Conservation Focus

Economic Growth, Climate Change, Biodiversity Loss:

Distributive Justice for the Global North and South
JON ROSALES
Department of Environmental Studies, St. Lawrence University, 23 Romoda Drive, Canton, NY 13617, U.S.A.,
email jrosales@stlawu.edu

Abstract: Economic growth-the increase in production and consumption of goods and services-must be
considered within its biophysical context. Economic growth is fueled by biophysical inputs and its outputs
degrade ecological processes, such as the global climate system. Economic growth is currently the principal
cause of increased climate change, and climate change is a primary mechanism of biodiversity loss. Therefore,
economic growth is a prime catalyst of biodiversity loss. Because people desire economic growth for dissimilar
reasons-some for the increased accumulation of wealth, others for basic needs-how we limit economic growth
becomes an ethical problem. Principles of distributive justice can help construct an international climate-
change regime based on principles of equity. An equity-based framework that caps economic growth in
the most polluting economies will lessen human impact on biodiversity. When coupled with a cap-and-trade
mechanism, the framework can also provide a powerful tool for redistribution of wealth. Such an equity-based
framework promises to be more inclusive and therefore more effective because it accounts for the disparate
developmental conditions of the global north and south.

Keywords: biodiversity, climate change, distributive justice, economic growth, equity, per capita emissions
Crecimiento Económico, Cambio Climático, Pérdida de Biodiversidad: Justicia Distributiva para el Norte y el Sur
Resumen: El crecimiento económico – incremento en la producción y consumo de bienes y servicios – debe
ser considerado dentro de su contexto biofı́sico. El crecimiento económico esta alimentado por los insumos
biofı́sicos y sus productos degradan los procesos ecológicos, como el sistema climático global. El crecimiento
económico es la principal causa actual del incremento de cambio climático, y el cambio climático es un
mecanismo primario de la pérdida de biodiversidad. Por lo tanto, el crecimiento económico es un catalizador
primario de la pérdida de biodiversidad. Debido a que la gente desea el crecimiento económico por razones
disimilares – algunos por el incremento de la acumulación de capital, otros por necesidades básicas – la forma
en que se limita el crecimiento económico se vuelve un problema ético. Los principios de la justicia distributiva
pueden ayudar a construir un régimen internacional de cambio climático basado en los principios de equidad.
Un marco de referencia basado en la equidad que encapsula el crecimiento económico en las economı́as más
contaminantes reducirá el impacto humano sobre la biodiversidad. En combinación con un mecanismo de
lı́mites y canje, el marco también puede proporcionar una herramienta poderosa para la redistribución de
la riqueza. Tal marco basado en la equidad promete ser más incluyente y, por lo tanto, más efectivo porque
considera la disparidad en las condiciones de desarrollo del norte y del sur.

Palabras Clave: biodiversidad, cambio climático, crecimiento económico, emisiones per cápita, equidad, justi-
cia distributiva

Introduction to attain higher levels of affluence. These disparate de-

sires must be considered when confronting the issue
People around the world desire economic growth for of economic growth and biodiversity conservation. Be-
different reasons, some to attain basic needs and some cause economic growth is the increase in production and

Paper submitted March 26, 2008; revised manuscript accepted June 10, 2008.
1409
Conservation Biology, Volume 22, No. 6, 1409–1417

