ChinaBrief

Volume IV Issue 24 December 7, 2004

VOLUME IV ISSUE 24 DECEMBER 7, 2004

IN THIS SPECIAL ISSUE:
ENERGY CONCERNS AND CHINAS UNRESOLVED TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
By John C. K. Daly

1 3 6

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOFT POWER: CHINAS AFRICA STRATEGY

By Drew Thompson

CHALLENGES TO THE SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP

By Matthew Oresman

THE QIAN QICHEN OP-ED: OFFICIAL DISCONTENT OR JUST ONE MANS OPINION?
By Harvey Stockwin

Hu Jintao in Gabon earlier this year. China continues to place greater strategic importance on Africa.

Energy Concerns and Chinas Unresolved Territorial Disputes

By John C. K. Daly While much of the world is xated on Chinas booming economic growth and its ravenous appetite for energy, untidy diplomatic loose ends in the form of territorial disputes with neighbors have many of the countries bordering the Asian giant nervous. Though Beijings claims over Taiwan remain the focus of world attention, China is embroiled in unresolved territorial maritime and land issues with no less than thirteen of its neighbors. Given that Chinas military capability is growing apace with its economy, the potential for military conict over the disputed regions is similarly on the rise. While China up to now has attempted to address these issues diplomatically, the fact that many of the unresolved border disputes involve potential energy reserves might prompt China to use military force to resolve issues of strategic economic interest. In the South China Sea, China is involved in a dispute with Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Brunei over the Spratly (Nansha) and Paracel Islands. Chinese forces seized the Paracels in 1974, but Vietnam still disputes their ownership. While the signing of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea reduced tensions, it failed to provide the legally binding code of conduct that several of the signatories wanted. In 1988 and 1992, the Chinese and Vietnamese navies clashed briey over the reefs; and on October 21 of this year, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhang Qiyue asserted that China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands, claiming that the South China Sea has been a Chinese lake for centuries. [1] China currently has about 450 soldiers on the Spratleys, Vietnam about 1,500, the Philippines about 100 and Malaysia 70-90 troops. Moreover, in the Paracels, China has established port facilities on Woody and Duncan islands and established a

China Brief: A Journal of Information and Analysis is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation, a private nonprot organization based in Washington, D.C. China Brief is a weekly journal of information and analysis covering Greater China in Eurasia. Since its founding in 1983, Jamestown has worked to increase public understanding of Communist and postCommunist societies. The opinions expressed in China Brief are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily reect the views of the Jamestown Foundation.

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small airport. Despite Chinese assertions of control, tensions over the South China Seas waters have continued to rise. On October 26, a partnership of Malaysias Petronas Carigali Overseas, American Technology Inc. Petroleum, Singapore Petroleum Co. and Petrovietnams Petroleum Investment and Development Co. announced it had discovered oil at its offshore Yen Tu oileld, 43 miles off Haiphong, with a preliminary estimate of reserves at 181 million barrels. [2] The same day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhang Qiyue immediately noted, China is seriously concerned and strongly dissatised. [3] China is also embroiled in a territorial dispute with Indonesia over the 272-island Natuna archipelago in the South China Sea, 150 miles northwest of Borneo. The islands have been in dispute for over a decade; in 1993, China presented a map of its historic claims on the Spratleys during a workshop in Surabaya, Indonesia, which included not only nearly the entire South China Sea but a portion of Indonesias Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off the Natuna islands. [4] The Natunas natural gas reserves are among the largest in the world, estimated at 210 trillion cubic feet. [5] Chinas third maritime dispute is with Japan over the Senkaku (Diaoyu Tai) islands, which Japan currently administers. In a signicant partnering with its renegade province, China, together with Taiwan, have asserted their claims to the Senkakus, stating that they have been under Chinese sovereignty for the last 500 years. The ve small volcanic islands and three rocky outcroppings total only 2.7 square miles, but once again, the dispute is about the surrounding EEZ. None of the islands, which lie 105 miles northeast of Taiwan and 254 miles west of Okinawa, are inhabited. While Japan claims that it discovered the islands and incorporated them in 1895, China and Taiwan maintain that Chinese discovered the islets in 1372. The Director General of Japans Foreign Ministry Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Mitoji Yabunaka, and the head of the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Nobuyori Kodaira, met on October 26 with Chinas Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Department Director General Cui Tiankai to discuss the disputed boundaries and natural gas reserves in the East China Sea. [6] At issue is each countrys claim to its EEZ under the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which came into force in November 1994. Under UNCLOS III, a country can claim an EEZ of 200 nautical miles from its coast, but the East China Sea is too narrow for such an arrangement to be feasible. China wants

