I

.'. .
I .

.A .;
5-

',

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: JUN 2007

16 December 1963

TRENDS I N SOVIET THOUGHT ON LIMITED WARFARE

DD/I

STAFF STUDY

CIA/RSS
REFERENCE TITLE:

___...

CAESAR XXI

..
. .. ... .

.,. ..,,..

. . . . .. ..... ... . . . .. .. .....L.:.._I.; I .^... ...

. .. . ..
,

.... . , .. ....... ,

. . . . ....

CAESAR

XXI
I
I

O f f . S e r . No. 15
I

TRENDS I N SOVIET THOUGHT ON LIMITED WARFARE

.. . ...., ... .. . .
. . .
~

T h i s is a working p a p e r , prepared in s u p p o r t of NIE 11-14-63, " C a p a b i l i t i e s of . t h e S o v i e t General Purpose F o r c e s , 1963-1969," P r i m a r i l y on t h e b a s i s of open S o v i e t m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l w r i t i n g s , t h i s r e p o r t a t t e m p t s t o i d e n t i f y new t r e n d s in S o v i e t t h i n k i n g on l i m i t e d w a r f a r e and to probe t h e i r p o s s i b l e consequences f o r S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p o l i c y , or f o r e i g n p o l i c y as it r e l a t e s t o t h e management of l o c a l c r i s e s . Although t h e writer h a s b e n e f i t e d from t h e suggest i o n s and r e s e a r c h findings of c o l l e a g u e s , he is s o l e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e paper as a whole. The DD/I Research S t a f f would welcome comment on t h e paper, a d d r e s s e d t o I r w i n P. Aalpern, who wrote it, o r t o t h e Chief or Deputy Chief o f t h e S t a f f .
.

...
. ....... .

:, ,

I
I
I

I
~

I
~

TRENDS I N SOVIET THOUGHT ON LIMITED WARFARE Page

1
4

I.
. . . ......._.
. ..

THE EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE Toward Greater T a c t i c a l F l e x i b i l i t y Toward Strategic Nuclear S t a l e m a t e

.. ..
'

12

Motivating F a c t o r s

13

11.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET MILITARY POLICY The European T h e a t e r

17
21

The N u c l e a r Problem
Distant L i m i t e d M i l i t a r y Action

24
26
29

E f f e c t on Weapons and T r a i n i n g

., ..
I

TD!xSwL

. ...
~~

1
I

TRENDS # I N SOVIET THOUGHT ON LIMITED WARFARE Summary Responsive t o a changing world around them and seeki n g new o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o advance t h e power and p r e s t i g e of t h e USSR, t h e S o v i e t s have embarked on a new c o u r s e i n t h e i r t h i n k i n g on t h e q u e s t i o n of l i m i t e d w a r f a r e . Whereas t h e S o v i e t s had e a r l i e r assumed a r i g i d n e g a t i v e s t a n c e on d i r e c t involvement i n l i m i t e d w a r f a r e , e s p e c i a l l y i n Europe, t h e y now appear t o wish t o have t h e o p t i o n t o u s e t h e i r m i l i t a r y f o r c e s on a s u b - s t r a t e g i c scale. In g e n e r a l , t h e y evince a strong i n t e r e s t i n gaining greater f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e management of l o c a l c r i s e s and, i n r e c e n t m i l i t a r y w r i t i n g s , have sought t o communicate t h i s i n t e r e s t t o t h e West, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e United S t a t e s , which h a s also e v i n c e d an i n t e r e s t i n r e d u c i n g t h e r i s k s of r a p i d escalat i o n from small-scale w a r f a r e i n Europe as w e l l as i n o t h e r c r i t i c a l areas of t h e world. There is no i n d i c a t i o n , however, t h a t t h e S o v i e t s are i n t e r e s t e d i n b r i n g i n g greater f l e x i b i l i t y t o t h e realm of s t r a t e g i c warfare. On t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e S o v i e t s c o n s i s t e n t l y reject as i m p r a c t i c a b l e , immoral, and u n a c c e p t a b l e t o them U.S. t h e o r i e s on c o n t r o l l e d s t r a t e g i c w a r f a r e . R a t h e r , t h e S o v i e t s stress t h a t t h e a d v e r s a r i e s w i l l f i g h t t o a d e c i s i o n i n a g e n e r a l n u c l e a r w a r ; t h e y dramatize t h e h o r r o r s of s u c h a w a r and t h e c e r t a i n t y t h a t none w i l l e s c a p e widespread n u c l e a r d e s t r u c t i o n . The S o v i e t s , hence, wish t o p r e s e r v e t h e i d e a of n u c l e a r stalemate or s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y s t a b i l i t y - - n o t t o undermine it. T h i s closes t h e circle, f o r t h e f r e e z i n g of s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y power t e n d s t o make t h e local u s e of m i l i t a r y f o r c e p o s s i b l e w i t h a low In s h o r t , g r e a t e r " t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y " r i s k of e s c a l a t i o n . and mutually- acknowledged " s t r a t e g i c i n f l e x i b i l it y" appear t o be c o r r e l a t i v e o b j e c t i v e s of t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p . It is perhaps t o o e a r l y t o estimate w i t h c o n f i d e n c e t h e impact which t h e observed t r e n d i n S o v i e t t h o u g h t w i l l
- i -

.. .. . .. ....... . . . ... . ,. . . . . . .
,

1
I

;..,.......... . . ...... . .. , . . .. .. .. .. . ..

,
i
I

I
I

:a>:.>s

.. . .... ., .. ...... . , ...,........ . , .

. . .

have on m i l i t a r y p o l i c y , both i n r e g a r d t o t h e management of crises and t h e t r a i n i n g and e q u i p p i n g of ' S o v i e t t r o o p s , For one t h i n g , S o v i e t d o c t r i n e s t i l l a p p e a r s t o be in a f o r m a t i v e s t a t e , as is U.S.-NATO d o c t r i n e on t h e problem of l i m i t e d w a r f a r e i n t h e European t h e a t e r . Even i f e n t i r e l y f i r m e d up, t h e d o c t r i n e w o u l d be an i n a d e q u a t e b a s i s f o r f o r e c a s t i n g S o v i e t b e h a v i o r in a l o c a l crisis because, i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , how S o v i e t leaders react w i l l depend n o t on any e s t a b l i s h e d d o c t r i n e b u t on t h e i r assessment a t t h e c r i t i c a l t i m e of t h e r i s k s involved and of t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s t o e x e r c i s e v a r i o u s o p t i o n s . That t h e S o v i e t leaders appear t o be r e a c h i n g f o r t h e o p t i o n t o u s e elements of t h e i r m i l i t a r y f o r c e s t o r e s o l v e l o c a l issues does n o t , of course, mean t h a t t h e S o v i e t s w i l l u s e them f o r t h a t purpose. B u t t h e y probably c a l c u l a t e t h a t s u c h an o p t i o n is i n d i s p e n s a b l e in an environment of m u t u a l l y acknowledged s t r a t e g i c stalemate. Where i n c r e a s e d t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y is l i k e l y t o a f f e c t S o v i e t p o l i c y i n Europe, i n t h e absence of an i d e a l stalemate, is i n s i t u a t i o n s i n which t h e U.S. and S o v i e t i n t e r e s t i n p r e v e n t i n g e s c a l a t i o n t a k e s precedence o v e r t h e i s s u e immediately a t s t a k e . Thus, it is u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e S o v i e t s would attempt t o s e t t l e t h e B e r l i n q u e s t i o n by m i l i t a r y means a s l o n g a s t h e United S t a t e s makes c l e a r and c r e d i b l e its d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o defend t h e Western s t a k e i n B e r l i n w i t h s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y power, if n e c e s s a r y . S i m i l a r l y , it is u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e S o v i e t s would l a u n c h an a l l - o u t c o n v e n t i o n a l a t t a c k a g a i n s t Europe as l o n g as t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r weapons are on s t a n d b y i n NATO forces there, and U.S. d o c t r i n e s t a t e s t h a t t h e self-imposed armaments r e s t r a i n t would be abandoned i f it i n t e r f e r e s w i t h t h e b u s i n e s s of winning. R a t h e r , under s u c h c o n d i t i o n s (of an i m p e r f e c t s t r a t e g i c stalemate) S o v i e t e x p e c t a t i o n s f o r Western a c c e p t a n c e a' t h e i r b i d f o r " t a c t i c a l f l e x i t b i l i t y " seems t o be i n t h e s p h e r e o f p l a i n l y d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n s , s u c h as a r e b u f f of a West German a t t a c k a g a i n s t E a s t Germany. T h u s , ' . t h e y now a p p e a r t o be r e a s s e s s i n g t h e r i s k s of r a p i d e s c a l a t i o n t o g e n e r a l war--risks t h e y had p r e v i o u s l y r e g a r d e d a s so g r e a t as t o i n h i b i t even a S o v i e t d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n i f t h i s meant engaging t h e a t t a c k e r s i n a l a r g e s c a l e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n Europe.

ii

..,

It is h a r d t o e s t i m a t e t h e s c a l e of l i m i t e d w a r f a r e i n Europe on which t h e S o v i e t s w o u l d be w i l l i n g t o f i g h t w i t h o u t r e s o r t i n g t o s t r a t e g i c weapons. F u l l - s c a l e convent i o n a l war i n Europe, w h i l e t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s are a v a i l a b l e t o b o t h sides, seems improbable as a S o v i e t e x p e c t a t i o n . The deep-grained f e a r of t h e consequences of a d i r e c t mass i v e c o n f r o n t a t i o n between S o v i e t and American t r o o p s i n Europe w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y c o n t i n u e t o work t o a v o i d s u c h a clash. I t is s t i l l n o t clear whether t h e S o v i e t concept i o n of t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y e x t e n d s t o t h e u s e of t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s i n l i m i t e d warfare i n Europe. D o c t r i n a l pronouncements on t h e problem t e n d t o be ambivalent. While some statements consider tactical nuclears a realistic possib i l i t y w i t h which S o v i e t f o r c e s m u s t be p r e p a r e d t o d e a l i n a l o c a l c r i s i s , most stress t h e l i k e l i h o o d of e s c a l a t i o n i f n u c l e a r weapons are employed. The ambivalence may, on t h e one hand, be i n t e n d e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t o deter t h e United States from r e s o r t i n g t o t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s and, f a i l i n g t h a t , t o a v o i d c o n f r o n t i n g t h e United States w i t h an unambiguous promise of e s c a l a t i o n ; on t h e o t h e r hand, it may r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n t assessments -by S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s of t h e r i s k s involved i n e i t h e r i n i t i a t i n g t h e u s e of t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s , o r responding i n k i n d t o t h e o p p o n e n t ' s i n i t i a t i v e i n a l o c a l c o n f l i c t . O u t s i d e t h e European framework, i n l i m i t e d c o n f l i c t s i n underdeveloped areas where t h e r e is no d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n between U , S . and S o v i e t f o r c e s , t h e S o v i e t s , by omission of s t a t e m e n t s t o t h e cont r a r y , s e e m t o regard t h e u s e of t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s by one of t h e major powers as a less dangerous c o u r s e of a c t i o n . D i s t a n t L i m i t e d M i l i t a r v Action The S o v i e t s e a r c h f o r g r e a t e r t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e Middle E a s t and S o u t h e a s t Asia h a s a l r e a d y a f f e c t e d p o l i c y . . Beginning i n 1962, t h e S o v i e t s have demonstrated a w i l l i n g n e s s t o u s e S o v i e t t r o o p s i n combat s i t u a t i o n s i n l o c a l c r i s e s on an unacknowledged b a s i s . The S o v i e t e x p e r i ence i n t h e Indonesian-West New Guinea crisis and t h e UARYemen w a r r e f l e c t s a t t h e v e r y l e a s t a p o l i c y d e c i s i o n t o u s e t r a i n e d S o v i e t crews w h i l e indigenous crews are s t i l l i n an e a r l y s t a g e of t r a i n i n g . Beyond t h i s , however, it

.. .. . .
'. :_..,..:
v...

iii

s
dangerous. (There was e v i d e n t l y n e v e r any p l a n t o employ S o v i e t t r o o p s based in C u b a . i n a s t r i c t l y local w a r between t h e United S t a t e s and Cuba.) T h e r e is n o t o n l y t h e fear of e s c a l a t i o n t h a t r e s t r a i n s t h e Soviets. There is a l s o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e USSR h a s a v e r y l i m i t e d c a p a b i l i t y for cond u c t i n g warfare a t any d i s t a n c e from t h e bloc. Therefore, u n l e s s and u n t i l these r e s t r a i n t s are l i f t e d , t h e USSR w i l l probably t r y t o avoid (1) any direct involvement w i t h U.S. forces in d i s t a n t areas, and (2) any p u b l i c knowledge of t h e employment of S o v i e t troops i n combat in d i s t a n t areas.
is d i f f i c u l t t o s a y how much S o v i e t p h i l o s o p h y r e g a r d i n g t h e u s e of S o v i e t troops i n l o c a l wars i n underdeveloped areas h a s a l r e a d y been changed or w i l l change. W e do n o t know, f o r example, whether t h e S o v i e t s would f a v o r t h e u s e of t h e i r troops o n an acknowledged b a s i s , under any circums t a n c e s , n o r how large a m i l i t a r y force t h e y would be w i l l i n g t o commit i n a l o c a l c o n f l i c t in t h e Middle E a s t or S o u t h e a s t Asia. In a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , t h e S o v i e t s have n o t y e t changed t h e i r estimate t h a t d i r e c t involvement of S o v i e t and U.S. forces even i n d i s t a n t areas, would be e x t r e m e l y

S o v i e t t h i n k i n g on l i m i t e d warfare seems t o be moving in t h e d i r e c t i o n of a t t a i n i n g s t i l l greater p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y i n d i s t a n t areas. B e c a u s e t h e S o v i e t s are s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d i n a i r l i f t , s e a l i f t , and n a v a l s u p p o r t s u i t a b l e f o r d i s t a n t m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s , t h e y might f i n d t h e idea of a system of fore$@;n bases a t t r a c t i v e from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e i r u t i l i t y in enhancing S o v i e t l i m i t e d warfare c a p a b i l i t i e s . I n d o n e s i a , f o r example, could p r o v i d e a valuable l o g i s t i c base i f t h e S o v i e t s decided t o g i v e more open s u p p o r t t o r e v o l u t i o n a r y movements i n S o u t h e a s t Asia. Howe v e r , t h e leaders of t h e young s t a t e s , jealous of their newly a c q u i r e d s o v e r e i g n t y , are loathe t o have it compromised; and, f o r t h a t reason among others, w e are u n l i k e l y t o see t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of f u l l - f l e d g e d S o v i e t m i l i t a r y bases in Asia, Africa or t h e Middle E a s t . I f , on t h e other hand, t h e USSR manages t o win o v e r one of t h e s m a l l count r i e s as a n a l l y or t o s u b v e r t its government, or i f a s m a l l c o u n t r y s h o u l d desperately need S o v i e t a i d i n a crisis, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e c r e a t i o n of a S o v i e t base on t h a t c o u n t r y ' s t e r r i t o r y would become q u i t e r e a l
e

iv

E f f e c t on Weapons
...._....