C 2008 Society for Conservation Biology
DOI: 10.1111/j.1523-1739.2008.01091.x
1410
consumption of goods and services, and goods and ser-
vices are directly or indirectly made of biophysical matter
that flows through the economic system, the impact of
economic growth on the natural world increases with
size of the economy.
Curbing economic growth in any culture will not be
easy; capping it will be very difficult. Powerful social ac-
tors that benefit from economic growth assume these
ambitions are universal. Economic growth as a public
policy has powerful constituencies, including corporate
coalitions, politicians who serve their interests, high-
ranking economists, and institutions of international fi-
nance. Perpetual economic growth is the purported rem-
edy for poverty alleviation, technological advancement,
and the very idea of social progress. But when economic
growth is placed in its biophysical context, a conundrum
emerges—perpetual economic growth is an impossibil-
ity (Daly & Townsend 1993). Long before it is limited by
its biophysical environment, it causes numerous social
problems that eventually outweigh its social merits. This
reality must be confronted. The question I consider here
is how to limit economic growth in an ethical manner.
As Lawn (2008 [this issue]) explains, macroeconomic
policy instruments are not currently designed to cap eco-
nomic growth; in fact, their purposes are quite the con-
trary. Macroeconomic policy will not necessarily achieve
ethical outcomes either. Although macroeconomic pol-
icy may be reformed as economic growth becomes
more problematic, one must also look elsewhere for pol-
icy tools to limit growth. Codifying limits to economic
growth into law can be effective if it is guided by science
and ethics with a sensitivity to ecological thresholds and
distributional equity.
The conflict between economic growth and biodiver-
sity conservation is often described by those working in
the conservation field as a trade-off between humans and
nonhumans in a competition for natural resources for sur-
vival (Czech et al. 2000). This conflict can also be seen
between groups of humans when competing economies
scour the globe for resources and prevent their com-
petitors from acquiring more favorable positions, what
Ophuls (1977) calls the politics of scarcity. Claims on
open-access natural resources in the atmosphere, high
seas, and even outer space, and human-contrived open-
access resources, such as information, are staked out and
gradually privatized into the market by privileged and
powerful interests. These interests are supported by cur-
rent institutions of global economic activity and policy.
The politics of scarcity seem insurmountable, and it is
difficult to envision an alternative.
Other traditions, however, can become more promi-
nent for allocating resources. For example, parallel to the
politics of scarcity are the politics of reason and the poli-
tics of equity. Applying reason through science-based de-
cision making requires one to acknowledge the impacts
of economic growth on biodiversity and to acknowledge
Conservation Biology
Volume 22, No. 6, 2008
Distributive Justice and Climate Change
limits to economic growth. Scientific efforts help deter-
mine the causal mechanisms of biodiversity loss and envi-
ronmental deterioration, and these determinations even-
tually comprise a powerful mode of persuasion in the
policy process. Science itself, however, cannot ensure ac-
tion. Science can help reveal the causal factors of climate
change and the likely impacts and vulnerabilities, but it
does not provide a basis for making choices among pol-
icy options. Other impulses, such as ethics, are needed
to guide responsible action and to resolve conflicts be-
tween values and principles. Furthermore, science and
ethics often work synergistically. Issues of equity, par-
ticularly the just distribution of wealth, often arise from
studying limited and deteriorating biophysical factors.
Although dominant economic theory includes the as-
sumption that economic growth provides the resources
necessary for environmental protection and a vehicle for
social equality, this assumption falls apart when biophys-
ical limits are acknowledged. Science is needed to deter-
mine environmental limits and thresholds, and ethics is
needed to ensure human actions move society toward so-
cial equity. The need to identify environmental limits and
develop equitable policy is becoming especially evident
with regard to climate change.
Climate change is an umbrella crisis in that it has social,
economic, political, and ecological impacts, including
biodiversity loss. It is also a crisis that exposes the need
to integrate the politics of reason and equity. The negoti-
ating body that developed the Kyoto Protocol, the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), has a core commitment to strive to reconcile
north–south equity concerns with scientific findings of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
and its Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological
Advice. I used the scientific work of the IPCC and the eth-
ical foundations of the UNFCCC to frame my argument.
Taken together, they offer a chance for biodiversity con-
servation by limiting economic activity in the diverse and
prolific sectors that emit greenhouse gases (GHGs) and,
given the integration of economic sectors, by limiting
growth of the economy at large while acknowledging
the relative contribution of economies that pollute less.
Economic Growth, Climate Change, and Biodiversity Loss
In their Fourth Assessment Report the IPCC compiles and
assesses climate-change literature from 1970 to 2005. Re-
garding biodiversity, they affirm, “recent warming is al-
ready strongly affecting natural biological systems” (IPCC
2007a). Observed changes in terrestrial systems include
shifting species ranges, in particular poleward and eleva-
