HAGADDAH AND HALACHAH IN THE WRITINGS OF MAX KADUSHIN

Carl Kinbar In Kesher, Issue 14 (Winter 2002). Pages 87-105 In his article on The Rabbinic View of God: A Contrast to the Rambam,1 John Fisher writes that when we employ the terms of classical philosophy even in an attempt to clarify rabbinic ideas, we are no longer within the rabbinic universe of discourse.2 Dr. Fisher has openly taken his cue from Max Kadushin, a Twentieth Century Jewish scholar of Rabbinic Judaism, whom he quotes profusely. In this article, I highlight some essential aspects of Kaddushins analysis of Rabbinic thought. How do articles like these find a place in a Messianic Jewish journal such as Kesher? Our movement has much to learn from Judaism and Jewish scholarship. We should not read such texts uncritically, of course. But we may find, on deeper analysis, that some of the same or similar - currents of thought, as well as the struggle between competing worldviews, are found in our Messianic Judaism. When Max Kadushin began to study Seder Eliahu, a collection of midrashim3 of uncertain dating4, he sought to find and explain what other, well known scholars had failed to discover an

John Fischer, The Rabbinic View of God: A Contrast to the Rambam Kesher 13 (Summer 2001) 82-96 2 Ibid. 95 This Rabbinic universe of discourse is illustrated primarily in the texts of the first six centuries of the Common Era. 3 In this paper I assume a general knowledge of Rabbinics including basic terms such as midrash, Haggadah, and Halachah, items such as the names of scholars, and dating, such as 200 CE as the commonly agreed date for the editing of the Mishnah. Terms coined by Kadushin will be explained. However, Kadushin was a bit erratic in his spelling of Hebrew terms and occasionally in the names of the terms he coined. For the sake of simplicity and readability, I will regularize 1

overarching logic or system in Rabbinic thought. He was impelled forward by a deep inner assurance one might even say an instinctual conviction that there must be an inner coherence to Rabbinic thought and to the corpus of texts in which that thought is embodied Rabbinic literature from the Mishnah to the Talmud Bavli. As he puts it, We ought not to reconcile ourselves to accepting Rabbinic theology as a congeries of ideas unrelated to each other, an inarticulate mass of separate concepts.5 Kaddushin describes his initial experiences: With the warnings of Schechter and Moore to deter me, I nevertheless attempted for a time to cast the Rabbinic concepts in the Seder into some sort of logical order. All this work was, of course, fruitless. At the last, however, a careful analysis yielded the conviction that this Midrash does possess coherence, but of an entirely different kind from that produced by logical, systematic thought. I have called the type of thinking which, it seems to me, characterizes Rabbinic theology, organic thinking.6 In Kadushins subsequent books, which focused on specific Rabbinic works, overall Rabbinic thought, and application in the realm of worship and ethics, he undertook to elaborate the basic findings first published in his study of Seder Eliahu. The purpose of this article is to describe the organic thinking that Kadushin discovered and elucidated, in particular as it relates to the comparison and contrast between Haggadah and Halachah.

the spelling and terminology in this paper, including passages quoted by Kadushin. The terms for the value concepts will be given in English. 4 In Organic Thinking, pp. 4-5 Kadushin discusses the various perspectives on dating this document. He favors Louis Ginzbergs proposition that portions of the document are early (perhaps even Tannaitic), while may be post-Talmudic. 5 Theology of Seder Eliahu, p. v 6 Ibid. 2

The Nature of Rabbinic Thought

Kadushin identifies four fundamental concepts in Rabbinic theology; each expressed by a conceptual term Gods Loving-kindness, Justice, Torah, and Israel.7 He repeatedly emphasizes that these four are fundamental not because they are more important than other concepts, but because they are organizing principles to which all other concepts are connected in relationships, like interconnected family trees. He sees other concepts such as Truth, Saving Life, Fear of Heaven, or Repentance as equally essential to the Rabbinic worldview. Rabbinic concepts are not like articles of a creed, some of which have a position of primary importance while others are relegated to secondary rank. All Rabbinic concepts are of equal importance, for the pattern would not have the same character were a single concept missing. We have, however, called [these four] fundamental concepts because all the Rabbinic concepts are built, woven rather, out of these four.8 Each of the four fundamental concepts has a number of related sub-concepts.9 For example, the fundamental concept of Torah [includes] the sub-concepts of the Study of Torah, Commandments, Good Deeds, and Ethics [Derek Erez], the latter also having its own subconcepts of Charity and Deeds of Loving-kindness and such ethical matters as humility, honesty, reverence and the like10 All of this, and all that follows, is specific to Israel as a people, whose violations of Torah come under Gods Judgement, a sub-concept of Justice. Gods

