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FUAT AKSU - NURŞİN ATEŞOĞLU GÜNEY
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Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBİV)
Citation
Fuat Aksu and Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney (Eds.), Proceedings of the International
Conference on the New Iraq, March 22nd, 2005, İstanbul. İstanbul: OBİV, 2005.
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Cover Designed By
I. SESSION
Chairperson
Özdem Sanberk
(R. Ambassador, Turkey)
10.30-12.30
11.30-11.45 Coffee Break
11.45-12.30 Discussions
II. SESSION
Chairperson
Prof. Dr. Kemal Kirişçi
(Boğaziçi University, Turkey)
14.00-15.30
15.30-15.45 Coffee Break
15.45-17.00 Discussions
viii
I. SESSION
10.30-12.30
Chairperson
Özdem Sanberk
(R. Ambassador, Turkey)
The Need to Include the Arab Sunnite in the Current Political Process in
Iraq
Oraib Al-Rantawi
(General Director of Al Quds Centre for Political Studies /Jordan)
ix
II. SESSION
14.00-17.00
Chairperson
x
CONTRIBUTORS
Prof. Dr. Alexander Nikitin; (Center for Political and International Studies/RF)
Dr. Dina S. Shehata; (Researcher, Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic
Studies / Egypt)
Prof. Dr. Alexander Nikitin; (Center for Political and International Studies/ RF)
Associate Prof. Dr. Thomas S. Mowle; (Director, Center for the Study of Defense
Policy United States Air Force Academy / USA)
xi
The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 İstanbul
CONTENTS
CONTRIBUTORS ............................................................................................XI
PREFACE............................................................................................................ 1
WELCOMING REMARKS .................................................................................3
Thomas S. MOWLE......................................................................... 59
IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ 2003-2005 ........................ 97
PREFACE
The Foundation of Middle East and Balkan Studies with the
Department of Political Science and International Relations organized a
conference under the title of “New Iraq” on 22 March 2005.
The participants who are all experts in their fields have come together
at this very important conference, so as to discuss the future of Iraq.
WELCOMING REMARKS
Distinguished Guests
Today, we will be discussing the future of Iraq. Since the Iraqi elections
of January 2005, the country’s political development and the role of the
coalition forces inevitably entered a new phase. Now, that the elections are
behind questions remain over whether they will pave way for security and
democracy in the future or cause even more instability and conflict in Iraq. At
the “New Iraq” conference today, the distinguished participants who are all
experts in their fields are expected to (i) discuss the various factors that can
worsen the current situation in Iraq and (ii) come up with policy
recommendations that could be help.
The current problems of Iraq (like; new Iraqi constitution, the future
status of Kirkuk, the legitimacy question, the problem of equal representation,
economic reconstruction of the country and such.) that are ahead of Iraqi
Transitional Assembly quite serious and challenging. Unless these problems are
carefully tackled, the damage they would cause would be beyond repair.
Nearly, two years after the end of the Saddam’s regime, the security
situation in Iraq is not solved yet. The country still continues to be a place of
widespread criminality, violence and instability. The on-going insurgencies in
Iraq had become the major obstacle on the way rebuilding the country and
moving towards peace and stability.
So, the Iraq story that was hoped to end with the overthrown of
Saddam regime in 2003 is not over yet. On the contrary, there seems to be
along way to go.
And, I hope that this meeting will produce some insight and solutions
to the problems of new Iraq.
4
The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 İstanbul
OPENNING REMARK
Güner ÖZTEK*
Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished Participants,
The election shows the will of Iraqi people to take control of their own
destinies and their strong belief in democracy. Although the security situation is
the most pressing issue in the country, the determination of the people is a
victory over the forces of terror and anarchy.
The third point is the status of Kirkuk. Kirkuk where the Turkmen
came to establish themselves in the XIth Century is a multi-ethnic province
6
OPENNING REMARKS
where almost all the segments of populations traditionally have coexisted. All
the population groups in Kirkuk have vested interest in the Province’s future.
No single community should be allowed to establish control or domination
over the others. Kirkuk should be, as in the past, the collective property of the
entire Iraq. The property and resettlement claims need to be fully addressed
according to the established mechanisms. Until then the “fait accompli” or
Manipulations aiming at moving of hundreds, of thousands of new settlers
should be stopped. The future status of Kirkuk should be determined within
the context of the new constitution also taking into consideration the vast
petroleum reserves which belongs to the entire Iraqi population.
Next step in the transitional process will be the drafting of the new
Iraqi constitution and the referendum. Transitional Administrative Law set 15
August 2005 as the deadline for the preparation of the new constitution, under
normal circumstances constitutional Referendum is to be held by October 15,
2005. Subsequently General Elections will be renewed no later than 15
December 2005 after which transitional arrangements and sovereignty will be
transferred to the elected Iraqi Legislative and the Government.
7
Güner ÖZTEK
The failure in Iraq will not only produce a major setback for
democratic system but no doubt will give way to the destabilization of the
whole region by strengthening the terrorist groups and increasing their prestige.
Then, Iraq will become global center of terror and radical Islam as well as a
secure base for their subversive activities. This is why all the countries should
help Iraq to overcome the difficulties it is encountering in the development of
democratic process and the establishment and strengthening of the key national
institutions as the national army, police, political parties, civil societies.
I am certain that this day in Istanbul will bring forth fruitful discussions
and will lead to concrete results.
With these thoughts in mind, I would like to wish you all every success
in your deliberations.
8
The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 İstanbul
*
The presentation is in Arabic and simultaneously translated from Arabic to Turkish. We would
like to thank to Mr. A. Sait Aykut for his valuable contribution for translation the paper from
Arabic to Turkish.
Konuşma Arapça yapılmış ve simultane olarak Türkçe’ye çevirilmiştir. Konferansın Arapça-
Türkçe simultane çevirisine katkıları ve Arapça metnin Türkçe’ye çevrilmesindeki yardımları için
Sayın A. Sait Aykut’a içtenlikle teşekkür ederiz.
**
Dr.; Dean of the College of Law Al-Nahrain University /Iraq
Ghazi Faisal MEHDI
10
THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE PERMANENT CONSTITUTION
11
Ghazi Faisal MEHDI
12
THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE PERMANENT CONSTITUTION
anayasaya aykırı düşen yasa ve kararnameleri iptal edebilmelidir. Yargı gücü aynı
zamanda yürütme gücünün tüm işlerini denetleme hakkına da sahip olmalıdır.
Böylece “kendi başına, başıboş davranma” diye nitelendirilecek
hukuksuzlukların önüne geçilir; “yasaya uygunluk ilkesi” en üst düzeyde
korunur ve devlet hem fiilen hem de teorik olarak kanun devleti hâline gelir.
*
Metindeki Arapça ifade; “ed-Dimuqrâtıyye şibhi’l-Mübaşire”dir. Bu terim, “half-direct
democracy” teriminin Arapçaya çevrisidir; Türkçeye “yarı dolaysız demokrasi” veya “yarı
doğrudan demokrasi” gibi karşılıklarla çevrilebilir. Bilindiği gibi bazı uzmanlar İsviçredeki
kantonal sistemi, temsilî demokrasi (indirect democracy) veya eski Yunan sitelerinde uygulandığı
sanılan doğrudan demokrasi (direct democracy) kavramları altına sokmayarak “half-direct
democracy” tanımı altında ele almaktadırlar. İnternette konuyla ilgili verimli bir tartışma için bkz.
http://www.ddleague-usa.net/halfDD.htm (çevirenin notu)
13
Ghazi Faisal MEHDI
After the successful elections in Iraq and the selection of the people
deputies, the main task of the assembly is writing a draft of the permanent
constitution by 15.8.2005. This constitution should express the hopes of the
Iraqis and their ambitions. It should unite them and guide them to the right way
2. The constitution should recognize the rights and public freedom for
all the citizens. It should not permit its restriction but only on the ground of a
certain interest and within the law limits.
14
The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 İstanbul
Adel ABDULSALAM*
various parts of the Old World, especially from central Arabia during the
seventh century A. D. and later, and from Persia (later Iran) in the Islamic
period and in recent decades. Last remnants of very few Armenian families
live in Mosul and Baghdad, and rests of Circassian emigrants still live in some
villages in the vicinity of Zakho and north of Kirkuk. Hence, Arabs and Kurds
are the main ethnic bulks in Iraq.
1- the national Iraqi Shi’is, who look for a democratic, national united,
free country.
16
ETHNIC, SECTERIAL AND TRIBAL HERITAGE, FACING DEMOCRACY IN
NEW IRAQ
In addition to these tow big Islamic sects, there are several small sects,
like the Yezidis, Kaka’is, Shabaks, Lurs (Fili Shi’is), and the Sabians. Beliefs of
these sects are mainly mixtures of some old Asian pagan superstitions, and
beliefs from Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Generally speaking, these sects
have secret rites, and are ambiguous and mysterious. But in spite of the variety
of these sects. The number of their followers is too small in comparison with
the tow big Islamic sects. Accordingly, their political and social influence is
limited, but not totally absent.
The Iraqi inhabitants are mainly of tribal origin, even dwellers of the
cities belong to different Arabic, Kurdish, and Turkmenian tribes, or they are
members of big extended families. Big tribes are divided into sub-tribes and
smaller clans. Consequently, number of tribes and sub-tribes in Iraq are more
than several hundreds, which reveals the social and ethnic complicated heritage
of the Iraqis.
In addition to that, all members of every tribe and extended family are
not, always, members of the same religion and sect. There are tribes whose
members follow more than one sect, and rarely more than one religion. There
17
Adel ABDULSALAM
are Sunni-Shi’i Arab and Kurdish tribes, as well as mixtures of sectarian and
tribal groups among the small tribes and sects.
It is well known that all ethnic, sectarian and tribal Iraqi groups, and
others outside the ruling group suffered from the reign of terror of Saddam’s
regime and his equally sadistic collaborators, backed by Arab Sunnis and his
clan members. The Saddamists showed no mercy to their native people, even to
their own relatives and members of their own tribes, who dared to criticize
their idol ruler and his assistants, and their arbitrary policy
18
ETHNIC, SECTERIAL AND TRIBAL HERITAGE, FACING DEMOCRACY IN
NEW IRAQ
acceptable by the majority of the Iraqi people, who will go to any referendum
ballot box.
Iraqis today are liberated from fear and frightening, they feel free on
their land, in spite of the terror, liberation actions, and slaughtering of innocent
persons exercised daily by suicidal attackers and merciless kidnapers, on the
pretence of resistance against U.S.A and U.K. troops, to liberate Iraq from
occupation foreign forces.
19
Adel ABDULSALAM
But the question is, can the Iraqis forgive and forget?
Tow big question, the time and the future can answer them. Some
events show positive tendencies, concerning tolerance. But there are also
negative tendencies, which express fears and distrust.
On the other hand, the Sunni Arabs in the post- Saddam Iraq, lost
their power, and they will, practically, remain marginal in the future, in spite of
nominating one of them for the state’s president post, and despite of soothing
statements and guaranties, that Sunni Arabs, will participate with others in the
government, and will have their share in the power according to their number
of representatives in the National Assembly.
20
ETHNIC, SECTERIAL AND TRIBAL HERITAGE, FACING DEMOCRACY IN
NEW IRAQ
countries as well the Christian world. Such step will exaggerate terrorism, and
will lead to very sever tensions, and even to a possible civil sectarian war in the
region.
Political observers speak about splitting Iraq into several small states. in
accordance with the main ethnic, religious and sectarian groups. There are
different suggestions and expectations concerning dividing the country into
three states (Kurdish in Iraqi Kurdistan, Arab Sunni in Central and Eastern
Iraq, and Arab Shi’i state in southern Iraq), or into five cantons. Such projects
of mini states are a kind of mine fields in the heart of the eastern flank of the
changing Middle East. The old-new dispute about the ownership of Kirkuk is
only one of the recent problems. Therefore it is necessary to discuss the
Kurdish question, and look at the demands of Kurds to establish a federal, self-
ruled territory in Iraqi Kurdistan, inside a national democratic new Iraq.
21
Adel ABDULSALAM
Naturally, Kurds in Iraq prefer to have their own free state. But the de
facto distribution of them in five sovereign and independent countries, which
have common borders with Iraq, makes it very difficult, even it is impossible
realizing such dream and intention. It is more reasonable for the Iraqi Kurds, at
least in the present time, to cooperate with the Arabs and Turkmenians to build
a new democratic Iraq, which guaranties all national, cultural and political rights
and identities of every citizen, with special privileges for Kurds concerning a
self-rule federation or confederation, within a democratic, united and national
Iraq. Every nationality of the three main nationalities of Kirkuk claims the city
as his own city. The Arabs and Turkmenians are afraid of subjunction of it to
Kurdistan. The Kirkuk crisis can cause sever clashes between Kurds and the
other nationalities.
