J Indian Philos (2010) 38:3948 DOI 10.

1007/s10781-009-9079-7

Facing the Boundaries of Epistemology: Kumarila on Error and Negative Cognition

Elisa Freschi

Published online: 18 November 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.2009

Abstract Kumarilas commitment to the explanation of cognitive experiences not conned to valid cognition alone, allows a detailed discussion of border-line cases (such as doubt and error) and the admittance of absent entities as separate instances of cognitive objects. Are such absent entities only the negative side of positive entities? Are they, hence, fully relative (since a cow could be said to be the absent side of a horse and vice versa)? Through the analysis of a debated passage of the Slokavarttika, the present article proposes a reconstruction of Kumarilas view of the relation between erroneous cognitions and cognitions of absence (abhava), and considers the philosophical problem of the ontological status of absence. Keywords Error Absence Negative cognition Indian Philosophy Mma msa Epistemology

Cognition of Absence According to the Bhattammamsa :: : Most Indian and Western thinkers consider judgments such as There is no x as presupposing their afrmative counterparts and interpret them through their allegedly equivalent afrmative version. Thus, there is no x in y is interpreted as stating something about y. More radically, non-x is maintained to be nothing but a linguistic expression.1 These solutions, however, are not viable for the Indian

[T]he questions whether there are negative facts [. . .] raise difculties. These niceties, however, are largely linguistic, so Russell (2009, p. 131). On the treatment of absence-judgements in Western and Indian philosophy, see the fundamental study of Arindam Chakrabarti (1997). E. Freschi (&) University Sapienza, Rome, Italy e-mail: elisa.freschi@gmail.com

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philosophical schools most committed to common sense realism, that is, Nyaya : Vaisesika and Mmamsa, which refute the reduction of commonly experienced facts : (such as the awareness there is no x in y) to something else (a quality of y). These schools also reject the existence of second-order attributions, and state that a quality cannot be further qualied. Thus, colours being typical examples of qualities, statements such as this red colour is not green prove that absence cannot be a quality. So, abhava is for these schools not tantamount to the non-existence of something, as in most other schools of Indian and Western philosophy. It is, instead, a positive reality, namely an absence which can thus be distinctly grasped, and is regarded as a separate category. The Bha::as, in fact, hold that there is something tt else (namely an absence) which is grasped apart from the other, present, objects, in order for one to be allowed to conclude that there is no pot on the ground. The Bha::a school of Purvammamsa is also the only philosophical school in classical tt : India which accepts an instrument of knowledge, also called absence, in order to grasp absences. All other schools understand instead instances such as the stockexample There is no pot on the ground either as sheer perceptions of something else, like the bare ground (thus Nyaya, Prabhakara Mmamsa, Santaraksita,2 etc.), or : : as inferential judgements (thus the Buddhist epistemological school).3 This did not lead the Bha::as to postulate the paradox of an entity being called absence. tt Abhava is a category distinct from substance (dravya), and it has not been reied by the Bha::as.4 On the contrary, Kumarila explains how absence is a relational tt reality,5 although this does not boil down to holding that absence is just a matter of point of view. Without postulating an in se distinct absence, Kumarila continues, one would not be able to account for the world as we commonly experience it, a world where entities are not other entities, and where the present is not the past, and so on. Let us now consider the relation between absence as an instrument of knowledge and as knowledge-content in the Bha::ammamsa. Is it a biunique relation? That is, tt : is absence as an instrument of knowledge the only instrument of knowledge which can grasp the absence of something? This is so, but only insofar as one considers the absence which is seized, and not the locus (often called anuyogin) where it is seized. Only absence as an instrument of knowledge, e.g., can seize the absence of a pot, but the same spot where such an absence is detected could be knownas bare groundalso by other means of knowledge. From this point of view absence is,
2

Therefore, the perception of this one is said to be the non-perception of another (TS 1682, translated in Taber 2001, p. 81). See also Kellner (1996, p. 158, fn. 30) and Kellner (1997, pp. 99102). For the oddity of Santaraksitas not following the position of the Buddhist Epistemological School, see Freschi : (2008, fn. 2).