. .

. .... . . .. .
..

.., .*,

':

. ..

.... .....

While t h e change i n S o v i e t t h o u g h t on l i m i t e d warf a r e might have an i m p o r t a n t impact on t h e t r a i n i n g and e q u i p p i n g of S o v i e t forces, t h e basic o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e armed forces toward g e n e r a l n u c l e a r war w i l l almost cert a i n l y be r e t a i n e d . Where we might e x p e d t to see change, if $he idea of l i m i t e d w a r f a r e p r e p a r a t i o n s becomes f i r m l y implanted, is i n t h e one-sided emphasis on n u c l e a r warfare e v i d e n t i n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e , p l a n n i n g and t r a i n i n g . B e c a u s e of t h e S o v i e t e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t a major c o n f l i c t i n Europe w o u l d e i t h e r be n u c l e a r from t h e start o r w o u l d r a p i d l y escalate i n t o a global w a r , v i r t u a l l y t h e f u l l weight of p r o f e s s i o n a l S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h i n k i n g on largescale combat i n Burope h a s up t o now been brought t o bear on problems of n u c l e a r war. Now, however, S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s p e c i a l i s t s may be concerned t h a t t h e overwhelming emphasis i n S o v i e t d o c t r i n e on g e n e r a l n u c l e a r w a r is e r o d i n g t h e USSR's c o n v e n t i o n a l war-making c a p a b i l i t y , and t h a t i n a f u t u r e s i t u a t i o n of a s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r stalemate or s t a n d off t h i s could be d i s a s t r o u s f o r S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The dilemma of having t o prepare t h e armed forces simult a n e o u s l y f o r n u c l e a r and l i m i t e d warfare may, i n terms of t h e i d e a l , be i n s o l u b l e , inasmuch as t h e n u c l e a r and convent i o n a l b a t t l e f i e l d s make v e r y d i f f e r e n t , and a t times, cont r a d i c t o r y demands as r e g a r d s mode of operat i o n s and equipment. And t h e USSR is bound t o be more c o n s t r a i n e d in respect t o s a t i s f y i n g d u a l f o r c e r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s because of more l i m i t e d resources. B u t a compromise may be reached i n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p l a n n i n g , whereby t h e e r o s i o n of c o n v e n t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s is slowed down or arrested and s p e c i f i c k i n d s of c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r l i m i t e d warfare are added t h a t do n o t now e x i s t . The r e c e n t appearance, a f t e r a long absence, of a s p a t e of a r t i c l e s i n t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y press on t h e s u b j e c t of amphibious l a n d i n g s may be an i n d i c a t i o n of s u c h a r e a d j u s t m e n t .

- v -

s%BI(ET

.. .

I.

THE EVOLUTION OF DOCTRIME;

o b j e c t i v e s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s .
. ..

In r e c e n t y e a r s , S o v i e t d o c t r i n e on l i m i t e d warfare has been i n t h e p r o c e s s of adjustment t o new s t r a t e g i c

The f o c a l p o i n t of change

which a t times has been so gradual as t o be barely perc e p t i b l e , has been t h e c r i t i c a l q u e s t i o n of e s c a l a t i o n

.. .. ,. _ ...I ... . . . .... .. .. .. .

has been a d i s t i n c t if somewhat tortuous movement away f r o m earlier categorical p o s i t i o n s on t h e danger of escalat i o n from l i m i t e d warfare i n v a r i o u s p a r t s of t h e world. The major w a t e r s h e d s i n t h i s p r o c e s s have tended t o follow, u s u a l l y a f t e r a good i n t e r v a l , important s h i f t s i n U.S. f o r e i g n p o l i c y and s t r a t e g i c t h o u g h t b e a r i n g on l i m i t e d warfare. Though r e f l e c t i n g t h e keen r e s p o n s i v e n e s s of S o v i e t leaders t o s u c h developments i n t h e West,,the

from a local c o n f l a g r a t i o n t o g e n e r a l n u c l e a r w a r .

There

changes i n S o v i e t d o c t r i n e have been n o t i m i t a t i v e b u t s i n g u l a r l y o p p o r t u n i s t i c . T h e i r common purpose appears t o be t h a t of a f f o r d i n g S o v i e t leaders g r e a t e r f l e x i b i l i t y and m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y i n d e a l i n g w i t h l o c a l issues, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y crises. B u t there may be o t h e r , more parochial r e a s o n s f o r changing t h e d o c t r i n e , s u c h as t h e d e s i r e of v a r i o u s m i l i t a r y leaders t o j u s t i f y t h e maint e n a n c e of large and v e r s a t i l e c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s . I n t h e mid-and l a t e f i f t i e s , t h e S o v i e t s assumed a v e r y r i g i d p o s t u r e i n E u r o p e where t h e y d e l i b e r a t e l y f o s t ered a p o l i t i c a l l y t a u t s i t u a t i o n . If Europe becomes an " a r e n a of war, t h e USSR Supreme S o v i e t solemnly declared i n Feburary 1955, such a w a r lJwould i n e v i t a b l y d e v e l o p i n t o a n o t h e r world war.M The S o v i e t s were c o n t e n t t o l i v e witho u t any m i l i t a r y f l e x i b i l i t y i n Europe and w i t h t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s o n l y of all-out n u c l e a r w a r o r h u m i l i a t i n g s u r r e n d e r i n t h e e v e n t of a s e r i o u s Western m i l i t a r y probe or p o l i t i c a l c h a l l e n g e . They d i d n o t seem t o f i n d t h i s an unacceptable p o s i t i o n because, a t t h e t i m e , t h e U.S. w a s s i m i l a r l y constrained.
I)

.,. ........ . . .

. . ..... .. .

O u t s i d e Europe, i n Asia, t h e Middle E a s t , and A f r i c a , t h e S o v i e t s saw a less r i g i d p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y e n v i r o n -

ment and c o n s e q u e n t l y greater o p p o r t u n i t y f o r expanding S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n t h o s e a r e a s . In t h e f a l l of 1955, t h e

- 1 -

.... ,.

... ..._ .......

.....

slliawz

USSR (through t h e Czechs) made its i n i t i a l arms d e a l w i t h a non-bloc c o u n t r y , Egypt, a t E g y p t ' s i n i t i a t i v e , a t a t i m e when t h e primary S o v i e t o b j e c t i v e i n t h e Middle E a s t was t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of " a g g r e s s i v e m i l i t a r y blocsl'--notably t h e iiew Baghdad P a c t . I n 1956, t h e S o v i e t s o f f e r e d t h e Indonesian government arms f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , p e r h a p s s e n s i n g a good o p p o r t u n i t y t h e r e t o have S o v i e t weapons u s e d d i r e c t l y a g a i n s t N T c o u n t r i e s i n t h e area. M i l i t a r y AO a s s i s t a n c e t h e n became and h a s remained a major p a r t of t h e S o v i e t a i d program t o non-bloc c o u n t r i e s .
.....
3 :

...

..

A t no time between t h e Korean War and 1962, however, d i d t h e USSR a s s i g n e l e m e n t s of its own f o r c e s a combat r o l e

......

.
!

i n local c o n f l i c e s o u t s i d e s a t e l l i t e c o u n t r i e s . S o v i e t i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e Suez crisis of 1956 t o o k t h e form of s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t - - t h e r a t t l i n g of missiles c a p a b l e of h i t t i n g B r i t a i n and France--and t h e t h r e a t e n e d d i s p a t c h o f "volunteers" t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e l o c a l c r i s i s . B u t i n a c t u a l i t y , t h e S o v i e t s w e r e so anxious n o t t o become i n v o l v e d m i l i t a r i l y i n t h e l o c a l crisis t h a t they, f o r b a d e t h e E g y p t i a n s t o u s e f o r t y - f i v e IL-28 j e t bombers s u p p l i e d e a r l i e r by t h e USSR. Moreover, S o v i e t bloc a d v i s e r s and t e c h n i c i a n s i n Egypb were i n s t r u c t e d n o t t o t a k e p a r t i n t h e f i g h t i n g and, immediately a f t e r t h e f i r s t a i r a t t a c k s , most of them were withdrawn from t h e crisis area. Thus, w h i l e t h e y were w i l l i n g t o e x p o r t arms ( a l b e i t o b s o l e s c e n t by S o v i e t s t a n d a r d s ) t o s m a l l c o u n t r i e s w i t h t h e aim of a l t e r i n g t h e power b a l a n c e i n t h e a r e a and t o r u n t h e r i s k of t h o s e weapons b e i n g used a g a i n s t m e m b e r s o f t h e Western a l l i a n c e , t h e S o v i e t s nevert h e l e s s were e x t r e m e l y anxious ( e s p e c i a l l y i n t i m e of crisis) t o avoid becoming d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i n a l o c a l war. The S o v i e t s might f o r a s h o r t t i m e have assessed t h e danger of d i r e c t involvement i n l o c a l w a r somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y when, i n t h e glow of t h e f i r s t s u c c e s s f u l ICBM t e s t i n A u g u s t 1957, t h e y j u b i l a n t l y claimed t h a t t h e c o r r e l a - t i o n of f o r c e s i n t h e world now f a v o r e d t h e s o c i a l i s t camp and t h a t t h e advent o f s t r a t e g i c r o c k e t s n u l l i f i e d t h e s t r a t e g i c advantages f o r m e r l y p o s s e s s e d by t h e United S t a t e s . In b r i n g i n g t h e S y r i a n crisis t o a p i t c h i n October 1957, . t h e S o v i e t s e v i n c e d a new emboldened assessment of t h e r i s k s of involvement i n l o c a l war: t h e y p u b l i c i z e d both t h e d i s patch of Marshal Rokosovskiy t o t h e Trans-Caucasus M i l i t a r y

._ ...._,

.............I

i.,,

- 2 #

. .___-

... ..- .

.2.

i
D i s t r i c t and t h e h o l d i n g of j o i n t maneuvers by t h a t command and t h e Black Sea F l e e t . Against t h i s backdrop, ' Marshal Zhukov warned from Albania, where he was v i s i t i n g : " e are a l l r e a d y t o s t r i k e a t any m i l i t a r y a d v e n t u r e W o r g a n i z e d by t h e United S t a t e s n e a r o u r s o u t h e r n border. S e v e r a l days l a t e r , however, d i E G T l y a f t e r r e c e i v i n g a communique a f f i r m i n g U . S . - B r i t i s h s o l i d a r i t y w i t h Turkey, Khrushchev t u r n e d U a t t h e T u r k i s h Embassy i n Moscdw i n p a n affable dood and t h e r e b y ended t h e c r i s i s . And s h o r t l y a f t e r t h a t , on 2 November, t h e C e n t r a l Committee announced t h a t it had e x p e l l e d Marshal Zhukov from t h a t body as w e l l as from t h e P r e s i d i u m on t h e grounds t h a t (1) he undermined P a r t y l e a d e r s h i p of t h e army and (2) he was "disposed t o adventurism i n h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e U S S R ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 1 9

.._ ., .. .. . . ....\......_ . . ,. .. ..
.

I
I

.:

..

.. ......
.I.... ,

.,

The c h a r g e of *'adventurism" i m p l i e d t h a t it was Zhukov's heavy hand t h a t had steered t h e S o v i e t s toward m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n in t h e Syrian-Turkish a i f a i r We of c o u r s e , do n o t know what r e a l l y happened, b u t i t : a p pears from t h e immediate aftermath t h a t Khrushchev and h i s associates a t least i n retrospect regarded t h e moYes toward direct i n t e r v e n t i o n i n s t r e n g t h as a serious m i s t a k e e n t a i l i n g great r i s k s of e s c a l a t i o n t o s t r a t e g i c warfare. The l e s s o n s t h a t t h e S o v i e t s appear t o have come away w i t h from t h e crisis are these: (1) It is one t h i n g t o int;ervene i n an u p r i s i n g i n Hungary, a s a t e l l i t e ; it is q u i t e a n o t h e r t h i n g t o i n t e r v e n e in s u p p o r t of a s y m p a t h e t i c e l i t e i n S y r i a , which is n e i t h e r a s a t e l l i t e n o r a c o n t i g u o u s count r y , by making w a r a g a i n s t Turkey, a NATO a l l y of t h e United S t a t e s . (2) The much vaunted demonstrad;ion of a S o v i e t ICBM c a p a b i l i t y d i d n o t m a k e t h e West any t h e less r e l u c t a n t t o meet local S o v i e t c h a l l e n g e s head-on,, r i s k i n g s t r a t e g i c warfare if n e c e s s a r y . (3) New methods had t o be found t o defend p o l i t i c a l g a i n s a t a d i s t a n c e from bloc t e r r i t o r y w i t h o u t becoming involved i n a d i r e c t clash between S o v i e t and American forces.
e

1
I

The impact of t h e crisis on S o v i e t d o c t r i n e was,reflected i n t h e renewed emphasis by S o v i e t leaders on t h e s t r o n g l i k e l i h o o d of e s c a l a t i o n from a l l t y p e s of l o c a l wars. Khrushchev, f o r example, declared i n an i n t e r v i e w i n November 1957: " e m u s t n o t t h i n k t h a t under p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n s W minor wars would be localized. Should s u c h wars break out,

j
I

I
I
I
I

- 3 -

I
I

t h e y c o u l d soon grow i n t o a world w a r . ' ' A prominent Sovdet m i l i t a r y writer and mouthpiece f o r Khrushchev's views; Major General T a l e n s k i y , was even more categorical i n March of t h e f o l l o w i n g y e a r :
w i t h a l l c l a r i t y t h a t t h e all-embracing
.. . . . ... ......

