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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio

Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis SECUNDI LIBRI

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III.

PARS I. ARTICULUS I. Quaestio II.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PART I ARTICLE I Question 2

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 94-99 Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 94-99. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO II. Utrum materia, ex qua compositi sunt Angeli, sit eadem cum materia corporalium.

QUESTION 2 Whether the matter, out of which the Angels have been composed, is the same with the matter of corporals?

SECUNDO DATO, quod habeant1 compositionem SECOND GRANTED, that (the Angels)1 have a
ex materia et forma, large sumto nomine materiae ad omne potentiale, quod cum alio venit ad constitutionem tanquam fundamentum rei; quaeritur de illa materia, utrum sit eadem cum materia corporalium. Non loquor de identitate secundum essentiam numeralem, sicut Socrates senex est idem sibi puero secundum substantiam;2 sed loquor secundum identitatem naturae communis, ut sicut omnes anuli de auro dicuntur habere eandem materiam per naturam composition out of matter and form, having taken the name of matter regarding every potential, which together with another comes to the constitution (of a thing) as the fundament of the thing; there is asked concerning that matter, whether it be the same with the matter of (things) corporal. I am not speaking of an identity according to the essence of a number, just as Socrates, the old man, is the same according to substance to himself, as a boy; but

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sive essentiam, cum tamen numeraliter varietur, et alia pars secundum substantiam sit in uno, alia in alio. Et quod sit idem per essentiam, videtur.

am speaking according to the identity of a common nature, so that, just as all rings of gold are said to have the same matter through nature or essence, even though (their matter) varies according to number [numeraliter], both one part (of the common matter) according to substance is in one (of them), another (part) in another. And that it is the same (thing) through essence, seems: 1. According to the authority of (St.) Augustine On the Wonders of Sacred Scripture, in the first chapter:3 The Omnipotent God out of the formless matter, which He Himself first founded from nothing, divided the multiform species of all other things, that is of (those) sensible and insensible, intellectual and lacking an intellect . What (is) more express than this? 2. Likewise, it seems by reason: In any genus there is a finding of one prime (being), according to which there are measured all which are in that genus , as the Philosopher wants in the tenth (book) of (his) First Philosophy;4 but substance is one genus, not only according to the logician, who considers the intentions (i. e. meanings) of things, but (also) according to the metaphysician, who considers the essences of things: therefore in the genus of substance there is one something, according to which there are measured all in that genus. But that cannot be an extrinsic principle, since according to the greater or lesser intrinsic5 participation in this things of that genus are more or less: therefore since there is no intrinsic principle but form, and/or matter, it will be either matter, and/or form. If matter, I have (arrived at) the proposed; if form; but the unity of form necessarily presupposes the unity of matter: ergo etc.. 3. Likewise, whensoever any common passion is in some subjects, it is necessary, that it be in them according to something common; but there is a number among spiritual and corporal (things) in a uniform manner, because according to the same number,6 according to which you number ten men, (you) also (number) ten angels for the number of the Angels will be supplied out of men therefore it is necessary, that one find some nature common among them,

1. Auctoritate Augustini de Mirabilibus sacrae Scripturae primo capitulo:3 Omnipotens Deus ex informi materia, quam ipse prius de nihilo condidit, cunctarum rerum, hoc est sensibilium et insensibilium, intellectualium et intellectu carentium, species multiformes divisit . Quid hoc expressius? 2. Item, ratione videtur: In quolibet genere est reperire unum primum, quo mensurantur omnia quae sunt in illo genere , ut vult Philosophus in decimo primae Philosophiae;4 sed substantia est unum genus, non tantum secundum logicum, qui considerat rerum intentiones, sed secundum metaphysicum, qui considerat essentias rerum: ergo in genere substantiae est unum aliquod, quo mensurantur omnia in illo genere. Sed illud non potest esse principium extrinsecum, cum secundum huius maiorem et minorem participationem intrinsecam5 res illius generis magis et minus sint: ergo cum principium intrinsecum non sit nisi forma, vel materia, erit vel materia, vel forma. Si materia, habeo propositum; si forma; sed unitas formae necessario praesupponit unitatem materiae: ergo etc.

3. Item, quandocumque aliqua passio communis inest aliquibus subiectis, necesse est, quod insit eis secundum aliquod commune; sed numerus est in spiritualibus et corporalibus uniformiter, quia eodem numero,6 quo numeras decem homines, et decem angelos numerus enim Angelorum supplebitur ex hominibus ergo necesse est, aliquam naturam communem in eis reperire, secundum quam haec passio insit. Sed hoc non potest esse forma: restat ergo, quod

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materia.

according to which this passion is in (them). But this cannot be form: therefore it remains, that (it is) matter. 4. Likewise, the matter of corporal (things) is abstracted from every form, again the matter of spiritual things7 (is also abstracted from every form); (then I ask) Either (matter) is distinguished, or not? If not: therefore (the matter of one and of the other) are the same through essence: if so: since every distinction is from form, therefore they have a form. If you say, that a perfect distinction is from form, but just as matter has an incomplete to be, so also an incomplete distinction; on the contrary: that in which spiritual and corporal (things) differ / most of all, . . .
1

4. Item, abstrahatur materia corporalium ab omni forma, iterum materia spiritualium;7 aut distinguitur, aut non. Si non: ergo sunt idem per essentiam: si sic: cum omnis distinctio sit a forma, ergo habent formam. Si tu dicas, quod distinctio perfecta est a forma, sed sicut materia habet esse incompletum, ita et distinctionem incompletam; contra: illud in quo maxime differunt spiritualia et corpo- / -ralia, . . .

Vat. Angelus habeat. Mox plures codd. cum ed. 1 possibile pro potentiale. 2 Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c de Differentia. 3 Libr. I, sed non est Augustini, vide Schol. ad q. 1. In hoc textu cod. V cum originali ex nihilo pro de nihilo. Paulo superius cod. O Et quod sit eadem pro Et quod sit idem. 4 In hac propositione, quae ex Averroe sumta est, complectuntur ea quae Aristot., loc. cit. text. 3. seqq. (IX. c. 1.) maxime text, 7, de mensura dicit. De seq. prop. cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam, c. de Substantia; IV. c. VI. Metaph. (text. 1.) seqq. (III. et V. c. 1.), in qua plures codd. voci intentiones praemittunt rationes et, cod. U praeterea addit communes. Paulo inferius post in genere substantiae est codd. U X Y interserunt reperire, et dein post omnia cod. H adiungit quae sunt. 5 Non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 perperam extrinsecam. 6 Fide codd. H K P Q T Y bb pro modo substituimus numero, quod Aristoteli magis congruit (de quo vide supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. arg. 4. ad opp.), et paulo inferius reperire pro esse, quod tantum cod. cc et ed. 1 cum Vat. ponunt. Circa initium arg. aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 substantiis pro subiectis. 7 Vat. glossando: abstrahatur etiam materia spiritualium ab omni forma; quaero tunc.