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a demarcation line drawn from the end of the continental shelf, while Japan supports a median line. The talks yielded so little that Nakagawa later said, I dont know why these talks were even held. China also has unresolved territorial issues with its neighbor India. While most of the boundary with India is in dispute, the two sides are committed to begin resolution with discussions on the Middle Sector, comprising Chinas approximately 20 percent portion of Kashmir, including Aksai Chin. India retains possession of Jammu and Kashmir while Pakistan controls Azad Kashmir. India does not recognize Pakistans ceding a portion of Kashmir and the Aksai Chin Ladakh region to China in a 1964 boundary agreement. [7] China also claims large parts of the northeastern Indian states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. China has been more successful in its territorial disputes with the former nations of the USSR, making signicant concessions to its Central Asian neighbors after the collapse of Communism in December 1991. China has kept 20 percent of the land disputed with Kazakhstan, and the two countries are working to demarcate their large open borders to control population migration, illegal activities, and trade. In its unresolved territorial claims with Kyrgyzstan, China has retained about 30 percent of the contested area, while it has dropped most of its claims to Tajikistans Pamir Mountains. In 2002, China signed boundary delimitation agreements whereby Tajikistan ceded 386 square miles of the Pamir mountain range to China in return for Chinas relinquishing claims to 10,810 square miles, but the demarcation has yet to begin. In the case of Kazakhstan, Chinas interest in the countrys vast energy reserves produced a strong inclination towards conciliation. Oil is also a major consideration in the growing ChineseRussian rapprochement. China continues to press for an agreement on disputed islands in the Amur and Ussuri rivers and a small island in the Argun River, and progress has been made. In 2001, the two countries signed a Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation in an attempt to ease tensions; and on October 14 they signed a Supplementary Agreement on the Eastern Section of the China-Russia Boundary Line, effectively resolving issues regarding the 2,670-mile land frontier. [8] The main result of Russian President Vladimir Putins visit to China in October was the signing of a number of important documents. Besides oil, the most important agreement delineated a section of the Russian-Chinese border along the Amur River, while China gave up its claims to exclusive ownership of the islands outside Khabarovsk, leaving the details to be

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hammered out in the future. [9] Putins concessions angered many in Russias Far Eastern provinces, however. A senior ofcial in the Khabarovsk Territory speaking on condition of anonymity said, Over the years, we spent huge sums on reinforcing the border, deepening the river and populating the islands. It now transpires that Russia is sacricing part of its indigenous territory for the sake of transitory economic interest. [10] Finally, though oil does not inuence Chinas dispute over islands claimed by North Korea in the Yalu and Tumen, along with territory around Mount Paektu, the issue of stemming mass illegal migration of North Koreans escaping famine and oppression into northern China is likely to impel Beijing to modify its claims. For the moment, China has attempted diplomatic solutions to its territorial claims with its Southeast Asian neighbors: on November 2, 2002, it signed a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), committing all signatories to peaceful resolutions of outstanding issues. While predicting future Chinese actions is difcult, it would seem that China is willing to modify its historic claims in return for increased access to indigenous energy reserves. Energy security now seems to be the driving force behind much of Beijings foreign policy, much to the consternation of its energy-poor neighbors. In addition to the cases enumerated above, groups in Burma and Thailand have expressed concerns over Chinas construction of 13 hydroelectric dams on the Salween River in Yunnan province. The only certainty for Chinas East Asian neighbors is that as its economy continues to grow, so will Beijings need for energy. In the nal analysis, the best bargaining position for countries affected by the growing Chinese appetite for energy would be to develop an energy for land policy, the sooner the better. UPI international correspondent, Dr. John C. K. Daly received his Ph.D. in Russian and Middle Eastern Studies from the University of London and is an Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC. Notes 1. China Daily, Oct. 22, 2004. 2. Collective Bellacio, Oct. 27 2004. 3. Inter Press Service News Agency, Oct. 26, 2004. 4. Asian Affairs, Sept. 22, 1997 5. News and View Indonesia [ofcial publication] Sept. 1994 6. Kyodo News, 26 October 2004. 7. ANI news agency, Oct. 20, 2004. 8. Asia Times, 2 Nov. 2004.

