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131007652 Topic 14 Animals Are Beings Too

We have prima facie duties not to cause non-human animals pain or discomfort as well as prima facie duties not to kill non-human animals, however these duties do vary in strength for the two different cases. There are three prima facie duties to consider and respect when deciding not to cause pain and discomfort to non-human animals. Firstly, it is our prima facie duty not to harm others that applies in the case of not causing pain to nonhuman animals. Secondly, we have a prima facie duty of beneficence that appeals to our better nature and utility that holds us to not put unnecessary pain and discomfort on other animals. Lastly, our special relationships with animals like pets or even animals on small farms that provide sustenance for the entire household bounds on us a prima facie duty. In the case of killing animals, it is still our prima facie duty not to harm others. When considering not killing animals, this duty is the strongest because animals can be killed but they can be killed without being caused discomfort and unnecessary harm. Next, we have a prima facie duty of beneficence when considering the choice of whether or not to kill animals. This duty is of a lesser strength and moral significance. Lastly, we have a duty to not kill animals that is completely created from our special relationships with these animals. This duty is of the least amount of strength because it is only applicable in specific circumstances. When considering our prima facie duties in the case of animal treatment and killing, there are many factors to consider. As humans, the main prima facie duty compelling us to not cause pain and discomfort on animals is our prima facie duty to do no harm to others, not to injure others or make them worse off. Firstly, we must assume all animals are capable of being harmed, that the definition of harm is consistent when being used for humans and non-human animals. As David Degrazia writes in his book, Taking Animals Seriously, Let us assume

that there is a prima facie duty not to harm that applies naturally enough, to all who can be harmed. (Here and hereafter, I mean harm in a morally relevant sense, not in the broader sense in which flowers can be harmed; similarly for benefit) (Degrazia 233). Next, we must also assume that all animals have moral standing, this standing may not be equivalent to that of humans but it is existent nonetheless. In her book, Animal Ethics in Context, Clare Palmer writes, If someone accepts that animals have moral status and that we can direct duties toward them, then the most obvious duty that follows is not to harm (Palmer 68). It is completely natural and almost habitual in society today to expect certain behaviors and duties from animals. Cows are kept on farms and expected to provide milk. Oxen are kept and expected to pull carts. Horses are kept and expected to provide transportation. Our giving these duties to animals obligates us to treat the same animals properly, without harming them in any way. A good example of a recent legal case can be seen with Michael Vick and his dog fighting scandal. His dogs were not kept as pets; they were merely kept as animals. However, they were given a duty to fight, to earn money for their human participants. Michael Vick went to jail for cruelty to animals as he did harm to these dogs, dogs that he applied a responsibility to. Our prima facie duty to not harm animals is the strongest duty compelling us to not cause pain and discomfort towards them; however, it becomes slightly weakened when dealing with the case of killing animals. We should not kill animals in respect for our prima facie duty to not do harm to others. When we kill a human, it is considering harming that human. Death is the greatest expression of a suppression of our living rights and as a result, killing someone is harm to said person. Considering our standing assumption that animals have moral status (Palmer 68) any action that harms them must have rationale and must have a justified backing.

Killing animals for meat, for leather, or for sport, has no justification. Since killing animals is harming animals, and killing animals has no justification, harming them has none either. Keith Burges-Jackson in his response to a paper written by David Oderberg writes, Look at it this way. If animals matter morally then actions that harm them must be justified. Death is a harm. Since eating the flesh of an animal requires death, eating the flesh of an animal must be justified. Oderberg has done nothing whatsoever (at least in this essay) to justify meat-eating, or even to suggest that he thinks it must be justified. He does imply that killing animals in order to use their coats as fashion accessories is morally questionable, so why is meat eating any different? (Jackson 7). Our prima facie duty of doing no harm to others is strong but not completely strong in this case as many people may have an argument that eating meat is essential to the human diet. A counterargument one may bring up in this case is that humans are perfectly justified in their killing of animals for meat that will be used as food. Many will argue that meat is the only source of true protein to keep the muscles strong. However, there is no scientific evidence to prove that eating meat is vital to human health. In fact, science has proven that it can be detrimental. According to the National Institute of Health, eating red meats can shorten your life, and is associated with higher risk of heart disease and cancer (Medline Plus). If anything these points are exactly opposite to any justification for killing animals for their meat. Just as killing animals for their hide and tusks is unjustified and extremely harmful, killing animals for their meat is harmful and according to our prima facie duty to do no harm, we have an obligation not to kill non-human animals just as we have an obligation not to kill humans. In considering our duties towards animals and not causing them pain and

