as opposedto mereemptyabstract formulas,like 'A=A'. Thatis, it must engagein this sort of 'differentiating activity',and then go beyondit; and it cannotgo beyondit unlessand untilit has engagedin it. So Hegelsays: "Spiritgainsits truthonly by findingitself in absolutedismemberment" this 'dismemberment' (p. 50) - and by then transcending through the synthesizing activityof reason.This is essentially what Hegel had said in his essay on Fichteand Schelling, these words: in
[Reason]is not againstoppositionand limitationin general; for bifurcationis a necessary factor of life, which forms itself througheternalopposing; and totality is possible in the highest livelinessonly throughrestorationout of the highest separation.4

In the first three paragraphsof the next section of the Preface,which Kaufmanntitles "The forms of consciousnessand truth" (pp. 56-8), For Hegel gives a capsule summaryof the whole Phenomenology. this are reason,theseparagraphs of the greatestimportance; just for that but reason,I shallpass over them at present,and shallreturnto them at the conclusionof my commentary.

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Ix

that The nextissue he takesup is that of 'truth',and morespecifically, of and knowledgeand historical truth the difference betweenphilosophical truth and knowledge.His discussionof this issue is and mathematical rather long; but his point may be stated relativelybriefly. Historical knowledgeand truth, he maintains,pertain to the merely particular. philosophy history) of History(whichis not to be confusedwith Hegelian and with particular is concerned facts,in all theirdetailand specificity, as on they happento occur.Mathematics, the otherhand,does not dealwith of but and with the happenstance its occurrence; the merelyparticular, it is concernedwith nothing more than magnitude,quantity,and arin differradicalWhilehistoryand mathematics theserespects rangement. from each other, both, accordingto Hegel, thus deal with the merely ly -that is, with something other than essence; accidentalor inessential for bothmagnitude, and quantityand arrangement, the merelyparticular to in its specificdetail,are irrelevant the questionof the essentialnatures of things,and of realitygenerally. Philosophy,on the other hand, is held to be concernedpreciselywith essences- with the basic qualitativefeaturesof things, ratherthan with and merelyparticular feasuch accidentalmattersas their quantitative not tures."Philosophy," determinaHegelsays,"considers the inessential insofaras it is essential." 70) And this sets (p. tion, but the determination philosophyapartfrom historyand mathematics and also abovethem, in Hegel's mind; since on his view a disciplinewhich deals with the essentialis clearlyto be rankedabovedisciplines whichdealwith matters whichdo not touch upon the essential.And it follows that philosophical truth and knowledgeare more profoundand more significant than the sorts of truths and knowledgewhich may be attained in history and mathematics.5 It may be thoughtcuriousthat Hegeldoes not mentionnaturalscience in this discussion.Thereis a reasonfor this, however;and this reasonis that Hegel regardsnaturalscienceas a kind of lower-order philosophyorrather a kindof naiveinvestigation reality as of whichis not qualitatively different fromphilosophy, whichattainsits trueandproperformonly but when it becomes a part of philosophy as Hegel conceivesit. Natural sciencefor Hegel is a kind of thinkingabout reality which,as long as it

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remainsmerelyempirical, incapableof yieldinggenuineknowledgeof is reality,and of penetrating the essential to natures things;butit makesa of start in that direction,and is ultimatelytransformed into a mode of consciousnesswhich does at least yield Absolute Knowledge.Scientific knowledge which is based upon mere empiricalinvestigationhas its which shortcomings; they are not those of historyand mathematics, but of renderthe latterincapableever of leadingto the attainment Absolute nor Knowledge.For scienceis not concernedmerelywith magnitude, is it concernedwith the meredescription particular of facts as they occur. withuniversals, is philosophy- thatis, withthe as Rather,it is concerned naturesof generaltypes of things, and the generallaws which apply to them- even if it cannot attaintrue knowledgeof them, until it is transformedinto Hegelian'philosophyof nature'.
x

