A Allied Joint Doctrine For Air and Space Operations (05NOV09)

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-3.3(A)
ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS AJP-3.3(A)
ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-3.3(A)
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ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-3.3(A)
ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS AJP-3.3(A) NOVEMBER 2009
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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)
NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION
5 November 2009
I. AJP-3.3(A) - ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERAnONS is a NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED Publication. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 3700. 2. AJP-3.3(A) is effective upon receipt. It supersedes AJP-3.3, which shall be destroyed in accordance with the local procedure for the destruction of documents.
Ju A. MORENO Vce-Admiral, ESP(N) irector, NSA
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NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION
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RECORD OF CHANGES
Change Date Date Entered Effective Date By Whom Entered
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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS
CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS
General
GBR, USA
DEU
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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

NATION SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS
Although the description of an "effects based approach" is appropriate and aiming at the philosophical appendage and not to a systematic approach, the future use of the term shall be avoided, based on decisions from Combined Custodial Project 1 (CCP 1). Para 0104 is to be amended accordingly. The gestation of the publication has been unnecessarily delayed and the doctrine no longer fully reflects our national interpretation of Air Power, or the conduct of current coalition Air operations. GBR recommends that an immediate review is undertaken in concert with the subordinate air doctrine and TTPs. a. The United States is one of the nations that does not accept the notion that a combined air operations center (CAOC) is a weapon system; as implied by the Preface, paragraph 2, Table of Contents, paragraph 0503, and Annex 5A. Rationale. A CAOC is a command and control center that plans, directs, and executes Allied joint air operations in support of the Allied joint force commanders operation plan. This is consistent with the US position on the functions of a command center, i.e., A facility from which a commander and his or her representatives direct operations and control forces. It is organized to gather, process, analyze, display, and disseminate planning and operational data and perform other related tasks. Conversely, a weapon(s) system is A combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency.
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Furthermore, the disclaimer THIS ANNEX IS PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION ONLY AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION does not provide the user with the understanding that the CAOC as a weapon system is not an accepted Allied joint doctrine position. This AJP should contain substantive and relevant information on air operations and not be used for information that is more suited to a non-authoritative handbook. b. The US does not subscribe to the use of the terminology in paragraph 0426 e that refers to humanitarian obligations as if it is a codified body of recognized law or obligatory issues binding on a nation. Rationale. There is no such recognized item such as humanitarian obligations, either the issues are part of customary international law and recognized as such or they are not.
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c. The United States does not agree with the No-Strike List items in paragraph 0426 f, specifically "important food resources and nuclear power stations." These restrictions appear to be an interpretation of Article 56 of Protocol Additional (Protocol 1) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, which limits attacks on certain targets, to include works or installations containing dangerous forces. Rationale. The United States is not a party to the Additional Protocol and does not consider portions of its restrictions to be customary international law (see Memorandum from the President of the United States Transmitting Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, Concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1977 U.S.T. LEXIS 465 (January 29, 1987)). Accordingly, protection of food resources and nuclear power stations is not absolute. Furthermore, food is a legitimate target. Article 54 of the Additional Protocol, again, which the United States did not ratify, protects only food [foodstuffs] indispensable to survival of the civilian population.
USA
A more agreeable definition of a no-strike list would be: A list of geographic areas, complexes, installations, forces, equipment, capabilities, functions, individuals, groups, systems, or behaviors that will not have action planned against them. This may be due to potential violations of law of armed conflict, rules of engagement, national policy, or other restrictions. For example, actions may interfere with friendly relations with indigenous personnel or governments. d. The United States does not subscribe to the terms and definitions in the glossary that fail to follow AAP-47 guidelines for AJP lexicon. 1. Are not used in this document: combined joint task force, combined joint task force headquarters, information operations, and joint force commander. 2. Are not approved in AAP-6 and do not follow guidance within AAP-3 for terminology that has not been approved: fires. 3. Are being modified without appropriate Military Committee Terminology Conference procedures being followed: component command and targeting.
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PREFACE
1. This publication provides fundamental principles for the effective employment of joint air and space capabilities, throughout the range of military operations, in order to ensure unity of effort for the benefit of the joint force as a whole. The publication incorporates and updates the detail from the former Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.3.7 Combined Joint Force Air Component Command Doctrine, emphasizing command and control of joint air operations and associated planning processes. It also provides an overview of military space operations. New material includes the introduction of North Atlantic Treaty Organisations (NATO) comprehensive planning and execution capability, the air estimate process, and inclusion of the fundamental and enduring operational air and space power activities used to achieve strategic, operational and tactical level objectives. This publication also compares and contrasts the functional battle management type (primarily NATO construct) Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) with the weapon system CAOC. 1 The publication closes with an overview of military joint space operations and discusses some of the pertinent operational considerations. The subject of space has largely been kept generic. Given that there is no specific NATO space doctrine as yet, it is appropriate that some detail be provided here. Variations to the relationships and procedures contained herein may be necessary to accommodate specific needs, but such variations should be the exception rather than the rule.
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Known as the AN/USQ-163 Falconer in some nations.
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ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS

CONTENTS
Front Page NSA Letter of Promulgation National Letter of Promulgation Record of Changes Record of Reservations Preface Contents Chapter 1 Fundamentals of Joint Air and Space Operations 1-1 1-3 1-3 1-4 1-5 Page i iii v vii ix xiii xv
Introduction Principles of Joint Space Operations and Forces Available Principles of Joint Air Operations Forces Available for Joint Air Operations Core Air and Space Power Activities Chapter 2 Command and Control of Joint Air Operations
Introduction The Joint Force Air Component Commander Liaison Requirements Airspace Control and Air Defence Air Command and Control System Chapter 3 Joint Force Air Component Commander Headquarters Organization
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Introduction The Joint Force Air Component Commander Headquarters Staff Joint Force Air Component Commander Headquarters Lead Divisions Deployed Joint Force Air Component Commander Headquarters Options Joint Force Air Component Commander Transition Joint Force Commander Staff Options in Joint Air Operations Chapter 4 Planning For Joint Air Operations
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Introduction Joint Force Air Component Commander Planning Responsibilities Campaign and Targeting Synchronization during Operations xv
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Air Battle Rhythm and Air Tasking Cycle Guidance, Apportionment and Targeting Joint Force Air Component Commander Targeting Responsibilities Ground-Based Air Defence and Theatre Missile Defence Planning Time Sensitive Targeting Communications Information Systems and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Considerations Annex 4A - Joint Air Estimate Process Annex 4B - Sample Generic Air Plan Annex 4C - Sample Generic Air Operations Directive Chapter 5 The Combined Air Operations Centre
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Introduction Combined Air Operations Centre Products Airlift Coordination Centre Annex 5A - The Combined Air Operations Centre as a Weapon System Chapter 6 Joint Military Space Operations
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Introduction Command and Control of Space Operations Space Operations Mission Areas Operational Considerations For Space Lexicon Part 1 - Acronyms and Abbreviations Part 2 - Terms and Definitions
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CHAPTER 1 - FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS

Section I - Introduction
Strategy and Doctrine 0101. There is a continuous requirement to adapt means and methods to exploit improved capabilities in air and space operations. The fact that each event in conflict is the unique product of many moral, mental and physical forces, however, means that the nature of conflict will remain fundamentally unpredictable and that certainty of outcome is impossible. Technology should improve our ability to determine possibilities and probabilities; however, actions will continue to be based on incomplete, inaccurate or even contradictory information. Actions based on imperfect information have inherent risk. 0102. Military strategy sets the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to meet the Alliances objectives. Joint planning should be the process that seeks to match strategy-to-task and means-to-ends. Air and space power offers unique capabilities that must be fully considered and integrated into all planning. This requires robust and informed representation within joint forums from subject matter experts who, through experience and training, appreciate the capabilities and limitations of air and space forces and how they can best contribute to the joint operation. 0103. Strategy provides the aims on how operations will be conducted to accomplish policy objectives, while doctrine addresses how best to use air and space power as a means to that end. However, the reality is that operations and strategies are invariably constrained and restrained by political, economic or social considerations. Where policy decisions seriously affect the application of doctrine, commanders must emphasize the potential military consequences. NATOs Comprehensive Operations Planning and Execution Capability 0104. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)s comprehensive operations planning and execution capability aims to involve the integrated application of all means of power, both military and non-military, to generate desired effects which will achieve desired results and contribute to attaining strategic objectives. A comprehensive operations planning and execution capability approach to operations is not new, rather it is a philosophical change in the way to view, plan, conduct and assess operations that places emphasis on achieving desired outcomes and mitigating undesired ones. At the operational level, this approach involves the selective combination of actions, coordinated with the activities of other organizations, to create lethal and non-lethal effects in order to achieve operational objectives, in support of the strategic end state.
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0105. The resultant effects of this approach comprise the full range of outcomes, events or consequences that result from a particular action, or set of actions; whether desired or undesired; ultimate or intermediate; expected or unexpected; intended or unintended; sequential, parallel, cumulative or cascading; physical, functional or psychological; and that can occur at all levels of war. Specific actions produce specific (direct) effects that in turn may produce other (indirect) effects; it is this chain of cause and effect that creates the mechanism through which objectives are achieved. Legal Considerations for Conducting Air and Space Operations 0106. The purpose of legal support is to ensure that air and space operations are conducted in a legal manner and conform to the principles of international law, agreements, customs and practices (including, but not limited to national sovereignty regimes and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)) through the appropriate analysis and evaluation of circumstances, the identification of options and the provision of timely advice to a commander. Wherever possible, personnel should consult their legal adviser (LEGAD) where any doubt exists. Multinational forces deployed to a friendly nation are subject to the law of that particular country, unless otherwise specified in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). 0107. Law of Armed Conflict. LOAC is a part of international law governing the relations between states. It regulates the rights and duties of the belligerents in time of armed conflict. Its main purpose is to protect combatants and non-combatants from unnecessary suffering; to safeguard the fundamental human rights of civilians and persons who fall into the hands of an armed belligerent; and to facilitate the restoration of peace. LOAC derives from 2 main sources of international law: customary law 1 and treaty law. 0108. Rules of Engagement. Military actions are controlled by Rules of Engagement 2 (ROE), which are authorized by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) for NATO/NATO-led operations on approval of the Operation Plan (OPLAN). Subsequent changes to the ROE profile for whatever reason will need to be proposed to higher command by the operational level commander for NAC approval. ROE define the degree and manner in which force may be applied and are designed to ensure that such application of force is carefully controlled. Conformity of any action within any ROE profile in force does not guarantee its lawfulness, and it remains the commanders responsibility to use only that force which is necessary and proportionate under the prevailing circumstances. 0109. Although participants in NATO-led operations may have similar political mandates, each nation is likely to have a different national ROE reflecting that nations unique political and legal interests and its reason for joining the NATO force. Some national ROE will be relatively free of constraint, while others may be severely restrictive. Commanders of deployed forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation in the ROE
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Rules developed from the practice of state, which are binding on all states. See Military Committee (MC) 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement for detail.
development process and, while consensus on standardization of ROE should be sought, it may not be achievable. It may even be necessary to tailor the employment of given troop contingents within the context of the ROE permissible to those contingents. 0110. ROE should be timely, appropriate, current, responsive to change and not too specific or restrictive. Should commanders at any level require a change to the extant ROE in order to carry out their assigned task they may request a change, with justification, through their command chain. The request should be made as soon as the need is identified. It is also essential that adjacent or mutually supporting formations and forces particularly understand each others ROE, as it cannot be assumed that each will react in the identical fashion to a given situation. This in turn can contribute to confusion, misperceptions and even fratricide. ROE never limit the right of self-defence, but provide political, legal and policy direction for the conduct of military operations. Even if no rule from a particular series is included, the relevant principles of law apply.
Section II - Principles of Joint Space Operations and Forces Available

0111. Space superiority is crucial to the outcome of conflicts. NATO only owns and operates a limited number of space assets, but space assets owned and operated by NATO nations can provide a range of capabilities that can contribute to mission planning and execution at all levels of warfare. Capabilities and products facilitated by space assets include intelligence gathering, reconnaissance and surveillance, environmental and weather monitoring, communications, imagery/global geospatial information and services, positioning and navigation and early warning systems. While all components have organic space assets, which will make unique contributions to joint operations, a significant portion of space support will be made available from outside the operational area. 0112. A Joint Force Commander (JFC) normally designates a single authority to coordinate joint space operations and integrate space capabilities. Based on the complexity and scope of operations, the JFC can either retain authority or designate a Component Commander (CC) to coordinate and integrate space operations. The JFC considers the mission, nature and duration of the operation, preponderance of space force capabilities and the Command and Control (C2) capabilities (including reach back) in selecting the appropriate option. The space authority will coordinate space operations, integrate space capabilities, and have primary responsibility for joint space operations planning.
Section III - Principles of Joint Air Operations

0113. In order to accomplish the assigned mission, the JFC develops a Concept of Operations (CONOPS), provides commanders intent for the assigned mission and then organizes assigned forces based on the CONOPS. The CONOPS will be further developed to an OPLAN. Usually, the JFC will designate a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) to exploit the capabilities of joint air operations. In operations of limited scope or duration, the JFC may plan, direct and control joint air operations. In that case, the command 1-3 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
authorities and responsibilities discussed in subsequent chapters would remain with the JFC, and the JFC staff would assume planning and coordination aspects. 0114. To achieve the strength of unified air action and to ensure that the capabilities of air power are used as the overall situation demands, the following key principles apply: a. Centralized Control. Centralized control places the responsibility and authority for planning, directing and coordinating air capabilities with a single commander. It maximizes operational effectiveness and avoids duplication of effort by allowing commanders to prioritize, synchronize, integrate and deconflict the actions of assigned, attached and supporting capabilities in time, space and purpose to achieve assigned objectives as rapidly and as effectively as possible. Decentralized Execution. Decentralized execution is the delegation of execution authority to responsible and capable subordinate commanders to make on-scene decisions that exploit opportunities in complex, rapidly changing or fluid situations. It provides for maximum responsiveness to cope with the uncertainty, disorder and fluidity of operations and makes it possible to generate the tempo of operations. Strategy-to-Task. In order to optimize finite resources the objective of every air task must be linked by the operational level to the aim of the overall strategy. The strategy must also be linked through the operational level to what is actually realistic. Of prime importance is for the operational level commander to understand clearly how his activities mesh with the other strategic lines of operation.
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Section IV - Forces Available for Joint Air Operations

0115. Air is not synonymous with air component forces. Maritime and land forces assigned to operations are likely to include air capabilities/forces that individual Component Commanders (CC) may make available for joint air operations in consultation with the JFC. Such capabilities/forces are tasked directly according to the JFCs air apportionment 3 decision and only the JFC has the authority to reassign, redirect, or reallocate a components air capabilities/forces. Should a component not have the organic air capabilities/forces to support their assigned mission the JFACC may task available joint air capabilities/forces based on the JFCs air apportionment decision. 0116. Joint air operations do not include air capabilities/forces organic to a component and used by that component solely in pursuit of its own operations to accomplish its assigned mission. Notwithstanding, these organic assets should appear on the Air Tasking Order (ATO) to enable coordination and minimize the risk of fratricide; however, their appearance on the ATO neither implies any command or tasking authority over them, nor does it restrict CCs flexibility to respond to changing battlespace dynamics. Component air capabilities/forces
Apportionment is the quantification and distribution by percentage of the total expected effort, in relation to the priorities, which are to be given to the various air operations in geographic areas for a given period of time. (AAP-6)
not available for joint air tasking must adhere to the guidance provided by the Airspace Control Plan (ACP), the Airspace Control Order (ACO), the Air Defence Plan (ADP) and the Special Instructions (SPINS) to assure integration and minimize the risk of fratricide. 0117. The JFC integrates the actions of assigned, attached and supporting forces within the operational area; however, in order to maximize operational effectiveness and avoid duplication of effort, the JFACC synchronizes and integrates the actions of assigned, attached and supporting air capabilities/forces in time, space and purpose. The JFACC exploits the characteristics of all air capabilities/forces made available for tasking to achieve assigned objectives as rapidly and as effectively as possible. 0118. While missions vary widely across the range of military operations, the framework and process for C2 of joint air operations should remain consistent. However, control of joint air operations is often complicated with the possible use of airspace by civilian airlines, national and international agencies, governmental and non-governmental organizations, allied and coalition forces, and other participating entities.
Section V - Core Air and Space Power Activities