....Contemporary s t r a t e g y stresses

n a t u r e of w a z is an i n e v i t a b l e and l o g i c a l development. A t p r e s e n t a local w a r can be n o t h i n g b u t t he i n i t i a l s t a g e of a world war. (T l e n s k i y ' s emphasis) a Over t h e same s p a n of t i m e , 1957-58, t h e U.S. d o c t r i n e of "massive r e t a l i a t i o n " w a s b e i n g kransformed a t t h e hands of t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , i n t o a more f l e x i b l e p o l i c y which involved a new concept--the u s e of t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r weapons i n a l o c a l i z e d c o n f l i c t . T h i s development e v i d e n t l y s p a r k e d concern in S o v i e t m i l i t a r y q u a r t e r s . o v e r its import f o r S o v i e t d o c t r i n e and m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . Although h i s w a s t h e n a l o n e l y c r y i n t h e w i l d e r n e s s , a Colone?. Petrb." i n asMay 1958 i s s u e o f t h e now d e f u n c t newspaper s c v i e t A v i a t i o n had called upon S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e t o v e l o p methods and forces f o r c o n d u c t i n g armed s t r u g g l e on any scale. Toward Greater T a c t i c a l F l e x i b i l i t y
An important watershed i n t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of S o v i e t d o c t r i n e on l i m i t e d warfare was r e a c h e d i n J a n u a r y 1961, when Khrushchev d e l i v e r e d one of h i s rare d i s c o u r s e s on t h e subject. In a s p e e c h which h e r a l d e d a massive o f f e n s i v e aimed a t expanding S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n t h e under: developed areas, Khrushchev de-emphasized t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of e s c a l a t i o n of c e r t a i n t y p e s of l o c a l m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s . H e d i s t i n g u i s h e d between "local wars'' and ' k a t i o n a l liberat i o n w a r s , l( d e s c r i b i n g t h e l a t t e r as " i n e v i t a b l e ' ' and implyi n g t h a t S o v i e t b l o c encouragement of them (which h e advocated) would n o t lead t o g e n e r a l war. Subsequent o f f i c i a l S o v i e t pronouncements on t h e s u b j e c t of l o c a l w a r went even f u r t h e r i n de-emphasizing t h e danger of e s c a l a t i o n . For example, t h e CPSU Program p u b l i s h e d i n J u l y 1961 d i d n o t

....._. .....,.. . .<.,...,., . ....... .I<'. . . : ." I

- 4 -

.. . . ..

even i n c l u d e a warning t h a t local war might s p r e a d i n t o g e p e r a l war.. N o r d i d Khrushchev himself refer t o t h e danger of e s c a l a t i o n f r o m local c o n f l i c t s o u t s i d e Europe t h e l a s t t i m e he made a p o l i c y s t a t e m e n t on t h e s u b j e c t of l o c a l w a r s , a t t h e 22nd CPSU Congress i n October 1961.
. A l s o in 1961, i n open m i l i t a r y p u b l i c a t i o n s , s u c h " c o n s e r v a t i v e " o f f i c e r s as Marshal Rotmistrov and General Kurochkin, began t o urge t h e s t u d y of local wars of t h e postwar p e r i o d as w e l l as World W a r 11, as a b a s i s f o r s o l v ing contemporary problems of m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e . This new udy of local w a r s was n o t however reflected military writings
I

.. ... .... .. . . . .
\.

.. .

What t h e S o v i e t s were s u g g e s t i n g i n 1961, i n e f f e c t , w a s t h a t t h e danger of e s c a l a t i o n had d i m i n i s h e d i n t h e underdeveloped areas, e s p e c i a l l y on t h e Asian p e r i p h e r y and . i n t h e Middle E a s t , b u t t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n remained t a u t as e v e r i n Europe, The new t u r n i n d o c t r i n e on l o c a l war was accompanied by a major change i n t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a i d and a s s i s t a n c e program. I n e a r l y 1961, t h e S o v i e t Union f o r t h e first time g r a n t e d up-to-date m i l i t a r y equipment t o Indonesia. S i n c e then, E g y p t , Iraq, Finsand, S y r i a as w e l l as Cuba also have r e c e i v e d first l i n e S o v i e t equipment. That is t o s a y , m o s t equipment f u r n i s h e d t h e major recipients of S o v i e t aid has been i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e material t h a t t h e USSR is manufacturing for its own armed forces, i n c l u d i n g equipment n o t y e t f u l l y deployed i n t h e bloc and not even made a v a i l a b l e t o C o m u n i s t China.
, .

..

.....

..

....:..

As regards Europe, there has been i n a d d i t i o n 20 p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s , good c o l l a t e r a l e v i d e n c e t h a t Khrushchev t h o u g h t a local w a r there t o be o u t of t h e q u e s t i o n i n 1961. I

- 5 -

...

The m i l i t a r y , of c o u r s e , would have preferred t h a t any cimbat in Europe be l o c a l ized, military writings but ossibility at the a t t h e t i m e saw t h i s as o n l y very least.

GlJ

The p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e book " M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y " i n May 1962 marked a n o t h e r watershed i n t h e e v o l u t i o n of S o v i e t d o c t r i n e on l i m i t e d warfare. It r e v e a l e d an awakened S o v i e t i n t e r e s t i n e x t e n d i n g t o t h e European theater t h e f l e x i b i l i t y which t h e USSR by t h e n enjoyed i n t h e management of l o c a l c r i s e s i n underdeveloped a r e a s . C e r t a i n S o v i e t leaders had e v i d e n t l y come t o regard t h e e s t a b l i s h e d d o c t r i n e on l o c a l or c o n v e n t i o n a l warfare i n Europe as t o o dangerous and res t r i c t i v e for S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y maneuver. Their malaise w a s p r o b a b l y one of envy of t h e United S t a t e s leade r s h i p , which more t h a n a y e a r b e f o r e had d i s c a r d e d its s t r a t e g i c s t r a i t - j a c k e t and developed a t h e o r y of " f l e x i b l e r e s p o n s e " a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e European theater. ( I n its A p r i l 1961 s t a t e m e n t t o t h e NATO C o u n c i l , t h e U.S. had called f o r

- 6 -

c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s a t l e a s t s t r o n g enough t o e f f e c t a pause in t h e e v e n t of s u b s t a n t i a l S o v i e t c o n v e n t i o n a l aggression. ) The f a c t t h a t t h e book, " M i l i t a r y Strategy," appears t o be a t c r o s s - p u r p o s e s w i t h i t s e l f on t h e q u e s t i o n of l i m i t e d warfare ( t h i s is t r u e of t h e r e v i s e d e d i t i o n as w e l l as t h e o r i g i n a l ) may, i n p a r t , reflect a c o n t i n u i n g i n t e r n a l dialogue on t h a t q u e s t i o n , and i n p a r t , t h e complexity of t h e problem and t h e m u l t i p l e purposes which p u b l i c l y e n u n c i a t e d d o c t r i n e may be i n t e n d e d t o s e r v e . In some places t h e book (in both its v e r s i o n s ) stressed t h e i m p r o b a b i l i t y of l i m i t e d warfare i n Europe, emphasizing t h a t if n u c l e a r powers are drawn i n t o an armed c o n f l i c t it w i l l " i n e v i t a b l y develop i h t o an a l l - o u t n u c l e a r war," and t h r e a t e n i n g t h a t a "direct a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e USSR or o t h e r s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . . . w i l l o b v i o u s l y lead t o a neFk' world w a r . " B u t elsewhere t h e book d i s c u s s e d local w a r s i t u a t i o n s and o p e r a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g a h y p o t h e t i c a l largescale non-nuclear "local war" i n c e n t r a l Europe, and urged t h a t a p l a c e be c a r v e d o u t f o r l o c a l w a r i n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y . Thus, t h e book s t r o n g l y i m p l i e d an a c t i v e r o l e in s m a l l - s c a l e w a r f o r t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t : " S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y c a l l s f o r t h e s t u d y of t h e means of c o n d u c t i n g s u c h wars in order t o p r e v e n t them f r o m dev e l o p i n g i n t o a world w a r and t o b r i n g q u i c k v i c t o r y o v e r t h e enemy." I n a n o t h e r place t h e book ( i its first e d i n t f o n ) c a l l e d f o r t h e s t u d y of l o c a l w a r on t h e grounds t h a t "such a war might a l s o be t h r u s t upon t h e s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s t J by " i m p e r i a l i s t circles f e a r i n g t h a t world w a r might be completely d i s a s t r o u s f o r c a p i t a l i s m . " (The r e f e r e n c e t o s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s w a s dropped in t h e r e v i s e d e d i t i o n , which g e n e r a l l y p l a y e d down t h e Western t h r e a t . ) The f a c t t h a t f o r t h e first t i m e i n a l o n g w h i l e t h e book d i s c u s s e d types of o p e r a t i o n s t h a t w o u l d be d i s t i n c t l y a p p l i c a b l e t o l i m i t e d war, is a l s o s u g g e s t i v e of s t r o n g i n t e r e s t in t h e problem. Geographic areas are u n f o r t u n a t e l y n o t mentioned in t h e c o n t e x t of s u c h d i s c u s s i o n s , a s in t h e f o l l o w i n g examples:
A l o c a l war might be a n o t h e r matter. H e r e , as before, t h e main e v e n t s m i g h t develop in t h e areas of m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s n e a r t h e f r o n t , a l t h o u g h t h e methods of armed c o n f l i c t in t h i s case as w e l l have been

.. . . .
. .

- 7 -

changed c o n s i d e r a b l y compared w i t h t h e p a s t war,:.ljince t h e w a r would be conducted w i t h d i f f e r e n t weapons and t h e t h r e a t of n u c l e a r war would hang cons t a n t l y over t h e warring countries.

..........
..., ...........
I

.. . . . . ... . _. ... . .

Each of t h e s e t y p e s of s t r a t e g i c operat i o n s w i l l be m a n i f e s t e d i n a world-wide nuclear w a r . In l o c a l w a r s , c e r t a i n of these t y p e s of st-ic o p e r a t i o n s may n o t be used o r w i l l be u s e d on a l i m i t e d scale. T h i s would be p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e of m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s d e e p ' w i t h i n ehemy t e r r i t o r y . M i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s in l a n d and n a v a l theaters acquire d e c i s i v e signif i c a n c e i n such w a r s . Although t h e r e v i s e d e d i t i o n of t h e book, p u b l i s h e d in autumn of t h i s y e a r , a l s o appeared t o be a t cross-purp o s e s w i t h i t s e l f , it p l a i n l y s u s t a i n e d t h e p r e v i o u s emphasis on t h e need t o p r e p a r e S o v i e t forces for l i m i t e d w a r f a r e , even i n Europe i f n e c e s s a r y . E q u a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t is t h e f a c t t h a t s i n c e l a s t w i n t e r t h e r e have been a numb e r of articles i n t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p r e s s u r g i n g t h a t S o v i e t forces be p r e p a r e d for l o c a l w a r c o n t i n g e n c i e s , inc l u d i n g t h e u s e of t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s . - Note how t h e s t a t e ments, i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l p r o g r e s s i o n , t e n d t o become more s p e c i f i c and clear:
L a s t January, C o l . Gen. S.M. Shtemenko, c h i e f of t h e main s t a f f of t h e ground forces, c o u l d have had a nonn u c l e a r c o n f l i c t i n mind when he wrote i n RED STAR t h a t
I

S o v i e t t a n k and motorized i n f a n t r y t r o o p s c a n " o p e r a t e s u c c e s s f u l l y under c o n d i t i o n s of t h e u s e of n u c l e a r weapons as w e l l as of t h e u s e of o n l y c o n v e n t i o n a l means of d e s t r u c t i o n . " He a l s o wrote e l s e w h e r e in t h e a r t i c l e i n a s i m i l a r v e i n t h a t f i e l d t r a i n i n g of ground t r o o p s i n c l u d e s conside r a t i o n of b o t h t h e " c o n d i t i o n s of a m u t u a l and wide a p p l i c a t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons, and of c o n v e h t i o p a l means of

- 8 -

. .

combat." B u t a g a i n t h e s t a t e m e n t s could a l s o have r e f e r r e d t o i s o l a t e d s i t u a t i o n s i n a n u c l e a r war i n which b a t t l e s a r e f o u g h t w i t h c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons a l o n e . T h i s ambiguity was removed i n February when t h e Commander of t h e Leningrad M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t , Army General M . I . Kazakov, s t a t e d t h a t t h e USSR was d e v e l o p i n g its conv e n t i o n a l f o r c e s because t h e West w a s p l a n n i n g t o f i g h t l o c a l wars, presumably w i t h o u t n u c l e a r weapons.