Dharmakrti explains cognitions such as there is no pot on the ground as inferred through the logical reason that he calls anupalabdhi (non-perception). He examines this kind of inferential judgements in his Nyayabindu. This distinction is anyway too rough, as it does not take into account those thinkers who understand different instances of the application of absence as an instrument of knowledge as either _ instances of perception or of inference, according to the case. So, e.g., Udayana and Sankara.
4

In a similar vein, many philosophical schools acknowledge, e.g., inherence (samavaya) as a distinct category. 5 svarupapararupabhyam nityam sadasadatmake j vastuni jnayate kaiscid rupam kincit kadacana k : : : (SV abhava 12).

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Kumarila in fact says, another aspect of presence. So, absence as an instrument of knowledge just seizes a different aspect of the same thing, which could be seizedaccording to its present aspectalso by perception. Summing up, absence as an instrument of knowledge is the only instrument of knowledge which can grasp objects according to their absent aspect, that is, according to the aspect of what they are not. Thus, it would be contradictory to uphold that one has known through absence something other than an absence, and one cannot but be aware of the absence-ness of what one is grasping.

Kumarilas Analysis of Perceptual Error and its Parallels with Cognition of Absence The possibility of perceptual error has been often used by Buddhist thinkers as an argument against realism. Since in many cases, it is argued, cognitions are found to have no external object supporting them, why should one assume the existence of an external world as existing in the way we seem to perceive it? Kumarila replies by stating that the content of an erroneous cognition is not a cooked-up unreal entity, but rather a misallocation of real items.6 So, even an erroneous cognition is not devoid of an external support, although such support is not actually present at the time and place where one thinks it to be. Let us now consider one of the standard examples of perceptual error, the mother-of-pearl mistaken as silver one. Though they are falsely connected, both connected elements are real. Mother-of-pearl is real, though it is perceived just vaguely as something bright and lustrous. Silver is also real, although not directly perceived in this case. Is there a direct link between Kumarilas analysis of error and that of cognition of absence? At rst sight yes, insofar as the content of an erroneous cognition is something that (in reality) does not exist, and also the content of a cognition of absence is something that does not exist, but I hope to show that this closeness risks being overestimated because of the non-distinction between the non-existent status of the content of an erroneous cognition, and the absence-status of that of absence as an instrument of knowledge (see infra, Section A Proposed Solution).7 Yet, surely Kumarila has dealt with arguments relating to erroneous cognitions and arguments relating to cognitions of absence close to each other in the same section of the SV. Such contiguity is probably mainly due to the way Buddhist opponents have been using both cases as weak points of the realists epistemological theories. After all, in erroneous cognitions and in cognitions of absence, as in dreams and in hallucinations, one has to do with entities whose ontological status can hardly be settled, and which cannot be pointed at, as one would expect in a purely referential theory of cognition. However, Kumarila strenuously argues for the non-creativity of errors, dreams, etc. (which just happen to reproduce items really existing, though in
6 7

Both denitions are to be found in Chakrabarti (1997, p. 244, n. 17).

Although some sort of likeness between absence as an instrument of knowledge and error has been : surely felt by some commentators. See, e.g., Candrananda in his commentary to the Vaisesika Sutra, as discussed in Kellner (1997, p. 53).