22
ETHNIC, SECTERIAL AND TRIBAL HERITAGE, FACING DEMOCRACY IN
NEW IRAQ
to the political, economical, social, human and historical issues, as well as the
main backgrounds considered by state policy makers, in account.
To avoid dividing the country, and prevent a civil war in Iraq, tolerance
and forbearance against fanaticism, racialism, sectarianism and tribalism are, the
main fundamentals for a new Democratic United National Iraq. It is impossible
to have a neutral ruling regime in Iraq, accordingly there is no other way except
to become a Democratic State, if the Iraqis are earnest and serious to build a
real Democratic United National country.
23
Adel ABDULSALAM
strategy of the Middle East. The main constant fundaments of the geo-strategy
of the region are:
These land-masses are inhabited by more than 275 300 000 souls (est.
2004), distributed in 14 states as follows:
Turkey 70 000 000
Iran 66 000 000
Syria 18 000 000
Lebanon 4 500 000
Palestine and (Israel) 10 000 000
Jordan 5 000 000
Saudi Arabia 22 000 000
Yemen 19 000 000
Oman 2 500 000
United Arab Emirates 3 500 000
Qatar 610 000
Bahrain 700 000
Kuwait 2 500 000
Iraq 23 800 000 (est. 2005)
These numbers reveal the demographic important position of Iraq as
the third populous country in the Eastern Middle East (without Afghanistan
and Pakistan, which are considered members of the Great-new-middle East).
24
ETHNIC, SECTERIAL AND TRIBAL HERITAGE, FACING DEMOCRACY IN
NEW IRAQ
25
Adel ABDULSALAM
of the Middle Eastern (eastern wing) community will enjoy a very significant
economic, political and cultural position, in the visible future.
Conclusion
I think, Iraq will possess, in spite of all recent and possible difficulties
and criticism, a Parliamentarian and Democratic institutional state,. The
elections of January 2005 were the entrance to a new constitutional period,
which will lead to the general elections of the Iraqi National Assembly, with
representatives of political parties as well as independent members, without
restrictions.
26
ETHNIC, SECTERIAL AND TRIBAL HERITAGE, FACING DEMOCRACY IN
NEW IRAQ
Last but not least, the Iraqi issue is only one folder of the changing
“Great Middle East” issues, and must be discussed as a part of the whole
question. And we must remember that Saddam's Iraq was a military force
threatening its neighbours, and it can be a threatening exporter of non grata
democracy to them in the future!!!
27
The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 İstanbul
Oraib AL-RANTAWI*
From the perspective of many observers, the Iraqi elections have both
general and particular signs which we would like to touch upon briefly. Perhaps
their most significant aspect are that they have clearly reflected the longing of
Iraqis to rid themselves from the existing security chaos and the raging acts of
violence and terrorism; highlighted their yearning to build a new Iraq -
pluralistic, democratic, sovereign and independent; and reflected their desire to
administer their own affairs by themselves by virtue of a democratic process
and elected institutions. These general signs are not rendered less significant by
the fact that the elections took place under candid US occupation of Iraq
despite the said occupations’ disguise under the name of “Allied forces” or Multi-
national forces.
The particular signs of the Iraqi elections are expressed in terms of the
heavy turnout of Shi’i Arabs and Kurds and the almost total boycott of it by
Sunni Arabs. The Shi’i Arabs have been a “people of cause” in an election
campaign in which they have found their historical opportunity to rectify the
defects of their participation and representation, in the Iraqi state institutions.
The said defects date back to more than 80 years in Iraq’s modern history. In
fact, it may be said that Shi’i leaders -who had learnt their lesson well from the
elections on 1922 which they had boycotted during the British Mandate would
not have lost an opportunity which had not made itself available to them, for
over 14 centuries.
The Kurds would not have lost the opportunity to streamline their
achievements afforded to them by the recent election and put them into proper
use. Hence their heavy participation in the said elections wherein they attained
second position after the Shi’i list and in a manner enabling them to consecrate
their achievements on the ground in the northern region; and to effect
30
THE NEED TO INCLUDE THE ARAB SUNNITE IN THE CURRENT
POLITICAL PROCESS IN IRAQ
To the Sunni Arabs, and unlike the Kurds and Shi’i Arabs, the elections
were the harbinger of the beginning of a phase of emaciation and retreat.
Appealing to ballot boxes, the logic of the majority / minority aspect of things
and representation based on numbers and percentages of the total population
were bound to lead the Sunnis to relinquishing positions of authority and
influence which they have been used to exercise mastery over for decades now.
It is the Sunnis –or most them al least- who have not yet recovered from the
shock of war, the fall and the collapse of the Ba'thist regime.
The US decision to dissolve the Ba’ath party , disband the army and
security organizations and dismantling state departments has led to throwing
thousands of Iraqis into the streets leaving them prey to hunger, poverty and
unemployment. Anarchy and security chaos have given reign to act of vendetta,
settlements of scores, thefts and lootings which have not limit themselves to
state establishments alone but included persons and families mostly from
among the Sunnites.
Sunni Arabs -unlike their Shi’i counterparts who enjoy the patronage of
their Marja’iah (Religious Authority) regardless of their factions and trends, and
31
Oraib AL-RANTAWI
the Iraqi Kurds whose representation is nearly limited to two principal parties -
found themselves in the wake of the downfall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in a
state of straying. Their representation is disputed among several forces, parties
and authorities; and in their name, tens of factions and scattered groups, some
of whom are imported as it were from neighboring countries, speak.
One may argue that one of the main reasons for this state of Iraqi
Sunni dispersion and fragmentation has in fact been on account of the
dictatorial and totalitarian attitude embodied by the ex-Ba’ath regime. Such an
attitude undermined the internal political, and partisanship life and destroyed
civil society establishments. Consequently, and after four decades of totalitarian
rule, Iraqis were left with two establishments, namely the religious and tribal.
And no one survived the process of organized methodical destruction of
political life and civil society organizations except the Kurds in their safe haven
north of Iraq. There, the two principal Kurdish secular parties managed to
safeguard their existence and accumulated influence which enabled the Kurdish
movement to play a significant role in the wake of the collapse of the Ba’ath
regime, the process of power transfer and the process currently in progress in
Iraq.
Unlike the Shi’i sect wherein the religious authorities and “Ulema” and
their institutions playa political, cultural and social role, and even an economic
role too, in the life of Shi’i adherents, the Sunnis do not go along with the
theory of the religious authority, Al-Marja, or the Muqalid (follower) nor do
they grant their “Ulema” such a role. The Sunni Ulema body was established
32
THE NEED TO INCLUDE THE ARAB SUNNITE IN THE CURRENT
POLITICAL PROCESS IN IRAQ
after the fall of Baghdad. This stands vis a vis the Shi'i Hawzat whose activities
date back to hundreds of years. The influence of the said Sunni “Ulema Body”
remains limited while the impact of the Shi’i religious authority has had a
significant effect before, during and after the elections.
• The Iraqi Islamic party. This party has sprung from the womb of the
Muslim Brotherhood League in Iraq and is considered an extension of it. It
is a political party with influence bases in the Sunni areas of Iraq. It has
taken part in the political process in its various pre-election stages. It found
itself forced to boycott the elections under pressure from Sunni Arab
public opinion whose majority favored the boycott.
• The Ba’ath party and the remaining bodies of the regime and its party and
security organizations. The party managed to pull itself together, gather up
its ranks and impose its influence in a number of living quarters and areas
in the wake of enrolling itself in violence such as liquidations and
assassinations that targeted army and security personnel as well as senior
Iraqi officials.
33
Oraib AL-RANTAWI
• Tens of organizations and movements both armed and political that sprang
in various locations and areas in Iraq. They number more than a hundred
and operate within Sunni communities claiming to be representatives of,
and spokesmen for, the said communities.
34
THE NEED TO INCLUDE THE ARAB SUNNITE IN THE CURRENT
POLITICAL PROCESS IN IRAQ
Us practices, both civil and military, have made difficult the emergence
of a more moderate and influential Sunni current. Under the slogan of
“uprooting the Ba’ath”, thousands of Iraqis were driven to hunger and destitute
and subsequently into the arms of resistance and terrorist movements. And
under the slogan of “combating terrorism” the lives and integrity of thousands
of Iraqis have been tampered with. These elements have not found their way to
political participation. Consequently, they have chosen the path of combating
occupation, and at times sought refuge in involving themselves in undertaking
retaliatory and vendetta acts.
Regional Repercussions
The Shi’i landslide victory in the recent Iraqi elections, and the
concomitant marginalization of the Sunni Arabs, together with the dwarfing of
the latter's role within the equation of the Iraqi internal forces equation, have
given rise to apprehensions from repercussions that might touch the stability
situation, civil peace and the balances of historical forces in a number of
countries in the region. Apprehensions have also arisen from the (probable)
consequences of Iraq turning itself into a bridge for increased Iranian influence
which might extend from the Gulf oil sources to the Israeli borders.
35
Oraib AL-RANTAWI
In Bahrain, on the other hand, leaders of the Shi’i majority received the
tidings and results of the Iraqi elections with considerable satisfaction. Shi’i
movements in the tiny Kingdom began to revive actively in order to
consolidate their presence and political participation. They have also begun to
declare publicly ally their close ties with Shi’i Marj’iat in both Iran and Iraq, and
to echo their confidence in that the changes in Iraq in this respect are hound to
usher subsequent changes which would extend to Bahrain.
36
THE NEED TO INCLUDE THE ARAB SUNNITE IN THE CURRENT
POLITICAL PROCESS IN IRAQ
peculiarity with which they have been confronted. News of their representation
in the national dialogue, and on local government election lists, as well as their
demands are strongly spreading on the Internet and in Saudi towns and cities.
Now if the slogan of resistance and enmity vis a vis the “greatest devil”
happens to be Hizbullah’ s mean for keeping its weapon and safeguarding its
immense influence in Lebanon, Hizbullah will not mind ignoring the alliance of
the Shi’i in Iraq with the USA so long as this alliance remain the means that
would enable them to attain power.
The cause for anxiety in the existing Iraqi and regional scene emanates
from the aggravation of foreign intervention in the affairs of this region; and
37
Oraib AL-RANTAWI
from the probability that certain Arab states and communities might be
transformed into arenas for the settlement of international and regional
accounts, and field for waging confrontations and wars by proxy among
regional states and international centers. Lebanon had paid an expensive bill for
this game in the past. It is not improbable that Iraq might pay similar costs for
the same game in the future, particularly in the event of the US Iranian conflict
aggravating against the background of Tehran's nuclear program.
A cause for anxiety also comes from the fears to return back to the
policy of alliances and pivots in the region. The united front between Syria and
Iran which was announced a few weeks ago is destined -if the confrontation
between the USA, on one side, and Syria and Iran, on the other side, were to
aggravate -to be transformed into a “Shi’i Crescent”, or “Arc of Crises”
particularly if the friends and allies of Tehran managed to hold the reins of
power in Iraq. It would be a front that would extend from Tehran to south
Lebanon via Baghdad and Damascus with supporting pockets in the Gulf. This
proposed political front finds a cultural and ethnic incubator to itself basically
expressed in terms of the Shi'i majority of the population of the said Arc's
countries including the regime of the Alawit minority of Syria which is bound
by religious ties with the Shi’i sect.
I believe that the calls for “exit strategy” for the USA from the
Quagmire of Iraq, are irresponsible and only take into account the direct and
38
THE NEED TO INCLUDE THE ARAB SUNNITE IN THE CURRENT
POLITICAL PROCESS IN IRAQ
I presume that a “Road Map” for Iraq must take the following
elements into consideration:
• Iraq must remain unified. The division of Iraq, in its known constituent
elements and their extensions to, and connections with, the neighbouring
countries, both Arab and regional, does not only increase the probabilities
of the outbreak of civil strife in it, but may well lead to its Balkanization
too. The division of Iraq, moreover, would sound the alarm in more than
one neighboring Arab or regional capital, particularly those of countries
that have ethnic and sectarian pluralism. It would also undermine the
efforts of minorities to demand their rights and increase the stubbornness
and obstinacy of majorities. Furthermore, it would provide many popularly
isolated regimes with a justification to tighten their repressive grip on their
peoples under the pretext of defending the unity of their respective
countries. Opposite all this, a united, democratic and politically pluralistic
Iraq can alone offer an impellent and inspiring model to other countries
and communities to venture into the throng of democracy, pluralism,
federalism and decentralization.
39
Oraib AL-RANTAWI
• The building of the institutions of the new Iraqi state, both civil and
military, is considered a preface for the evacuation of US and multinational
forces in accordance with an agreed -upon time table thereby allowing the
Iraqis to see a light at the end of the tunnel; assuring the Iraqi people that
occupation is not perennial in Iraq; expediting and revitalizing power
transfer, building institutions and effecting reconstruction; and ensuring a
wider participation by the Iraqis in determining their fate and future.
