The Kansei Reforms-Success or Failure? Author(s): Isao Soranaka Source: Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 33, No.

2 (Summer, 1978), pp. 151-164 Published by: Sophia University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2384123 . Accessed: 14/05/2011 15:45
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The lKansei Reforms Success or Failure?

than his colorfulpredefromWesternscholars.He has seemed less significant cessor Tanuma Okitsugu.2 This general lack of interestin Sadanobu resulted from a Western historical preoccupation with Japan's so-called 'miraculous' of modernization.John W. Hall's treatmentof Tanuma as a 'forerunner modern Japan' representsthis dominant historiographicalinclination.3 Recently, however, there has been increased interest in Sadanobu's career, presents the firstfull-length Bureaucrat, and Herman Ooms's book, Charismatic This biographical account reveals the study of Sadanobu to appear in English.4 man as a significanthistorical figure. The author characterizes Sadanobu as a pragmatic reformerand rejects the traditional view of him as a conservative feudal figure-a view still currentamong some historianswho write textbooks.5 Ooms's work on Sadanobu deserves positive appraisal in that it raises the new and stimulatingissue of the success or failure of the Kansei Reforms (1787-93). But Ooms fallsshortofprovidinga convincingexplanation in his book. He simply states, without adequate substantiation,that Sadanobu 'enabled the Bakufu to survivea crisis,which, at some point, threatenedto destroyit . . . solved financial and laid solid foundationforan economic recoverythat continued for difficulties decades. He unambiguously reasserted Bakufu authority and, most important, which was in serious and gave new vigor to its political value system, reformulated he took office.'6In part thisview followsfromOoms's biographical jeopardy when objective to revise Sadanobu's portrait. My question is this: were the Kansei
is Assistant Professorin the Department of History, The Universityof WesternOntario. He wishes to acknowledge William B. Hauser his gratitudeto Professors and Tetsuo Najita for their kind help and advice. ' **Zro,21, 1758-1829. 2 1719-88. 'RM, 3 John W. Hall, TanumaOkitsugu, 1719of 1788: Forerunner ModernJapan, Harvard U.P., 1955.
THE AUTHOR
4 Herman Ooms, Charismatic Bureaucrat: A Political Biography of Matsudaira Sadanobu,

by ISAO SORANAKA
consideration serious N the past MatsudairaSadanobu' has failedto attract

1963. Berkeley, of University California, tation, 5 For example, Mikiso Hane, Japan: A & Clark Scribners Sons, 1972, Survey, Historical
p. 219. 6 Ooms, pp. 152-3.

noted is Robert L. Backus, Matsudaira Sadanobu unpublished disseras a Moralist and Litterateur,

of University Chicago Press, 1975. Also to be

152

Monumenta Nipponica, XXXIII, 2

Reformstrulysuccessful? If they were, why was the Bakufu forced to carry out similar reforms with disastrousresultsin the 1840s and yet another in the following decade? Furthermore,did not these repeated attemptsat reform illustratethe Bakufu's inability to regenerate itselfat the crucial periods? The most obvious weakness inherentin Ooms's workis that he moves froma favorableimpressionofSadanobu to a favorable impressionof the Kansei Reforms.His accompanying assumption that the Bakuhan system was 'stillvital and flexible'7in the late eighteenth century also needs to be criticallyexamined. The crux of this question about the success or failure of the Kansei Reforms concerns the economy since Sadanobu recognized the vital importance of this sector.His commercial policies were primarilyintended to controlhigh prices,yet in this aim Sadanobu was frustrated. While he mighthave been able to improve the Bakufu'spolitical and economic power to some degree,he was unable to restore the systemto anythinglike a healthy condition.8 The fundamental causes of the Bakufu's economic impotence lay below the perceived surface; only the outward symptoms of the disease were treated. Sadanobu's effortwas determined and intelligible,but it was not soon enough or deep enough to rectify economically an entrenchedsociety along Bakufu lines. During much of the 1780s the Bakufu was faced with serious socio-economic problems which tended to undermineits political authority.These crises came in many forms,such as the persistenceof the fiscal crises for the Bakufu, the socioeconomic alienation ofthe samurai and, above all, the frequent urban and agrarian revoltswhich characterized that decade of the eighteenthcentury. Social and economic disorder persistedbecause the existing agrarian economy proved vulnerable to the natural disasters which mercilesslyhit Japan during thisperiod, especiallyin 1783, 1785 and 1787. Crop failures theseyearsdestroyed in any equilibrium between supply and demand. This disruptionin turn brought about acute shortagesin urban centersand a consequent spiral of pricesin Osaka, Edo and other areas. For example, the price of rice at the wholesale marketin Osaka reached a record high in June of 1787, ranging from181 to 187 monme of silverper koku,9 roughlythreetimesthe usual price. The prices of other commod7 Ibid., p. 83.