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9. Komsomolskaia Pravda, Oct. 21, 2004 10. Novye Izvestia, Oct. 22, 2004 ***

Economic Growth and Soft Power: Chinas Africa Strategy

By Drew Thompson The UN Security Councils mid-November meeting in Nigeria highlighted Chinas growing interest in Africa since the end of the cold war. The talks on November 18-19 were aimed at resolving the conicts in Sudan by advancing the peace process between Khartoum and rebels in the South, and apply greater pressure on the government to stop the violence in Darfur. Chinas effort to dilute a September UN resolution against Sudan not only demonstrated Beijings potentially more active role in the Security Council but also revealed its emerging interest in trade and energy in Africa. An increasingly inuential player in Africa, China needs to be considered if the U.S. wants to achieve its goals of bringing democracy and economic development to the continent. Likewise, China has an opportunity to fulll its aspirations as a responsible power through cooperating with the international community to help promote security and stability in the region. Chinas Interests in African Cooperation Chinese presence in Africa is illustrative of Beijings efforts to create a paradigm of globalization that favors China. Beijing has long sought to portray itself as the leader of the Third World, and remains an attractive strategic partner to many African countries. By cultivating relations with African nations, providing aid, technical expertise and diplomatic support in multilateral institutions, China has attempted to better position itself in a multi-polar, postcold war environment. Its history as a former colony of the European powers allows China to promote itself as sensitive to the dignity of Third World countries, in the hopes that African people will favorably relate to this invocation of a shared colonial past. Furthermore, Chinas professed respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs is appealing to many African leaders, some of whom face internal rebellions and ethnic unrest similar to China. But Chinas interests in Africa have shifted over the past fty years from a desire to be the leader of the Third World during the cold war to expanding its spheres of inuence

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and ensuring access to energy and raw materials through diplomacy, investment, and trade. Diplomacy, Aid and Trade The Chinese government has invested heavily in Africa over the past four years to encourage trade relations, sponsoring the China-Africa Cooperation Forum to provide opportunities for governments and businesses to strengthen economic cooperation. The rst China-Africa Cooperation Forum took place in Beijing in 2000. It established a mechanism for promoting diplomatic relations, trade and investment between China and African countries. That same year, two-way trade between China and Africa surpassed US$10 billion for the rst time in history, reaching US$10.6 billion this number increased to US$18.545 billion in 2003. By 2004, 674 Chinese companies were operating in Africa. A forum held in Addis Ababa in December 2003, and attended by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, UN Secretary General Ko Annan, 250 businessmen from Africa and 150 from China, indicates the signicant support that Beijing provides African businesses with interests in China. The most recent forum was held in Beijing in October 2004. This cooperation between Chinese and African businesses is part of a long history of China providing aid to African countries, and thereby building goodwill and political support. Chinese assistance to African countries includes grants as well as low and no-interest loans. China is also very effective at leveraging loans a second time, forgiving debt for the poorest countries at the high-prole China-Africa Cooperation Forums. Chinas aid and debt forgiveness earns it signicant political capital among African countries, ensuring their support in the UN and other multilateral forums. Moreover, Chinese technical aid to Africa is becoming increasingly important in building Chinas inuence in the region. Medical, agricultural and engineering teams have provided technical aid to African countries for decades to support everything from building projects to treating AIDS patients. Since 1963, some 15,000 Chinese doctors have worked in 47 African states treating nearly 180 million cases of HIV/AIDS. At the end of 2003, 940 Chinese doctors were still working throughout the continent. Beijing prefers technical support over nancial aid to African countries for obvious reasons. Financial aid stretches resources and diverts capital from signicant needs at home, therefore investments in trade and projects that have a chance at providing returns are more popular than direct aid and loan programs.