The Vatican edition reads an Angel has [Angelus habeat]. Next several codices, together with edition 1, have possible [possibile] for potential [potentiale]. 2 Cf. Porphyry, On the Predicables, ch. On Difference. 3 Book I, but this work is not by (St.) Augustine: see the Scholium to Question 1. In this text codex V, together with the original, has out of nothing [ex nihilo] for from nothing [de nihilo]. A little above this codex O reads And that it is the same (i. e. matter) [Et quod sit eadem] for And that it is the same (being) [Et quod sit idem]. 4 In this proposition, which has been taken from Averros, there are comprised those which Aristotle, loc. cit., text 3, ff. (Bk. IX, ch. 1), most of all in text 7, says concerning measure. On the following proposition, cf. Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. On Substance; Metaphysics, Bks. IV and VI (text 1) ff., (Bks. III and V, ch. 1), in which several codices preface to the word the intentions [intentiones] the words the reasons and [rationes et]; codex U moreover adds common [communes]. A little below this after in the genus of substance there is [in genere substantiae est] codices U X and Y insert a finding of [reperire], and then after all [omnia] codex H adjoins which are [quae sunt]. 5 Not a few codices, together with editions 1 and 2, have faultily extrinsic [extrinsecam]. 6 Trusting in codices H K P Q T Y and bb for standard of measure [modo] we have substituted number [numero], which is more congruent with Aristotle (concerning which, see above d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, 4th opposed argument), and a little below this read But one cannot find this according to form [reperire] for But this cannot be form [esse], which only codex cc and edition 1, together with the Vatican, have. About the beginning of the argument some codices, together with edition 1, have substances [substantiis] for subjects [subiectis].

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The Vatican edition, glossing, reads explicitly the words added in English: is abstracted from every form; then I ask [abstrahatur etiam . . . ab omni forma; quaero tunc].

p. 95 corpo- / -ralia, est simplicitas et compositio; sed materia abstracta ab omni forma est ita simplex, ut punctus: ergo nullam partibilitatem habet: ergo si in hoc non differunt, non videtur, quod in alio. Si dicas, quod per capacitatem; contra: materia non est sua capacitas per essentiam:1 ergo contingit eam abstrahi a capacitate. Abstrahatur ergo materia spiritualium et corporalium a capacitate; quaero, per quid differant; nullam omnino est dare, nullam assignare differentiam: ergo essentia est eadem per naturam. corporal (things) differ / most of all, is simplicity and composition; but matter abstracted from every form is thus simple, as a point: therefore it has no divisibility [partibilitatem]: therefore if in this they do not differ, it does not seem, that (they differ) in the other (i. e. in composition). If you say, that (they differ) through (their) capacity: on the contrary: matter is not its own capacity through essence:1 therefore it happens that it is abstracted from (its) capacity. Therefore the matter of (things) spiritual and corporal is abstracted from (their) capacity; I ask, Through what do they differ?; there is entirely a granting of no (difference), the assigning of no difference: therefore the essence (of both) is the same through nature. 5. Likewise, the form of a genus is abstractable from the forms of the species or from the differences; but substance means a form of a genus, corporeal and incorporeal are differences: therefore (the former) can be abstracted from these latter. But the form of a genus is naturally prior to [prior quam] the form of the differences, just as the Philosopher says,2 that animal is prior to man. Therefore the matter of spiritual and corporal (things) is considered under the form of a genus; nor do they differ as much as regards the form, which is consequent to the essence3 itself of matter: therefore much more strongly do they not differ in regard to matter itself, as it seems. 6. Likewise, when there is said: the matter of things corporal is matter, the matter of (things) spiritual is matter; either there is a convening in a name alone, or in a habitude, or in an essence.4 If in a name alone: therefore since there is an equivocation in a first principle, therefore there is no univocation. If in a comparison; (a univocation) is withdrawn from that comparison, then either (matter in the

5. Item, forma generis est abstrahibilis a formis specierum sive a differentiis; sed substantia dicit formam generis, corporeum et incorporeum sunt differentiae: ergo ab his potest abstrahi. Sed forma generis naturaliter est prior quam forma differentiarum, sicut dicit Philosophus,2 quod prius est animal quam homo. Consideretur igitur materia spiritualium et corporalium sub forma generis; nec differunt quantum ad formam, quae consequitur ipsam essentiam materiae:3 ergo multo fortius non differunt quoad ipsam materiam, ut videtur.

6. Item, cum dicitur: materia rerum corporalium est materia, spiritualium materia est materia; aut est convenientia in solo nomine, aut in habitudine, aut in essentia.4 Si solo in nomine: ergo cum sit aequivocatio in primo principio, ergo nulla est univocatio. Si in comparatione; abstrahitur ab illa comparatione, tunc aut erit dictum per convenientiam in essentia, aut aequivocatio pura.

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second proposition) will have been said through a convening in essence, or (is) a pure equivocation.

CONTRA:
5

1.

Augustinus

duodecimo

ON THE CONTRARY:

1. (St.) Augustine (says)

Confessionum: Duo fecisti Domine, unum prope te, aliud prope nihil . Et iterum in duodecimo: Duo sunt carentia temporibus: unum, quod sine ullo defectu contemplationis et sine ullo intervallo mutationis tua aeternitate perfruatur; alterum, quod ita informe erat, ut ex alia forma in quam formam mutaretur, non haberet . Si ergo, quae recte dividuntur, unum non intrat in constitutionem alterius, si angelica natura dividitur contra corporalem naturam sive corporalium: ergo6 etc. Si tu dicas, quod loquitur de ea secundum esse; hoc nihil est, quia loquitur de ea, sicut patet in antecedentibus et consequentibus, secundum quod omni forma erat privata, sive ut intelligitur sub omnimoda informitate, et sic consideratur ut immutabilis: ergo etc. Beda7 etiam et alii Sancti sic dividunt.

in the twelfth (book) of (his) Confessions:5 Two have Thou made Lord, one near Thee, the other near nothing . And again in the twelfth (book): There are two which lack seasons [carentia temporibus]: the one, which without any defect of contemplation and without any interval of change thoroughly enjoys Thy Eternity; the other, which was so formless, that it did not have (something) of any form into which form it would be changed . If, therefore, (regarding) those which are rightly divided, one does not enter into the constitution of the other, if the nature of an Angel is divided against a corporal nature or (the nature) of corporals: ergo6 etc.. If you say, that he is speaking of it (i. e. matter) according to a to be; this is nothing, because he is speaking of it, just as is clear in the antecedent and consequent (passages), according to which it had been deprived of every form, or as it is understood under an omnimodal formlessness, and thus it is considered as immutable: ergo etc.. (St.) Bede7 too and the other Saints divide (it) in the same manner. 2. Likewise, whatsoever communicate in matter, are transmutable into [ad] one another, just as (St. Severinus) Boethius says On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ;8 but (things) spiritual and corporal are not of this kind: ergo etc. 3. Likewise, it seem by reason: just as the power of acting is essentially consequent to form, so the power of suscepting is essentially, nay more essentially, consequent to matter;9 but it necessarily follows, that if there are diverse prime and essential powers of some forms, such that for any effect and/or act there is ordained one form, to which no other (form is ordained), that (these powers) differ through essence. Therefore since matter subjected to corporal forms can in no manner grasp spiritual forms through individual perfection, nor vice versa, because from an Angel there can never come to be a body, nor vice versa: therefore they differ

2. Item, quaecumque communicant in materia, sunt ad invicem transmutabilia, sicut dicit Boethius de Duabus Naturis et una persona Christi;8 sed spiritualia et corporalia non sunt huiusmodi: ergo etc. 3. Item, ratione videtur: sicut potentia agendi essentialiter consequitur formam, ita potentia suscipiendi essentialiter, immo essentialius consequitur materiam;9 sed necessario sequitur, quodsi sunt diversae potentiae primae et essentiales aliquarum formarum, ita quod ad aliquem effectum vel actum ordinatur una forma, ad quem non alia, quod differunt per essentiam. Cum ergo materia subiecta corporalibus formis nullo modo possit capere formas spirituales per individuam perfectionem, nec e converso quia nunquam de Angelo potest fieri corpus, nec e converso: ergo differunt per essentiam.

