The Timing of Feminism Author(s): Robyn Ferrell Source: Hypatia, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter, 1999), pp.

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The Timingof Feminism

ROBYN FERRELL

a Is history category reason,or is reasona category history? Theseopposing of of havedivided structuralist thematerialist-butneither the is questions from question thelogicof oppositions in particular, find to wrong.Analysisof challenges feminism, a logic-and a poetics-in whichto render valueswithout its or historical theoretical naivete.I explorethequestion the timingof feminismthrough and JuliaKristeva of LuceIrigaray.

Not only can I not think time without thinking; I cannot think it without also thinking thought. (Genevieve Lloyd, Beingin Time) Feminism is brought to bear on metaphysicsthrough the analysis it must make of difference. Of course, in the process, metaphysicsis brought to bear on feminism.As logical difference,the concept of differencetakes part in the logic of identity,which marksout being by distinguishingthat which it is not. But as sexual difference, the effect of distinction in practice has given rise to subordinationand oppression. Contrast is experienced as a kind of spacing, at work in producingany difference at all. This spacing (as an experience) is also a timing-the interval which divides the entity and its difference.The analysisof the interval that producesthe differencebetween any two termsis thereforeas relevant to feminist politics as to philosophical logic. But it also raises scepticism about the necessity of any state of affairs,political or logical. It unsettles metaphysical certainty;feminismapplaudsthis unsettling, and in fact, feminismhad a hand of in the operationwhen it diagnosedthe fraternizing oppositions like subject and object with masculine and feminine. But the analysisof the interval also erodesclaims of feminist normativityto know the "truthof sexual difference," and for this consequence, deconstructive philosophies have sometimes been condemned. I want to explore the formalquestionsthat the logic of opposition raisesfor
Hypatia vol. 14, no. 1 (Winter 1999) ? by Robyn Ferrell

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feminist theory. Mine is not a desire to preserveor defend feminist certainties-there no need to, since the history that led to the challenge of sexual inequality was not bor of theory. The experience of subordinationhas its own incontrovertiblepain. What oppositional logic raises is the appearance of a paradox:in relation to time, as to whether time will be determinedas the exterior contingent event of history, or as the interior orderedoperation of consciousness. Time appears objective, never moreso than in the sequenceof events called and yet, it is the ineluctable companion of subjectivity.There is no history; consciousnesswithout sequence, and conversely,without time we are unconscious, for the reflex of self-consciousnessneeds two moments;there needs to be a moment in which to reflect. It is hard to conceive of what the past could be without invoking the subjective operation called memory.The difference between the past and the futureis immense, since one has happened, has been made objective in all its specifics.And yet, what is left of it after the event (the records,the objects) appear as frail and inessential souvenirs of it. The past is cherished in the memoriesof those who experienced it, that is, in the subjectiverealm.Meanwhile, the futurecan only be assumedby an act of faith. "The time will come .. ,"the futureis that which will happen-this truthhas not yet been falsified, but it is still a hypothesis. The futureexists only as a hypothesis because it is not yet known as actual in its specific occurrence.1 If time is bound up with consciousness, then it makes sense that the unconscious has been said to be timeless. Sometimes, this means only that the unconscious is a mode of being without recourseto the orderingof chronology. For the materialist,things in the unconscious are weighted accordingto the strength of their impression;these impressionsare renderedthere like an exhaustive glossaryof one's experience. This is not to deny that the subject is subject to the action of time, which can modify this lexicon through the introduction of furtherexperience. But it does claim that the interiorityof the subject experiences necessity not from the direction of time as reason, but from time as history.The force with which the event strikesus and the angle of the blow producesignificance.2 At other times, there is held to be no time in the unconscious since it is "full"only of potential and as-yet-unrealized possibilitiesfor meaning, as well as of the moments that are ruled out by virtue of their being incompatible with the present moment. This structuralist view understandsthe subjection of time as an ordering and refers the problem of experience to the logical terms set for it in the unconscious-structured like a language,as Lacan has it-that is, the laws. Is history a category of reason, or is reason a category of history?These opposing questions have divided the structuralistfrom the materialist-but neither question is wrong.Analysis of the logic of oppositionschallengesfemi-