In May, a r t i c l e s by a '*radical" and a " c o n s e r v a t i v e ' * i n d i c a t e d t h a t both schools of t h o u g h t had a common i n t e r est in a d j u s t i n g S o v i e t d o c t r i n e and c a p a b i l i t i e s t o l o c a l war c o n t i n g e n c i e s . In what was g e n e r a l l y a s t r o n g l y Khrus h c h e v i a n . a r t i c l e , Major D. Kazakov wrote in t h e No. 10 i s s u e of KO116MUNIST OF TEIEi ARMED FORCES:
Based on t h e d i a l e c t i c s of r e a l i t y , S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e believes t h a t a f u t u r e war, i f it is i m p o s s i b l e t o p r e - ' v e n t , can b e g i n s u d d e n l y as a world n u c l e a r and m i s s i l e w a r . However, t h i s . c o n c l u s i o n does n o t exclude t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t under c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s a w o r l d c o n f l i c t may b u r s t f o r t h from a local w a r . W should a l s o not l o s e s i g h t e of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s , t e r rorized b e f o r e t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y of a mighty r e t u r n n u c l e a r m i s s i l e s t r i k e , may f o r c e upon u s a n o t h e r f o r m of war, w i t h o u t t h e u s e of n u c l e a r weapons. The p r a c t i c a l c o n c l u s i o n h e r e is t h a t o u r A r m e d F o r c e s s h o u l d be p r e p a r e d t o o f f e r p r o p e r r e s i s t a n c e w i t h c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons, m a i n t a i n i n g m i s s i l e s and n u c l e a r weapons a t t h e h i g h e s t degree of combat r e a d i n e s s .
And Mars'hal Rotmistrov, o n e of t h e l e a d i n g c o n s e r v a t i v e 1 spokesmen, wrote in t h e 1 May i s s u e of t h e E n g l i s h l a n guage MOSCOW NEWS:

The S o v i e t Army h a s a t its command an a b s o l u t e l y new a r s e n a l of weapons,

- 9 -

. .......

,.

w i t h w e l l - t r a i n e d men a b l e t o wage b o t h atomic and c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e , on a large o r small scale, i n any climate and on any t e r r i t o r y . The f a c t t h a t t h i s s t a t e m e n t appeared i n a newspaper p u b l i s h e d o n l y i n E n g l i s h meant, of course, t h a t t h e message was i n t e n d e d e x p r e s s l y f o r American and B r : i t i s h e y e s . (Th'e idea t o which Rotmistrov h a s a l l u d e d , of employing t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s i n a s m a l l - s c a l e w a r is a n e t t l e s o m e and e v i d e n t l y h i g h l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l q u e s t i o n f o r t h e S o v i e t s , and w e s h a l l d i s c u s s it i n v a r i o u s p l a c e s i n t h i s p a p e r . ) F i n a l l y , t h e most r e c e n t e v i d e n c e of change i n S o v i e t t h i n k i n g on l i m i t e d w a r f a r e is a l s o p e r h a p s t h e m o s t s t r i k i n g . W e r e f e r h e r e t o an a r t i c l e p u b l i s h e d i n RED STAR on 2 November 1963, i n which f o u r of t h e a u t h o r s of t h e book " M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y " lambasted t h e U.S. e d i t o r s of t h e E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n s (of t h e first e d i t i o n ) f o r t h e i r " s l a n d e r o u s " commentaries on t h e work. E s c a l a t i o n and l i m i t e d w a r were among t h e q u e s t i o n s on which t h e y showed s p e c i a l s e n s i t i v i t y . They i n s i s t e d , i n t h e f i r s t place , t h a t t h e U . S . e d i t o r s were i n g r o s s error i n s a y i n g t h a t " A r e t a l i a t o r y s t r i k e by t h e USSR as a r e s u l t of an a t t a c k a g a i n s t one of t h e s t a t e s w h i c h are members of t h e S o v i e t bloc would-mean t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union w o u l d s t r i k e t h e first blow a g a i n s t t h e United S t a t e s . I ' Obviously, t h e S o v i e t a u t h o r s r e t o r t e d , " t h e u n l e a s h i n g of war a g a i n s t t h e S o v i e t Union as a r e s u l t of an a t t a c k a g a i n s t one of t h e s o c i a l i s t s t a t e s would n o t They n e x t s a i d that'mean' a ' s t r i k e a g a i n s t t h e USA.O" t h e book t h e y were not s p e a k i n g about t h e U.S. b u t about an a t t a c k by " i m p e r i a l i s t forces." I f , of course, t h e U.S. i t s e l f were t h e aggressor, t h e n t h e r e t a l i a t o r y blow would be s t r u c k a g a i n s t t h a t c o u n t r y . C l e a r l y , these writers t o o , are t r y i n g t o get a message across t o t h e U.S.; t h e y are making a p i t c h f o r f l e x i b i l i t y - - t h e y want it known t h a t t h e y , , . t o o , wish t o respond t o a l o c a l m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n Europe i n p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e s i t u a t i o n , w i t h o u t a u t o m a t i c a l l y provoking an a t t a c k by U.S. s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s .
I n t h e same a r t i c l e , . t h e S o v i e t a u t h o r s a l s o s o u g h t t o c l a r i f y t h e i r p o s i t i o n on e s c a l a t i o n . They described as an o u t r i g h t f a l s i f i c a t i o n a t r u n c a t e d s t a t e m e n t l i f t e d

... . . .
,

....

i
I
'.

I
I

!
I

.. ...... . .. .
. . .. .. .

Ii
I
I
1

10

. ,. . . ....... ...
... .. . ..... . ...

....

. .

t h e U.S. e d i t o r s ' a n n o t a t i o n s t h a t t h e S o v i e t s s a y l o c a l w a r w i l l i n e v i t a b l y t u r n i n t o a globaR war. e x e r c i s e d o v e r t h i s , t h e S o v i e t a u t h o r s retorted nowhere i n t h e book was it s a i d t h a t '#any l o c a l war w i l l i n e O i t a b l y t u r n i n t o a g l o b a l war." T h i s w a s an "absurd c o n c l u s i o n , t h e y said--perhaps w i t h t h e Chinese i n mind for t h e y are t h e ones who have accused t h e S o v i e t s of advancing s u c h a l i n e . The authors t h e n n o t e d t h a t s i n c e t h e Second World War, there had been some 70 m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s and l o c a l wars. What w a s a c t u a l l y s a i d i n t h e book, t h e y declared, was t h a t any l o c a l war "can" t u r n i n t o a world war. "Obviously, t h e words ' i n e v i t a b l y ' and ' c a n ' have a d i f f e r e n t meaning.'! As i f t h a t were n o t enough, t h e S o v i e t a u t h o r s proceeded t o rebuke t h e U.S. e d i t o r s for s a y i n g t h a t i n t h e S o v i e t view any war " m u s t . take t h e form of a world n u c l e a r w a r . " (Their e l i p s i s and i t a l i c s . ) According t o the S o v i e t a u t h o r s i n t h e i r a r t i c l e : "What is emphasized i n t h e book is n o t t h a t any w a r w i l l t u r n i n t o n u c l e a r w a r , b u t o n l y s u c h a w a r i n which t h e n u c l e a r powers are involved.

from that Much that

..

. .

:.,.',>'... ..

.. ........ ..... .
.. ... .

The f o r e g o i n g , i n s h o r t , are t h e best a v a i l a b l e examples of t h e d a r t s and t u r n s i n r e c e n t S o v i e t w r i t i n g s on t h e q u e s t i o n of l i m i t e d warfare. They are p l a i n l y s u g g e s t i v e of new i n t e r e s t s , new ways of t h i n k i n g and p l a n n i n g for local w a r c o n t i n g e n c i e s . Y e t , t h e y have appeared a l o n g w i t h r e i t e r a t i o n s of e l e m e n t s of t h e e s t a b l i s h e d d o c t r i n e t h a t t e n d t o suggest t h a t l i t t l e i f a n y t h i n g has r e a l l y changed i n S o v i e t e x p e c t a t i o n s about l i m i t e d warfare. The case i n p o i n t is t h e periodic r e i t e r a t i o n r i g h t up t o the p r e s e n t t i m e of t h e d o c t r i n a l forumla which s t a t e s t h a t if t h e major powers are drawn i n t o a l o c a l war ( e v i d e n t l y anywhere i n t h e world) t h e war w i l l i n e v i t a b l y escalate i n t o a global n u c l e a r war.

Because t h e p i c t u r e is n o t y e t c l e a r , t h e e v i d e n c e b e i n g n o t o n l y t h i n b u t mixed, w e cannot draw f i r m conclus i o n s about t h e p r e s e n t s t a t u s of S o v i e t d o c t r i n e on l i m i t e d w a r . What w e can s a y w i t h c o n f i d e n c e , however, is a t l e a s t t h i s : S o v i e t t h o u g h t on l i m i t e d w a r f a r e is i n a h i g h l y form a t i v e s t a g e ; p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y leaders are s e n s i n g new o p p o r t u n i t i e s and r e q u i r e m e n t s i n r e s p o n s e t o changing p o l i t i c a l and strategic r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Above a l l , it is

- ii ..A.

....,.....,... ..

.........

clear t h a t t h e compon d i r e c t i o n of t h e i r t h i n k i n g is toward increased f l e x i b i l i t y i n sub-strategic crises.

Toward S t r a t e g i c Nuclear Stalemate There is also an important c o r o l l a r y t o t h e s e a r c h f o r greater t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y . The S o v i e t s have made it abundantly c l e a r t h a t t h e y have no i n t e r e s t whatever i n i n t r o d u c i n g any f l e x i b i l i t y i n t o t h e realm of s t r a t e g i c w a r f a r e . They c o n s i s t e n t l y r e Sect as i m p r a c t i c a b l e , immoral, and t h o r o u g h l y u n a c c e p t a b l e ' t o them c h r r e n t U.S. t h e o r i e s on c o n t r o l l e d s t r a t e g i c warfare. In the course of r e p u d i a t i n g these t h e o r i e s , t h e S o v i e t s u s u a l l y impugn U.S. m o t i v e s , s a y i n g t h a t t h e r e a l i n t e n t i o n of t h e "Pentagon brass h a t s " is t o convince t h e U.S. p e o p l e t h a t n u c l e a r w a r need n o t be h o r r i b l e . The S o v i e t s , for t h e i r p a r t , dramat i z e t h e horrors of g e n e r a l n u c l e a r war and t h e c e r t a i n t y t h a t n e i t h e r s i d e w i l l e s c a p e widespread d e s t r u c t i o n ; t h e y stress, i n a d d i t i o n , t h a t because of t h e i d e o l o g i c a l probl e m , t h e a d v e r s a r i e s w i l l be bound t o f i g h t t o a d e c i s i o n i n s u c h a war. 1n"our view, t h i s p u b l i c s t a n c e is n o t s i m p l y a propaganda harangue i n t e n d e d t o p o r t r a y t h e USSR as a champion of peace. The S o v i e t s o b v i o u s l y have a s t r o n g i n t e r e s t i n a v o i d i n g g e n e r a l w a r . They have made it clear t h a t t h e y f f u l l y u n d e r s t a n d t h e s i z e and power o ' American s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s . And t h e r e is no r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y have b e e n shaken of t h e manifeSt c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a g e n e r a l n u c l e a r w a r would n o t s p a r e t h e USSR u n a c c e p t a b l e d e s t r u c t i o n , irr e s p e c t i v e of t h e c o n d i t i o n s under which t h e w a r had begun. A s s t a t e d i n a r e c e n t U.S. n a t i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e e s t i m a $ e , t h e a v a i l a b l e e v i d e n c e does n o t s u g g e s t t h a t t h e S o v i e t leaders are b u i l d i n g t h e i r f o r c e s t o a c h i e v e a p o s i t i o n from which t h e y could l a u n c h a deliberate a t t a c k on t h e West and count on r e d u c i n g r e t a l i a t i o n t o l e v e l s t h a t would be i n any s e n s e tolerable. Unless and u n t i l t h e S o v i e t s a c h i e v e s u c h a p o s i t i o n , t h e y almost c e r t a i n l y w i l l n o t r e g a r d t h e i n i t i a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c w a r f a r e by themselves a r a t i o n a l c o u r s e of a c t i o n .

.. .. . .. . . . . ... ,.. .
...A ../

i
(

.;:.

. . . . ... .

..... ... . .

12

. . . . ..

... .

. . . . . .. . .

. .. .. ......

Whether or n o t t h e S o v i e t s r e a l l y b e l i e v e t h a t , once t h e s t r a t e g i c t h r e s h o l d is c r o s s e d , t h e w a r cannot be brought u n d e r c o n t r o l , is, of c o u r s e , beyond our a b i l i t y t o ' know. Whatever t h e y b e l i e v e now, t h e r e is always t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e y might a c t d i f f e r e n t l y in t h e m i d s t of a r e a l emergency. A l l w e can s a y a t t h i s t i m e is t h a t it is p l a i n l y n o t in t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e USSR t o a d m i t to t h e p o s s i b i l i t y f c o n t r o l l i n g g e n e r a l w a r once it h a s s t a r t e d . To do so w o u l d have t h e effect of undermining t h e n o t i o n which t h e S o v i e t s are t r y i n g t o p r e s e r v e of a s t r a t e g i c stalemate. General war has g o t t o be t h o u g h t of as an almost i m p o s s i b l e c o u r s e of a c t i o n if t h e stalemate is t o be g e n e r a l ' l y acknowledged.