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Finally, the Chinese government has also actively promoted their own brand of economic development and reform model to African countries, encouraging government counterparts in several countries to visit China and learn from their experience. Chinas efforts to encourage African governments to fashion their economic systems after their own is an important indication of the soft power that China hopes to ultimately project in Africa. Chinas soft power gambit can also be seen in its heavy investments in Africas educational systems, both by sending teachers to Africa and providing scholarships to African students from across the continent to study in Chinese universities. Between the start of the educational exchanges in the mid-1950s and 2000, 5,582 African students had enrolled in Chinese universities. These students typically spend two years learning Chinese, then study technical subjects, particularly engineering disciplines. Currently, about half of African students are pursuing advanced degrees. This support for education improves Chinas image in many countries, builds grassroots support in local communities and a better understanding of China among the educated elite. But more than just increasing goodwill towards Beijing, these educational programs help to provide China with the kind of workforce it requires to expand its own high tech industries. As Chinas space program expands and matures, it is seeking to improve its space tracking capabilities in the southern hemisphere. China operates a space tracking station in Namibia, and utilizes South African ports of call to support space-tracking ships. Chinas investments in Africa pay an added dividend in the diplomatic effort to deny Taiwan international space through recognition by individual countries and their resulting support in multilateral forums, such as the UN. For example, Chinas deployment of 90 peacekeepers to Liberia in December of 2003 occurred two months after Liberia switched its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, illustrating the strategic importance that African nations hold in the on-going diplomatic struggle between Taiwan and the Mainland. Seven countries in Africa currently recognize Taiwan, making up one quarter of the total. However, several African countries have played China and Taiwan against one another, seeking massive aid packages and switching recognition. In order to compete with Chinas dominating presence on the continent and support in international forums, Taiwan must offer substantial aid packages to its African allies. Taipei is able to concentrate its greater nancial resources on the small number of countries that recognize it, while methodically approaching other countries that might consider switching recognition to them. Beijing, with fewer resources and more countries to support, must

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carefully consider its investments in countries that are likely to provide them with a stable return. Beijings Investment in Sudan Paying Off Chinas rapidly growing demand for imported oil and other raw materials surprised world commodity and nancial markets and revealed the extent to which China has invested in extractives industries in Africa in order to lock up barrels at their source. China, through the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), is the most visible and signicant investor in Sudanese oil exploration, transportation and production infrastructure. These investments enabled Sudan to begin exporting oil in 1999 and eventually become a net oil exporter. Though Sudans current production capacity of 310,000 barrels per day (bpd) is relatively insignicant compared to the global production of approximately 82 bpd, its product is of a high quality. Such so-called light-sweet crude is in short supply in global markets, and sells at a premium over Middle Eastern crude which has a higher sulfur content. Chinas investment in Sudanese oil production capacity has resulted in Sudans output now amounting to ve percent of Chinas total imports. Signicantly, China is Sudans single largest customer of oil, taking over half of Sudans exports in 2003. This relationship with Sudan provides Beijing with signicant diplomatic leverage over Khartoum, and puts China in a strong position to encourage Sudan to take measures to stop the violence in Darfur and even invest in social programs to promote domestic security and stability. Chinas experience in promoting trade and investment relations with Sudan illustrates its broader interests in Africa, as well as some of the competitive advantages Beijing enjoys when operating in difcult environments. African countries represent a signicant market for cheap Chinese-made products, which helps China maintain a favorable global balance of trade and creates jobs in China. Several African countries also present Chinese rms with an investment environment where they can compete effectively against Western multinational corporations that enjoy greater access to international capital and technology. Chinese companies have been very active investors in African infrastructure (including hydropower plants, pipelines, factories and hospitals) and are particularly competitive in countries where unreliable political situations, sanctions or other potential liabilities keep large multinationals from committing themselves. Chinese rms are not hindered at home by legal challenges from non-governmental organizations or concerned about corporate-image liabilities when investing in high-risk markets with unsavory regimes or where severe human rights abuses take place. In fact, Chinese companies

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are attracted to the potential for large prots in markets with less competition from multinational rms. Conclusion Chinas interests in Africa represent an opportunity for the United States and the international community. China maintains friendly relations with most African nations, particularly nations that the U.S. has limited contact or diplomatic leverage over, such as Libya and Sudan. If President Bush seeks to address U.S. national security interests around the world, promoting social, political and economic development in Africa will have to become a signicant priority for the administration. China can potentially be a strong ally in this effort. But, as the U.S. and China seek to further their interests in Africa, whether they work together or at cross-purposes remains an open question. The U.S. could see China as a competitor, and become increasingly concerned about its growing spheres of inuence, while China could see U.S. efforts to promote stability and democracy in Africa as an effort to cut off their access to raw materials and further contain Chinas professed peaceful rise. Of course, China is always cautious of U.S. intentions, which might lead to suspicion of any overtures made to them to cooperate on issues, particularly involving other nations internal affairs. China is likely to be initially reluctant to work with the U.S. on any efforts to coerce African countries to conform to a Western-centric global strategy. Concerns about the subjugation of their own interests, as well as any precedent such cooperation would set regarding a code of conduct for nations that China enjoys close relationships with, are sure to dominate Beijings thinking on these issues. The Chinese remain wary that their cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue might encourage Washington to seek to use their leverage on Sudan, Libya, Syria and Iran, without tangible benets on the table for Beijing. U.S. assertions that Chinas effort to defuse the North Korean crisis is in their best interest might not translate as easily to problems in Africa. Drew Thompson is a researcher at the Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. Thompson lived and worked in Beijing, Nanjing and Shanghai for 7 years in the 1990s, and studied at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center in 1992. ***

