Security Threat Groups or Individual Factors:

What Are the Major Causes of Prison Violence?

William J. Morgan, Jr.*

William J. Morgan, Jr. is ABD at Capella University, a criminal justice professor at Erie Community College, and
a correction officer in the New York State Department of Correctional Services.

Abstract: Violence generated by inmates impacts the administration of the correctional facility; individual factors
are found to have a more compelling effect than institutional dynamics. Inmate behaviors that contribute to
prison violence in the United States are identified. Illustrated are institutional and individual factors correlated to
inmate violence. The methodology used is the examination of criminal justice text books and peer-reviewed
journal articles on the phenomenon of prison violence.

KEYWORDS: Gang activity, Inmates, Institutional factors, Individual factors, Prison violence

INTRODUCTION more to them than the piece of personal freedom they

Prison is an institution that is rehabilitative and
secure but not a panacea to the ills of man. Even the
most secure of correctional facilities experience
prison disorder and violence on a daily basis. Both
individual and institutional factors were cited as
problems that corrections experience, such as harms
from gangs, architectural design, management
philosophy, and expressive and instrumental
violence. The most important causal features of
prison violence are discussed, elucidated, and
explained in the literature.
A brief discussion of classical theory of
criminology is followed by individual causative
factors of prison violence and disorder.
must lose in exchange” (Curran & Renzetti, 2001, p. 6).
Inherent in nature are the principles of right and wrong;
crime is an immoral behavior that denigrates society
and the quality of the bond formed (Schmalleger,
2006). Prison is a law-based institution with rules
specific to the intended population for utilitarian
purposes and based on a social contract. The discussion
of prison gangs is based on basic principles of the
criminological school, which is inclusive in the
discussion. Prison gangs and the peripheral violence
that perpetuates are individual factors and prerogatives
that follow offenders from the street to prison and a
major cause of prison violence.
Prison disorder

Classical theory Theories of prison violence elucidate problems that

The classical school of criminology proposed
three tenets of human nature, which assumed that
people have free will, are hedonistic, and rational
(Miller, Schreck, and Tewksbury, 2006). According
to these basic principles, people make choices based
on the pleasure/pain principle and calculate the
beneficial outcomes including anticipation of the
consequences of criminal action, cited by Miller, et
al. The theory of social contract specific within the
classical school assumed that “…people come
together and form a society because the social
stability and protection such and arrangement affords
is worth
________________________________________
*Address correspondence to the author:
William J. Morgan, Jr.
Erie Community College
45 Oak Street
Buffalo, New York 14203
(716) 851-1246 Email: morganw@ecc.edu
correctional organizations face on a daily basis. First,
the importation model posits that small groups of
inmates come to prison with a proclivity for gang
behavior, subcultural values, the behavior increases
with incarceration, and that disorder arises from the
concentration approach (McCorkle, Meithe, & Drass,
1995; Mears & Reisig, 2006). Secondly, the deprivation
theory assumed higher levels of disorder occur if
inmates are dispossessed of security, heterosexual
relationships, and goods/services as a matter of
structural deprivation (Sykes, 1958; Mears and Reisig,
2006; Merton, 1957). In that vein, inmates are
maladaptive to the prison environment and disorder
results from conceptual deprivations. Third, a theory of
criminal propensity using inmate misbehavior that is
evident in proclivity of the life course (Blumstein,
Cohen, & Farrington, 1988a, 1988b; Blumstein, Cohen,
Roth, & Visher, 1986). Perhaps the most salient points
about prison disorder are discussions on gangs and
violence.
Gang activity
The issue of gangs, or security threat groups, in
prison is a major concern for correctional
organizations that consume peripheral misbehavior
and violence in correctional facilities as individual
factors to include gambling, assault, extortion, rape,
and murder (Fong and Buentello, 1991). The early
formation of prison gangs was based on racial/ethnic
ideologies, protection from other groups, which later
developed the intent to commit acts of violence and
formed crime syndicates.
A study conducted by Griffin and Hepburn
(2006), hypothesized that 50% of prison disorder,
gangs perpetrate violence, and that approximately 3%
of the prison population is involved in gang activity.