WhileHegel stressesthat the concernof philosophyis with the essential, it ratherthan with mere magnitudeand particularity, is importantto observethat he does not mean to say that existenceis of no concernto philosophy.To be sure,it is of no concernto thatpart of Hegelianphilosophywhichdealswith the Begriffor 'systemof reason'as it is in itse6fis that is, to philosophical 'Logic'.But existence of greatconcernto those partsof Hegelianphilosophywhichdeal with Natureand the social and intellectual world;andit is of greatconcernto Hegelin thePhenomenology. For all of these parts of Hegelianphilosophyare concernedwith essencesas they come to attainreal existence. is Indeed,the whole of the Phenomenology devotedto an examination of the different And for modesor levelsof actuallyexistingconsciousness. Hegel,it wouldmakeno senseif someonewereto say: Nevermindabout the variousmodesor levelsof consciousness; us talk about whatexists let moregenerally. whatexists,for Hegel,is precisely For consciousness its in variousforms,and nothingmore. He regardsit as meaningless speak to of anythingelse - such as Kantian'thing-in-themselves'as existing;for he regards as meaningless speakof themat all. Sincethe wholeof the it to is Phenomenology devotedto an analysisof the variousmodesof the only thing whichfor Hegel may properlybe said to exist at all, therefore,he would regardit as very odd indeed- and certainlyas wrong- if anyone

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wereto accusehim of beingconcerned only withessences,and of ignoring existence. So whileHegeldoes regardexistingparticulars 'evanescent', says: as he "Theevanescent must ... be considered essential." 70) This is another (p. way of sayingthatit is crucial,on his view,thatessencesshouldattainthe formof realexistence. Existence itsparticularity evanescent, in is transient, and ephemeral;but existenceas such is indispensibleand 'essential'if spiritis to becomesomethingactual.So Hegel says: "The appearance is the comingto be and passingawaythat whichitself does not come to be or pass away;it ... constitutesthe actualityand the movementof the life of thetruth."(p. 70)Theparticulars whichachieve statusof appearance the or explicitexistenceare all ephemeral, are of no essentialimportance and as particulars; that thereshouldbe such particulars in the form of but actual conscious events- is necessaryin order for spirit to achieve actuality.So Hegelcharacterizes spiritat theconclusionof its development in termsof both its essentialcontentand existence:"Its existenceis knowledge of itself even as this knowledgeis just as immediately existence." (p. 72) Thereis a famous passagein this sectionof the Prefacewhichat first glance seems both mysteriousand - insofaras it is not completelymysterious- ratherself-contradictory; sensemay be madeof it, if only it but is viewedin the light of what has just been said. The passageis:
The true is thus the bacchanalianwhirl in which no memberis not drunken;and because each, as soon as it detaches itself, dissolvesimmediately the whirl is just as much transparentand simple repose. (p. 70)

In this passage,Hegel is suggestingthat 'the true' may be viewedboth as a 'bacchanalian whirl' of appearingand disappearing elements,and as somethingin a state of 'transparent simplerepose',just because and 'the true' as somethingactualhas two aspects:the aspect of substance, the Begrif, whichis timelessand unchanging, is therefore 'transand in parent and simple repose'; and the aspect of existencein the form of 'appearance' consciousevents(whichis the work of its dynamic,selfor realizing subject-element), which have the charactercollectivelyof a 'bacchanalian whirl'. The two aspects are very different;but both are essential,according Hegel,if 'the true'- or the Absolute,or Spirit- is to to be somethingactual. So also he says: "The individualforms of the spiritendureno morethan determinate thoughtsdo; yet they arejust as

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much positiveand necessarymomentsas they are negativeand evanescent." (p. 70) in It may be observed passingthat this view of the statusof particulars as for has importantimplications us and our significance existingindividuals. For it follows that as particularindividualswe have no essential significance,since we are merely transcientand ephemeral,and- qua particular merelyaccidental.But spiritis somethingthat exists only in the form of particularity only, that is to say, in the form of particular like ourselves;and so particularindividuals individualconsciousnesses like ourselvesare essential to the actualizationof 'the true' or spirit. In short:it is in virtueof the fact - and only in virtueof the fact - thatwe that of areexplicitmanifestations variousgeneralmodesof consciousness, and we have essentialor ultimatesignificance; the higherthe modes of is. we consciousness manifest,the greaterour ultimatesignificance But we as uniqueand individualpersonalities, have no such ultimatesignifiabout ourselvesmattersto us; but cance. What is uniqueand particular and we are ephemeral, when we are gone, what we have been as unique The will individuals have no enduringsignificance. details and particular has beenseen,Hegel but of ourlivesmaybe of interestto the historian; as does not regardhistoricalknowledgeas knowledgeof the essential.Our lives do really count for something- but only for insofar as we are, in and of a mannerof speaking,torch-bearers consciousness, in particular of insofar as we are torch-bearers the highest forms of consciousness.6
XI