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Challenges to the Sino-Russian Relationship
By Matthew Oresman Now that the Sino-Russian diplomatic season celebrating 55 years of formal relations comes to a close, an opportunity exists to reassess the fundamentals of this dynamic and challenging relationship. After viewing Russian President Vladimir Putins summit with his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao in Beijing last month, the visits of Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice-Premier Wu Yi to Moscow in September, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Head of Government meeting, it is clear that despite 55 years of interaction, it is Russia and Chinas perceived national selfinterest that increasingly drives all aspects of their relations. And more and more, these national goals contradict one another, forcing the pair to make tough decisions. In the coming years, China and Russia will face serious dilemmas that will test the strength of their so-called strategic partnership and could expose underlying rifts between the two. By understanding China and Russias basic needs, we can more accurately predict how this relationship will evolve in the short-term and what choices and factors will most affect the ties between these two global powers. Chinas Needs China has three basic needs it looks to Russia to ll, at least in part: military arms, energy supplies, and sources of trade. A more complicated need for international political support and leverage also exists. Chinas demand for military equipment comes from its ongoing drive to reform its military into a ghting force that can repel any threat to the mainland and to develop capabilities to conquer Taiwan (including succeeding against the possibility of U.S. defense of the island). Domestic Chinese military production, while improving, is still signicantly behind American, Russian, and European standards. Beijing looks to Russia to help increase its military power. On energy, China has become a major importer of oil and gas. Chinas projected oil demand in 2015 will be 7.4 million bb/d (up from 3.4 million bb/ d is 2002), about half of which will need to be imported. Russia, with the potential to export up to 20-30 million tones a years from its elds in Siberia, provides an attractive source for Chinese imports, a source with which the United States will unlikely be able to interfere. Lastly, China is continuously looking for new investment opportunities and foreign markets to further fuel its rapid economic growth. Russia, with its still developing economy, untapped natural

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resources, and open, unpopulated Western region, offers alluring opportunities for increased Sino-Russian trade and investment. On these basic needs, China has not been provided with all it has desired. While Russia has been relatively generous with the arms it has sold to China, including most recently the delivery of two Kilo-class submarines for the Chinese navy, shortfalls, at least from Chinas perspective, still exist. Russia has stopped short of providing material that is specically designed to alter the balance of power between Chinese and American forces, such as the Granit anti-ship missile, which is specically designed to sink U.S. aircraft carriers. Disputes over manufacturing licensing agreements and Chinese access to Russian proprietary technology have also created tension. But it is Chinese energy demands that are currently the most pressing trouble in the relationship especially the disruption in service created by Yukoss ongoing legal troubles. However, Russian Deputy Transport Minister Alexander Misharin announced on September 12 that Russia will guarantee uninterrupted export by rail, pledging to deliver 10 million tones in 2005, and possibly 15 million tones in 2006. In the short term, though, China is being required to cover the cost of this export. More urgent is the ongoing dispute over the nal destination of the pipeline exporting Siberian oil from Angarsk. Despite numerous agreements between the Russian and Chinese governments, and a signed deal between China and Yukos, Russia seems poised to change the export destination of this oil to its port of Nakhodka. This change will allow Japan to gain access ahead of China. While the Nakhodka option is much more economically efcient for Russia, especially given Japans pledge to fund the total construction of the pipeline and future exploration for additional Siberian resources, Moscow is faced with an excruciating choice. It knows that no matter what it decides, it will anger either Japan or China. While it seems inevitable that Moscow will choose to export to Nakhodka, Russia has taken several steps to try to soften the blow to China, pledging to later build a branch from the Nakhodka pipeline to Daqing in China (assuming there is enough oil available at Angarsk). Meanwhile, Russia is helping China ll its nuclear power shortfall, most actively at the Tianwan nuclear plant, and it has even been suggested that Russia may attempt to ll the Chinese-Kazakh pipeline with Russian oil and gas, though this comes with certain geopolitical risks. Chinas goal of engaging with Russia to provide continued economic opportunities for Chinese entrepreneurs has recently met with more success. Russias politically