tional range shifts; increased wildfire risk; and phenolog-
ical changes in species, such as timing of growth and
migration, length of growing season, and changes in
abundance (IPCC 2007a). Changes have also been
observed in aquatic systems, including phenological
Rosales
changes in species; poleward shifts in the range of species
(plankton have moved 10◦ north in the last 40 years);
coral bleaching; and, perhaps most disturbingly, ocean
acidification that has affected corals, plankton, and ben-
thic marine organisms (IPCC 2007a). Ocean pH has de-
clined by an average of 0.1 units since 1750 (IPCC 2007a).
The full ramifications of ocean acidification are unknown.
Similar effects have been observed in lakes and rivers
(IPCC 2007a). Of the 28,671 observed biological changes
reviewed by the IPCC, 90% are consistent with what one
would expect to see with global warming (IPCC 2007a).
The projected impacts on biodiversity are even more
troubling. The most vulnerable terrestrial ecosystems—
tundra, boreal forest, mountain, and Mediterranean-type
ecosystems; mangroves and salt marshes; coral reefs and
sea ice biomes—are virtually certain (>99% probability)
to experience “severe” impacts (IPCC 2007a). Endemic
species are the most vulnerable. Some species and com-
munities will benefit from increasing net primary pro-
ductivity in systems (e.g., savannas, species-poor deserts
in some regions), but ecosystems are unlikely to be able
to adapt by 2100 to atmospheric CO 2 levels higher than
any time in the last 650,000 years and to temperatures
higher than in the last 740,000 years (IPCC 2007a). These
conditions will be “characterized by threshold-type re-
sponses, many irreversible on time-scales relevant to hu-
man society, such as biodiversity loss through extinction,
disruption of species’ ecological interactions, and major
changes in ecosystem structure and disturbance regimes”
(IPCC 2007a). Overall, the IPCC states with high confi-
dence (80% chance) that there will be up to a 30% in-
crease in risk of extinction with 1 ◦ C warming and more
than 40% extinction with 4 ◦ C warming (IPCC 2007a).
Economic growth drives climate change, and atten-
dant biodiversity loss, and the rate at which it does so
increases with size of the economy. Producing a dollar’s
worth of goods or services in the United States yields, on
average, 0.36 kg of CO 2 e (all GHGs weighted for their
global warming potential compared with CO 2 ) at the site
of production and 0.83 kg when supply-chain emissions
are included (Suh 2006). According to Canadell et al.
(2007), economic growth accounts for approximately
65% of the increase in GHGs in the atmosphere (17%
of which comes from an increase in carbon intensity and
∼18% of which comes from decreased environmental
sink efficiency). Growth rates in CO 2 emissions increased
from 1.3%/year in the 1990s to 3.3%/year between 2000
and 2006. Carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmo-
sphere are growing at 1.93 ppm/year, the highest rate
of increase on record. These new findings exceed IPCC’s
highest emissions scenarios. Additionally, midrange emis-
sions scenarios predict global emissions will grow by 60%
between 2000 and 2025 (Baumert & Pershing 2004).
Although technological efficiency improvements that
allow economies to grow without any additional burden
on the environment have a powerful grip on our imag-
1411
inations, evidence shows technological improvements
have been overtaken by economic growth. Whereas the
energy intensity embodied in goods and services de-
creased by 33% between 1970 and 2004, increased use
of carbon-based energy from economic and population
growth vastly outstripped gains in efficiency, with GHGs
emissions growing by 70% over the same period (IPCC
2007b). The main driver of increased GHGs from 1970
to 2004 was global economic growth, which grew by
77% over the period (IPCC 2007b). Even if technological
improvements can lessen GHG production, the activities
required to research and produce these technologies re-
quire surplus production in other sectors that will have an
additional impact on ecosystems and biodiversity (Czech
2008 [this issue]).
Although much uncertainty remains about individual
species and ecosystems, it is well established that the
overall impact of climate change on biodiversity has been
and will be negative. It is also well established that eco-
nomic growth is the main driver in increased GHG emis-
sions. Therefore, by inference, economic growth is the
main driver of climate-change-related biodiversity loss.
The issue at hand, then, is how to limit economic
growth in an ethical manner to minimize biodiversity
loss. Traditional economic instruments are insufficient
for the task. To address this enormous challenge, one
must turn to ethics.
Ethical Principles
A convergence of ethical principles can point to a res-
olution. Ethical principles from the field of distributive
justice are particularly useful. Inspiration in this field is
drawn from political philosopher John Rawls, and in par-
ticular his seminal work on justice (Rawls 1971). Rawls
develops a theory of distributive justice from the basic
rights of life, liberty, and personal security that can be
used to address economic growth and biodiversity loss.
His theory, called “justice as fairness,” is instructive be-
cause it offers a solution to the problem of economic
growth that is amenable to developing countries. Rawls
suggests social structures should be developed that ac-
knowledge each person has equal rights that are compa-
rable to the rights of others; social and economic condi-
tions should be arranged so there is equal opportunity
for all; and the greatest benefit of social action should
be granted to those who are the least advantaged (Rawls
1971).
Although Rawls’ principles are intended for national
ethical obligations, not international relations, there are