One might argue that Sadanobu was able to improve the Bakufu's fiscal solvency of through successful the enforcement programs which resultedin an increaseof gold reserves in the Bakufu'scoffers. But this argumentis of less convincing since the recovery financial solvency provedonlytemporary. show that For example, available statistics the Bakufuhad 2,147,200ryo of gold on hand in 1785. But its total reservesdecreased to only 817,200 ryo over the next two years;
8

they increased slightlyto 1,079,700 ryo in 1798,but again shrankto 723,800ryiby 1816. For further information, Takeuchi Makoto see MMpki, 'Bakufu Keizai no Henbi to Kin'yu KeizaishiTaikei J3 * T6ky6Daigaku Shuppankai,1965,vol. 4. 9 Nakazawa Benjiro@ M4 ]3, Nihon Beika Hendishi ; Kashiwa Shob6, 1965, Fi p. 238.
Seisaku no Tenkai' 4V#QAi*)OD 9EV:Df, in Furushima Toshio , Rf ed., Nihon

SORANAKA:

The Kansei Reforms

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ities such as rapeseed oil," salt, bean paste, bean cake, paper, cotton, and dried foods also rose proportionally." durMatsudaira Sadanobu came to prominencein the Bakufu's administration out his famous Kansei Reforms ing thisperiod of socio-economic crisisand carried we directedat theirsolution.Judgingfromhis writings, can discernthat he understood some of the causes of the economic problems. His understandingof the problem of inflationis reflectedin his commentaryon prices,12 probably writtenin 1789. In this essay Sadanobu revealed his concern about the recentrise in prices ideas about the source ofinflation.He maintained that there and expresseddefinite were three primaryfactors.First, he realized that therewas an acute shortage of goods and servicesin Edo. Second, price increases seemed to be aggravated by a decline in the relative value of metals (gold, silver and copper) and regional disparitiesin thevalue ofcertainmetals (gold and silver),especiallybetween Osaka and Edo. Lastly, Sadanobu with his austere Neo-Confucian concepts believed that the populace was consuming too much.'3 This so-called 'extravagance of the people' he singled out as the most important cause of inflation,yet from our perspectivethis reason seems the least correct aspect of his diagnosis. Sadanobu's commercial (price) policy followedfromthese views. Soon afterhe shuza'4 inJune 1787, he introduced and enforceda strict as assumed his office roYjiu and frugalityto discourage excessive consumption, especially of policy of thrift luxury goods. Thus he imposed a severe reduction of the Bakufu adminstrative expenditures by placing a tight control on spending, while he also ordered a drastic cut in the expenditures at the Shogunal Palace.'5 His own austere life, Yoshimune, set an example forBakufu officials patterned afterhis grandfather, and retainersin Edo. Sadanobu also attempted to extend his own personal frugalityto society in general througha seriesof sumptuarylaws designed to discourage certain inclinaissued against tionsofsociety.Between 1787 and 1793 ordinanceswere continuously streetprostitution(although some authorized brothels like Yoshiwara survived), against gambling, against mixed bathing, against gaudy hairstyles,and against the publication of obscene books.'7 While seekingto correctpublic morals, which to seemed to Bakufuofficials have declined, Sadanobu also attemptedto discourage excessive consumption. His Neo-Confucian moralism thus complemented his
p. 928. natane aburaXA 11 Kitajima Masamoto 4LWE:IE,Bakuhansei 16 @7w 1684-1 75 1. 17 Zoku Tokugawa ZohoKokushi Jikki(Shintei 18), no Kumonugfiij1 1:r (Nihonno Rekishi, Kokushi Taikei)4R 2 0JII5f,id Chuo K6ronsha, 1965,p. 26. 12 Bukka-ron Taikei Kankokai, 1933, XXXVIII, pp. 57, 90-1, tO'RI 103 & 146. For a more detailed account of Keizaishi Sosho[-NKS] H*,UA 13 Nihon gF,Nihon Keizaishi S6sho Kank6kai, 1914-7, censorshipunder Sadanobu's administration, see Peter F. Kornicki, 'Nishikino Ura: An v, p. 30. 14 7-Wrpj of and the Structure a Instanceof Censorship in 2f Sharebon', MN, xxxii: 2 (1977), pp. 153-62. 15 Nihon Zaisei Keizai Sosho[-NZKS] gffi:R;, Zaisei Keizai Gakkai, 1933, iII,
10