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through essence. 4. Item, partibilitas inest rebus corporalibus: aut ergo a parte formae, aut a parte materiae radicaliter. Non a parte formae, quia omnis forma est in simplici essentia consistens :10 ergo principaliter a parte materiae et originaliter. Aut igitur consequitur ipsam materiam secundum se, aut non; si non, ut si materia sit simplex, quantum est de se, ut punctus: ergo sicut punctus non potest esse materia vel pars superficiei, ita nec materia pars corporis. Quodsi hoc absurdum est11 quia dimensiones secundum rationem infinitam consequuntur materiam secundum se: cum ergo sit in corporalibus et spiritualibus, patet etc. 4. Likewise, there is a divisibility [partibilitas] in corporal things: therefore, (such a divisibility is) either on the part of form, or on the part of matter radically. Not on the part of form, because every form is one consisting in a simple essence :10 therefore principally on the part of matter and originally (so). Therefore, either (divisibility) is consequent to matter itself according to itself, or (it is) not; if not, such as if matter be simple, as much as concerns itself, as a point (is): therefore just as a point cannot be the matter and/or a part of a surface, so neither (can) matter (be) a part of a body. Which if this is absurd (, it is consequent to matter according to itself)11 because dimensions according to an unlimited reckoning [rationem infinitam] are consequent to matter according to itself: therefore, since (matter) is in corporal and spiritual (things and there is no divisibility in spiritual things), it is clear that etc.. 5. Likewise, this is shown on the part of (their) end, because Angels have been made to see the clarity of the Most High Light; . . .
1 2

5. Item, ostenditur hoc a parte finis, quia Angeli facti sunt ad videndum claritatem summae lucis; ...
1 2

Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. ad 4.

Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. II, a. , q. 3, in reply to n. 4.

Libr. IV. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.): Nam genere quidem posterior est, specie autem priorem differentiam esse oportet. Cfr. XI. Metaph. c. 1. (X. c. 1.) et Porphy., de Praedicab. c de Communitatibus et differentiis generis: Genera quidem priora sunt iis quae sunt sub se positae differentiis, propter quod simul quidem eas auferunt, non autem simul auferuntur ab eis; sublato enim animali, aufertur rationale et irrationale; differentiae vero non amplius simul auferunt genus; nam etsi omnes interimantur, tamen substantia animata sensitiva intelligitur, quae est anima . Idem dicitur in liro de Causis, prop. 1. 3 Intellige: capacitatem ad formam (cfr. supra d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1.). 4 Aliis verbis: aut est aequivocatio, aut analogia, aut univocatio, de quibus cfr. Aristot., de Preadicam. in princ. et IV. Metaph. text. 2 (III. c. 1.); et I. Sent. d. 7. q. 4. Schol. In fine arg. cod. cc et ed. 1 prima pro pura. 5 Cap. 7. n. 7. Sequens textus est ibid. c. 12. n. 15. Vide supra pag. 60, nota 1. 6 Cod. F prosequitur: nullo modo erit materia Angeli rerum corporalium, ergo etc. Paulo superius post intrat in pluribus codd. deest in.

Topics, Bk. IV, ch. 3 (ch. 6): For indeed it is posterior to genus, but it is necessary that a difference be prior to species. Cf. Metaphysics, Bk. XI, ch. 1 (Bk. X, ch. 1) and Porphyry, On the Predicables, ch. On the Commonalities and Differences of a Genus: Genera are indeed prior to those which have been placed under them according to differences, on which account they indeed take those (differences) away together (with themselves), but they are not taken away from those (placed under them) together with those (differences); for with animal removed, the rational and irrational are taken away; but differences do not more amply take away the genus together (with themselves); for even if all (differences) are destroyed, yet the animated, sensitive substance, which is the soul, is understood . The same is said in the Book of Causes, proposition 1. 3 Understand: (its) capacity for form [capacitatem ad formam] (cf. above d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q, 1, in reply to n. 1.). 4 In other words: either there is an equivocation, or an analogy, or a univocation (of the term matter), concerning which, cf. Aristotle, On the Predicaments, at the beginning, and Metaphysics, Bk. IV, text 2 (Bk. III, ch. 1): and Sent. I, d. 7, q. 4, Scholium. At the end of the argument codex cc and edition 1 have prime [prima] for

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Vide supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. arg. 2. ad opp. et ibid. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. 8 Cap. 6: Sola enim mutari transformarique in se possunt quae habent unius materiae commune subiectum. In cod. F additur et Philosophus de Generatione et corruptione, ubi libr. I. text. 1. dicitur: Una omnium materia habentium ad invicem transmutationem. 9 Cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 5. Paulo inferius cod. cc et ed. 1 per se pro primae et codd. A T vel individuam pro per individuam. 10 Gilb. Porretanus, de Sex principiis, c. 1. Aliquanto post cod. F sed cum pro ut si. 11 Hic supplendum est: consequitur materiam secundum se; et. Quae verba, vel similia probabiliter exciderunt ante quia dimensiones. Quod sequitur confirmat et explicat hanc propositionem ex Averroe, de Substantia orbis in princ., qui docet, dimensiones interminatas i. e. per se seu in natura dimensionis tantum, existere primitus in materia prima et praecedere formam in materia, dimensiones vero terminatas sequi formam in materia. Cod. aa indefinitam pro infinitam. Vat dein post cum ergo sit; cod. I post spiritualibus addit non; et cod. ff post rationem infinitam ponit etc. et omittit quod sequitur.

pure [pura]. 5 Chapter 7, n. 7. The following text is ibid., ch. 12, n. 15. See above d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, p. 60, footnote 1. 6 Codex F proceeds thus: in no manner will the matter of an Angel (be the matter) of corporal things, ergo etc. [nullo modo erit materia Angeli rerum corporalium, ergo etc]. A little above this after enter [intrat] there is missing in several codices into [in]. 7 See above d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, 2nd opposed argument, and ibid., a. 2, q. 3, in the body of the Question. 8 Chapter 6: For only those who have the common subject of one matter can be changed and transformed into themselves. In codex F there is added and the Philosopher On Generation and Corruption [et Philosophus de Generatione et corruptione], where in Book I, text 1 there is said: (There is) one matter of all having a transmutation into one another. 9 Cf. above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, p. 89, footnote 5. A little below this codex cc and edition 1 have there are powers, diverse and essential through themselves, [diversae potentiae per se et essentiales] for there are diverse prime and essential powers [diverseae potentiae primae et essentiales] and codices A and T have and/or individual [vel individuam] for through individual [per individuam]. 10 Gilbert of Porretain, On the Six Priniciples, ch. 1. Somewhat after this codex F has but since [sed cum] for such as if [ut si]. 11 Here one must understand by supplying: Wherefore if this is absurd, it is consequent to matter according to itself, and [Quodsi hoc est absurdum, consequitur materiam secundum se; et]. Which words, and/or those similar, probably fell from (the text) before (the words) because dimensions [quia dimensiones]. What follows confirms and explains this proposition from Averros, On the Substance of the Orb, at the beginning, who teaches, that unterminated dimensions, i. e. (those which are) per se or in the nature of dimension alone, exist for the first time in prime matter and precede form in matter, but terminated dimensions follow form in matter. Codex aa reads undelimited [indefinitam] for unlimited [infinitam]. The Vatican edition then, after therefore since (matter) is [cum ergo sit] and codex I after corporal (things) and [corporalibus et] add not [non]; and codex ff after an unlimited reckoning [ratoinem infinitam] puts etc. [etc.] and omits what follows.