parallels that can be drawn to international climate pol-
icy. Four principles of international policy that are perti-
nent to the discussion here are: polluter pays; provision of
basic needs; ability to pay; and common but differentiated
Conservation Biology
Volume 22, No. 6, 2008
1412
responsibilities. These principles can help guide specific
policy approaches and help construct just and equitable
legal structures and policy outcomes (Brown et al. 2006).
In a bellwether article, Shue (1999) applies ethical prin-
ciples to how the costs of global environmental issues
should be distributed. He develops three ethical postu-
lates that can be directly applied to the principles men-
tioned above.
1. If climate change costs are imposed on the south with-
out their consent by industrialized countries in the north,
then the south has the right to demand the north “shoul-
der the burdens” of mitigation and adaptation. This is
consistent with the polluter pays and common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities principles.
2. The north should contribute more to mitigate climate
change because it has the most resources. Shue (1999)
suggests this position is logically irreducible. It is consis-
tent with the ability to pay principle.
3. With unequal capacity to mitigate and adapt to cli-
mate change, the south should at least be guaranteed an
“adequate minimum” to meet basic needs. An adequate
minimum guarantee requires a right to development if
such a minimum has not been achieved. This is consis-
tent with the provision of basic needs principle.
When there are disproportionate benefits to the north
and harm to the south derived from GHG emissions
and economic growth and where the capacity to re-
spond to climate change is disproportionately limited,
extra burdens on the “producer of the inequality” are
ethically justified (Shue 1999). Furthermore, progres-
sive burdening rates (i.e., a higher imposition of bur-
dens on the more affluent) are justified. Acknowledg-
ing and incorporating these principles into law can help
maintain equity as a core commitment of climate-change
policy.
The principle of equity is more than rhetorical argu-
ment, it is a founding principle of international law and
policy. Equity is codified, for example, in the charter
of the United Nations, the Stockholm Declaration, the
Brundtland Commission’s report “Our Common Future,”
the UN Rio Declaration, and the UNFCCC (Rosales 2008).
For example, the Charter of the United Nations states,
“We the peoples of the United Nations Determined. . . to
reaffirm faith in. . . the equal rights of men and women
and of nations large and small” (UN 1949). The Rio Decla-
ration adds, “The right to development must be fulfilled
so as to equitably meet developmental and environmen-
tal needs of present and future generations” (UN 1992).
And the UNFCCC maintains, “The Parties should protect
the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and
in accordance with their common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities and capabilities” (UNFCCC 2002).
Although the definition and intent of equity in these
documents are necessarily ambiguous, equity is laid out
Conservation Biology
Volume 22, No. 6, 2008
Distributive Justice and Climate Change
as a principle to work with. Equity, therefore, is codi-
fied in the institutions that develop international envi-
ronmental policy, including climate-change policy. These
institutions are designed to facilitate equity in their
operations.
There are three fundamental ethical positions to draw
from this body of literature that have direct relevance
to economic growth and biodiversity loss: each coun-
try has an equal right to develop; each country has
equal rights to the atmospheric commons; and in the
context of existing international inequality, the global
south should be granted “atmospheric space” to pur-
sue economic growth. Principles of equity, from the-
ory to practice, provide a powerful position from
which to negotiate policy on the disastrous effects of
economic growth and climate change on biodiversity
loss.
Ethical Framework to Cap Harmful Economic
Growth
Frameworks used to address climate change that are
based on ethical foundations, especially those based
on equity, are receiving much attention in the climate-
change community. They particularly resonate with
those representing the global south. An ethical frame-
work can be developed into a model that shows how
economic growth can be capped, and even reduced, at
least in some sectors.
Per capita schemes are in a class of climate-change mit-
igation proposals that are based on equity. The Centre for
Science and Environment (CSE) was an early proponent
of a per capita approach to climate-change mitigation
(Agarwal & Narain 1991). The CSE finds that GHG emis-
sions have been and continue to be emitted unequally
from different countries (Table 1), and they point out that
although the chemical composition of the GHG emissions
from different sources is the same and the molecules
themselves mix evenly in the atmosphere, the type of
activities from which they derive vary significantly ac-
cording to their necessity to meet basic needs. Emissions
from luxury activities, such as recreational boating, can-
not be equated with growing rice for a family. Because
GHG emissions are associated with varying degrees of
luxury and survival, CSE envisions a global per capita
emissions quota. These quotas could be tradable, but
only after equal entitlements to the atmospheric com-
mons were allotted. Other scholars have since adopted
this ethical foundation and further developed proposals
for per capita GHG trading (e.g., Byrne et al. 1998; Gupta
& Bhandari 1999).
Elaborating on a concept developed by Carley and Spa-
pens (1998) and Athanasiou and Baer (2002), for exam-
ple, initially framed global inequity in terms of space.
Rosales 1413