M o t i v a t i n g Factors
Apart f r o m t h e w i s h t o avoid g e n e r a l war and t h e propaganda b e n e f i t s t o be d e r i v e d from d e p l o r i n g t h e i d e a of making it manageable, there are a number of s t r o n g p o l i t i c a l r e a s o n s why t h e S o v i e t s are s e e k i n g t o make t h e s t r a t e g i c power s i t u a t i o n more, n o t less, r i g i d . For one t h i n g , t h e o r e t i c a l l y , a s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r stalemate--which d i m i n i s h e s g r e a t l y t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t s and t e n d s t o p r e v e n t t h e u s e of s t r a t e g i c , m i l i t a r y power--makes p o s s i b l e t h e u s e of m i l i t a r y force on a sub-strategic scale (not d i r e c t l y i n v o l v i n g t h e territories of t h e major adv e r s a r i e s ) w i t h a low r i s k of e s c a l a t i o n . The achievement of " s t r a t e g i c i n f l e x i b i l i t y , " as it were t e n d s t o be a s i n e q u o non f o r g r e a t e r " t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y " in t h e s e n s e of l i m i t e d warfare p o s s i b i l i t i e s . They are, in s h o r t , c o r r e l a t i v e a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e S o v i e t regime.
A s a p r a c t i c a l problem, t h e S o v i e t d e s i g n f o r t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y and s t r a t e g i c i n f l e x i b i l i t y is r e a d i l y unders t a n d a b l e in terms of t h e European s i t u a t i o n . I t is clear t o t h e S o v i e t s t h a t t h e United States d e f e n d s its stakes in Europe p r i m a r i l y w i t h s t r a t e g i c power, and t h e l e s s e n e d p o s s i b i l i t y of its u s e through a c q u i e s c e n s e in a s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r stalemate is t h e r e f o r e an important S o v i e t goal. The S o v i e t s are q u i c k t o agree w i t h any American s u g g e s t i o n t h a t a "balance" of m i l i t a r y power has been reached, whereby

, ... . ..

..:.... .:..q . . :: . .. \...... ..

,.*

..2

- 13
I

. .. ......... .
I.....,

. ., .... .

n e i t h e r s i d e c a n impose its w i l l on its a d v e r s a r y by t h e t h r e a t or u s e of s t r a t e g i c forces. A t one p o i n t , i n the first e d i t i o n of t h e book " M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y , " t h e a u t h o r s wrote t h a t American s t r a t e g i s t s "have begun t o understand" t h a t t h e m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r weapons i n t h e U.S. and USSR has a l r e a d y brought about a n u c l e a r stalemate. ' The o r i g i n a l e d i t i o n went so f a r as t o s a y (implying t h a t t h e S o v i e t s endorsed t h i s n o t i o n ) t h a t " t h e growth of n u c l e a r missile power is i n v e r s e l y p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of its use." To suggest t h a t t h e massing of weapons h a s i n c r e a s e d s t a b i l i t y , of course, c o n t r a d i c t s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l S o v i e t l i n e t h a t t h e arms race i n c r e a s e s t h e danger of w a r ; i t w a s probably f o r t h i s r e a s o n t h a t t h e r e v i s e d e d i t i o n of t h e book dropped t h e s e n s i t i v e s t a t e m e n t s , b u t neverthel e s s r e t a i n e d r e f e r e n c e s t o s t r a t e g i c stalemate. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e v i s e d v e r s i o n dropped a r e f e r e n c e t o a s t a t e m e n t by P r e s i d e n t Kennedy (November 1961) on t h e need f o r t h e United S t a t e s t o have a c h o i c e somewhere between " h u m i l i a t i o n and holocaust" a l s o seew t o p o i n t up S o v i e t s e n s i t i v i t y on t h i s q u e s t i o n : f o r t h i s is p r e c i s e l y t h e predicament in which t h e S o v i e t s now f i n d t h e m s e l v e s .
I

T h i s leads u s t o a n o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n :

S o v i e t envy

....\ ...... . . .. . ...,. . ... .. .. . ....

. .

I.....

t o s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r warfare. The S o v i e t s s e e m t o envy a l s o t h e p o l i t i c a l advantages which t h e United S t a t e s might g a i n from m i l i t a r y f l e x i b i l i t y , s u c h as i n c r e a s e d c r e d i b i l i t y f o r its t h r e a t s of c o u n t e r a c t i o n and greater m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y i n local crises. There is, f o r example, an unmistakable a i r of s e r i o u s n e s s in S o v i e t c r i t i c i s m of t h e United S t a t e s f o r abandoning t h e lJmassive r e t a l i a t i o n " d o c t r i n e and de3 v e l o p i n g i n s t e a d its local war theories f o r c a r r y i n g o u t " a g g r e s s i v e d e s i g n s " w i t h o u t r i s k i n g t h e collapse of t h e c a p i t a l i s t system i n a world w a r . The envy. of which w e speak is p a r t i c u l a r l y i n e v i d e n c e i n s t a t e m e n t s made by S o v i e t m i l i t a r y leaders o v e r t h e p a s t y e a r ( s u c h as those cited e a r l i e r i n t h i s paper) promising n o t e s c a l a t i o n , b u t
I

of t h e new m i l i t a r y f l e x i b i l i t y s o u g h t and p a r t i a l l y a t t a i n e d by t h e United S t a t e s i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Europe. The Cuban e x p e r i e n c e may have underscored t h e need t o p r e v e n t t h e United States from a c q u i r i n g i n E u r o p e t h e advantageous p o s i t i o n it enjoyed i n Cuba, of b e i n g able t o u s e s u p e r i o r forces i n a localized c o n f l i c t w i t h f a i r c o n f i d e n c e t h a t t h e opponent would not expand t h e c o n i l i c t

14

I
an a p p r o p r i a t e r e b u f f - - i .e., a r e s p o n s e i n kind--to any l o c a l acts of a g g r e s s i o n by t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s . A s e l f c o n s c i o u s power, t h e USSR f e e l s o b l i g e d t o d e c l a r e its acc e p t a n c e of t h e U.S. p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y c h a l l e n g e anywhere i n t h e world, and hence f i n d s t h a t it m u s t claim or imply a m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e and c a p a b i l i t y commensurate w i t h t h e c h a l l e n g e . Thus t h e a s s e r t i o n (quoted e a r l i e r ) by Marshal Rotmistrov t h a t t h e S o v i e t army is c a p a b l e of f i g h t i n g any k i n d of w a r , on any s c a l e , anywhere in t h e world, is a d i r e c t r e p l y t o t h e c h a l l e n g e i m p l i c i t in U.S. d o c t r i n e . The book " M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y , " had e a r l i e r made clear t h e n a t u r e of t h e U.S. c h a l l e n g e , as i n t h e f o l l o w i n g q u o t a t i o n : The s t r a t e g i c c o n c e p t , t h e Dresi. d e n t ' s 7 message of March 28, 1961, stresged, "must be both f l e x i b l e and determined," and m u s t p r e p a r e f o r t h e conduct of any war: g e n e r a l o r l o c a l , n u c l e a r or c o n v e n t i o n a l , l a r g e or s m a l l . T h i s concept is based upon t h e same idea as a " r e t a l i a t o r y s t r i k e " t h e o n l y d i f f e r e n c e b e i n g t h a t , whereas p r e v i o u s l y t h e t h r e a t of s u c h a s t r i k e implied t h e u n l i m i t e d u s e of n u c l e a r weapons regardless of t h e scale of /he e x i s t i n g 7 conf l i c t , . . i . e . , a g e n e r a r n u c l e a r war, now t h e ' ' r e t a l i a t o r y s t r i k e " m u s t be approp r i a t e t o t h e n a t u r e of t h e p o t e n t i a l conf 1i c t

.... ... . . . . . ,
3 :.

The S o v i e t s , by t h e way, have l o n g been r e s p o n s i v e t o developments i n Western s t r a t e g i c t h i n k i n g and d o c t r i n e , as w e l l as t o m i l i t a r y hardware i n NATO a r s e n a l s . Thus, it w a s above a l l owing t o t h e i r f e a r of s t r o n g Western reliance on n u c l e a r s , i n t h e e v e n t of w a r i n Europe, t h a t t h e S o v i e t s t o o k a v e r y d i m view of t h e l i m i t i n g t h e scope of armed c o n f l i c t there. S o v i e t m i l i t a r y documents ( p u b l i s h e d p r i o r t a s s e r t e d t h a t NATO has no l i m i t e d war d o c t r i n e , t h a t it does n o t p l a n t o f i g h t any s e r i o u s c o n v e n t i o n a l war, t h a t t h e (imputed) i n f e r i o r c o n v e n t i o n a l s t r e n g t h of NATO is compensated f o r ( i n Western p l a n n i n g ) by n u c l e a r weapons, and . t h a t a l l c a l c u l a t i o n s of t h e NATO command are based on

15

... .

\._... . . ._ . . ..) .........

t h e u s e of n u c l e a r weapons. Now it is t r u e t h a t t h e S o v i e t s have f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s c l o s e l y followed s t r a t e g i c d e b a t e s i n t h i s c o u n t r y and have w i t n e s s e d t h e build-up of c e r t a i n c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s f o r s p e c i a l i z e d local w a r o p e r a t i o n s . B u t t h e y d i d n o t a s s o c i a t e t h e s e e a r l i e r developments w i t h Western s t r a t e g y f o r Europe. In t h e i r view, w h i l e t h e U . S . massive r e t a l i a t i o n s t r a t e g y was by 1958 a l l b u t dead and b u r i e d as f a r as t h e rest of t h e world was concerned, it was s t i l l v e r y much a l i v e as a s t r a t e g y f o r Europe. S i n c e 1961, however, t h e S o v i e t s have been w i t n e s s t o c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t s by U.S. l e a d e r s (as r e v e a l e d b s p e e c h e s by t h e B e c r e t a r y of Defense among o t h e r s ) i n r a d i c a l l y a l t e r i n g NATO s t r a t e g y f o r Europe. S o v i e t p u b l i c a t i o n s have obs e r v e d a U.S. p r e f e r e n c e f o r s t a g e d r e s p o n s e s t o S o v i e t bloc i n i t i a t i v e s and f o r s t r e n g t h e n i n g NATO c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s i n Europe' i n o r d e r t o r e d u c e N A T O ' s dependence on n u c l e a r s . Other s t e p s t a k e n by t h e United S t a t e s may a l s o have s e r v e d t o confirm i n S o v i e t e y e s t h i s t r e n d toward d e v e l o p i n g c o n c e p t s and c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r non-nuclear war i n Europe. I n May 1962--with t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of " M i l i t a r y S t r a t egy"--the S o v i e t s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y understood t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e of " f l e x i b l e r e s p o n s e " was now b e i n g adapted t o t h e European t h e a t e r : The s t r a t e g y of "massive r e t a l i a t i o n "
w h i c h e x i s t e d p r i o r t o 1961. i n t h e U.S. and NATO .has become obsolete and is b e i n g r e p l a c e d by t h e s t r a t e g y of "flexib l e response" which p r o v i d e s f o r t h e pre-

. .. .. ...

..

..... . , . . . .. .... . . ,

p a r a t i o n and conduct n o t o n l y of g e n e r a l n u c l e a r w a r b u t a l s o of l i m i t e d w a r s w i t h or without t h e u s e of n u c l e a r weapons against the socialist countries. However, t h e f a c t t h a t t h e U.S. s t r a t e g y of " f l e x i b l e response" h a s been t h e s u b j e c t of c o n t r o v e r s y between t h e United S t a t e s and some of its N T a l l i e s who f e a r t h a t ' . t h e AO s t r a t e g y w i l l undermine t h e n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n t , p r o b a b l y h a s k e p t t h e S o v i e t s from drawing f i r m c o n c l u s i o n s f o r t h e i r own m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e and e s t i m a t e s .

16

11.

IbfPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

It is perhaps s t i l l t o o e a r l y t o estimate w i t h conf i d e n c e t h e impact which t h e observed t r e n d i n S o v i e t t h o u g h t on l i m i t e d w a r f a r e w i l l have on S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p o l i c y , b o t h i n r e g a r d t o t h e management of c r i s e s and t h e t r a i n i n g and e q u i p p i n g of S o v i e t t r o o p s . What can be s a i d a t this t i m e is l a r g e l y of a h y p o t h e t i c a l order. There are, i n a d d i t i o n , s e v e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which bear d i r e c t l y on t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p 09 d o c t r i n e and p o l i c y t h a t m u s t f i r s t be s o r t e d o u t and acknowledged a s q u a l i f i e r s t o any c o n j e c t u r e s u b s e q u e n t l y set f o r t h i n t h i s paper.

To b e g i n , w e are most c o n s t r a i n e d when a t t e m p t i n g t o forecast S o v i e t b e h a v i o r i n a m i l i t a r y crisis on t h e b a s i s of e x p l i c i t S o v i e t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e . Whether and how t h e S o v i e t leaders w i l l react i n a m i l i t a r y way i n any c r i s i s anywhere i n t h e world w i l l undoubtedly depend n o t on any e s t a b l i s h e d d o c t r i n e , b u t on t h e i r assessment a t t h e t i m e of t h e crisis of t h e r i s k s involved--what t h e y may b e l i e v e t h e y s t a n d t o g a i n o r t o lose; t h e local and s t r a t egic apportionment of power; and how t h e y assess t h e actions and p o l i c i e s of t h e opponent. S u r e l y , Qrushchev w i l l n o t be bound by any d o c t r i n e , b u t w i l l r e s e r v e m a x i m u m freedom of a c t i o n t o manage t h e crisis (as he d i d i n t h e case of Cuba), p r o b a b l y as any head of s t a t e would do. I n t h e case of c e n t r a l Europe, at. t h i s j u n c t u r e , any S o v i e t assessment of t h e r i s k s of engaging i n l i m i t e d m i l i t a r y actions i n Europe is l i k e l y to.be complicated by a number of f a c t o r s . There is f i r s t of a l l t h e u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t how f a r t h e Uni&ed S t a t e s would be w i l l i n g t o go in a m i l i t a r y engagement w i t h o u t u s i n g its l o c a l n u c l e a r power. There is also t h e u n c e r t a i n t y about how i n d i v i d u a l NATO c o u n t r i e s would react when w a r f a r e is conducted o r about t o be conducted on t h e i r s o i l . (What may be " t a c t i c a l " t o t h e - U n i t e d S t a t e s and S o v i e t Union may be l ' s t r a t e g i c " t o t h e N A V a l l i e s . ) The S o v i e t s are f u l l y aware of t h e penc h a n t of c e r t a i n c o n t i n e n t a l NATO c o u n t r i e s f o r a f r o n t - l i n e n u c l e a r d e f e n s e and an independent s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r deterr e n t . W do n o t y e t have a clear r e a d i n g of how S o v i e t e m i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s a r e r e a c t i n g t o t h e s e developments.