0119. This chapter introduces the broad, fundamental and enduring operational activities of air and space power that are used to achieve strategic, operational and tactical level objectives. They are not unique to the air component, and other components do perform them or similar activities to varying degrees. 0120. Control of the air helps shape the operational area wherein friendly operations can proceed at the optimum place and time without prohibitive air interference, while providing force protection. Gaining control of the air is not an end in itself, but is only useful if it is then exploited as a means to a greater end. Once sufficient control of the air has been achieved, air and space power provides the possibilities to project military power where and when needed, unlimited by natural barriers. Air powers reach and concentration of force allow it to be employed at all levels of operations. The speed, reach, ubiquity and flexibility of air power offers opportunities for wresting the initiative and to support other forces in different lines of operations and different levels of war concurrently. Strategic Attack 0121. A strategic attack is a JFC-directed offensive action against a target, whether military, political, economic, or other, that is specifically selected to achieve military strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the adversarys ability or will to engage in conflict or continue an action and as such, could be part of a campaign, major operation, or conducted independently as directed by the Alliance. Additionally, these attacks may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition. Suitable targets may include but are not limited to enemy strategic Centres of Gravity.
0122. The key advantage of air power, over other military forces, is the ability to strike directly at the heart of the enemy, disrupting critical leadership functions, war-sustaining resources and strategy, while avoiding the need to sequentially fight through layers of surface forces to get there. Expected effects, not the specific weapon systems, delivery platform or the type of target attacked, define strategic attack. Counter-air 0123. The purpose of counter-air operations is to achieve a desired, or necessary level of control of the air, through the destruction, degradation or disruption of enemy aircraft and missiles, in order to allow all friendly forces greater freedom of action, while minimizing their vulnerability to detection and attack. Counter-air operations include all actions, taken by any component, to gain and maintain control of the air. Control of the air is achieved through counter-air operations, which use a variety of integrated weapon systems and sensors to counter threats that include manned or unmanned aircraft, ballistic missiles and air, land or sea launched cruise missiles, both before and after launch. 0124. Offensive Counter-Air. Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) consists of offensive operations to destroy, disrupt or degrade enemy air and missile threats. Ideally, most OCA operations will prevent the launch of aircraft and missiles by destroying them and their supporting systems on the ground, or failing that, as close to their source as possible. Such operations may be pre-planned or immediate, and are conducted across enemy territory at the initiative of friendly forces. Pre-planned operations rely on continuous and accurate intelligence for targets expected at particular locations and times, while immediate operations are conducted against unexpected mobile and time-sensitive targets where minutes often define the timeline when these targets are vulnerable to attack. OCA includes surface attack operations, air-toair missions and suppression of enemy air defences. 0125. Defensive Counter-Air. Defensive Counter-Air (DCA) operations protect friendly forces and vital interests from enemy air and missile attacks; as such it is synonymous with air defence (AD). DCA consists of all active and passive air defence operations to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy air and missile forces attempting to attack or penetrate friendly battlespace, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attacks should they escape destruction. The Air Defence Commander is responsible for the integration of all air defence efforts regardless of system ownership. 0126. Active Air Defence. Active air defence involves any direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy air and missile attack against friendly forces and critical elements. It is achieved through integrated detection, identification, assessment, interception and engagement and usually characterized by layered defence-indepth allowing multiple engagement opportunities, utilizing reactive air-to-air fighters, surface-to-air missiles and other assets in the air or on the ground. 0127. Passive Air Defence. Passive air defence includes all other measures taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile attacks, through individual and collective protection of
friendly forces and critical assets. Elements of passive air defence include early warning; camouflage, concealment, and deception; hardening; dispersion; reconstitution, and low observable or stealth technologies. Passive air defence measures do not involve the employment of lethal weapons, but do improve survivability. These passive air defence measures for survivability of the joint force are part of the overall force protection doctrine. Space Operations 0128. Military forces have always viewed the high ground as one of dominance and advantage in warfare. With rare exceptions, whoever owned the high ground owned the fight. Air and space power contributes to space operations through offensive or defensive operations conducted to help attain and maintain a desired degree of space superiority to allow friendly forces to exploit space capabilities, while negating the enemys ability to do the same. Offensive Space Operations. 0129. Offensive space operations deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy or deceive an adversarys space capability or the service provided by a 3rd partys space asset(s) to the adversary, terrestrial nodes or the links that comprise a space system. These operations range from dropping ordnance on terrestrial nodes of space systems to jamming enemy satellite uplink or downlink frequencies. Defensive Space Operations 0130. Defensive space operations preserve space capabilities, withstand enemy attack, restore/recover space capabilities after an attack, and reconstitute space forces. These operations should be proactive in nature to protect friendly capabilities and prevent the adversary from disrupting overall friendly operations. Suppression of threats to friendly space capabilities is a key of defensive space operations. Air Power Contribution to Land Operations 0131. Air power contributes to land operations by helping to shape the battlespace through the targeting of fielded enemy ground forces and the infrastructure directly supporting them. How these air operations are conducted is dependent on overall joint campaign strategy and the specific circumstances of the conflict; such factors include enemy disposition, phase of the operation, whether ground combat is also occurring, the degree of control of the air and the need to support, or be supported by, surface forces. 0132. Air power offers the advantage of finding, fixing and engaging enemy surface forces across the full depth of the battlespace, without many of the physical, spatial, and environmental limitations imposed on surface forces. However, the synergy of air forces/capabilities and surface forces, operating as an integrated joint force, can often be overwhelming in cases where a single component cannot be decisive by itself. Such operations generally fall under 2 mission types: Air Interdiction (AI) and Close Air Support (CAS):
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Air Interdiction. AI is action to destroy, disrupt, degrade, divert or delay the enemys surface potential by targeting fielded enemy ground forces and the infrastructure directly supporting them before they can be used effectively against friendly forces, or otherwise achieve their objectives. It is carried out at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is normally not required. The flexibility of AI allows it to be conducted in support of surface 4 operations or as main effort against the enemy surface force without the presence of any friendly ground forces (or with discrete ground force elements providing target cueing); thus, it may offer the potential to reduce or even eliminate the requirement for ground combat. Close Air Support. CAS is action by fixed and rotary wing aircraft against hostile targets, which requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces for fratricide avoidance and targeting guidance performed by a certified and qualified Forward Air Controller 5 (FAC). CAS provides ground or amphibious forces with firepower in offensive and defensive operations, by day and night, to destroy, suppress, neutralize, disrupt, fix or delay enemy forces in close proximity to friendly ground forces. The firepower and mobility of aircraft can make an immediate and direct contribution to the surface battle, especially against targets that are either inaccessible or invulnerable to available surface weapons. The variety of targets likely to be encountered makes it important to be able to employ a variety of weapons and delivery systems, thus reliable and interoperable communications with the supported force are essential features in the CAS environment.
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Air Power Contribution to Maritime Operations 0133. Air power contributes to maritime operations by extending the application of air power into the high seas or the littoral and its adjacent waters. Operations are typically flown in support of friendly naval forces as part of air-maritime coordination operations; however, operations may also be conducted independently or when no friendly forces are in the area. Such operations range from counter-air, AI and CAS through specific maritime orientated sea surveillance and reconnaissance, antisurface warfare, antisubmarine warfare and mine warfare operations: a. Antisurface Warfare. Antisurface warfare operations are conducted to destroy or neutralize enemy naval surface forces. The area of attack and other factors that influence tactics, weapons mix and support requirements should be clearly identified and primary targets should be specified especially when surface combatants are escorting amphibious craft and supply ships.
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Surface in this case includes maritime, littoral and ground. May be known as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) in some nations.
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Antisubmarine Warfare. Antisubmarine warfare operations are conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the effective use of submarines. Antisubmarine includes searching, locating, classifying and attacking submarines as well as their support assets. Aerial Mining. Aerial mining operations support the broad task of establishing and maintaining control of vital sea areas by inflicting damage on an enemy's vessels or submarines to hinder his sea operations and impede the flow of traffic through a given area. Aircraft can penetrate areas that are denied to surface vessels and submarines, and are not endangered by previously laid mines when replenishing an area.
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Airlift 6 0134. Airlift allows a JFC to move and sustain forces anywhere in the world and across the entire range of operations. It provides rapid and flexible mobility options to military, national and international government agencies to quickly respond to various crisis situations worldwide. Airlift can deliver forces with minimum delay and is often a crucial capability for operational and tactical commanders within a Joint Operations Area (JOA). Airlift operations are typically classified as inter- or intra-theatre: a. Inter-theatre airlift. Inter-theatre airlift provides the air bridge that links theatres to home bases and/or to other theatres. Given the ranges usually involved, inter-theatre airlift is normally comprised of heavy, strategic air transport or larger civilian aircraft taken up from trade, augmented by tactical-range air transport if/when required. Intra-theatre airlift. Intra-theatre airlift provides air movement within a specific theatre or JOA and is normally fulfilled by tactical air transport capable of operation under a wide range of tactical conditions, including small, austere and unimproved field operations. Intra-theatre operations generally provide time-sensitive airlift to a commander, which may be critically needed to fulfil JOA objectives.
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Air Logistics Operations 0135. Air logistics operations include those tasks, other than airborne missions, conducted to deploy, sustain, distribute and recover personnel, equipment, supplies and the extraction of non-combatants. Airborne Operations 0136. Airborne operations provide air-delivered combat power to seize ground or installations through the airdrop or air-landing of land forces directly onto an objective. The significance of airborne operations may be operational or strategic within the joint campaign plan;
Also known as air transport.
however, they generally pose high risks, though the potential gains make them a valuable element of the air power inventory. Aeromedical Evacuation 0137. Aeromedical evacuation is a specialized form of airlift for transporting ill or injured personnel under medical supervision to appropriate medical treatment facilities. Aeromedical transportation of patients requires aeromedical crewmembers to be with the patient prior to, and during the movement. During contingency operations, a capable aeromedical evacuation system complements and supports the JOA medical infrastructure, allowing a smaller medical footprint within the JOA. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 0138. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) integrates capabilities from all components to provide the battlespace awareness essential to successful planning and conduct of operations, through collection, processing, exploitation and dissemination of accurate and timely information: a. Intelligence. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information. Good intelligence provides accurate, relevant, timely and predictive analysis to support operations in the creation of a commanders desired effects and is essential to inform the force protection process. Intelligence organizations integrate technical and quantitative assessments with analytical judgments based on detailed knowledge of the way hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements are thinking and operate. Surveillance. Surveillance is a continuing and systematic observation of air, space, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means. It is not oriented to a specific target, but designed to provide warning of opponents initiatives and threats (indications and warning) and to detect changes in opponents activities. Airborne and space-based surveillance assets exploit elevation to detect opponents initiatives at long range. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance complements surveillance through visual observation or other detection methods to obtain specific information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or in securing data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Reconnaissance generally has a time constraint associated with tasking or the endurance of assets involved. Intelligence critical to the prosecution of current operations is derived from reconnaissance operations and should be evaluated and transmitted in near real time to those elements needing that information.
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c.
0139. Successful ISR should help to reduce uncertainties in the decision-making process and improve the ability to gain and maintain information superiority, which in turn increases flexibility, enhances effectiveness, increases responsiveness and aids in force protection. To 1-10 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
be effective ISR products must be responsive to a commanders needs. Key ISR principles are: integration; predictive analysis, correlation and fusion; accessibility; coordination; timeliness; objectivity; review; survivability; deployability and sustainability; and connectivity and interoperability. Special Air Operations 0140. Special air operations forces are an integral part of a special operations force. Special operations force are specially organized units manned by carefully selected people using modified equipment and trained in unconventional applications of tactics against strategic and operational objectives. While special air operations are normally conducted in support of the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC), they will be coordinated and monitored on the daily ATO and ACO. The special operations liaison element will coordinate special air operations supporting these core tasks. Electronic Warfare 0141. Control of the electromagnetic spectrum has a major impact on the success of military operations because military forces rely heavily on a variety of complex, high technology, offensive and defensive electronic capabilities. Modern weapons and support systems employ radio, radar, infrared, optical, ultraviolet, electro-optical and laser technologies. Commanders must prepare to operate weapons systems in an intensive and non-permissive electromagnetic environment. This may be aggravated by both intentional and unintentional emissions from friendly, neutral, and enemy forces. Air-to-Air Refuelling 0142. Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) is an essential capability that increases the range, endurance, payload and flexibility of all capable receiver aircraft, and is especially important when forward basing is limited or unavailable. The high demand placed on AAR assets makes proper employment critical. a. AAR enhances the ability of air power to achieve surprise by allowing indirect approaches and multiple axes of attack to seek out targets the enemy least expects to be attacked. AAR also maximizes the use of each combat/combat support asset launched by increasing flight time or on-station time. Increasing an aircrafts flight time will make additional aircraft available for reassigning towards other objectives, thus achieving economy of force. Additional fuel provides attack aircraft the ability to fight longer and out-last the enemy by extending range and endurance, and thus putting enemy aircraft at a distinct disadvantage. As range is increased by AAR, airpower assets can be based beyond the effective range of enemy weapons. This increases security and makes available multi-role assets for offensive operations. Lesser intermediate fuel stops have to be made during initial deployment, 1-11 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
b.
c.
redeployment or overhaul flights, therefore ferrying can be done in a more efficient and expeditious way. Air Traffic Control 0143. Air Traffic Control (ATC) in the JOA is essential to guide, control and support civil and military air traffic within the framework of the ACO. As a means of control and in its supporting function, ATC can provide prerequisites for the safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic, by day and night and in all weather conditions, as well as for efficient and economic mission-accomplishment. Based on primary and secondary radar, ATC controls air traffic under tactical aspects, supports air operations and provides information to aircrews. Navigation and Positioning 0144. Navigation and positioning are vital to air operations and key elements of information superiority and global awareness through the provision of accurate location and time of reference in support of operations. For example, space-based systems provide global positioning systems; airborne systems provide air-to-surface radar; and ground-based systems provide various navigational aids that assist in accurate rendezvous and synchronization of effort through common timing, position, location and velocity for accurate weapons delivery. Geographic Support 0145. Geographic forces produce and supply high quality geographic material (maps, charts and terrain analysis products) and digital geographic data to joint forces. Accurate, standardized, timely and focussed geographic support is indispensable in providing mission-relevant information describing the operational impact of geography and topography. The availability of geographic material and data, either of which can enhance or impede the effectiveness of tactical and strategic systems and operations, supports the execution of all geographic operations including, but not restricted to, the production and supply of geographic material and digital geographic data. Meteorological Support 0146. Accurate, timely, relevant and tailored Meteorological and Oceanographic Centre (METOC) support assists operations by the provision of information on the state and operational impacts of the air, sea and space environments that may enhance or impede the effectiveness of air and space systems and operations. METOC support provides environmental information, including both space environment and atmospheric weather, to commanders for their objectives and plans at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. It gathers, analyzes and provides meteorological data for mission planning and execution. Environmental information is integral to the decision process and timing for employing forces and planning and conducting air, ground and space launch operations. METOC support also influences the selection of targets, routes, weapon systems and delivery tactics, and is a key element of information superiority.
Combat Service Support 0147. Combat service support consists of the essential capabilities, functions, activities and tasks necessary to create and sustain forces. It includes logistics readiness (logistics plans, transportation, supply/fuels, aircraft maintenance and munitions), personnel, communications and information systems, financial management, force protection, safety, civil engineering, medical services, historians, media, legal services and religious support.
CHAPTER 2 - COMMAND AND CONTROL OF JOINT AIR OPERATIONS

0201. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) will exercise its responsibilities from either a static or deployed headquarters (HQ), depending on the characteristics and requirements of the operation. In deciding location, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) should ensure the JFACC has necessary access to him. In his turn, the JFACC must strike the balance between the advantages of face-to-face contact with the JFC and the need to exercise his tactical responsibilities. Given that the JFACC generally has no specific area of operations but operates within the whole Joint Operations Area (JOA), his HQ is normally collocated with the JFC. 0202. The NATO command structure has 2 static air component command (CC-air) HQ, located at Ramstein (Germany) and Izmir (Turkey), each with the capability to command the air component of a major joint operation, or an operation larger than thatn this in the initial stage, from their static location. The CC-air HQ provide the environmental specific expertise for the JFC, as well as operational level service specific advice on joint operational planning and execution. Although these component commands are routinely subordinated to a JFC, they can be allocated to operations under another commander as the need dictates. In addition, the 2 CC-air HQ can provide a single deployed HQ, with either one acting as parent HQ while drawing from one set of deployable equipment. 0203. CC-air HQ are supported by a number of static and Deployable Combined Air Operations Centres (DCAOCs). Under the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command structure, the existing 10 Combined Air Operations Centres (CAOCs) will be replaced by 4 CAOCs and 2 DCAOCs equipped with the new unified Air Command and Control System 1 (ACCS). ACCS will enable NATOs European nations to seamlessly manage all types of air operations over their territory, and beyond, integrating Air Traffic Control (ATC), surveillance, air mission control, airspace management and force management functions. In addition, a number of Deployable Air Control Centre/Recognized Air Picture Production Centre/Sensor Fusion Posts (DARS) will be activated with ACCS. ACCS will be fielded at the planning and tasking level in the CAOC, and at execution level in the DARS. 0204. The CAOCs can support Allied air operations from their fixed locations while the DCAOCs provide the operational flexibility to increase the tasking capacity of a static CAOC or to deploy to where they are needed. The CAOCs are in Uedem (Germany); Finderup (Denmark); Poggio Renatico (Italy); and Larissa (Greece); and the DCAOCs in Uedem and
Air Command and Control System (ACCS) in this case relates to the equipment not the totality of the air Command and Control (C2) structure.
Poggio Renatico. Additionally, for NATO response force operations, JFACC HQ and CAOC functions may be provided by national entities (Annex 5A expands on these areas).
Figure 2.1 - NATO Air Command and Control Structure Post-ACCS 2 Implementation
Section II - The Joint Force Air Component Commander

0205. The JFACC is normally the Component Commander (CC) with the preponderance of air assets and the capability to plan, task and control joint air operations. He plans, integrates, allocates, controls and tasks joint air operations based on the JFCs guidance and objectives, in accordance with the air apportionment decision and the authority, command relationships and responsibilities laid down by the JFC. Authority and Command Relationships 0206. The JFACC is given the authority to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the JFC. The JFACC typically exercises operational control over assigned assets and tactical control over other air capabilities/forces made available for tasking. The JFC may also establish supporting and supported relationships between the JFACC and other components to facilitate operations. The JFACC conducts joint air operations in accordance with the JFCs intent and concept of the operation.
ACCS in this case relates to the equipment not the totality of the air C2 structure.
Joint Force Air Component Commander Responsibilities 0207. The responsibilities of the JFACC are assigned by the JFC and include, but are not limited to, planning, integrating and monitoring joint air operations, and the allocation and tasking of joint air operations forces based on the JFCs Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and air apportionment decision. Specific responsibilities include: a. b. Developing an air operations plan and air operations directive to best support the JFCs objectives. Recommending apportionment of the joint air effort to the JFC, after consulting with other CCs, by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations for a given period of time. Allocating and tasking of air capabilities/forces made available based on the JFCs air apportionment. Providing oversight and guidance during execution of joint air operations to include making timely adjustments to tasking of available joint air capabilities/forces. Coordinating with the JFC and affected CCs, as appropriate, when the situation requires changes to planned joint air operations. Integrating joint air operations with operations of other CCs and forces assigned to or supporting the JFC. Evaluating the results of joint air operations and forwarding assessments to the JFC to support the overall assessment effort. Providing and receiving appropriate liaison personnel as required. Performing the duties of the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) (unless a separate ACA is designated 3 ). Performing the duties of the Air Defence Commander (ADC) (unless a separate ADC is designated). In concert with the above responsibilities, accomplishing various mission areas to include, but not limited to Air Interdiction (AI), Close Air Support (CAS) and airlift. Functioning as a supported/supporting commander as designated by the JFC.
c. d.
e. f. g. h. i. j. k.
Separation of the ADC and ACA functions will only be accomplished in extraordinary circumstances when no single component is capable of performing both functions.
Section III Liaison Requirements

0208. Effective liaison between forces is essential for coordinated operations and is a key factor in the success of joint operations. Liaison Officers (LOs) serve as their parent commanders eyes and ears, and their representative on matters of capabilities and limitations. Components have ready access to the JFACC, the JFACCs staff and the other components through their liaison personnel; however, where a JFACC is sea-based, space and communication equipment limitations may restrict the size and capability of any liaison elements. Liaison with Component Commands 0209. Component liaisons serve as conduits for direct coordination between their respective CCs and have the responsibility of presenting component perspectives and considerations regarding planning and executing joint air operations. They should possess the authority to represent their CC on time-sensitive and critical issues, and must be equipped and authorized to communicate directly with their respective CC. Component LOs must be familiar with the details of all component air, surface and subsurface missions, to coordinate their impact on joint air operations, and its impact upon them. Senior component liaisons represent their CC on time sensitive and critical issues and help integrate their components participation in joint operations, whilst experienced specialists provide component planning and tasking expertise, and coordinate and deconflict component direct support air operations with joint air operations and host nation diplomatic clearance requirements. Air Liaison Element 0210. The Air Liaison Element (ALE) is an organisation under the command of the JFACC, located with the Joint Force Land/Maritime Component Commander (JFLCC/JFMCC), responsible for operational level inter-component coordination and liaison. Additionally, the JFACC may also elect to position an ALE with the JFC to assist the JFC staff in planning air component supporting and supported requirements. The ALE provides the means for effective component-to-joint and component-to-component liaison and is the conduit for information flow between the joint and component level functions. The ALE focuses on the planning cycle of the JFC and JFACC as well as those of the JFLCC and JFMCC. The ALE assists in planning air component supporting and supported requirements and is normally organised with expertise in plans, operations, intelligence, airspace management and air transport. Its interface includes exchanging current intelligence and operational data, support requirements, coordinating the integration of JFACC requirements for Airspace Control Means (ACMs), Joint Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs) and CAS. Maritime Liaison Element 0211. The Maritime Liaison Element (MLE) staff serves as both the JFMCCs primary representative to the JFACC and the maritime counterpart of the JFACC HQ battle staff. The overall role of the MLE is to integrate the maritime plan with that of the JFACC, thereby 2-4 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
ensuring an effective and efficient joint execution of the JFCs campaign plan. If required, LOs may be detached from various naval sub-commanders to support the MLE staff. Land Liaison Element 0212. The Land Liaison Element (LLE) staff is functionally subordinate to the JFLCC and acts as his representative within the JFACC HQ. If required, LOs may be detached from various land sub-commanders to support the LLE staff. Other Liaisons 0213. Intergovernmental organizations, other government agencies and Non-governmental Organizations conduct activities near or in areas of military operations, and liaisons from these organizations to the JFACC may be appropriate. To the maximum extent possible, commanders should assure that these organizations efforts and the military efforts are integrated, complementary, or not in conflict; and establish coordination and mutual support mechanisms as needed to eliminate or mitigate conflict and support Alliance or coalition goals in the region. Multinational partners, particularly in operations being conducted in conjunction with or in close proximity to those of allied or non-aligned nations, may provide liaisons that work with the JFACC to ease coordination between forces and with governmental agencies. They work with the JFACC (or CAOC) to coordinate the activities of their sending organizations.
JFLCC
ALE
JFACC
MLE LLE
ALE
JFMCC
Corps HQ
AOCC(L)
CAOC
BCE MCE
SOLE
CTF
AOCC(M)
MAOC
Figure 2.2 - Liaison with Component and Subordinate Commands Liaison with Subordinate Commands 0214. Air Operations Coordination Centre (Land/Maritime). The Air Operations Coordination Centre (AOCC) Land/Maritime provides an air entity, functionally subordinate to the CAOC as part of the NATO command structure, collocated with and an integral part of an army corps or maritime task force. The AOCC provides air expertise and integrates the liaison and coordination functions relating to air operations, including, but not limited to; AI; CAS; 2-5 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
coordination of air defence assets such as mobile integrated air defence units, army organic air defence; coordinated air/space procedures; and airspace control. In peacetime, the AOCC will provide a nucleus of people to coordinate with the hosting HQ as they plan, refine, and execute operations. The AOCC will also provide a socket for the ALE team from the JFACC. For exercises/operations, the AOCC (with augmentation as required) will provide execution-level coordination of air operations in support of the appropriate CC as an extension of a designated CAOC for the exercise/operation. 0215. Maritime Coordination Element. The Maritime Coordination Element (MCE) is an integrated part of the CAOC that is functionally subordinate to the JFMCC. It provides coordination between the CAOC and (various) task groups at the tactical level through the Maritime Air Operations Centre (MAOC). The MCE provides expertise and liaison on naval matters relevant to tactical air planning, tasking and execution; monitors and evaluates the maritime situation. It also advises on planning and execution of air operations in support of naval operations and units; and identifies and provides analysis of naval operations in support of current and future CAOC operations and planning. 0216. Battlefield Coordination Element. The Battlefield Coordination Element 4 (BCE) is an integrated part of the CAOC that is functionally subordinate to the JFLCC. It provides coordination between the CAOC and (various) army HQs at the tactical level and provides expertise and liaison on army matters relevant to tactical air planning, tasking and execution. The BCE monitors and evaluates the land situation; advises on planning and execution of air operations in support of land operations and units; identifies and communicates the results, effectiveness and status of friendly and enemy ground operations and provides analysis of ground operations in support of current and future CAOC operations and planning. 0217. Special Operations Liaison Element. The Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) provides a Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) to the JFACC or appropriate component air C2 facility. The SOLE coordinates and synchronizes special operations force air, surface and sub-surface operations with conventional air operations. The SOLE director places special operations force air, ground and maritime LOs throughout the JFACCs staff, located in the CAOC. The SOLE coordinates, integrates and deconflicts all special operations force air, surface and sub-surface activities by providing a special operations force presence in the CAOC that is aware of the activities of special operations units in the field. This will provide visibility of special operations force operations in the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and Airspace Control Order (ACO). Special operations must be closely coordinated with joint air operations planning and execution to prevent fratricide, and ensure achievement of mission objectives.
Known as the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) in some nations.
0218. Maritime Air Operations Centre. The MAOC is the planning and execution element for maritime air operations. It is subordinate to the JFMCC and can task organic air assets in direct support of the JFMCC. The MAOC is responsible for providing input to the CAOC for the ATO and JFACC HQ battle staff ACO on such operations via the MCE/MLE as appropriate.
Section IV - Airspace Control and Air Defence