philosophito But I digress.Returning the Preface:havingcharacterized cal as opposed to historicaland mathematicaltruth and knowledge, method,which Hegelturnsto the questionof the natureof philosophical is to yield such truthand knowledge.But it seemsto him that little more reallyneeds to be said about it, since,in his words:
... the concept of this method is implicitin what has been said, and its real exposition belongsto the Logic, or ratherconstitutesthe Logic. For the methodis nothingelse than the edifice of the whole, constructedin its pure essence. (p. 72)

Philosophicalmethod, he contends,has neitherthe 'looser gait of connor nor versationalarguments', the 'stiffergait' of mathematics, that of facts, those so-calleddisciplineswhich merelyrecordvariousparticular

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and so are largely superficial. Rather,it consists in following out 'the necessityof the Concept'- thatis, of the Begriff, systemof reason,as it or unfolds both within itself (in philosophical'Logic')and in the realmof appearance the Phenomenology). 74) (in (p. But Hegel is very muchconcernedthat it shouldnot be confusedwith mere'schematizing and formalism'; so, in the followingsection,he returns to his criticismof Schelling again, without mentioninghim by name. His criticism is essentiallythe same as that which he levels against Schelling's versionof speculative philosophyearlierin the Preface.The only differenceis that here he goes on at greater length, ridiculing Schellingmercilessly. main point once againis that Schellingsimply His imposed an empty, abstract,formal schematismon phenomenain a merelysuperficial way, insteadof bringto light the underlying, essential featuresand necessaryrelationsof these phenomena,which consist of those aspectsof the Begrif or systemof reasonreflected them.Schelling in did not, in otherwords,'enterinto the immanentcontentof the matter', as 'scientific And it is only by doing this, Hegel knowledge... demands'. argues,that we "confrontand expressits inner necessity',and thereby attaingenuinephilosophical knowledgeand truth.(p. 80)
XII

Hegelthenbreaksoff his criticism Schelling, resumes presentaof and the tion of his own position.And here he revealsthe very heart of it, committinghimselfexplicitlyto that form of idealismwhich he developsat much greaterlengthin this Logic and Encyclopedia. says: He
By its qualityan existenceis differentfrom another .... But throughthis it is essentially thought.- In this the fact is comprehended that being is thinking;and this includesthe insight ... of the identity of thinkingand being. (p. 82)

In other words: when we eliminate everything inessential (i.e., considerations of magnitude and quantity and of mere particularity), we are left with nothing but general qualities - and, of course, thinking activity.

But these generalqualitiesare not things,which have any real existence independentlyof thinking activity or consciousness.Rather, they are only so many differentthought-forms concepts.We thus find that at or
bottom, reality consists solely of the system of these thought-forms or

concepts, insofar as they are actually thought in thinking activity or

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consciousness.'Being', therefore,is to be conceivedin terms of these thought-forms, the one hand, and thinkingactivityor consciousness, on on the other. And this is in effect simply to restatethe claim that the Absolute or ultimateprincipleof realityis both substance(the Begriff) and subject- and nothing more. To say that thinking and being are identical, as Hegel does here, is simply to say that at bottom, what there is is simply thought as content (the thought-forms which constitute the Begriff) and thought as subject (thinking activity or consciousness). If it wereto be objected that Hegelhasleft out existingthings,he would reply that it is meaningless speak of them except in terms of actual to contents of consciousness;and that he has made referenceto both consciousness its possiblecontentsin his statementof what thereis. and The form of existence,he holds, is suppliednot by anythingexternalto but itself. Existenceis inconceivconsciousness, ratherby consciousness ableexceptin termsof eventsof consciousness. associateexistence To with is anythinglike Kantianthings-in-themselves to associateit with something the very notion of whichis unnecessary, unwarranted, incoherent, and thereforeinadmissible.There is no justification,either from experienceor from a priori reasoning,for the extensionof the notion of existence something to lyingoutsideof consciousness altogether. Eliminate consciousness,and one can only legitimatelyspeak of the system of reason or the Begrif in itself, which as such lacks existence.In short:
"Existence", Hegel says, "is ... determinate thought". (p. 84) And he

