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a) Assess the claim that dualism establishes that M+B are separate b) Assess the problems associated with dualism

1. Masked Man fallacy (doubt isnt a property of an object) 2. Hume if you strip away everything there is NO res cogitans, you are left with

nothing! There is NO underlying substance. 3. Synthetic a priori 4. Arnaulds triangle example

5. Descartes relies on INTROSPECTION beetle in a box


INTERACTION (use Descartes essay)

You MUST use more than one problem FREE WILL it appears to give us free will as res cogitans and the mind are separate to the causal laws of nature If the mind is separate how is it known? Introspection Beetle in a Box THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS Ayer Literally insignificant to talk about the mind



Talk about water and talk about H2O INTERTHEORETIC REDUCTION a new and powerful theory entails a set of propositions which mirror perfectly the propositions of an older theory

Just like H20 = water the mind is the brain (necessary) You cant have water without H2O, therefore you cant have a brain without a mind or a mind without a brain Therefore if MBI can successfully prove that the functions of the brain are REDUCIBLE to functions of the mind then MBI succeeds as a theory.

Nagel and Searle Qualia, the what its likeness of experience Intentionality, the directedness of thought Subjectivity, the idea that every thought is thought by a particular individual, from a particular place. Together jointly sufficient for providing consciousness. Throughout the course of this essay I will be arguing that the brain is resistant to reductionist accounts, and to support this view I will be using Jacksons What Mary didnt know, Searles Chinese room and Nagels what its like to be a bat. 1. QUALIA raw feels, or the what it is actually like to experience this of sense data within consciousness. Revealed via introspection we have privileged access to it, so could only ever know with certainty our own quale experience. No amount of research or scientific study could ever prove what it actually feels like to taste a cheeseburger, or to smell perfume, as there is something further than simply the scientific account of our experience of this which provides us with the full idea of what these experiences actually feel like. Therefore, it could be argued that brain activity alone isnt enough to reveal the true quale experience, thus the mind must be something separate from the brain activity. Jackson what Mary didnt know (illustrates the idea that brain activity must be separate from our raw experience.) It states that: Mary is a colour scientist who lives in a room in which every object, item of food and even her clothes are black, white, or a shade of monochrome. Therefore, Mary has never had firsthand experience of viewing colour. However, Mary knows every single fact there is to know about colour perception, the physics of colour and neuroscience, and when viewing black and white footage of brain activity, possesses the ability to be able to identify the colour being perceived. However, one day Mary leaves her black and white room, and perceives colour for the first time. It is here when Jackson poses the question, when Mary sees a red rose, does she have a new experience? Mary does in fact have a completely new experience, as she has gained the quale experience of the colour red. Even though Mary knew all the scientific knowledge that

was possible to know about the colour red, this does not equate to the actual raw feeling Mary is now experiencing. The qualia is not reducible to the physical brain activity. It would be a contradiction to claim that the quale experience was the same as the brain activity, as according to Leibniz in order for two things to be the same, they must have the same properties.

Quale experiences can be reduced to brain activity, as it was quale experiences which Mary perceived in the first place. e.g. even though the actual viewing of a rose was a new experience for Mary, this experience reduces down to the colour wavelength and the neuroscience that Mary already knew about. Therefore although it appears that Mary was experiencing something new and unconnected from physical activity, the qualities the new experiences pick out are the qualities she already knew, they are simply presented in a different way.

Nagel and Black support Jacksons ideas and state that qualia is isolated from brain activity because; 1. It is only accessible via introspection, 2. Quale experiences are non-intentional, 3. They are the mental counterparts to properties of objects, 4. They determine the phenomenal character of experience. These four things cant be deduced via brain activity, and therefore qualia must be something that lies separately to the brain. Therefore the mind and brain possess different properties 2. INTENTIONALITY The view that in order for a thought to be a thought it must be directed on, about or at something. Therefore, if the propositional content of our thoughts is resistant to being reduced to something physical, then mind is resistant to being something physical. In other words, if intentionality has different properties to the brain, then the mind and brain must be separate. If intentionality is a purely mental aspect, and is necessary for consciousness, then it has totally different characteristics to the brain.

In order to distinguish whether intentionality is sufficient, we must think of an example where we can have intentionality without having consciousness.

However, it prima facie appears that computers possess intentionality, as they have thoughts, or go through processes which are directed at a specific outcome, but we would not necessarily regard computers as being conscious. If this is the case, we have an example of intentionality without consciousness, and so intentionality cannot be sufficient, or purely mental. Therefore, the mind and the brain share a property, so there is still a possibility that they could be the same thing.