p. 96 sed materia corporalium de se tenebra est,1 et quod magis permiscetur et magis unitur ei, tanto minus cognoscit et magis est tenebrosum. Si ergo forma Angeli unitur suae materiae maxima but the matter of corporals is of itself a shadow,1 and what is more mixed together with (it) and more united to it, cognizes so much the less and is more shadowy. If, therefore, the form of an

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indivisione, substantia eius esset ineptissima ad contemplandam lucem. Si ergo propter hoc solum factus est, nunquam habet materiam conformem per unitatem naturae materiae corporali. 6. Item, videtur, quod non sit ponere materiam tanquam mensuram generis substantiae rerum, quia quae magis participant de ratione materiae, minus sunt entia, et ipsa est quod ignobilissimum in genere entium, quia prope nihil .2 Si ergo illud unum, quod est mensura generis, debet esse perfectissimum in genere illo, ut albedo in genere coloris: patet etc.

Angel is united to its matter by the greatest indivision, its substance would be most inept for the contemplating of the Light. If, therefore, he was made for this sake alone, he never has a matter conform to corporal matter through a unity of nature. 6. Likewise, it seems, that there is no positing of matter as a measure of the genus of the substance of things, because what participate more from the reckoning of matter, are less beings, and (matter) itself is what is most ignoble in the genus of beings, because (it is) near nothing .2 If, therefore, that one (thing), which is the measure of a genus, ought to be the most perfect one in that genus, such as whiteness (is) in the genus of color: it is clear that etc.. CONCLUSION In a twofold way there is demonstrated, that both the one denying (this) and affirming (this) speaks the truth; but it is asserted, that those, who understand matter according to its essence, metaphysically, posit that it is the same.

CONCLUSIO. Duplici via monstratur, solutionem tum negantem tum affirmantem verum dicere; eos autem melius asseritur, qui metaphysice materiam secundum suam essentiam intelligunt et eandem esse ponunt.

RESPONDEO:

Dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem sapientes videntur contrariari sapientibus. Nam magni et profundi clerici et in theologia et in philosophia, qui magis fuerunt veritatis inquisitores, diversificati sunt. Quidam enim posuerunt, quod materia in spiritualibus et corporalibus differt nec habet unitatem nisi analogiae. Alii posuerunt, quod est una per essentiam. Si quis autem velit diligenter considerare, quae istarum positionum sit probabilior et verior, et attendere ad rationes moventes, videbit, quod utraque opinio secundum diversas vias verum dicat, ita quod neutri sunt decepti.

It must be said, that about this question wise men seem to be opposed [contrariari] to wise men. For great and profound clerics both in theology and in philosophy, who were greater inquisitors of the truth, took diverse positions [diversificati sunt]. For certain (clerics) posited, that matter in spiritual and corporal (things) differs and that it does not have a unity except (that) of analogy. Others posited, that (matter) is one through essence. If anyone, however, wants to diligently consider, which of these positions of theirs is more probable and more true, and to attend to the reasons moving (these), he will see, that each opinion, according to diverse ways, speaks the truth, such that neither have been deceived. But the reason for this diverse position was the diverse manner of cognizing matter. For matter is knowable in a twofold manner, namely through privation and through analogy. (Matters) cognition through privation is prior to (the intellects) removing form, then (its

RESPOND:

Ratio autem huius diversae positionis fuit diversus modus cognoscendi materiam. Materia enim dupliciter est scibilis, scilicet per privationem et per analogiam. Cognitio per privationem est prius removendo formam, deinde disponens ad formam, et considerando

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ipsam essentiam nudam in se quasi tenebram intelligibilem.3 Cognitio autem per analogiam est per consimilem habitudinem; habitudo autem materiae est per potentiam, et ita haec cognitio est per comparationem materiae ad formam mediante potentia.4 Potentia autem materiae dupliciter potest comparari ad formam: aut in quantum praebet ei fulcimentum in ratione entis, et sic considerat metaphysicus; aut sub ratione mobilis, et sic considerat naturalis philosophus.

cognition is) disposing to (the cognition of) form, and (is prior) to considering (its) bare essence itself in itself, as an intelligible shadow.3 But (its) cognition through analogy is through a consimilar habitude; but the habitude of matter is through potency, and thus this cognition is through the comparison of matter to form by means of potency.4 But the potency of matter can be compared to form in a twofold manner: either inasmuch as it proffers to it a support in the reckoning of a being [ratione entis], and in this manner the metaphysician considers (it); or under the reckoning of a movable, and in this manner the philosopher of nature [naturalis philosophus] considers it. Considering, therefore, matter according to a privation of every form, both substantial and accidental, they said, that it is the same in (things) spiritual and corporal through essence; for if each matter be separated from all forms and from all accidents, entirely no diversity will appear. But considering matter according to analogy, namely under the reckoning of potency, inasmuch as it proffers a support to form in the reckoning of a being, they said, that it is the same according to analogy, because there is a consimilar habitude there. For just as the matter of (things) corporal sustains and gives to its forms (their) existing [existere] and subsisting [subsistere], so also the matter of (things) spiritual. There is also in them the reckoning of participation according to a more and less. For in spiritual (things matter)5 stands under [substat] the substantial form only, in superior bodies (under) the substantial form and quantity, in inferior (bodies under) the substantial form and quantity and contrariety. And since what is purely in the genus of substance participates more from the reckoning of one standing and independent through itself, but what more accedes to the nature of accidents is more elongated (from this reckoning); hence it is, that spiritual substances, through (a consideration of what is) prior and more true, are substances, then superior bodies, lastly inferior bodies. And these did not say, that (the matter of each) was the same properly, because neither is the matter of

Considerantes igitur materiam secundum privationem omnis formae, tam substantialis quam accidentalis, dixerunt, quod eadem est in spiritualibus et corporalibus per essentiam; si enim ab omnibus formis et ab omnibus accidentibus separetur utraque materia, nulla omnino diversitas apparebit. Considerantes autem materiam secundum analogiam, scilicet sub ratione potentiae, in quantum praebet fulcimentum formae in ratione entis, dixerunt, esse eandem secundum analogiam, quia est ibi consimilis habitudo. Sicut enim materia corporalium sustinet et dat suis formis existere et subsistere, ita etiam materia spiritualium. Est etiam ibi ratio participationis secundum plus et minus. Nam in spiritualibus substat5 formae substantiali tantum, in corporibus superioribus formae substantiali et quantitati, in inferioribus formae substantiali et quantitati et contrarietati. Et quoniam quod pure est in genere substantiae plus participat de ratione per se stantis et independentis, quod autem plus accedit ad naturam accidentium magis elongatur; hinc est, quod substantiae spirituales per prius et verius sunt substantiae, deinde corpora superiora, postremo corpora inferiora. Et hi non dixerunt, quod esset eadem proprie, quia nec materia corporalium est nata sustinere formas spirituales, nec e converso. Considerantes autem secundum analogiam sub ratione potentiae, in quantum praebet fulcimentum formae in ratione mobilis, dixerunt etiam, esse eandem per analogiam. Quoniam,