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a different pattern), and considers abhava as simply the other-side of a real existing item. A further parallel between erroneous cognitions and cognitions of absence can be found in their causes. Why does one mistake mother-of-pearl, which is present before ones eyes, with silver, which is only remembered? There are, of course, some external factors, like lack of light, defects of the sense-faculty, etc. Apart from them, I might suggest that a role could be played by ones expectations and desires. If one wishes to see, say, a silver jewel one has lost on the sea-side, it is likely that one will believe one has seen it as soon as one perceives something similar, say, a piece of mother-of-pearl. If, vice versa, one is afraid of meeting a snake, one could be so obsessed by the idea of seeing it that one could mistake a rope for a snake. Moreover, a further element may be the external look of something, since, e.g., a lustruous object can be more easily mistaken for silver than a dull one. Those two causes can be possibly compared with the desire to grasp (jighrksa), and to the : : emergence character (udbhu mentioned by Kumarila as reasons for the arising ti) of the cognition of an absence in SV abhava 13. Furthermore, both cognition of absence and erroneous cognition imply a relation. Error, as seen above, consists in the erroneous connection of two existing items, and also cognition of absence could be analysed as consisting in the absence of the relation of two elements (such as the hare and its horn), which, by themselves, do separately exist.8 And, as the reality of error cannot be simply denied, although it consists only in the erroneous relation of elements, so also absence has a distinct nature, although it does not consist in absolute non-existence, but merely in determinate absence of, say, x in y. SV niralambana 107cd-118 The niralambana chapter of the SV is devoted to the refutation of the Buddhist arguments to the thesis that every cognition is devoid of any external support (niralambana), just like dreaming cognitions.9 This section will be followed by a discussion on sunyavada, but up to this point Kumarilas Buddhist opponents maintain that cognitions have no external support, that is, they have as support another cognition. Kumarila, instead, states that every cognition has as content a real, external object. In this context, the karikas 109cd-118ab10 deal with erroneous cognitions. Even those, maintains Kumarila, are not devoid of an external support, since they are erroneous just insofar as they erroneously conate together different cognitions, each of them having by itself an external support. For instance, one of the stock examples of illusion is the gandharvanagara, that is, the illusion of seeing a town
8

The typical Naiyayika to whom Arindam Chakrabarti gives voice, explains: The (compound) term rabbit-horn refers to a relation. Hence we are not denying the being of a particular horn but only denying that a certain relation holds (Chakrabarti 1997, p. 213). So the Buddhist opponents. Kumarila maintains, vice versa, that even dreaming cognitions are not devoid of an external support, as they are based on past memories (SV niralambana 107cd-109ab). We will see that it is not so easy to decide when the discussion on error ends.

10

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in the sky, possibly due to the city-like shape of some clouds (SV niralambana 110ab). Kumarila explains it as derived from the cognition of the cloud and the memory of a building, which has been seen somewhere else. He discusses in a similar vein some other well-known instances of illusion: the seeming circle of re that one sees when a torch is moved rapidly (v.109cd), and the mirage of water in the desert (110cd-111ab). He also mentions a case which isfor our present purposemore interesting. That is, the illusion of horns on the head of a hare (v.111cd 112ab).11 The same example is mentioned in the abhava section (SV abhava 4) as an example of atyantabhava, absolute absence. Through this case, Kumarila moves somehow apart from the eld of erroneous cognitions. With 112b he refers to the cognition there is no hares horn, which represents the validating cognition arising after one has become aware of ones mistake. Thereafter, Kumarila mentions the case of the cognition of an empty (place) (v. 112cd), that of sentences describing states of affairs which cannot apply (v. 113ab),12 and that of cognitions having as content something which could never be perceived (v. 113cd-114ab).13 Then, he deals with the theme underlying all the previous examples, that is, whether an object which is not present at the time the cognition arises can be considered as its support. His answer is that even a non-present object can possibly give rise to cognitions (v. 114cd-117ab). Next comes the passage 117cd-118, which is introduced by a tasmad, therefore that seems to sum up all preceding arguments. After v. 118 Kumarila deals with the faults to be found in the inferential reason proposed by the Buddhist opponent, and states it is self-contradictory. But let us now examine 117cd-118. tasmad yad anyatha santam anyatha pratipadyate k tan niralambanam jnanam abhavalambanam ca tat j : : bhavantaram abhavo nyo na kascid anirupanat k : (SV niralambanavada 117cd-118). At rst sight, the rst line is a relatively not problematic description of error: the [cognition that] knows something to be other than what it is. The Bha::a theory of tt error is indeed known as viparta-khyati, but it closely resembles the Naiyayika anyatha-khyati,14 lit. otherwise cognition, that is cognition [of an object] as if it were otherwise than it actually is. Leaving aside for the moment every doubt regarding anirupanat, the last line could be understood as stating that non-being : (abhava) is just another being, nothing else, because it is not discerned [as such](, i.e., it is never ascertained independently from what exists). This is, again, not as easy as it might seem, since it raises a doubt about the nature of absence. If it has only a relational nature (absence of y in x, that is, difference of x and y), then it
The hare is in reality hornless, but its ears may be mistaken for horns from a distance. Parthasarathi Misra and Sucarita Misra mention the standard example There is a hundred elephants on the tip of my nger. 13 Like the Primordial Nature of Sankhya, explain Parthasarathi Misra and Sucarita Misra. _
12 14 Some important differences will be pointed out later, Section A Proposed Solution. However, as far as depicting the phenomenology of error, they both agree in describing it as the cognition of something according to the characteristics of something else. 11