• And from here too springs the need to activate the dynamics of
participation in the Iraqi political order; and to contain the Arab Sunnis in
40
THE NEED TO INCLUDE THE ARAB SUNNITE IN THE CURRENT
POLITICAL PROCESS IN IRAQ
the said dynamics. At this juncture, the following elements of the required
containment process must be observed:
1. The “General mood” of Arab Sunnis has undergone change after the
elections. Large sections of them, including members of the Muslim “Ulema
Body”, the Islamic party and national, liberal and tribal personalities, in addition
to a wide section of old Ba’thist have come to realize the volume of the mistake
involved in their boycotting the elections. Consequently, they have entered into
preliminary dialogues with certain Iraqi forces. Accordingly, there are some
encouraging signs to the effect that the year-end elections may witness a more
earnest Sunni Arab participation.
41
Oraib AL-RANTAWI
future of Iraq. Dialogue with them is not only possible but a must in order that
the extremist, fundamentalist and terrorist force may be isolated.
6. There are regional roles which may be undertaken by several Arab and
Islamic states for encouraging Iraqi Sunni Arabs to participate (in the political
process); instituting dialogues with them; prompting them to form their party
and political frameworks; and rescuing them from the claws of the more
extreme forces. It is in this area that countries like Jordan and Saudi Arabia can
offer their contributions.
42
The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 İstanbul
Dina S. SHEHATA∗
∗
Dr.; Researcher, Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies / Egypt.
Dina S. SHEHATA
All of these factors help explain the growth of violent resistance among
the Sunni Arab population of Iraq. There is wide spread agreement that the
resistance in Iraq is mostly an Arab Sunni Phenomena. It consists primarily
from former personnel from the security and political apparatus but also from
Sunnis who resent the occupation and fear its consequences on the position of
Sunni Arabs in a Post-Saddam Iraq. The resistance also includes some non-
Iraqi fighters who came from abroad. These fighters are thought to be involved
in the suicide operations taking place in Iraq. However there is an opinion that
the bulk of the resistance is homegrown rather than imported.
44
PROPOSITIONS FOR CREATING AN INCLUSIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN
IRAQ
are marginalized from emerging. That explains why the resistance has often
been accused of having no political agenda.
Since the fall of the regime two years ago, new groups have been
emerging and claim to represent the Sunni Arab population of Iraq. These
include the Association of Muslim Scholars, the Islamic party of Iraq, tribal
leaders from the Sunni areas (most have adopted a radical approach vis-à-vis
the occupation and are said to tacitly support the armed resistance but others
such Ghazi Elyawer have adopted a conciliatory approach) and finally some
secular politicians such as Adnan Bajaji also claim to represent the Sunni Arab
of Iraq. However, it remains unclear how much support any of these groups
specially the Association of Muslim Scholars and the Islamic party of Iraq enjoy
among the Sunni Arab population which they claim to represent especially
since most of the groups have chosen to boycott the January 30th elections.
The links between these groups and the resistance are unclear but they
are said to exist and there is a widespread belief that some of these groups
especially some of the tribal leaders and also the association of Muslim scholars
are able communicate with the resistance and that they can negotiate a
cessation of the violence if their demands are met. Some of these demands
were presented at a recent conference which brought together representatives
from most of the Sunni Groups including tribal leaders with links to the
resistance. The aim of the meeting was to reach a unified strategy for the post-
election period and the demands were as follows:
45
Dina S. SHEHATA
here that same prominent groups such as the Islamic party accept
Federalism)
However, not all Sunni Arab groups boycotted the elections. Ghazi
Elyawer formed his own list under the name Iraqiyun which succeeded in
46
PROPOSITIONS FOR CREATING AN INCLUSIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN
IRAQ
winning five seats in the national assembly. Adnan Bajaji also ran his own list
but didn’t secure enough votes to win any seats.
Furthermore, in recent days there has been news about a divide within
the ranks of the major Sunni groups over the best course of action in the post
elections period. There are signs of dissatisfaction with the way the Association
of Muslim and the Islamic party have tackled the elections issue and they are
being blamed by some for further marginalizing the Sunni Arab population of
Iraq. There is evidence that the Sunni Arab population of Iraq is unhappy with
the decisions taken by those who claim to represent them and that they would
like their leaders to take a more pro-active position in the post-election period
especially in the process of drafting a new constitution. There is also evidence
that the principle of federalism is gaining wider acceptance among Sunni Arabs
and there have been some recent calls for the creation of a Sunni Arab province
similar to one proposed by some Shiites for the South and by the Kurds for the
north.
Sunni Arab leaders are poised to play an important role in the post-
election period especially once the negotiations over the creation of a new
47
Dina S. SHEHATA
48
PROPOSITIONS FOR CREATING AN INCLUSIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN
IRAQ
- A Mutual veto
- Proportional representation
49
The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 İstanbul
52
TURKEY AND IRAQ: CHALLENGES OF TRANSITION
53
Meliha BENLI ALTUNIŞIK
and the status of the city of Kirkuk are of particular concern for Turkey.
Within this context the status of Kirkuk is especially highlighted. Turkey
accuses the Kurds of Iraq of continually pressing for full control of towns
where there are mixed populations and seeking to evict Turkmen and Arab
inhabitants from the region. The most significant conflict in this regard centers
on Kirkuk. Although Kirkuk and its environs are not part of the Kurdistan
regional government for now, the Iraqi Kurdish leaders have been quite vocal
on their aim of incorporating it, which they consider historically a Kurdish city.
Turkey, on the other hand, continues to adamantly oppose Kurdish control of
the multi-ethnic Kirkuk region, in large part because of the assumption that
Kurdish control of the region and its resources could contribute Iraq’s ultimate
disintegration. Attempts to change the demographics in multi-ethnic Kirkuk are
considered as unacceptable by Ankara and seen as dangerous as it may lead to a
civil unrest erupting between different ethnic groups. Turkey also advocates
exploration and administration of Iraq’s natural resources by its central
government.
2) The second challenge is about how to integrate the Sunni Arabs into
the political system. Turkey has been emphasizing this aspect as well. Most of
the Sunni Arabs boycotted the elections and thus there is a limited
representation of Sunni Arabs in the National Assembly. Turkey has been
emphasizing the importance of the principle of inclusion and it was basically
hoped that the post-election process of building institutions will include Sunni
Arabs, although they are not really part of the National Assembly. Before the
elections Turkish Prime Minister Gül said that “we will make suggestions to
anyone in order to persuade them to participate in the elections.” Turkey was in
contact with different Sunni Arab groups to convince them to participate in the
elections. Gül in the same speech also said that “Sunni Arabs should not be
excluded from the government. While Iraq was being formed in 1932, the Shi’a
was excluded from the administration and when they tried to participate in the
54
TURKEY AND IRAQ: CHALLENGES OF TRANSITION
government later on, trouble occurred. The same thing should not be
repeated.” Thus Turkey has been arguing that the Sunni Arabs should be
included within the system for a post-Saddam regime to consolidate itself and
to work.
55
Meliha BENLI ALTUNIŞIK
intervention to sort out its problems out in the process of state building and
consolidation. The security concerns of all these actors cannot be taken
individually, as they are interconnected. In other words, these actors constitute
a “security complex”, defined by Barry Buzan as “a group of states whose
primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national
securities cannot realistically be considered apart from another.” Thus the
strategic setting that emerged after the Iraq War of 2003 created a new sub-
regional security sphere with Iraq as its center. The main actors in this new
setting are no longer just the countries of the Gulf; they now include Turkey,
Syria and Jordan.
The question, then, is how the states of this particular sub-region can
achieve security in the new strategic environment. It is safe to argue that in the
post-war setting there are significant enough shared interests in this sub-region
to forge creation of a limited security regime. In the Iraq-centered security
space the states share a common interest, namely preventing the total failure of
Iraq. In the current environment characterized by uncertainty and fear, some
states are behaving as if they are pursuing policies that may be working against
this common interest. However, if Iraq fails, if it disintegrates or bogged down
in civil war, then all the countries in this sub-region will suffer. If the conditions
of uncertainty and fear are mitigated through the establishment of a security
regime, they would not be pursuing policies that are undermining their security
interests in the long run. All the states in this sub-region also have an interest in
containing the transnational radical terrorist groups. These common interests
are sufficient to build a limited multilateral security regime. The consultation
mechanism between Iraq and its neighbors can be significant in that respect.
Turkey launched this initiative in January 2003, right before the US invasion of
Iraq in order to find ways to prevent the upcoming war. Although the imitative
was not successful in achieving that objective, the countries including Iraq
continued to meet after the War. There have been seven meetings since then
56
TURKEY AND IRAQ: CHALLENGES OF TRANSITION
57
The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 İstanbul
Thomas S. MOWLE*
* Associate Prof. Dr.; Director, Center for the Study of Defense Policy United States Air Force
Academy / USA.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government. The author would like to thank many people with whom he was stationed in
the Green Zone from August to December 2004, most especially Tom Duffy, Henry
Enscher, Tammy Fitzgerald, Jerry Howard, Mike Lewis, Laura Poitras, Stuart Symington,
Tom Warrick, and Jim Xinos. Their insights and suggestions, and those of many others, were
crucial to the development of the author’s understanding of Iraqi politics. The author would
also like to thank Doug Borer, Damon Coletta, Juan Cole, Jerry Howard, Neal Rappaport,
Greg Rose, and Brad Thayer for their comments on drafts of this paper. All remaining errors
of fact, interpretation and analysis are the sole responsibility of the author.
Thomas S. MOWLE
The Iraqi elections are the legacy of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,
senior cleric of the Najaf marja’iyyah and the Object of Emulation for most Iraqi
Shia.1 From the earliest days of the American occupation, he advocated direct
national elections for Iraqi institutions, a stance that combined the ideological
1
For simplicity, this paper will use the term “Sunni” as shorthand for “Sunni Arabs” and “Shia”
as shorthand for “Shia Arabs.” Kurds, about 85% of whom are estimated by Sunni with the
remainder Shia, are identified by their ethnicity, which is their primary identity. Similar logic
applies to the Turkomen, nearly all of whom are Shia. A small percentage of Christians are
found among all groups; where they are politically active they are identified here by their faith
rather than their ethnicity.
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POLITICS AND IRAQ: TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTION AND
BEYOND
appeal of pure democracy with the partisan knowledge that the Shia comprised
a majority of the Iraqi population.2
2
There is no precise demographic breakdown for Iraq. Most estimates suggest that the Shia are
55-60% of the population, the Kurds and Sunni 15-20% each, with Turkomen, Christians,
and other minorities combining for about 5-10% of the population.
3
Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs 83, 5, September/October 2004,
pp. 44-8; Hiwa Osman, “Questions Surround Elections,” Iraqi Crisis Report 37, 28 November
2003.
4
Osman, “Questions.”
5
Mohammed Ali al-Hassani, “Iraqi Shias Call for Elections,” Iraqi Crisis Report 24, 25 June 2003.
6
Zaki Yahya, “Iraqis Call for Self-Rule,” Iraqi Crisis Report 25, 2 July 2003.
61
Thomas S. MOWLE
ensured minority rights, they could empower a tyranny of the Shia majority;
they also would be a complex undertaking amid violence. Caucuses of local
and regional leaders would be easier to secure, and would do more to ensure
that all groups in Iraq were represented.
The TAL, published on 8 March 2004, and CPA Orders 96 and 97,
issued on 7 June 2004, included this plan. Iraqi sovereignty would be restored
on 30 June 2004,10 with power going to an Iraqi Interim Government (IIG).11
The IIG would govern under TAL provisions until an Iraqi Transitional
Government (ITG) was formed after National Assembly elections, to be held
7
Adnan Karem and Haytham al-Husseini, “Shias Demand Free Elections,” Iraqi Crisis Report 45,
22 January 2004.
8
Kamal Ali, “Ballot Debate Rumbles On,” Iraqi Crisis Report 47, 9 February 2004.
9
Diamond, “What Went Wrong,” pp. 48-50.
10
Transfer of sovereignty occurred early, on 28 June 2004.
11
TAL 2.B.1
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POLITICS AND IRAQ: TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTION AND
BEYOND
no later than 31 January 2005.12 Formation of the ITG would initiate a second
phase of Iraqi governance, which would end with the formation of a
government under the Constitution written by that assembly and ratified in a
national referendum.13 UN Security Council Resolution 1546 (8 June 2004)
endorsed the plan without reference to the TAL.14
An annex to the TAL issued on 1 June 2004 directed that the IIG
would be chosen in the context of the National Conference, a national caucus
of several hundred Iraqi leaders meeting in July. The Conference would choose
a National Council of 100 members, including the 3-member Presidency, Prime
Minister and cabinet. Most of the power in the IIG would lie with the Council
of Ministers and Presidency, which could issue legislative orders.15 The wider
National Council could veto IIG orders by a 2/3 vote and monitor IIG
activities.16
12
TAL Annex Section 1.