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sicut in corporalibus est aliquid, quod sustinet variationes quoad proprietates corporales, ita in spiritualibus quoad spirituales; et est ibi ratio prioris et posterioris in participando. Nam materia potest esse fulcimentum variationis secundum situm et formam, . . .

corporals bound to sustain spiritual forms, nor vice versa. But considering (it) according to analogy under the reckoning of potency, inasmuch as it proffers a fundament to form in the reckoning of a movable, they said also, that is it the same through analogy. Since, just as in corporals there is something, which sustains variations in regard to corporal properties, so in spirituals in regard to spiritual (properties); and there is in them the reckoning of a prior and posterior in participating. For matter can be the support of variation according to site and form, . ..
1

Cfr. supra pag. 15, nota 10. Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 Item obiicitur a parte finis pro Item ostenditur hoc a parte finis. Dein codd. K U Y Z post claritatem subiiciunt ipsius. Mox codd. F K et quanto magis pro et quod magis. 2 August., XII. Confess. c. 7. n. 7. De seq. prop. cfr. Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 2-7. (IX. ch. 1.), ubi proprietates mensurae recensentur, et etiam exemplum albedinis in genere coloris occurit. 3 Sub hoc respectu Aristot. considerat materiam VII. Metaph. text. 8. (VI. c. 3.), ubi ipsam definit quae per se ipsam neque quid neque quantum neque aliquid aliud quippiam dicitur, quibus ens determinatur . Cfr. X. text. 16. (XI. c. 4.). Fide cod Z substituimus considerando pro considerare. Cod. T ponit dispositiones, codd. bb ee and ed 1 dispositionem pro disponens, et aliqui codd. ut K X Y post quasi interserunt quandam. 4 Aristot., I. Phys. text. 69. (c. 7.): Subiecta autem natura scibilis est secundum analogiam; ut enim ad statuam aes, aut ad formam materia et informe se habet, priusquam accipiat formam, sic haec ad substantiam etc. De iis quae sequuntur cfr. Aristot., VI. Metaph. text. 1 seqq. (V. c. 1.). Cod. I in hac prop. verbis per potentiam praefigit ad formam. Mox cod. T potest considerari pro potest comparari. 5 Subaudi cum cod. bb materia. Averroes, I. Phys. text. 70: Subiectum sustentat formam, secundum quod forma non potest esse sine subiecto; forma autem sustentat subiectum, secundum quod est complementum eius, et secundum quod subiectum non potest denudari a forma.

Cf. above d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, p. 15, footnote 10. Not a few codices, together with edition 1 have Likewise there is objection on the part of (there) end [Item obiicitur a parte finis] for Likewise this is shown on the part of (their) end [Item ostenditur hoc a parte finis]. Then codices K U Y And Z, after the Most High Light [claritatem], subjoin Itself [ipsius]. Next codices F and K have and as much as it is [et quanto] for and what is [et quod]. 2 (St.) Augustine, Confessions, Bk. XII, ch. 7, n. 7. On the following proposition, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. X, texts 2-7 (Bk. IX, ch. 1), where the properties of matter are reviewed, and there even occurs the example of whiteness in the genus of color. 3 Under this respect Aristotle considers matter in Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 8 (Bk. VI, ch. 3), where he defines it as what is indeed said through itself (to be) neither the something nor the quantum nor the anything else, according to which a being is determined . Cf. Book X, text 16 (Bk. XI, ch. 4). Trusting in codex Z we have substituted to considering [considerando] for to a considering of [considerare]. Codex T reads then the disposition regarding form [tunc dispositionem ad formam], and some codices, such as K X and Y, after as [quasi] insert a certain [quandam] for an. 4 Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, text 69 (ch. 7): But subjected nature is knowable according to analogy; for as the formlessness of matter [materia et informe] holds itself to a bronze statue, or to a form, before it accepts a form, so these to a substance etc.. Concerning those which follow, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VI, text 1 ff (Bk. V, ch. 1). Codex I in this proposition prefixes to the words is through potency [per potentiam] (the words) regarding form [ad formam]. Next codex T has can be considered regarding [potest considerari] for can be compared to [potest comparari]. 5 Understand together with codex bb matter [materia]. Averros, Physics, Bk. I, text 70: The subject sustains the form, according to which the form cannot be without a subject; but the form sustains the subject, according to

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which it is its compliment, and according to which the subject cannot be denuded of (its) form.

p. 97 ut in corporibus corruptibilibus; aut ad situm tantum, ut in superioribus; aut ad receptionem influentiae et habituum, et perditionem,1 ut in substantiis spiritualibus. Et secundum hanc considerationem proprie est materia in corporibus corruptibilibus, minus proprie in corporibus incorruptibilibus, minime in spiritibus et inde etiam est, quod dicuntur aliquando immateriales, quia minumum habent de hac possibilitate et secundum hoc materia est infimum. Et hi non posuerunt materiam unam, quoniam materia in Angelis non habet possibilitatem ad transmutationem formarum substantialium nec est possibilis ad recipiendum formas corporales. Et inde est, quod dicit Philosophus, quod spiritualium et corporalium non est materia una,2 considerans potentiam materiae in relatione ad formam ut mobilem. Ex his patet ratio diversitatis et via harum positionum, et quod verum dicunt secundum diversas vias et secundum diversos modos intelligendi. Et sic currunt diversae rationes, et auctoritates inveniuntur ad partes oppositas. Et patet responsio obiectorum. Nec est contradictio, si quis recte intelligat utramque. as in corruptible corporals; or according to site only, as in superior (bodies); or according to the reception of an influence and of habits, and the loss (of them),1 as in spiritual substances. And according to this consideration matter is properly in corruptible bodies, less properly in incorruptible bodies, least (properly) in spirits and hence it is also, that they are sometimes said (to be) immaterial, because they have the least of this possibility and according to this, matter is the lowest (entity). And they did not posit matter as one, since matter in the Angels does not have a possibility for the transformation of substantial forms nor is it able [possibilis] to receive corporal forms. And hence it is, that the Philosopher says, that of spiritual and corporal (things) there is not one matter,2 considering (as he does) the potency of matter in relation to form as a movable. From these (considerations) the reason for the diversity and the way of these positions is clear, and that they speak the truth according to diverse ways and according to diverse manners of understanding. And thus run the diverse reasons, and (thus) are found authorities for the opposed sides. And the response to the objections is clear. Nor is there a contradiction, if one understands each (side) rightly. And/or it can be said in another manner, that when we speak of the unity of matter, we are speaking of it, insofar as the explanation of things which depend upon a principle [resolution principiatorum] is made [stat] according to it; for that reason we can speak in a threefold manner, according to which there are three (sciences), which teach, that (such) an explanation [resolutio] is made according to a material principle. For the (philosopher) of nature, who considers generation and corruption, explains [resolvit] (them) according to matter; the physicist of the universe [physicus universalis], who considers every body, whether movable

Vel aliter potest dici, quod cum loquimur de unitate materiae, loquimur de ipsa, prout ad eam stat resolutio principiatorum; ideo tripliciter possumus loqui, secundum quod tres sunt, qui docent, resolutionem facere ad principium materiale. Nam ad materiam resolvit naturalis, qui considerat generationem et corruptionem; ad eam resolvi physicus universalis, qui considerat omne corpus mobile sive ad situm, sive ad formam; ad eam resolvit metaphysicus, qui considerat omne ens: et unusquisque resolvit secundum amplitudinem suae considerationis.