. .
. .

17

YmJeREz

II

\
!
I

... .. ..

..

. . . .':~..::

Secondly, S o v i e t d e c l a r a t o r y p o l i c y on m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e p l a y s an important r o l e in t h e c o n t e s t of power p o l i t i c s , East-West ad w e l l as Sino-Soviet. (Marshal Sokolovskiy and h i s colleagues, i n t h e i r p r e f a c e t o t h e second e d i t i o n of " M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y " made it clear t h a t t h e book was i n t e n d e d f o r Western e y e s as w e l l as Communist.) Consider t h e q u e s t i n n of e s c a l a t i o n , around which S o v i e t d i s c u s s i o n of l i m i t e d w a r f a r e h a s mainly r e v o l v e d . The S o v i e t s o f t e n r e i t e r a t e t h e d o c t r i n a l formula which s t a t e s t h a t i f t h e major n u c l e a r powers are drawn i n t o a l o c a l w a r , t h e war w i l l i n e v i t a b l y escalate i n t o a g e n e r a l n u c l e a r w a r . Obviously (although pure d e t e r m i n i s t s 'may disagree) , war w i l l not e s c a l a t e a u t o m a t i c a l l y ; e s c a l a t i o n w i l l depend on t h e w i l l of t h e a n t a g o n i s t s . (The s t y l e of l e a d e r s h i p of t h e p r e s e n t S o v i e t regime is s u g g e s t i v e of supreme pragmatism and opportunism i n r e a c h i n g t h e Udetermined'l h i s t o r i c a l o b j e c t i v e of a world-wide Communist -triumph.) The main purpose of r e i t e r a t i n g t h i s d o c t r i n e i n p u b l i c forums is t o deter t h e United States from u n d e r t a k i n g m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e USSR i n local s i t u a t i o n s . In t h e i r propaganda, t h e S o v i e t s exploit t h e danger of e,scalat i o n i n s u c h a way as t o t h r e a t e n a would-be a d v e r s a r y w i t h more serious c o u n t e r a c t i o n s t h a n he might w i s h t o accept; t h e y t r y t o i n s t i l l doubt in h i s mind as t o t h e r i s k s of t h e v e n t u r e ; and, g e n e r a l l y , t h e y t r y t o d e t e r him from i n i t i a t i n g a m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n a p o l i t i c a l crisis o r , as i n t h e case of Cuba, t o i n h i b i t h i m from e f f e c t i v e l y respondi n g t o a l o c a l Communist c h a l l e n g e .
I t might have been t h e case, moreover, t h a t i n decidi n g t o u n d e r t a k e t h e Cuban v e n t u r e of 1962, t h e S o v i e t leaders calculated t h a t t h e i r U. S. c o u n t e r p a r t s found credible t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t of a u t o m a t i c e s c a l a t i o n from a l o c a l C o n f l i c t in which U.S. and S o v i e t troops w e r e d i r e c t l y involved. Khrushchev may have thought t h a t U.S. fear t h a t a g e n e r a l w a r would rise o u t of a c o n f l i c t o v e r Cuba, where S o v i e t t r o o p s were s t a t i o n e d , would deter t h e U.S. from a t t a c k i n g Cuba--or a t l e a s t w o u l d d e l a y U.S. m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s .long enough t o g a i n t i m e t o p l a c e s t r a t e g i c missiles i n Cuba. In f a c t , even now t h e S o v i e t leaders may calculate t h a t t h e r e t e n t i o n of some S o v i e t t r o o p s i n Cuba a c t s as a s t r o n g d e t e r r e n t - - a reminder t o the U.S. of t h e danger of escalat i o n i n t h e e v e n t of a U.S. m i l i t a r y i n i t i a t i v e a g a i n s t Cuba.

!
I

I
I

i
~

i
,

I
I

18

i
I
I

i!

I
1

O f course, t h e c o n t i n u e d t o k e n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e i n Cuba is based on t h e safe assumption t h a t t h e United S t a t e s w i l l n o t attack Cuba--at least n o t w i t h o u t warning, i n whikh case t h e t r o o p s c o u l d be h a s t i l y withdrawn or be declared 'Inon-belligerent

A t t h e same time, t o be s u r e , t h e S o v i e t s are genui n e l y concerned &bout t h e danger of e s c a l a t ion--as many p e o p l e are i n t h i s country--in t h e e v e n t of a d i r e c t m i l i t a r y c l a s h between U.S. and S o v i e t forces. In t h i s respect, t h e r e s i d u a l S o v i e t f e a r of g e n e r a l w a r s e r v e s t o regulate t h e peacetime e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h e c o u n t r y ' s m i l i t a r y power, e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e management of p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y crises. T h i s b u i l t - i n element of r e g t r a i n t may even operate i n d e p e n d e n t l y of any e x p r e s s e d U . S . r e s o l v e t o escalate a c o n f l i c t . There is also t h e p o s s i b i l i t y , depending upon t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e t h r e a t of " i n e v i t a b l e " e s c a l a t i o n , t h a t once U.S. and S o y i e t forces come d i r e c t l y t o blows, ' t h e d o c t r i n e would be a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophesy. T h i s is because each a n t a g o n i s t might b e l i e v e t h a t t h e o t h e r r e a l l y b e l i e v e s i n " i n e v i t a b l e " e s c a l a t i o n and w o u l d a c t on t h a t belief t o secure t h e great advantage of s t r i k i n g f i r s t . T h e o r e t i c a l l y , however, i n a s i t u a t i o n of acknowledged s t r a t e g i c stalemate, t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y is remote. And p r a c t i c a l l y , in terms of t h e e x i s t i n g r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r t h e u l t i m a t e s i t u a t i o n , t h e S o v i e t s would be s t r o n g l y r e l u c t a n t t o assume t h i s " i n e v i t a b i l i t y .I1

..

R e c e n t l y , i n u s i n g m i l i t a r y d o c t z i n e as an h s t r u ment t o communicate i n t e n t i o n s o r t h r e a t s t o t h e West, t h e Soviets have s l i p p e d i n t o a dilemma. On t h e one hand, t h e y w i s h t o deter t h e United S t a t e s , as s u g g e s t e d i n t h e foreg o i n g paragraphs. With t h i s aim in view, t h e y stress t h e d a n g e r of e s c a l a t i o n f r o m local c o n f l i c t s On t h e other hand t h e y w i s h t o a t t a i n greater f l e x i b i l i t y so as t o be able t o u s e m i l i t a r y forces a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l i n a l o c a l s i t u a t i o n w i t h o u t b r i n g i n g on a d e v a s t a t i n g a t t a c k by SAC a g a i n s t t h e USSR It is no wonder, t h e n , t h a t S o v i e t m i l i t a r y writers o f t e n appear t o b e a t cross-purposes w i t h thems e l v e s i n d e a l u g w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of e s c a l a t i o n f r o m l i m i t e d warfare.

19

A good example of t h e c o n t o r t i o n s t o be found i n r e c e n t S o v i e t l i t e r a t u r e is t h e disavowal i n t h e November 2 RED STAR of any i n t e n t t o a t t a c k t h e U.S. f i r s t i n t h e e v e n t of an a t t a c k by a NATO a l l y a g a i n s t a S o v i e t s a t e l l i t e , f o u r months a f t e r t h e a s s e r t i o n by Marshal Yeremenko i n an INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS a r t i c l e t h a t

. . .. ... .......
... .. . . . . . .

The laws of modern war are implacable: no matter which N T c o u n t r y sows t h e wind, AO t h e whole /RAT07 bloc would r e a p t h e w h i r l wind. T h i s is-axiomatic nowadays. T h i s is not n e c e s s a r i l y a c a s e of f l a t c o n t r a d i c t i o n , howe v e r , When read i n t h e g e n e r a l c o n t e x t of h i s a r t i c l e , Yeremenko's s t a t e m e n t a p p l i e s almost e x c l u s i v e l y t o a s i t u a t i o n i n which a NATO c o u n t r y ("Federal Germany above a l l " ) . s t r i k e s a n u c l e a r blow a g a i n s t t h e USSR--hardly a "local war." Yeremenko presumes a s i t u a t i o n i n which West Germany h a s a n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y . The motive behind Yeremenko's t h r e a t I s c l e a r : t h e S o v i e t s are i n t e n t on f o r e s t a l l i n g t h e c r e a t i o n of a m u l t i l a t e r a l n u c l e a r force ( d e s i r e d by t h e United States) or a m u l t i n a t i o n a l n u c l e a r f o r c e ( t h e v a r i a n t desired by some West, European c o u n t r i e s ) In f a c t , i n t h e c o u r s e of d i s c u s s i n g t h e idea of " m u l t i n a t i o n a l n u c l e a r f o r c e s , " Yeremenko acknowledges t h a t t h e arguments i n s u p p o r t of t h i s concept "might c a r r y some weight" i f it w e r e a q u e s t i o n of c o n v e n t i o n a l arms.

. .....,.. .. . .. . . ..

. . .

F i n a l l y , w h i l e w e may b e n e f i t from t h e f a c t t h a t Soviet m i l i t a r y doctrine sets f o r t h t h e guidelines f o r t h e development of t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t , it is s t i l l h a r d t o estimate on t h a t b a s i s t h e f u t u r e course of t r a i n i n g and e q u i p p i n g of S o v i e t t r o o p s . T h i s is because S o v i e t d o c t r i n e is s t i l l v e r y much i n f l u x , a f a c t which is suggest i v e of i n d e c i s i o n on a number of basic m i l i t a r y p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s . (There is s u b s t a n t i a l c o r r o b o r a t i v e e v i d e n c e of s u c h i n d e c i s i o n , as f o r example, i n t h e c o n t i n u i n g d i s p u t e o v e r t h e p r e r o g a t i v e s of t h e m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l leaders i n t h e s p h e r e of d e f e n s e p a l m i n g , and i n t h e i n t e r minable debates over r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n s . ) That S o v i e t d o c t r i n e h a s n o t y e t been worked o u t on a whole r a n g e of q u e s t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e conduct of a p o s s i b l e f u t u r e war is made clear i-n t h e f o l l o w i n g paragraph found o n l y i n

20

t h e r e v i s e d e d i t i o n of t h e book " M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y , " published t h i s f a l l :

. . . ..
.
.<,

.... . .... .
,.

._ .. . .... ..

These q u e s t i o n s are subject t o POlemics, E s s e n t i a l l y , '.the argument is o v e r t h e b a s i c ways i n which f u t u r e war w i l l be conducted, whether t h i s is t o be a ground.war w i t h t h e employment of n u c l e a r weapons as a means of s u p p o r t i n g t h e operat i o n s of t h e ground forces, or a fundam e n t a l l y new w a r i n which t h e main m e a n s of d e c i d i n g s t r a t e g i c t a s k s w i l l be n u c l e a r r o c k e t weapons. The European T h e a t e r That t h e S o v i e t leaders appear t o be r e a c h i n g f o r t h e o p t i o n t o u s e elements .of t h e i r m i l i t a r y f o r c e s t o r e s o m c a l East-West c o n f r o n t a t i o n s even i n s u c h a c r i t i c a l area as c e n t r a l Europe, does n o t mean, of course, t h a t t h e S o v i e t s w i l l u s e t h e i r forces f o r t h a t purpose; it means a g r e a t e r l l i n g n e s s t o u s e them if t h e y r e g a r d t h e r i s k of e s c a l a t i o n from t h e i r a c t i o n a s low o r cont r o l l a b l e i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n . Such an o p t i o n , i d e a l l y , presumes (1) a diminished c r e d i b i l i t y f o r s t r . a t e g i c m i l i t a r y t h r e a t s and (2) an u n d e r s t a n d i n g by t h e opponents t h a t t h e r e is room f o r f i g h t i n g t o a d e c i s i o n o v e r t h e local i s s u e without e i t h e r s i d e causing t h e c o n f l i c t t o escalate. The o p t i o n a l s o presumes t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t which b o t h s i d e s have i n p r e v e n t i n g e s c a l a t i o n t o s t r a t e g i c p r o p o r t i o n s t a k e s precedence o v e r t h e i n t e r e s t i m mediately a t stake. Were t h i s s i t u a t i o n a p p l i e d t o B e r l i n , t o t a k e an extreme b u t c r i t i c a l case, t h e S o v i e t s would c l e a r l y be i n an advantageous p o s i t i o n , g i v e n t h e p r e s e n t deployment of forces on b o t h s i d e s . The S o v i e t s c o u l d u s e t h e i r local m i l i t a r y proponderance t o r e s o l v e t h e B e r l i n quest i o n in t h e i r f a v o r o v e r n i g h t . For what h a s made Khrushchev a c c e p t t h i s "bone i n h i s t h r o a t " f o r so l o n g and a f t e r so many ultimatums is n o t t h e m i l i t a r y g a r r i s o n i n

... . . . ..
. .