A good predictor of violent conduct and calculated
risk taking is age where young people tend to engage
in risk taking behavior, which is especially true of
young inmates with a history of incarceration and
violence. When controlling for the structural and
deprivation effects of incarceration, the predictors of
violent conduct are prior violence, age, ethnicity and
race, age, and prior incarceration (Bottoms, 1999;
Ellis, 1984; Gendreau, Goggin, & Law, 1997; Griffin
& Hepburn, 2006; Harer & Steffensmeier, 1996;
Wooldredge Griffin, & Pratt, 2001). The main
finding of the Griffin and Hepburn study concluded
that gang-affiliated inmates were twice as likely to
perpetrate assault within the first three years of
incarceration when the factors of age, commitment
offense, prior incarceration, security length, and
sentence length when compared to inmates
nonaffiliated to a gang. Prison gangs generally
originated from Illinois or California Street gangs and
emigrated to the Federal and State correctional
departments (Bartollas, 2002).Classified as security
threat groups, gangs in the prison system originated
in institutions in the 1950s became more organized
since that time, competed for profit through violence,
little is known about prison gangs due to avoidance
detection, and the secretive nature.
According to Fleisher and Decker (2001), the
following is a definition of prison gangs:
…an organization which operates within the
prison system as a self-perpetuating
criminally oriented entity, consisting of a
select group of inmates who have
established an organized chain of command
and are governed by an established code of
conduct. The prison gang will usually
operate in secrecy and has as its goal to
conduct gang activities by controlling their
prison environment through intimidation and
violence directed toward non-members (p.
2)
At the individual and intra-group level, gangs pose
security threats to correctional facilities and undermine
the goal of rehabilitation (Jacobs, 2001). Jacobs further
asserted that anti-social values, terrorism, and criminal
activities are committed and coordinated between
institutions and the streets in the quest for domination
of both environments. For example, Gaes, Wallace,
Gilman, Klein-Saffran, and Suppa (2002) examined
gang membership and violent acts compared to
peripheral members. The study used two dependant
variables of violence, which were violent misconduct
and other misconduct category; the former included
assault, homicide, aggravated assault, etc., and the latter
sexual misconduct, drugs, and property crimes. Based
on a “threat index,” the rate of gang misconduct was
compared to the general inmate population of violence
to other forms of misconduct (p. 363). The study
concluded that most gang violence and other
misconduct increased because of gang affiliation. The
study additionally cited that violent misconduct with
gang embeddedness decreased; a possible explanation
is that with time, gang members joined the leadership of
gangs and authorities scrutinized and evaluated their
security levels, therefore, a decrease in individual
member violence.
In the United States today, 2,500 distinct gangs are
reported in every state and most cities. Street gangs
demand respect, where revenge on rivals is appropriate,
which accentuates the reputation. In street gangs, youth
join gangs for several reasons to include structure,
nurturing, belonging, economic opportunity, and
excitement; risk factors to the community include
disorganization, low commitment to positive peers, low
commitment to school, and externalizing behaviors
(Hess & Wrobleski, 2006). These and other factors find
synthesis with prison gangs, generally drawn along
racial lines and commonly homogeneous in nature
according to neighborhood affiliation, nationality,
religion, cultural factors, or gang membership in
mainstream society, that bring values and attitudes from
the streets (Bjerregaard, 2003; Davis & Flannery,
2001). Organizational similarities are common in prison
gangs, such as the hierarchy structure similar to their
street organized crime counterparts. Further similarities
included signs, dress, mottos, tattoos, and a
membership requirement of “blood in, blood out;”
working in groups is further similarity of gang
affiliation and philosophy that rarely differs between
gangs in the United States today (Bjerregaard, 2003;
Fleisher & Decker, 2001; Hess & Wrobleski). The
structure of gangs would not be complete without a
correlation between street and prison gangs.
Several subgroups exist as individual inmates align
with prohibited groups for cultural, religious, and/or for
protection. Racial and ethnic divides are dominant
influences on prison population but second only gang
membership, which are also drawn along racial and
ethnic lines (Trulson, Marquart, and Kawucha, 2006).