7 8

I will systematically present Rabbinic concepts in capitalized English words Organic Thinking, p. 6-7 9 Although each is identified by a concrete conceptual term (such as Torah or Commandments), the fundamental concepts and sub-concepts appear in Rabbinic writings even when the terms themselves are not used. 10 The Rabbinic Mind, p. 15 3

Loving-kindness includes Providence His care for individuals Mercy, and Atonement, which temper Judgement and Justice.11 The fundamental concepts and all their sub-concepts intertwine with one another to form the whole of the Rabbinic value-complex. This inner coherence of Rabbinic thought is unveiled only after a careful examination of the whole system.12 As an example of this intertwining and coherence, let us survey the concept of the Sanctification of the Name. When Israel is ready to die as martyrs for the one God, Gods Name is made known, or sanctified, among the nations. In parallel, Israel takes upon itself the Yoke of Gods Sovereignty by the Recitation of the Shema. Thus, both the Sanctification of the Name and the Recitation of the Shema are declarations the first is an objective declaration to the nations, the second a subjective acknowledgment of God by individual or congregation. The same individuals who take the Yoke are the ones who are ready to Sanctify the Name. This is Israel. The unity of relationship among these concepts does not lie in an ordered logic, or even in the words involved (since the concepts can appear even when their names do not), but in the inner organic coherence of Rabbinic thought. Thus, we see the subtlety of Rabbinic thought as its concepts form organic relational patterns on the macro- and the micro-levels. These patterns and the overarching organic whole of Rabbinic thought are such that a full description of any one concept or sub-concept ultimately involves its relationship with all the other concepts, that is, with the entire conceptual system. 13 The meaning of any particular concept is a function of the entire complex of concepts as a whole.

11 12

Organic Thinking, p. 9-10 The Rabbinic Mind, p. 16 13 Organic Thinking, p. 11 4

If every Rabbinic concept depends for its meaning upon all the rest, then all the concepts together constitute an organic whole.14 Not only is each element of the organic complex fully defined only in terms of the entire system, but also every concept is vital to the system as a whole. None is more important or crucial than any other. Rabbinic thought is organic, not hierarchical. The concepts are related like the organs of a body. And yet, even more than in a physical organism, the removal of even a single concept at any level would damage the very integrity and nature of the whole organism.15 To remove one concept would be to change the whole and to distort the meaning of every other concept. Because all the concepts are part of one organic whole, each may be seen in combination with a variety of other concepts. This can give rise to understandings that appear to contradict one another. For example, at one time the Rabbis declare that because God loves the scholars devotion to Torah He deliberately withholds from him wealth which would distract him from study, and at another time they affirm that wealth is the reward of those who study Torah. The first statement combines Torah with the concept of Gods Loving-kindness; the second, Torah with the concept of Gods Justice.16 These kinds of combinations and apparent contradictions can be seen at every conceptual level. Organic thought allows for such divergence without losing its essential unity. It is this flexibility that both empowered and encompassed great individuality of expression during the

14

Worship and Ethics, p. 4. Kadushins result, repeated in all of his books, is that the concepts combine or interweave with every value-concept of the Rabbinic complex of concepts. The upshot is that we can never know what anything means in general, because all language is specific in its setting (Neusner, Forward: The Inquiry of Max Kadushin, in Understanding the Rabbinic Mind, p. xii-xiii) 15 The Rabbinic Mind p. 22-25 16 Organic Thinking, p. 13 5