0219. The goal of airspace control is to increase combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient and flexible use of airspace. It helps reduce fratricide by facilitating the safe passage of friendly and neutral aircraft, and the engagement of enemy aircraft and missile threats in airspace that may be used by all component, civilian or neutral air traffic. Developing and executing fully integrated joint air operations, ACA and ADC responsibilities are normally assigned to the JFACC because of the close relationship between these functions and the need to simplify the coordination required. If conditions do not permit this then the JFC may also designate a separate ACA or ADC, in which case close coordination between these commanders becomes essential. 0220. Air defence operations must be integrated with other tactical air operations within the operational area through the Air Defence Plan (ADP). Weapons control procedures and ACMs for all air defence weapon systems and forces must be established. These procedures must facilitate defensive air operations while minimizing the risk of fratricide. 0221. All air missions are subject to airspace control 5 and have to adhere to the respective ACO, which provides direction to deconflict, coordinate, and integrate the use of airspace within the operational area. Methods to accomplish this deconfliction, coordination, and integration range from positive control of all air assets in an airspace control area to procedural control of all such assets, with any effective combination of positive and procedural control between the two extremes. It is up to the ACA, through the ACP, to decide the appropriate method based on the JFCs operations plan. 0222. Depending on the mission, the degree of control of air assets may need to be rigorous and the Rules of Engagement (ROE) may be more restrictive. This is especially true in a nonwarfighting environment that can transit quickly to combat and back again, and often has constraints and restraints on the forces, weapons, tactics, techniques and procedures employed. Consequently, all air missions, including both fixed and rotary-wing aircraft of all components should appear on the appropriate ATO and/or flight plan and all aircraft must adhere to common procedures. This type of rigorous control is necessary because the mix of friendly, adversary and neutral aircraft and mission constraints require the JFC to strictly control flights in the operational area. No matter what methods are chosen, they need to be continually evaluated for effectiveness and efficiency as the environment and mission change.
Details for joint airspace control are in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.3.5 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control.
The Airspace Control Authority 0223. The ACA is the commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in a designated airspace control area. He establishes and coordinates an airspace control system that responds to the needs of the JFC, provides for integration into the airspace control system of the host nation, and coordinates and deconflicts user requirements. In consultation with appropriate components and civilian authorities, he develops the ACP, taking into consideration any coordination required and organized around maritime and land units. He is then responsible for directing the execution of the ACP through the implementation of ACMs and the development and promulgation of the daily ACO and any special instructions through the joint airspace coordination centre. All components are required to comply with the ACP. The Air Defence Commander 0224. The ADC is the commander with overall responsibility for air defence; normally, the CC with the preponderance of air defence capability and the command, control and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defence operations. He integrates and coordinates the air defence assets of each force component into a coherent joint ADP. This includes establishing weapons control procedures and measures for all DCA weapon systems and forces, coordination with regional/host nation air defence systems and the exchange of information necessary to support civil defence activities. Additionally, he is responsible for the production of the Recognized Air Picture (RAP). He applies the principles of air defence to counter hostile air activity, including Theatre Missile Defence 6 (TMD), and promulgates and employs common procedures for air defence battle management and the reduction of mutual interference, taking into account any air defence required and organized around maritime and land units. Should the area to be defended be large and the intensity of operations likely to be high, the ADC/JFACC may establish a number of geographic air defence sectors, each under the control of a Sector Air Defence Commander (SADC) who reports to the ADC. A SADC will be subject to the overriding authority of the ADC, but could otherwise be vested with some of the responsibilities of the ADC necessary for the conduct of air defence operations within his allocated sector. In the task as the supporting HQ for the ADC the CAOC must integrate all DCA operations with focus on air defence, particularly Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD) and TMD operations in either current plans and/or current operations.
Theatre missile is a missile employed to attack friendly assets within the theatre, regardless of the range of the system considered or the method of launch. They are categorized as Theatre Aerodynamic Missiles (TAM) or Theatre Ballistic Missiles (TBM) depending on their flight path.
Section V - Air Command and Control System 7

0225. Air operations are controlled through an overarching air C2 and Communications and Information Systems (CIS) structure centred on the CAOC - ACCS. It includes the structures, personnel, procedures and equipment necessary to plan, direct and control air operations, and to coordinate air operations with other components. Combined Air Operations Centre 0226. The CAOC is the principal centre from which air operations are directed, monitored, controlled, executed and coordinated with the other components. It is structured to operate as a fully integrated facility and includes the equipment and personnel necessary to accomplish the planning, directing, controlling and coordinating of JOA-wide air operations. Actual CAOC organization may vary with specific JOA or national requirements. Below the CAOC are elements of the air C2 chain that provide tactical control for forces executing air missions. Control and Reporting Centre 0227. The Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) is a ground-based integrated C2 element. It may be static or mobile/deployable and can be provided by an alliance, coalition as a combined element or by a single nation. One or more radars are connected to the CRC, one of which may be collocated. Subordinate to the CAOC, and horizontally integrated with tactical C2 and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance elements, attack and support aircraft, it is responsible for the decentralized execution of air defence and airspace control as well as supporting offensive air operations in a geographic sector assigned by the CAOC. The CRC manages all defensive air, offensive air and airspace management activities within its assigned operational area through surveillance, identification, weapons control, positive and procedural airspace control, and link management. Moreover, it produces a fully identified air picture, which contributes to the RAP. In compliance with CAOC directives, further control, surveillance and/or management may be delegated to subordinate radar units, Airborne Early Warning (AEW)/Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) or flight procedural agencies (such as Air Operations Control Centres) where, for example, they may have interoperable and better radio and/or radar coverage. With the introduction of NATO ACCS the CRC will be renamed as an Air control centre/Recognized air picture production centre/Sensor fusion post (ARS). Air Control Centre/Recognized Air Picture Production Centre/Sensor Fusion Posts 0228. The ARS consists of a number of tactical control organizations collocated into a single entity; that may be static or deployable (DARS). ARS are established for the production of the RAP; control of assigned weapon systems; preparation and execution of tasked missions; provision of guidance and control to air defence weapon systems; implementing the ordered
ACCS in this context refers to the entirety of the air C2 structure and not the specific C2 equipment being procured also known as ACCS.
readiness posture; reacting to execution orders; and reporting mission results to the CAOC. Components of the ARS are: a. Air Control Centres. Air control centres are the real-time battle management components that perform air mission control for manned aircraft and GBAD weapons within a designated geographical area. They can be delegated single, multiple or all of the tactical battle management functions by the parent CAOC for mission execution. This could include GBAD weapons preparation and GBAD weapon employment control. They may also provide limited ATC services, coordinate the minute-to-minute air battle with maritime forces afloat and army ground-air operations, and can also provide tactical, navigational and emergency assistance to aircraft. Recognized Air Picture Production Centres. Recognized Air Picture Production Centres (RPCs) produce a RAP, disseminate a joint environment picture (composite of sea, land and air surveillance picture), and manage their subordinate surveillance assets within an assigned area. An area air picture is established by correlating local air pictures from subordinate Sensor Fusion Posts (SFPs) with tracks and surveillance data received from external sources. Maritime surface and sub-surface, land surface and air tracks are received via automatic data links from maritime forces, allied ground surveillance assets and airborne early warning aircraft. Additionally, the RPC manages allocated surveillance assets in accordance with the orders and priorities received from the CAOC and in response to requests from RAP users for additional or improved RAP data. Sensor Fusion Posts. The SFP develops a local air picture through the fusion of data from active and passive sensors. They also report on the status and performance of subordinate sensors, controls sensor detection and respond to antiradiation missile threats and electronic countermeasures activity. Additionally, they manage and distribute all data coming from ATC radars to the RPC.
b.
c.
Air Operations Coordination Centre 0229. The AOCC is an air entity functionally subordinate to the commander of a CAOC. Collocated with an army corps HQ or a maritime task force, it forms an integral part of the corps/task force HQ organisation, provides air expertise and liaison, and the coordination of air operations in support of land and maritime operations.
Tactical Air Control Parties 0230. Tactical air control parties provide direct interaction with supported ground combat forces. They are staffed with Air Liaison Officers and/or Forward Air Controllers 8 to conduct liaison and control functions. Officer in Tactical Command 0231. The officer in tactical command is responsible for coordinating all friendly air movement within the force air coordination area. He ensures that airspace requirements are coordinated with the ACA and that ACOs are adhered to. Airborne Early Warning/ Airborne Warning and Control Systems 0232. AEW aircraft are flexible and capable integrated surveillance platforms that can provide a real-time, accurate and reliable all altitude/all weather battlespace picture of friendly, neutral and hostile activity beyond the coverage of ground-based radar. On board controllers provide an offensive and defensive control capability. AWACS provides an additional air battle management capability, above and beyond pure AEW. Air Ground Surveillance 0233. Air-Ground Surveillance (AGS) systems, such as the Alliance ground surveillance Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and Airborne Stand-off Radar (ASTOR), are integrated land/air theatre/JOA wide battle management and/or C2 aircraft that build ground situational awareness through surveillance to support attack operations and/or targeting. They allow for rapid updates on enemy force disposition, identify opportunities for rapid interdiction and retargeting of surface forces and a limited battle management function. On-board battle managers (where carried) provide direction based on wide area surveillance ground moving target indicator and synthetic aperture radar information that detects and locates stationary ground targets and tracks moving ground targets and rotating antennas. This data is used to build a common tactical picture to provide the JFC and his CCs with situation development, targeting, attack planning and limited post attack assessment information. Data is transmitted to airborne and ground elements of the ACCS capable of receiving appropriate data link messages. Signals Intelligence 0234. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is a category of intelligence comprising, either individually or collectively, all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. Airborne SIGINT capabilities allow real (or near real) time assessment of hostile air or surface based electronic emitters
Known as Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) in some nations.
and the correlation of location, type and mode of emitted signal with the radar tracking information from AEW, AWACS and AGS type aircraft. Wing Operations Centre 0235. The Wing Operations Centre (WOC) performs continuous coordination between the wing and the CAOC (also the AOCC, if tasking authority is delegated) or air control centre (when delegated by the CAOC) and between the wing and the squadrons. Feasibility of tasking will be verified throughout the mission preparation process. The tasking will be adjusted for additional mission relevant information and within the wing's capabilities and capacities in coordination with the tasking authority. Mission launch schedules are generated and missions are assigned to individual squadrons or to individual aircraft. The WOC monitors and ensures mission result reporting and provides continuous near real-time status information to the CAOC and associated ARS. Squadron Operations Centre 0236. The Squadron Operations Centre (SQOC) performs continuous coordination with the WOC for final mission preparation. The SQOC is responsible for the preparation of assigned missions, their timely execution, and the reporting of mission results through the WOC to the ARS and associated CAOC. Surface to Air Missile Operations Centre 0237. The Surface-to-Air Missile Operations Centre (SAMOC) performs management and control of GBAD weapons systems and provides continuous near real-time GBAD status information to the air control centre, the CAOC and the AOCC (when providing support to ground forces). A SAMOC is normally deployable, but may be implemented at static installations.
CHAPTER 3 - JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION

0301. The size of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) Headquarters (HQ) and the internal manning and composition of the elements will vary according to the type and scope of the mission. The structure could vary from an organization with a formal A-1 to A-9 staff structure, in functional areas or complete with a separate and readily identifiable Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC), to one in which the staff might carry out the functions, accomplished by a CAOC but would not be so formally structured.
JFACC
Liaison Elements
Component Unit Interagency NGO HN Multinational Inter-Governmental
Admin Registry LEGAD POLAD PIO HQ Support Group CC Air Liaison Elements
A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4

Command Coordination
A-5 A-6 A-7
A-8 A-9
Figure 3.1 Generic JFACC HQ Organization 0302. The JFACC HQ will generally form from a Component Commander (CC)-air HQ utilizing its organic Command and Control (C2) structure and supported by one or more CAOCs from its static location. However, the option exists for the HQ to deploy to a forward land or sea-base with an embedded Deployable Combined Air Operations Centres (DCAOCs). The location decision will be based on the specific mission, the type and composition of assigned forces, the tempo of the operation, the required tasking capability, the availability of suitable HQ location and supporting infrastructure, and the necessity to collocate with the Joint Force
Commanders (JFCs) HQ or not. Ultimately, the capacity to provide working space and communications and information system support will be a driving factor. 0303. For deployed operations the JFACC and his staff will be supported by an embedded DCAOC, augmented as required by the static CAOCs. Where a deployed location or vessel cannot support the JFACC HQ staff and embedded DCAOC a partially deployed option may be utilized with the establishment of a JFACC HQ (Forward) and JFACC HQ (Rear) using the principle of reachback. The permutations of a deployed, rear and forward JFACC are many and varied, thus any final decision will depend on the mission, scenario and capabilities at hand. 0304. There are national variations to the JFACC planning responsibilities, which see more of the planning effort devolved to a CAOC. This option is discussed in greater detail in Annex 5A.
Section II - The Joint Force Air Component Commander Headquarters Staff

0305. The JFACC will activate a battle staff to form the operational centre and main coordinating element of his HQ. The battle staff will work alongside the existing divisional A-level structure, with sections and cells below the division level operating along functional lines. An additional HQ Support Group is responsible for providing administrative, logistical and security support to all elements of the HQ. 0306. The A-Level Staff. The A-Level staff comprise the following: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. Division chiefs. A1 personnel and administration. A2 intelligence. A3 operations. A4 logistics. A5 policy and plans. A6 communications and information systems. A7 doctrine and training. A8 budget and finance. A9 civil-military cooperation.
0307. The Battle Staff. The battle staff provides the battle staff director with knowledgeable officers who can react to dynamic circumstances and provide him with insight and guidance 3-2 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
into operations at both the operational and tactical levels. The battle staff consists the following: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. Director. Deputy battle staff director operations. Coordination officer/information manager. Divisional representatives. Political adviser. Legal adviser. Public information officer. Component Liaison Officers (LOs).
0308. The JFACC HQ staff will also include appropriate component representation and subject matter experts who provide the knowledge and experience required to effectively employ any capabilities/forces made available to the JFACC for tasking. To be most effective, the JFACC should integrate appropriate component representation throughout his staff, rather than just limiting them to a liaison position. Ideally, JFACC HQ staff billets requiring specific expertise or individuals will have been identified, staffed accordingly, trained and employed during peacetime exercises to ensure their preparedness for operations. 0309. The nucleus of the JFACC HQ staff should be trained in joint air operations and be representative of the joint force. Staff augmentation with the manning identified above ensures joint representation throughout the JFACC battle staff. The JFACC, in coordination with other CCs, will determine specific manning requirements based on the size and scope of the operation, force list and personnel availability.
Section III - Joint Force Air Component Commander Headquarters Lead Divisions
A3 Division 0310. The overall responsibility of A3 operations is to integrate the various inputs into consolidated operations orders and directives that facilitate effective and efficient air operations. Centralized control is maintained through the Air Operations Directive (AOD), Joint Prioritized Target List (JPTL) and Airspace Control Order (ACO). This relies on integrating inputs from A2, A5, A6 and the LOs. The A3 division consists of:
a.
Air Operations Directive Team. The air operations directive team, in conjunction with A2, A4, A5 and the LOs, analyze the JFCs Joint Coordination Order (JCO) to create the air plan and translate this into the AOD with a supporting JPTL. Current Operations Cell. The current operations cell is split into an offensive and defensive section responsible for managing all aspects of ongoing air operations. It synthesizes the recognized air picture, various reports and direct dialogue with CAOC and forward air element to maintain overall situational awareness. The current operations cell also coordinates changes to the AOD and priority target lists and coordinates with the target cell to execute all mobile, time-sensitive and conventional counter force targeting. Ground-Based Air Defence/Theatre Missile Defence Coordination Cell. The Ground-based Air Defence (GBAD)/Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) coordination cell monitors, assesses and advises on GBAD and TMD operations and plans. Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell. The air electronic warfare coordination cell is responsible for the planning and coordination of all air electronic warfare and related activities in liaison with the joint and CC electronic warfare coordination cell. Air-to-Air Refuelling/Airlift Cell. The air-to-air refuelling/airlift cell is responsible for coordinating air-to-air refuelling planning for all CCs and establishing appropriate airspace. Combat Search and Rescue Cell. The combat search and rescue cell assists in planning, risk assessment and guidance to establish the combined joint rescue coordination centre embedded in the CAOC. Force Protection Coordination Cell. The force protection coordination cell advises the JFACC on appropriate force protection measures considering threat, mission criticality and risk-taking philosophy, and coordinates chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear warning and reporting. The cell maintains close liaison with force protection staff at JFC, other CC and subordinate HQs. Joint Airspace Coordination Centre. The joint airspace coordination centre develops the Airspace Control Plan (ACP); manages and publishes the ACO; receives, coordinates and approves/denies requests for Airspace Control Measures (ACM)s; coordinates/deconflicts request for the activation of ACMs extending into adjacent joint operations areas; establishing liaison with CCs, appropriate NATO, national and international organizations; and ensuring the timely and adequate distribution of the ACO. Airspace Surveillance and Control System Cell. The airspace surveillance and control system cell monitors, assesses and advises on integrated air defence operations and data links.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
A5 Division 0311. The overall responsibility of A5 plans is to lead on the development of the short-term air strategy and overall assessment of the air operations based on the JFACCs operation and ongoing operational, intelligence and logistic constraints. A5 also maintains the medium to long-term vision for air operations, monitors force composition, analyzes and assesses the operational effectiveness of the air operations as well as compiling branch and sequel plans. A5 leads the translation of the JCO into a comprehensive air strategy for execution in the short-term, as well as the development of plans for the medium and longer terms. A5 will also monitor the operations and plans of other CC HQs to identify their impact on air strategy and the overall joint campaign, recommending new courses of action as appropriate. The A5 division consists of the following sections: a. b. Coordination and Administration. This section provides overall management, coordination and control of A5 administration, signals traffic and correspondence. Air Operations Planning Group. The Air Operations Planning Group (AOPG) develops the long-term vision; identifies friendly centres of gravity with higher HQ staff; translates higher HQ direction and guidance into the JFACCs direction and guidance and acts as the JFACCs link to higher HQ planners; identifies desired effects and refines phased air objectives; advises the JFACC on planning issues and requirements, representing the JFACC in the joint coordination board as required; leading the development of apportionment and air target requirements; work on beddown issues with A4 as required; and support and contribute to the AOD decision Meeting. Analysis and Assessment Section. This section, part of the AOPG, evaluates results against objectives, advising on any changes to current objectives and estimates likely achievement timescales. This enables the the air strategy assessment and report to be reproduced as well as supporting the air strategy section.
c.
Section IV - Deployed Joint Force Air Component Commander Headquarters Options