Prison gangs exist for protection from other gangs;
however, correctional systems find that gangs are
involved in extortion, murder, gambling, prostitution,
and drug-trafficking and considered crime syndicates
(Fong & Buentello, 1991). Correlations are attributed
to gang violence and the overall increase in violence
in mainstream society and prison (Howell, 1994).
Proposed by Alarid and Cromwell (2002)
common myths is that prison gangs are unorganized,
street gangs and prisons gangs are separate entities,
and transferring prison gang members will eliminate
gangs within the prison. Conversely, gangs are
organized with rules of conduct, a hierarchy, gang
members retain full connection while in prison as
street gangs exist within the institution, and
transferring gang members expands gang recruiting
and membership. Therefore, a synthesis of street and
prison gangs emerges for preservation of the group,
the individual and illicit activities. For example,
Howell (1994) stressed that many gangs are involved
in drug trafficking in correctional facilities and the
streets. Some gangs, such as the Latin Kings, Nation
of Islam, Bloods, and Crips, originated as street
gangs and synthesized into prison gangs. Other
gangs, such as NETA and the Aryan Brotherhood,
originated as prison gangs and synthesized into street
gangs. Because the reach of gangs extends beyond
prison walls, it makes them especially treacherous as
business is conducted while incarcerated, such as
contract murder, drugs, and other gang activity.
Extensive communication systems coordinated
between inmates, criminal activity, and street gangs
are common as violent and organized individuals are
brought to the attention of correctional
administrations (Carlson, 2001). The point was
reinforced by Seiter (2001) that gangs are more
sophisticated, have well-established connections to
street gangs, have an extensive membership, and
money rival of many successful businesses or by
Coughlin and Venkatesh (2003) who established that
the rational, illicit, organized gang activity structure
is a reflection of the intricacies that corrections must
contend.
Postulated by Carlson (2001), illicit activity and
an established communication system between prison
and street gangs found that gangs are more violent,
sophisticated, and organized, which leaves
correctional agencies to devise new strategies to
contend with nefarious conduct. Seiter (2001)
asserted that gangs are more sophisticated, have well-
established connections to street gangs, an extensive
membership, and money. Understanding consistency
of gangs how they contribute to racial tensions,
higher rates of violence, and present challenges to
correctional administrators is paramount to
understanding the extent of the problem (Anti-
Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, 2002; Camp &
Camp, 1985; Ross & Richards, 2002; Ruddell, Decker,
& Egley, Jr., 2006). Factors exist for individual
violence not related to gang activity.
Other individual factors
Gang activity has been noted as the main reason for
prison violence; there are other perceived reasons that
inmates engage in violence and points to dispel these
myths are elucidated. For example, Gaes (1991) cited
that violence due to overcrowding exists for several
reasons: litigation due to poor conditions, the institution
can no longer deliver services or protect inmates, and
that inmate density parallels a decline in the quality of
life that occurs. Gaes further asserted a lack of evidence
in the literature exists and that correctional
administrators have stated these reasons are suspect; the
institution must make accommodations for crowding
such as increased use of inmate grievance procedures,
increase in staffing, and tighter institutional controls.
Cited is that individual factors have a more prevalent
than institutional factors for staffing-to-inmate ratios,
type of institutional control, and type, age, and size of
facility. Gaes suggested that individual dynamics
should be examined independent of institutional factors.
Examples provided by Welch (1999) found that
individual factors contributing to violence fall into two
categories: Instrumental and Expressive. Expressive
violence is the spontaneous, irrational emotional
response to stimuli conducive to the psychological state
of mind or the spontaneous release of tension by the
group or individual also known as patterned
spontaneous attack. In the correctional setting, one
might find that female inmates use that type of violence
compared to males. Male inmates tend to use
instrumental violence that involves rationality,
calculation, and planning for acquiring power in prison,
such as inmate-on-inmate assaults, gang activity, and
rape. Expressive types of violence, according to Welch,
are also known as spontaneous attacks, which are
premeditated, difficult to anticipate, and perpetrated on
both staff and inmates. Spontaneous attacks are justified
and rationalized by the inmate population by creating
peer admiration, fear, protection, concealing
attacks/creating opportunities, and assaulting inmates
by providing challenges, temptations and provocations,
even for inmates who are nonviolent (Welch, 1999).
These aspects are sometimes known as prison survival
strategies.