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nism, in particular,to find a logic-and a poetics-in which to render its values without historical or theoretical naivete. One way in which this analysiscan be illustratedfor feminism is by considremarksabout time. As feminists of ering Julia Kristeva'sand Luce Irigaray's difference, both bring the resourcesof philosophy and psychoanalysisto the problem. Feminism and psychoanalysisare common companions in the practice of many theorists, yet there is a deeply irreconcilablecontest between them. on The claims of a political program behalf of women compete with an episteclaim to masterthe field of subjectivity in general. mological Feminism is a normative project, and normative projects begin from assumptions and prioritiesthat are not easily, or often may not coherently be, given up to an alternative. Feminismhas been as much a political demand as it has a theory and the theory remains in creative tension with the simpler practice built on the intuition of oppression. Of course, psychoanalysishas its own priorities, and the normativity in psychoanalysisas a scipsychoanalysisis only better disguised.In particular, entific aspirationmakes a better show of keeping affect out of it. But psychoanalysis has its own convictions and assumptionswhich, since they derive more thoroughlyfrom the philosophical context in which they come about, are less visible. There are sustainedfeminist critiquesof the culturalassumptions that psychoanalysisrelies on, for example, of the famous discussion of femininity in the writingsof Freudand his followers. Yet, it is possible to take the heretical sense of these possibilities-feminist theory and practice, psychoanalytic theory and practice-and to deduce at least a kind of time in which these would coincide. Kristeva, in her analysis of the tides of feminism in her essay "Women's Time" (1986), has given a diagnosis of the next moment that is yet to be grappledwith (this despite the piece firsthaving appearedin Frenchin 1979). Her vision takes in the panoramaof three kinds of time, whose coincidence is both historical and conceptual. "There are three attitudes on the part of Europeanfeminist movements towardsthis conception of linear temporality, which is readily labeled masculine and which is at once both civilizational and obsessional"(1986, 193). Presented as a historical actuality, Kristeva's descriptioncan neverthelessserveto describemomentsin a conceptualscheme that have an appearanceof necessity, or at least, have a logic to them. Kristeva's analysisbegins froma firstmoment, which she also nominates as the firstgeneration."Inits beginnings,the women'smovement, as the struggle and of suffragists of existential feminists, aspiredto gain a place in linear time as the time of projectand history"(1986, 193). This generation,whereinmuch of the discussion remains, is probablythe most familiarto Anglo-American feminists. These kinds of feminism, which in our own time encompass the

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aspirationsof equal opportunityand (what I want to characterizeas) "technological-rational"feminisms, are still very much extant and for good reason: they are projects,and continue to have goals, that are worth pursuingin relation to women'smaterial-historicalcircumstances. this Nevertheless,as Kristeva notes, it has been necessaryin pursuing project to adopt values belonging to the "timeof project and history"(1986, 193). In particular,it has been conceptually necessaryfor these feminismsto accept a versionof the nation-state,and the narrativeof the social contract,fromwhich neatly: fromwhen the rightsof rightscan be derived.This can be summarized man are thinkable, then the rights of woman are, too. But it seems importantto analyzewhat is contributedconceptually to uphold that particularcontract model, and thereby,that particularmoment of feminism.3Most cogent for the discussion of the relation between feminism and psychoanalysisis the privilege given to consciousnessand rationality. That particularcommitment leads this moment of feminism into its own impasse and gives rise in Kristeva'sanalysis to a second time of feminism, a second generation, which nevertheless does not want to associate itself with, or identify itself in, the more linear or rational notion of time that she is proposing. "In a second phase, linked, on the one hand, to the youngerwomen who came to feminism after May 1968 and, on the other, to women who had an aesthetic or psychoanalyticexperience, linear temporalityhas been almost totally refused,and as a consequence there has arisen an exacerbateddistrust of the entire political dimension"(1986, 194). This second generationof feminismhas dwelt more in the realmof the unconscious, and it sometimes, through its leftist leanings, has been understood as false consciousness.In analysesof women'sposition, the second generation has sought theoretical inspiration in terms of (post)structuralist, psychoanalytic, or other "hermeneuticsof suspicion.""Essentiallyinterested in the specificity of female psychologyand its symbolicrealization,these women seek to give a languageto the intra-subjectiveand corporealexperiencesleft mute by culture in the past" (1986, 194), and "bydemanding recognition of an irreducible identity, without equal in the opposite sex and, as such, exploded, plural, fluid, in a certain way non-identical, this feminism situates itself outside the linear time of identities .. ." (1986, 194). It is not surprising discover that these two moments in feminism, where to occur together, are in conflict. This might even be predicted from the they division is consimpleevidence that, by definition, the conscious-unconscious ceived as a conflictual structure.Kristevafollows the trajectoriesof these generations in termsof what is perhapsmost alarmingabout each of them. For the feminism of consciousness, a kind of dissipationhas resultedfrom the impotence of rationality and the general "enlightenment project."Kristeva describes this dissipation as "a certain exhaustion of its potential as a for programme a new social contract"(1986, 197), an exhaustion occurringin