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motivated fears of mass Chinese migration to Russias Far East have given way to a practical understanding that Russia needs Chinese labor. Recently, it was announced that Maritime Krays long-term development program envisions attracting as many as 500,000 Chinese workers by 2010 (up from 15,000 now). This is a dramatic change from the days of the yellow peril in the early 1990s. Additionally, Chinese-Russian bilateral volume trade is expected to reach $60 billion by 2008, up from $20 billion this year. Following the October Summit, China is planning to invest $12 billion in the Russian economy. However, President Putin has demanded this investment be in Russias emerging technology center and not in the natural resource sector, effectively crushing Chinas expressed interest in purchasing Yuganskneftegaz, the main production subsidiary of Yukos. Related to this, China and Russia have mutually recognized each others market economy status, and negotiations have been completed for Chinas approval of Russias WTO membership. Russias Needs Russias central need from China is money. While there is a similar demand for international political support and leverage, it is the Russian economys demand for continued investment that drives much of the relationship. This need is consistently met by Chinese military purchases and the export of oil. From 1990 to 2001, China bought over $10 billion worth of military equipment. This number has continued to grow in the last several years. Furthermore, Chinese energy purchases have made up a signicant portion of annual turnover. These two areas, arms and oil, make up the vast majority of Chinese-Russian trade, with the sale of normal market goods making up only a small fraction. Furthermore, Russia will gain in both its trade relationship with China and with the rest of the world when it eventually joins the WTO; a goal that is more likely now given Chinas recent support. While this support has cost Russia, especially in the area of a more lenient visa regime, Moscow is still in a very enviable position. In pure money versus material calculations, it seems that China needs Russia more than Russia needs China. While Russia needs Chinese investment to keep its arms industry alive, China has no alternative but to buy from the Russians (as long as Europe and the United States maintain their embargo). Without Russian arms, Chinas national security is in serious peril. Similarly, Chinese energy demand drives its thirst for Russian resources. However, in a global market, Russia has no problem nding buyers for its oil. China, though, does have a serious problem nding and securing sources of energy. This purely material calculation is overly

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simplistic, though. For a true understanding of Russia and Chinas position vis--vis each other, one mush consider the much more complicated calculation of each nations need for political support and leverage. International Political Support Mutual international support between China and Russia has been a key component of their relationship for most of the last 55 years. In Chinas post-Tiananmen international isolation, Russia was Beijings only true friend. The two have continuously sought to support each other in the international arena on important matters, and have equally sought to nd common positions on the major international issues of the day. This support, and the perceived harmony in Sino-Russian thinking, has been an effective bargaining tool for each in its dealing with the West. By and large, this mutual support has created signicant goodwill between China and Russia, and has helped advance their specic national interests. This has included Russias support for Chinas Taiwan and Xinjiang policies, Chinas support for Russias incursion into Chechnya, and their common positions on North Korea and Irans possible nuclear development. However, in recent years, this aspect of the relationship has suffered several setbacks. Chief among these is disagreement over the response to Americas proposed missile defense system. While both initially protested the development of this system and the abrogation of the ABM treaty, China was left standing alone against the U.S. after Russia realized that it was not threatened by the system and could gain more in international political capital by not openly opposing it. Many Chinese leaders and scholars have reported feeling rejected and hurt by Russias move, and it became a signicant event symbolizing the changing calculus in Sino-Russian relations. The two would increasingly make choices that best served their own interests, and continuously sacrice the more ethereal elements of the relationship. This trend has been played out in the negotiations over WTO entry, direction of energy exports, and sophisticated arms sales. Similarly, several issues related to the development of Chinas relationship with Central Asia could further weaken the international political support given to one another. China and Russia jointly founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (and its predecessor, the Shanghai Five), as, among other things, a mechanism by which China could engage in the region. While the SCO promotes Chinas entry into Central Asia, one theory is that the SCO is a way by which Moscow can contain Chinas Central Asian