Rabbinic period the houses of Hillel and Shammai, Akiba and Ishmael, the various authors of the haggadic and halakhic midrashim. Fluid yet unified, the organic complex gives room for differences in temperament among individuals, even for different moods in the same individual, for the stressing of different concepts in different historical periods17 It is the organic coherence, not hard-and-fast logical consistency, that permits the development and expression of individuality.18 And yet, organic thought works not against, but alongside, logical thinking. In fact, both are necessary for the full coherence and expression of human thought.19 The only cause for friction between organic and logical thinking arises from the attempt to bend organic concepts to a rigid logical consistency. What factor or factors allow the concepts to interweave and cohere? Kadushin asserts that, the Rabbinic concepts are, in every instance, rooted in the Bible; there are biblical antecedents for every Rabbinic concept,20 although the actual terms (such as the recitation of the Shema) are not always found there. However, the Rabbinic concepts have often developed beyond their biblical antecedents, taking on a broader application and significance. Compare, for example, the manifold concretizations of the Sanctification of the Name [in Rabbinic literature] with its biblical antecedent in Leviticus 22:32.21 The world of Rabbinic thought developed from the Bible not so much as individual and discreet concepts but as a whole, as an organism. It is as if we leave the Second Temple period when the Bible was being assembled and enter a tunnel. When we emerge in the Rabbinic period, we see the Biblically-rooted order
17

Organic Thinking, p. 14. Kadushin explains how the organic nature of the rabbinic valuecomplex allowed for its diverse and creative expression. But he gives us no tools for dealing with the obviously distinct conceptual characteristics of various rabbinic texts what, for example, accounts for the conceptual and methodological difference between the Mishnah and the Bavli? 18 Organic Thinking, p. 14 19 Organic Thinking, p. 14 20 Commentary on Leviticus Rabba p. xi 21 Commentary on Leviticus Rabba p. xii 6

developed into a distinct conceptual universe that can be identified as Rabbinic thought, the product of the Rabbinic mind. How does the Rabbinic mind reveal itself? Kadushin sees Rabbinic thought as ready to spring into action at every opportunity. It is concretized, and expressed as fully as possible, wherever it finds an opening. The organism is ready to express itself textually when triggered by any narrative, event, or situation in the Bible that touches on its interests.22 Because of its highly laconic style, the Bible is an ideal catalyst for the expression of Rabbinic thought. What the Biblical narrative leaves to the imagination, the Rabbinic mind sees as an opportunity for elaboration. The various concepts and sub-concepts are then applied in their permutations and combinations. Genesis Rabbah 106:7, concerning the narrative of the Akeidah, is one such passage: And the angel of the Lord called to him out of heaven, and said, Abraham, Abraham. (Genesis 22:11) R. Hiyya taught: This is an expression of love and encouragement. R. Liezer said, [The repetition of Abrahams name indicates that he spoke both] to him and to future generations. There is no generation that does not contain men like Abraham. And there is no generation which does not contain men like Jacob, Moses, and Samuel... And he said: Lay not your hand upon the young man, etc. (22:12). Where was the knife? Tears had fallen from the angels upon it and dissolved it. Then I will strangle him, [Abraham] said to him. Lay not your hand upon the young man. was the reply. Let us bring forth a drop of blood from him, he pleaded. Neither do anything to him, he answered. Inflict no blemish upon him, for now I know I have made it known to all that you love me, and you have not withheld, etc. And do not say that all ills that do not affect one's own person are not ill. For indeed I ascribe merit to you as though I had bidden you sacrifice yourself and you had not refused. Thus, this one brief slice of narrative simultaneously expresses Gods Lovingkindness, Israel, the Love of God, and Atonement.