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historical terms (as a loss of impetusfor furthermoves to economic, political, but and professionalequality-the famed "backlash"), is better seen in terms of a conceptual limitation: Because this feminism shares with its enlightenment context (socialist and democraticgovernment) a commitment to equality, "the specific character of women could only appear as non-essential or even non-existent to the totalising and even totalitarian spirit of this ideology [i.e., the socialist ideology]"(1986, 197). For the second moment, the feminism of the unconscious encounters the constant magnetismof violence (rhetoricaland otherwise), in which the unconscious findsexpressionin a technological-rationalworld.Kristeva's analysis scans the attraction of certain kinds of separatism,and (worse materially, and for the practice of feminism) to certain kinds of terrorism(she discusses which were relthese attractionswith examples such as the Bader-Meinhoff, evant in Franceat the time of writingbut in no way renderher insight redundant in the present). But Kristeva's explanation of a "symboliccontract"details why the second moment, in retreatingfrom equality to specificity,may identify vehemently with the sacrificialaspect of sexual difference,and breakitself (and others) in its frustration.For Kristeva,the metaphorologyof castration, which belongs to the imaginaryof psychoanalysis,nevertheless designatesa logical hypothesis fromwhich the characterof our generalpsychosocialpredicamentcan be deduced. Kristeva'ssymbolic contract is defined in contrast to the firstgeneration's social contract: "... the social contract, far from being that of equal men, is basedon an essentiallysacrificalrelationshipof separationand articulationof differenceswhich in this way producescommunicablemeaning"(1986, 199). from a presumedstate of nature,"introducesan "arLanguage,a "separation ticulated network of differences,"a network of substitutesfor the objects for which its signs stand and through which meaning comes about (1986, 198). but This view she presentsas "Freudian," it is more attributablein our Anglocontext to JacquesLacan,and the figureof sacrificeis sharedwith other structuralistaccounts of culture and subjectivity. To the extent that feminismas a political philosophy inherits the problems of liberalismand of the Enlightenment, it will encounter an intensificationof violence alongside the intensification of rationality,and is even consequent upon it. Kristevaimplies at the end of her essaythat one cannot guardagainst either of those possibilities, in either of these moments-neither a hyperrationality nor the irrational as expressed violently-while one remainsunconscious of them. Nevertheless, the demands of dismantling conceptual commitmentsinvolve transformation, maybeeven of cherishedpoliticalnorms, and such transformationnaturally causes anxieties. But anxiety is recognizable as the other side of desire-in this case, a desire for a certain metaphysi-

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cal view of the natureof things to be upheld. It might mean that a repressed of the theory cannot remainso-there will be the "bringingto light," to use the psychoanalyticmetaphor,of the unconsciousof feminist theory,which would be an awkwardand difficult task, and one which the normativityof feminist practice would resist. But this resistancedemonstratesa featureof normative theories in general-that they desire that their truth be accepted literally, ratherthan scrutinizedat a second order. Where does Kristeva'sdiagnosis of our time leave us? Or, she puts it another way: "Whatcan be ourplace in the symbolic contract?" (1986, 199). She a third generation,one that we areyet to inhabit effectively,and one proposes that is not quite present, nor even quite a futureperhaps;certainly it is utopian. Feminisms,where they have alreadybroachedthis moment, have taken other philosophies with them and have led the way. Kristeva describes the third moment as the "demassification" difference, the recognition of the of all other kindsof distinction-as belongingto metamasculine/feminine-and physics (1986, 209). ForIrigaray, an understanding sexual differenceleads to the critique of too, of metaphysicsthat is a featureof contemporary philosophy."Inorderto make it possible to think through, and live, this difference,we must reconsiderthe whole problematicof spaceand time"(Irigaray1993b, 7). It leads her to proclaim (in The Ethicsof SexualDifference): "Sexualdifference is one of the major philosophical issues, if not the issue, of our age" (1993b, 5). In philosophicalterms(and she flagsthis when she mentions Heidegger in her next sentence), this can be arguedby pointing up how an organic difference within the human confounds humanist assumptions.Even if humanism is just a disguisefor Westernchauvinism, it is still confoundedby this presence of difference within it-that the human species is made up of two kinds, men and women. cites moreutopianusesforher claim:"Thinkof it [sexualdifference] Irigaray as an approachthat would allow us to check the many formsthat destruction takesin ourworld;... Sexual differencewouldconstitute the horizonof worlds more fecund than any known to date-at least in the West-and without reducingfecundity to the reproductionof bodies and flesh"(1993b, 5). In these polemics, Irigaray drawsboth on Heidegger'scritique of technoland on possibilities suggestedby Lacan's"imaginaryanatomy,"and she ogy bringslogic and the erotic together as two partsof one project. This is a captivating synthesis of philosophy,psychoanalysis,and feminism-not to mention of the poetics of philosophyand polemic. Indeed,she promisesthat sexual differencecan also create "anew poetics"for a new age. "The transition to a new age requiresa change in our perception and conthe or ception of space-time, inhabiting places,and of containers, envelopes of of