Prisons are violent places because they house the
violent offenders, which is true in any security-type
institution. Inmates attempt to settle disputes and seek
power in a way in which they are accustomed to:
violence. The literature is weak on drawing correlations
between assaults/disturbances, overcrowding, and other
institutional factors. Many factors of prison gang
violence are correlated to the power and economics
to that of the street gang. As a group of convicted
felons with a propensity for criminal thinking, their
actions cause the facility to become hotbeds of crime
especially in the discussion of gang activity. Moving
away from individual factors, several institutional
factors are identified as causative factors for prison
violence, such as prison management and use of the
Supermax.
Supermax
An institutional factor of inmate violence is the
use of the Supermax prison, which is defined as,
“…free-standing facilities, or a distinct unit within a
facility, that provides for the management and secure
control of inmates who have been officially
designated as exhibiting violent or seriously
disruptive behavior while incarcerated” (Pizarro,
Stenius, & Pratt, 2006, p.7). Inmates that perpetrate
the greatest amount of disruption and violence,
although few in number, may be housed in
administrative segregation from the general inmate
population. These perpetrators of crime within the
prison walls cause assault, rape, murder, extortion,
and fear for both staff and inmates.
Alarid and Cromwell (2002) hypothesized the
common assumptions and realities for use of the
Supermax, that is, myths found that inmates are
placed in that environment due to the crime of
commitment and the level of privileges inmates
receive parallel that of inmates in general population.
The realities of Supermax institutions are that
inmates are sent here for violent/predatory behavior
within other institutions, identified as gang leaders,
high escape risks, and inmates incarcerated in the
Supermax do not have the freedoms allowed inmates
in general population because of security
status/institutional disciplinary record. Supermax
facilities are used to segregate known dangerous gang
members and leaders for utilitarian purposes but not
always based on actual prison crimes or infractions in
suppression techniques (Tachiki, 1995). Pizarro, et al;
Mears and Reisig (2006) hypothesized several myths
and realities existed for the use of Supermax; the
myth of novelty found a general deterrence to the
general inmate population with specific deterrence
model through selective incapacitation, long term
solitary confinement, and that solitary confinement is
not a new phenomenon in prison. In addition, Pizarro,
et al, evidences the myth of public safety and
appearing to be tough on crime that snowballs into a
decrease in prison violence. The assertion is
supported in a study conducted by Briggs, Sundt, and
Castellano (2003) that used an interrupted time series
design that found assaults on staff were lowered
although overall inmate-to-inmate violence was not
reduced in three states with the use of Supermax.
However, it must be noted that administrative
segregation for violent/disruptive/predatory inmates or
gang leaders help to maintain one facet of corrections,
which is the safe and secure operation of correctional
facilities. Although there is no evidence to support that
Supermax inmates suffer from mental illness due to
deprivation or lack of human contact, it was stressed by
Pizarro, et al. that Supermax may exacerbate
preexisting mental conditions and violence despite
measures taken by prison administration.
A criticism of Supermax revisits the arguments of
the concentration and importation models and that
Supermax should be used for all gang members and
violent/predatory inmates, thus, normalizing prisons
and making the goal of rehabilitation for the general
population achievable (Mears & Reisig, 2006;
McCorkle, Meithe, & Drass, 1995). The problem lies in
that only so much space exists in these facilities and
only the most violent and behavioral problem inmates
can be incarcerated at one time; therefore, the assertion
is unrealistic in expectation. Inmates with subcultural
values and/or violent tendencies do not come to the
attention of correctional management until an inquiry,
investigation initiated, or a precipitating incident
occurs.
The crux of the Supermax is reduction in prison
violence from violent and predatory inmates. Related to
the discussion of Supermax are prison administration
and managerial style and correlation to prison violence.
A criticism of the Supermax is that it does not stop
gang activity/predatory behavior/violence; conversely,
the Supermax is not designed to stop system-wide
disorder but to take the worst of the worst offenders in
prison and selectively incapacitate. A peripheral benefit
is the general deterrence to the general inmate
population to the consequences of violent behavior.
Prison administration
Prison administration has been cited as a cause for
inmate violence and disruption for several reasons. It
was postulated by Craig (2004); Reisig (1998), that the
management style of the correctional facility
contributed to prison disorder as well as the type of
disorder (e.g., less serious versus serious disorder).