Table 1. Contribution of CO 2 from fossil fuels and cement from the After examining climate-change mitigation options for
top 20 emitters of greenhouse gases (Baumert & Pershing 2004). the post-Kyoto Protocol era, a group of scholars con-
Cumulative Cumulative cludes, “An equal per capita allocation would be con-
emissions emissions Percent sistent with principles of justice because: (a) it treats
Country 1850–2000 1990–2000 change all individuals as equals and therefore is consistent with
most theories of distributive justice, (b) it would imple-
United States 29.8 23.5 −21
Russia 8.3 7.8 −5 ment the ethical maxim that all people should have equal
Germany 7.5 4.0 −46 rights to use the global commons, (c) it would implement
China 7.3 13.8 89 the widely accepted ‘polluter pays’ principle, and (d) it
United Kingdom 6.5 2.5 −61 would recognize the need of developing countries to in-
Japan 4.1 5.2 28 crease their emissions to meet the basic needs of their
France 3.0 1.6 −45
Ukraine 2.3 2.1 −8 citizens” (Brown et al. 2006).
Canada 2.1 2.1 −3 Due to the widely disproportionate nature of global
Poland 2.1 1.5 −27 GHG emissions, the principles of polluter pays, ability to
India 2.0 3.7 80 pay, and shared but differentiated responsibilities com-
Italy 1.6 1.9 18 pel one to acknowledge the disparate responsibility for
South Africa 1.2 1.5 27
Australia 1.1 1.3 24 climate change and to use it as a foundation for action.
Mexico 1.0 1.5 60 In this disparity one can read the histories of economic
Spain 0.9 1.1 30 growth and the development of the global north and
Brazil 0.8 1.2 60 south (Table 1). This history of unequal growth and in-
South Korea 0.7 1.7 138 equity is often overlooked, disregarded, or dismissed by
Iran 0.6 1.1 93
Argentina 0.5 0.5 14 northern scholars. After an extensive review of the eq-
Developed 77 62 −20 uity literature on climate change and the IPCC’s Third
Developing 22 38 73 Assessment Report of 2001, Müller (2002) concludes that
the majority of the literature completely misses the eq-
uity concerns of the south. Most of the discussion is on
They suggest that the remaining atmospheric space for emission targets, as opposed to unequal impacts and re-
the south to develop is scarce. Because the provision of sponsibility and the gaping divide in per capita emissions
basic needs in the south involves increased GHG emis- (Fig. 1).
sions, southern countries will not accept a global treaty Because GHGs mix evenly in the atmosphere, it is
that will limit their atmospheric space, especially when possible to reduce emissions in one location and have
the space has been filled by way of economic growth a global impact. This fact has been taken advantage of by
in the affluent north. Athanasiou and Baer (2002) base the north in developing offset projects in the south as a
their proposed scheme on equal rights to the atmospheric way to avoid structural change and the tempering of eco-
commons. They argue that an equal-rights approach is ef- nomic growth. The south can use this fact and that their
fective for two reasons: it accounts for the tremendous share of GHG emissions is minimal to get compensation
ecological debt northern countries owe for using up the for their often enormous carbon sinks and environmen-
space, and it is more politically acceptable for southern tally benign development choices to rectify their unequal
governments because their right to develop is retained. share of atmospheric space (Fig. 1).
Their rights-based approach centers on principles of eq- To set up a global per capita scheme, it makes sense to
uity and fairness; “atmospheric overusers have to pay for take advantage of the political and economic infrastruc-
their overuse of the atmospheric space” (Athanasiou & ture already developed under the Kyoto Protocol and to
Baer 2002). The lack of available space, however, occa- build on its tradable allowances framework, in this case
sioned these scholars to rethink their support of a per tradable emissions credits. To set up such a scheme, three
capita approach (Baer et al. 2007). steps are required: set a cap, allocate credits, and institute
The most developed per capita scheme has been pro- trading rules.
posed by Meyer (2007) at the Global Commons Institute. First, any tradable-permits scheme is only as effective
His model, called contraction and convergence, shows as the associated cap. Assuming the scheme is robust
how to negotiate a long-term target for overall GHG re- enough for parties to comply, the cap determines its
ductions (contraction) and establish a GHG budget on overall environmental effectiveness. As in the contrac-
a per capita basis. Greenhouse gasses then converge on tion and convergence model mentioned above, caps can
a negotiated per capita level of emissions for all coun- be set high initially, so that parties will accept the frame-
tries. Much like emissions trading, unused entitlements work, and then decreased over time to match ecologi-
are tradable (i.e., if a country emits GHGs below its ne- cal thresholds. Although a flexible cap does not immedi-
gotiated cap, it can sell the remaining entitlements on a ately satisfy the ethical principles (such as polluter pays)
global market). outlined above, it does consider that countries will not