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engagement. This idea has gained support recently, as made evident by Russias rejection of Chinas proposal at the Heads of Government meeting to speed up region wide economic integration. According to RIA Novosti, an unnamed Russian ofcial stated that, We turned down the proposal in mild terms as it was clearly aimed at inltrating many of our markets. Furthermore, Russia has stepped up its own bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Central Asian states: beeng up its forces in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and becoming a full member of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization. All this paints a picture of Russia becoming increasingly worried about China in Central Asia and not interested in offering the kind of support China would like. However, this dynamic is still evolving and it is unclear how Moscow will react to Chinas ongoing encroachment into Russias back yard. What is clear, though, is that China and Russias mutual political support is increasingly guided by one or the others relationship with the United States, and, to a lesser degree, Europe. Nixons brilliant calculation that Russia and China fundamentally face away from each other still holds true today. Russia sees its future in the development of ties to Europe and the West, while China focuses intensely on its place in Asia. In pragmatic terms, when China realizes it can gain more from America by abandoning a common position it holds with Russia, it will do so. And Russia will do the same concerning a Chinese potion. Conversely, when the two realize that they will achieve the most through a joint position, they will stand against the United States. This was evident last year when Russia attempted to stand in the way of Americas invasion of Iraq, until the United States promised to honor Russias existing oil contracts. China, on the other hand, remained quiet, and seems to have won American approval to retain control over its small Iraqi elds. On the other hand, Russia and China have united in a common bargaining position regarding North Korea as a way to push the United States to a negotiated settlement of the conict. The open question, though, is will China and Russia be there for each other when it counts? Moscow and Beijing would like to think so, but if the dispute involves the United States, it is doubtful that either will support the other over their own national interest. This question increasingly plagues the Sino-Russian relationship and challenges the supposed strong foundation on which it is based. Only time will tell if this marriage of convenience can make it to a diamond anniversary. Matthew Oresman is the Director of the China-Eurasia Forum (CEF) and Editor of the CEF Quarterly. Information about the CEF can be found at www.chinaeurasia.org. ***

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The Qian Qichen Op-ed: Ofcial Discontent or Just one Mans Opinion?
By Harvey Stockwin In one of his farewell interviews with the televised Wall Street Journal Report, retiring Secretary of State Colin Powell once again made the claim that Sino-American relations are now in their best state in three decades. The Report ironically illustrated the interview with shots of Powell conferring with former Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, apparently unaware that Qian had just done his best to demolish Powells claim in two publications owned by the Chinese Communist Party. On November 1st, the op-ed page of the China Daily carried a major article entitled U.S. Strategy to Be Blamed, placed under a cartoon of a Republican Elephant and a Democratic Donkey struggling towards a distant White House. As the title implied, the article was a highly critical assessment of the United States role in international affairs. Had it been written by a Chinese academic, it would have attracted attention only by virtue of its timing, coming right on the eve of polling in the U.S. but the bye-line attached to the article was that of Qian Qichen, one of the Chinese Communist Partys (CCP) recognized experts on international relations. The episode was the more puzzling because it arose just as Chinese academic commentators on Sino-Americans relations were welcoming the fact that there had been no China-bashing during this current U.S. presidential election. China has never been a positive factor in American politics, wrote Professor Fan Gang of Beijing University, from Chinas perspective the less it is mentioned in this election season, the better. Professor Fan suggested that the lack of China-bashing by Kerry and Bush may indicate that Americas political elite is facing up to the new realities, and adjusting its view of China accordingly. So it is strange that Beijing itself reminded the U.S. political elite of old and enduring communist realities by launching a strong verbal attack on the Bush Administration. The article was a forthright rendition of the calculations and ambitions, fears and tensions, which customarily underlie the CCPs view of the world, and with which any regular reader of Chinese propaganda is familiar. Besides its timing, the article attracted additional attention by virtue of its stridently anti-American tone and its well-placed author. As