goes on to say that it is meaningfulto speak of Being only in terms of 'its own inwardness' in terms of 'its becoming'(p. 84) - the former and referringto the Begriff, and the latterto its actualization the form of in the variousmodes and states of existingconsciousness. Hegel is simplyrestatingthe point that the Absoluteor Spiritis both substance self-realizing and subject,whenhe goes on to say: "thenous...
is the substance, [which] on account of its ... self-identity ... appears

firmand enduring.But this self-identity also negativity;thereforethis is firmexistencepassesover into its dissolution" that is, into a processof becomingsomethingactual.(p. 84) Hegel speaksof its 'dissolution' here becauseit is only at the end of this processthat it is self-identical once again. For at the beginningof this process,and all the way throughit until it is finally completed,its subject-aspect in the form of existing

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but consciousness is not identicalwith its substance-aspect, ratheris only a partialand imperfectapprehension it. And when Hegel says, of "reasonableness a becoming,and as such becomingit is rationality", is (p. 84) his point is simply that rationalitycan come to exist explicitly only by that whichexists- i.e., consciousness passingthrougha process of development;for the merelyexistent as such, in its simplestforms, exhibitslittle or no rationality.Since the developmentof existingconsciousness guidedby the systemof reasonwhichis its implicitessential is nature,however,the result of the processis existencethat exhibitscomplete rationality. So Hegel contendsthat this processis characterized 'logicalnecesby sity'; for it is in "the natureof beings",he says, "to be theirconceptin theirbeing"(p. 84) - that is, to move towarda state in whichtheirexistence will conformto their essence,as this is determined the Begriff by - which is somethingrational,and which indeed is the measureof rationality.And he is simplyrestatingthis point in anotherway when he goes on to say, "Thisalone is the rationaland the rhythmof the organic whole."- And it shouldbe observedthat Hegelis heregivinga definition of the notion of 'logical necessity',as it appliesto the processthrough whichspiritis actualized. basicnotion hereis 'the rational',whichis The to be understood the senseof the Begrif; and Hegelis defining'logical in necessity'in terms of it. The 'logical necessity'of the developmental processis the necessitywith whichthat which exists(i.e., consciousness) develops through a necessarysequence of stages in the direction of conformityto the rational(or the Begriff). This process, Hegel says, "is in itself the transitioninto formalism" (p. 86) - i.e., the transformation existenceinto a form which correof the of If spondsto or reflects formalstructure the Begriff. the claimHegel is makinghereis a questionable it is at leastnot the claimthat'logical one, necessity' as construed ordinary by logicians- alonerenders transition a in a processrational.Ratherit is the claimthatexistence impelledby an is internalprinciplein the directionof conformitywith essence,with the Begrif. And this may be a questionable claim,thoughmuchless so than the other.And it shouldbe observedthat it is quitereasonable Hegel of to makeit, givenhis view that existenceand essenceareultimately simply differentaspectsof one and the same thing- namely,spirit,or the Absolute.