154

XXXIII, 2 Nipponica, Monumenta

greatly of economic pragmatism.Sadanobu realized that the residents Edo suffered frominflation.His so-called'reactionary'moral attitudeshould be temperedby an understandingof his wider economic objective. But Sadanobu's campaign against 'moral degeneration' met with severe social opposition, and people resistedhis negative moral ordinances. Street prostitution thrivedand gambling went underground,only to surfaceagain when the enforcement of the laws was relaxed. It is well known that the Bakufu authoritysent out to the streetsmany enforcementagents18 to stiflegambling and other activities such as prostitution.But this proved ineffectivein eradicating illicit activities because these agents were easily bribed by the operators of gambling and prostiIt tutionestablishments. is ironic that the police authorityin Edo even had to hire several spies to watch its own spies.19 Sadanobu's moral pretensions annoyed way to remedy was a difficult society,and he eventuallylearned that moral reform measures to economic hardship. As a result he was forced to seek more effective stabilize prices. his As a means to strengthen overall price program against inflationSadanobu (or turned against the kabunakama20 merchant associations). The origin of the goes back to the late seventeenthcenturywhen the Bakufu allowed kabunakama certain merchant groups in urban centers to establish exclusive associations, endowed with monopoly rights over distributionof specialized products such as jinseng,iron, brass, oil products, charcoal, lime, and many other items. They in turn paid a business tax21 to the government.The rationale behind the Bakufu's early policy was that it feltthat these groups could serve to facilitatethe flow of commoditiesand servicesfromOsaka, the chiefsupplier of goods, to the shogunal capital. But during the administrationof Sadanobu's predecessor the Bakufu alto lowed more kabunakama be formedsimplyin returnforthe businesstaxes and its desire to increase the revenue prompted it to issue increasing numbers of licenses forthe formationof these associations. resulted in a rise in prices. For one thing, of But this proliferation kabunakama the merchants automatically shifted their tax burden onto the consumers by increasing prices. Second, these privileged merchants took advantage of their wheneverpossible,to manipulate pricesforgreatergain. Sadanobu exclusiverights, and acted against and his close advisors suspected such abuses by the kabunakama them by dissolvingtheir monopoly rightsbetween 1787 and 1790.22 Sadanobu's in motiveis reflected the thoughtofNakai Chikuzan, author of the Sobo Kigenand a close advisor of Sadanobu: Since the Meiwa era [1764-72] it has been the Bakufu's policy to allow merchants to organize themselves in return for the payment of unjo. The
onmitsu |23 19 Kitajima, pp. 85-6.
18 20
21

unjo i ?: or myjgakinXtJk

Yale U.P., 1974,pp. 201-2.

22 NZKS, iii, p. 30; Harold Bolitho,Treasures Men: TheFudai Daimyoin TokugawaJapan, among

SORANAKA:

The Kansei Reforms

155

imposition of these business taxes is definitelya factor contributingto the rise in prices. However, I am convinced that the high prices of recent years have mainly come about because the merchants have conspired togetherto manipulate prices and extract exorbitantprofits.For example, the price of paper drastically rose as the result of a crop failure, but since then harvestshave recovered and yet the price of paper still remains too high. Why? Because the are kabunakama making too great a profit.23 It should be noted, however, that Sadanobu did not abolish all the kabunakama, or the systemof grantingmonopolies itself.He simplyselected a number of them value under for dissolutionbecause he still believed that they had a distributive the strictsupervision of the government.His action against certain kabunakama to was part of his effort 'restore' the Bakufu's authorityover 'mattersof gold and 24 rice' Sadanobu furtherattempted to stabilize prices through currency reform,for he also suspected that the unrestrainedcurrencypolicies of the Tanuma administrationhad caused inflatedprices. Again Nakai Chikuzan spoke on the matter: 'gold' pieces in the Meiwa era the relative Since the issuance of the nishu25 of gold has declined considerably while the value of copper coins has value also declined sharplybecause of excessiveissuance. It is the general decline in the value of these metals that has contributedto the rise of prices in recent years in Edo.26 Sadanobu approved ofthisview about the close relationshipofprices and currency levels,27 and he thus enacted countermeasuresto correct the situation. First, in 'gold' pieces as a necessary issuance ofthe nishu April 1788, he stopped any further first step towards halting theirdecline in value. He did not, however, abolish this currency entirely. Second, he moved to raise its value by minting more silver pieces28 from the silver gained out of melting down quantities of nishu'gold' pieces.29 This conversion was possible because the intrinsicvalue of the nishu 'gold' pieces was silver. Finally, he promoted an outflow of nishu'gold' pieces fromEdo. For example, the Bakufu during the early 1790s provided a number of of loans to various rural areas forthe reconstruction their communitiesand used
But in the second quarterof the 18thcentury. the governmentlater issued it in excessive phrases found in Sadanobu's autobiography, quantity,and this helped to bring about the silver decline in relativevalue of gold vis-'a-vis UgenoHitokoto c7)OA-. 25 Although the nishugin =ZOUR was a silver in Edo. 26 NKS, XVI, pp. 402-3. coin, the Bakufucirculatedit as a 'gold' piece 27 NKS, V, pp. 23-4. with the actual gold and treatedit at parity 28 chlzgin bearing the same deTM = piece, nishukin 29 Kitajima, pp. 69-71. minted The nishugin originally was nomination. to alleviate the shortageof gold coins in Edo
23 NKS, XVI, p. 403. 24 This is one ofthe mostfrequently quoted