13
TAL 2.A, 2.B.2.
14
UNSCR 1546, paragraph 4.
15
TAL Annex, section 2.
16
TAL Annex, section 3.
17
Omar Anwar, “Courting Muqtada,” Iraqi Crisis Report 80, 24 August 2004.
63
Thomas S. MOWLE
was pushed through the conference without organized opposition. The new
government was broadly representative of Iraqi groups, but it remained
established in many Iraqi minds as a continuation of a puppet regime installed
by the Americans.
Shia Ayad Alawi of the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) served as prime
minister and Sunni Ghazi Yawr was the president; both are considered political
moderates.18 The only overtly religious leader of the IIG was Deputy President
Ibrahim Ja’afari, leader of the main branch of the Shia Da’wa Party; Finance
Minister Adil Abdel-Mahdi of the Shia SCIRI also represented more religious
interests. The other two top posts went to Kurds, Deputy President Rowsch
Shaways and Deputy Prime Minister Barhim Saleh. Saleh conducted most of
the day-to-day operation of the IIG, and has impressed many observers as a
highly competent administrator. The 27 ministries were distributed among
different groups; between 20 and 25% of the 32 leadership positions were held
by Sunni and Kurds, both somewhat in excess of their apparent proportion of
the population.19
18
The term “secular,” sometimes used to describe Iraqi leaders who are not overtly tied to
religious parties, is both inaccurate (their views on religion are congruent to those of the
American religious right) and offensive to a devout Muslim. Members of the Iraqi
Communist Party are among the few who would accept such a label.
19
For details on members of the IIG, see its website,
http://www.iraqigovernment.org/index_en.htm
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POLITICS AND IRAQ: TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTION AND
BEYOND
20
CPA Order 92
21
CPA Order 96, para 3.3.
22
For a discussion of the electoral choices made by the UN’s Carina Perelli in conjunction with
occupation leaders, see Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Is Haunted by Initial Plan for Iraq Voting,”
The New York Times, 9 January 2005.
23
CPA Order 97, para 2.2; IECI Regulation 03/2004, Amended 25 Oct 04, paragraph 3.6.4.
24
List from http://www.irc-co.com/elections/en/parties.asp
65
Thomas S. MOWLE
These coalesced into 111 lists competing on the national ballot. Iraqi electoral
law did not provide an artificial threshold for representation in the TNA.
Election to the TNA required receipt of only 1/275 (0.36%) of the national
vote, or about 29,000.25 This lack of a hurdle, unusual for proportional
systems, especially for such a large Assembly, ensured the most accurate
representation of Iraqi voting preferences. It also would tend to promote the
election of candidates with minimal appeal – extremists as well as those with
only isolated support. Individuals could register as a political entity and run
alone; any votes they received in excess of the natural threshold would be
reallocated to other lists. Electoral law required that a non-individual electoral
list include at least 12 names, at least four of whom would be women;26 in
principle this would filter out extremists (especially those most opposed to
women’s participation in politics), but assembling 12 like-minded individuals is
not a difficult task. As it turned out, several factors led to the largest electoral
lists receiving the lion’s share of the vote: coalitions formed among the
Kurdish parties and the more religious Shia parties, and violence effectively
precluded campaigning.
25
CPA Order 96, para 3.4
26
CPA Order 96, para 4.3, 4.4
27
IECI Regulation 02/2004. This method may have overstated the actual registration numbers,
since there is no incentive for families to remove members from the cards if they die or move
away. Thus the actual percentage turnout may have been much higher than the stated 58%
(8.5 million voters of 14.5 million registered). If, to use an unofficial estimate, only 12.5
million were legitimately on the roles, then turnout was 68%.
66
POLITICS AND IRAQ: TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTION AND
BEYOND
Iraqi political leaders tried to recreate the national list used at the
August National Conference. In October and early November 2004, proposals
were floated that would have created a single list including the seven major
parties of the IIG – the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK), SCIRI, Da’wa, the INA, the INC, and the Iraqi Islamic Party
(IIP). After rounds of informal discussion, the parties met at Lake Dohuk in
Iraqi Kurdistan in November, but could not reach an agreement. This effort
was doomed from the start, since it would have been very difficult for such a
diverse group of parties to agree on the proportion allocated to each party and
their rankings, especially with the added requirement that every third seat be
allocated to a woman. This failure was good for liberalism, because the
resulting national list would have been widely perceived as an attempt to
undemocratically fix the election results. The resulting government would have
had great difficulty winning legitimacy among those dissatisfied with the status
quo. The formation of an “incumbents” list would also have increased the vote
for more illiberal parties excluded from the list, since such parties would be the
only opposition. This hypothetical list probably would not have reduced the
calls for a boycott from the Sunni Muslim Ulema Council (MUC), since the
clerics would have labeled it as a continuation of the regime installed by the
67
Thomas S. MOWLE
Americans; Sunni turnout may have been higher if the IIP had been on this list
but the legitimacy of the ITG would have been profoundly weakened.
In the absence of a national list, the Kurds and Shia turned to the
formation of identity lists.28 The PUK and KDP, while continuing to compete
in elections for the Kurdistan Regional Assembly (KRA), agreed to form a
combined list, the Kurdistan Alliance (KA). By including representatives of
other Kurdistan parties, most notably the Kurdish Islamic Union, the Assyrian
National Party, and the Chaldean Democratic Union Party, Massoud Barzani
and Jalal Talabani assured that their list would secure almost the entire vote
from Kurdistan – 93.5%.29 The Christians also ensured that they would benefit
from the overall regional vote. Aided by turnout exceeding 80% in each of the
three KRA provinces (and 70% in Tamim), the KA won 75 seats in the TNA,
or 27% -- far in excess of the Kurds’ share of the Iraqi population.30 The
Islamic Kurdish Society won 2 seats, and later allied itself to the KA in the
National Assembly. Among other minorities, the Iraqi Turkomen Front (ITF)
won 3 seats, winning votes mostly in Tamim, and the National Rafidain List of
Assyrian Christians won 1, with half its vote coming from Out-of-Country
voting.
28
The most concise description of the Iraqi electoral lists is “Iraqi Election: Who Ran?” BBC
World, 31 January, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4051977.stm. See
also Max Sicherman, “Iraqi Elections: What, How, and Who,” Policy Watch 944, The
Washington Institute, 24 January 2005.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2237.
29
Asharq al-Awsat, reprinted in Iraqi Press Monitor 202, 2 December 2004. All election tallies from
IECI, at http://www.ieciraq.org/English/Frameset_english.htm
30
For province-by-province turnout, see graphic included in Paul Reynolds, “Sunni Share of
Power is Critical,” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4262557.stm
68
POLITICS AND IRAQ: TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTION AND
BEYOND
Alliance list blessed by the elder Sistani – and the fear of being excluded from
such a list – led the major religiously-oriented Shia parties to agree to accept a
lesser number of seats on a list primarily composed of independent candidates.
This list included SCIRI, Da’wa, the INC, representatives of Moqtada al-Sadr,
and the Islamic Fayli Grouping of Shia Kurds, along with many smaller parties.
While this list dominated the elections, winning 140 of the 275 seats (51%), its
cohesion over the long-term remains uncertain. The independents are loyal to
no one except Sistani, and the party leaders have a long history of rivalry. They
may remain united for a while for fear of being seen as breaking with Sistani,
but it seems difficult to believe that the group would remain intact through the
constitutional election. Three additional Shia seats went to the National
Independent Elites and Cadres Party, tied to Moqtada al-Sadr, and two to the
Islamic Action Organization in Iraq. Those parties, as well as the Shia ITF,
allied themselves to the UIA in the National Assembly after the election.
31
Al-Nahdhah, reprinted in Iraqi Press Monitor 191, 10 November 2004.
69
Thomas S. MOWLE
final two “centrist” seats were won by the People’s Union/Iraqi Communist
Party, which won an overwhelming percentage of its support in Baghdad. Both
the Constitutional Monarchy Movement of al-Sharif Ali Bin al-Hussein and the
Assembly of Independent Democrats led by Adnan Pachachi were shut out of
representation.32
Finally, we turn to the parties most strongly identified with the Sunni
Arabs. The largest such party, Muhsin abd al-Hamid’s IIP, announced on 27
December that it was withdrawing from competition in the election. While its
list remained on the ballot by law, the IIP later announced that even if elected
its members would not join any Iraqi government. The IIP was the only party
that appealed to a large portion of the Sunni population. While it supported
democracy in Iraq, it retained credibility among the Sunni for its criticism of
occupation policies. For much of fall 2004, the IIP was a counterweight to the
MUC’s repeated calls for a boycott – the MUC had insisted since February that
elections held under occupation were illegitimate,33 while the IIP argued that
Sunni exclusion would be self-defeating. The late Ramadan assault on Fallujah
and the mid-November raid on the Abu Hanifa mosque in the Adhamiyah
district of Baghdad inflamed Sunni public opinion against the IIG and the
occupation, making the IIP’s position increasingly untenable. Several other
parties joined the IIP in boycotting the election, leaving two seats for explicitly
Sunni parties: one for Mishan al-Jabouri’s Reconciliation and Liberation Front,
based in Salah ad-Din, and one for Justice Minster Malik Duhan al-Hassan’s
National Democratic Alliance, mostly from Baghdad.
32
Zaineb Naji and Talar Nadir, “Iraqi Election: Winners Rejoice, but Talk to Losers,” Iraqi Crisis
Report 112, 14 February 2005.
33
Ali, “Ballot Debate.”
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POLITICS AND IRAQ: TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTION AND
BEYOND
34
SCIRI’s Al-Adala, reprinted in Iraqi Press Monitor 196, 24 November 2004, indicated IIP’s
support, while Al-Mada, reprinted in Iraqi Press Monitor 197, 25 November 2004, reported that
the IIP had renewed its call for postponement.
35
Asharq al-Aswat, reprinted in Iraqi Press Monitor 196, 24 November 2004 discussed weather,
while the KDP’s al-Taakhi, reprinted in Iraqi Press Monitor 198, 26 November 2004, described
other reasons to postpone elections.
36
Addustour, reprinted in Iraqi Press Monitor 215, 10 January 2005.
37
Al-Sabah al-Jadeed, reprinted in Iraqi Press Monitor 199, 29 November 2004.
38
Al-Sabah al-Jadeed, reprinted in Iraqi Press Monitor 202, 2 December 2004.
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Thomas S. MOWLE
In the last several weeks before the election, the MUC continued to
assert conditions under which it would end the Sunni boycott, perhaps leaving
room for the IIP to re-enter the elections. These conditions included expedited
disposition of mostly Sunni detainees,39 transfer of the election to the UN from
the IECI, and a timetable for withdrawal.40 These conditions were not
addressed by American leadership.41 After the election, the MUC repeated
these same demands for release of detainees and a timetable for withdrawal, as
a condition for participation in writing the constitution.42 If the Iraqi
democratic process breaks down due to Sunni Arab perception of its
illegitimacy, the failure to bring Sunni Arabs and the IIP into the political
process will likely be seen as a preventable tragedy greater than disbanding the
Iraqi army, the blanket de-Baathification order, and the looting of Iraqi
infrastructure.43
39
Dhiya Rasan, “Jailed Without Trial, Iraqi Crisis Report 50, 1 March 2004. The IECI did not
allow prisoners to vote since they could not get to polling centers; polling centers were not
set up in the prisons. Al-Mashriq, reprinted in Iraqi Press Monitor 185, 2 November 2004.
40
Kamran al-Karadaghi, “Sunni Election Dilemma,” Iraqi Crisis Report 97, 14 January 2005.
41
Al-Nahdhah, reprinted in Iraqi Press Monitor 216, 11 January 2005.
42
Patrick J. McDonnell, “Key Sunni Arab Group Predicates Its Participation on Troops'
Leaving,” Los Angeles Times, 16 February 2005.
43
See Diamond, “What Went Wrong in Iraq?”
44
TAL, Article 36A.
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POLITICS AND IRAQ: TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTION AND
BEYOND
unanimously select a Prime Minister, who would submit a cabinet for approval
by both the PC (again unanimously) and a simple majority of the TNA.45
Given the election results, there were three ways to form such a coalition. The
simplest was to combine the 148 seats held by the UIA and its allies with the 77
seats held by the KA and its allies. This result – 82% of the seats – would allow
for some splintering within the UIA, which began to happen as negotiations
dragged into March. A second coalition would combine the UIA with the
Alawi’s Shia-led liberal party; Sunni members of that party might be reluctant to
join such a grouping, however, and even the addition of Shia members of
Yawr’s party might not bring the coalition up to the 2/3 required.46 A third
coalition option would be a more complex combination of Kurdish, ethnic
minority, and the liberal Arab parties (totaling 132 seats) with parts of a now-
splintered UIA.