22

Worship and Ethics p. 5 7

The same verse may also be used repeatedly, with emphasis by different authors or even the same author at different times on different concepts. A verse, the same verse, can be used over and over again in haggadic interpretations, each of them independent of the others, and thus a feature of haggadic interpretation is multiple interpretation of biblical texts.23 God tested Abraham in order to exalt him, that his Justice might be known in the world. 24 God tested Abraham in order to improve him,25 expressing Gods Loving-kindness, or in order to vindicate Abrahams utter devotion to God,26 expressing the Love of God and a unique instance of the Sanctification of the Name. How can these various interpretations co-exist in the Rabbinic mind? It is not a matter of constructing a meta-narrative that will account for divergence. Rather, Kadushin uncovers an aspect of Rabbinic thought that he calls indeterminacy of belief, a qualified or modified belief that exists within the rabbinic value-complex,27 ready to give credence to diverse and even apparently conflicting narrative, or to interpretations that conflict with the plain sense of a Biblical passage. How the Rabbinic mind attained this elasticity of belief we do not know. But as long as the competing story or interpretation falls within the orbit of the Rabbinic valuecomplex, it is given a credence that coexists comfortably with divergent statements. Neither can we easily enter into this way of thinking. Yet it does seem to be the only way of explaining the ability of the Rabbinic mind to encompass what are for us clearly conflicting and contradictory narratives.

23 24

Approach to the Mekilta p. 21 Genesis Rabbah 106:1 25 Genesis Rabbah 106:2 26 Genesis Rabbah 106:4 27 The Rabbinic Mind 135 8

Although the body of Kadushins work delves into additional aspects of, and perspectives on, the coherence and subtlety of Rabbinic thought,28 we will now focus on the place of Haggadah and Halachah as expressions of the Rabbinic mind.

Haggadah and Halachah

Haggadah and Halachah two seemingly disparate literary forms are intimately related not because they share a number of common attributes or even, in some cases, common authorship, but because of their common possession and embodiment of the same organic web of Rabbinic concepts.29 Although there are genuine distinctions between the two, their fundamental connection in the conceptual realm allows haggadic and halakhic expressions and interpretations to be juxtaposed and interwoven in some Rabbinic texts.30 Thus, in a typical development from Biblical to Rabbinic thought, the word ger (as in Exodus 12:49) is understood to refer not to the stranger but to the Proselyte. Since they express the same Rabbinic concepts, there is no marked rift between haggadic stories and halakhic rulings about Proselytes.31 Haggadah and Halachah are two complementary expressions of Rabbinic thought. They differ in many respects. And yet they also work together to express the organic network of Rabbinic value-concepts and to ensure that these concepts are incarnated in the lives of the Jewish people. Virtually every haggadic story full-blown or as brief as a line or two expresses the organic character of Rabbinic thought by embodying a number of Rabbinic concepts in a single

28

See especially The Rabbinic Mind p. 15-54, in which he discusses conceptual phases and auxiliary ideas, such as Immanence and Transcendence 29 See Worship and Ethics, 9 and 148f 30 Approach to the Mekilta, 22 31 Approach to the Mekilta, 22 9

narrative. Each story is unified because the concepts are woven together, apparently without effort, into a seamless whole.32 According to the Rabbis, for example, Jonah thought: I will go outside the Land [of Israel], where the Shekinah does not reveal itself, for since the Gentiles [the men of Nineveh are more inclined to repent, I might be causing Israel to be condemned [by contrast].33 Woven into this one statement are the concepts of Gilluy Shekinah (Revelation of God), Israel, Gentiles, and Repentance.34 There is no sense of artificial construction undertaken to relate these concepts. (See the discussion of Genesis Rabbah 106:7 above.) Not only is each haggadic story a unified reflection of the organic nature of Rabbinic thought, but each haggadic story is complete in itself, an independent entity Even in those instances in which haggadic stories are connected to others, they are connected only through the association of ideas,35 collected and joined in literary forms that most likely stem from haggadic-style preaching, in which stories were strung together on a common theme. 36 Despite these larger literary forms found in the midrash collections, each story or statement is an entity in itself, freestanding and organically whole. Unlike Haggadah, Halachah is not composed of independent entities. The meaning of Halachah is not expressed in discrete units. Rather, there is a connecting bond that unites the halakhic material in Rabbinic literature. Kadushin calls this innate property of Halachah a nexus between the laws,37 a nexus which becomes increasingly explicit as a result of logical processes. Classification is one such process. The interrelations inherent in the halakhic nexus permit the laws to be classified by subject matter matters dealing with impurity in one order, festivals in
32 33