Based on DiIulio’s (1987) three managerial approaches,
delineated were the control model, the responsibility
model, and consensual model for prison governance.
The control model manages every aspect of inmate life,
authoritarian in manner, order maintenance, and rigid
control is paramount to good corrections. The antithesis
is the responsibility model where inmate self-
governance and official control mechanisms are
minimized thus order maintenance are pursued as a
correctional management approach. A synthesis of the
above models occurs in the consensus model where
neither inmate governance nor rigid controls are
relied on as a managerial strategy. Craig further
asserted that a prevailing theory of control, or
“Theory X” (p. 98), has been evident in correctional
models that rely on the assumption that inmates are
unworthy of trust. Craig emphasized that a balance of
multiple tasks is the crux of prison management to
attain the goals of control, safety, punishment, and
rehabilitation. Reisig (1998) noted that prisons which
operate on the control model experienced higher
occurrences of less and serious disorder than the
either the responsibility or consensual model. Reisig
further pointed out limitations to the study, such as
the homogeneity of inmates and the small size of the
responsibility model facilities that found shared
characteristics of the inhabitants. In many of the older
and larger institutions, it is often noted that order
maintenance is used to control the inmate population,
thus, it appears that more disorder is prevalent.
On a more serious level of institutional violence, a
study conducted by Reisig (2002) concluded that
prisons experienced higher rates of gang-related
homicide where the staff and administration
experienced conflict for lack of authority. As the
dependent variable, inmate-on-inmate homicide was
reported during the study period and independent
variables were administrative control measures (staff
turnover, administrative sanction, etc.) and control
variables (overcrowding, security type, etc.). Reisig
addressed that overcrowding may result in increased
homicide, which is an issue addressed for lack of
evidence. Furthermore, inmate homicide, according
to Reisig; Palermo, Palermo, and Simpson (1996),
was a rare event not supported or related to staff
turnover. A significant finding was the less prison
administrators upheld misbehavior reports written by
officers, the higher the inmate homicide rate,
therefore, a higher increase in tension between front-
line correctional staff and administration. The most
significant finding was that members of prohibited
groups experienced a higher homicide rate compared
to the general inmate population. A more persuasive
argument is individual inmate behavioral conditions
as a response to the prison environment to assert
control through violence. Although mental illness and
a correlation to violence and murder are debatable,
inmate psychology and psychopathology found that
inmates revert to antisocial behavior in prison to
control an otherwise uncontrollable situation
(Palermo, et al., 1996). An example provided by
Palermo, et al, found the murder of Jeffrey Dahmer in
prison was not due to overcrowding, but the
psychopathology of the killers combined with racial
overtones. Furthermore, criticisms were that the
correctional agency should have carefully screened
the life sentenced inmates more carefully for patterns
and propensity of violence.
Physical design
A further cause for institutional violence and
disorder is faulted in the physical design of prisons. In
many older maximum-security facilities, the physical
plan is indirect supervision where a correctional officer
must constantly observe inmates actions and behavior
from an enclosed booth and interaction with inmates
takes place through an intercom system; it is through a
physical barrier that staff safety is ensured. Officers
control the opening and closing of gates and inmate
safety comes in the form of individual cells; officers
call for a response team for major incidents. (Farbstein
& Wener, 1989). A personal perspective of the writer
and correction officer is a feature associated with older
maximum-security institutions was “blind spots” exist
that allow inmates to conceal illicit activity from
security staff. Conversely, direct supervision finds that
physical layout is the same as direct supervision with
that added management strategy of officers patrolling
the cell block and interacting with inmates, as proposed
Farbstein & Wener. Furthermore, officers intervene in
minor altercations between inmates and correct
nefarious behavior. The concept of direct supervision as
an operational issue has led to decreased tension and
stress of staff and inmates, contraband, vandalism, and
sexual or violent assault (Wener, 2006). However, in
direct supervision prisons, major incidents are less and
minor incidents higher. The results are mixed on the
effectiveness of these types of prisons because they
restrict space that inmates have in non-direct
supervision institutions, thereby causing a perceived
deprivation for inmates (Wener, 2006).