Conservation Biology
Volume 22, No. 6, 2008
1414 Distributive Justice and Climate Change

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0
CO2 per capita (tonnes)

0.0

-10.0

-20.0

-30.0

-40.0

-50.0

-60.0
UNFCCC member countries

Figure 1. Per capita CO 2 emissions for 149 UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change)
member countries. Roughly 30% of the countries reported their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since 2000, and
the rest reported them in the 1990s, with the vast majority of those reporting in 1994 (UNFCCC 2007). Population
figures for the year GHGs were reported are used to calculate per capita amounts (U.S. Census Bureau 2007a).
Data points for Guinea-Bissau (−10,110 t per capita) and Gabon (−477 t per capita) are not included because
they exceed the range shown on the y-axis. These two countries are large net carbon sinks due to their removal of
CO 2 from land uses and forestry.

accept a treaty in which caps are seen as too onerous
or unachievable. Adjustable caps can be included for po-
litical expediency as a means to arrive at ethical respon-
sibility. In general, lower caps will result in less climate
change and more biodiversity conservation.
The IPCC’s Third Assessment Report concludes that
the most serious effects of climate change can be avoided
if warming stays below 2 ◦ C (IPCC 2001). The Euro-
pean Union has adopted this threshold as a target (Coun-
cil of the European Union 2005). Hansen et al. (2007),
however, argue that 1 ◦ C is the threshold. Identifying
this threshold is important because the ultimate objec-
tive of the UNFCCC (Article 2) is to avoid “dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”
(UNFCCC 2002). Article 2 also states that greenhouse
gas concentrations should be “achieved within a time-
frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not
threatened and to enable economic development to pro-
ceed in a sustainable manner” (UNFCCC 2002). Of key
importance is ensuring that ecosystems are able to adapt
to climate change. Although admittedly conservative and
“underestimated due to missing carbon cycle feedbacks”
(footnote IPCC 2007c), the IPCC estimates that at least
85% cuts in CO 2 emissions from 2000 levels by 2050 are
required to keep warming below 2◦ C (IPCC 2007c).
Global CO 2 emissions in 2000 were roughly 33 Gt
(IPCC 2007c). An 85% decrease in CO 2 emissions from
2000 levels would be approximately 5 Gt. To avoid dan-
gerous climate change, as defined by the IPCC and given
2000 population totals (U.S. Census Bureau 2007b), hu-
manity would have to reduce its emissions to 0.8 t of CO 2
per capita per year by 2050 (Fig. 2, dashed). Countries
currently emitting at this level are Pakistan, the Philip-
pines, Solomon Islands, and Niger. Of the 149 countries
in this data set, 68 with altogether nearly 800 million
people, fall at or below this threshold.
Staying at or below this threshold emissions level will
not prevent climate change. Rather, the threshold is an
estimate of GHG emissions levels needed to avoid danger-
ous climate change as defined by the IPCC and UNFCCC.
If we are to avoid dangerous climate change, we need to
be aware there is not much atmospheric space left for
GHG emissions.
After a cap is determined (in this case 0.8 t CO 2 /year),
the ethical principles laid out above to allocate credits
can be adopted. Consistent with the principles of polluter
pays and shared but differentiated responsibilities princi-
ples, countries that emit above 0.8 t CO 2 /year would be
responsible for either reducing their per capita emissions
to the ecological threshold or buying credits from those
countries that are already below the threshold. Either