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XIII

In the next part of the Preface,Hegel turns to what he considersthe properand improperways of viewingphilosophicalassertions,and the concerned He consequencesof viewingthem improperly. is particularly with what he terms"the conflictbetweenthe form of a propositionand the unity of the Conceptthat destroysit." (p. 94) He suggeststhat the form of propositions has misled philosophersinto subject-predicate view takinga substratum-attribute of things,and therebyinto regarding "a as the grammatical-subject-termdesignating subjectat restthatcarries unmoved."(p. 92) He arguesagainstthis view,and contends its attributes to thinkingfrom subjection philosophical that it is necessary emancipate substrata for to grammar; he holdsthatin fact thereareno suchenduring to which variousattributesmerelyadhere.Rather,as has alreadybeen seen, he contendsthat thereis only consciousness whichis no material whichprovideit withcontent. substratum andthevariousthought-forms of withthe properinterpretation a certain concerned Hegelis especially philosophy- such as class of propositions:namely,those of speculative 'spiritis subjectand substance'.And his main point is that one should not be misled by the form of such a propositioninto thinkingthat (to 'spirit'is some thingwhichhas the take the exampleunderconsideration) of is Rather,the proposition properly and attributes 'subject' 'substance'. understoodonly if it is seen that the content of the expression'spirit'is and that the subjectof such a exhaustedthroughthese specifications; nothingover and abovewhat the variousspecipropositionis essentially ficationof it collectively convey,excepttheirunity.Thisis partof whathe has in mind when he speaks of 'the identity of subjectand predicate'. Thereis a sense of 'subject'and of 'predicate', however,in which he even while constitutinga suggeststhat they are still to be distinguished, is fundamental unity.Thisis the sensein whichthe 'subject' not conceived or denoted by the grammatical as a materialsubstratum thing-in-itself subject, but rather as the 'knowing [or conscious] ego', or explicitly is And existingspirit-as-subject. it is the sensein whichthe 'predicate' not conceivedas a particular thingof attribute set of attributes a material or in-itself,but ratheras the whole or somepartof thatcomplexof thoughtwith forms which suppliesthe 'knowingego' or spirit-as-subject definite content- i.e., spirit-as-substance.

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are and It is in this way, Hegelcontends,that 'subject' 'predicate' truly to be conceived.For, as he has alreadyargued,the philosophical analysis of all possibleproperpredicatesreducesthem to one or anotherof the conceptswhichcollectively makeup the Begriffor systemof reason.And, as he also hasalready and hereagain,philosophical argued, argues analysis also shows that the notion of the subjectof predicationas a material substratumor thing-in-itselfis indefensibleand incoherent;with the consequencethat "this subjectis replacedby the knowing ego which and connectsthe predicates becomes[itself]the subject thatholdsthem"i.e., that supportsand unitesthem.(p. 94) Any otherway of viewingthat whichpredicates denoteis heldto be naiveandto indicatethatphilosophical analysishas not yet been carriedfar enough.And any "realist" interpretationof thatwhichsupports unitesvariouscollectionsof qualities and denotedby predicatesis held to constitutea naive and erroneousview, resultingfrom one's havingbeen misledby the subject-predicate of form
linguistic propositions.

If 'subject'and 'predicate'are understoodas 'spirit-as-subject' and 'spirit-as-substance'then, to repeat,Hegel suggeststhat, while thereis an 'identityof subjectand predicate',there is also a distinctionto be
drawn between them. He says: '... the identity of subject and predicate is not meant to destroy the difference between them ...; rather, their unity

is meantto emergeas a harmony." 94) The point is simplyone which (p. shouldbe quitefamiliarby now: namely,that spiritor the Absoluteis to be conceivedboth as subjectand as substance,and that the failureto recognizethat it has these two aspectshas far-reaching fatal philoand sophical consequences;but that while these two aspects must be distinguished,and while, in the course of its development,the concretely existingspirit-as-subject and does fail to conformadequately the can to natureof spirit-as-substance, two arestillbothmerelydifferent the aspects of one and the same ultimateprinciple.They are both 'spirit';only one consistsof its essentialstructure, while the otherconsistsof the form in whichits essentialstructure comes to be actualized.
XIV

Of the remaining pagesof thePreface, littleneedbe said;for in themHegel devoteshimselfprimarily the further to development pointswhichhave of