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regarding site, or regarding form, explains (it) according to the same [ad eam]; the metaphysician, who considers every being, explains (them) according to the same [ad eam]: and each one explains (the object of his science) according to the amplitude of his consideration. Nam physicus3 inferior, qui negotiatur circa generationem et corruptionem, considerat materiam, ut est principium generationis et corruptionis; et sic est solum in his inferioribus. Et quoniam omnia talia sunt ad invicem transmutabilia, ideo solum dicit eandem4 materiam generabilium et corruptibilium. Physicus superior considerat ipsam materiam mutabilem sive ad situm, sive ad formam, et videt eandem passionem in inferioribus et superioribus, per quam mutabilia sunt ad situm, ut partibilitatem mobilis, cuius principium est materia; et ideo resolvit ad materiam omnis rei corporalis, et secundum hunc physicum est eadem materia in omnibus corporalibus. Metaphysicus considerat naturam omnis creaturae, et maxime substantiae per se entis, in qua est considerare et actum essendi, et hunc dat forma; et stabilitatem per se existendi, et hanc dat et praestat illud cui innititur forma; hoc est materia. Et quoniam per se esse in spiritualibus et corporalibus dicit communitatem, non aequivocationem, et communitatem generis et rei, non analogiae solum;5 ideo oportet recurrere ad principii unitatem; ideo secundum metaphysicum in omnibus per se entibus est pondere unitatem materiae. For the physicist3 of the lower world [physicus inferior], who busies (himself) about generation and corruption, considers matter, as it is the principle of generation and corruption, and in this manner it is only in these inferior (things). And since all such are transmutable into [ad] one another, for that reason he says only that the matter of generable and corruptible (things is) the same.4 The physicist of the superior world [Physicus superior] considers matter itself mutable, whether according to site, or according to form, and he sees the same passion among inferior and superior (bodies), through which they are mutable according to site, such as (the passion which is) the divisibility of the movable, the principle of which is matter; and for that reason he explains every corporal thing according to matter, and according to this physicist matter is the same in all corporal (things). The metaphysician considers the nature of every creature, most of all of a substance being through itself [substantiae per se entis], in which there is also a considering of the act of being, and this (act) form gives; and (likewise he considers) the stability to exist through ones self, and that, which form supports, that is matter, gives and presents this (stability). And since to be through itself [per se esse] in spiritual and corporal (things) means a commonality [communitatem], not an equivocation, and a commonality of genus and thing, not only of analogy;5 for that reason one is bound [oportet] to recur to the unity of a principle; for that reason, according to the metaphysician, there is in all (things), being through themselves, the pondering of a unity of matter. The consideration of all of these philosophers is true, but they judge differently. For the physicist does not say, that there is the same matter except in corporal (things),6 because he never comes to consider matter according to (its) essence, but

Omnium istorum philosophorum consideratio vera est, sed differenter iudicant. Physicus enim non dicit, eandem esse materiam nisi in corporalibus,6 quia nunquam venit ad considerandum materiam secundum essentiam,

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sed solum secundum esse; et absque dubio aliquod esse habet in corporalibus, quod non in spiritualibus, et aliquod in corruptibilibus, quod non in incorruptibilibus. Metaphysicus vero non tantum secundum esse, sed secundum essentiam7 considerat; et quia, abstracto omni esse, non est reperire nec etiam fingere diversitatem in materia; ideo dicit, esse unam per essentiam.

only according to (its) to be [esse]; and without a doubt it has some being [esse] in corporal (things), which (it does) not (have) in spiritual ones, and some being in corruptibles, which (it does) not (have) in incorruptibles. But the metaphysician does not only consider (it) according to its to be, but (also) according to (its) essence;7 and because, abstracted from every to be, there is no finding of nor even the fashioning of [fingere] a diversity in matter; for that reason he says, that it is one through essence. And for that reason, when the theologian treats this question, either he treats it thoroughly as a (philosopher) of nature, or as a metaphysician, because he can accept the standards of measure of all sciences, since they should serve him zealously. If as a (philosopher) of nature, thus he will say, that it is not the same; if as a metaphysician, he will say that it is the same through (its) essence, differing according to (its) to be. And since the metaphysician judges in a more noble manner than the inferior sciences, for that reason those who posit that matter (is) the same in spiritual and corporal (things), (being themselves) elevated more highly, judged better, even though according to the diverse considerations of each they can speak the truth, as has been shown beforehand.
1

Et ideo, cum hanc quaestionem tractat theologus, aut pertractat eam sicut naturalis, aut sicut metaphysicus, quia ipse potest accipere modos omnium scientiarum, cum ei famulentur. Si ut naturalis, sic dicet, non esse eandem; si ut metaphysicus, dicet eandem esse per essentiam, differentem secundum esse. Et quoniam nobiliori modo iudicat metaphysicus quam scientiae inferiores, ideo hi qui posuerunt materiam eandem in spiritualibus et corporalibus, altius elevati, melius iudicaverunt, quamvis secundum diversas considerationes utrique potuerint dicere verum, ut prius ostensum est.

Cod. U bene addit eorum. Paulo inferius auctoritate cod. cc et ed. 1 posuimus corporibus corruptibilibus pro corporalibus et corruptibilibus, quod Vat. cum aliis mss. minus congrue habet. 2 Aristot., VIII. Metaph. text. 12. (VII. c. 4.) ait: In naturalibus igitur et generabilibus substantiis necesse est ita procedere, si quis recte procedet . . . De naturalibus autem, sed perpetuis substantiis alia ratio est; fortassis etenim quaedam non habent materiam, aut non talem, sed solum quae seccundum locum mobilis est . Averroes super hunc locum dicit: Substantiae vero aeternae, quia in eis non est potentia ad corruptionem, non est in eis materia, sed materia earum est aliquid existens in actu, scil. corpus; ideo dignius habent hoc nomen subiectum quam hoc nomen materia . . . istae substantiae caelestes non habent materiam, scil quia non sunt compositae ex materia et forma, sed ex corpore et forma animata intelligibili, non ita quod anima sit res animata, non ita quod illic et aliquid, quod animatur per animam aut vivit per vitam, sed sunt animata per se et viva . . . et ideo dicit Themistus, quod sole et luna et stellae aut sint formae sine

Codex U adds well of them [eorum]. A little below this on the authority of codex cc and edition 1 we have put corruptible bodies [corporibus corruptibilibus] for corporal and corruptible (things) [corporalibus et corruptibilibus], which the Vatican edition, together with other manuscripts, has, less congruously. 2 Aristotle in Metaphysics, Bk. VIII, text 12 (Bk. VII, ch. 4) says: Therefore, in natural and generable substances it is necessary to proceed thus, if one is to proceed rightly . . . However concerning natural, but perpetual, substances there is another reason; for indeed perhaps certain ones do not have matter, or not such (a matter), but only what is mobile according to place . Averros on this passage says: But eternal substances, because there is not in them a potency for corruption, there is not in them a matter, but their mater is something existing in act, namely a body; for that reason they have this name subject in a manner more worthy than this name matter . . . those celestial substances do not have a matter, that is, because they have not been composed out of matter and form, but out of a body and an animated, intelligible form, not thus that a