45
TAL, Article 38A.
46
The Communists, while nominally Shia, were an unlikely partner for the religious Shia.
47
Dexter Filkins, “Race for Top Iraq Post Narrows to 2 Shiites,” The New York Times, 16
February 2005.
48
Department of State Office of Research, 17 November 2004.
73
Thomas S. MOWLE
Mahdi, on the other hand, was opposed 21-9% nationwide, winning support in
no area of the country, and was opposed 17-6% in the Sunni areas, 21-2% in
Kirkuk and Mosul, and 39-2% in Kurdistan. SCIRI leader al-Hakim’s rating
may be a better proxy for Mahdi’s, since he is as well-known as Jaafari; al-
Hakim trailed Jaafari in every region, with 43-25 overall national support, 47-
12% opposition in Sunni areas, 31-19% opposition in Mosul and Kirkuk, and
35-19% in Kurdistan. SCIRI’s willingness to concede this post to Da’wa was
important because Jaafari’s party is more clearly opposed to Iranian-style rule of
the jurisprudent and he is more attractive to the Sunni population.
74
POLITICS AND IRAQ: TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTION AND
BEYOND
Interim Prime Minister Ayad Alawi did not concede leadership to the
more religious Shia, however. On 21 February he announced his intention to
try to form his own majority, composed of his own party, the Kurds and the
remaining more moderate parties. While this would only yield 48% of the
seats, a 2/3 majority could be achieved if he were able to entice a third of the
UIA members to defect from the list.51 More likely, his bloc could prevent
Jaafari’s election, perhaps then throwing the job to Chalabi as the candidate
most acceptable to both blocs despite the long-running feud between Chalabi
and Alawi himself. This leaves the KA in a position to bargain hard with both
sides, giving it even more leverage with the UIA to gain concessions on
autonomy and Kirkuk.
49
Patrick J. McDonnell, “Chalabi Savors Status Gained Outfoxing U.S.,” Los Angeles Times, 20
February 2005.
50
John Daniszewski, “Islamist Is Nominated as Iraqi Premier,” Los Angeles Times, 23 February
2005.
51
John F. Burns And Dexter Filkins, “Shiite Alliance in Iraq Wants Islamist as the Prime
Minister,” The New York Times, 23 February 2005.
75
Thomas S. MOWLE
52
Anthony Shadid, “Iraq Must Unify Or Face 'Disaster,' Premier Warns,” Washington Post, 18
February 2005.
53
Eric Schmitt, “Iraqi Army Adds National Guard to Its Ranks,” The New York Times, 24
February 2005.
54
TAL, Article 28A.
55
TAL, Article 31A.
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POLITICS AND IRAQ: TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTION AND
BEYOND
The division of power between the PC, CM, and TNA is complex.
The PC may veto legislation, acting unanimously and subject to a 2/3 TNA
override, while the CM cannot block TNA actions.56 Both the Council of
Ministers (by a majority vote of its members) and individual assembly members
may propose legislation.57 The budget can only be proposed by the CM, but in
the absence of meaningful party discipline, especially within the UIA, it may
have difficulty passing it.58 The TNA can reduce or reallocate funding; a
proposal to increase the national budget would need to return to the CM for
approval.59 The PC is the ceremonial military commander in chief, with
command authority flowing from the PM to the Minister of Defense.60 The
CM appoints the director of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) and
general officers, with the TNA’s ratification.61 The PC, on the other hand,
appoints members of the Federal Supreme Court from a list recommended by
the Higher Judicial Council, which will also appoint the members of lesser
courts.62 These appointments are not subject to further review. The TNA
would ratify international agreements, after the PC unanimously recommends
56
TAL Article 37.
57
TAL Articles 33D, 42.
58
TAL Article 33C.
59
TAL Article 33C.
60
TAL Article 39B.
61
TAL Article 39D.
62
TAL Articles 44E, 46A.
77
Thomas S. MOWLE
63
TAL Articles 33F, 39A.
64
TAL Article 36A.
65
TAL Article 40.
66
TAL Article 38.
67
TAL Article 41.
68
TAL Article 42.
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BEYOND
With the ITG selected and in office, the primary official task before
the TNA is to draft a constitution in consultation with the people of Iraq.69
The constitution is to be drafted by 15 August 2005, but the TNA can vote
itself a single 6-month extension if it is unable to complete it on time. While
much of the TAL is designed to force supermajorities, passage of the draft
constitution would be by a simple majority vote.70 Supermajorities return in the
ratification process. Two months after the constitution is drafted, it is to go
before the Iraqi people in a national referendum. The constitution passes if it
receives a majority of the vote, and if at least 33% of the vote in 16 of 18
provinces is in favor.71 To state that last provision more clearly: if 2/3 of the
voters in 3 provinces vote no, the Constitution fails. When written into the
TAL, this provision was called the “Kurdish veto,” since there are three
overwhelmingly Kurdish provinces – Sulamaniyah, Irbil, and Dahuk. In
principle, however, it could be any three provinces, voting against it for reasons
of ethno-religious identity or more local concerns. If the referendum fails, the
TNA is disbanded and new elections held, restarting the process.72
With the low Sunni turnout in the election, and the concentration of
violence in Sunni areas – now an insurgency against a popularly-elected
government as well as a resistance to the American occupation – speculation
has centered on the possibility that the Sunni could veto the Constitution.
While possible, this seems unlikely. Anbar (Ramadi and Fallujah, and points
west) clearly has a 2/3 Sunni majority. In the absence of census data that
reveals the demographics of each governorate, it is difficult to tell if there are
69
TAL Article 60.
70
TAL Articles 61A, 61F.
71
TAL Articles 61B, 61C.
72
TAL Article 61E.
79
Thomas S. MOWLE
two more provinces that could give the Sunni their veto. The best available
demographic breakdown we have is from two polls taken in Baghdad in
September and November 2004, which averaged 54.5% Shia, 29% Sunni, 13%
“Muslim,” and just under 4% “other.”73
There are two proxies for Shia percentage. One is Sistani’s popularity.
In a November survey,74 93% of Basra residents and 96% of those in Kut (both
cities are Shia-dominated) said they were confident in Sistani’s ability to
“improve the situation in Iraq.” 25% in Sunni Tikrit agreed, as did 35% in
mixed-population Kirkuk. 70% in Baghdad supported Sistani, a bit higher than
the number of Shia identified in the polls, but reflecting the Tikriti results that
some Sunni respect the man. In Bacquba, capital of Diyala province, 69%
supported Sistani, suggesting a majority Shia population there as well. Earlier
polls showed him with 30% support in Mosul, capital of Nineweh province.75
73
Baghdad Polls, 16 September 2004 and 8 November 2004.
74
Department of State Office of Research, 24 November 2004.
75
Department of State Office of Research, 16 September 2004.
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POLITICS AND IRAQ: TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTION AND
BEYOND
Kurdish. Thus Baghdad may be 63% Shia, 19% Kurds and religious minorities,
and 18% Sunni, similar to the country as a whole. With Baghdad’s overall
turnout 83% of the national turnout, if we assume the depressed turnout is
spread across all groups equally, we find that Baghdad’s Sunni turned out at
levels similar to Anbar’s 2%.
76
Election day reporting suggested that turnout in Mosul was high among Kurds, Turkomen,
and Shia. See Mohammed Alban, “Mosul Poll Optimism,” Iraqi Crisis Report 106, 30 January
2005. For discussion of ballot problems that may have depressed Kurd, Turkomen, and
Assyrian voting, see Yaseen al-Rubai, “Ballot Problems in Ninewa,” Iraqi Crisis Report 112, 14
February 2005.
81
Thomas S. MOWLE
77
UNSCR 1546, paragraph 4c.
78
UNSCR 1546, paragraph 12.
79
UNSCR 1546, paragraph 12.
80
UNSCR 1546, paragraph 12.
82
POLITICS AND IRAQ: TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTION AND
BEYOND
81
TAL Article 3A.
82
Bradley Graham, “Army Plans To Keep Iraq Troop Level Through '06,” Washington Post, 25
January 2005.
83
Thomas S. MOWLE
83
An excellent discussion of Kirkuk and its politics is Nir Rosen, “In the Balance,” The New York
Times Magazine, 20 February 2005. See also Nermeen al-Mufti, “Turkomans under Threat,”
Iraqi Crisis Report 24, 25 June 2003; Sirwan Gharib, “Kirkuk’s Displaced Still Homeless,” Iraqi
Crisis Report 68, 14 June 2004; Twana Osman, “Comment: A Kurdish Jerusalem,” Iraqi Crisis
Report 84, 11 October 2004; and Soran Dawoodi, “Kurd Demos Spark Ethnic Conflict
Concerns,” Iraqi Crisis Report 84, 11 October 2004.
84
TAL Article 53A, B, and C.
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POLITICS AND IRAQ: TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTION AND
BEYOND
Kirkuk,” is to wait until after the ratification of the new constitution, a census
has been taken, and investigation of the Ba’athist regime’s demographic
manipulations is complete.85 The major part of this investigation will be
undertaken by the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC), which is looking
at forced migrations in and out of Kirkuk and the forced alteration of citizens’
ethnic affiliation. Migrants are to be returned or compensated.86 The
Presidency Council or an arbitrator appointed at its request is also supposed to
recommend changes to political boundaries, possibly correcting Saddam’s
movement of Kurdish areas into Arab provinces.87
The Kurdish leadership, however, is not eager to wait for these steps to
be complete before establishing Kirkuk as part of – probably the capital of –
Kurdistan. Throughout 2004, thousands of Kurds moved into Kirkuk, first in
an attempt to beat the planned (and cancelled) census, then in an attempt to
influence the provincial elections. Initially, these new residents were not going
to be able to vote, but after the main Kurdish parties threatened to boycott
provincial elections, the IECI ruled in mid-January that an estimated 72,000
Kurds could vote. The PUK and KDP quickly assembled a Kirkuk
Brotherhood List, which included Arabs and Turkomen, to compete in these
elections.88 This list won 26 of 41 seats on the provincial council.89
85
TAL Article 58C.
86
TAL Article 58A
87
TAL Article 58B
88
Ommar Gharib, “Kirkuk Parties Upset at Kurdish Returnee Vote,” Iraqi Crisis Report 99, 25
January 2005; Ommar Ghardib, “Kurdish Parties Team Up in Kirkuk,” Iraqi Crisis Report 102,
26 January 2005.
89
Talar Nadir and Zaineb Naji, “Kurds Set Out Their Demands,” Iraqi Crisis Report 113, 18
February 2005. Their numbers are at odds with the official IECI results, provided in the text.
85
Thomas S. MOWLE
90
TAL Article 53A
91
TAL Article 54A
92
TAL Article 54B
93
TAL Article 25
86
POLITICS AND IRAQ: TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTION AND
BEYOND
in June 2004. They said they were “bitterly disappointed” that both the prime
minister and president would be Arabs. Further, they said, “If the TAL is
abrogated, the KRG will have no choice but to refrain from participating in the
central government and its institutions… and to bar representatives of the
central government from Kurdistan.”94 In an unofficial parallel referendum, a
majority of Kurds voted for independence in January.95 In addition, the Kurds
would like to gain control of revenue from the Kirkuk oil fields.96 Once again,
the KA is more likely to be accommodated on this issue by the UIA than by the
moderate parties that want a more centralized state. Both the Shia and Kurds
have an interest in taking control of oil revenues;97 the Sunni would likely reject
such a measure since few natural resources exist in their areas, other than the
headwaters of the two rivers.
94
Eric Watkins, “Iraqi Kurds Hint at Independence,” Iraqi Crisis Report 66, 7 June 2004.
95
Talar Nadir, “Kurds Stage Unofficial Independence Vote,” Iraqi Crisis Report 107, 31 January
2005; Jeffrey Fleishman, “Iraqi Kurds See Chance to Press for Statehood,” Los Angeles
Times, 1 Feburary 2005, reports that 1.7 million Kurds, or 45% of the population, signed an
independence petition.
96
Edward Wong, “Iraqi Kurds Detail Demands for a Degree of Autonomy,” The New York
Times, 18 February 2005.
97
Talar Nadir and Zaineb Naji, “Kurds Set Out Their Demands,” Iraqi Crisis Report 113, 18
February 2005.
98
TAL Articles 4, 52, 57A
87
Thomas S. MOWLE
Kurdistan’s.99 Proposals have been mooted for a southern region around the
Basra oilfields and for a mid-Euphrates region;100 the Sunni could also form a
region to increase the power of the areas in which they have a majority. The
UIA seems more supportive of this federal project than the moderate parties,
which also creates room for accommodation of Sunni concerns.
99
TAL Article 53C
100
Al-Taakhi, reprinted in Iraqi Press Monitor 205, 7 December 2004.