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alreadybeen discussed(e.g.,theneed to subjectexpressions 'God' to like philosophicalanalysis,the fact that the contentof grammatical-subjecttermsin philosophical is propositions exhaustedby the predicates applicable to them, the distinctionbetweengenuine philosophyand philosophizingand othermodesof thinking,and the fact thatthereis 'no royal road to knowledge'.) Onefinalpoint is worthmentioning, however;and that is containedin Hegel'swarningagainsttryingto understand evaluateany proposiand tion of speculative philosophysimplyby itselfin isolationfromall others. Any such proposition,he says (p. 98), can be properlyunderstoodonly in the contextof the speculative systemas a whole;for by itselfit is bound to be eithervacuousor one-sided.This followsfromhis generalposition, stated near the beginningof the Preface,that "The true form in which truthexistscan only be the scientific systemof it." (p. 12) This is a statement in part about the conditionsunderwhich 'the truth'or the Begriff achievestrueexistenceor actuality;but becausephilosophical knowledge is knowledge 'thetruth'so understood, statement has the sense of this also that genuine philosophicalknowledgemust take the same form as its object- namely,the form of 'scientific system". More concretelystated, the point is that for Hegel, philosophical knowledge musttake the formof an all-embracing system,and cannotbe achievedthroughisolated bits and pieces of analysis.And, since philosophicaltruthis to be found only in such a systemas an inter-connected whole,in whichthe appropriateness eachpartmaybe understood of only in termsof its relationsto all the others,it follows that any proposition whichis anything thana completeand exhaustive less specification the of whole system- as all conceivablepropositions of manageablelength are- will sufferfrom one of two faults.They will eithercharacterize the whole, but in too generala way to indicateits specificcontent- e.g., 'the absoluteend and aimof the worldis freedomactualized', 'science the or is actuality of spirit', or 'spirit is substance and subject'; or they will characterize somepartor aspectof the wholein a moredeterminate way, but in a way which is one-sidedor which otherwiseleaves a great deal unsaid- e.g., 'the state is spirit objectified', 'existenceis determinate or thought',or 'the actualis the sameas its Concept'.Bothsortsof speculative propositionsleave a good deal to be desired;and that which they leave to be desiredcan be suppliedonly by viewingthemin relationto the

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restof the systemof speculative philosophyof whichtheyarea part.And, whateverthe merit of this position may be as a generalthesis about philosophicalknowledge(whichmay be considerable), is essentialto it keepit in mindwhenreadingHegel;for his systemis meantto be viewed as a whole, and his variousparticular assertions only be understood can properlyas partsof this whole. Still,it wouldnot seemto me to followthateverything Hegelhas to say about the manyissues he discusseseitherstandsor falls with his system as a whole. For it seems to me that, even if one ultimatelyrejectshis one metaphysics, can still gain a great deal of insightinto such matters as the natureof social institutions,the developmentof personality,the relation between human freedom and social institutions,and the dependence of self-consciousness upon inter-personalinteraction,from readingwhathe has to say aboutthem.It mayruncounterto the spiritof Hegelianphilosophyto readHegelwith a view to discovering various the particular insightsit contains;but he can be readin this way, with much profit.And it is betterto readhim in this way, than not to readhim and take him seriouslyat all becauseone findshis metaphysics unacceptable.
xv

In conclusion,I shallturnto a briefconsideration the firstparagraphs of of the section of the Prefacewhich Kaufmannentitles "The forms of consciousnessand truth"(pp. 56-8), which, as I have suggestedabove, contain a capsulesummaryof the whole development presentedin the body of the Phenomenology. What Hegel says hereis this. Spiritexists in the form of consciousness. Consciousnesscontains two elements: an objective element and a subjectiveelement. That is, consciousnessis alwaysconsciousnessof something it alwayshas some objectbeforeit; and this objectis alwaysthe objectof some sort of thought-process, or thinkingactivity(and existsonly in relationto it). It is throughthe interaction of conscious activity and the objects of this activity that spirit developsand realizesitself, passingfrom simplerformsof consciousness and naiveways of conceivingthe natureof its objects,to higherformsof consciousnessand more sophisticatedways of conceivingits objects. Spirit thereforeexists as a variety of forms of consciousness, some of whichdevelopmentally succeedothers,andall of whichmaybe relatedto