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... identity " (1993b, 7). This is becausethe historyof space-timehas been the history of the subject, as Irigaraysketches. Time with Kant becomes finally "the interiorityof the subject itself,"and thereby consciousness;while space becomes its exteriority. Irigaraysees that it will be necessary to take apart, then, the structuresthat give things identity, in orderto get at this difference without making it exterior (and therefore,other). tells us, "whatis missing is the double In present sexual relations, Irigaray of attraction and support, which excludes disintegration or rejection, pole attraction and decomposition, but which instead ensuresthe separationthat articulatesencounter and makespossiblespeech, promises,alliances"(1993b, container" 7). Here she makesuse of psychoanalyticpractice,of the "psychical that the maternal relation, or the analytic situation, is said to offer to the that can growingsubjectivity.The positive model of "attractionand support" ensure mutual recognition between subjects is contrasted with the subject that, acting alone, finds another subject to be merely exterior and expels her. Her critique diagnoses the theoretical problem for the sexual relation. The "doublepole" of attraction and supportdescribes ambivalence in a positive sense, as an operation that allows both for identification and for distinction. But this is not the notion of ambivalenceas conceived, for example, by Freud, who took a colder view. Can this analysisbe extended to the problem of relation as such, as it occurs in the logic of identity, i.e., are all oppositional relations in need of this moment of recognition?Becausethe maternalbond is an originatingevent in the personal history of subjectivity,contemporarypsychoanalysis,and femitends to make of the maternalthe history of nist psychoanalysisin particular, the origin of the subject.Thereby,it assumesthat the dichotomy of masculine and and feminine is an originalor foundingopposition. Both Irigaray Kristeva assumea version of this. But while sexual difference (in the Oedipus complex) may emerge as archaic in the individual,as that which in fact triggersthe processof symbolization, it does not therebygive it conceptual priority,let alone make it a causal origin of dichotomous thought. In theory, the distinctions that carry such psychical influence-self/world; subject/object; masculine/feminine-are analogous,probablymutuallyreinforcing,but only causal as a matter of history,not of time. To imagine that historical time can make conceptual relations causal in this way (e.g., differencefrom the mother leads to differencefrom the world) is to confuse the genres of historical and theoretical time. Concepts do not need history;we cannot find conceptual priorityin originaldistinctions. Distinction itself is the problematic of the copula, the figureof logical distinction, and sexual differencealong with logical differencefinds its expressionin this pro formaof identity.4