.... ...... ......... ..._... . .. .. . ......

..... ,. ...,.

21

..- .......... ......

West B e r l i n b u t t h e f e a r of U . S . d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o defend t h e Western s t a k e i n B e r l i n even i f it means r e s o r t i n g t o s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r weapons. By t h e same token, as l o n g as t h e United S t a t e s succeeds i n making c r e d S b l e its d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o p r o t e c t t h e i n t e g r i t y of West B e r l i n w i t h s t r a t e g i c f i r e p o w e r , if n e c e s s a r y , S o v i e t p o l i c y reg a r d i n g B e r l i n is n o t l i k e l y t o be a f f e c t e d by changes i n S o v i e t d o c t r i n e on l i m i t e d w a r f a r e i n Europe.
......... ...........

As t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of an a l l - o u t S o v i e t convent i d n a l a t t a c k a g a i n s t Europe, g i v e n t h e p r e s e n t a r r a y of m i l i t a r y power and commitments, t h i s , too, seems out of t h e q u e s t i o n i r r e s p e c t i v e of a s o f t e n i n g of the S o v i e t p o s i t i o n on l i m i t e d w a r f a r e in Europe. As a prominent Western s t u d e n t of s t r a t e g y h a s p o i n t e d ? ouf;,the inducement o f f e r e d t o t h e R u s s i a n s t o s t a y non-nuclear i n an a l l o u t premeditated a t t a c k has been accompanied by t h e p r o v i s o t h a t we w i l l abandon t h e armaments r e s t r a i n t as soon as it seems t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e serious b u s i n e s s of winning.. As l o n g as t h i s remains a c r e d i b l e U.S. d o c t r i n e , and as l o n g as t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r weapons are on s t a n d b y among NATO forces i n Europe, t h e S o v i e t s w o u l d almost c e r t a i n l y estimate t h a t t h e t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r weapons w o u l d be u s e d t o Stem t h e a g g r e s s i o n .

. . . .

......... . . ...........

Where i n c r e a s e d t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y w i l l have an impact on m i l i t a r y p o l i c y under c o n d i t i o n s of an i m p e r f e c t s t r a t e g i c s t a l e m a t e is, as s u g g e s t e d e a r l i e r , i n t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s i n which t h e U.S. i n t e r e s t i n p r e v e n t i n g escalat i o n p z a i a l y t a k e s precedence o v e r t h e i s s u e a t hand. One s u c h s i t u a t i o n might be an a t t a c k by West Germany a g a i n s t E a s t Germany, o r i n t e r v e n t i o n by West German t r o o p s i n t h e e v e n t of a major r e v o l t i n E a s t Germany. The f i r s t case is n o t o u r s c e n a r i o , b u t a S o v i e t one. I t appeared i n b o t h e d i t i o n s of t h e book " M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y . " * In s u c h a case, S o v i e t bloc f o r c e s would c o u n t e r t h e a g g r e s s i o n ,

*It has a l s o appeared i n RED STAR on 26 December 1962, w r i t t e n by one of t h e a u t h o r s of " M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y , ' ' Maj. Gen. A. A. Prokhorov.

22

....... ..:.,.

might s t r i k e c e r t a i n b a s e s i n West Germany ("There may also be a t t e m p t s t o s t r i k e rear o b j e c t i v e s w i t h t h e h e l p of a v i a t i o n , although it is d o u b t f u l whether s u c h s t r i k e s w i l l t a k e p l a c e on a large scale.. . I 1 ) , b u t p r o b a b l y w o u l d n o t "go beyond t h e Yalu" i n t h e s e n s e of o v e r r u n n i n g and occupyi n g p a r t s of West Germany--for f e a r of t r i g g e r i n g e s c a l a t i o n t o g e n e r a l n u c l e a r war.

Another case i n p o i n t is t h e i l l u s t r a t i o n mentioned e a r l i e r in RED STAR on November 2 , in which t h e S o v i e t s claimed t h a t t h e y would r e b u f f an i m p e r i a l i s t attack" a g a i n s t a s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r y , b u t would n o t attack t h e United S t a t e s u n l e s s it had first attacked t h e S o v i e t homeland. The p o i n t t o be made here, it seems is t h a t u p t o now, t h e S o v i e t s have been i n c l i n e d t o regard t h e r i s k s of r a p i d escalation'to g e n e r a l w a r , i n t h e e v e n t of an a t t a c k by one o r more European NATO c o u n t r i e s a g a i n s t an E a s t European s a t e l l i t e , a s b e i n g so great as t o i n h i b i t (or even p r o h i b i t ) a s u i t a b l e r e b u f f , i f t h a t m e a n t engaging t h e attackers i n a l a r g e - s c a l e : . m i i l i t a r y a c t i o n , Now, t h e S o v i e t s look a t t h e risks d i f f e r e n t l y and appear t o be e l i c i t i n g Western r e a c t i o n s t o t h i s change, It is, i n s h o r t , i n t h e sphere of p l a i n l y d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n s or i n a d v e r t e n t c o n f r o n t a t i o n s t h a t t h e Sov.iets would hope t o g a i n most from t h e i r b i d for " t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i $ a . " And it is p r o b a b l y o n l y t h a t k i n d of f l e x i b i l i t y i n Europe t o which t h e S o v i e t s might r e a l i s t i c a l l y e x p e c t t h e United S t a t e s and its a l l i e s t o accede.
.
>...

.. .... ..

The deep-grained fear of t h e consequences of a d i r e c t massive c o n f r o n t a t i o n between S o v i e t and American troops i n Europe w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y work t o avoid s u c h a clash. Y e t t h e p r e s e n t r e a l i t i e s are s u c h t h a t S o v i e t forces would n e c e s s a r i l y be drawn i n t o any serious m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t between say,.West Germany and E a s t Germany; i n t h a t e v e n t , U.S. forces would also v e r y l i k e l y become involved. What t h e S o v i e t s might a t t e m p t t o do in s u c h a s i t u a t i o n --if t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n p r e v e n t i n g e s c a l a t i o n is s t r o n g e r t h a n t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n t h e matter b e i n g f o u g h t o v e r - - i s to d e p i c t t h e bloc m i l i t a r y f o r c e s engaged in t h e c o n f l i c t as a Warsaw P a c t o p e r a t i o n under t h e command of an E a s t German. T h i s might s e r v e t o d e f l a t e t h e a n x i e t y on both

23

E a s t German p o l i t i c a l a i m r a t h e r t h a n a S o v i e t . That is, it would be a kind of S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l - s t r a t e g i c disengagement, d e s p i t e S o v i e t l o c a l m i l i t a r y involvement. I t would probably be t h e closest t h i n g t o a proxy war i n Europe. That t h e S o v i e t s might have g i v e n some t h o u g h t t o s u c h a p o l i t i c a l s a f e g u a r d , f l i m s y though it may seem, is s u g g e s t e d by a t r e n d begun i n September 1962, of p u b l i c l y naming a n E a s t European o f f i c e r of m i n i s t e r i a l r a n k as b e i n g i n command of a j o i n t Warsaw P a c t exercise. There have been three s u c h exercises t o d a t e .
,

sides about e s c a l a t i o n , for t h e o p e r a t i o n - - e s p e c i a l l y i f it is a d e f e n s i v e one--would be d e p i c t e d as s e r v i n g an

The. N u c l e a r Problem
I t is n o t clear whether t h e S o v i e t a o n c e p t i o n of " t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y " i n c l u d e s room f o r t h e t a c t i c a l employment of n u c l e a r weapons. When t h e S o v i e t s a d d r e s s themselves s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e u s e of n u c l e a r weapons in l i m i t e d w a r f a r e (we haye o n l y open s o u r c e s t o go on h e r e ) , t h e p i c t u r e becomes v e r y hazy. W e have, a g a i n , o n l y been able t o p e r c e i v e t r e n d s . The S o v i e t s had c o n s i s t e n t l y d e p r e c a t e d t h e v e r y idea of ' J t z c t i c a l " n u c l e a r weapons u n t i l t h e y themselves had succeeded i n e q u i p p i n g t h e i r own f o r c e s w i t h s u c h weapons in" s t r e n g t h . S i n c e e a r l y 1961, t h e S o v i e t s have t a k e n a more s o b e r l o o k a t t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r u s i n g t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s i n l o c a l w a r f a r e as w e l l as i n g e n e r a l war. They t e n d t o t r e a t t h e employment of n u c l e a r s i n l o c l t l c r i s e s i n g e n e r a l as a p o s s i b l e c o n t i n g e n c y w i t h which S o v i e t f o r c e s m u s t be p r e p a r e d t o deal. One wonders whe*her some S o v i e t t h e o r i s t s might a l s o be i n c l i n e d t o see it as a more p r o b a b l e development i n t h e e v e n t of a s t a b l e m u t u a l s t r a t e g i c d e t e r r e n t , which w e b e l i e v e is a S o v i e t g o a l (and an expressed American e x p e c t a t i o n ) . Under. s u c h a c o n d i t i o n , a s p e r s u a s i v e l y p o i n t e d o u t by some Weste r n a n a l y s t s , t h e f a c t o r s w h i c h i n h i b i t e s c a l a t i o n from a l i m i t e d w a r t o a g e n e r a l war s h o u l d encourage t h e u s e of t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r weapons i n l i m i t e d war.

,.

.... . .

24

. .

. .

The s t r i k i n g ambivalence e v i d e n t e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e l a s t f a l l i n S o v i e t s t a t e m e n t s on t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of e s c a l a t i o n from a l o c a l n u c l e a r c o n f l i c t is p l a i n l y s u g g e s t i v e of an i n t e n t t o keep t h e W e s t off b a l a n c e and deterred from i n t r o d u c i n g n u c l e a r s . ( I n t h e l a t t e r respect, t h e ambivalence is p r o b a b l y s e e n as a way of d i s c o u r a g i n g e s c a l a t i o n t o g e n e r a l war i n t h e e v e n t t h a t t h e a n t a g o n i s t f a i l s t o be deterred from r e s o r t i n g t o t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s i n a l o c a l crisis.) The ambivalence may a l s o r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n t assessments among S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s p e c i a l i s t s of t h e r i s k s i n volved in e i t h e r i n i t i a t i n g t h e u s e of t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s , or r e s p o n d i n g ' i n k i n d t o t h e enemy's i n i t i a l u s e of n u c l e a r s i n a local c o n f l i c t .
Up u n t i l 1962, S o v i e t m i l i t a r y w r i t i n g s had c o n s i s t e n t l y promised automatic e s c a l a t i o n t o global w a r if t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s were i n t r o d u c e d i n a l o c a l war. B u t in November of t h a t y e a r , Marshal Malinovskiy made a s t a t e m e n t i n an fmportaht p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y pamphlet t h a t could be read t o mean t h a t t h e S o v i e t s w o u l d r e p l y i n k i n d t o t h e u s e of t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s , b u t would n o t n e c e s s a r i l y escalate t h e c o n f l i c t . In May, i n a n o t h e r important pamphlet C o l . Gen. N . A . Lomov made t h e f o l l o w i n g f l a t s t a t e m e n t w i t h o u t a c a v e a t about c e r t a i n e s c a l a t i o n : " I n l o c a l war, which can grow i n t o a world war, n u c l e a r means of armed s t r u g g l e may a l s o be used."

On t h e other hand, t h e older l i n e s k r e s s i n g t h e l i k e l i h o o d of e s c a l a t i m has also found its way i n t o p r i n t i n r e c e n t months. Thus, t h e r e v i s e d e d i t i o n of t h e book, " M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y " c a r e f u l l y weighed t h e problem (as i f i n r e f u t a t i o n of o p p o s i t e arguments by ether S o v i e t t h e o r i s t s ) and came t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r exchange i n t h e course of l i m i t e d warfare w a s c e r t a i n t o cause escalat ion:
It c o u l d also happen t h a t t h e antagonists i n t h e course of t h e local war employ n u c l e a r weapons of operational t a c t i c a l designation, without r e s o r t i n g t o s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r weapons. T h i s r a d i c a l l y changes t h e character of m i l it a r y operat i o n s , g i v i n g them g r e a t dynamism and d e c i s i v e n e s s .

However, it is d o u b f f u l whether t h e war w i l l be conducted w i t h t h e u s e of o h l y some o p e r a t i o n a l - t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r means. Once it h a s come to t h e p o i n t t h a t n u c l e a r weapons are. b e i n g used, t h e a n t a g o n i s t s w i l l be f o r c e d t o p u t i n t o a c t i o n a l l t h y i r n u c l e a r might. The l o c a l w a r w i l l change i n t o a n u c l e a r world w a r .
... . ..

B u t t h i s q u o t a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y h a r k s back t o a s i t u a t i o n i n which major n u c l e a r powers are drawn i n t o a l o c a l c o n f l i c t ; and on t h i s p o i n t , d o c t r i n e h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y s t a t e d t h a t c o n f l i c t would i n e v i t a b l y s p r e a d i n t o a g l o b a l n u c l e a r w a r . Hence, t o t h e S o v i e t way of t h i n k i n g , t h e most dangerous s i t u a t i o n i n a l o c a l m i l i t a r y crisis is When t h e USSR and t h e United States b o t h resort t o t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r weapons t o defend t h e i r s t a k e s . T h i s view, as is Mnown, is shared by soLe f r a m e r s of U.S. d e f e n s e p o l i c y . What remains--on a much less dangerous l e v e l - - i s , t h e u s e of t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s i n a crisis i n which o n l y one of t h e major n u c l e a r powers is i n v o l v e d . Thus, by omission of s t a t e m e n t s t o t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e S o v i e t s have l e f t a lower r i s k o p p o r t u n i t y for t h e United States t o use its n u c l e a r s i n l o c a l c r i s e s in such areas a s t h e Far E a s t and S o u t h e a s t Asia, w i t h o u t t h r e a t e n i n g immediate e s c a l a t i o n t o g e n e r a l war.