156

XXXIII, 2 Nipponica, Monumenta

the nishu'gold' pieces for such purposes.30 He encouraged their use outside this chiefurban center so that in Edo the relative value of this currencywould rise. saw that an excess supply of the nishu'gold' pieces in Edo The Kansei reformer also disrupted the balance of exchange between gold and silver, thus causing increased prices in Edo. Edo primarily used gold as its exchange medium for business transactions.As it was undercut by excessive gold currencythe relative value of gold (vis-a-vissilver) in Edo fell below the established officialexchange of rate of 1 ryoof gold to 60 monme silver. In contast the exchange rate in Osaka, the chief supply center for goods going to Edo, remained fairlyconstant. This chronic regional disparityin the exchange rates of silver and gold brought about of a grave situation forEdo residents,and it had the immediate effect preventing the smooth flowof goods to Edo. For instance, a rice merchantoftenchose to sell his rice in Osaka forsilverbecause in Edo the same amount ofrice could be bought forless.3' Thus the regional disparityof exchange rates discouraged meaningful inter-regionaltrade and encouraged speculation in the monies themselves.The forcedprices up. effect Edo was a shortage of goods which effectively on Edo was flooded with copper coins of To complicate the situation still further, denomination. An excessive supply of an inferiorquality, especially the 4-monme copper coins there tended to reduce their value in terms of other commodities, thus causing inflated prices. Sadanobu realized that this situation directly disrupted the livelihood and securityoflarge numbersofpeople who were dependent stopped the mintingof these coins and at the same on copper coins. He therefore time arranged forthe Bakufu to purchase large quantities of them in the hope of raising their relative value. In addition he also took the precaution of issuing ordinances prohibitingthe transportof coins fromother districtsto Edo.32 But brought this measure backfiredwhen speculators,keen on turninga quick profit, copper coins to Edo, where the Bakufu had made them more valuable.33 A frustratedSadanobu could do nothing but rely on the forces of supply and demand forthe restorationof the currencyvalue in Edo.34 of The effect Sadanobu's monetaryprogramon the stateof priceswas negligible. This is shown by the fact that the commodity prices in the years of 1788, 1789 and 1790 either did not decline or did not recover the level as desired by the which had set the price level of 1783 as the standard price index Bakufu authority, policy.35 As shown in the diagram, the price of rapeforits currentanti-inflation
30 Takeuchi Makoto, 'Bakuhan Taisei to Kahei RyatsiP' N${IJ3a WIT , in Rekishi xi: 11 (1962), pp. 30-1. Kyoiku fTZW, 31 Tsuda Hideo Mffl*)A, 'Kansei Kaikaku' Rekishi in Iwanami Kiza Nihon (Kinsei Ak:c, H 3) ;j49-XrmA*M-Q (Bec 3) , Iwanami Shoten,

1963, p. 269.
32 33 34

Kitajima, pp. 71-2. Tsuda, pp. 269-70. The relative value of copper coins (in

increasein termsof rice) did not significantly and it would seem that the late 18thcentury, Sadanobu's attemptto raise the relativevalue of copper coins did not succeed in Edo either. See Fujikawa Kaname NJ)I, 'Edo Jidai , in Meijo S Kin'yuko' PW Al;, Shomin Shogaku 4Mf%, Iv: 3 (1955), pp. 93-116. 35 Price data for the early years of Sadanobu's administrationare scanty and less of reliable.But an examination thesescattered

SORANAKA: Silverin monme

110 _ 100 90v

The Kansei Reforms

157

80 _ 70
6050-RCE

(perkoku)