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Foreign Minister in the post-1989 period, Qian maneuvered skillfully to try and win back Chinas international prestige in the aftermath of the 1989 Beijing Massacre. Later, as Vice Premier, Qian continued to direct foreign relations after he ceased to be Foreign Minister. While he has retired from ofce, along with the rest of the third generation of CCP leaders, it is certain that he remains highly inuential in foreign affairs, and is therefore capable of delivering an election-eve attack on the Bush Administration in the English-language newspaper owned and published by the CCP. Reecting traditional Chinese fears of encirclement, Qian suggested that, under the Bush Doctrine the U.S. has tightened its control of the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia, and that Washingtons anti-terror campaign has already gone beyond the scope of self-defense. On the Bush Administrations motivation, Qian was blunt: The U.S. has not changed its Cold War mentalityThe philosophy of the Bush Doctrine is, in essence, force. It advocates the United States should rule over the whole world with overwhelming force, military force in particular. Nor was Qian sparing in his criticism of the Iraq War: the United States did win a war in the military dimension but it is far from winning the peace Washington has opened a Pandoras Box, intensifying various intermingled conicts such as ethnic and religious onesThe Iraq War has made the U.S. even more unpopular in the international community than its war in Vietnam The Iraq War was an optional war, not a necessary one He suggested the Iraq War should help end the trans-Atlantic alliance since the rift between the U.S. and its traditional European allies has never been so wide. It is now time to give up the illusion that Europeans and Americans are living in the same world, as some Europeans would like to believe. Moreover, Qian takes a distinctly negative view of the socalled war on terror: The pre-emptive strategy will bring the Bush Administration an outcome that it is most unwilling to see, that is, absolute insecurity of the American Empire and its demise because of expansion it cannot cope with The Iraq War has destroyed the hard-won global anti-terror coalitionMounting hostile sentiments among the Muslim world towards the United States, following the war, have already helped the al-Qaeda terrorist network recruit more followers and suicide martyrs. Instead of dropping, the number of terrorist activities throughout the world is now on the increase. Qians view of the U.S. is equally bleak: The current U.S. predicament in Iraq serves as another example that when a countrys superiority psychology inates beyond its real

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capability, a lot of trouble can be caused. But the troubles and disasters the United States has met do not stem from threats by others, but from its own cocksureness and arrogance. The 21st Century is not the American Century. That does not mean that the U.S. does not want the dream. Rather, it is incapable of realizing the goal. Obviously, none of Qians comments would be welcome in the White House. The sensation was not merely what Qian said, but the fact that he said it. Retired ranking CCP leaders remain subject to party discipline, and do not slip into the role of free lance journalists, as retired politicians sometimes do in Western democracies. The China Daily is very much part of the communist system, and of the still strictly-controlled press. So any editor in the China Daily would automatically know that an article strongly critical of the United States on the eve of the American election could only appear after some high ofcial approved it. Ofcial approval was further suggested when Qians article, apart from appearing on all website editions of the China Daily, also appeared, in full, on the Peoples Daily English-language website. Chinese ofcialdom was quick to produce excuses once Qians controversial comments drew adverse headlines abroad. The Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue insisted that Qian Qichen had not been interviewed by, nor had he written any article for, the China Daily. But Zhang did not deny that Qian had actually made the comments the article contained. Asked to explain how the article appeared, she said that the Chinese side would look into the situation. So far, no further report has been released nor is it likely to be. It has been suggested that Qian originally made the remarks in a lecture at the CCP Central Party School, and that the lecture was then reported in the party schools newspaper, the Study Times. The China Daily is said to have then translated and published that article. However, this explanation fails to resolve how any editor of the China Daily or Peoples Daily would publish such a controversial article at such a sensitive time when the party line is that Sino-American relations are generally improving, without rst getting permission from very high in the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy. If such permission was given, what was the motive? Chinawatchers are still seeking a convincing explanation for this discordant message. Was the Beijing leadership, or some faction within it, making a very late, and certainly ill-timed, bet on John F. Kerry becoming President of the United States? Since much of what Qian had to say was related to the criticisms Senator Kerry had been making on the campaign trail, it could have been a crude attempt to

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curry favor with the next U.S. Administration in which case it has backred. Or was there a more devious political motivation at work? Was the article an extremely devious Chinese effort to see that Bush was re-elected? Another possibility is that deliberately defective diplomacy may have been attempted, possibly by a high-ranking Jiang Zemin protg, with the specic aim of embarrassing the Hu Jintao administration. Alternatively, it was conceivably an attempt by a Hu Jintao ally to discredit Jiang Zemin. But unquestionably Qian was either expressing a CCP majority view which he himself nurtures, or at least the opinions of an inuential minority. While Chinese ofcials dismissed the article as the work of a retired ofcial, the signicance of Qians comments was underlined by the speedy disappearance of the article from the Internet archives of the China Daily and Peoples Daily. We may never know who ordered Qians trenchant words to be published. As it undertook hasty damage-control, Beijing must have been hoping that the Bush Administration would fail to notice what the article strongly suggests a growing alienation in Sino-American relations. Interviewed by the Financial Times on November 8th, Colin Powell said he accepted Chinese protestations that Qian Qichens remarks did not reect ofcial policy. This, however, hardly resolves the matter. Harvey Stockwin has been reporting Asian politics and international relations since 1955 and has been Chinawatching from his base in Hong Kong since 1978.

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