0312. Procedures for joint air operations are designed to exploit the flexibility of air power to achieve joint force objectives while providing support to component operations. Effective joint air operations planning must contain provisions to transition JFACC responsibilities between appropriate air HQs or components. Joint air operations scenarios may vary, and each scenario requires extensive planning when transition of JFACC responsibilities is necessary. a. Land-Based. In large-scale air operations a land-based JFACC and CAOC is normally desirable because of enhanced logistics, communications and other required equipment, services and workspace that may not be available on sea-based facilities.
b.
Sea-Based. The JFACC and CAOC should be sea-based when any one of the following conditions are present: maritime forces provide the preponderance of air assets and the capability to effectively plan, task and control joint air operations; land-based facilities or sufficient infrastructure do not exist;a secure land-based area is not available and/or ground support forces are forced to withdraw. Collocation with Joint Task Force Headquarters. Collocation of the JFACC HQ with the joint task force HQ while clearly desirable, especially if the JFACC is also the Air Defence Commander (ADC) and the Airspace Control Authority (ACA), is not an absolute requirement, provided adequate communications are available. However, where the JFACC HQ and the joint task force HQ are separate, scarce resources will be further strained by the duplication of functions, services and the requirement for a robust JFACC HQ multi-disciplinary liaison staff to the joint task force HQ. When sea-based, joint task force and JFACC HQ staffs may be collocated on a suitably equipped platform.
c.
Section V - Joint Force Air Component Commander Transition

Planned Transition 0313. The JFACC should develop a plan for the transition of JFACC duties to another air HQ, component or location. Planned JFACC transitions are possible as a function of build up or scale down of joint force operations. During transition of JFACC responsibilities, the component passing responsibilities should continue monitoring joint air planning, tasking and control circuits, and remain ready to reassume JFACC responsibilities until the gaining HQ or component has achieved full operational capability. Unpredicted Transition 0314. As a possible result of battle damage or major C2 equipment failure, a smooth transition is unlikely. Therefore, the JFC should pre-designate alternates (both inter and intra-component) and establish preplanned responses/options to the temporary or permanent loss of primary JFACC capability. Frequent backup and exchange of databases is essential to facilitate a rapid resumption of operations should an unplanned transition occur. Transition Events 0315. The following events may cause the JFACC responsibilities to shift: a. b. Coordination requirements related to air tasking order planning and execution exceeds the component capability. Build-up or relocation of forces shifts preponderance of the air capabilities/ forces and the ability to effectively plan, task and control joint air operations to another CC
and the JFC decides that the other component is in a better position (location, C2 capability or other considerations) to accomplish the JFACC responsibilities. c. Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence capability becomes unresponsive or unreliable.
Transition Considerations 0316. Considerations to aid in JFACC transition planning and decisions include: a. b. c. d. Continuous, uninterrupted and unambiguous direction and guidance for joint air operations. Appropriate communications system support capabilities to ensure that the shift of JFACC duties is as transparent to the components as possible. The provision of specific procedures for coordinating and executing planned and unplanned shifts of JFACC in the air operations plan. The availability of adequate communications, connectivity, manning, intelligence support and C2 capability in relieving component prior to assuming JFACC responsibilities. Management of the current AOD, ACO, force disposition, adversary situation and order of battle. The JFCs objectives to conduct supporting joint air operations. Established timely, reliable and secure communications links with all appropriate coordination cells to facilitate continuous and dynamic exchange of information. Complete familiarity with the air defence plan and airspace control plan. Complete and current databases to expedite the transition.
e. f. g. h. i.
Section VI Joint Force Commander Staff Options in Joint Air Operations

0317. The JFC normally appoints a JFACC; however, the possibility exists for the JFC to directly task joint force air capabilities/forces. In those situations, the JFC would retain command authority and responsibility and would normally request augmentation from appropriate components to perform the JFACC responsibilities and assist in planning and coordinating joint air operations. This includes ACA and ADC responsibilities unless these are separately designated. Factors for consideration in determining whether or not to appoint a JFACC include:
a.
Span of Control. Does the JFC have the ability to effectively manage the actions of subordinates? Span of control is based on the number of subordinates, number of activities, range of weapon systems, force capabilities, the size and complexity of the operational area, and the method used to control operations (centralized or decentralized). Scale. When joint air operations are the only operations, or the duration and scope of air operations are of a very limited nature, the JFC may elect to plan, direct and control joint air operations.
b.
0318. Should a JFACC not be designated, unity of effort in joint air operations requires the JFC to centrally plan, direct and coordinate joint air operations with other joint force operations. The JFC may delegate authority and assign responsibility for various aspects of joint air operations to subordinate commanders; those commanders then make decisions based on the JFCs mission, guidance and intent. Joint Force Commanders Staff Organization and Manning 0319. The JFC HQ staff should be organized and manned so that component and force representation generally reflects the composition of the joint force, and should include expertise necessary to effectively plan and execute joint air operations. The HQ staff will operate out of the JFC HQ, which may include a joint operations centre that functions as the CAOC from where the JFC HQ staff plan and monitor the execution of joint air operations. Transition of Command and Control for Joint Air Operations 0320. The JFC may choose to assign C2 of joint air operations to a JFACC when the duration and scope of joint air operations exceed the JFCs span of control. Additionally, the JFC may transfer designated mission experts and functional area augmentees from the JFC staff to the JFACC battle staff to assist in the transition and coordination of joint air operations. Conversely, a transition from JFACC to JFC staff may also be directed when the JFC determines that operational requirements warrant such a change.
CHAPTER 4 - PLANNING FOR JOINT AIR OPERATIONS

0401. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operational planning process 1 consists of a two-stage development process: a. The military estimate process selects a Course of Action (COA) and develops a CONOPS to provide a clear and concise statement of how the assigned mission is to be accomplished. The development of appropriate contingency plans/standing defence plans/Operation Plans (OPLANS), which drive the production of a campaign plan and a family of supporting plans.
b.
Section II - Joint Force Air Component Commander Planning Responsibilities

0402. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) employs a Joint Air Estimate (JAE) process to derive a supporting air operations plan, also known as the air plan. The air plan 2 details how the joint air effort will support the JFCs OPLAN and is a collaborative effort of the JFACC staff, the JFC staff and the component staffs, and is the principle output of the estimate process. 0403. The JAE comprises a systematic series of steps to formulate one or more courses of actions (COA)s. The JFACC uses the JFCs mission, estimate 3 and objectives, commanders intent, CONOPS, tasks to subordinate units, Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and the components objectives to devise an estimate of the situation. While the phases are presented in sequential order, work on them can be either concurrent or sequential. Nevertheless, the phases are integrated and the products of each phase are checked and verified for coherence; moreover, the process is iterative. A generic JAE process is detailed in Annex 4A. 0404. When the JFC approves the JFACCs COA(s) it becomes the concept of joint air operations expressing what, where and how joint air operations will affect the adversary or current situation - articulated as the air plan. The JFACCs daily guidance ensures that these operations effectively support the joint force objectives while retaining enough flexibility to adjust to the dynamics of military operations.
See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning (Ratification Draft) for greater detail. 2 Known as the Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP) in some nations. 3 Estimate of the political, religious, cultural, economic, military, and social forces affecting the operational area and articulation of the objectives needed to accomplish the mission from the basis for determining components objectives see AJP-5.
0405. The JFACCs role is to provide focus, guidance, direction and purpose to the staff to generate the effects associated with the commanders intent; however, his degree of direct involvement will depend on the time available, preferences, and the experience and accessibility of the staff. During planning he will use the entire staff to explore the full range of probable and likely adversary and friendly COAs, and to analyze and compare friendly air capabilities with the adversary threat. He ensures that planning is conducted in a collaborative manner with other components by making maximum use of appropriately empowered Liaison Officers (LOs) to support integration of operations across the joint force.
CONCEPT OF JOINT AIR OPERATIONS DEVELOPMENT Joint Force Mission
JFC Estimate
Objectives & Comprehensive JOA Perspective
JFACC Joint Air Estimate Process

JFACC and/or JFC Staff Recommend COA JFC Approves COA
Air Supporting Plan (SUPPLAN)

Supporting Plans (such as) Air Defence Plan Airspace Control Plan
JFACCs Guidance
Air Operations Directive - Airspace Coordination Order Master Air Attack Plan and Supporting Orders Air Tasking Order
Figure 4.1 - Joint Air Operations Development 0406. Planning is a continuous process that only ends when the mission is accomplished and the forces are redeployed, or when the national command authorities terminate the mission and direct the redeployment of forces. Staff assigned to develop the plan should include representation from all components providing air capabilities/forces to enable coordination and greater understanding of all component capabilities/forces. Adversaries will always attempt to frustrate a plan and the JFACC HQ staff must expect changes and be ready to make them in a time-constrained environment. 4-2 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
Force Protection 0407. The footprint of the air component when it is ground-based is almost impossible to fully conceal and difficult to protect, and inevitably the ground environment from which it operates will frequently impact upon operations. Because aircraft and their supporting infrastructure are at their most vulnerable on the ground, adequate force protection becomes a key planning consideration in attempting to conserve fighting potential and allow an appropriate degree of freedom to conduct air operations. Force protection consists of preventative measures and means that aim to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, operations and activities from threats in order to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness thereby contributing to mission success. Force protection is an iterative process that relies on the application of effective risk management in relation to the perceived threat; however, the dynamic nature of an operational environment frequently makes the force protection process sensitive to change. The level of acceptable risk will invariably alter over time and appropriate force protection measures will need a degree of flexibility to reflect this.
Section III - Campaign and Targeting Synchronization During Operations

The Joint Coordination Process 0408. The joint coordination process synchronises the campaign efforts of a joint force. The primary objective of joint coordination is to provide the most efficient use of joint force assets and to capitalize on their synergistic effect. The JFC will establish, or may delegate a subordinate commander to establish a Joint Coordination Board (JCB) 4 organization within his staff to accomplish campaign synchronization and joint coordination. The JCB and its subordinate working groups, (the Joint Target Working Group (JTWG), the Information Operations (Info Ops) working group, the )Daily Asset Reconnaissance Board (DARB), the Joint Defended Asset Working Group (JDAWG), Time-Sensitive Target (TST) cell, current operations or the combined joint operations centre and the joint operations planning group must all contribute specific inputs to, and shoulder specific responsibilities for, the campaign synchronization process. Effective communications and liaison are vital to its success. The Joint Coordination Board 0409. The JCB seeks to accomplish campaign synchronization and joint coordination (approximately 3-10 days hence), including joint targeting guidance, balancing competing component requirements with the JFCs direction and guidance. The JCB should have a macro-level view of the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and balance competing component requirements with the JFCs direction and guidance for the next 3-10 day period. It issues a Joint Coordination Order (JCO) as required on behalf of the JFC.
Known as a Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) in some nations.
The Joint Coordination Order 0410. The JCO provides, in one document, the overall operational focus of the campaign showing the total interaction of all forces and capabilities, lethal and non-lethal, that the JFC has available to complete his mission. The JCO states the JFCs intent, the point of main effort, provides amplifying guidance and coordinating instructions. It includes annexes for the Joint Prioritised Target List (JPTL), TST, Info Ops guidance matrix and any Special Instructions (SPINS) on restricted targets, joint fires and Info Ops. 0411. Based on the JCO, CCs develop their own objectives and tasks including requests and/or recommendations to the JFACC (unless he is the supported commander) on the proposed allotment/apportionment of air assets, prior to their submission to the JFCs JCB for review and concurrence. The JCB will resolve any case of conflicting component objectives. The JTWG manages the targeting process by coordinating the targeting inputs of the CCs with additional inputs received from other organisations. The JTWG determines desired effects to be generated, harmonizes, and prioritizes targets; proposes the effects to be created, assigns an executing authority; and develops a draft JPTL for JCB approval.
Section IV - Air Battle Rhythm and Air Tasking Cycle

0412. The JFACC employs a joint air tasking cycle to provide for the efficient and effective employment of the joint air capabilities/forces made available. The cycle provides a repetitive process for the planning, coordination, allocation and tasking of joint air missions/sorties within the guidance of the JFC. The cycle accommodates changing tactical situations or JFC guidance as well as requests for support from other CCs. The joint air tasking cycle is an analytical, systematic approach that focuses targeting efforts on supporting operational requirements. Much of the day-to-day joint air tasking cycle is conducted through an interrelated series of information exchanges and active involvement in plan development, target development and air execution (through designated component LOs and/or messages), which provide a means of requesting and scheduling joint air missions. A timely Air Tasking Order (ATO) is critical - other joint force components conduct their planning and operations based on a prompt, executable ATO and are dependent on its information. 0413. The joint air tasking cycle begins with the JFCs objectives, guidance during JFC and component coordination, and culminates with Combat Assessment (CA) of previous actions. The ATO articulates the tasking for joint air operation for a specific time period, normally 24 hours. Detailed planning normally begins 48 hours in advance of the execution period to enable the integration of all component requirements. The net result of this planning effort is that there are usually 3 ATOs in various stages of progress at any time: the ATO currently being executed; the ATO being developed/produced; and the ATO in planning. 0414. The full cycle from JFC guidance to the start of ATO execution is dependent on the JFCs procedures. A 72-hour ATO cycle, starting from JFC guidance and ending after a 24-hour execution period is fairly standard. The precise timeframes for the joint air tasking cycle 4-4 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
must be specified in the JFCs OPLANs or the JFACCs air plan. Long-range combat air assets launching from outside the theatre/JOA, may be airborne before ATO publication/execution. These assets require the most current (draft) ATO information and updates as required. Inter-theatre airlift, combat, aerial support and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 5 (UAV) missions may not necessarily operate within an established ATO cycle and are subject to foreign nation diplomatic clearance procedures. Careful consideration must be given to how these and intra-theatre air mobility and combat missions are integrated into the ATO. 0415. The cycle matches specific targets with the capabilities/forces made available to the JFACC for the given ATO day. Other component air missions that appear on the ATO may not be under the control of the JFACC, but their presence on the ATO provides visibility to assist overall coordination and deconfliction. The ATO phases are interrelated to the air targeting cycle. The approach is the same, a systematic process that matches available capabilities/forces with targets to achieve operational objectives. Unlike the targeting cycle, the air tasking cycle is time dependent. The air tasking cycle is built around finite time periods that are required to plan, prepare for and conduct air operations. The number of ATO development phases may vary based on theatre and contingency requirements. Prior to the JFC and CCs meeting, the JFACC meets with senior component liaisons and the JFACC staff to develop recommendations on air planning and air apportionment for future operations. (The use of the term meeting is notional; other methods of information exchange could also be used.) The air tasking cycle usually consists of the following phases. Phase 1 - Joint Force Commander/Component Coordination 0416. The JFC consults often with CCs to assess the result of the warfighting effort and to discuss the strategic direction and future OPLAN. The JCO provides the JFCs intent and guidance. The JFACC through consultation and the JCO strikes a balance between long-range planning and intimate involvement with day-to-day ATO production or execution. The end product is the daily air operations directive, which provides the daily guidance for ATO production. Phase 2 - Target Development 0417. This is the point where the efforts of the targeting process relate target development to tasking and are processed with the assistance of the liaison elements, through a Guidance, Apportionment and Targeting (GAT 6 ) team (within plans/strategy). The GAT team collates target nominations from the components. It screens all nominated targets to ensure they meet the JFC guidance and are relevant. It prioritizes the nominated targets based on the best potential achievement of the JFC guidance and the components priorities and timing requirements.
5 6
Known as unmanned aircraft in some nations. See Section V for Guidance, Apportionment and Targeting (GAT) responsibilities.
Phase 3 Weaponeering and Air Allocation 0418. Weaponeering. During the capabilities analysis/allocation phase, targeting personnel quantify the expected results of lethal and non-lethal weapons employment against prioritized targets to create desired effects. The JPTL provides the basis for weaponeering assessment activities. All approved targets are weaponeered to include recommended aim points, weapons systems and munitions, fuzing, target identification and description, target attack objectives, probability of destruction and collateral damage concerns. The final prioritized targets developed during GAT are then provided to a Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP) team. The MAAP teams allocate airpower by melding available capabilities with the GAT recommendations. The resulting MAAP is the plan of employment that forms the foundation of the ATO. The MAAP is normally a graphic depiction of capability required for a given period and is a key element of the concept of joint air operations. The development of the MAAP includes the review of JFC and JFACC direction and guidance; component air plans and their support requests; updates to target requests; availability of capabilities/forces; target selection from the JPTL; and aircraft allocation. Components may submit critical changes to target requests and asset availability during this final phase of ATO development. 0419. Air Allocation. Following the JFC air apportionment decision, the JFACC translates that decision into total number of sorties by aircraft type available for each objective/task. On the basis of the JFCs air apportionment decision, internal requirements and air support request messages, each air capable component prepares an allocation request message for transmission to the JFACC (normally not less than 36 hours prior to the start of the ATO day, this coincides with the beginning of the MAAP process). Allocation request messages report excess sorties not required by the air capable component and available for tasking by the JFACC and requests for air support. Phase 4 - Air Tasking Order Production 0420. JFC and JFACC guidance, including the air operations directive, target worksheets, the MAAP and component requirements are used to finalize the ATO/SPINS/Airspace Control Order (ACO). Airspace control and air defence instructions must be provided in sufficient detail to allow components to plan and execute all missions listed in the ATO. These directions must enable combat operations without undue restrictions, balancing combat effectiveness with the safe, orderly and expeditious use of airspace. Instructions must provide for quick coordination of task assignment or reassignment and must direct aircraft identification and engagement procedures with Rules of Engagement (ROE) that are appropriate to the nature of the threat. These instructions should also consider the volume of friendly air traffic, friendly air defence requirements, Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) technology, weather and adversary capabilities. Instructions are contained in SPINS and also in the ACO, and are updated as frequently as required. The ATO, ACO and SPINS provide operational and tactical direction at appropriate levels of detail. The level of detail should be very explicit when forces operate from different bases and multi-component and/or composite missions are tasked. By contrast, less detail is required when missions are tasked to a single component or base. 4-6 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
Phase 5 - Force Execution 0421. The JFACC directs the execution of air capabilities/forces made available for joint air operations. Inherent in that is the authority to redirect joint air assets. The JFACC will coordinate with affected CCs upon redirection of joint sorties previously allocated for support of component operations. Manned and unmanned aircraft or other capabilities/forces not apportioned for joint air operations, but included in the ATO for coordination purposes (e.g., other component air missions), will be redirected only with the approval of the respective CC: a. The CAOC must be responsive to required changes during the execution of the ATO. In-flight reports, the discovery of TST and initial Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) may cause a redirecting of joint air capabilities/forces before launch or a redirection once airborne. During execution, the CAOC is the central agency for revising the tasking of joint air capabilities/forces. hIt is also charged with coordinating and deconflicting those changes with the appropriate control agencies or components. Battlefield dynamics may require the JFACC to make changes to the planned joint air operations during execution and he will be required to coordinate with affected CCs and nations. During execution, the JFACC is responsible for retargeting joint air operations assets to respond to moving targets or changing priorities. Ground or airborne C2 platform mission commanders may be delegated the authority from the JFACC (under the same conditions outlined above) to redirect sorties/missions made available to higher priority targets as necessary. It is essential, however, that the CAOC be notified of all redirected missions.
b.
c.
d.
Phase 6 - Combat Assessment 0422. Combat assessment is performed at all levels of the joint force. The JFC should establish a dynamic system to support combat assessment to ensure that all components are making contributions to the overall joint force activity. Normally, the JFC HQ joint operations staff (J3) is responsible for coordinating combat assessment, assisted by the joint intelligence staff (J2). Combat assessment evaluates the effectiveness of combat operations in achieving command objectives. Effective operation planning and execution require a continuing evaluation of the impact of joint force combat operations within each of the components and on the overall operation or campaign. The JFACC continuously plans for and evaluates the results of joint air operations and provides assessments to the JFC for consolidation into the overall evaluation of the current campaign. 0423. Within the joint force, comabt assessment is conducted at the tactical level and at the operational level. The combat assessment process at the tactical level includes planning for, and gathering data and information on, BDA and munitions effectiveness assessments in 4-7 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
order to generate quick reattack recommendations and rapid decisions affecting current operations. However, the overall assessment process for joint air operations continues over several days or weeks to evaluate the effectiveness of weapons and tactical engagements as additional information and analysis become available from sources within and outside the operational area. At the operational level, combact assessment is concerned with planning for, and gathering information on, the broader results achieved by air operations. In order for the combat assessment process to be effective, logical links must be established early in the planning sequence. Planners must identify air objectives and tasks, along with relevant success indicators and measures of effectiveness, collection management and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) participation in the planning process. 0424. In general, the combat assessment process at the tactical level provides one of the major sources of information for performing it at the operational level. Those inputs along with a wide assortment of other information aid in the development of the air components operational level combat assessment. The JFACCs operational level combat assessment should be forwarded to the JFC HQ J3 as one of the components inputs to the JFCs determination of overall campaign success. The operational level CA can also serve as the basis for important recommendations that can affect the JFCs air apportionment decision and the JFACCs allocation of air resources. 0425. Although combat assessment appears to mark the end of the air tasking cycle, it is an ongoing activity that provides important inputs to decision-making and supporting processes throughout that cycle.
Section V - Guidance, Apportionment and Targeting