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materiis, aut habent materias per aequivocationem, sicut est dispositio in materia intellectus. 3 Vat. hic et in seqq. pluries philosophus pro physicus. 4 Plures codd. ut K X Y aa communem, plures alii perperam omnem. 5 Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 12. (IV. c. 6.). 6 Non pauci codd. in hac prop., refragante contextu, omittunt nisi. Opponitur enim infra metaphysicus tum physico superiori, qui omnium omnino corporalium rerum, non autem spiritualium, unam materiam esse vult, tum physico inferiori, qui istam unitatem restringit ad materiam rerum terrenarum. 7 In cod. cc et ed. 1 additur et in quantum ipsa est substantia in potentia solum.

soul is an animated thing, not thus that it and something, which is animated through a soul either lives through life, but they are animated through themselves and alive . . . and for that reason Themistius says, that the Sun and Moon and stars are either forms without matters, or have matters through equivocation, just as there is a disposition in a matter of understanding. 3 The Vatican edition, here and very often in the following, reads philosopher [philosophus] for physicist [physicus]. 4 Several codices, such as K X Y and aa, have common [communem] for the same [eandem], several others faultily have all [omnem]. 5 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text. 12 (Bk. IV, ch. 6). 6 Not a few codices in this proposition, breaking with the context, omit except [nisi]. For below there is a contrasting of the metaphysician [metaphysicus] both to the physician of the superior world [physicus superiori], who of all corporal things, but not of spiritual ones, wants that there is entirely one matter, and to the physician of the inferior world [physico inferiorri], who restricts this unity to the matter of earthly things. 7 In codex cc and edition 1 there is added and inasmuch as it itself is only a substance in potency [et in quantum ipsa est substantia in potential solum].

p. 98 Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes materiam eandem per essentiam in spiritualibus et corporalibus, sicut manifeste innuit Augustinus in libro de Mirabilibus sacrae Scripturae, qui fuit altissimus metaphysicus. 1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod distinguitur materia contra angelicam naturam; dicendum, quod loquitur de materia secundum esse, non secundum essentiam. Vel aliter, distinguitur ratione actualitatis,1 quae est in Angelo, ratione cuius summe inter creaturas appropinquat Deo, et ratione possibilitatis, quae est in materia de se, ratione cuius est prope nihil. Therefore, the reasons proving, that matter is the same through essence in spiritual and corporal (things), are to be conceded, just as (St.) Augustine, who was a most lofty metaphysician, manifestly hints at in the book On the Wonders of Sacred Scripture. 1. What, therefore, is objected, that matter is distinguished against the nature of an Angel; it must be said, that it speaks of matter according to being, not according to essence. And/or in another manner, it is distinguished according to the reckoning of the actuality,1 which is in the Angel, by reason of which (the Angel), among (all) creatures, approaches God in the highest manner [summe], and (it is distinguished) according to the reckoning of the possibility, which is in matter of itself, by reason of which it is near nothing. 2. What is objected: whose matter is one etc.; it must be said, that it speaks of matter according

2. Quod obiicitur: quorum materia est una etc.; dicendum, quod loquitur de materia secundum

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esse, hoc est de materia transmutabili, ratione cuius dicuntur res ad invicem transmutabiles; et ideo sermo ille secundum physicum et in genere physici est intelligendus, et alii sermones consimiles, qui dicunt, materiam esse diversam. Omnes enim loquuntur de materia secundum esse.

to being, (and) this concerns the matter of a transmutable, by reason of which things are said to be transmutable into [ad] one another; and for that reason that discourse [sermo] is to be understood according to the physicist and in the kind (belonging) to the physicist, and the other, consimilar discourses, which say, that matter is diverse. For all speak of matter according to being. 3. What is objected concerning the power of suscepting, it must be said, that the power of matter considered according to itself is not more for this form than for another, nay it holds itself indifferently to every (form).2 For matter considered in itself is neither spiritual, nor corporal; and for that reason the capacity consequent to the essence of matter holds itself indifferently to a form, whether a spiritual or a corporal one. But because matter is never despoiled from all being, and what is once under a corporal being is never laid aside [exuitur], and similarly that, which is under a spiritual being: hence it is, that the matter consequent to the to be in (things) spiritual and corporal is different [alia et alia] 4. What is objected concerning divisibility [partibilitate], it must be said, that this is not by reason of matter itself, because matter, abstracted from every form, is simple; yet it does not have an actual simplicity, as a point (does), but is simple, because it lacks an actual extension, yet has a possibility for it; and when the nature of a corporal form is given to that matter, then (that possibility) is reduced to act. Wherefore when it is said, that extension is from matter, it must not be understood, that (it is)3 from matter according to its essence, but according to its to be, insofar as it suscepts a corporal form, which is not born to be in matter except with extension, though it is in itself one consisting according to a simple essence .4 5. What is objected, that matter is a shadow; it must be said, that it is said (to be) a shadow by reason of a privation of form, which5 form is a light; and for that reason matter with privation would be repugnant to contemplation. And because among the Angels has been wrought

3. Quod obicitur de potentia suscipiendi, dicendum, quod potentia materiae secundum se consideratae non est magis ad hanc formam quam ad aliam, immo indifferenter se habet ad omnem.2 Nam materia in se considerata nec est spiritualis, nec corporalis; et ideo capacitas consequens essentiam materiae indifferenter se habet ad formam sive spiritualem, sive corporalem; sed quia materia nunquam exspoliatur ab omni esse, et quae semel est sub esse corporali nunquam exuitur, et similiter illa quae est sub esse spirituali: hinc est, quod materia consequens esse in spiritualibus et corporalibus est alia et alia.

4. Quod obiicitur de partibilitate, dicendum, quod hoc non est ratione ipsius materiae, quia materia, abstracta omni forma, simplex est; non tamen habet actualem simplicitatem, ut punctus, sed est simplex, quia caret actuali extensione, habet tamen possibilitatem ad illam; et cum natura formae corporalis illi materiae datur, tunc reducitur ad actum. Unde cum dicitur, quod extensio est a materia, non est intelligendum, quod3 a materia secundum suam essentiam, sed secundum esse, prout suscipit formam corporalem, quae non est nata esse in materia nisi cum extensione, quamvis ipsa in se sit simplici essentia consistens .4

5. Quod obiicitur, quod materia est tenebra; dicendum, quod tenebra dicitur ratione privationis formae, quae5 forma lumen est; et ideo materia cum privatione repugnaret contemplationi. Et quia in Angelis facta est sub actu perfecto, sublata privatione; hinc est, quod

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remota est ab ea ratio tenebrositatis; et sic patet illud. Non enim est tenebra per essentiam, nisi quis forte dicat tenebram comparative: sicut creatura omnis tenebra est respectu summae lucis, sic et materia tenebra potest dici et respectu Dei et respectu formae, qua perficitur.

under a perfect act, with privation withdrawn [sublata]; hence it is, that there has been removed from (its matter) a reckoning of shadowiness; and thus that is clear. For it is not a shadow through essence, except perhaps one says shadow in a comparative manner: just as every creature is a shadow in respect of the Most High Light, so too matter can be said (to be) a shadow both in respect of God and in respect of the form, by which it is perfected. 6. What is objected, that matter is not that by which all (things) are measured;6 it must be said, that though some wanted to say, that matter, according to the reckoning by which it is a fundament, grants a fixed being [esse fixum], and in that reckoning it is the reason for being measured, because it tastes [sapit] and participates more from the nature of the genus of substance, which (genus) is in itself more supported (by matter); yet it is not fitting to say this, that matter itself is that one (principle of measurement), since this ought to be (something) most complete, just as is said in the tenth (book) of The First Philosophy,7 that whiteness is the measure of all colors . And for that reason it must be said, that we do not posit one matter, because it itself is a measure, but because, if matter is not one, it is impossible to posit some one measuring (principle), since the latter presupposes the former. But what that one (principle) is, which is the measure of all, which are in the genus of substance, this belongs to another investigation [inquisitionis]. SCHOLIUM I. About the unity of matter, common, as is supposed, to all things, there is first asked in this second Question, whether the unity is a specific one, (and) second in the third Question, whether the unity is a numeric one. Neither Question has a place in the sentence of those, who judge that matter is in no manner to be posited among the Angels. (Those) following the other sentence disputed of the unity of matter in a metaphysically manner. St. Bonaventure judges, that it itself, according to essence or metaphysically, is one in all created (things), one not by a unity of universality, nor of singularity, but in an intermediary manner