Approach to the Mekilta, 17, 19 Mekhilta, Tractate Piskha Aleph 34 Approach to the Mekilta, 19 35 Approach to the Mekilta, 17 36 The Rabbinic Mind, 62 37 The Rabbinic Mind, 93 10

another, damages in still another, and so on. The process of halakhic classification reveals the relatedness of the laws in any one order and among the orders. The Mishnah, which is the first product of Rabbinic classification, made the nexus partially explicit.38 It was made more fully explicit in the Talmud where the use of highly subtle inferential reasoning exposes the relatedness among laws belonging to different classifications or orders.39 It is elicited in a discussion, for example, that an identical principle underlies both a law concerning acquisition and a law in an entirely different classification concerning the prohibited mixture of animals.40 Despite the process of classification and inferential reasoning, Halachah also possesses characteristics of organic thought. An act governed by Halakah is able to concretize a number of value concepts simultaneously, particularly in acts of worship.41 The recitation of the Shema, for example, expresses at least three key, interlocking valueconcepts the Kingdom of Heaven, Commandments, and the Study of Torah.42 Acceptance of the Kingdom of Heaven (or Kingship of God) takes place when reciting the first verse of the first section (Deut 6:4-11): Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One, a declaration that also implies the rejection of idolatry. Acceptance of the yoke of the Commandments takes place

38 39

Approach to the Mekilta, 23 Approach to the Mekilta, 23-24. Although Kadushin mentions the increasing elaboration of the nexus of Halachah from Mishnah to Talmud, he does not account for increased halakhic rigidity or for the suppression (in practice though not in literary preservation) of divergent halakhic views as we move through the rabbinic period. In other words, why did Halachah became less and less organic as we move from through the period? 40 Approach to the Mekilta, 24; see also The Rabbinic Mind, 91-93; also the nexus was later elaborated more fully, its development can be seen in the process leading up to the final editing of the Mishnah see Judaism: The Mishnah, especially chapters 1 through 4 41 Worship and Ethics, 11 42 Worship and Ethics, 11-12 11

when reciting the first verse of the second section (Deut 11:13-21): And it shall come to pass if ye shall hearken diligently unto my commandments which I command you this day. In the sequence of these passages, R. Joshua b. Korhah sees a logical relationship: so that a person shall first accept upon himself the yoke of the Kingship of Heaven, and after that accept upon himself the yoke of Commandments.43 The sequence of recitation reflects a sequence in the very nature of things. Yet according R. Simeon b. Yohai, the sequence of these passages in the Shema is due to another series of commitments to learn Torah, to teach it, and to practice it.44 The commitments expressed in the Shema are logically coherent and its recitation, shaped by Halachah, is thus a unified act that simultaneously expresses a number of value-concepts.45 In the area of Biblical interpretation we also see both similarity and difference between Haggadah and Halachah. In Haggadah, a biblical phrase or verse may receive various interpretations, none of them considered more authoritative than the others.46 Because of the Rabbinic capacity for indeterminacy of belief (as explained above), they are not seen as being in conflict with one another. An example of this is found in Exodus Rabbah 27, which gives nine diverse interpretations of And Jethro... heard (Exodus18:1). Many of these interpretations result from seeing Jethro as the reference of texts in such diverse books as Psalms 145:18; Psalms 14:4; Proverbs 3:35; Jeremiah 16:19; Job 31:32; and Ecclesiastes 11:1. Within the chapter, there is no sense of tension between these interpretations.

43 44

Mishnah Berachot II.2 Sifre on Numbers 15:39 45 Worship and Ethics, 79 46 The Rabbinic Mind, 71 12