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Our thinking is more than our history of thinking, since "the past is never states (1993b, 7). But not even the purelyconceptual strucpast,"as Irigaray ture of identity could find its originating distinction, and it need not, since although it is learnedcausallyas a personalhistory,our web of meaningsneed have no beginning or ending, but rathermay be seamlessand circular.5 The new age of sexual difference, Irigaray and entails an writes, "assumes evolution or a transformation forms,of the relationsof matterand formand of of the interval between ... " (1993b, 7). Understandingthe economy of the interval requiresa concept of time that will scrutinize itself as the effect of interval. But how, in this sense, can we have a "newage"at all?Where, in the economy of the interval, can we find the new, the novel, the utopian, and the original? In Irigaray's polemic, this is not resolved.She writesthat sexual differown as the bearerof differenceas such, would provoke a revolution of someence, thing new, the defeat of the logic of identity, which is something without an historical precursor.How can this be reconciled with, on the one hand, an historical continuity of sexual relations, and on the other, the logic of neces"newpoetics"will carrythis paradoxicaldouble burden. sity?Irigaray's In her utopian vision of a moment in which difference is experienced as attraction and offered as support,can Irigarayreconcile her psychoanalytic insight with her deconstructive one? It is a question of a poetics-how that part of her philosophy which bringsus to a critical understandingof the production of value, including of sexual difference,need not undermineher rhetorical sea-change towardromance, metaphor,and passionslike wonder. The new of Irigaray's "newage"may be a utopian solution of paradox.And what might look like an attempt in Kristevaat synthesis-the generationsof feminism expressed in the classic logic of threes, which governs the dialectic-may prove on closer inspection to be a chimera. If I use metaphorsof improbability-utopia, chimera-in discussingKristeva'sthird moment and new age, it is because it is important that these timely notions be Irigaray's genuinely improbable,at least in logical terms. And it is importantthat they be improbable,not as spectral impossibilities, but as living occurrences of breachedlegibility.The utopic is a genre, and not a time or place, despite its appearance. How can a position simultaneouslydemand and refusea notion of history or of reason?But it is preciselythis unthinkableposition that is given to womAs en, of course, in the paradoxof the symbolic order.6 subject, she must find herself only as exterior to the subject. "She"is a paradox.The conception of time and/orreasonis both impossibleand unavoidable,as are all metaphysical oppositions, and this is preciselyhow the question of the genre, that is, of the representationas oppositional, comes to light. Therefore,one need not waste

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time seeking the coherence of this attitude within a usual rational scheme, but rathertry to find other philosophical resourcesto depict the occurrenceof paradoxdifferently.In their difference styles, Kristeva's"symboliccontract" and Irigaray's "new poetics"both approachthe mirageof opposition.7 The investigation of this metaphysicscalls for sexual differenceto be analyzed as a logic itself. Beyond the Oedipus story, the castration figurewhich Kristevaherself uses and which has preoccupiedtheoretical attention to the question of this "symboliccontract,"there are other figuresthat are less tractable but have potential in the process of theorizingdifference.The rhetorical procedureknown to psychoanalysisas the disavowalparticularlysuggests itself, because of its special relation to the logic of opposition. In analyzing masculine and feminine as part of that logic, it is necessaryto recruit a conby ceptual understandingthat can include that which is "repressed" the distinction, i.e., that which it has excluded in orderto install itself. This cannot be done within familiarphilosophical logic, since it is itself part of the operation of distinction. But the logic of the disavowalwould have as its whole purpose the representationof the ambivalent moment, one in which "it is and it in isn't."Whereas,ambi-valenceis exactly what oppositionaimsto "fix," fixing a value. If logic, as Heideggerpromisesus, is to be about the thinkable possibility, we may reflect that the repressedis precisely the unthinkable-that which must be obscuredin orderfor the definition to go ahead. It has been said of the case of "repressed memory,"for example, that the with the "unknownthought"so much as with the incest victim is not living "unthoughtknown." As a configurationof the repressed,it is a challenge to renderthis as logic. Likewise,to renderthat "doublemovement"of the third moment, or generation, of feminism, or the new age of sexual difference, remains a rhetoricalhope ratherthan a conceptual event. To connect time with feminism will also connect it to a history of ideas. Empiricalfeminism resiststhis connection; and yet, the connection is needed to take up the notion of sexual difference as a metaphysicalone. For sexual difference to have been revealed as a metaphysical question is a significant moment for feminism and for philosophy. It is a moment when an empirical history of sufferingdiscerns its theoretical gravity,and the particularcontingent protest becomes a general conceptual challenge. Fromthis moment, an account might begin of the startlingconceptual vigor of feminist philosophy, which has had an influence well beyond the domesticated sphere to which the (male-dominated) philosophical institution desiresto confine it. But the failureto appreciatetime as paradoxleads to the intellectual truncation of feminism. The seduction of the objective and external look of time leads to taking its progressliterally.This is to misunderstandthe problem of sexual difference completely. The revolutionarystory of liberation from an