Conservation Biology
Volume 22, No. 6, 2008
Rosales
way, those above the threshold bear the costs. In addi-
tion, this approach is consistent with the ability-to-pay
principle, whereby those that have benefited from using
more than their fair share of atmospheric space for eco-
nomic growth will have accumulated the wealth to pay
for the credits or to invest in mitigation. The resulting
redistribution of wealth from those countries above the
threshold to those below would be significant.
The principle of basic needs is more difficult to ap-
ply. Because Pakistan, the Philippines, Solomon Islands,
and Niger represent levels of development equal to 0.8 t
CO 2 /year, it could be argued that the threshold is not high
enough. This fact is not lost on once-ardent advocates for
per capita schemes. Baer et al. (2007), for example, step
back from their previous support of per capita schemes
and refocus on the conditions necessary for a human life
beyond basic needs, yet well below affluence. They now
focus on “greenhouse development rights” that establish
a development threshold of $9000/year (calculated with
purchasing power parity, which equalizes the value of
global currencies according to the amount of money it
would cost to buy a similar basket of goods in each coun-
try) (Baer et al. 2007). They justify this $9000 threshold
on the basis of who has the capacity to develop. Those
who do not have the capacity to develop should not bear
the extra burden of climate-change mitigation. Their po-
sition is consistent with the ethical principle of ability to
pay.
1415
Figure 2. Per capita carbon
dioxide emissions for selected
countries. Dashed line is the
resulting 0.8 t CO 2 per capita
threshold needed to achieve
Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change assessment
figures of 85% CO 2 emissions cuts
by 2050 to keep global
temperature increase below 2 ◦ C.
Countries below the dashed line
would be able to sell GHG credits
equal to the amount below the
line to those countries above line.
Countries with emissions above
the line would be required to
reduce their emissions or buy
credits equal to the amount they
are above the line.
However, for purposes of biodiversity conservation,
maintaining the capacity of ecosystems, communities,
and species to adapt to climate change is also a concern.
Therefore, it is incumbent on conservation biologists to
identify ecological thresholds to augment the develop-
ment thresholds in the political discourse pertaining to
caps and tradable permits. The importance of biodiversity
in maintaining the development capacity of all economies
should also be emphasized.
Developing trading rules appropriate for all peoples
also has ethical implications. The rules developed for
the Kyoto Protocol-the Marrakech Accords-are so com-
plex they effectively exclude most people on the planet
from participation. Specialized technical knowledge is
required to calculate GHG emissions according to the
standards necessary and to proceed through the ver-
ification process of the UNFCCC. A southern farmer,
for example, who intentionally preserves forest along a
river bank probably will not have the capacity to par-
ticipate in a global credit-trading market. As developed
thus far, the carbon market established by the Kyoto Pro-
tocol benefits those already benefiting from economic
globalization (Lohman 2006). This violates ethical prin-
ciples of distributive and participatory justice. Trading
rules that start with ethical principles need to acknowl-
edge these difficulties. Therefore, governments must en-
sure the opportunity to participate is open to everyone
and the benefits of participation are equally shared and
Conservation Biology
Volume 22, No. 6, 2008
1416
not just going to those who already have the capacity to
benefit.
Conclusion
The atmospheric space for safe levels of GHG emissions
and the ecological space for socially beneficial economic
growth have been outstripped. Long-term ecological and
economic carrying capacities have been overshot, devel-
opment options are cut off, and economic growth is no
longer an option for all people on the planet. If the north
does not abide by its ethical obligations to accept respon-
sibility and to act first, as expressed in principles such as
the polluter pays, ability to pay, and common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities, the south’s participation in
global environmental protection is less likely. Similarly,
if countries act according to national interests alone, the
economic growth impasse cannot be resolved. The most
effective resolution is to provide room for development
for the south while capping economic growth.
With increased knowledge of ecological thresholds,
and in the context of an ethical framework, per capita
GHG emissions can be used to determine levels of re-
sponsibility and, by association, to identify under- and
overgrown economies. In other words, per capita emis-
sions can be adjusted as a scientifically sound metric and
used to determine whether economic growth is an ap-
propriate goal for particular countries.
Climate-change negotiations that developed the Ky-
oto Protocol were fantastic efforts to guard economic
growth, especially for the high-polluting economies of
the north. Many government delegations recognized the
threat an unstable climate poses to economic growth,
particularly for agriculture and coastal human settle-
ments. They rallied to develop a treaty that addresses
climate change, albeit insufficiently, yet develops new
sectors for economic growth such as GHG credits, tech-
nology exchange, and financial trade. In addition, those
countries that resisted the protocol most fervently—the
United States and until recently Australia—did so on
grounds that it would dampen economic growth even
with the development of these new sectors. Ironically,
guarding economic growth is often the key consideration
in climate-change negotiations even though economic
growth is the main driver of climate change.
This imperative may be changing. Negotiations by the
UNFCCC are increasingly focusing on science-based de-
cision making (IISD 2007), and scientists are increasingly
exposing the impact of economic growth on the environ-
ment (Canadell et al. 2007; IPCC 2007b). In addition the
Working Group III of the IPCC is building on the ethical
foundations of the UN and the UNFCCC and increasingly
working on the ethical dimensions of climate change (see
Fisher et al. 2007). Efforts to mitigate climate change that
Conservation Biology
Volume 22, No. 6, 2008
Distributive Justice and Climate Change
began at the Earth Summit in 1992, and earlier with the
establishment of the IPCC in 1988, are moving political
leaders toward the realization that economic growth is
the main driver of climate change and biodiversity loss.