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could hardly be understood as a vastu,15 a distinct reality. Parthasarathi senses this risk when he gives voice to an objector stating that perception of the bare ground is enough to know the pots absence, because as you (siddhantin) said, absence is nothing but another being (SV niralambana 118cd). Nonetheless, even Parthasarathi does not ultimately attribute 118cd to an objector, and shows in his commentary to the crucial verse SV abhava 12 how a distinct reality can appear within a reciprocal relation (x is not y, that is, there is abhava of x in y).16 As for the relation between abhava and error, the main difculty lies in understanding the middle line and the reference of the two tat pronouns. More in detail, it is difcult to ascertain what kind of absence is referred to in 118b. Does Kumarila refer to absence as the (exclusive) content of absence as an instrument of knowledge? If it were so, then we should hypothesise a role for absence as an instrument of knowledge in at least this kind of erroneous cognition. However, abhava is also to be found in sastric Sanskrit in general and in the SV in particular17 as meaning just non-existing, non-being, not there. In ne compositi it can be translated as without. The commentators, as already hinted at, explain 118ab in different ways, and so do contemporary scholars. Some among the latter follow Parthasarathi Misra in referring those lines to the well known example of mistaking mother-of-pearl for silver. Roughly, we could distinguish three different translations,18 that is (a) Therefore, a[n erroneous] cognition that knows something to be other than what it is, is without an [external] object, but that [cognition, in reality] has absence as its object (i.e. the absence of silver; so it is not really objectless). And absence is just another being (i.e., the absence of the silver is the presence of the mother-of-pearl), nothing else (hence, it is something real), because it is not discerned [as such](, i.e., it is never ascertained independently of what exists). (b) Therefore, a[n erroneous] cognition that knows something to be other than what it is, is [according to your terminology] without an object. And that [cognition of absence] has absence as its object. And absence is just another being, nothing else (hence, it is something real), because it is not discerned [as such](, i.e., it is never ascertained independently of what exists). (c) Therefore, a[n erroneous] cognition that knows something to be other than what it is, is [according to your terminology] without an object, and it has an unreal object (, like silver, as its content). Absence, [instead] is just another
As Kumarila denes absence, SV abhava 9c.

15 16

For my interpretation of this verse, see above, Section Cognition of Absence According to the Bha::ammamsa. On the theme of the reciprocal nature of abhava, see Kellner (1996). tt : 17 See Kellner (1996, p. 157, fn. 27).
18 The following translations are the ones that have been proposed by either Kumarilas classical commentators or by his modern interpreters. However, further options are open. For instance, I thank Alessandro Graheli for having suggested that pratipadyate can also be understood as a passive voice, since by rule the jnatr, and not the cognition, is the one who cognises. However, pratipadyate or : pratipadyante are always active in the SV (pratyaksa 243a, anumana 188c, arthapatti 18c). :

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being, nothing else [hence, it has nothing to do with the unreal object referred to above], because it is not discerned [as such].19 The rst interpretation is the one chosen by some modern scholars, such as (although with different argumentations) Schmithausen (1965, p. 204, Sect. 76) and Taber (2001, p. 77, fn. 20). The second one is supported by Parthasarathi Misras commentary and has been adopted in Ganganatha Jhas translation of SV. The third : one resembles Umbeka Bhat:as understanding (see Freschi 2008, Sect. 3), and it is :t supported by Kellner 1996 [which, notwithstanding its date, has been written after Kellner (1997), where Kellner supports a].