40

-RAPESEED 0.0

OIL

30 20-COTNIE

10 _ 1 t 178 '82 1
1

'83

l '84

'85

! '86

I 1 '87

88

I 89

90

l 91

'92

'93

'94

I 95

PriceTrends Selected for Goods Osaka,1781-95 in

(Adaptedfrom Kitajima,Bakuhansei Kumon n. 11], p. 84.) no [see

seed oil remained extremelyhigh during these years, while that of cotton fiber36 remained unreasonably unstable. The prices of these commoditiesthen continued to fluctuate and, moreover, remained comparatively high (vis-'a-visrice) in the followingfewyears, although prices appear to have dropped temporarily 1791. in The forcibleendorsementof Sadanobu's bukka-hikisage37 ordinance in some areas such as Edo may explain such a temporarydecline of prices and I shall comment more on this ordinance later in this article. The spate of difficulties broughton by the persistenceof high prices was further aggravated by a reversalin price, which began to drop in late 1788 and declined furtherduring the followingtwo years. The average wholesale price of rice at Osaka for the month ofJune 1790, for example, dropped to mere 38.7 monme of silverforone kokuof rice, whereas it had maintained the 60/70 monme level in the preceding two years.38 This decline in the price of rice amidst the inflationary
pricedata on a fewcommodities, together with chiefreformer. 36 kuriwata other related evidence, shows that prices in 40 37 Edo, Osaka and elsewhere remained high Ntaglkazawa,p'. 2 38 duringSadanobu's earlyyearsas the Bakufu's Nakazawa, p. 239-

158

XXXIII, 2 Monumenta Nipponica,

and for fiscalproblem boththeBakufu createdan evenmoreserious atmosphere the of of thesamurairesidents Edo. It had thedirecteffect reducing real income of in its whichreceived salary theform rice.Kuse Tango of ofthatsegment society the under no Kami (Hirouji),39head ofthekanj5sho40 Sadanobu, acknowledged period: of seriousness thisdeclinein ricepricesduringan inflationary these difficulties days.This facthas financial severe Many samuraiare facing froma changein the people's way of lifewhichpromotes mainlyresulted inhave drastically for Thus expenses all samuraihouseholds extravagance. it Therefore, has become constant. haveremained incomes whiletheir creased that for moredifficult themto maintaintheirbudgets.The worstsituation is themtoday,however, thatpricesof all goods remainextremely confronts gravesince in widefluctuation thepriceofrice.This is extremely highdespite trend.4' is stillin itsdownward the priceofrice the during for of Our generalobservation thepricetrends variouscommodities basic question:whatcausedthesteady one few first yearsofSadanobu's ruleraises including of commodities, of decline prices riceat thetimewhentheprices other in vinegar,etc., remainedhigh? The answer itemssuch as sake, thoserice-related of variousfactors supply assessing fully without cannotbe obtained to thisquestion basicallythedeclinein thepriceofricein theseyears and demand.It seemsthat was caused by supplyfactors.42 because ofa generalrecovery the For one thing, priceofricedeclinedsteadily by beendepressed frequent whichhad previously (rice)production, in agricultural The and volcaniceruptions. earthquake floods, suchas drought, naturaldisasters ricesupplyat the the increased level of production of return normalagricultural and henceloweredthe pricelevel of in rice markets Osaka, Edo and elsewhere, flowofriceshipments the rice. Second and perhapsmoreimportant, continuous in especially Osaka, in the latterhalfofthe eighteenth markets, to thewholesale the also century tendedto depress priceofrice. In thisregard,the available statraders and governments private to tistics riceshipments Osaka, bothbythehan on ricemarkets revealthatthewholesale century, in regions theeighteenth in various amountsof rice whichoftenexceededthe annual in Osaka receivedincreasing supplyof rice in greatbulk naturally level.43This constant 1.2/1.5millionkoku of What caused such a concentration ricesupply riceprices.44 tendedto depress in Osaka? ricestockin Osaka came of the towards accumulation a surplus The tendency
40 41

39 te@?

42 The population decrease in Osaka and *-1, Osaka Daigaku, xix, 1963, p. 120; see the decline in the volume of rice shipped also the graphon p. 118. 44 NihonKeizaishi Taikei (Kinsei 1), p. 88. fromOsaka to Edo in the late 18th directly

Thi QV' 'Kansei no Kien Rei ni tsuile' 162 (1964), p. 68. C,in RekishiHyoron fTr,

Quoted in Kitahara Susumu ;1L1E,

MTl, the Bakufutreasury.

(0L)

price of rice.

may have also caused the drop in the century

43 Yamazaki Ryuzo ILAUYR-E, 'Kinsei Koki Kakaku no Doko' XLMM Lt3 Nosanbutsu ni okeru in Keizaigaku Nenpj <fV 8;6A9ff DA,

SORANAKA:

The Kansei Reforms

159

about because han governmentsattempted to dispose of their surplus rice in the marketwhere it commanded the highestprice; Osaka being the center forcomthe mercial and industrialactivitieswithitslarge population usually offered highest rice. In addition to the price advantage that prices for commodities,including for Osaka usually offered distantsuppliers,the tendencytoward the accumulation of rice stockin that city was also caused by the annual shipmentof rice by many for han governments the payment of debts and interestsdue to their creditorsin Osaka.4" The han governmentsoften relied upon creditorsfor fiscal continuity centuryhangovernments beforea crop was harvested.Thus by the mid-eighteenth in were already less than efficient disposing of their surplus rice, and they were locked into an economic systemresistantto central governmentalintrusion. Sadanobu realized that declining rice prices undercut the Bakufu's finances and lost no time in respondingto the threat.In late 1788 he issued an ordinance in to which he ordered the hangovernments retain much of theirrice surplusin their domains46 so that theirrice would not flood the Osaka market.He also restricted for the han warehouses in Osaka fromissuingrice certificates47 the stockon hand. This was a precautionary measure against the tendency of the han governments them. The proliferation of beyond their ability to fulfill to issue these certificates in artificialrice certificates48 Osaka helped to depress rice prices by making it appear that there was more rice in that city than there actually was. But the hangovernmentsseem to have simply defied Sadanobu's ordinances.49 They conbeyond their tinued to ship rice to Osaka and continued to issue rice certificates in actual stocks.The primacy of han interests rice dealings undercut the interests of the Bakufu. In the meantime, Sadanobu carried out several other measures to restorethe price level of rice. He ordered some wealthy merchantsto purchase quantities of rice, thus hoping to stimulate demand.50 He also initiated a policy of purchasing the glutted rice, but the amount the Bakufu bought up did little to influencethe price at the wholesale marketin Osaka. Finally the Bakufu relaxed itsregulations on the productionofsakeand otherrice-relatedproducts. Such measuresto boost the price of rice through massive purchasing programs, however, did not bring resultsfor the Bakufu since the financial capacity of both the about satisfactory Bakufu and the merchants,who were not always cooperative, was limited. While battling against the rice price Sadanobu also continued his fightagainst inflationin the post-1787 period. Thus, in 1790, he reduced the volume of annual trade withthe Dutch at Nagasaki by one third.52Some historiansin the past have trade as a reactionarymeasure since it allegedly regarded thislimitationofforeign stifled commercial activities.However, Sadanobu's real intentionwas more prag46 NKS, XXXIV, 47 48 49

45 Ibid., p. 89. pp. 77-8.

kome-kitte )kfJJ Furushima, 92-6. pp. karamai-kitte J tk

no Beika Chosetsu )IIW

50 Honj6 Eijir6*lEXi#MP,Tokugawa Bakufu

Ii,

Shob6, 1966,p. 172.

52 NZKS, III,

Kashiwa

51 Ibid., p. 222. p. 30.

160

XXXIII, 2 Nipponica, Monumenta

matic in nature. A passage, in the Kasshi Yawa,53 which is attributedto Sadanobu, partly substantiatesthis: We know thatJapan's trading activitieswith foreigncountrieshave brought in her enormousbenefits the past. They have broughther numerousvaluable items, especially fromChina, which have enriched her tremendously.Yet in at recentyears trading activitieshave dwindled because economic difficulties goods. This factin turnhas put home have reduced the consumptionofforeign undue hardship on merchants engaged in the trade of foreigngoods. This is a grave situation forthe countryas a whole.54 He then expanded his opinion about the desirabilityof maintaining trade relations with foreigncountriesin the followingpassage: I hear that many samurai hoard theirmoney excessivelyforemergencypurposes. This habit of saving should be halted, because the use of such wealth stimulatesthe flowofcurrencyin the marketand hence stimulatesthe nation's economy. In thissense,the use ofimportedgoods,55 ifconsumed in meaningful ways, is not only beneficial to the individual, but also to the country as a whole. 56 trade implicationsin a purelypragmatic It is clear that in each case he saw foreign light as regards their effecton the Japanese and their domestic market, and in this way he was able to weigh both benefitsand liabilities. forprograms, including his programs to restrict Sadanobu's anti-inflationary of the distributionmechanism through the eign trade and the reorganization to were stillinsufficient bring prices down, and this dissolutionof the kabunakama, Sadanobu. Moreover, it left him with few alternatives but to failure frustrated take more coercive action in dealing with the problem of prices. His frustration ordinance in July of 1790.57 thus resulted in the issuance of the bukka-hikisage This ordinance, directed at both the wholesale and retail merchantsin the Bakufu and otherhandomains, ordered reductionsin the priceofcommodities.The Bakufu in to also issued a series of detailed instructions be followed by its administrators other areas. It also expected that the han governmentswould Edo, Osaka, and enforce the ordinance in their respective domains. These instructionsordered to administrators obtain frommerchantsthe price lists of their commodities and rice over the past several years.58 In otherwords,the Bakufuwanted themerchants to justifytheirprice policy in relation to the existingrice price. Judgingfromthis, one can discern that the Bakufu designated rice as the standard commodityfor the ultimate determinationof prices. But the trouble with this was that rice was the price level in the economy, no longer the dominant commodityin determining
53 *

54 NKS, XXXIV, 5 5 tnmntUf4t1/i7

p. 59.