101
The fate of party-linked militias will likely be resolved by folding them into security forces –
since the largest such militias are the Kurds’ peshmerga and SCIRI’s Badr Organization.
Neither the Kurds nor the Shia are going to take much action to reverse the de-
Ba’athification order, CPA Order 1, 16 May 03.
102
TAL Article 7A.
103
John Daniszewski, “Acting as an Iraqi First, a Shiite Second,” Los Angeles Times, 20 February
2005.
104
“Constitution Blow,” Iraqi Crisis Report 51, 5 March 2004; Dhiya Rasan, Wiam al-Jaf, and Ali
al-Naji, “Leaders Sign Up to New Constitution,” Iraqi Crisis Report 52, 8 March 2004.
88
POLITICS AND IRAQ: TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTION AND
BEYOND
If social policies are left largely to the provinces, different policies could apply
in different areas. This could be the final building block in a grand compromise
among Kurd and Shia leaders: the Shia would retain the ability to impose
Islamic laws where they dominated, while the Kurds would be free to be
exempt from such legislation. This compromise might be acceptable to the
more cosmopolitan Baghdad residents, as well as to the Sunni provinces. The
Kurds have indicated they would be willing to take Kirkuk while leaving the oil
revenue nationally shared, which might appease the Arabs (this is an easier
concession for the Kurds than it might seem, since the oil pipelines from
Kirkuk run southwest through majority Arab areas). They might be willing to
accept the oil revenue and defer Kirkuk, which also might appease some Arabs.
The main opposition to this compromise would be the moderate Arab leaders,
whose lack of national popularity has already been demonstrated.
89
Thomas S. MOWLE
105
Patrice Claude, “’Foreign Forces Must Leave Iraq as Soon as Possible,’ Declares the Head of
the Shiite Alliance,” Le Monde, 8 March 2005.
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BEYOND
The preceding predicts that by mid 2006, Iraq will have an elected
government based on a federal system, a minimal American troop presence,
and substantial Kurdish autonomy and influence over Kirkuk. The insurgency
will continue, but with a reduced appeal as Iraqi security forces become more
competent and as Sunni leaders’ fear of Shia domination are eased by
constitutional provisions. Reduction of American forces will also reduce the
insurgents’ appeal; given that the constitutional government will ask the
Americans to leave, it might help the Iraqi government if the United States
announced an intention to do so. A more peaceful Iraq has the human and
natural resources to make economic and social progress, returning to its historic
position as a significant regional power.
Turkey would then find that it has a regional partner that it can work
with, based on some common ideology and a good fit in international trade.
Kurdish autonomy in Iraq will not be much different than Kurdish autonomy
under the no-fly zones, and a prosperous Kurdistan could be an economic
boon for southeastern Turkey. The Iraqi Kurds have historically not offered
much support for violence among Kurds in Turkey (they have even cooperated
with the Turkish army in its efforts against the PKK), and this is unlikely to
change in the future. Kurdish autonomy in Iraq would probably increase
Kurdish pressure within Turkey; the form this takes will be up to the Ankara
government. The most bitter pill for Turkey would be the loss of Turkomen
control of Kirkuk. One would expect, however, that Turkish aspirations for
membership in the European Union will quell any coercion from Turkey, as
long as those aspirations continue to seem viable. The same aspirations will
also produce pressure on Ankara to continue accommodating the interests of
91
Thomas S. MOWLE
While Iranian support for the Iraqi Shia cannot be denied, the Iranian
government will find any dreams of influence quickly dashed. The Arab-
Persian divide runs much deeper than Shia commonality. Allegations of ties to
Iran are almost as devastating to an Iraqi politician as are ties to the United
States. Iraqi Shia will be careful to set their own course, and may raise
questions about the Arab minority in Iran. Iraqi Kurds may raise similar
questions about their brethren in Iran. A democratic Shia-ruled state in Iraq is
likely to inspire calls for reform among already disillusioned Iranians. Many
factors interact here, including popular Iranian reaction to international
pressure over nuclear weapons, so it is unwise to predict an Iranian counter-
revolution. The Iranian regime will, however, have to spend more time being
concerned with its own tenure than with trying to influence Baghdad.
Syria would also face pressure, although its government does not face
nearly the level of opposition that the Iranian does. Syria is responding to
international pressure over its presence in Lebanon, and popular reaction to the
assassination of Rafik Hariri suggests that Lebanon may be the next Arab state
to establish a sovereign democracy. The Ba’ath regime in Syria seems to be in
little danger, but its support for the insurgency will not win it friends in
Baghdad. A growing Iraq will mean that any Syrian hopes for regional pre-
eminence will once again be frustrated.
106
For further discussion of Turkey and Iraqi Kurds, see Bill Park, “Iraq’s Kurds and Turkey:
Challenges for US Policy,” Parameters, Autumn 2004, pp. 18-30.
107
Salih Boztas, “Turkey Accepts a Federal Structure in Iraq,” Zaman, 27 February 2005.
92
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BEYOND
Other Arab states, in the Gulf and beyond, would need to confront the
implications of a mostly successful, mostly liberal Iraq. Jordan, the most liberal
of these, would benefit from trade, and would be likely to continue to open its
society. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, with their large Shia populations, especially
will feel popular pressure. The more important variable here, and the limiting
factor on the spread of democracy, will be an Arab-Israeli settlement.
Discussion of the latter falls far outside the scope of this paper, but the
combination of peace in Iraq and in Israel would be truly revolutionary. It
remains to be seen if all parties will seize the current opportunity, or let it slide
away again.
For the United States, the projected outcome doesn’t fully fit its
aspirations, but the end result may actually be better. The United States would
not have permanent bases in Iraq, but those bases would have become lasting
targets for Iraqi and Islamic agitators. The Iraqi government will not be as
liberal as it would have been under someone like Pachachi, and it will be
strongly influenced by Islamic law – but the Iraqi government will also reflect
the preferences of the Iraqi people. Neither a Ja’afari government nor its likely
successors would be considered American puppets, so they could work with
the United States on matters of common interests. Resentment towards the
United States would linger under a more moderate leader. More importantly,
this Iraq would become strong enough to repel terrorism, and will be genuine
enough to inspire liberal reforms elsewhere in the Arab and Islamic worlds.
Under this outcome, despite the mistakes, American policy will seem to have
been vindicated. The difficulty of achieving the outcome may, however,
discourage the United States from attempting a similar mission elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
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Thomas S. MOWLE
Government, are but the first steps across the tightrope to a liberal and
prosperous Iraq. The grand federal compromise among Shia and Kurds
requires both to give up some of their political goals, and asserts that the Sunni
will accept a federal system with central distribution of oil revenue in exchange
for the loss of Kirkuk to an enlarged Kurdistan. On the other hand, politics
cannot succeed without such a vision – and all the elements are in place for it.
The federal solution would also help reduce the prospects that a future Iraqi
leader disbands democracy.
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BEYOND
some ready location in case the insurgency flares up. It is difficult to imagine,
however, that Iraq would accept permanent American bases – staging rights
such as those offered by neutral Ireland through Shannon airport might be
possible. This combination of factors, especially if joined by a turn to
independent democracy in Lebanon and progress on the Palestinian problem,
would create the conditions for a more peaceful Middle East and enhance
Turkey’s role as a bridge between the Arab and European worlds.
95
The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 İstanbul
Kamran TAREMI*
The topic I would like to talk about is Iranian foreign policy towards
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. In that context, I will discuss the Iranian
perceptions of the United States’ invasion of Iraq, as well as the policies that
stem from these perceptions. I will argue that the US invasion transformed
Iranian-Iraqi relations into an extension of Iranian-American relations.
Further, I will contend that, in the two years since the invasion, the
Iranian government has pursued two goals in Iraq. The first has been to ensure
that the US invasion of Iraq will not be followed by an attack on Iran. And the
second has been to facilitate the holding of elections in Iraq which were
expected to produce two desirable results: a government dominated by the
Shiites and the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq at the earliest possible
time. The achievement of these goals translated into a cautious policy, itself,
(how should I put it?) … a cautious policy that sought to restore order and
stability to Iraq.
*
Dr.; Tehran University/ Iran.
Karman TAREMİ
I will further contend that by and large Iran was successful in achieving
its goals in Iraq due to a combination of factors, namely the US’s initial
miscalculations about the situation in the ground in Iraq, the increasing
resistance to the Iraqi occupation and Iran’s long-term investment in Iraqi
opposition groups.
Now, let us see what factors have shaped the Iranian policy towards
the US-occupied Iraq. Traditionally, a combination of international, regional
and domestic factors combined to shape Iranian policy towards our neighbor.
But the US invasion of Iraq has completely changed that situation. With the
United States now practically running Iraq for the past few years, the
international factors have assumed an overwhelming importance suppressing
the role of regional and domestic factors in shaping Iranian policy towards Iraq.
In other words, whilst in the past Iran relations with Iraq, with the United
States superpower, were only one of the factors that influenced Iran’s policy
towards Iraq, after the invasion, the international factors, that is Iran’s relations
with the United States, have emerged as almost the sole factor shaping the
Iranian ties with Iraq.
Now, I would first of all like to explain how the Iran-US relationship
influenced Iran’s stance on the US decision to invade Iraq. That mean, 2002,
the Kurds’ signs emerged of a US mobilization for the invasion, the Iran
government lost no time in opposing the use of force against Iraq. From
Tehran’s point of view, the US decision to invade Iraq was part and parcel of a
larger scheme that was aimed to eliminating all challenges to the US hegemony
in the Middle East. The leadership in Iran was confident that once the United
States has dealt with the Saddam Hussein, it would unleash its military machine
against the Islamic Republic of Iran. But it is clear from the Iranian government
pronouncements that even if the US invasion of Iraq would not be followed by
an attack on Iran, it still opposed the invasion. The chief reason for that was
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IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ 2003-2005
the Iranian government feared once the Americans came and defeated and
overthrown the Baath regime, they would install their client state which would
pose a host of threats to the security of the Islamic Republic. There was this
clear preference for the survival of Saddam Hussein in comparison with a
government placed in power in Iraq by the Americans.
99
Karman TAREMİ
Now, of course, what we had was that in March of 2003 the United
States actually invaded Iraq. Let us see how Iran responded to the invasion and
outbreak of war in its neighboring country. The official position of the Iranian
government was that Iran was neutral, meaning it would not side with either
belligerent during the course of hostilities. However, the Iranian government’s
pronouncements and the way that the news of the war was reported in the
Iranian media made it clear that Iran preferred the survival of Saddam Hussein
and wished for an ignominious defeat for the United States. So, listening to the
government-owned media, the war was depicted as one between David and
Goliath, on the one side were the Americans who were bombarding the Iraqis,
Iraqi women and children day and night; and on the other side were the Muslim
people of Iraq resisting the invasion of the infidels.
Let us see now how Iran reacted to… what kind of policies Iran has
actually adopted towards US-occupied Iraq. The invasion and fall of Saddam
Hussein’s regime presented Iran with a completely new situation on its western
borders. But it did not take the Iranian government long to adapt to the new
situation in Iraq, and adapt a more balanced view of the developments in that
country. For instance, Ayatollah Rafsanjani, the head of the Iranian Expediency
Council, argued that the US invasion of Iraq per se was neither good nor bad.
What was important was what would happen after the invasion. He held that, if
the United States was successful in imposing a client state in Iraq, then that
would certainly be detrimental to Iranian interests. On the other hand, if
democratic elections were held in Iraq and a representative government
100
IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ 2003-2005
emerged in that country, that would be in Iranian interests because any such
government would be dominated by the Shiites, and of course, the Shiites
would allying themselves with their Iranian co-religionists. These perceptions
formed the background to Iranian policy towards Iraq as it emerged after the
invasion.
Now, what that translated into was that the Iranian government
supported the participation of the Iraqi Shiite political organizations and parties
in the political process that was sponsored by the United States. So, with the
support of the Iranian government, these Shiite groups actually first joined the
Governing Council set up by the CPA. So you have… what you have… what
you can see is that the Deputy Head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq joined the CPA, at the same time the Head of the Islamic
Dawa Party, Mr. Al Jaffary, also became a member. And they went beyond that.
They called on the international community to support the Governing Council
in Iraq.
Similarly, when in June of last year the CPA was dissolved and gave
way to the Interim Government, again the Shiites actively participated in the
Interim Government either as, you know, Vice Presidents or ministers or vice
ministers.
At the same time, of course, Iran made sure that the armed wings of
these Shiite parties would not engaged the US forces in Iraq.
101
Karman TAREMİ
holding of elections would put an end to the American military presence in Iraq
and it would also bring in a Shiite-dominated government. However, for the
elections to be held in Iraq it was necessary to create a calm atmosphere and
hence the Iranian government concentrated its efforts in restoring security to
Iraq. In that context, it took a number of steps. It… for instance it… invited
Muqtada Sadr to Tehran in June 2003. While Muqtada Sadr was in Tehran, he
was strongly advised against resorting to force against the coalition. He was told
explicitly that the resort to force would not be in the interest of the Shiite
community. But Iran went beyond advising, trying to calm the situation in Iraq.