A Proposed Solution Perceptual error is notI believean instance of an erroneous application of absence as an instrument of knowledge,20 but rather an instance of an erroneous application of perception as an instrument of knowledge. In fact, what is the ontological status of the content of an erroneous cognition? It is not an absence, since absence presupposes the awareness of a counter-positive entity (its pratiyo gin, as explained in SV abhava 27), whereas the content of an erroneous cognition, though non-existent, cannot evoke its counter-positive, because its non-existence is not ascertained as such. Turning back to the mother-of-pearl mistaken as silver, the content of the alleged cognition of absence cannot be the absence of silver, otherwise one would be aware that this is not silver. Indeed, such awareness of absence is possibly the only agreed upon characteristic of absence as an instrument of knowledge. One might suggest that the grasped absence of silver is erroneous just insofar as it lacks such an awareness. But that would be the same as to claim that a seemingly inferential cognition can be an instance of erroneous perception. Instead, a perception is erroneous if it appears to be perceptual cognition, but wrongly grasps its content. Similarly, an instance of an erroneous cognition of absence would be, e.g., the grasping of the absence of a thing, which isin realitypresent, or the grasping of the absence of a pot instead of that of a jar. However, those ne distinctions are not elaborated in Mmamsaka (and, as far as I know, in all Indian) : texts. Erroneous inferences are dealt with, but all other instances of error seem to be included in perceptual error.21

19 20

I could not understand how Kellner explains this anirupanat. See Kellner (1996, p. 156, fn. 27). : As seems to be implicitly assumed by Taber (2001, p. 77).

21 An interesting analysis of a related issue, that is, which instrument of knowledge could ever yield the cognition of a non-existing item as if it were existent, can be found in Udayanas Atmatattvaviveka, see Chakrabarti (1997, pp. 227232).

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Before offering my own translation of this passage, I would argue as follows: (1) The initial therefore of v. 117cd sums up all preceding cases of alleged supportless cognitions, and not just the erroneous ones. So, following Kumarila independently (as far as possible) of his commentators,22 the next lines should not refer only to an instance of erroneous cognition, and certainly not speak of a particular instance thereof. The use of niralambanam is at rst sight odd, as according to the siddhantin supportless cognitions are altogether impossible. In fact, the purpose of the chapter in which these karikas are found is to refute the Buddhist assumption that cognitions can arise without any external support. Even the immediately preceding karikas state that there is no supportless cognition, not even among erroneous cognitions. Hence, the niralambanam of 117c must be either immediately denied (as with translation a), or only provisionally admitted as a concession to the opponents terminology (as with b and c).23 Although Parthasarathi Misra, in his commentary on this passage, reads the tad. . .tad in 118a and 118b as referring to different kinds of cognition,24 a split in the sentence is not, as far as I know, common in the SV. Parthasarathis suggestion is however valuable, insofar as it brings into the picture both erroneous cognition and cognition of absence (thus indirectly conrming 1). Moreover, his explanation of 117cd embraces both erroneous cognitions and cognitions of absence. I understand the ca in 118b as adjusting the just uttered statement on supportlessness, that cognition is supportless, and it [can be better dened as] having a non-existing support.25 I interpret abhava in 118b in a similar vein, that is, as referring to both erroneous cognitions and cognitions of absence. In the rst case, it means non-present,26 meaning that perceptual error (as well as dream, also mentioned in vv.107cd-109ab) has a support, although this is not available to the senses. As for cognition of absence, instead, it has absence as support. Both cases are further justied by the immediately preceding verses (SV niralam bana 115d-116ab), where Kumarila explains how even absent objects can serve