Moreover, Rabbinic texts confirm the equality of interpretations when they preface a statement by the term, another interpretation, as we read numerous times in the aforementioned chapter of Exodus Rabbah. Another interpretation can only mean that the preceding interpretations, as well as that about to be given, are each independent of the others [although related organically in thought] and that all are of the same rank. And this prefatory term is employed profusely throughout midrashic literature.47 Because there is no demand for consistency among the various interpretations of Scripture, even the same individual may offer more than one interpretation of a passage. For instance, in Genesis Rabbah 70:8, R. Hama bar Hanina presents six consecutive interpretations of Genesis 29:2-3.48 In Haggadah, the biblical text acts as stimulus to the resulting haggadic story. The haggadic imagination is given great play in explicating the biblical text and relating it to other texts. However, the haggadic understanding of a word, phrase, or incident must have some connection, even if quite slender, with the plain meaning of the text. Sometimes that connection is a mere play on words. And you shalt have a paddle among your weapons (azeneka) (Deuteronomy 23:14); read not azeneka but ozneka (your ears) if a man hears a thing that is not proper, let him put a finger in his ears.49 Often the lack of vowels in the written Hebrew text is a stimulus to such word play, resulting in this oft repeated Read not... but.... There are also halakhic interpretations that exhibit the midrashic characteristics of Haggadah, being related to biblical texts by nothing more than word play, bare sequence of words, or doubtful relationship with another text. However, it should be noted, it is for these very

47 48

The Rabbinic Mind, 72 The Rabbinic Mind, 72 49 Ketubot 5a-b in The Rabbinic Mind, 118 13

characteristics that objections are sometimes voiced to this type of interpretation serving Halachah. For example, when R. Eliezer employed a midrashic interpretation of Leviticus 13:47 in halakhic discourse, his colleague R. Ishmael exclaimed, You say to the verse, Keep silent until I interpret [you]! The root of his objection is that, in theory at least, Halachah should rest only on straightforward exegesis.50 Kadushin asserts that, in most cases, a slender connection between a biblical text and a Halachah is a good indicator that the Halachah in question was practiced before it was connected with the biblical text.51 Such is the derivation of the morning, afternoon, and evening prayers from verses in Genesis relating to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Another example are various biblical reasons given for the number of blessings in the Amidah, which number had already been established.52 The practices involved were long-standing, but the developing nexus of halakhic thought required a basis in Scripture, and so one (or more) had to be found. It was much less common to develop new Halachah using the looser methodology of Haggadah. But such practice was not unknown. The Mekilta is a work emanating from one school, that of R. Ishmael. Nevertheless, it contains numerous differences of opinion with regard to the derivation of laws, and a significant number of divergent opinions on actual matters of practice.53 Occasionally, two different halakhot are derived from the same verse, the second interpretation usually being prefaced with the words, another interpretation, the very term which introduces alternative haggadic interpretations of a verse.54

50 51

Sifra to Leviticus 13:47 in The Rabbinic Mind, 127 The Rabbinic Mind, 129 52 The Rabbinic Mind, 127 53 Approach to the Mekilta, 25 54 Approach to the Mekilta, 24-25 14

The Biblical text normally acts as a more straightforward catalyst to Halachah. Such is the case with verses dealing with the multitude of ethical, commercial, and ritual laws found in Torah, including those involving festivals and holy days. An example of this would be Mishnah Tractate Pesachim, which is largely an expanded, text-based response to Exodus 12:1-28, with some secondary amplification. 55 Halachah is not only stimulated by biblical texts. The Halakhic process is aroused and sustained by an impetus to use logical procedures such as inference, comparison, analogy, and argumentation to expand existing Halachah, beginning with its base in Scripture, to apply to every facet of life.56 Kadushin refers here to the development of the halakhic principle of agency. According to Torah, every man should take a lamb for his household for Passover (Ex 12:3). But this is modified in the very next verse: and if the household is too small for a lamb, then he and his neighbor shall take one according to the number of people (Ex 12:4). The commandment is for every man, and yet it is not necessary for each to take or buy a lamb for himself. It was thus deduced that a mans agent is like the man himself. This principle of agency, with its profound implications for commercial and family law, is not given explicitly in the Biblical text, but is legitimized by inferential reasoning.57 Whether a specific law was stimulated by a text or by the use of logical procedures, the organic elasticity of Rabbinic thought left ample room for differences of opinion in Halachah. The Mishnah is replete with halakhic controversy, much of it unresolved. In fact, the Mishnah