When the first round of fighting began between Muqtada Sadr and the coalition
in April of 2003, the Iranian government immediately intervened and tried to
use its political influence to convince Sadr to desist from use of force against
the coalition. Similarly, in August of 2004, when the second round of fighting
broke out, again Iran used its influence in Iraq to try to contain the fighting and
convince Mr. Sadr to set aside arms and join the political process. Iran even
went further than that and expressed its unhappiness for the first time of the
course taken by Muqtada Sadr. As a sign of that Ayatollah Ha’ari, a prominent
Merciat Al Taklid, a source of emulation in Iraq, who had earlier appointed
Muqtada Al Sadr as his representative in Iraq, removed Sadr from this position.
In explaining why he had done it, he said that Mr. Sadr formed an army without
his permission and had engaged the coalition forces without his approval. This
was certainly done with, you know, with the consent and with the support of
Iranian government.
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IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ 2003-2005
103
The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 İstanbul
Mahir NAKIP*
First of all, let me talk a little bit about the historical identity of the city.
It is possible to say that Turks started to settle down in Kirkuk after 834-35.
Tugrul Bey, the ruler of the Seljuks, entered Iraq in 1055 with his army that was
composed of mostly Oguz Turks. Aslantash’s son, Kipchak, took the control of
Kirkuk in 1130. The most famous member of this dynasty was Muzaffer Ed-
Din Gokboru, who lived between 1154 and 1232. This Turkish hero had a lot
of artworks built most of which have survived. Therefore, we can say that
Kirkuk and Erbil were turkified in the middle of 14th century. Turkish started
to be used as an official language in Iraq. It is known that Timur visited the
Kirkuk castle in 1393. The Black Sheep State captured the castle eighteen years
later. Today the White Sheep (Akkoyunlu) and the Black Sheep (Karakoyunlu)
*
Prof. Dr. ; Erciyes University / Turkey.
Mahir NAKİP
are the surnames of two well-known Turcoman families who live in Kirkuk and
Erbil.
The Safawid became a Shia Turcoman state in 1508, and they governed
Iraq until 1534, when Suleyman the Magnificent went to Iraq for Iraqi
campaign in 1534. Turkish poet Fuzuli, who was from Kirkuk and a member of
Bayat tribe, presented the famous Baghdad Qasideh to the Sultan. Murat the
Fourth has started his Baghdad campaign in 1638. Baghdad was taken from the
Safawid state and Kirkuk became a city of the Ottoman Empire again. The
Ottoman Empire dominated Kirkuk until 1918.
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THE IDENTITY OF KIRKUK
The Gavurbagi Massacre took place in 1946. The Iraqi police fired on
workers who started a protest march from an oil company.
107
Mahir NAKİP
The Baath Party came into power in 1968 and tried to change the
identity of Kirkuk in the seventies. Saddam, who became the Vice President in
1974, took some Turcoman cities such as Tuz Hurmati and Kifri back from
Kirkuk and joined them with Arabian cities. He forbad Turcoman to buy any
properties in the city. He also sentenced a lot of Turcoman to death in Kirkuk.
While investigating the identity of any city, it is not enough to take into
consideration only the demographic or the ethnic structure of the city. What is
important is the value that the community of that city contributes to its cultural
heritage. The Kirkuk Massacre in 1959 led the migration of many Turcoman
families to Baghdad, though Kirkuk continued to be a Turcoman city until the
beginning the sixties. There have been considerable political interferences in the
ethnic structure of the city. During the rein of Saddam the city was tried to be
Arabized, yet after the war in 2003, excessive Kurdification activities began with
the support of United States army.
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THE IDENTITY OF KIRKUK
Turkish newspaper was published in February 1911 for the first time and closed
by the English in 1918.
The first Turkish magazine was called Maarif. It was published in April
1913. All the writers of mentioned publications were consisted of Turcomans.
The first newspaper published in Kirkuk after the start of English occupation
was Necme. This newspaper was also published in Turkish and its publication
continued between 1918 and 1926.
Now let me talk a little bit about the cultural structure of the city. A
considerable number of Turkish art works exist in Kirkuk. Yet Baghdad
government and Saddam demolished most of them. A number of palaces
109
Mahir NAKİP
during the rein of Ottoman Empire and the stone bridge of Kirkuk are among
the demolished works of art. The Kirkuk Castle, which has became the symbol
of Kirkuk, safeguards the oldest historical works of art, ramparts. The Daniel
Peygamber Mosque, considered holy by Turcomans, was originally a Jewish
temple and the Great Mosque was originally a Christian church. Moreover, the
Turcoman showed their respect and affection to the Christianity by calling this
place of worship as Virgin Mary Mosque.
Another Turkish work of art which survived until today is the Blue
Vault (Gök Kümbet). Its construction occurred during the rein of Ilhanid in
1361. Either pashas or Turcoman built all of the art works located in the outer
part of Kirkuk Castle’s during the Ottoman rein, Naqishli Minaret Mosque,
Covered Bazaar, Hajji Numan Mosque, Kirdarlar Mosque, Neftchizadeh
Ibrahim Bey Mosque, Indjili Mosque, and etc.
Not only the owners but also the creators of this civil architecture were
also Turcomans. The first districts of Kirkuk were established in the interior
part of the Castle. Because of the population increase, they began to constitute
new districts around the Castle. The Turcomans, however, populated all of
these districts. The districts where constituted naturally without any
administrative interferences. If we investigate linguistically, we realize that the
names of the majority of these districts are Turkish names. For example, Sari
Kahiya, Avdjilar, Kara Kahiya, Gedikler, Karakachlar and Beyler are not only
the names of the districts but of Turcoman families who lived in the city. These
families have maintained their existence until today.
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One of the most considerable thing that reveal a city’s identity and the
cultural heritage over the historical course is the poets, writers and authors who
lived in that city. Imad Ad-Din Nesimi is the oldest poet of Iraqi Turcomans.
Nesimi is the pioneer of the Turkish Sufism, lived between 1370 and 1417. His
fame spread to Balkans, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. A splendid statue of
Nesimi was erected in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan by the Soviet
government.
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city started. After the sixties, these interferences increased and, after the
seventies, it became serious. Cultural erosion in Kirkuk became more intense
and a planned activity of the government during the rein of Saddam.
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Final conclusion; Despite all these facts the Turcomans are not saying
that Kirkuk is the heart of Turkmenistan, but insisting that Kirkuk is a city that
belongs to all Iraqi people and the oil income of the city should be fairly
distributed among the Iraqi people.
On the other side, the Kurdish political groups have dared to claim
that Kirkuk is situated in so-called Kurdistan and they should exclusively have
the oil income. The problem exists partly because of the fact that the United
States has followed wrong policies in the region. No doubt that the Iraqi
people, including Turcoman, are grateful to the American people due to the
fact that they saved them from Saddam. However, not only that the Iraqi
people did not received the justice, democracy, freedom and welfare promised
by the United States government, but also the previous order, though it was a
bad one, disappeared with the arrival of the American soldiers. The United
States has not been able to create a new order yet. Moreover, it has ignored the
injustices and wrongful behavior in the region.
Kirkuk should have a special status that would give Turcomans, Arabs
and Kurds equal representative rights and ensure that no group will be in a
position to dominate other groups. The real owners of Kirkuk have done their
best for the city. Today, without a just arbiter, Kirkuk cannot find its real
owner. Kirkuk should be the heart of Turcoman, Arab and Kurdish peoples’
brotherhood, not the heart of the so-called Kurdistan. Without abandoning a
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The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 İstanbul
DISCUSSIONS
The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 İstanbul
Mr. Al-Rantavi’s reply: I think the concerns about the so-called Shia
crescent dominated by Iran is not a Jordanian concern. It is also there in the
Gulf States. But Jordan, I think, is worried too much by this dominating
presence in many aspects. This process, for example, the lasted for few years
and months we find many parties in this crescent involved in acts to give
[inaudible] peace process in the Middle East. They are not encouraging this
process. They are putting obstacles and difficulties on the path of this process.
In the manner of, for example, Hizbullah [inaudible] … joint ventures by Syria
and Iran [inaudible]. In the last few weeks only Hizbullah encouraging some
extremists in the Palestinian communities to permit and to incite attacks to
complicate the whole business of the [Mahmoud Abbas] Abu Mazen
government. This world is for us a source of concern. But we are aware about
the road map on relationship between Iran and some other Arab countries.
There is a mutual need for this improvement of relationship when it comes to
security, when it comes to oil, when it comes to counter terrorism, in many
fields. But this doesn’t diminish the concern in all these countries when it
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comes to the Shiites all in Iraq and the area. You are aware, surely aware that
the majority of the Bahrain people, for example, are Shiites. The majority of the
eastern part of Saudi Arabia is Shiites. And the debate there was accelerated and
they were transformed into more hot debates in the last few months.
Therefore, I think the concern is there despite all these improvement in the
relationship between those countries and Iran.
Chair: [Thanks for question in Turkish]. Dr. Mehdi, the floor is yours.
And the other distinguished panelists also if they want to add.
Chair: Thank you. Would you like to add anything Mr. Rantavi?
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Chair: Thank you Dr. Al-Rantavi. The panel has a rather pluralistic
stance on this crucial issue. Let us see, other distinguished panelists will think
on this issue. Dr. Abdussalam do you have an idea?
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the modes of thinking are also different, but they are completing each other. So
I am optimist in the future of Iraq.
Dr. Shehata’s reply: I just also want to endorse what Mr. Rantavi said
about federalism not being the opposite of unity. There are many successful
democratic, united federal countries, many examples across the world,
especially in countries that have the consociational system where you have
countries like Belgium and India has a federal system and the United States has
a federal system, Switzerland has a federal system. Many, many united, strong
democracies are also federals. So I think we need to get over the negative
associations that come with federalism and our understanding of the concept.
Chair: Thank you so much. Other questions? Yes. I see one. Please
also introduce yourself.
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Dr. Shehata’s Reply: I think perhaps you were in the States at a time
when modernization theory was, you know, after… [Intervention from floor].
Yes. No, but I mean there was a time when military regimes that were seen as
progressive, as promoting secular values, as women’s rights as Abdel Nasser’s
regime in Egypt and even Saddam Hussein in the 70s. They were seen as taking
their societies perhaps forcefully away from a traditional model to a modern
industrialized model. [Intervention from floor] Well, up until 90s they were
praised as modern. I don’t know but at least, I know at least, there was a time
when military… if you remember the book by Huntingdon, Political Order and
Changing Societies, that was the book that blessed those types of regimes and
these were the right policies to pursue at that stage of their development, and
that they were not mature enough for democracy because there was a high level
of political mobilization that would lead to chaos if you opened up democratic
channels of participation. [Intervention from floor] Yes, yes. I think military
regimes and revolution from above, there was a time when these were seen as a
model, especially during the Cold War perhaps, when there as a fear of leftist
trends in many of these countries. But I think, you know, that proved to be
wrong as we now see. They have not succeeded in building modern nation-
states and even the process of nation building doesn’t seem to have succeeded.
Also the point you made about federalism, being based on a strong
sense of national identity: there is also another opinion that you find in the
literature on consociational democracy that federalism is actually the result of
conflict. When, you know, the members or the different groups of a certain
country have to trade between seceding or trying to find as an alternative
agreement, they go for federalism. It allows for unity while maintaining
diversity. So, there are different opinions about this. I don’t know if this
answers your questions.
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Chair: Thank you very much. Dr. Abdusselam would you like to add
anything?
Chair: Thank you very much. Dr. Rantavi, would you like to
comment?
Mr. Al-Rantavi: I want to point out one or two points only. In Jordan
we used to compare ourselves with Syria and Iraq to prove that we are in a very
good situation concerning modernization, democratization, human rights. We
used to compare ourselves with the situation in Syria and Iraq. This has been
taking by our governments as a pretext to avoid the pressure from inside for
democratization and reforms in our country. Therefore, I don’t think those
regimes ever been a modal for modernization and progress in our country. I
think the Baathist regime both in Syria and Iraq are committed very serious
problems and obstacles towards democratization and modernization in our
country, not only in Syria and Iraq, but in the whole region. It is a typical
totalitarian regime. They destroy the civil society, the partisanship life, the
political life in the last four or five decades. For the first time in our history, a
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president delivered the power, handover the power to his son. It is another
typical…, a new kind of…, a typical of monarchy emerging in Syria, for
example. In Iraq we were in the middle of that process before the war. [If]
There were no war, we [would be] waiting the day when Uday or Kusay to be
successor of his father. This type of totalitarian regime, I think, they never be a
model; they never be identified as a model, at least from a Middle East point of
view, from my point of view as a man whom identifies himself as a democrat
and a liberal, and committed to democratization, to liberalization of our society.