Other correctional responses
Correctional administrations established various
control mechanisms to combat gangs, control behavior,
but can never prepare enough and implement new
strategies (Carlson, 2001; Seiter, 2001). One example
of policy is the New York State Department of
Correctional Services (NYSDOCS) that does not
recognize prison gangs but instead focuses on
individual crimes committed in prison and deal with
each case as separate from gang activity. The state
believes that recognition empowers inmate gangs and
does not provide information to the media or the public,
although Carlson noted close monitoring of these
groups. For example, New York utilizes a multiuse data
base for identification of gang members created by
several states known as the Northeast Gang Intelligence
System. Because gangs are dangerous, well-organized,
and multijursidictional, intelligence and open
communication between police and correctional
agencies is important; intelligence benefits both
paradigms in response to effective gang management
and identification. Other correctional paradigms have
enlisted policies to control gangs and gang activities
verified; examples include the Texas Department of
Corrections and the California Department of
Corrections (CDC) that created gang intelligence
units and opened special housing units where
identified gang members are confined, debriefed, and
disassociated from gangs. In addition, The Florida
Department of Corrections (n.d.) validates and allows
gang members to adjust to the correctional
environment; if failure is achieved, these individuals
are segregated. Examined are correctional paradigms
that enlisted policies to control gangs and gang
activities, which were verified through the courts
(Carlson, 2001).
In the past few years, inmates have filed gang-
related lawsuits in relation to protection from gangs
and gang members, psychological injury from gang
members, grooming policies as anti-gang measures,
classification and placement of gang members in
administrative segregation, and prohibited audio or
written materials (Eckhart, 2001). Inmates filed
lawsuits that correctional administrators did not
protect them from gang members under Farmer v.
Brennan (511 U.S. 825, 834 [1994]) where certain
“conditions of incarceration pose a substantial risk of
serious harm” (Eckhart, p. 59). For example, cases
were dismissed because inmates could not show that
correctional administrators deliberately ignored that
plaintiffs were likely to be assaulted by gang
members after taking several measures such as
transferring the affected inmates to another part of
the facility or placement in administrative
segregation under involuntary protective custody.
Inmates also filed lawsuits under the Eighth
Amendment provision of cruel and unusual
punishment due to psychological injury caused by
housing individual inmates with known gang
members who posed a threat to their well-being, in
crimes such as assault, extortion, and terror (Eckhart,
2001). These cases were dismissed because it could
not be assessed if inmates suffered damage and to the
extent that damage was caused. Not limited to the
general population, gang members filed lawsuits to
advance group members and gang affiliation.
Conversely, inmates filed lawsuits because of
their gang affiliation and the measures that
correctional administrations took to suppress gang
activity. The precedent setting case of Turner v.
Safely found that penological interests were
advanced and validated in the identification,
assessment, monitoring, reclassification, and
segregation of gang members for the protection of
staff and inmates (Eckhart, 2001). In the cases of
Sandin v. Connor; Barnett v. Centoni; Russell v.
Scully; In re Long Term Administrative Segregation
of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters v. Moore
(Eckhart, 2001) the Courts ruled that inmates rights
were not violated because they were segregated in
special housing due to gang affiliation, including
groups that claimed religious affiliation. As a rational
response to gangs, Federal Courts have also ruled that
maintaining order and discipline through grooming and
clothing policies is not unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. Furthermore, the Courts ruled that inmates
can be denied “materials [that] fostered disruptive
group activities…because of mere possession” by
correctional administrators in Golden v. McCaughtry;
George v. Sullivan, under the Turner Standard, which
included written lyrics, or written material related to
gangs (Eckhart, 2001, p. 63).
Conclusion
Violence is often a serious component of prison life;
it is a matter of context important to understanding the
actors and place. Gangs cause the majority of disorder
and violence as they vie for control of the inmate
population through intimidation, extortion, assault,
rape, and murder. Other causes of individual violence
not gang related are instrumental or expressive
violence, which are considered strategies to survive the
prison experience. Institutional dynamics of Supermax,
administration policies, and architectural designs are
often cited as causes other than individual prerequisites
that offenders bring to prison. Individual factors that are
cited as causative of prison violence seem to far
outweigh the institutional causes.
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