55

Pesachim as we know it simply restates and carries forward what is explicit in Scripture. Judaism: The Mishnah, 186 56 The Rabbinic Mind, 126; Approach to The Mekilta, 23 57 The Rabbinic Mind, 123-124 15

contains only six complete chapters in which no controversy is recorded. The halakhic midrashim show similar characteristics.58 The Mishnahs unresolved controversies do not relate only to matters of theory or abstract interpretation. They often reveal actual divergence in practice. Apparently, it was not only the right but also the responsibility of one authority to stand against the majority. For this reason, it is often the case that a single sage is able to hold to an opinion contrary to all of his colleagues. Kadushin quotes Louis Ginzberg: Hence we need not wonder at the many conflicts of opinion among the Rabbis from the days of Shammai and Hillel to the close of the Mishnah. Not only could each of the Rabbis differ from the majority when dealing with theoretical questions, but the individual authority could decide according to his own opinion without regard to the opinion of the majority in any specific case that came before him, outside of those matters already decided by The Great Court.59 Another aspect of Rabbinic thought that Kadushin observed was the powerful drive of the value-concepts toward expression. They could not be left abstract. Every Rabbinic valueconcept had a drive toward actualization or concretization60 in both words and in action. Haggadah, Kadushin asserts, is the most important product of the value-concepts drive toward concretization.61 The value-concepts were powerfully manifested in story form. The midrashim, the haggadic stories - either collected separately or interspersed with halakhic

58 59

Approach to the Mekilta, 24 Louis Ginzberg, A Commentary on the Palestinian Talmud, I, 82-83 quoted in The Rabbinic Mind, 95. Later, the differences and divergence were increasingly limited by the strong propensity of the Talmudic mind to demonstrate the utter unity and seamlessmness of Jewish law. 60 The Rabbinic Mind, 79 61 The Rabbinic Mind, 93 16

thought - expressed the value-concepts in ways that captured the imagination, making them vivid and powerful to the people at large.62 Haggadah brought to life both individual value-concepts and the totality of the Rabbinic matrix of value-concepts. It nurtured and cultivated them in the thought life of the people, without ever having to define its terms dictionary-style. Haggadah made the value-concepts vivid, and by means of sermons, nurtured and cultivated them.63 Haggadah is the textual or literary expression of the value complex. It concretized the valueconcepts and made them determinate in textual interpretation [and narrative.]64 By incisively expressing an interwoven fabric of Rabbinic concepts in simple, seamless stories, Haggadah was the clearest expression of the organic nature of Rabbinic thought.65 Halachah served an altogether different function. It prescribed concrete ways for the value-concepts to be incarnated in the fabric of daily life, beyond interpretation and story. It is one thing to read about the concept of visiting the sick (as in Genesis Rabbah 8:13, which depicts God visiting Abraham as he recovered from his circumcision). It is quite another to fulfill the Commandments by visiting a sick person oneself.66 Where Haggadah inculcated the value-concepts in the imagination of the people, Halachah nurtured and cultivated the value-concepts by embodying them in ritual, worship, and ethics.67 As Martin S. Jaffee puts it, in The Rabbinic Mind [Kadushin] attributed to the halakhic system a central role in transforming the ethical values of Judaism from potency to actuality, or from sentiments or traits of mind into concrete acts expressive of the organic system as a

62 63

The Rabbinic Mind, 89 The Rabbinic Mind, 89 64 Max Kadushin: Scholar, 344 65 Worship and Ethics, 9 66 Max Kadushin: Scholar, 345 67 The Rabbinic Mind, 89 17

whole.68 The concept of Charity, for example, was made concrete by the various agricultural regulations, including the tithes for the poor, peah (corner of the field), gleaning, and forgotten sheaves, as well as by the institutions of tamchuy (community place) and khuppah (community chest) and by the laws concerning personal charity.69 Lacking Halachah, the value-concepts, with their need for steady concretization in actual life, might not have functioned at all. However, Kadushin contends that Halachah was not simply a calculated, legalistic means of promoting the value-concepts. Unless we realize that they are concretizations of warmly felt values, we shall completely fail to apprehend [the inner significance of] such outward actions. For here we are dealing with the springs of human actions, in other words, with the self, wherein inner experience and outward action are hardly separable.70 Because of the strong internalization of the Rabbinic value-concepts, we should not be surprised that the system of halakhic norms did not exhaust the drive of the value-complex toward concretization in daily life. Halachah did not crowd out the possibility for spontaneous concretization. For example, the concept of Deeds of Loving-kindness includes not only required actions of Charity but also unconstrained deeds of love done beyond what is required by Torah.71 This halachic process of concretization is powerfully demonstrated in the dynamics of Jewish prayer. Halakah governs Rabbinic worship. It determines not only the occasions and the forms of the various acts of worship but the content of the acts as well.72 Halakhah gives