Target Lists 0426. Following Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)s initiating directive, the JFC will normally task a JTWG to produce a Joint Target List (JTL) derived from the campaign targets database that has been initially derived from the integrated database. The JTL has to be reviewed against SACEUR/North Atlantic Council targeting guidance and national limitations and caveats. All further joint targeting activities are based upon the JTL, which is updated, as new information becomes available. Subordinate commanders will keep the JTL under constant review, and forward their own nominations and/or restrictions of targets to the JFC staff through the JTWG via the Target Nomination Process/Lists (TNLs) and proposal of Restricted Targets List (RTLs). Integration of proposed TNLs and RTLs with the JTL results in the production of the JPTL. The JTL/JPTL and all target folders will be maintained in a collaborative environment and updated by inputs from the JTWG, the JFCs BDA Cell and any other authorized source with relevant data that requires inclusion. Types of target list include: a. Joint Target List. The JTL is the primary target list supporting a particular operation. The JTL represents the compendium of all targets considered to have military significance in the JOA. NATO HQs, national authorities, the joint force 4-8 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
b. c.
Target Nomination List. A list of targets nominated by CCs or the JFC staff for inclusion in the JTL. Joint Prioritized Target List. The JTWG prioritizes the JTL/TNL(s) to become the JPTL, in accordance with the operations objectives and the detailed guidance from the JFC. The JPTL will include reference to all methods of attack being undertaken including Special Operations Forces (SOF), surface force lethal capabilities and nonlethal techniques. Restricted Target List. A sub-set of the targets on the JPTL that require special consideration, usually where simple destruction is not sought. Special consideration may be warranted because of the particular sensitivity of the site, the need to deconflict any proposed action with other activities, or because the site is assessed to have a significant intelligence value, the wish to use a unique weapon, or the desire to exploit the target or post-conflict reconstruction considerations. A proposal to attack a restricted target will need to be coordinated through the JTWG to the JFC. Prohibited Target List. The prohibited target list comprises of an area, structure, object, person, organization, mindset, thought process, attitude or behavioural pattern which can not be suitably and effectively influenced by a capability due to constraints imposed by the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Actions which jeopardize the designation of a target as prohibited will require submission to the JTWG for consideration and approval by required command authority before redesignation of a prohibited target onto a JTL/JPTL, typically through the TST process. No-strike List. A no-strike list is a list of those objects or locations granted protection from attack under international law. These include religious and cultural sites, civilians, important food resources and nuclear power stations. Thus, an object listed therein cannot be targeted for attack or be removed from the list unless it has lost that protection under the relevant provisions of international law.
d.
e.
f.
Joint Target Working Group 0427. The JFC may establish and task an organization to accomplish targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. Typically, the JFC will create a JTWG comprised of representatives from the joint force HQ and all components of the joint force and, if required, national liaison representatives. If the JFC so designates, the JTWG would be an integrating centre providing a macro-level targeting review mechanism. This should be a joint activity comprised of representatives from the JFHQ and all components of the joint force, and, if required their subordinate units. 0428. The JFC defines the role of the JTWG. Typically, the JTWG would review target information, develop targeting guidance, priorities, and may prepare and refine JTLs for 4-9 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
recommendation to the JFC. During operations, the JTWG should also maintain a complete list of restricted targets and areas where SOF are operating to avoid endangering current or future operations. The JTWG is the primary agency for the synchronization and management of the joint targeting efforts. As such they will prepare target lists for JCB review and if necessary the JFCs approval, maintain the targeting database and coordinate the production of target materials. The Air Apportionment Recommendation 0429. Air apportionment allows the JFC to ensure the priority of the joint air effort is consistent with campaign or operation phases and objectives. Given the many functions that the joint air effort can perform, its operational area-wide application, and its ability to rapidly shift from one function to another, JFCs pay particular attention to apportionment. After consulting with other CCs, the JFACC submits air apportionment recommendation for approval by the JFC and as guidance for upcoming targeting cycles. The methodology the JFACC uses to make the recommendation may include priority or percentage of effort against assigned mission-type orders and/or categories significant for the campaign. Targeting 0430. Targets fall into 3 general classes: deliberate, dynamic and time sensitive: a. Deliberate. Delibrate targets are those known to exist in an operational area with actions scheduled. Examples range from targets on JTLs in the applicable campaign plan, to targets detected in sufficient time that can be listed in the ATO, mission-type orders, or fire support plans. Deliberate targets have 2 subcategories: scheduled or on-call. Dynamic. Dynamic targets are those that have been identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in the normal targeting cycle, and therefore have not been scheduled. Dynamic targets have 2 sub-classifications: anticipated and unanticipated. Time Sensitive. TSTs are those targets requiring immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity. The JFC provides specific guidance and prioritization for TSTs within the operational area. See AJP-3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Targeting for more detail.
b.
c.
Draft Joint Prioritised Target List Construction 0431. The draft JPTL is formed from a prioritized listing of targets based on JFC and component target priorities. Members consider the estimated available air forces/capabilities and their ability to affect the targets on the list. The draft JPTL should reflect which targets would most likely be attacked (barring technical problems with aircraft, weather, retasking for higher priority targets, or other operational circumstances) with the projected apportionment 4-10 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
of air assets assigned or made available to the JFACC. The priorities are important since low priority targets may not be tasked in that days targeting cycle. Component LOs should be ready to justify and/or prioritize target nominations among all the priorities of the joint operation. The JFACC may also recommend to the JFC that other component assets be used against targets on the draft JPTL; however, only the JFC can approve this use of other components assets/forces.
Section VI - Joint Force Air Component Commander Targeting Responsibilities

0432. The JFACC has the following targeting responsibilities to the JFC and subordinate formations/units: a. Joint Force Commander. The development of a target list and priorities for achieving the JFACCs objectives; the provision of representatives to the JFCs JCB; support to the JTWG; the provision of BDA information to the JTWGs target support cell and combat assessment information to the JFCs combat assessment section for fusion with other information sources; and for targeting, weaponeering, and allocation of organic assets for assigned JPTL targets. Formations/Units. Ensuring that all targets passed to formations/units for prosecution meet the legal requirements of the LOAC and comply with the ROE. However, this does not relieve lower echelon commanders and operators from using sound judgement to ensure continued compliance with LOAC and ROE.
b.
Section VII - Ground-Based Air Defence and Theatre Missile Defence Planning
0433. Ground-based Air Defence (GBAD)/Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) planning within the ATO planning cycle is based on the Joint Prioritized Defended Asset List (JPDAL) produced by the JFC HQ. The JPDAL is the basic document for the ADC to enhance an efficient employment planning of limited TMD resources consistent with direction and guidance for each phase of the campaign. Subordinate units are tasked by a coverage mission order developed from the JPDAL. 0434. The Critical Asset List (CAL) lists assets that have been nominated by the ADC to be covered by TMD capable GBAD. A Prioritized Critical Asset List (PCAL) is derived by each CC from the CAL. The PCAL lists critical military and civilian high value assets, which are significant from a strategic and operational perspective. The JFC compiles a Joint PCAL from the individual CC PCALs. Military assets are prioritized by an objective means, political assets by subjective assessment of political authorities. Whilst an iterative process, finalization of the Joint PCAL is the responsibility of the JDAWG on behalf of the JFC.
Section VIII - Time Sensitive Targeting

0435. TSTs are those targets requiring immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces, or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity the engagement of which is of a high enough priority to warrant immediate action in order to support campaign objectives. A large proportion of TSTs involve cross-boundary issues and multi-component or joint force assets to find, fix, track, target, engage and assess them. 0436. TSTs will normally be prosecuted by the component that has responsibility for operations within their Area of Operations (AOO) with organic/direct support assets. However, if unable to prosecute a TST the component may request support from another component. Via the collaborative network, the JFC TST Cell and other component TST cells have the visibility of the processing of the TST. Any TST Cell may offer other solutions/assets via the collaborative network, and coordinate with the JFC TST Cell. 0437. The JFC may designate a lead component as the TST lead, where it has the best information or situational awareness to prosecute TSTs. Where this is the case the JFC will normally embed his deployable TST Cell within the lead components current operations section. 0438. Targeting and Engagement Capabilities and Limitations. Generally, the primary weapon systems suitable for surface joint TST attacks in an operational area are fixed-wing aircraft, attack helicopters, army tactical missile system, multiple launch rocket system, conventional artillery, cruise missiles, naval surface fire support and SOF. Determination of the best capable TST asset begins during the target step and continues through the engage step. Time permitting, each component provides recommendations highlighting the pros and cons of their available weapon systems based upon the current situation. The JFC also provides guidance to CCs to allow them the flexibility to make the proper decision regarding rapid selection of best capable attack asset. Each of the different weapon systems has associated pros and cons regarding; effectiveness against different target types, responsiveness, range, accuracy, vulnerability to adversary threat and associated risks of employment. 0439. Find, Fix, Track and Assessment of Time Sensitive Targets. Various air and space sensors, both manned and unmanned, can detect, identify, track and assess TSTs. These sensors are very specific and generally require cross-cueing to each other or with other available intelligence to provide identification. In order to effectively employ Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) sensors and systems the TST cell must know what is available, what products are provided by the available systems, what the capabilities and limitations of each sensor and system are and where to access the information. Ideally multiple sensors and persistent ISTAR products need to be available for effective engagement of TSTs: a. Manned Systems. Manned airborne sensors are generally more flexible than other platforms as the man in the loop allows for direct contact and re-tasking when required. Manned platforms require a high degree of security, such as air supremacy or protection in the form of dedicated combat air patrol, when operating in a 4-12 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
potentially hostile AOO. The TST cell must understand the capabilities, limitations and level of risk tolerance of each available ISTAR platform in order to re-task it. b. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. UAVs may be equipped with the same range of sensors as available on manned airborne sensors. They are a very useful asset to provide surveillance of heavily defended areas or in areas that have unknown level of threat. They may be redirected if required, may possess long loiter times, and may provide real-time feedback (system dependent). It is critical that the TST cell know where to access the UAV information (both real time and analysed) and how to task the platform. Recent operations have also proven the viability of the armed UAV as a one-stop-shop for TST operations. Space-Based Sensors. Space-based sensors provide long-term, large and small area surveillance with excellent resolution and with minimal vulnerability to adversary actions. Depending on orbit and positioning, they may suffer gaps in surveillance periods and may be difficult to shift to a new surveillance area. By its nature, satellite coverage schedules are predictable and the adversary can adjust activities to avoid detection. The 2 primary problems associated with space-based sensors are releasability and timeliness. Because these systems are closely held national assets, releasability is a problem in the dissemination of real time and unsanitized data and information. As a result, the TST cell may not get reports until long past the window for TST engagement. In many cases the raw imagery and/or data that precipitated intelligence may not be provided while the sanitized intelligence is made available. Responsiveness to tasking is not a feature of space-based systems. As a result, real time data from space systems will probably not be available for TST operations. However, as a source of cross -cueing, intelligence and imagery (if available) from space based sensors may be invaluable for cueing current ISTAR manned and UAV systems operating in real time within the JOA. Ground-Based Sensors. Ground-based sensors such as acoustic, seismic, infrared and electro-optics sensors are part of an overall collection effort mostly managed within the land component. These systems serve tactical commanders and are virtually impossible to re-task. However, their data and information may be invaluable in the cueing of other ISTAR assets and in the identification of TSTs within the JOA. Other Intelligence Sources. Other intelligence sources, such as open source and human intelligence, may provide cueing and or identification for the TST process as well.
c.
d.
e.
Section IX - Communications Information Systems and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Considerations
0440. Communications Systems. The JFACC is responsible for identifying all validated joint air communications links requirements that support the JFCs mission and allow accomplishment of the JFC directives. The ability to exchange information via reliable secure communications with the JFC, joint force staff and CCs is key to the successful integration of the joint air effort. Planning must address the following areas: a. Promulgation of data exchange requirements as early as possible to ensure that each component can meet interoperable interface requirements, and effort be made to confirm data information exchange connectivity requirements during planning. Planning for all information exchange requirements and procedures must consider all elements of Info Ops. The best mix of computer-aided systems must be available for data transmission. The JFACC HQ, CAOC and LOs depend on secure, reliable, beyond line-of-sight, communications and data exchange equipment in order to respond to requirements.
b. c.
0441. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. The JFC battle staff develop an overall collection strategy and posture for the execution of the ISR mission. The J2 reviews, validates and prioritizes all outstanding intelligence requirements for the JFC: a. The JFACC is responsible for planning, coordinating, allocating and tasking assigned airborne ISR assets to accomplish and fulfill JFC tasks and requirements. The CAOC will request ISR support from the JFC or another component through the JFACC if assigned assets cannot fulfil specific airborne ISR requirements. It is therefore imperative that the JFACC remains aware of all available surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that can be integrated into joint air operations. The ISR personnel are usually part of the JFACC battle staff; however, that function may be devolved to and integrated into the CAOC, where the complexity of integrating airborne ISR normally determines whether a specialty team, cell or division within the CAOC handles the function. The JFACCs ISR collection managers and operations planners will work with the JFC battle staff and other components to effectively coordinate ISR objectives. The ISR collection elements will manage and satisfy the JFACCs information requirements. The JFACC provides integrated airborne ISR for the JFC. The CAOC provides the joint force integrated information from the JFACCs available airborne ISR support.
b.
c.
ANNEX 4A - JOINT AIR ESTIMATE PROCESS

4A1. The Joint Air Estimate (JAE) process is a six-phase process similar to other joint estimate models that culminates with the production of an air plan. While the phases are presented in sequential order, work on them can be either concurrent or sequential. Nevertheless, the phases are integrated and the products of each phase are checked and verified for coherence; moreover, the process is iterative.
JOINT AIR ESTIMATE PROCESS Phase 1 - Mission Analysis Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) is initiated. Phase focuses on analyzing the JFCs mission and guidance to produce a JFACC mission statement. Phase 2 - Situation and COA Development IPB is refined to include adversary COAs. Adversary and friendly centres of gravity are analyzed. Multiple air COAs or one air COA with significant branches and sequels are developed. Phase 3 - COA Analysis Friendly COAs are wargamed against adversary COAs. Phase 4 - COA Comparison Wargaming results are used to compare COAs against predetermined criteria. Phase 5 - COA Selection Decision brief to JFACC with COA recommendation. JFACC selects COA. Phase 6 - Air Plan Development Selected COA is developed into an Air Plan.
Figure 4A.1 - Joint Air Estimate Process Phase 1 - Mission Analysis 4A2. Mission analysis is critical to ensure thorough understanding of the task and subsequent planning. It results in the Joint Force Air Component Commader (JFACC)s mission statement that includes the who, what, when, where and why for the joint air operation. Anticipation, prior preparation and a trained staff are critical to a timely mission analysis. Staff estimates generated during mission analysis are continually revisited and updated during the course of planning and execution: a. Mission analysis begins by developing a list of critical facts and assumptions. Facts are statements of known data concerning the situation. Assumptions are suppositions about the current or future situation and replace facts and fill the gaps. 4A-1 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
b.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) continuously examines friendly and adversary capabilities and the operational environment. During mission analysis, IPB focuses on those broad aspects of capabilities, intentions and the ennvironment.
IPB TOPIC AREAS
SOCIETY
History Government Laws Culture Economy Resources Geography Religious Beliefs Infrastructure
CENTRES OF GRAVITY
Critical Vulnerabilities
INTERNATIONAL FACTORS
Alliances and Coalitions Conflict Length and/or Effect
DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS ADVERSARY ACTION

Air Land Maritime Space Information Special Operations
COURSES
OF
FORCE STRUCTURE

Leadership Doctrine Adversaries capabilities
WEATHER DECISIVE POINTS
Figure 4A.2 - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace c. The staff must analyze the Joint Force Commander (JFC)s desired effects and determine how air operations can contribute to creating them. This will include determining specified and implied tasks. Specified tasks are assigned specifically to the JFACC by the JFC. Implied tasks support accomplishing a specified task and are derived from a detailed analysis of the JFCs order, the adversary situation and Courses of Action (COA)s and the operational environment; determination of implied tasks requires initiative and subjective analysis. Those implied tasks requiring allocation of resources are retained. The staff then determines those tasks that must be executed to accomplish the JFACCs mission; these are the essential tasks. The JFACC and staff examine readiness of all available air capabilities/forces to determine if there are enough to perform all specified and implied tasks. The JFACC identifies additional resources needed for mission success to the JFC. Factors to consider include available forces (including multinational contributions), command relationships (national and multinational), force protection requirements, Rules of Engagement (ROE), Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), applicable treaties and agreements (including the existence of a status of forces agreement), base-use (including land, sea and air) and over-flight rights, logistic information (what is available in theatre ports, airfields and associated infrastructure requirements, depots, war reserve materiel, host-nation support and what can be provided from other theatres and/or Joint Operations Areas(JOAs).
d.
4A-2 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
e.
The mission analysis phase is conducted by the JFACC staff and presented to the JFACC. The mission analysis provides an overview of the process undertaken and information developed thus far and concludes with a proposed mission statement to the commander. The JFACC either approves the revised statement or provides further guidance. The Commanders Intent statement articulates both end-state and purpose of the operation, and helps to focus the staff throughout the rest of the estimate process. It may also address when the commander is willing to accept risk in the operation. The end-state defines the commanders criteria for mission success. By articulating the air components purpose, the JFACC provides an overarching vision of how the conditions at the end-state support the joint campaign and follow-on operations. The output from the mission analysis is the production of the Mission Statement, a list of essential tasks, Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and constraints. The mission statement is formulated to provide a clear, concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be done, when it will take place, where it will occur and why it is being conducted (e.g., the purpose of the operation). However, the mission statement does not state how the operation will be conducted.
f.
g.
SAMPLE JFACC MISSION STATEMENT