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

22 Such a hypothetical reconstruction of Kumarilas thought is not meaningless, insofar as the post Kumarila debate on absence as an instrument of knowledge has been deeply inuenced by the polemics with Buddhists, and hence die erhaltenen Kommentaren [sind] zeitlich schon so weit vom Slokavarttika entfernt, dass sie nolens volens unter deutlichem Einuss post-kumarileischer Granden wie Dharma krti stehen (Kellner 1997, p. 66). The views of the SV commentators on this point have been examined in Freschi (2008). 23 24

So Kellner (1996, p. 156, fn. 27).

Therefore, a [cognition] which grasps something in a way different from how it [actually] is, that is a supportless cognition. And that [cognition of absence], on the other hand, has absence as [its] support. See NR ad SV niralambana 117cd-118ab. I thank Prof. Daniele Maggi for having pointed out this problem. As with Sucarita Misra, ad loc., and Kumarila himself, who elsewhere explains that an external support cannot be altogether absent. Even dreaming cognitions are not devoid of an external support, as they are based on past memories (see SV niralambana 107cd-109ab: svapnadipratyaye bahyam : sarvatha na hi nesyate k sarvatralambanam bahyam desakalanyathatmakam j janmany ekatra : : : bhinne va tatha kalantare pi va k.
26 25

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as cognitions contents. In fact, the double rendering non-present and absent is only necessary for the sake of translation. They both refer to a nonpresent item, which is grasped as an absence by absence as an instrument of knowledge, and thought to be actually present in case of error. Whatever the case, both kinds of cognitions are supported by an external object t for supporting cognitions, as declared by Kumarila, though not available to the senses at the time the cognition arises. This latter nuance can be better understood in view of the Nyaya-Mmamsa debate. Naiyayikas are, together with Buddhists, : the main opponents in all Mmamsa texts27 as they are also in the SV. As for : perceptual error, Nyaya and Mmamsa agree on maintaining that in erroneous : cognitions something is misunderstood as something else. They also agree that whatever causes a cognition must necessarily be a real entity. They differ, however, in explaining the status of silver in the case of mother-of-pearl misunderstood as silver. According to Naiyayikas, the silver present elsewhere is perceived due to a special contact of the mind with it.28 Mmamsakas, on the : other hand, are too much committed to empiricism to admit such a perception. Thus, they explain silver as cognised (through memory), but not perceived (memory is indeed a kind of cognition, although it is not an instrument of valid cognition). Hence, verse 118ab could be read as follows: that (erroneous cognition) is [according to your denition] without support, but it is based on a [piece of silver] non-present [at that place]. Abhavalambanam would thus aim at differentiating Kumarilas position from the Naiyayika one. Kumarila would be saying that silver is not present (abhava) through any kind of sensorial or mental perception in this instance of erroneous cognition. This interpretation is also partially supported by Kellner (1996), insofar as she understands abhavalambanam in a rather deationary way, that is it has as support [an instance of silver] which is not real, and by Umbeka Bhat:a, Sucarita Misra and Parthasarathi Misras admitting that false :t cognitions are indeed niralambana. As this cannot be meant as an agreement with the Buddhist position, it can only be addressed to those Naiyayika who elaborated the above mentioned theory of error in order to prove that all cognition has a proper, real support. Moreover, a non-technical use of abhavalambana is further understandable within the perspective of this chapter of the SV. Kumarila will later, in the abhava-chapter, deal in detail with the issue of absence, whereas here he rather intends to show how all cognitions are not objectless.29
For the way Nyaya and Mmamsa mutually interacted, e.g., on the subject of verbal communication, : see Freschi, Graheli (2005).
28 For an interesting analysis of this Naiyayika explanation of error, see Schmithausen (1965, pp. 171 176) and the chapter on Nyaya in Rao (1998). 29 I owe this remark, along with many others, to Dr. Yasutaka Muroya, who discussed with me the interpretation of SV, niralambana 117cd-118. As I explained in this paper, I do not think Kumarila wants here to be neutral as regards absence as an instrument of knowledge as this is already dealt with in the preceding verses, but obviously Kumarilas main purpose here is the denial of the Buddhist niralambana thesis. 27