68 69

In Halakhic Personhood, Understanding the Rabbinic Mind, 96 The Rabbinic Mind, 79 70 The Rabbinic Mind, 80 71 The Rabbinic Mind, 80 72 Worship and Ethics, 9 18

regularity and steadiness to the drive toward concretization possessed by the concept of prayer, enlarges the scope of its expression, and supplies the means for its expression.73 It is due to Halachah that prayer is regular and steady rather than haphazard and random. It is Halachah that makes of every occasion on which a person eats or drinks a stimulus for prayer.74 It is Halachah that provokes prayer according to the time of day, the days of the week, the month, the Holy Days. And within all this prayer, the diversity of the organic complex of Rabbinic value-concepts is expressed with beauty and power. Returning to the recitation of the Shema it is because of the halakhic requirement to recite the Shema twice daily that its value-concepts of the Kingdom of God, Commandments, and the Study of Torah are guaranteed a consistent and lifelong embodiment. Even the inner motivational aspects of the recitation of the Shema are partly governed by Halachah.75 The recitation of the Shema requires Kavvanah, a term best expressed by such words as intention, devotion, and concentration. According to the opinion of R. Akiba,76 this Kavvanah is required for the entire first section of the Shema (Deut 6:4-11). The first verse, however, Hear, Oh Israel, which is the declaration of the Kingdom of God and the accepting of its yoke, is distinguished by special instructions with respect to Kavvanah.77 The last word of the declaration echad is to be lengthened in enunciation so as to allow enough time for one to make Him King above and below and in the four directions of heaven78
73

Kadushins account of the rabbinic value-concepts inherent drive toward concretization, especially in Halachah, does not adequately factor in such motivations as the desire fully to obey God and the striving for merit. It seems to me that these would also play a significant role in the drive toward concretization, toward an extensive, integrated, and definitive daily practice of Torah. 74 The Rabbinic Mind, 211 75 The Rabbinic Mind, 210 76 Berachot 13.a-b 77 The Rabbinic Mind, 213 78 Berachot 13b 19

Conclusion
How could such variety, diversity of interpretation, and strong controversy exist in Rabbinic Judaism without producing fissures between the parties concerned? Kadushin found that such disagreements, such divergent interpretations and halakhot, could be tolerated because all parties involved shared the same conceptual universe, the organic complex of rabbinic value-concepts. Biblical interpretation, Haggadah, and Halakhah could just as easily trend one way as another, as long as they stayed within the same complex of organic thought. As Messianic Jewish thought gels into a coherent world-view, we may find that it also is expressed within an organic conceptual universe. If that is so, then our discourse will show increasing signs of organic, rather than systematic, thinking. Perhaps our progress toward that goal would be enhanced by a deeper study not only of Kaddushin, but also of the Rabbinic texts whose organic nature he unveiled.

References Kadushin, Max. A Conceptual Approach to the Mekilta. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary, 1969. Kadushin, Max, A Conceptual Commentary on Midrash Leviticus Rabbah. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987. Kadushin, Max. Organic Thinking: A Study in Rabbinic Thought. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary, 1938. Kadushin, Max. The Rabbinic Mind. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary, 1965. Kadushin, Max. The Theology of Seder Eliahu: A Study in Organic Thinking. New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1932 Kadushin, Max. Worship and Ethics: A Study in Rabbinic Judaism. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964 Neusner, Jacob, Judaism: The Evidence of the Mishnah. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988. Ochs, Peter, ed. Understanding the Rabbinic Mind: Essays on the Hermeneutic of Max Kadushin. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990. Steinberg, Theodore. Max Kadushin: Scholar of Rabbinic Judaism. New York: New York University, 1979.

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