When directed, JFACC XXX conducts joint air operations to protect the deployment of the joint force and to deter aggression. Should deterrence fail, the JFACC XXX, on order, gains air superiority in order to enable Allied military operations within the operational area. Concurrently, JFACC XXX supports JFLCC YYY in order to prevent seizure of AAA mineral fields. On order, JFACC XXX shapes the battlespace for a joint counteroffensive, supports the JFMCC ZZZ for maritime superiority and JFLCC YYY for ground offensive operations, degrades conventional military power and destroys weapons of mass destruction long-/mediumrange delivery capability in order to defeat military forces in the area.
Figure 4A.3 - Sample JFACC Mission Statement Phase 2 - Situation and Course of Action Development 4A3. This phase begins by refining the initial IPB and analyzing Centres of Gravity (COG)s. IPB is essential in developing and analyzing both adversary and friendly COGs. Adversary COAs assist friendly COA development in this phase and allow COA analysis in the next phase: a. COGs are defined as those characteristics, capabilities or sources of power from which an organization derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. A COG might have multiple, interrelated target systems (critical requirements) that in
turn are comprised of multiple targets that are vulnerable to lethal and non-lethal weapons (critical vulnerabilities). Strategic and operational COGs for both friend and adversary are identified during the mission analysis phase of the JAE process. This should be a parallel and collaborative effort between the JFCs staff and the CCs staffs and should include both operations and intelligence personnel. Analyzing COGs for air operations can be accomplished by using a construct described as the critical factors, i.e. critical capabilities - critical requirements - critical vulnerabilities. Critical capabilities are those inherent abilities that enable a COG to function as such. Critical requirements are those essential conditions, resources and means for a critical capability to be fully operative, while critical vulnerabilities are those critical requirements or components thereof which are deficient or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction or attack. b. COGs exist at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and are directly related to the attainment of objectives. (1) Strategic Centres of Gravity. Strategic COGs provide the power, will or freedom of action to achieve strategic objectives. At the strategic level COGs may be found in the power of a regime, the will of the people, ethnic nationalism, economic strength, the armed forces or a coalition structure. Operational Centres of Gravity. Operational COGs are likely to be the physical means for achieving operational and strategic objectives, such as a mass of offensive forces, air power, maritime power projection capabilities, and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) for example. An operational COG may be concentrated in a specific geographic area or dispersed. In such cases, determining the ability to keep a COG from forming or concentrating its effects could be decisive in defeating it. Tactical Centres of Gravity. Tactical COGs tend to be specific capabilities at specific points that provide freedom of action and the means for achieving tactical objectives.
(2)
(3)
4A4. The JFACC and staff prioritize the identified adversary and friendly critical vulnerabilities based on the critical vulnerabilitys impact on achieving the objective in the shortest possible time and with the fewest resources. The prioritized list of adversary critical vulnerabilities are then developed into specific targets and incorporated into the various COAs. These COAs must directly support achievement of JFC objectives. The prioritized list of friendly critical vulnerabilities is developed into a critical asset list and incorporated into the Air Defence Plan. 4A5. COAs are based on situation analysis and a creative determination of how the mission will be accomplished. COAs will be broad or detailed depending on available planning time and JFACCs guidance. Each COA developed should be significantly different and the JFACC will identify the number of COAs to develop. When time is limited, the JFACC must
determine how many COAs the staff will develop and which adversary COA to address. As a COA represents a potential plan the JFACC could implement, it must meet the JFACCs intent and accomplish the mission. The JFACCs staff must assess each COA to estimate its success against the most likely and most dangerous adversary COAs, at a minimum and other adversary COAs as time permits. 4A6. A complete COA must consider, at a minimum: the JFACCs mission; desired end states, JFACCs intent (purpose and vision of military end state), CCIRs, Command and Control (C2) structures; essential tasks; available logistic support; available forces; and available support from agencies. COAs should address who, what, when, where, how and why joint air operations will be conducted. They include the following specifics: operational and tactical objectives and their supporting tactical tasks in the order of accomplishment; forces required and the force providers; force projection concept; employment concept; and sustainment concept.
4A7. COAs may be presented in several ways; in text discussing the priority and sequencing of objectives, or graphically displaying weights of effort, phases, decision points and risk. Any quantitative estimates presented should clearly indicate common units of measure in order to make valid comparisons between COAs. For example, a sortie is not a constant value for analysis - one Tornado sortie does not equate to one B-2 sortie. COAs should also avoid numerical presentation. Ultimately, the JFACC will direct the appropriate style and content of the COA. 4A8. COA formulation develops several courses of action that can be taken by air forces/capabilities: a. The first step in COA development is to determine the objectives that will accomplish the JFACCs mission and support the JFCs objectives. The framework of operational objectives, tactical objectives and tactical tasks provides a clear linkage of overall strategy-to-task. While the JFC normally provides operational objectives to the JFACC, they may also emerge through mission analysis or COA development. An objective should be clearly defined, decisive and state an attainable goal. JFACC support to other components should also be expressed in terms of objectives. The resulting objective can then be prioritized with other JFACC objectives in accordance with the JFCs Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Supporting objectives should describe what aspect of the adversarys capability the JFC or other component wants affected. For example, the Joint Force Land Component Commanders (JFLCC) attack may require disrupting the adversarys operational reserve. Supporting JFACC objectives could be expressed as: render adversarys operational reserve unable to conduct counter-attacks on JFLCC forces or destroy adversarys operational reserves offensive capability. Assessment measures and indicators are a critical aspect of planning and should accompany every identified objective and effect. Success indicators support operational objectives, providing broad, qualitative guidance for operational assessment. In addition to 4A-5 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
b.
success indicators specific Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) may also clarify the given operational objective. Clearly defined objectives prevent confusion over what the force is trying to accomplish and reduce the risk of mission failure; quantifiable objectives ensure the JFACC knows when the desired end state has been achieved. c. The speed, range and flexibility of air assets are their greatest advantages and their employment location and purpose may change in minutes. Air planners deal with objective sequencing and prioritization, operational phasing, employment mechanisms and weight of effort. In some cases, there may be flexibility in how to attain the JFACC objectives. For example, an objective may be to destroy weapons of mass destruction capability, but an alternate objective may be destroy weapons of mass destruction delivery means. In addition, COAs may vary by the phase in which an objective is achieved or the degree to which an objective is achieved in each phase. Operational objectives are supported by tactical objectives that are in turn supported by tactical tasks. Once achieved, tactical objectives should, in aggregate, achieve the operational objective. An operational objective is normally supported by more than one tactical objective. Each tactical objective should include an MOE that quantifies the objective statement. MOE measure the result joint air operations are having on the adversarys capability, allowing the JFACC to gauge success toward achieving the JFACCs objectives. Analysis of adversary critical vulnerabilities must include a determination of the level of degradation at which the adversarys capabilities are affected. MOE should be based on the adversarys reaction to joint air operations and not just on the success of individual air missions. The challenge of MOE is how long a commander is prepared to sit back waiting for desired effects to be realized. Tactical tasks are actions undertaken against specified target types, using lethal and non-lethal weapons to achieve tactical objectives. They are normally written with a clearly defined action verb (destroy, divert, for example), and the tasks include the specific types of targets that are feasible, acceptable and most likely to achieve the objectives (fora example surface-to-air missile sites and division command centres). When articulated in this manner, tactical tasks should not require a MOE to clarify the task statement. This prevents planners from focusing too heavily on achieving the tactical task when it is the objective that is most important. MOE also help focus component operational assessment efforts and identify Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) requirements. Once planners define the objectives and supporting tasks, they further refine potential air COAs based on the objective priority, sequence, phasing, weight of effort and matched resources. This is one method to differentiate COAs. Other methods include varying by time available, anticipated adversary activities, friendly forces available and higher-level guidance.
d.
e.
f.
4A9. A COA is suitable if it accomplishes the mission; feasible if it may be accomplished with resources available; acceptable if it is within given policy and guidance comports with the 4A-6 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
LOAC and worth the risks; distinguishable if it is significantly different from other COAs; and complete if it answers what, where, when, why and how. A good COA positions the force for future operations and provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution. It also provides the maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates: a. The relationship between resources and COA development is critical. COA development must take into account resource constraints of the joint force at large. Competing requirements for limited airlift will often result in deployment priorities that may be less than ideal for all components but optimal for the joint force at large. The JFC must ensure the time-phased force and deployment-planning data reflects the priorities and requirements of the joint force. Planners must ensure the COA developed adheres to deployment considerations across the force and does not assume away potential mobility pitfalls. During COA development, the JFACC staff helps the commander identify risk areas that require attention. These will vary based on the specific mission and situation and may include: regional access; host-nation support/basing; climate; force protection; petroleum, oils and lubricants availability; armaments/precision guided munitions availability; lessons learned review planning; reachback; out of theatre/JOA staging; availability of long range assets; sustainment (air and sea-lift); communications system support and architecture; bandwidth; fratricide and collateral damage. The JFACCs planning effort needs to focus on the limitations and constraints imposed. Decisions related to operational assumptions will drive a change in how the JFACC operates. These changes may range from CAOC process changes to weaponeering and targeting methods. One of the first considerations for the JFACC is usually control of the air. The JFACC is responsible for considering the risk related to air defence planning when designated as the Air Defence Commander. The commanders operational assumptions will determine the resources committed, force posturing and structure of the Air Defence Plan (ADP). The JFCs assumptions will also affect the operational assumptions made by the joint force air planners. The joint force structure and campaign or operation plans directly influence the JFACCs risk estimate and guidance. Minimizing the risk of fratricide and collateral damage are operational factors in risk analysis. The commander must balance the potential for fratricide and collateral damage with mission success. When the risk becomes unacceptable, the commander should consider changes in operational employment.
b.
c.
d.
4A10. The result of COA development is generally a minimum of 2 valid COAs, articulated in sufficient detail to allow valid comparisons to be made. However, the direction from the JFC may be very precise and may not give sufficient latitude to develop anything other than a single COA with several branches and/or sequels.
Phase 3 Course of Action Analysis 4A11. COA analysis involves wargaming each COA against the adversarys most likely and most dangerous COAs. Wargaming is a recorded what if session of actions and reactions designed to visualize the flow of the battle and evaluate each friendly COA. Wargaming is a valuable step in the estimate process because it stimulates ideas and provides insights that might not otherwise be discovered as it permits better visualization of the problem. It also provides initial detailed planning while also determining the strengths and weaknesses of each COA. This may alter or create a new COA based on unforeseen critical events, tasks or problems identified. Wargaming is often a sequential process, but planning groups adjust their wargame style based on JFACC guidance, time available, situation and staff dynamics. Wargaming begins by assembling all the tools and information planners require and establishing the general rules to follow. Recording the activity is vital and directly contributes toward identifying the advantages and disadvantages of a COA and providing sufficient detail for future air plan development. Planners may use a synchronization matrix to detail the results of wargaming. 4A12. It is crucial that the staff considers all facts and assumptions of the estimate and their possible effect on the action. Additionally they should consider active and passive measures to decrease the impact of adversary COA. conflict termination issues and think through own action, adversary reaction and counteraction. 4A13. COA analysis concludes when planners have refined each plan in detail and identified the advantages and disadvantages of each COA. Automation in the planning process and joint analysis centres may provide additional modelling support to wargaming, increasing the accuracy and speed of COA analysis.
COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON
Criterion Weight COA 1 3 5 5 5 3 COA 2
Flexibility Infrastructure Damage Attrition Simplicity Initiative
5 2 3 1 4
5 3 4 4 5 67
Value Scale Is 1 to 5 (5 is best)
57
Weighted Total
Higher Values indicate a more favourable staff recommendation
Figure 4A.4 - COA Comparison
Phase 4 - Course of Action Comparison 4A14. Comparing the COAs against predetermined criteria provides an analytical method to identify the best employment options for air forces/capabilities. This begins with the JFACC staff comparing the proposed COAs and identifying the strengths, weaknesses, advantages and disadvantages of each. This is often followed by analytical comparison via a decision matrix. The matrix technique identifies and weights the criteria for comparison. Staffs must guard against pre-selecting a COA and adjusting either the weights or rating in favour of it. Such actions may invalidate the decision matrixs overall recommendation. A potential pitfall of a numerical matrix is that numbers imply objectivity. In fact, the evaluation criteria, the weights applied to them, and the values assigned the individual COAs are all subjective, meaning they are only as valid as their underpinning assumptions and can bias the process of COA selection if not approached carefully with these limitations in mind. 4A15. Another technique for COA comparison involves developing an objective-risk timeline. Operational objectives or significant events are plotted against a timeline that identifies when certain objectives or actions will occur. Risk for each COA based on the timeline is identified. Phase 5 Course of Action Selection 4A16. COA selection begins with a staff recommendation and ends with a JFACC-approved COA and guidance. The staff presents their recommended COA usually in the form of a briefing. This briefing includes a summary of the estimate process that led to the recommended COA. Based on the amount of JFACC involvement throughout the planning process and the degree of parallel planning the commander accomplishes, COA selection will vary from choosing among alternatives to direct approval of the staff-recommended COA. His decision will be based on operational experience and intuition, operational analysis (COA comparison) and the wargaming results. Once the COA is identified, adjusted (if required) and approved by the JFC, the estimate products contribute directly to air plan preparation. Phase 6 - Air Plan Development 4A17. Air plan development is a collaborative effort of the JFACC staff, the JFC staff and the component staffs. It is the principle output of the estimate process. The air plan details how the joint air effort will support the JFCs overall OPLAN and accomplishes the following: a. b. c. d. Integrates the efforts of joint air capabilities and forces. Identifies objectives and tasks. States the commanders intent. Identifies measures or indicators of success used to determine whether air operations are meeting assigned objectives.
e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. m.
Accounts for current and potential adversary offensive and defensive COAs. Synchronizes the phasing of air operations with the JFCs OPLAN. Indicates what air capabilities/forces are required to achieve joint air objectives. Clearly spells out C2 relationships for air operations. Clearly spells out control measures needed to manage theatre/JOA airspace. Develops specific procedures for allocating, tasking, exercising and transitioning C2 of joint air capabilities and forces. Articulates the ADP. Articulates the ISR collection plan. Describes any JOA specific special instructions.
4A18. Once components provide information, total force structure is determined; force availability, deployment timing, basing availability and sustainment requirements are matched with logistic and planning requirements. With this information, the JFACCs ability to accomplish the assigned mission is re-evaluated and adjusted as necessary. This evaluation includes a comprehensive sustainability assessment. 4A19. In addition to building the plan for the employment of air capabilities/forces, the air plan should include a plan to turnover from initial to sustainment forces as appropriate. Additionally, the air plan should also include considerations for conflict termination, redeployment of forces and procedures to capture and report lessons learned. Incomplete planning for conflict termination can result in the waste of valuable resources or even a return to hostilities.
ANNEX 4B - SAMPLE GENERIC AIR PLAN

Air Plan 4B1. (Number or code name). References 4B2. Maps, charts and other relevant documents. Command Relationships 4B3. Briefly describes the command organization (composition and relationships) for the JFCs campaign and the air operations envisaged. Detailed information may be included in the command relationships annex. Cover Component Command, Air Defence Commander and Airpace Control Authority identities and others as required. Situation 4B4. Briefly describes the situation that the plan addresses (see Joint Force Commanders (JFC) estimate): a. Guidance. Provides a summary of directives, letters of instructions, memoranda, treaties and strategic plans, including any campaign/operations plans received from higher authority, that apply to the campaign: (1) (2) (3) b. Relates the strategic direction of the JFCs requirements. Lists strategic objectives and tasks assigned to the command. Constraints-lists actions that are prohibited or required by higher authority (Rules of Engagement (ROE), force protection and others as appropriate).
Adversary Forces. Provides a summary of pertinent intelligence data including information on the following: (1) Composition, location, disposition, movements and strengths of major adversary forces that can influence action in the area of responsibility/Joint Operations Area. Strategic concept (if known), should include adversarys perception of friendly vulnerabilities and adversarys intentions regarding those vulnerabilities. Major objectives (strategic and operational).
(2)
(3)
4B-1 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
(4) (5) (6) (7) c.
Adversary commanders idiosyncrasies and doctrinal patterns. Operational and sustained capabilities. Vulnerabilities. Centre of Gravity and decisive points.
Friendly Forces. States information on friendly forces not assigned that may directly affect the command: (1) (2) Intent of higher, adjacent and supporting commands. Intent of higher, adjacent and supporting allied or other coalition forces.
d. Mission
Assumptions. States assumptions applicable to the plan as a whole. Include both specified and implied assumptions.
4B5. States the joint air task(s) and the purpose(s) and relationship(s) to achieving the JFCs objective(s). Air Operations 4B6. Strategic or Operational Concept. States the broad concept for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of major air capable joint forces including the concepts of deception and psychological operations during the operation or campaign as a whole: a. b. c. d. e. f. Joint air force organization. Joint force air objectives. Bed down overview. Operational missions. Phases of joint air operations in relation to JFC operation or campaign plan. Timing and duration of phases. (air operations normally do not lend themselves to linear, sequential phasing. However, the concept of phases, even those conducted simultaneously or unparallel, might provide a useful framework for thinking about the attainment of intermediate objectives.)
4B7. Phase 1. Provides a phase directive for each phase: a. Operational concept. Include operational objectives, plan of attack, and timing. 4B-2 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
b. c. d. e. f.
General missions and guidance to subordinates and components supporting and supported requirements. Ensure that missions are complementary. Capabilities/forces required by role or capability. Should consider land, sea, air, space, special operations and multinational. Tasks of subordinate commands and components. Reserve Forces. Location and composition. Mobility. Consider transportation, ports and airports, lines of communication, transit and overflight rights, reinforcement, reception and onward movement, and host nation support arrangements. Deception. Information operations.
g. h.
4B8. Phases II to XX (last). Cites information as stated in paragraph 4B7 for each subsequent phase, to include whether or not it will be conducted simultaneously with other phases. Provides a separate phase for each step in the operation at the end of which a major reorganization of forces may be required and another significant operation initiated. Coordinating Instructions 4B9. If desired, instructions applicable to 2 or more phases or multiple events of the command may be placed here. Logistics 4B10. Brief, broad statement of the sustainment concept for the joint air operations with information and instructions applicable by phase. Command, Control, and Communications 4B11. Command: a. Command Relationships. States generally the command relationships for the entire joint air operations or portions thereof. Indicate any transfer of forces contemplated during the joint air operations, indicating the time of the expected transfer. These changes should be consistent with the operational phasing in paragraph 4B3. Give location of commander, Combined Air Operations Centre and command posts. Delegation of Authority.
b.
4B12. Communications: a. Communications. Plans of communications including time zone to be used; rendezvous, recognition and identification instructions; code; liaison instructions; and axis of signal communications as appropriate. Electronics. Includes plans of electronics systems, electronic policy and other such information as appropriate. (1) (2) (3) Camera. Includes digital still photo and motion video imagery transmission. Armament delivery recording (bomb and gun camera imagery) and the plan for armament delivery recording. Communications and Information Requirements: Determines, resources, and integrates supporting communications and information systems, personnel, and necessary bandwidth to meet joint air operational requirements.
b.
Annexes as Required.
ANNEX 4C - SAMPLE GENERIC AIR OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE

Exercise/Operation XX 4C1. AOD (Letter designator). a. b. c. Period. Update. Status (Draft/Approved).
For NATO Response Force operations the AOD may be reduced in size (AOD-light). However, the minimum content should include commanders intent, air objectives, priorities and apportionment. Current Situation 4C2. Enemy forces. 4C3. Friendly forces. 4C4. Brief historical and current joint situation within operational schemes of manoeuvre. Assessment - Enemy Courses of Action 4C5. Most likely. 4C6. Least likely. 4C7. Most dangerous. Air Allotment 4C8. From: Parent HQ/Number/Type/Role/Providing Base/Unit. 4C9. Receiving HQ/Receiving Base/Unit. Joint Force Commander Guidance (Phase XX) 4C10. Phase specific and extracted from applicable JTFCs planning guidance and JFE/guidance, apportionment and targeting directives. 4C11. Must include: intent, purpose, method, end state and daily priorities when possible. JFACC Mission (By phase, if applicable) JFACC Guidance (By phase, if applicable) 4C-1 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
4C12. Intent. 4C13. Purpose. 4C14. Method and end state. JFC Air Apportionment Decision 4C15. Mission assignment (prioritised operational objectives). 4C16. Objective (first priority operational objective). 4C17. Timeline (not later than). 4C18. Intent, purpose, method and end state. 4C19. Strategy-to-task analysis. 4C20. Task apportionment. Operational Summary of Effort Operational Objective Allocation JFACC Objective Sortie Ground Alert
Total Combat Support Sorties Total Joint Air Allocation Component JFLCC JFMCC JSOFCC Total Component Sortie Allocation Role Allocation Requested Sortie Allocation
Daily Sortie Capability:
4C-2 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
Sustained Operations Surge Operations Non-Operational Sorties (including Unit Training etc) Total Planned Sorties Sortie Potential on Ground Alert Additional Sorties Available for Tasking Asset Apportionment (Changes in Tactical Command (TACOM) and Tactical Control /TACON) JFC Targeting Decision (JPTL attached) 4C21. Included within the JPTL is the mission priority for this ATOs TNL. 4C22. The priorities given below are attached to targets for offensive missions or attached to tactical tasks for non-offensive missions. The MISSION PRIORITY is designed to aid decision-making within Combat Plans and Combat Ops and is defined below: a. b. c. Priority 1: Enabling mission/target or sequencing issue, must be accomplished in this ATO. Priority 2: Possible sequencing issue - failure to accomplish as planned will affect subsequent ATOs. Priority 3: No sequencing issues or immediate requirement to accomplish.
Joint Force Air Component Commander Daily Guidance 4C23. Operational level intent. 4C24. Purpose, method and end state for the day. Operational level scheme of manoeuvre and integration with other CCs. Tactical Scheme of Manoeuvre 4C25. Air tactical coordination and integration into the days joint plan. 4C26. Specifically highlight issues of priorities, de-confliction and FSCMs.
Tactical Role Concept of Operations 4C27. Describes by role as required to articulate the desired effects. 4C28. Includes any directed tasking, objectives, priorities or required tactical conduct of operations. Joint Force Commander Air Component Commander Resource Allocation Unit Aircraft Base Role Aircraft Remain Allocated Role Tasking Agency Sortie Rate Planned Allocation Notes
4C29. This resource allocation is A5 Strategy planning assumptions for the period. It is a result of discussions with Plans, Current Ops and air component units to take into consideration planned down days, surges etc. It should include information on all assets TACOM/TACON to the JFACC from the AOD Feeder. Tactical Objective Apportionment and Allocation Tactical Tactical Objective Objective Weight of Effort* ETC**
4C30. *Weight of effort is intended to describe the approximate number of assets to be applied towards the achievement of particular tactical objectives during the period. It may describe sorties, aircraft (ground alert) or other assets and when necessary the desired effect will be articulated at paragraph E or F. **ETC = Estimated Time of Completion. Tactical Task Prioritization and Allocation Tactical Priority Tactical Task Task Weight of Effort*
4C31. A3 Current Plans are to task ground alert assets as required by Current Operations.
CHAPTER 5 - THE COMBINED AIR OPERATIONS CENTRE

Section I -Introduction
0501. The Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) is the joint air operations Command and Control (C2) centre that plans, directs and executes joint air operations. In general terms a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) CAOC develops, issues and controls the execution of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and related instructions to subordinate units, who will execute the plan. Additionally, the CAOC coordinates air support with appropriate Component Command (CC) Headquarters (HQs) operating in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). It facilitates the centralized planning and the decentralized execution of air operations, optimizing the employment of air power, and exploiting its inherent potential by managing the air effort in accordance with the Air Operations Directive (AOD). In addition, a CAOC will liaise with appropriate land/maritime forces and provide coordination between national and NATO agencies. The CAOC provides the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) with the tools (Air Command and Control System(ACCS)) to perform near real-time air power management.
Figure 5.1 - NATO CAOC Organization 0502. The CAOC does not have permanently established operating areas assigned, though the following areas may be assigned to the CAOC on a case-by-case basis: air policing areas in peacetime; air defence areas in crisis and conflict; Recognized Air Picture (RAP) production areas; area of operations; and exercise areas for specific NATO-sponsored exercises. They will be limited in time and scope and consistent with the guidance and objectives of the respective operation plan or exercise plan. 5-1 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
0503. NATO CAOCs function primarily as battle management organizations, with the responsibility for many force-level planning functions resting with the higher-level air component HQs. This is at variance with some national CAOCs, where the CAOC is viewed as a weapon system 1 comprising a system of systems that includes sensors, effectors, C2 and the human interface to exploit the advantages of network-enabled capability in the dynamic fields of decision superiority, information sharing, common situational awareness, collaborative planning and synchronization of efforts and effects. For completeness, a weapon system CAOC is discussed in greater detail in Annex 5A.
Section II Combined Air Operations Centre Products

0504. The air C2 process at the CAOC is driven by the inputs from the JFACC in the form of the air plan, the AOD, the airspace control order and the prioritized target list, as well as immediate support requests from other Component Commanders. These directives, combined with the information on status and availability of allocated air assets, will form the basis for the main CAOC products. a. Air Task Order. The ATO contains detailed tasking for all pre-planned air missions scheduled to operate within the JOA during a specific timeframe, normally 24 hours. It contains information both on missions flown under tactical command/tactical control of the CAOC as well as other missions within the CAOCs assigned area. It also contains the Special Instructions (SPINS). Special Instructions. SPINS are intended to provide information, and direction and guidance that apply to a longer period that just the intended ATO period or to more than one part of the ATO. Operations Task Anti-Air Warfare. The Operations Task Anti-Air Warfare (OPTASK AAW) directs the operations of subordinate Airspace Surveillance and Control (ASACS), Airborne Early Warning (AEW), Defensive Counter-Air (DCA) and Ground-based Air Defence (GBAD) units. Assessment Report. The daily Assessment Report (ASSESSREP) informs the JFACC of the CAOC commanders assessment of the progress of the air effort and the problems encountered in his area. Situation and Status Reports. These reports inform the JFACC of the status of the Communication and Information Systems. Recognized Air Picture. The CAOC will direct the production and dissemination of the RAP.
b.
c.
d.
e. f.
NATO forces were exposed to the weapon system Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) influence at Vicenza, Italy from 1993 to 2000, for OPERATION DENY FLIGHT.
g.
Battle Damage Assessment. The CAOC contributes to the battle damage assessment process by means of written and verbal reports, and available sensor information.
Section III - Airlift Coordination Centre

0505. The Airlift Coordination Centre (ALCC) plans, coordinates, executes and controls air transport operations within the JOA. It works in concert with the CAOC director to ensure effectiveness in the air assessment, planning, and execution process. ALCC tasks and responsibilities normally include: a. b. c. d. Tasking and scheduling airlift operations within the JOA based on the JFC/Joint Task Force approved priorities for validated airlift requirements. Allocating slot times for arrival/departure of transport aircraft at airfields in the JOA in response to requests from nations or the appropriate commander. Integrating airlift activity with other operations, for example humanitarian and disaster relief operation flights. Publishing the air transportation schedule as a portion of the ATO.
ANNEX 5A - THE COMBINED AIR OPERATIONS CENTRE AS A WEAPON SYSTEM

THIS ANNEX IS PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION ONLY AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION 1
Section I -Introduction
5A1. When employed as a weapon system, the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) is structured to operate as a fully integrated node in planning, directing and executing joint air operations. Dependent on Joint Operations Area (JOA) and contingency, and whether the mission involves warfighting or other types of operation, the composition, organization and functions of the CAOC may need to be tailored. However, the basic framework still applies. The CAOC is led by a Director who focuses on integrating planning and coordinating, allocating, tasking and executing tasks. He coordinates with the director of the Airlift Mobility Division (AMD) to meet the airlift and tanker priorities. Each of the CAOCs major activities rely on expertise from liaison officers to coordinate requests or requirements and maintain a current and relevant picture of the other component operations.
5A2. Functions that should be common to all CAOCs are combat plans and combat 2 operations; other divisions, cells or teams within the CAOC should be established as required. For example, planning future joint air operations and assessing past operations may be the responsibility of a strategy division, while the plans division may be devoted to near-term planning and drafting the daily Air Tasking Order (ATO). Execution of the daily ATO is carried out by combat operations and closely follows the action of current joint operations; shifting air missions from their scheduled times or targets and making other adjustments as the situation requires. A separate air mobility division may be responsible for integrating inter-theatre and intra-theatre airlift, Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR), and aeromedical evacuation into the air plan and providing liaison with national transport agencies, while an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) division will match collection requirements with integrated ISR assets. 5A3. The role of intelligence is also extremely important and an integral part of the daily functions of the CAOC. Intelligence personnel monitor and assess adversary capabilities and intentions and provide assistance in target, weapon and platform selection, and ISR tasking. They also conduct battle damage assessment and provide an up-to-date picture of the adversary, expected adversary operations, and the status and priority of assigned targets to assist in execution day changes.
Allies Administrative Publication (AAP)-3(I), Paragraph 0329 refers. Annexes containing factual information not requiring ratification are to be clearly identified. 2 May also be known as current operations.
5A4. Though the use of the word combat is used in the title of 2 of the divisions in the CAOC, the activities in supporting joint air operations may span the range of military operations. These activities may just as well involve planning to accomplish non-combat objectives in a peace support scenario. Whether an activity is called a division, cell, branch or specialty team, is dependent upon the scope and complexity of the operation. For simplicity, the major activities described below are labelled divisions.
Weapon System CAOC Functional Organization
JFACC CAOC Director

Strategy
Strategy Plans Operational Assessment GAT
Combat Plans
MAAP ATO Development & Production ACO Development Air Defence Plan
Combat/ Current Operations

Current Operations Operations Support Joint Personnel Recovery
ISR
Collection Analysis, Correlation & Fusion Processing, Exploitation & Dissemination
Air Mobility
Air Transport Aeromedical Evacuation Air-to-Air Refuelling
Liaison Elements
Component Unit - Interagency - Non-Governmental - Host Nation Multinational Intergovernmental
Figure 6.1 Weapon System CAOC Functional Organization
Section II - Strategy
5A5. Within the standard NATO Air Command and Control (C2) structure the duties of the strategy area are completed within the Component Command (CC)-air HQ. In a weapon system CAOC this task will generally fall to a Strategy element. Notwithstanding, the tasks are broadly similar and equally applicable in both structures. Strategy develops, refines, disseminates and assesses the progress of the Joint Force Air Component Commanders (JFACCs) strategy. This area is responsible for long-range planning. It should strike a balance between long-range planning and intimate involvement with day-to-day ATO production or execution. Strategy publishes a daily air operations directive that provides the JFACCs guidance for each ATO to the successive planning steps. Furthermore, this 5A-2 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
document conveys the JFACCs guidance with respect to acceptable levels of risk. This gives the operational level planners the information they need to allocate sorties to meet JFC objectives within imposed risk constraints. Although responsible for strategy development, Strategy must remain aware of the detailed planning and execution of the air plan to ensure continuity from strategy to execution. When located in the CAOC, Strategy reports to the CAOC director for continuity with CAOC processes, though it maintains the same special direct relationship with the JFACC, as the CC-air HQ. 5A6. Strategy comprises the strategy plans team and the operational assessment team with representatives from a range of functional areas: weapons systems; modelling/operations research; intelligence; ISR; other components; political-military affairs (including working government agencies for aircraft diplomatic clearances); C2; doctrine/strategy; meteorological and oceanographic centre; targeting/mission planning; counterintelligence; space warfare; information operations; logistics; media operations; personnel recovery; special air operations; medical; communication and information systems; legal; and safety. 5A7. Guidance, Apportionment and Targeting Team. In accordance with the JFACCs prioritized tasks (provided by Strategy), Guidance, Apportionment and Targeting (GAT) team develops the daily JFACC planning guidance, air component target nomination list and air apportionment recommendation (JFACC guidance letter). The team is responsible for the development of a comprehensive Joint Prioritised Target List (JPTL). If the JFC delegates joint targeting coordination authority to the JFACC, the GAT team receives all target nominations and prioritizes them into the draft JPTL. All targets are reviewed for compliance with the law of armed conflict and rules of engagement before being included on the JPTL.
Section III - Combat Plans

5A8. Combat Plans is responsible for the near-term operations planning function of the CAOC. It develops detailed plans for the application of air resources based on JFACC-approved guidance received from Strategy. These plans provide the near-term guidance, allocation and apportionment and tasking instructions for assigned and attached forces, and include the Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP), air component target nomination list, JPTL 3 , Airspace Control Plan (ACP), air defence plan, ATO, Airspace Control Order (ACO) and Special Instructions (SPINS). Combat Plans transmits the ATO to combat operations for execution. Generally, combat plans works the 3 ATO periods beyond the current ATO and is normally task-organized into 4 functionally oriented core teams: the GAT team, the MAAP team, the ATO/ACO production team, and the C2 planning team. 5A9. Master Air Attack Plan Team. The MAAP Team develops the daily MAAP to accomplish the JFACC tasks and objectives. The daily MAAP coordinates and integrates all air efforts used to develop the ATO. The fundamental responsibility of the MAAP team is to produce a
Known as Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPLT) in some nations.
timely and executable ATO. The team is staffed by representatives of most of the types of aircraft or systems that may be on the ATO. The team develops the MAAP in accordance with JFACC guidance, the air apportionment recommendation and the JPTL. There may be 2 functionally oriented specialty cells: the offensive cell and the combat support planning cells. 5A10. Offensive Planning Cell. The Offensive Planning Cell plans, coordinates and tasks the employment of counter air, air interdiction, strategic attack and close air support assets. The cell will ordinarily have representation for each type of aircraft and weapons system being employed. 5A11. Combat Support Planning Cell. The combat support planning cell plans, coordinates and tasks specialized combat support missions including, but not limited to: electronic warfare, personnel recovery and special air operations. These functionally oriented cells are responsible for each mission being employed with at least one officer assigned for each type of aircraft available for tasking. The cell chief will receive and promulgate JFACC guidance on mission objectives, priorities, timing and relationships to other joint operations as well as directing the preparation of daily coordination plans for specialized combat support missions. 5A12. Air Task Order Production Team. The ATO Production Team is directly responsible for the technical production and distribution of the ATO, SPINS and ACO (when delegated), and facilitates the timely production and dissemination of them by the most expeditious means available. 5A13. Command and Control Planning Team. The C2 planning team develops the detailed C2 execution plans and the data link architecture for the JFACC. Major elements include airspace management, theatre air defence planning, link interface planning and C2 architecture support planning. Some of the C2 documents produced are the ACP, ADP, the daily ACO, SPINS and tactical data link coordination messages.
Section IV - Combat Operations

5A14. Combat Operations is responsible for monitoring and executing the current ATO. It normally assumes responsibility for the ATO as soon as it is released, usually 12 hours prior to execution, and executes actions and decisions that apply to the current ATO period. Combat Operations is usually divided into the following areas: 5A15. Current Operations. This branch consists of a cadre of joint personnel (e.g., legal, fighter, reconnaissance, surveillance, air battle management, combat support, tanker, bomber, airlift and ground-based air defence/ theatre missile defence) experienced in rules of engagement and force application/employment. Within current operations, this branch may be further divided into offensive and defensive cells. Offensive and defensive personnel bring a broad base knowledge of operations of weapons capabilities and limitations that are required to monitor, and if required, adjust joint air operations. Defensive operations normally include specific air defence/airspace control duties to coordinate all air defence and/or airspace activities. This branch may also be responsible for airspace management activities to ensure 5A-4 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
flying activities are compatible with mission requirements and coordination with host nation agencies and components. If the JFACC is not the airspace control authority and/or air defence commander, this branch provides JFACC coordination with whoever has that responsibility. 5A16. Meteorological Support. The Meteorological Support Branch provides forecasts tailored to the various requirements; reports significant weather with emphasis on target weather, refuelling tracks and recovery bases and inputs weather data in to appropriate planning systems (if required). Although weather operations are part of combat operations, weather information is an integral part of planning air operations. 5A17. Operations Support. Support operations may include airlift, AAR, reconnaissance and aeromedical evacuation missions. Mission experts track the flow of assets and status of missions dedicated to each operation. Rapid coordination may be required to meet timesensitive demands.
Section V - Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

5A18. The ISR element provides ISR support to airspace planning and execution activities, supporting the CAOC, joint force and subordinate units. In addition, the ISR element provides oversight and management of JFACC ISR processes internal and external to the CAOC to ensure that the appropriate ISR reporting, planning, tasking and deconfliction occur to build a common all-source threat and targeting picture. ISR personnel ensure continuity of threat picture and integration of ISR processes across the CAOC. Within the CAOC, ISR is functionally aligned to provide support for core ISR duties as well as to fully integrate sensor experts, platform experts and intelligence experts within the other CAOC areas. 5A19. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Division Core Teams. The ISR division has 4 core teams: analysis, correlation and fusion; targeting and combat assessment; ISR operations; and processing, exploitation and dissemination management. In the event that the air operations centre is not collocated with an existing special security office, a sensitive compartmented information management team may be established. Core personnel provide intelligence products and services that support the entire CAOC, joint force and subordinate units. 5A20. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Support to Other Divisions. In order to provide specialized support to other CAOC divisions, the ISR Director assigns personnel directly to those divisions. The function of these ISR assigned personnel is to provide direct ISR support to specific strategy, planning, execution and assessment activities and to ensure the ISR system is meeting the information requirements of the division being supported. Although these personnel receive overall guidance and direction on ISR matters and processes from the ISR chief, day-to-day tasking comes from the respective CAOC section chief being supported.
Section VI - Air Mobility Division

5A21. The AMD plans, coordinates, tasks and executes the air mobility mission and works in concert with the CAOC director to ensure effectiveness in the air assessment, planning, and execution process. The AMD coordinates with appropriate agencies to derive apportionment guidance, to compute allocation and to collect requirements. The AMD is responsible for ensuring inter-theatre assets arriving and departing the JOA are included in the ATO. The AMD is normally comprised of five core teams: an airlift control team; an AAR control team; an air mobility control team; an aeromedical evacuation control team and an air mobility element. AMD responsibilities normally include: a. b. c. d. e. Integrating and directing the execution of intra-theatre and inter-theatre air mobility forces operating in the JOA and in support of the JFC requirements/objectives. Maintaining the flow of theatre- and inter-theatre air mobility assets in support of JFC objectives. Coordinating air mobility support for mobility requirements identified and validated by the JFC requirements and movement authority, as appropriate. Coordinating AAR planning, tasking and scheduling to support intertheatre and intratheatre air operations. Participating in the air assessment, planning, and execution process and coordinating with the JAOC director to ensure the air mobility mission is incorporated into the ATO. Identifying ISR requirements in support of the air mobility mission. Ensuring air mobility missions are reflected in the ATO/ACO.
f. g.
CHAPTER 6 - JOINT MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS

0601. The use of space capabilities has proven to be a significant force multiplier when integrated into joint operations. To ensure effective integration, Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) and space operators must have a common and clear understanding of how space forces and space capabilities contribute to joint operations, and how military space operations should be integrated with other military operations to achieve alliance security objectives. The use of space capabilities by the military has changed significantly since the first military satellites were orbited. Continuous improvements in space technology have led to the development of more advanced space systems and this change has led to a need for commanders to view space capabilities in a new light. Military, civil and commercial sectors are increasingly dependent on space capabilities and adversaries can view this dependence as a potential vulnerability. 0602. Space capabilities are based on complex systems that include the following: ground stations; launch facilities; satellite production, checkout, and storage facilities; communications links; user terminals; and spacecraft (both manned and unmanned). Space capabilities, especially ground assets and supporting infrastructure, are potential targets for adversaries with the means to attack them and the alliances greater dependence on space capabilities increases the likelihood that potential adversaries will threaten space assets. Alliance members must be able to protect their space assets and deny the use of space assets by its adversaries. 0603. Commanders must anticipate hostile actions that attempt to deny friendly forces access to or use of space capabilities. They should also anticipate the proliferation and increasing sophistication of space capabilities and products with military utility that could be used by an adversary for hostile purposes. Potential adversaries no longer have to develop the infrastructure necessary to obtain space capabilities; today many of these capabilities can be purchased. Options available to prevent an adversary access to space capabilities include diplomatic, legal, economic and military measures. Space systems provide unique capabilities, in that they are generally deployed and can be in place (in theory) when crises arise. Information from space systems is continuously available to deploying units and offers global force enhancements that are critical to prevailing in todays and tomorrows conflicts. It must be recognized that space capabilities, once integrated into the total operational effort, are a significant force multiplier. 0604. To achieve optimal support from space, all space capabilities and systems (military, national, civil, commercial and multinational), as well as the means to protect those capabilities, must be integrated into military planning. Commanders should use space-based systems to achieve access in support of operations worldwide. To realize the global advantages provided by space forces, they must understand the applications of space capabilities, have access to space-based support sufficient to accomplish their missions, use space systems to
the degree needed for completing required tasks expeditiously, and make recommendations to deny or limit an adversarys access to space and use of space systems.
Section II - Command and Control of Space Operations