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Bearing all the above in mind, I propose to translate these verses as follows: Therefore, the [cognition] which grasps something in a way which is different to the way it is, that is [according to your terminology] a supportless cognition. But that [in fact] has a non-present/absent support (so supportless does not altogether deny any support whatsoever, hence, if even erroneous cognitions are not supportless, how could you claim that all cognitions are supportless?). For an absent [reality] is another being, nothing else, as it is not [independently] ascertained. I interpret 118cd as explaining how also cognitions of absence can be referred to by 117cd. Absence, explains Kumarila, is indeed nothing but the [absent aspect of] another thing. Hence, also the cognition of an absence grasps something in another way, namely, according to the aspect of what is absent in it. References A. Texts and Translations
NR: Nyayaratnakara, in Slokavarttika of Sr Kumarila Bhat:a with the commentary Nyayaratnakara :t of Sr Parthasarathi Misra, ed. by Ganga Sagar Rai, Ratna Publications, Varanasi 1993. SV: in Slokavarttikavyakhya Tatparyatika of Umveka Bhat:a, ed. by S.K. Ramanatha Sastri, revised : : :t by K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy, Madras University Sanskrit Series No. 13, Madras 1971. SV: The Mmamsaslokavartika with the Commentary Kasika of Sucarita Misra, ed. by K. Sambasiva : Sastr, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, 90, 99, 150, Trivandrum 1926, 1929, 1943. SV: Clokavartika translated from the original Sanskrit, with extracts from the commentaries Kasika of Sucarita Misra and Nyayaratnakara of Partha Sarathi Misra, transl. by G. Jha, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi 1983 (1st edition published by the Asiatic Society, Calcutta 19001908). _ TS: Tattvasangraha of Santaraksita with the commentary of Kamalasla, ed. with an intr. in Sanskrit by : Embar Krishnamacharya, Oriental Institute, University of Baroda, Baroda 1984 and 1988 (1st ed. 1926).

B. Studies
Chakrabarti, A. (1997). Denying existence. The logic, epistemology and pragmatics of negative existentials and ctional discourse. Synthese Library (Vol. 261). Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer. Freschi, E. (2008). Abhavapramana and error in Kumarilas commentators. Nayoga Studies in Indian : Culture and Buddhism: Sambhasa, 27, 129. : : Freschi, E., & Graheli, A. (2005). Bha::ammamsa and Nyaya on Veda and Tradition. In F. Squarcini tt : (Ed.), Boundaries, dynamics and construction of traditions in South Asia. Firenze/New Delhi: FUP/Munshiram Manoharlal. Kellner, B. (1996). There are no pots in the Slokavarttika. Kumarilas denition of the abhavapramana : and patterns of negative cognition in Indian Philosophy. Journal of the Oriental Institute Madras, XLVI.3-4, 143167. Kellner, B. (1997). Nichts bleibt nichts. Die buddhistische Kritik an Kumarilas abhavapramana. : Ubersetzung und Interpretation von Santaraksitas Tattvasamgraha vv. 16471690 mit Kamal: : aslas Panjika. Mit einem Anhang zur Geschichte der negativen Erkenntnis in der Indischen Philosophie. Wien: Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde. Rao, S. (1998). Perceptual error: The Indian theories. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Russell, B. (2009). Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. New York: Routledge (Originally published: 1948) Schmithausen, L. (1965). Mandanamisras Vibhramavivekah. Mit einer Studie zur Entwicklung der :: : indischen Irrtumslehre. Wien: Hermann Bohlaus Nachf. Taber, J. (2001). Much ado about nothing: Kumarila, Santaraksita, and Dharmakrti on the cognition of : non-being. Journal of the American Oriental Society, 121.1, 7288.

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