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the others in a developmental sequence.The study of actual, existing spiritis thus the studyof thesedifferent formsof consciousness, themin selvesandas theyrelateto eachother.And in sucha study,the 'substance' or structural contentof spiritis dealtwith, not as it is simplyin itself,but ratheras it gradually comesto be revealed known,in the form of the and successionof types of experienced objectsof the variousforms of consciousnessin the developmental sequence. Consciousness have knowledgeonly of that whichis an objectfor can it - only of 'whatlies in its experience'; it surelycouldhaveno knowlfor edgeof something whichwasnotan objectfor it. But(although does not it this recognize to be the caseuntilit reachesthe end of its development) its objectis neveranythingotherthanthe 'substance' structual or contentof spirit- whichis nothingotherthan its own substantial content.Thus its object,in otherwords,is alwaysonly its self; but in its naiveand simpler forms,it fails to see this, and regardsits objectsas somethingotherthan itself. Its objectsare somethingother than itself-qua-subject thinking or activity;fortheyareitself-qua-substance. untilit achieves adequate And an knowledgeof its own nature, as 'spirit' which is both substanceand subject,it conceivesitself only as subject. This process, in which spirit assumesthe double form of conscious subjectand objectof consciousness, in whichthe objectof consciousand ness is firstregarded something'other'thanconsciousness, then is as and recognized consciousness beingmerelyits own substantial by as naturein objectified form, is the processthroughwhichspiritbecomesactualand self-conscious. And this processis simply experience, which is initially naive and then is gradually transformed into genuineknowledge.In the simplest forms of experience,there is no explicit distinctionbetween consciousnessand its objects;the formeris completelyabsorbedin the latter.Withthe development a degreeof self-consciousness greater of and sophistication, subjectand objectare distinguished, are regarded but as radically different independent eachother.Finally,theirunderlying and of unity and interdependence recognized.This developmentmight be are characterized a processin whicha stage of immediate as unity givesway to a stage of 'separated opposites',whichin turngives way to a stage of higher,'mediated' unity.It is in thesetermsthat Hegelcharacterizes in it his early writings.Or it might be characterized as he characterizes it here- as a process in which a stage of unity gives way to a stage of

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or 'estrangement' 'alienation',which then gives way to a final stage in is or which this 'estrangement' 'alienation' overcome. of In the middlestage,thereis whatHegeltermsa 'non-identity' subject and object,or of 'ego' and 'substance'.As 'non-identical', they are both defective;for each is what it ought to be only whenit is at one with the which is something'negative'in itself, is other. But this 'non-identity', since this very 'negative'element also somethingof positivesignificance, is experiencedas a defect or deficiency,and so provides the dynamic impetus which drives the developmentonward, until a form of conis sciousnessis attainedin which this 'non-identity' seen not to be abwhich is relativeto an underlying solute, but rathermerelya difference identityor unity. ceasesto regard Whenthis point is reached,the 'ego' or consciousness external it, whichimpinges to its objectas something uponit fromwithout. and so is consciousof itself It recognizes objectas its own substance, its both as subjectand as substance.And, since it is somethingactually existing,and since it existsin the form of 'spiritknowingitself as spirit' - that is, as both subjectand substance it is spirit'in-and-for-itself'. In it, spirit has become somethingfully actual, or completelyand selfconsciously realized. Thus 'spirit has made its existence equal to its essence'.The Begriffis no longer mere abstractessence;it has come to life. life, and more than that, to self-conscious of And, Hegel says, "Withthis the phenomenology the spiritis concluded." nowspiritexistsin theformof AbsoluteKnowledge knowlFor both of its own essentialcontent, and of the whole course of its edge development throughthe variousforms of explicitlyexistingconsciousness. The systematic expositionof the formeris the propertask of philosophical'Logic';whilethe sequential expositionof the latteris the proper task of a Phenomenologyof Spirit.These, taken together,contain the whole of AbsoluteKnowledge. And evenan omniscient deitycouldknow nothingmore. In fact, Hegel implies,in the last pages of the Phenomenology itself, - insofaras it is legitimate that God philosophically speakof 'God' at to all - is nothingother than 'spiritknowingitself as spirit',as this notion has been developedin the precedingdiscussion.God's natureis nothing other than the Begriff,as this is set forth in philosophicalLogic. And God's life is nothing other than existingconsciousness, which develops

