MISSING ITEMS PILOT RUN

Objectives
Determine the actual and potential causes of reported missing items. Propose actions to eliminate or mitigate the effect of these causes, looking for a reduction in missing items during the entire process. Identify where the devices are lost throughout.

Background
Missing items has become the second mechanical reject cause during current month.

For the same period, model 1035340 / 856561 (CSP5BT) has been the main contributor to total missing items.

Following chart shows the process behavior regarding missing items of the model mentioned above.

Scope
The experiment was designed to address missing items in C3 line and it does not consider the following: Material mix Special causes that result in out of control spikes. Impact of team presence on operators behavior.

Methodology
Plan and release a pilot run of model 1035340. Isolate this lot from other running on the floor. Perform a physical count of incoming and outgoing parts from each operation to the next. Record all incidences of missing items. Prepare each work center by cleaning all work areas and machines, and taking preventive measures to avoid parts from being lost inside the machines, fixtures, etc. Compare reported quantities in SAP vs. physical amounts.

Team
Walter Caldern Gerardo Chaves Gustavo Herra Camilo Jimnez Eduardo Sandoval Olman Sols

Results table

Results analysis
In operation 0300 we did not detect missing items. However we did see the operator skip one value (from 16) when adding up data from the reject control log form. As an immediate action, it should be mandatory to fill in the subtotal cells while an automated web entry form that calculates amounts of rejects is developed. As a permanent action to eliminate this potential source of missing items, functionality should be added to the 2D map software for recording rejects without operator intervention and allowing manual input of visual inspection rejects. Remarkable facts detected during operation 0550: 1. The operator reported 3 rejects less than the actual amount. A verification of actual vs. recorded quantities prior to sending the parts to TMTR will avoid this kind of mistakes. 2. Thirteen rejects were not timely reported. When the operation was re-opened to report them, the yield quantity on the next operation was not updated. This can lead to missing items. As an interim action, only group leaders should be allowed to perform corrections and they should be trained in the proper way to do it.

Furthermore, the system has to be modified so that it can verify automatically next closed operations whenever a correction is made and alert the user to correct them. At operation 0600 the actual quantity of parts and rejects were not verified against SAP prior to sending the lot to TMTR. A verification of actual vs. recorded quantities should be established at the end of this stage. In operation 0650, twenty six un-inked parts fell while de-taping inked devices, 6 fell while de-taping good devices and 6 fell while transferring devices from tray to ESD bag. Un-inked parts fallen during the de-taping are not being accounted for. As an immediate action, counting and recording fallen parts from de-taping operation using the appropriate reject code in SAP (Device fell off tape) will be required. As a permanent action, the native vision system should be installed to identify and segregate ink rejected devices. For parts fell during transfer, see actions stated in operation 0700. During operation 0700, four devices fell while being transferred from the ESD bags to the oven trays. To prevent this situation, parts will be handled inside metallic trays from de-

taping operation to TMTR testing, eliminating the intermediate transfer steps and minimizing the probability of loosing parts. In operation 0750 four devices were lost. The root cause was not identified. Also, another 19 fell from the baskets to the bottom of the bomb. These were picked up by the operator who put them back into a tray randomly selected. This action may cause material mix (eventually missing items) if more than one production order is being bombed simultaneously. Metallic trays mentioned in above operation will minimize the occurrence of these situations. During operation 0850, sixty three parts were found next to the bins inside the bin drawer. (56 devices were laser marked, 7 were not). Most of them jumped out of the AOQL bin during normal test. The AOQL bins on all machines were modified by process engineering to have a higher and softer bottom. However the current height allows parts to bounce off and fall out of the bin. As a corrective action the bottom of the AOQL bins of all machines will be lowered. In addition, a way to eliminate the gap that exists between the top of the bins and the ends of the tubes that carry the parts to them will be researched. Note: Thirteen devices were replaced from fallen group to the bowl feeder. Under current conditions (not experimental) these would have been reported as missing items, bringing the SAP number from 126 to 139.

Missing items composition

Conclusions
The main causes of missing items, within the scope of this experiment, are: - Missing items reported as such - Parts incorrectly reported as missing items The categories incorrectly reported as missing items are: - Ismeca handling - Parts that fell during de-tape of inked and not inked parts. - Transfer of parts between ESD bags and containers. - Reporting mistakes To correct the above it is necessary to properly classify the rejects instead of calling them missing items. Each of these rejects must be addressed by the following corrective actions: - Account for and record fallen parts using the appropriate reject code. - Implement Native Vision System to eliminate human intervention to segregate ink rejected devices. - Handle parts inside metallic trays throughout all TMTR operations. - Lower the AOQL bins floor and/or eliminate the gap that exists between the top of the bins and the ends of the tubes that carry the parts to them. To minimize the true missing items we have to: - Implement an error free system to totalize and report rejects at the flip chip operation. - Only group leaders should be allowed to perform corrections and they should be trained in the proper way to do it. Furthermore, the system has to be modified so that it can verify automatically next closed operations whenever a correction is made and alert the user to correct them. - Verify actual vs. recorded quantities prior to sending parts from array saw to TMTR. Within the scope of this experimentnot considering material mix or special causesthe implementation of corrective actions should let us accomplish an average of 0.5% of missing items. In order to address the potential effect of material mix a different DOE would need to be executed.