56 NKS, XXXIV, p. 59. 57 NZKS, III, pp. 480-2.

58

Ibid., pp. 482-3.

SORANAKA:

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but rather one of many commodities whose price was subjected to changes of supply and demand. An examination of the available evidence seems to indicate that the Bakufu was largely unable to enforcethe ordinance effectively despite its determination to control inflation.The followingexample reveals the problem of enforcement. in The Edo machi-bugyo September 1790 ordered the two main kabunakama in of Edo, which representedthe producers and distributors cottonfabrics,to reduce their wholesale prices voluntarily. But the members of these two associations refusedto obey the order, offering various reasons which, they claimed, made it difficult them to comply. In response to this the Bakufu officials for pointed out that therehad been a steady decline in the price of cotton fiber,and therefore the should be reduced by the same price of the finishedproducts (cotton fabrics) proportion. Faced with this, the kabunakama responded that they would immediately reduce the wholesale price by 5%o and declared that theywould make an to additional effort reduce the price by 3000 in February 1791 in order to meet the Bakufu's request. This offer was rejected by the Bakufu, which insistedupon an immediate reduction of the price by 30%. After a deadlock lasting several in in months,the kabunakama December 1790 made a compromiseoffer which they proposed to reduce the price by 7% startingin January 1791 and then reduce it further a level that would correspond to the Bakufu's order by the following to month of February (179l).5 The Bakufu grudginglyaccepted the proposal and expected the price would go down as scheduled. But the kabunakama defaulted on their promise and failed to reduce the price of theircommodities.It is not entirelyclear why theybroke their pledge, but one reason could have been the sudden increase in the price of a kuriwata, material over which they had no control,thus showing that the kabunakamalacked any absolute power over the determinationof prices and that the measures (bukka-hikisage Bakufu's restrictive ordinance) lacked effectiveness.60 Another example of the ineffectiveness the government'sprice-cutordinance of involved the dispute between the Bakufu and the sakebrewersin Nadame district (in Settsu province), which was under Bakufu jurisdiction. In 1790, the Bakufu a informed brewer,Nadaya Kiyobei,61 'While it is understandablethat the price of sakeshould go up when the the price of rice rises,it is definitely acceptable that not the price of sake should remain higher when the price of its major component [rice] stays unreasonably low.' Like the Edo machi-bugyJ Edo, the Bakufu in demanded a full explanation and satisfactionfromthe brewer. To this Nadaya responded, 'It is our policy to set the price of our product on the basis of the cost incurredin its production, and the price we are asking forour sakeclosely reflects the cost incurredin its production thisyear.'62 He too refusedto comply with the
60

59Kitajima,
M A

61
62

pp. 81-2. Ibid., p. 82.

Quoted in Komatsu Kazuo IJ1ThI,

'KinseiToshi no V) Shluzgy3 Dotai' iFdj$$filA %X, in MiyamotoMataji ; ed., Shohin Ryatsa no ShitekiKenkya f Mineruba Shobo, 1967,p. 105.

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an Bakufu'sorder. Moreover, Nadaya had offered explanation forhis price policy. He maintained that the price of rice at the time of production in October, when the preparationforthe productionofsakealways begins,was higherthan the price of rice when the sake arrived on the market. The Bakufu officialscould find no further pretextforinsistingon the reductionof the price of sake.What the Bakufu officialsand Sadanobu did not fully realize was that prices of commodities fluctuatedwidely, and oftenindependentlyof others,as they were being affected sets of supply and demand factors,and so their attempts to simply by different enforcea price reduction were frustrated.The prevailing price of rice was an gauge of proper price levels, and proved unenforceablein the complex insufficient economic context of the Kansei period. In the meantime, Sadanobu's continued search fora means to curb inflationin Edo also convinced him of the need to reshape the existingmarketmechanism. As is well known,the Bakufu up to thisperiod heavily relied on Osaka to supply Edo, always attemptedto improve the perhaps withthe exceptionof rice.63 It therefore the two citiesso that the smoothflowof goods mechanism that linked distribution between Osaka and Edo could be assured. One mightalso add that thisestablished marketmechanismfunctionedfairlywell as it served the basic needs of the populace in Edo during the early phase of Tokugawa rule. The excessivereliance of Edo on Osaka forsupplies, however,proved disastrous for the Bakufu (and the residentsof Edo) in the long run. The main reason was that Osaka's dominant position as the nation's central market began to crumble in the course of the eighteenthcentury.The city'sgrowingweakness resultedfrom the economic growthin provincial areas and subsequent changes in the pattern of the flow of goods that now tended to bypass Osaka (vis-'a-visemergingrural from markets).64 Being dependent on Osaka foritssupplies, Edo naturallysuffered this atrophyin the volume of trade between Osaka and the provinces. Sadanobu seems to have recognized thissubtle change in the patternof the flow of goods in the national economy in the course of the eighteenthcentury,and thus took concrete measures to reshape the supply mechanism for the benefitof Edo, his main objective being to diminish the degree of Edo's dependence on Osaka. First,he encouraged the direct shipmentof certain vital goods fromother givento Nadame areas to Edo. The mostnotable example ofthiswas thepermission districtin Settsu province to ship oil products to Edo in 1791.65 This encouragement of direct shipmentclearly reflecteda reversal of the Bakufu policy, because until this time the oil producers (as well as distributors)in this region had been forced to operate under rigid regulation which restrictedany free trade. For example, theywere allowed to sell theirproducts only to the Bakufu's authorized merchantsin Osaka and oftenat the prices quoted by the privileged merchants.
63 Yasuoka Shigeaki %R1)j, 'Osaka no to Hatten Kinsei Sangyo' ;kiDM& a idUiM , in ChihashiKenkyuKyagi Kai ; ed., Nihon SangyoshiTaikei El