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from the simplestforms of consciousnessto its highestform, Absolute Knowledge.It is with this thoughtthat Hegelconcludesthe Phenomenolof ogy, saying that philosophicalLogic and the Phenomenology Spirit together.
... form the recollectionand the Golgotha of Absolute Spirit;the actuality,truth, and certaintyof its throne, without which it would be someting lifeless and empty. Only 'from the cup of this realm of spiritualforms does its infinityfoam forth for it.'7

With these words, which are the last lines of Hegel'sPhenomenology, on I shallconcludemy commentary his Prefaceto it. And to repeatwhat to verydifficult understand; his is I saidat the beginning: Preface certainly the it, butif one cancometo understand one understands heartof Hegel's philosophy- even if not the whole body of it, to which, afterall, this is only a 'Preface'. of University Illinois(Urbana-Champaign)
NOTES
1 Hegel: Texts and Commentary, transl. and ed. by Walter Kaufmann, Doubleday

Anchor, Garden City, N.Y., 1966. All citations from the Prefacein this commentary are from Kaufmann'stranslation;and all page referencesrefer to the Anchor edition of it. In some cases, however,I have slightly modifiedKaufmann'srenderings. 2 Hegel, Differenzdes Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systemsder Philosophie,Felix Meiner,Hamburg,1962, pp. 12-17. 3 This point will be discussedfurtherbelow. 4 Op. cit. pp. 13-14. 5 The Phenomenologyof Spiritis distinguished from merehistory,accordingto Hegel, by virtue of the fact that it is concernednot with particular historicalfacts, but rather with what might be termedthe 'logical development'of the humanspiritwhich underlies - and is often virtually obscured by - the particularfacts of history. It is thus concernedwith those featuresof the existentialdevelopment spiritwhichare essential of and necessaryto that development, ratherthan with its merelyparticular accidental and features- though it certainlywould seem that Hegel does not alwayskeep withinthese limits in the Phenomenology; he brings in a great deal of materialwhich cannot for plausibly be consideredto relate solely to the necessaryand essential, even by one convincedthat the progressionof stages of spiritualdevelopmenthe describesconstitutes a necessarysequence. 6 This may seem to be a coldly impersonal estimationof the value of humanlife and of human individuals.But at least it is far from nihilistic;it does assign a value to our lives - even if it is not the valuewhich2000yearsof Christianity taughtus to believe has the human individualhas. And one might ask oneself: if one abandonsthe Christian belief in the existenceof a personalGod who endowseach individualwith an immortal soul of infiniteworth, how would one go aboutjustifyingthe attributionof any greater to ultimatesignificance ourselvesthanthat whichHegelattributes us? And one might to

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also ask oneself: if one rejectsHegel'sview of the matteraltogether- his whole metaphysics- as well the traditionalChristianone, what sort of ultimate significance if any - can onejustify assigningto humanlife and the humanindividual? 7 My translation. The term'God', to be sure,is not usedhere;but that is becauseHegel is now writing from the standpointof Absolute Knowledge,rather than of religious symbolization- and so speaks of 'Absolute Spirit'instead. It is interestingto reflect on Hegel's use of the term 'Golgotha' in this passage. At first glance, it seems quite bizarre;but upon reflection,it turns out to be a strikingly appropriateimage. The Logic and the Phenomenologyof Spirit may be comparedto Golgotha, in that they, like it, containnothing but skeletalbones and skulls,until they are animated by the presence of living spirit or consciousness.Again: Hegel's last words upon the completionof the Phenomenologyare in effect the same as Jesus'last words on Golgotha: "it is finished".But in the formercase as in the latter, what is finishedis not life itself, but ratheronly merelyhumanlife, only the developmentof the human spiritas it rises from lowly originsto maturityand perfection.The resultis not really death at all; rather,it is the beginningof eternal life, in which the agonies of developmentare left behind,and the humanspiritentersinto that 'divine'life in which it is at one with God (Absolute Spirit) and lives 'the life of God' (Absolute Spirit) - which 'life' is simply 'God knowing himself as God', i.e., spirit knowing itself as spirit, i.e., Absolute Knowledge.