Both regimes are supposed to be pan-Arab nationalist regimes. But they failed
to keep the unity of their own small countries because they are sectarian
regimes in general. The Baathist regime in general depended on the Arab
sovereignty, especially in certain areas such as Tikrit. They summarized the class
and with the party; the party with the family; the family with the father and his
sons. These are the ruling families there, not more. In Syria, I am sorry to say, it
is also a minority ruling regime. The Alewite minority ruling regime in Syria.
And they are threatening the unity of the Syrian people also. They are failed in
solving the minority problem in their own territories. This is our reality. We are
not here to talk some diplomatic words. I am not a diplomat; I have never been
a diplomat anyway. Therefore, this is the reality; we have to take into
consideration if you want to address our serious problems. They failed to keep
the unity of their people, own people. Therefore, I disagree with my colleague
from Iraq about [the allegation that] the sectarian division, this nationalist
division, this ethnic division created by the foreigners. No, it is not true. It has
not emerging in the last two years only. It has roots in the history of the
Baathist regime, in totalitarian [?] regime in Iraq. But they have now after the
war, they have the ability to express themselves. This is the difference between
both Saddam Hussein era and the era during his influence and ruling regime in
Iraq. People nowadays can express themselves, before they cannot. This is the
only difference, but the roots of these problems are there. For us in Jordan, for
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Chair: Thank you Mr. Al-Rantavi for the poignant plea for democracy
in the region, but I am sure Dr. Mehdi would like to make same comments, but
I wonder if he was able to follow what you said because you have spoken in
English. Maybe you can resume in Arabic in order to allow Dr. Mehdi to
make…
Chair: Thank you very much Dr. Mehdi. This concludes our session,
the morning session. We thank all the distinguished participants, they and I
think need an applause from all of us.
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Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mowle: Well, it is partially result of the war, partially
result of the increased demand in China and unrest in Venezuela. I think that
the Iraqi oil exports are greater now than they were before the war and yet the
price of oil has gone way up. In fact one of the… about the only people happy
with the price of oil going up are people who are hoping to fund Iraqi
reconstruction, because Iraq is making twice as much money off of oil exports
now than it was at the beginning of the war. So, that at least helps Iraq; it
doesn’t help anybody else. The war in Iraq, if anything, increased oil production
by itself. Maybe I should point out before I have to be in a position of
defending too much here, it’s my own personal opinion, I did not think that the
war was a very good idea, especially the way it was done, and I still don’t think
so. But, again, no one asked me in the American government what I think and
no one is going to now. I don’t want to be in the position of … justify why the
American government did this. That’s not my job and it is also not my personal
view necessarily. Thank you.
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and nobody knows where it is. That was the first one. The second: yes, in your
presentation, that the you just pressed on that the United States of the America
doesn’t intend to have any permanent bases, but we know of another
speculation, let’s say, that twelve permanent bases maybe in the future would be
built – some of them in the Northern part and some of them in the western
and some of them in the Southern part of Iraq. Is that so? For my Russian
colleague: you know that this is Iraq, but the Iran also is very important for
Iraq. Maybe this is not the platform to ask this question but [it is] up to you to
answer. Russia, this is very clear, that Russia exported some nuclear technology
to Iraq. This is quite clear and many many … I mean that academic and the
other persons accept overtly. But how about the nuclear energy? I mean that,
how does it look from Russia’s standpoint? Does Iran have a right to improve,
develop some type of nuclear energy for peace purposes? Thank you very
much.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mowle: I guess I should answer the second question
first. Certainly, there are those within the United States that would like to have
permanent bases in Iraq. I am simply saying those bases can actually exist with
the permission of the Iraqi government and my personal opinion is that no
Iraqi government will authorize those bases to be used that way. … That’s
really about all I should say about that. I think that there are people who would
like to have such bases but I don’t think the Iraqis do and, ultimately, the Iraqi
government’s position will have to define that. No country can have bases on
its territory without accepting them unless they are at war with that other
country or something along those lines. As for the rumor about missing money:
rumors in Baghdad are very interesting. [interjection from the floor] I don’t
have it personally… But it is not quite enough money. My favorite rumor is
that Zarkawi is actually a Kurd who is a Mossad agent, and that is pretty
interesting. I had no idea… There are a lot of rumors in Baghdad that there is a
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lot of money is missing. I haven’t heard that particular one but I… I don’t
know. What can I say?
Prof. Dr. Nikitin: In fact in the time when in the sixties and seventies
many developing countries were becoming independent and entering the
United Nations, the United States or Soviet Union as a gift was given normally
nuclear reactor, research reactor and promises that they would help with
nuclear technologies. But what is interesting is just several weeks ago President
Bush and President Putin in Bratislava, they concluded two important joint
statements that till the year 2008 both America and Russia are responsible to
return back from all countries the nuclear fuel which they gave many many
years ago, so to say as a gift for research reactors. And now there is a lot of
joint control between the United States, Russia and the IAEA (International
Atomic Energy Agency) regarding all kinds of nuclear exports. That is one
hundred percent sure that current Russian assistance to Iran limits very much
to the peaceful purposes reactor in Bushehr, the nuclear power plant which is
purely for producing electricity. And in fact there is a lot of political pressure of
Washington over Moscow to stop even that cooperation. But Moscow is trying
to draw a clear line between what is legally allowed (and legally it is allowed to
provide assistance in peaceful nuclear energy) and what is not allowed (and not
allowed is any kind of support in military programs) and Moscow definitely is
not interested to see nuclear powers in North Korea, or say Iran or Syria
converting to military nuclear efforts by no means. Moscow is very much
interested to keep to the traditional nuclear club and even is interested to
continue negotiation on the first nuclear disarmament. Those in MINATOM
(Ministry of Atomic Energy) of Russia theoretically, because of commercial
considerations, would be interested to sell to Iranians and even more, maybe
another one or two reactors. But the political conditions now such difficulty
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even for the first Bushehr reactor that I think it would be the first and the last
deal between Russia and Iran regarding nuclear support.
Chair: Thank you. No reflections on the nine billion dollars that might
have ended up in Moscow or somewhere?
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attitude towards the existence of PKK in Northern Iraq, where they co-exist. It
is a terrorist organization, United States declares, recognized as such, and
continues to do so, as a global war declared against terrorism and they are there
co-existing. We have a difficulty in understanding that. Maybe you can tell me
about something, some reasoning that I don’t know. Thank you very much.
Prof. Dr. Nikitin: Thank you very much for the first question which I
consider to be a kind of Marxist interpretation of international relations,
[laughter] because it gave me a hint that there is some economic reason behind
the political behavior of the States. Yes, of course, there is some important role
of oil in all this politics, but I should not over-estimate it. I mean that
explanations that everything was done because of the old imperialistic
motivations, because of getting oil money through the lives of solders lost in
Iraq, that is too simple. I don’t buy such explanation. I see a certain sector of
economic interest in this war. But it is much more then economy is on the
stake. It is about politics, it is about culture, it is about democratization and I
sincerely believe that for many countries, including Americans, then your
democratization of Iraq really was one of the serious and sincere reasons of the
war. I don’t think that all this play of words around the removing dictator and
democratization was only a cover operation for getting, grabbing the Iraqi oil.
But Russia what could be like interest in is benefiting a little bit from the high
prices of oil because Russia itself is an oil selling country. So following this logic
you may even say that Russia was also interested in the war in the region,
because as a result of the Russian oil assets become a little bit more valuable.
But I don’t think so, I mean such considerations are... they may influence your
decision if decision is already here, but they will not the major consideration of
the Russia behavior towards this conflict. And finally, Russian oil companies
are practically interested to participate in tender for future restoration of oil
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infrastructure of Iraq, but chances are very bad. I mean, Russian oil companies
as well as French oil companies would be definitely overwhelmed by American
oil companies who will be distributing the wealth. But, after all, let me say that I
do think that … like explanation of all Iraqi affairs through the oil would be
rooted back in the nineteenth century. The politics in the twenty-first century is
much more multi-dimensional.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mowle: Can I take his question instead? I liked it
better. I should start out by saying that I don’t really know exactly what our
current policy is in respect to PKK or the Kongra-Gel or KADEK or whatever
they are calling themselves these days. But my understanding is… I may be
wrong about this, my understanding is that a bit of ceasefire is going on
between the PKK and Turkish government and it has been relatively… on the
PKK side is relatively inactive of late and if I were to speculate, I will say that it
is a matter of resources as much as anything else. The United States forces in
the moment in Iraq are stretched fairly, I think I can fairly say that they
stretched fairly thin, and to start an offensive against the PKK at this point
could be seen as just simply something a little bit too difficult to do right now.
But I don’t know if that is the reason, I could not say what the intentions are
for the long term, once the Sunni triangle is more pacified… I just don’t know
what the policy would be. I am sorry.
Chair: If you allow me, I wouldn’t like to let you of the hook easily. I
am very curious to know whether in the US when this issue is kind of thrown
upon US officials, and they are, whether there are those who recognize that,
from the Turkish perspective, there is this discomfort when they hear US
officials talk about, as my admiral mentioned, the war on terrorism, and that
there is an organization that is present there that is a major source of
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discomfort. I share your view that maybe the threat has diminished seriously. Is
there a recognition of that? And maybe an awareness or talk about it?
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mowle: I am not entirely sure what recognition there
is. I think there is a certain extent, at some levels a distinction is made between,
I guess, what is regarded as more localized terrorist groups versus ones that are
striking internationally and globally. Because there are relatively few of those
former groups which are far more localized terrorist groups than there are the
globalized terrorist groups… Now I’ve lost the train of thought... Basically I
think there is a recognition… there is a recognition, I know that there is a
certain amount of disconnect between saying a global war on terrorism and yet
there are certain terrorist groups that are not being targeted. And the rational
behind that, I suppose, is primarily one of resources and the nature of the
immediate threat to the United States. But, again, that’s just my opinion. I am
not an expert on Turkey by any means.
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because you are afraid that the tendency will become a reality. This is how
Americans explain the difference between the prevention and pre-emption.
And the problem is that while with prevention the international law, United
Nations can look and say, OK, here was the action and here is counter-action.
Action was serious, danger was here, present and clear danger, please act. In
case of pre-emption things are much more depended on interpretation. You
may say that maybe Saddam Hussein in the future will support some structures
which will create some international terrorist network, maybe they will create
weapons of mass destruction, maybe not, you are acting just in case. And here,
of course, it is much more amorphous and much more dependent upon your
political values, your permissiveness, whether you are a strong nation or big
nation, and, by the way, very much dependent upon the unity in the
international community.
Chair: It sounds like you shoot first than ask questions in the case
of…
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Dr. Kamran Taremi: One of the most important for the moment for
the Iranian government is not how the constitution of Afghanistan or the
constitution of Iraq is different from Iran’s and what forces are fighting over
power in these two countries. The most important thing for Iran at the
moment is to see sort of stability emerging in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Once
the situation has become stable, once foreign forces have left those two
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countries, once you got a stable government there, than secondary concerns
might gradually emerge.
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Israeli peace process or its involvement with the Hizbullah might cause…
might lead to a military action by the United States. So there the policies are
more daring, there the policies are more challenging of Western interests.
Dr. Altunışık: OK, thank you. Yes, I would agree with you that there
is a shift towards more pragmatism. And, as you know, it is generally joked that
red-line have turned into pink. Although I would say that the basic… the most
important aspect of that policy has not been challenged yet so it is still bit early,
I think, to say that. But there is clearly some change and I think there are
different reasons for it. The first reason is that, particularly after the Turkish
parliament’s rejection of the bill, Turkey’s options in Iraq have become much
more limited. You may discuss whether it was good or bad that the bill did not
pass, but at least militarily it limited Turkey’s options and also, in terms of its
political aspect, it limited Turkey’s options in Iraq. In addition to that, I would
say that there has been a change in general in Turkish foreign policy,
particularly with the Helsinki decision of the EU, and also with Öcalan’s trial
and the ceasefire with the PKK. Turkish policy in general, but as regards to Iraq
as well, became based much more on confidence than it was before. In the
nineteen nineties when you looked at it there was a lot of apprehension,
feelings of encirclement, that somehow there were serious challenges to Turkey.
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That atmosphere has changed a bit. But with the situation in Iraq turning
against Turkey’s interest or with relations with the EU again turning… turn out
in a bad way, there is still a potential, I think, and we can see that with the rise
of ultra nationalism in Turkey, that things may change. But I think there was
that kind of window of opportunity in that respect.
With those remarks, I would like to bring the panel to an end. I would
like to thank every and each of the panelists for sharing their views with us.
And also for your questions and patience for sitting out through the panel this
afternoon. Thank you very much.
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