Faky6Daigaku Shuppankai, 1960,pp. 112-3. 64 Ibid., pp. 112-4. 65 Kitajima, p. 82; Tsuda, p. 258.

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Moreover, the oil processorsin this region were also forbidden to purchase raw material, e.g., rapeseed, from anyone except authorized dealers.66 Sadanobu had an interestin increasing the supply of oil products in Edo, for this mightin on turn have a favorable effect prices. Second, the Bakufu under Sadanobu also began to develop Edo's outlying areas. In the past the area adjacent to Edo provided verylittlein the way ofdaily necessitiesfor the residentsof the city. The economy of the Kanto area, which was constitutedthe principal part of the Bakufu territory,67 relativelybackward in the sense that the degree of agriculturalcommercializationwas minimal,except in thosevillages immediatelyadjacent to the cityofEdo; thesevillages traditionally provided perishable products, e.g., vegetables, for the city. In the wake of the decliningrole ofOsaka as Edo's supply centerthe Bakufurealized thatthedevelopment of this backward area was essential to securing supplies for Edo. Thus it began to promote the development of agriculture in this area, especially the cultivation of cash crops such as cotton,rapeseed, tobacco and some other items. It also encouraged the development of certain processing industries involving cotton,rice, rapeseed, and grains such as barley, wheat and millet.68However, it seems that the Bakufu's desire to stabilize prices in Edo throughthe reshaping of the existingmarket mechanism and the development of Edo's hinterland areas ended in complete failurein the long run. This is evidenced by the fact that later Tokugawa officialssuch as Mizuno Tadakuni were still preoccupied with the problem of economic integrationof the area surroundingEdo (and Osaka) and, rei69 of above all, feltpowerless in carryingout the Bakufu's measure, i.e., agechi 1843, which would have promotedeconomic (political and military)integration.70 In general termswe need to know why the Kansei Reformsfailed. Our analysis of the Kansei programs in the preceding pages seems to suggest that the Bakufu was unable to resolve conflictsof interestswithin the Tokugawa system.For example, the governmentfailed to convince the people of the need to obey its regulatory ordinances against social activities because its own moral pretensionsdid a not correspondto the times. The populace in general preferred more permissive resistedany governmentalintrusion.Sadanobu's social atmosphere and therefore plea for the cooperation of the han governmentsin the restorationof rice prices of likewisefailed because his demand challenged the self-interest the han governments. By the late eighteenthcenturythese governmentshad little affectionfor ordinance the Bakufu. Sadanobu's monetarymeasures as well as his bukka-hikisage likewisemet with a similar fatewhen the merchantsflatlyrefusedto comply with the order in defense of their own interests.Finally, his programs to improve the
Ryiitsii 70 Kobayashi Shigeru Jit8, 'Tenpo no no Yagi Akira )k1ct, Kinsei Shohin -cV'Z7, in o9finiS Hanawa Shobo, 1962,pp. 179- AgechiRei ni tsuite'ikg Kenkyui Nihonshi 92. i*PT , 30 (1956), p. 57; 67 Tsuda, pp. 272-4. Igi' no Kaikaku Keizaishiteki Tsuda Hideo, 'Tenpo 68 tenryj iX Nihon Keizaishi Hit$0,W 9in 69 Taikei(Kinsei2), pp. 347-51.
66

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flowofgoods to Edo throughthe reorganizationof the existingmarketmechanism also proved a failurein the long run, simply because the Bakufu could not effectivelyenforcesuch programswithoutthe cooperation of the daimyo and hatamoto. It is possible to conclude, then, that the ultimate failure of the Kansei Reforms stemmedfromthe Bakufu's inabilityas a central authorityto redirectestablished economic interests into a Bakufu-oriented economy.