D i s t a n t L i m i t e d M i l i t a r y Action

The S o v i e t s e a r c h f o r t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e
. ... ... ..... .,

Middle E a s t and S o u t h e a s t Asia h w a l r e a d y been r e f l e c t -

..

a d i n policy.. 'Bqg'innir?g i n 1962 *he S o v i e t s have demons t r a t e d a w i l l i n g n e s s t o u s e S o v i e t t r o o p s i n combat i n l o c a l cr-laes on an unacknowledged b a s i s . From t h e t i m e of t h e Korean War t o 1962, t h e nearest t h a t t h e S o v i e t s came t o d i r e c t involvement i n l o c a l w a r o q t s i d e t h e E a s t European s a t e l l i t e s was i n t h e i r ' b a c k i n g of t h e P a t h e t Lao, That e f f o r t , howeyer, was c o n f h e d t o t r a i n i n g and l o g i s t i c s u p p o r t . There was n e v e r any sign of d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t r o o p s i n combat i n . b a o s , n o t even under t h e guise of t r a i n i n g . However, a s t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a i d program

26

. ..

...

==Xc

.. .

expanded o v e r t h e p a s t two y e a r s , it added t h e f e a t u r e of 1 m i t e d , s e c r e t i v e employment of S o v i e t troops i n combat i s i t u a t i o n s on behalf of some s t a t e s r e c e i v i n g S o v i e t a i d . The Indonesia-West New Guinea crisis and t h e UARYemen w a r r e f l e c t a t t h e v e r y l e a s t a S o v i e t p o l i c y decis i o n t o use t r a i n e d S o v i e t crews w h i l e i n d i g e n o u s crews are s t i l l in an e a r l y stage of t r a i n i n g . B u t beyond t h i s , it is d i f f i c u l t t o s a y how much S o v i e t philosophy regardi n g t h e u s e of S o v i e t t r o o p s i n local wars i n underdeveloped a r e a s h a s a l r e a d y been changed. W e do n o t know, f o r example, whether t h e S o v i e t s would f a v o r t h e u s e of t h e i r t r o o p s on an acknowledged b a s i s , under any c i r c u m s t a n c e s , n o r how large a m i l i t a r y force t h e y would be w i l l i n g t o commit i n a l o c a l c o n f l i c t i n t h e Middle E a s t or Southeast ASia. From t h e p o l i t i c a l s t a n d p o i n t , t h e S o v i e t s have p u b l i c l y pledged themselves t o r e n d e r s u p p o r t t o newly emergent s t a t e s b u t have never e x p l i c i t l y mentioned t h e p o s s i b l e commitment of S o v i e t t r o o p s . The Cuban e p i s o d e is of an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t order. I n t h i s case t h e deployment of combat r e a d y S o v i e t u n i t s w a s i n t e n d e d n o t for use in a s t r i c t l y l o c a l w a r between t h e United States and Cuba, b u t t o s e r v e a larger S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e which placed t h e USSR on t h e f i r i n g l i n e . By t h e same t o k e n , S o v i e t p l e d g e s made a f t e r t h e crisis t o d e f e n d C u b a implied d e f e n s e from a f a r - - i n v o l v i n g t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y of t h e S o v i e t homeland and n o t S o v i e t t r o o p s i n t h e Eocale a l o n e .

.. .. . .. .
.,I. ,..,

..

. .......

. . . .. . .... . . . , ..

.......... .... ... . _:.

. ..

In a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , t h e S o v i e t s have n o t y e t changed t h e i r estimate t h a t d i r e c t involvement of S o v i e t and U.S. f o r c e s , even in d i s t a n t areas, w o u l d be e x t r e m e l y dangerous.

There is n o t o n l y the fear of e s c a l a t i o n t n a t t h e S o v i e t s . There is a l s o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e USSR has a v e r y l i m i t e d c a p a b i l i t y f o r c o n d u c t i n g warfare a t any d i s t a n c e from t h e bloc,. Unless and u n t i l these r e s t r a i n t s are l i f t e d , t h e USSR w i l l no doubt t r y t o a v o i d (1) any d i r e c t involvement w i t h U.S. forces in d i s t a n t areas, and (2) any p u b l i c knowledge of t h e employment of S o v i e t t r o o p s i n combat in d i s t a n t areas.

27

. . .. .
I

I
1
~

!
~

The march of S o v i e t t h i n k i n g on l i m i t e d w a r f a r e seem t o be i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of overcoming t h e major o b s t a c l e s i n t h e way of a t t a i n i n g s t i l l g r e a t e r p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y i n d i s t a n t areas, and c o n s e q u e n t l y g r e a t e r S o v i e t p r e s t i g e . The S o v i e t s have e x p r e s s e d concern o v e r t h e development of U.S. c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r d i s t a n t a c t i o n ; t h e y have called f o r c l o s e a t t e n t i o n t o be p a i d by S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s p e c i a l i s t s t o t h e problem of local w a r s ; - t h e y have urged t h a t l o c a l war problems be t a k e n i n t o account by S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y ; t h e y have observed t h a t local wars are most l i k e l y t o b r e a k o u t i n t h e n e a r and Middle E a s t , F a r E a s t , Africa and Cuba; and t h e y have acknowledged t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s c o u l d be involved i n l o c a l wars. The y e a r n i n g f o r g r e a t e r m i l i t a r y prowess i n d i s t a n t areas may a l r e a d y have l e d t o a q u e s t f o r S o v i e t base

'

. .. .. . . .

. .. . , . ..... . ..... . . . .._ .

, ... .. .

..

I
1

.... . .
. .

..

The S o v i e t s might f i n d t h e idea of a system of f o r e i g n bases q u i t e a p p e a l i n g from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e i r t a c t i c a l value--notably t h e i r importance t o t h e S o v i e t s i n r e g a r d t o enhancing S o v i e t l i m i t e d w a r f a r e c a p a b i l i t i e s . I n d o n e s i a , f o r example, c o u l d p r o v i d e a v a l u a b l e l o g i s t i c b a s e i f t h e S o v i e t s decided t o g i v e more open s u p p o r t t o r e v o l u t i o n a r y movements i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a . A s o t h e r s have p o i n t e d o u t , t h e placement of medium r a n g e m i s s i l e s in I n d o n e s i a under S o v i e t c o n t r o l c o u l d have a g r e a t inf l u e n c e on developments i n S o u t h e a s t Asia (depending n o t o n l y on t h e U.S. r e s p o n s e b u t on t h e Chinese Communist The mere p r e s e n c e of t h e S o v i e t m i s r e s p o n s e as w e l l ) . s i l e s w o u l d have c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e on e v e n t s : medium r a n g e missiles based on J a v a could c o v e r a l l of S o u t h e a s t A s i a ; and t h e S o v i e t s could see i n t h a t a u s e f u l symbol f o r S o v i e t s u p p o r t of wars of l i b e r a t i o n and .a c o u n t e r t h r e a t t o U.S. i n t e r v e n t i o n i n s u c h wars. .The f l y i n t h e o i n t m e n t , however, is t h e p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y . The leaders of t h e young s t a t e s , j e a l o u s of t h e i r newly acquired s o v e r e i g n t y , are loathe t o have it compromised.

..

28

........... .. ... ..

... .:......
...

.,. .\....... , ; . ... . . ..:I ...., .., ... . .

Thus I n d o n e s i a has rejected t h e idea of S o v i e t c o n t r o l of bases on its t e r r i t o r y . S y r i a wants a i d , b u t does n o t want S o v i e t t e c h n i c i a n s and i n s t r u c t o r s i n t h e c o u n t r y . And so f o r t h . Under s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , we are n o t l i k e l y t o see t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y bases i n , t h e Middle E a s t , Asia, o r A f r i c a . I f , however, t h e USSR manages t o win o v e r one of t h e small c o u n t r i e s a s an a l l y or t o s u b v e r t its government, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e e c r e a t i o n of a S o v i e t base on t h a t c o u n t r y ' s t e r r i t o r y would become q u i t e r e a l .
E f f e c t on Weapons and T r a i n i n g

The change i n S o v i e t thought on l i m i t e d warfare w i l l p r o b a b l y have an important impact on t h e t r a i n i n g and e q u i p p i n g of S o v i e t forces. The basic o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e armed f o r c e s toward g e n e r a l n u c l e a r w a r w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y be r e t a i n e d , however. Thus, w e e x p e c t r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r g e n e r a l n u c l e a r w a r t o c o n t i n u e t o be t h e p r i n c i p a l f a c t o r s determining t h e s t r u c t u r e and s i z e of t h e S o v i e t t h e a t e r f o r c e s . The r e q u i r e m e n t s themselves have been t h e s u b j e c t of a l o n g c o n t r o v e r s y , b u t t h e u n d e r l y i n g s t r a t e g i c assumption t h a t t h e armed f o r c e s m u s t be t r a i n e d and equipped t o f i g h t eff e c t i v e l y u n d e r t h e worst c o n d i t i o n s - - g e n e r a l n u c l e a r w a r - h a s n o t been q u e s t i o n e d .
Where we might e x p e c t t o see change, i f t h e idea of 1i m i t e d warfare p r e p a r a t i o n s becomes f i r m l y implanted, is i n t h e one-sided emphasis on n u c l e a r warfare e v i d e n t i n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e , p l a n n i n g and t r a i n i n g . Up u n t i l 1962 t h e S o v i e t s e x p e c t e d t h a t any major c o n f l i c t i n Europe would e i t h e r be n u c l e a r from t h e s t a r t o r would r a p i d l y

.....

. .(......., ..

.. .

escalate i n t o a g l o b a l w a r , For t h a t r e a s o n , v i r t u a l l y t h e f u l l weight of p r o f e s s i o n a l S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h i n k i n g on l a r g e - s c a l e combat in Europe has been brought t o b e a r on problems of n u c l e a r war. 1
I

29

.. ...

. I

.... .
.. .

In s h o r t , there w a s no e v i d e n c e of t he e x i s t e n c e of a m l l i t ' m y d o c t r i n e f o r t h e t r a i n i n g and e q u i p p i n g of S o v i e t f o r c e s f o r l a r g e - s c a l e 1 mited warfare. i

. It may w e l l have occurred t o S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s p e c i a l ists, as it h a s t o some of u s , t h a t t h e .overwhelming emphasis i n S o v i e t d o c t r i n e on g e n e r a l n u c l e a r w a r w i l l p r o b a b l y erode t h e USSR's c o n v e n t i o n a l war-making c a p a b i l i t y o v e r t h e long run. (In a f u t u r e s i t u a t i o n of a s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r stalemate q r s t a n d o f f t h i s c o u l d be d i s a s t r o u s for S o v i e t foreign policy.) T h i s e r o s i o n has a l r e a d y begun. While some changes i n S o v i e t f o r c e s t r u c t u r e have no doubt i m proved S o v i e t c o n v e n t i o n a l war machinery ( m o t o r i z a t i o n of i n f a n t r y and i n c r e m e n t s t o i n f a n t r y c o n v e n t i o n a l f i r e p o w e r ) , other measures ( s u c h as c u t b a c k s i n f r o n t a l a v i a t i o n and t u b e a r t i l l e r y ) ,have tended t o have a d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t on t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y of t h e t r o o p s . The s a m e may be s a i d f o r t h e p l a n n i n g of o p e r a t i o n s : d o c t r i n e demands t h a t n u c l e a r weapons be t h e b a s i s f o r p l a n n i n g of major m i l i t a r y operations.

. ......... . . ,
.

The dilemma of having t o p r e p a r e t h e armed forces s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f o r n u c l e a r and l i m i t e d w a r f a r e may, i n terms of t h e i d e a l , be an i n s o l u b l e one, inasmuch as t h e n u c l e a r

..

.... .. .. .......... . .... . . . ... . . .

....

and c o n v e n t i o n a l b a t t l e f i e l d s make v e r y d i f f e r e n t , and a t times, c o n t r a d i c t o r y demands as regards mode of operat i o n s and equipment. And t h e USSR is bound t o be more c o n s t r a i n e d i n respect t o s a t i s f y i n g d u a l force r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a n t h e U.S. because of more l i m i t e d resources. But a compromise may be reached i n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p l a n n i n g , whereby t h e e r o s i o n of c o n v e n t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s is slowed doyn o r arrested and s p e c i f i c k i n d s of c a p a b i l i t i e s for l i m i t e d w a r f a r e are added t h a t do n o t now e x i s t . The r e c e n t appearance, a f t e r a l o n g absence, o a f s p a t e of a r t i c l e s i n t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y press on t h e subj e c t of amphibious l a n d i n g s , may be an i n d i c a t i o n of such a readjustment. /

.. ..

U n t i l t h i s t i m e , e v i d e n t l y , t h e S o v i e t s had no serious amp h i b i o u s l a n d i n g c a p a b i l i t y . The a c q u i s i t i o n of one would i m p o r t a n t l y add t o t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s i n some of t h e underdeveloped areas where t h e S o v i e t s have demonstrated t h e g r e a t e s t w i l l i n g n e s s t o become i n v o l v e d i n l o c a l conf 1i c t s It might have been t h i s v e r y c a p a b i l i t y , i n a d d i t i o n t o a new kroop o r g a n i z a t i o n , I F i n a l l y , I t mlgnt 'cnaz me a o v i e z s nave ar; la begun t o develop a m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y t o defend t h e i r p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s i n d i s t a n t a r e a s , and p e r h a p s a d d i t i o n a l l y t o o f f e r new chall e n g e s i n t h e underdeveloped areas.

.
I

*\,.

31

TzSREz