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oppressivepast into a better future (preciousthough it is) can blind feminism into thinking itself as more than history, as a messianic moment in which women'sstate is changed forever.The deepest and most woundingproblemin sexual difference is the one expressed in the cry: "Why,in all times and all places... ?"Sexual oppressionhas been reinvented at every moment, and this is what makes sexual difference the metaphysicalquestion of our age. But if feminism is thought without thinking through this paradoxof time, the idea of liberation seems less and less plausible. What would remain of a feminist moment that has conceded that its objects of enquiry-the feminine and the sexual relation-are a kind of logical fiction? Can the paradox of the third generation and the new age happen Other modem revolutions show that libanyway,despite being implausible? eration is both an enduringhope and a fleeting moment in history.Such is the irony of event-that sometimes what is released is no longer recognizable. What will the feminist moment, in time, have liberated?

NOTES

An earlier versionof thispaper appeared "Time" Australian has as in Feminist Studies (Winter1997). 1. Metaphysical of discussions time, especially fromthe phemonological view, and in, for example,Heidegger Being Time(1962) and RicoeurTimeandNarrative the horizon muchof this essay's of femi(1984-88), naturally provide philosophical nist discussion. 2. I discuss in detailin chapter and3 of Passion Theory this 2 In (Ferrell 1996). 3. Thisanalysis pursued Moira is in Gatens(1996) andCarolePateman (1988). in The 4. See mydiscussion "Copula: Logicof the SexualRelation" forthcoming in a special issueof Hypatia: Australian: Feminist (Ferrell, Going Reconfiguring Philosophy forthcoming). 5. No doubtphysicsexpresses when it conceivesof timeas circular, the this in classicprojection a subjective of interior onto the external world whichcharacterizes scientific discourse. 6. BothKristeva represented this paper)andIrigaray various in (as (in sources) this. argue 7. Deconstruction genealogical and whileat the styleshavemuchto contribute, sametimecontributing theirownhostilities,to this feministoperation. Theycreate breached both dualanddivided,realand imagined, The loyalties, amongfeminists. affectiveclimateis likelyto be energetic,then, to put it mildly-this is already a familiar for momentwheneverit experience feminists caughtup in this theoretical occurs. Deconstruction genealogy aresexistdiscourses, theirimaginaries and also and and on carry thoughtless even aggressive figures; call for a certainstrategy the they partof feministtheory.

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REFERENCES with Burke,Carolyn,Naomi Schor,and Margaret Whitford,eds. 1994. Engaging Irigaray. New York:Columbia University Press. New York, Chanter, Tina. 1995. Ethicsof eros: Irigaray's rewriting the philosophers. of London: Routledge. Diprose, Rosalyn. 1994. The bodiesof women.London: Routledge. Ferrell,Robyn. 1996. Passionin theory.London: Routledge. . Forthcoming.Copula: The logic of the sexual relation. Hypatia:GoingAustraFeminist lian: Reconfiguring Philosophy. bodies.London: Routledge. Gatens, Moira. 1996. Imaginary Three Frenchfeminists.Sydney: Allen & Grosz, Elizabeth. 1989. Sexual subversions: Unwin. and Robinson. Heidegger,Martin. 1962. Beingandtime.Trans.John Macquarrie Edward New York:Harperand Row. a Trans.Alison Martin. Luce. 1993a.Je, tu, nous: Toward cultureof difference. Irigaray, New York,London: Routledge. -. 1993b. An ethicsof sexualdifference. Trans.Carolyn Burkeand Gillian C. Gill. Ithaca:Cornell University Press. - . 1996. I love to you. Trans.Alison Martin. New York,London: Routledge. Kristeva,Julia. 1986. Women's time. In The Kristevareader,ed. Toril Moi. Oxford: Blackwell;alternativelytrans.Ross Guberman.1995. In New maladies thesoul. of NewYork:Columbia University Press. Lloyd, Genevieve. 1993. Beingin time.London: Routledge. Kristeva:Unravelling doublebind.Bloomington: Indithe Oliver, Kelly. 1993. Reading ana University Press. Pateman, Carole. 1988. The sexualcontract.London: Polity. Trans.Kathleen McLaughlinand David Ricoeur, Paul. 1984-88. Timeand narrative. Pellauer.Chicago: University of Chicago Press. in Whitford, Margaret.1991. Luce Irigaray: Philosophy thefeminine.New York,London: Routledge.