0605. Space presents another form of military operations that, much like air mobility, usually are best presented functionally to a regional commander through a supporting relationship if they are not attached. Space Command and Control (C2) brings another level of complexity because many space assets that support military interests come from a variety of organizations, some outside of military channels or are considered national assets and not readily available to the alliance. These capabilities often have non-traditional chains of command. In some cases, authority may be split between organizations due to shared interagency responsibilities. Coordination at the strategic political level may be a requirement to fully access national space assets. Space capabilities within a regional operation can be focused within a joint task force by the designation of a single authority for space operations. 0606. Within a regional operation, the JFC can designate a Space Coordinating Authority (SCA) to facilitate unity of effort with member-nation space operations and military component space capabilities. Based on the complexity and scope of operations, the JFC can either retain authority or designate a Component Commander (CC) to coordinate and integrate space operations. The JFC considers the mission, nature and duration of the operation preponderance of space force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities (including reachback) in selecting the appropriate option. 0607. The SCA is the single authority within a joint force to coordinate joint space operations and integrate space capabilities. SCA is an authority, not a person. As such, the commander with SCA serves as the focal point for gathering space requirements from the JFCs staff and each CC. This provides unity of effort for space operations in support of the JFCs campaign. These requirements include requests for space forces (e.g., deployed space forces), requests for space capabilities and requests for implementation of specific command relationships. The commander with SCA develops a recommended prioritized list of space requirements for the joint force based on JFC objectives. While a commander with SCA can facilitate nontraditional uses of space assets, planning staffs should utilize the established processes for fulfilling intelligence and communications requirements. Responsibilities of an SCA normally include: a. b. c. d. Determining, deconflicting and prioritizing military space requirements for the JTF. Recommending appropriate command relationships for space to the JFC. Helping to facilitate space target nomination. Maintaining space situational awareness.
e. f. g.
Requesting space inputs from JTF staff and components during planning. Ensuring optimum interoperability of space assets with Allied/coalition forces. Recommending JTF military space requirement priorities to the JFC.
0608. Upon JFC approval, space requirements are provided to applicable member-nation reachback agencies/commands and the regional chain of command. This process does not restrict components from communicating requirements directly with their component counterparts through their own reachback agencies/commands. However, the SCA, JFC, and the regional chain of command must be kept appraised of all such coordination activities to ensure that space activities are coordinated, deconflicted, integrated, and synchronized.
Section III - Space Operations Mission Areas

0609. Space mission areas describe the capabilities space brings to the fight. Space force enhancement capabilities contribute to maximizing the effectiveness of military air, land, sea, and space operations (e.g. surveillance, warning, communication, navigation and positioning, weather services). Space control capabilities attain and maintain a desired degree of space superiority by allowing friendly forces to exploit space capabilities while negating an adversarys ability to do the same (e.g., space control protection, prevention and negation). Space support capabilities provide critical launch and satellite control infrastructure, capabilities and technologies that enable the other mission areas to effectively perform their missions. Mission support capabilities are those functional areas that cut across all mission areas and provide the infrastructure required to support all 4 space mission areas. 0610. Space Control Mission Area. Space control involves those operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of space superiority by the destruction, degradation or disruption of adversary space capability. Such operations may include operations against a third-party nation with space capabilities supporting an adversarys interests. The main objectives of space control operations are to allow friendly forces to exploit space capabilities, while negating an adversarys ability to do the same. Air, space, land, sea, information or special operations forces may conduct space control operations; however, effective space control operations depend on Space Situational Awareness (SSA) to provide an understanding of global space operations and are derived from C2, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and environmental information. space control operations have an offensive and a defensive component: a. Space Situational Awareness. SSA is the result of sufficient knowledge about space-related conditions, constraints, capabilities, and activities (both current and planned) in, from, toward or through space. Achieving SSA supports all levels of planners, decision makers and operators across the spectrum of terrestrial and space operations. It is the requisite current and predictive knowledge of space events, threats, activities, conditions, and space systems status, capabilities, constraints and employment to enable commanders, decision makers, planners and operators to gain 6-3 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
and maintain freedom of action in space through the spectrum of conflict. SSA is the integration of a number of related processes that provide the full picture of what is needed to know about space. b. Offensive Operations. Offensive space control operations deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy or deceive an adversarys space capability or the service provided by a thirdpartys space asset(s) to the adversary at a time and place of own choosing through attacks on the space nodes, terrestrial nodes, or the links that comprise a space system. These operations range from dropping ordnance on terrestrial nodes of space systems to jamming enemy satellite uplink or downlink frequencies. Offensive space control operations initiated early in a contingency can result in an immediate advantage in space capabilities and control of the space medium. Defensive Operations. Defensive space control operations preserve space capabilities, withstand enemy attack, restore/recover space capabilities after an attack, and reconstitute space forces. Defensive space control operations should be proactive in nature to protect friendly capabilities and prevent the adversary from disrupting overall friendly operations. Suppression of threats to friendly space capabilities is a key of defensive space control operations.
c.
0611. Space Force Enhancement Mission Area. Force enhancement operations multiply effectiveness by enhancing battlespace awareness and providing needed warfighter support. There are 5 force enhancement functions: ISR; integrated tactical warning and attack assessment; environmental monitoring; communications; and position, velocity, time, and navigation. They provide significant advantage by reducing confusion inherent in combat situations. They also improve the lethality of air, land, sea, space and special operations forces. 0612. Space Support Mission Area. Space support operations consist of operations that launch, deploy, augment, maintain, sustain, replenish, de-orbit and recover space forces, including the C2 network configuration for space operations. Support operations consist of spacelift, satellite operations, and deorbiting and recovering space vehicles, if required: a. Space Lift. Space lift delivers satellites, payloads and materiel to space. During periods of increased tension or conflict, space lifts objective is to deploy new and replenishment space assets as necessary to meet space goals and achieve security objectives. To satisfy this requirement, space lift must be functional and flexible, capable of meeting the full range of military, commercial and civil launch requirements. Equally important, space lift must be timely and responsive to the users needs. Space lift can be pursued from 2 approaches: launch-on-schedule (based on priority as well as launch vehicle and payload readiness); or launch-ondemand (when required to accommodate user needs).
b.
Satellite Operations. Satellite operations are conducted to manoeuvre, configure, and sustain on-orbit forces, and to activate on-orbit spares. Military satellite operations are executed through a host of dedicated and common-user networks. Reconstitution of Space Forces. Reconstitution refers to plans and operations for replenishing space forces in the event of loss of space assets. This could include repositioning and reconfiguring surviving assets, augmentation by civil and commercial capabilities and replacement of lost assets.
c.
0613. Space Force Application Mission Area. The application of force would consist of attacks against terrestrial-based targets carried out by military weapons systems operating in or through space. The force application mission area includes ballistic missile defence and force projection. Currently, there are no force application assets operating in space.
Section IV - Operational Considerations for Space

Considerations for Joint Space Planners 0614. The special characteristics of space and the difficulty in gaining access to it present unique planning and operational considerations that affect friendly, adversary and neutral space forces alike. There are presently numerous resource and legal considerations that must be weighed during planning stages in order to ensure mission success. The joint space planner must not only understand planning and operational considerations for employment of space capabilities, but must also have a firm knowledge of the threats to the use of those systems by an adversary. The joint space planner must understand what can be done to limit an adversarys use of space capabilities and how to protect our own use of space. Foundation for Military Space Operations 0615. Global Access. The fact that there are no geographical boundaries and no terrestrial obstructions or limitations in space gives military forces global access and extensive advantage. Space is the ultimate high ground. A single satellite in a low-Earth polar orbit will overfly any location on the Earths surface within given time. However, basic orbital mechanics limit the time most satellites can remain over a particular geographic area. Except for a small number of orbits, the amount of time that a terrestrial user will be within a satellites direct field of view will vary from minutes to days depending on the satellite orbit type and the field of view of the satellite sensor/antenna. With a sufficient number of satellites in a properly configured constellation, it is possible to maintain continuous line of sight of, and have access to, any or all points on the surface of the Earth. Global access is one of the key advantages that space forces offer. Most spacecraft can serve multiple commanders and/or users around the world simultaneously (e.g., missile warning satellites). 0616. Persistence. The movement of on-orbit space assets is neither tied to the Earths surface nor significantly impeded by the low-level atmosphere. This allows these assets to remain on orbit for extended periods of time (generally measured in terms of years). It should be noted, 6-5 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
however, that except for certain geosynchronous satellites, orbital mechanics prevent satellites from providing continuous support to a given terrestrial area of interest. Because orbits are easily determined, short dwell times and intermittent coverage by a given satellite may provide an adversary significant windows of opportunity for unobserved activity. Therefore, most satellite surveillance systems must be supplemented by other sensors if continuous surveillance of an area is desired. 0617. Limitations. Limitations on the operating lifetime of a satellite include the following: a. Design Life. Maintenance cannot currently be performed on most satellites; and repairs are limited to commanding the use of back-up systems. Additionally, the amount of fuel carried for changing or maintaining the spacecrafts desired orbit and attitude (in particular for low orbits as they will eventually decay into the atmosphere without additional energy input). The type of orbit used by the spacecraft as satellite orbital manoeuvres are costly in terms of fuel expended and generally require a great deal of time to perform as well as shortening the overall useful life of the satellite. Predictable Orbits. Once in orbit, many forces affect a satellites motion. A satellites motion or orbital location is predictable. This predictability allows for both warning of satellite over-flight and maintaining situational awareness and tracking the location of objects in space. However, there are several forces at work that slowly degrade the prediction accuracy of a satellites location. These forces will cause a satellites orbit to slowly change. The magnitude of the effects (as a whole) cannot be precisely known but is predictable to a high degree of accuracy. A satellite may use propulsive forces to manoeuvre and change its orbit, making the orbit hard to predict to anyone but the organization initiating the manoeuvre. However, manoeuvring is done at a high cost in terms of onboard fuel, a limited resource. Vulnerability. Ground to satellite links are susceptible to jamming. Fixed C2 facilities are subject to attack, which could degrade the utility of a satellites service over time. Launch facilities must be protected to ensure access to space so that force replenishment may be accomplished. Some space capabilities may also be subject to exploitation, such as an adversary using commercial global positioning system receivers for navigation. Knowledge of an adversarys negation and exploitation capabilities will allow a joint space planner to develop appropriate responses. Resource Considerations. Long lead times to replenish/replace space assets may force a commander to use only those assets that are available at that time. Current launch programs can take 40-150 days to generate and launch, providing all hardware, including payload, is available at the launch site. Payload availability, prelaunch processing, positioning and on-orbit checkout are factors that can significantly lengthen the time from call-up to operating on-orbit. Space systems are often assets requiring careful allocation. Although it may appear there are numerous satellites available to support every mission, these resources are limited. Therefore requirements are prioritized, and a commander may not receive the unlimited support 6-6 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
b.
c.
d.
desired (e.g. when communication across satellites is restricted due to limited capacity). Users may be pre-empted based on priority. Competition for bandwidth, priorities for tasking and similar constraints, combined with satellite physical access to specific locations, impact availability of space support. e. Legal Considerations. Numerous national and international laws and treaties exist that must be considered in the planning stages of any mission anticipating space support, and Legal Advisers must be immediately available during all stages of planning and execution of space operations in order to ensure compliance. Although some acts are prohibited. Many of the restrictions may be applicable during space negation operations. International laws, including contracts and consortium agreements, prohibit certain space assets from being used for military purposes. For example, certain corporation agreements prohibit using satellite communications for military operations. International law, as it pertains to the use of force, regulation of the means and methods of warfighting, and protection of non-combatants, must be considered when conducting space control, space force enhancement and space support operations. Space Treaties. The military use of space is constrained by international treaties. None of these treaties specifically forbids the deployment of weapons in space, other than weapons of mass destruction.
f.
LEXICON
SECTION 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The Lexicon contains abbreviations relevant to AJP-3.3(A) and is not meant to be exhaustive. The definitive and more comprehensive list of abbreviations is in AAP-15.
AAR air-to-air refuelling ACA airspace control authority ACCS air command and control system ACM airspace control means ACO airspace control order/ allied command for operations ACP airspace control plan ADC air defence commander ADP air defence plan AEW airborne early warning AGS air-ground surveillance AI air interdiction AJP allied joint publication ALCC airlift coordination centre ALE air liaison element AMD air mobility division AOCC(L/M) air operations coordination centre (land/maritime) AOD air operations directive AOO area of operations AOPG air operations planning group ARS air control centre/ recognized air picture production centre/ sensor fusion posts ASSESSREP assessment report ASTOR airborne stand-off radar ASUW antisurface warfare ASW antisubmarine warfare ATC air traffic control ATO air tasking order AWACS airborne warning and control system battlefield coordination detachment BCE battlefield coordination element BDA battle damage assessment C2 command and control CAOC combined air operations centre CAL critical asset list CAS close air support
Lexicon-1 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
CC component command(er) CC-Air allied air component command CCIR commanders critical information requirement COA course of action COG centre of gravity CONOPS concept of operations CRC control and reporting centre DARB daily asset reconnaissance board DARS deployable air control centre/recognized air picture production centre/sensor fusion post DCA defensive counter-air DCAOC deployable combined air operations centre FAC forward air controller FSCM fire support coordination measure GAT guidance, apportionment and targeting GBAD ground-based air defence HQ Headquarters IFF identification friend or foe Info Ops information operations IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
ISTAR intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance JAE joint air estimate JAOP joint air operations plan JCB joint coordination board JCO joint coordination order JDAWG joint defended asset working group JFACC joint force air component command(er) JFC joint force command(er) JFLCC joint force land component command(er) JFMCC joint force maritime component command(er) JFSOCC joint force special operations component command(er) JOA joint operations area JPDAL joint prioritised defended asset list JPTL joint prioritised target list JSTARS joint surveillance and target attack radar system (US system) JTAC joint tactical air controller JTF joint task force JTF HQ joint task force headquarters
JTL joint target list
JTWG joint target working group LEGAD legal adviser LLE land liaison element LO liaison officer LOAC law of armed conflict MAAP master air attack plan MAOC maritime air operations centre MCE maritime coordination element METOC meteorological and oceanographic centre MLE maritime liaison element MOE measure of effectiveness MOU memorandum of understanding NAC North Atlantic Council NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCS NATO Command Structure NRF NATO Response Force OCA offensive counter-air OPLAN operations plan OPTASK AAW operations task anti-air warfare PCAL prioritized critical asset list
PfP Partnership for Peace RAP recognized air picture ROE rules of engagement RPC recognized air picture production centre RTL restricted target list SADC sector air defence commander SAMOC surface-to-air operations centre SCA space coordinating cuthority SFP sensor fusion post SIGINT signals intelligence SOF special operations force SOFA status of forces agreement SOLE special operations liaison element SPINS special instructions SQOC squadron operations centre SSA space situational awareness TACOM tactical command TACON tactical control TAM theatre aerodynamic missiles TBM tactical ballistic missile/ theatre ballistic missile
TMD theatre missile defence TNL target nomination list TST time sensitive targeting
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle WMD weapon of mass destruction WOC wing operations centre
SECTION 2 - TERMS AND DEFINITIONS area of operations An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the entire joint operations area of the joint commander, but is sufficient in size for the joint force component commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces. AAP-6 NATO Agreed area of responsibility The geographical area assigned to the NATO strategic command Allied Command Operations. AAP-6 NATO Agreed battle damage assessment The assessment of effects resulting from the application of military action, either lethal or non-lethal, against a military objective. AAP-6 NATO Agreed battlespace The environment, factors and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather (terrestrial and space); health hazards; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. Not NATO Agreed campaign A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. AAP-6 NATO Agreed centre of gravity Characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. AAP-6 NATO Agreed combined Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations in which elements of more than one nation participate. AAP-6 NATO Agreed
combined Joint Task Force A combined (multinational) and joint (multiservice) deployable task force, tailored to the mission, and formed for the full range of the Alliances military missions. A JTF consists of three layers: the JTF HQ, subordinated component command headquarters, and forces assigned for the mission. It may include elements from non-NATO troop contributing nations. Not NATO Agreed combined joint task force headquarters A deployable, non-permanent combined and joint headquarters of variable size, tailored to the mission. It assists the Joint Task Force Commander in exercising command and control over the entire Joint Task Force and can be either land or sea-based. Not NATO Agreed combined operation An operation conducted by forces of 2 or more Allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. AAP-6 NATO Agreed communication and information systems Collective term for communication systems and information systems. AAP-6 NATO Agreed component command 1. In the NATO military command structure, a third-level command organization with specific air, maritime or land capabilities that is responsible for operational planning and conduct of subordinate operations as directed by the NATO commander. 2. A functional component command or service component command responsible for the planning and conduct of a maritime, land, air, special or other operation as part of a joint force. AAP-6 NATO Agreed component commander 1. A single-service or functional component commander at the third level of the NATO military command structure. 2. A designated commander responsible for the planning and conduct of a maritime, land, air, special or other operation as part of a joint force. AAP-6 NATO Agreed
concept of operations A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his mission. AAP-6 NATO Agreed control1 That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. AAP-6 NATO Agreed course of action In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed. AAP-6 NATO Agreed doctrine Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. NATO Agreed AAP-6 electronic warfare Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing: the search for, interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions, the employment of electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces. AAP-6 NATO Agreed end state The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. AAP-6 NATO Agreed fires Action using kinetic or non-kinetic weapons to produce specific lethal or non-lethal effects on a target. Not NATO Agreed
force protection All measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force. AAP-6 NATO Agreed host nation A nation which, by agreement: a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory; b. allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or c. provides support for these purposes. AAP-6 NATO Agreed host-nation support Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organizations which are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nations territory. AAP-6 NATO Agreed information operations Coordinated actions to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other approved parties in support of the Alliance overall objectives by affecting their information, information-based processes and systems while exploiting and protecting one's own. Not NATO Agreed intelligence The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity. AAP-6 NATO Agreed joint Adjective used to describe activities, operations, organizations in which elements of at least 2 services participate. AAP-6 NATO Agreed joint fires Fires applied during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. AAP-6 NATO Agreed
joint force commander A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise command authority or operational control over a joint force. Not NATO Agreed joint operations area A temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency or mission-specific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations. AAP-6 NATO Agreed military strategy That component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations. AAP-6 NATO Agreed mission 1. A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. 2. One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one particular task. (AAP-6) Multinational Preferred term: combined. AAP-6 NATO Agreed operation A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. AAP-6 NATO Agreed operation order A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. AAP-6 NATO Agreed
operation plan A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation `plan is usually used instead of order in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order. AAP-6 NATO Agreed operational command The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary. Note it does not include responsibility for administration. (AAP-6) operational control The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. (AAP-6) rules of engagement Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (AAP-6) Standardization The development and implementation of concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs in order to achieve and maintain the compatibility, interchangeability or commonality which are necessary to attain the required level of interoperability, or to optimize the use of resources, in the fields of operations, materiel and administration. (AAP-6) supported commander A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher NATO military authority and who receives forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders. (AAP-6) supporting commander A commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan. (AAP-6) tactical command The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. (AAP-6)
tactical control The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (AAP-6) targeting The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (AAP-6)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS AJP-3.3(A)

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Ju A. MORENO Vce-Admiral, ESP(N) irector, NSA

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NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION

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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

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Known as the AN/USQ-163 Falconer in some nations.

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ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS

2-1 2-2 2-3 2-7 2-8

3-1 3-2 3-3 3-5 3-6 3-7

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4-4 4-8 4-11 4-11 4-11 4-13

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CHAPTER 1 - FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS

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Section II - Principles of Joint Space Operations and Forces Available

Section III - Principles of Joint Air Operations

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Section IV - Forces Available for Joint Air Operations

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Section V - Core Air and Space Power Activities

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Also known as air transport.

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