discomfort and not killing them, we have a prima facie duty of beneficence to ensure welfare of all. As we have discussed, animals have a moral status. We as humans assign duties to animals just as we would to other humans. We as humans assign responsibility and entrust animals to perform these duties. Furthermore, humans are at the top of the food pyramid, animals underneath are at our discretion in order to ensure their survival and welfare. As a result, we must ensure we treat them accordingly as it is our obligation. Infants are born with the same ability to interact with us, as an animal has to interact with us. They cannot successfully communicate with us with language, they cannot survive without our discretion. Essentially, it is up to us to make sure we help them survive. Not only must we help them survive but also it is in our moral nature to never do any harm to them or kill them. Society severely punishes those who hurt or kill babies. In the same regard, animals are helpless when it comes to the power humans have over the rest of the pyramid. Just as a baby is helpless and humans make sure to ensure its survival, animals are helpless and we must ensure their survival (Carruthers 120). Concerning the duty of beneficence, many can argue that humans have no obligation towards other animals as they are not human, babies are human and we must ensure their survival to continue the species. However, just as we feel a need to show beneficence towards babies out of societal standards and pressures to be generous and be caring, we must also understand that much of society views animal cruelty in a very negative light. As Peter Carruthers explains in his book, The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, It need not infringe on a persons rights if we keep them alive, though it may display a serious lack of beneficence on our part (Carruthers 120). Humans are innately beneficent and society pressures this beneficence on others even more.

Our last prima facie duty towards ensuring no pain, discomfort or killing of animals takes place is the duty created from our special relationships with animals. When we have pets, we ensure their survival, we ensure their comfort, and we make sure we never harm them in any way. This same relationship can be seen when small farms have a couple of cows and hens that provide milk and eggs for the family. In India, cows are respected because of the fruits they bear. They provide milk for nutrients, power for plows, and dung for fire fuel. Our cats, dogs and other pets are taken to the vet when they are sick, they are fed healthier food than we sometimes eat, and they are cared for and loved more beyond measure. However, when it comes down to fact, they are empirically just animals like the rest of the animals on earth. Using this argument, we can say that all animals should be treated just as we treat our pets and farm animals. Many would counter this argument with the idea that we only treat our pets with respect because we have given them a name and taken them into our homes. They may argue that there is a personal connection there. However, this argument only shows ignorance and passivity. Pets are simply animals; they were born animals and given a life as a pet. What if I took a chicken out of a slaughterhouse right before it was killed and decided to make it my pet? This chicken was going to be mistreated and killed, but because I have labeled it a pet, it will now be treated almost equally as I would treat any human. Our special relationships with pets and farm animals can be applied to all animals as a means to justify our not killing, paining, or discomforting animals. As can be seen, we do have prima facie duties towards animals when it comes to not killing them, causing them pain, or causing them discomfort. While arguments can be made to support these actions, no justifications can be made to support these arguments.

Considering animals are moral beings, we have a duty to do no harm to them, to be beneficent, and, as a result of our special relationships with some of them, to never kill, pain, or discomfort all of them.

Works Cited Burgess-Jackson, Keith. Oderberg on Animal Rights. Google Books. Web. 12 Apr. 2012. Carruthers, Peter. The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice. Google Books. Web. 12

Apr. 2012. Degrazia, David. Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status. Google Books. Web. 12 Apr. 2012. Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics In Context. Google Books. Web. 12 Apr. 2012. "Red Meat Can Be Unhealthy, Study Suggests: MedlinePlus." U.S National Library of Medicine. U.S. National Library of Medicine. Web. 12 Apr. 2012. <http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/news/fullstory_122839.html>.

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