The politics of scarcity may yet be tempered by the poli-
tics of science and equity.
Literature Cited
Agarwal, A., and S. Narain. 1991. Global warming in an unequal world:
a case of environmental colonialism. Centre for Science and Envi-
ronment, New Delhi, India.
Athanasiou, T., and P. Baer. 2002. Dead heat: global justice and global
warming. Seven Stories Press, New York.
Baer, P., T. Athanasiou, and S. Kartha. 2007. The right to development
in a climate constrained world: the greenhouse development rights
framework. Heinrich Böll Foundation, Berlin.
Baumert, K., and J. Pershing. 2004. Climate data: insights and observa-
tions. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Arlington, Virginia.
Brown, D., et al. 2006. White paper on the ethical dimensions of climate
change: preliminary analysis. Rock Ethics Institute, College Station,
Pennsylvania.
Byrne, J., Y. Wang, H. Lee, and J. Kim. 1998. An equity- and
sustainability-based policy response to global climate change. En-
ergy Policy 26:335–343.
Canadell, J. G., C. Le Quere, M. R. Raupach, C. B. Field, E. T. Buitenhuis,
P. Ciais, T. J. Conway, N. P. Gillett, R. A. Houghton, and G. Mar-
land. 2007. Contributions to accelerating atmospheric CO 2 growth
from economic activity, carbon intensity, and efficiency of natural
sinks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA
104:18,866–18,870.
Carley, M., and P. Spapens. 1998. Sharing the world. sustainable living
and global equity in the 21st century. Earthscan, London.
Council of the European Union. 2005. Information note. Council
of the European Union, General Secretariat, Brussels. Available
from http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st07/st07242.
en05.pdf (accessed June 2008).
Czech, B. 2008. Prospects for reconciling the conflict between eco-
nomic growth and biodiversity conservation with technological
progress. Conservation Biology 22: in press.
Czech, B., P. R. Krausman, and P. K. Devers. 2000. Economic associa-
tions among causes of species endangerment in the United States.
BioScience 50:593–601.
Daly, H. E., and K. N. Townsend. 1993. Sustainable growth: an impos-
sibility theorem. Pages 267–273 in H. E. Daly and K. N. Townsend,
editors. Valuing the Earth: economics, ecology, ethics. The MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Fisher, B. S., et al. 2007. Issues related to mitigation in the long term
context. Pages 169–251 in B. Metz, O. R. Davidson, P. R. Bosch, R.
Dave, L. A. Meyer editors. Climate change 2007: mitigation. Contri-
butions of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom.
Gupta, S., and P. Bhandari. 1999. An effective allocation criterion for
CO 2 emissions. Energy Policy 27:727–736.
Hansen, J., et al. 2007. Dangerous human-made interference with cli-
mate: a GISS modelE study. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics
7:2287–2312.
IISD (International Institute for Sustainable Development). 2007. A Brief
Analysis of COP 13 & COP/MOP 3. Earth Negotiations Bulletin
112(354):18–21.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2001. Climate
change 2001: synthesis report. United Nations Environmental Pro-
gramme, Nairobi, Kenya and the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion, Geneva, Switzerland.
Rosales
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2007a. Sum-
mary for policy makers and technical summary. Pages 7–78 in
M. L. Parry, O. F. Canziani, J. P. Pultikof, P. J. van der Lin-
den, and C. E. Hanson, editors. Climate change 2007: impacts,
adaptation and vulnerability: contribution of Working Group II to
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United
Kingdom.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2007b. Climate
change 2007: mitigation of climate change: Working Group III
contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report. Summary for pol-
icymakers and technical summary. United Nations Environmental
Programme, Nairobi, Kenya and the World Meteorological Organi-
zation, Geneva, Switzerland.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2007c. Cli-
mate change 2007: synthesis report. United Nations Environmen-
tal Programme, Nairbobi, Kenya, and the World Meteorological
Organization, Geneva, Switzerland. Available from http://www.
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf (accessed
June 2008).
Lawn, P. 2008. Macroeconomic policy, growth, and biodiversity con-
servation. Conservation Biology 22: in press.
Lohman, L. 2006. Carbon trading: a critical conversation on climate
change, privatisation and power. The Corner House, Sturminster
Newton, United Kingdom.
Meyer, A. 2007. Contraction and convergence. Global Commons In-
stitute, London. Available from http://www.gci.org.uk/ (accessed
June 2008).
Müller, B. 2002. Equity in climate change: the great divide. Oxford
Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, United Kingdom.
Ophuls, W. 1977. Ecology and the politics of scarcity: prologue to a
political theory of the steady state. W.H. Freeman, San Francisco.
1417
Rawls, J. 1971. A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Rosales, J. 2008. The politics of equity:precedent for post-Kyoto per
capita schemes. In press in V. Grover, editor. Climate change:
Kyoto—ten years and still counting. Oxford & IBH Publishing, New
Delhi, India.
Shue, H. 1999. Global environment and international inequality. Inter-
national Affairs 75:531–535.
Suh, S. 2006. Are services better for climate change? Environmental
Science & Technology 40:6555–6560.
UN (United Nations). 1949. Charter of the United Nations. United
Nations, New York. Available from http://www.un.org/aboutun/
charter/index.html (accessed June 2008).
UN (United Nations). 1992. Rio declaration on environment and
development. United Nations, New York. Available from http://
www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126–1annex1.htm
(accessed June 2008).
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change).
2002. United Nations framework convention on climate change.
Climate Change Secretariat, Bonn, Germany.
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change).
2007. Greenhouse gas inventory data. United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, Climate Change Sec-
retariat, Bonn, Germany. Available from http://unfccc.int/ghg_
emissions_data/items/3800.php (accessed January 2008).
U.S. Census Bureau. 2007a. International data base. U.S. Census Bu-
reau, Washington, D.C. Available from http://www.census.gov/
ipc/www/idb/idbsprd.html (accessed January 2008).
U.S. Census Bureau. 2007b. Total midyear population for the
world: 1950–2050. U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C. Avail-
able from http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpop.html
(accessed January 2008).
Conservation Biology
Volume 22, No. 6, 2008