6. Quod obiicitur, quod materia non est illud quo omnia mensurantur;6 dicendum, quod licet aliqui voluerint dicere, quod materia, ratione qua est fundamentum, dat esse fixum, et in ea ratione est ratio mensurandi, quia plus sapit et participat de natura generis substantiae, quod magis in se ipso fulcitum est; tamen illud non est conveniens dicere, quod ipsa materia sit illud unum, cum hoc debeat esse completissimum, sicut dicitur in decimo primae Philosophiae,7 quod albedo est mensura omnium colorum . Et ideo dicendum, quod non ponimus materiam unam, quia ipsa sit mensura, sed quia, si non est materia una, impossibile est ponere aliquod unum mensurans, cum illud praesupponat illam. Quid autem sit illud unum, quod est mensura omnium, quae sunt in genere substantiae, hoc est alterius inquisitionis.

SCHOLION. I. Circa unitatem materiae omnibus rebus, ut supponitur, communis, primo in hac q. 2. quaeritur, utrum sit unitas specifica, secundo in q. 3, utrum sit unitas numerica. Neutra quaestio habet locum in sententia eorum, qui materiam nullo modo in Angelis ponendam esse censent. Alteram sententiam sequentes disputabant de unitate materiae metaphysicae. S. Bonav. censet, ipsam secundum essentiam sive metaphysice esse unam in omnibus creatis, unam non unitate universalitatis, nec singularitatis, sed medio modo (supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. circa med.), eam esse diversam in spiritualibus et corporalibus

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creaturis, nec unam nisi secundum analogiam. Cfr. infra d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. in fine.

(above d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q, 2, in the body of the Question, near the middle), that it is diverse in spiritual and corporal creatures, and that it is not one but according to analogy. Cf. below d. 12, a. 2, q. 1, at the end. Moreover from the aforesaid it is easily understood, that the terms specific and numeric cannot be accepted in (their) proper sense, but ought to be understood in (their) transcendental sense, i. e. outside of the ten genera of predica- / -ments. For . . .
1

Ex praedicits autem facile intelligitur, terminos specifica et numerica non posse accipi in sensu proprio, sed debere intelligi in sensu transcendentali i. e. extra decem genera praedica- / -mentorum. Nam . . .

Cod. cc et ed. 1: Vel aliter, distinguitur contra naturam angelicam non ratione contrarietatis, sed ratione actualitatis. Vat. com codd. F K cc satis bene distinguit (scil. Augustinus) pro distinguitur; cod. bb distinguit rationes pro distinguitur ratione. Paulo inferius post possibilitatis cod. cc et ed. 1 subnectunt et privationis. 2 In cod. aa adiungitur formam sive spiritualem, sive corporalem. 3 Supple cum codd. F V est. 4 Ex definitione formae a Gilb. Porretano prolata, in libro Sex Princip. c. 1. 5 Vat. cum nonnullis codd. quia. Aliquanto inferius plures codd. cum ed. 1 comparatione, cod. aa in comparatione pro comparative. Circa finem solutionis plures codd. et etiam respectu formae pro et respectu formae. 6 Plurimi codd. cum 3 primis edd., contradicente contextu, numerantur. 7 Text. 7. (IX. c. 2.). 8 De quo vide supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 2, ubi unitas temporis repetitur ab unitate materiae. De seq. propositione cfr. d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, ubi tangitur, quod Deus est omnium mensura extra genus.

Codex cc and edition 1 read: And/or in another manner, it distinguishes against the nature of an Angel, not according to a reckoning of contrariety, but according to the reckoning of the actuality [Vel aliter, distinguitur contra naturam angelicam non ratione contrarietatis, sed ratione actualitatis]. The Vatican edition, together with codices F K and cc has sufficiently well (St. Augustine) distinguishes [distinguitur] for it is distinguished [distinguitur]; codex bb has he distinguishes the reasons [distinguit rationes] for it is distinguished according to the reckoning [distinguitur ratione]. A little below this after possibility [possibilitatis] codex cc and edition 1 subjoin and privation [et privationis]. 2 In codex aa there is adjoined explicitly form, whether spiritual or corporal [formam sive spiritualem, sive corporalem]. 3 Supply together with codices F and V it is [est]. 4 As quoted from the definition of form by Gilbert of Porretain, in (his) book On the Six Principles, ch. 1. 5 The Vatican edition, together with not a few codices, has because [quia] for which [quae]. Somewhat below this several codices, together with edition 1, have according to a comparison [comparatione], codex aa in a comparison [in comparatione] for in a comparative manner [comparative]. Near the end of the solution several codices read and also in respect of the form [et etiam respectu formae] for and in respect of the form [et respectu formae]. 6 Very many codices, together with 3 first editions, contradicting the context, have are numbered [numerantur] for are measured [mensurantur]. 7 Text 7 (Bk. IX, ch. 2). 8 Concerning which see d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, where the unity of time is sought from a unity of matter. Concerning the following proposition, cf. d. 2, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, where, that God is the measure, outside the genus (of measure), of all (things), is touched upon.

p. 99

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praedica- / -mentorum. Nam materia metaphysica est ens omnino in potentia, ideo nec genus nec species esse potest, quae dicunt aliquomodo actum (hic in corp.). Haec unitas magis explicatur infra q. 3. (in fine corp.) et vocatur a S. Doctore unitas homogeneitatis. Homogeneum autem dicitur proprie id quod habet partes omnes eiusdem rationis, ut aqua, et cuius quaelibet pars recipit praedicationem totius.

predica- / -ments. For metaphysical matter is a being entirely in potency, for that reason it can be neither a genus nor a species, which mean in some manner an act (here in the body of the Question). This unity is explained more below in q. 3 (at the end of the body of the Question) and is called by the Seraphic Doctor a unity of homogeneity. Moreover the homogeneous is properly said (to be) that which has all (of its) parts in the same reckoning [partes omnes eiusdem rationis], such as water, and of which any part (thereof) receive the predication of the whole. II. The few authors, who treat of these (matters), resolve this and the following (Question) in one question. In the solution (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, de Rerum principio., q. 8, a. 4, and Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 1, agree. But (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 3 only mentions and solves the arguments for the affirmative and negative, to proffer his own judgment concerning the (diverse) sentences.

II. Auctores pauci, qui de his tractant, una quaestione hanc et sequentem absolvunt. In solutione consentiunt Scotus, de Rerum princip. q. 8. a. 4; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. Sed Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. tantum argumenta pro responsione affirmativa et negativa affert et solvit, quin suum de his sententiis iudicium proferant.

This English Translation and the digitization of the Latin and English texts, the HTML markup, all emendations and corrections of the Latin text, and all notes by the Translator, are 2007, 2008 by Br. Alexis Bugnolo. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

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