Searle the Chinese Room- designed to distinguish the difference between syntactical processing and semantics. A room with two holes, one in which to enter a question in Chinese, and the other where the answer will appear, also in Chinese. From the outside of the room, you will come to the conclusion that the person in the room can speak and understand the Chinese language, whereas in reality all he needs to answer the question is a book of symbols which match up, and tell him the correct answer. Therefore in reality, no knowledge of the Chinese language is needed at all to sit inside the room, as the information is being processed via syntax, not semantics, and all the man is doing is manipulating the symbols with no understanding, showing how machines actually need no knowledge of our language to reproduce it. Although it may appear that the computers possess the knowledge to direct their thoughts with intentions, in fact they are simply reproducing information already given to them. Computers dont have intentionality, and therefore we cannot think of an example of intentionality which does not imply consciousness, and as a result of this, intentionality is sufficient and the mind is resistant to reductionist accounts.

Minsky believes that machines are consciously aware of what theyre doing. We are unconscious to what are brain is doing and therefore we cannot fully understand it, meaning that he believes there is no difference between artificial intelligence and the human brain. e.g. the fact we as humans are conscious and know that we exist, is no different than a GPS device that knows where it is. e.g. society of mind, which is the theory that our brain is made up of 400 different computers, and that it is not one syntactical Chinese Room that gives us understanding, its when all of the rooms come together and interact that you gain this understanding, therefore, according to Minsky all semantics is, is very complex syntax, and humans and machines are functionally isomorphic. Neither machines nor humans fully possess intentionality, and therefore it cannot be a sufficient condition for consciousness. If this is the case, our semantical processing can be reduced to brain activity, and the mind can be reduced to the brain.


Syntax no understanding no matter how many times you repeat this you will never gain any, as 0 times the 400 computers, will still equal zero Machines cannot even have the possibility of ever understanding what they are processing, whereas humans can. e.g. Blocks Chinese Nation if you log onto the internet, you have entered the world wide web, which is effectively governed by lots of Chinese rooms, as it is controlled through the manipulation of symbols, but the internet actually has no understanding of what any of the symbols mean. According to Minsky, this would constitute as a mind, as it possesses all of the same qualities, but it is not, as the internet as a whole does not possess intentionality, as it is unconscious. Since only conscious beings can possess intentionality, it must be a characteristic of the mind, and thus the mind is resistant to reductionist accounts.


The idea that every thought is thought from a particular place.

e.g. the smell of garlic bread may be the quale, but the smell from this particular perspective is the subjective element in the experience.

Subjective experiences are completely personal, as we have privileged access to the information, i.e. I may know what its like to see the colour blue, but I can never know what its like to see the colour blue from the subjective perspective of Robin.

If we cannot grasp the idea of anyone elses subjective experience, it cannot be reduced down to brain activity. Therefore, the brain and the mind must have different properties.

Nagels What its like to be a bat only the bat can fully understand fully what it feels like to be a bat. Even if I flew around pretending to be a bat,

it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question, I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat, yet if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task.

Consciousness cannot be understood from an objective third-person point of view, as the objective facts do not reveal the subjective experience.


Mind is not private or subjective at all, as everything our mind tells us is knowledge gained from experience of the world, and confirmed through ostensive verification.

We may believe we have a different subjective view to everyone else, this view can be reduced down to our understanding of the meaning of words, and ultimately brain activity.


We all learn the content of our thoughts through ostensive verification, we all still possess individual subjective opinions as we all think our thoughts from our own viewpoint


Directly contrasts theories such as DUALISM (claims that the mind is a nonphysical Cartesian substance (res cogitans), and the brain is a separate entity). Maintains that statements about the mind and mental states turn out, after analysis, to be equivalent to statements that describe a persons actual and possible public behaviour, without loss of meaning (residue). There is no more to talking about someones mental states than the patterns of behaviour that they exhibit and we observe.


In order for us to be able to talk about something with literal significance, it must be verifiable. Literally Significant Reducible to a tautology, or be empirically verifiable in practice or principle. (However, theories of mind such as the Dualist response talk about the mind as a private substance which we all possess which is revealed to us via introspection.)

Ayer therefore states that to talk about the mind in this way would be literally insignificant, as this definition of mind cannot be reduced to a tautology, as you could never define something which is private without verification via a public standard of correctness, and due to the very nature of this definition of mind this would be impossible. Also non-verifiable in practice or principle, as by very definition it is a private substance which we hold privileged access to, and therefore it would be a contradiction to claim that we could publically verify mind.

It is literally insignificant for us to talk about a mind, as by very definition it could never be verified. Therefore, even in the case of our own mental states (e.g. anger), we label via a public standard of correctness where a particular set off behaviours were labelled anger, and this gives us the ability to talk about other peoples mental states with significance as we discover other mental states and relate these to our own via behaviour. WITTGENSTEINS BEETLE IN A BOX ANALOGY Highlights the impossibility of the formation of a logical private language. All language, even that concerning the mind must be public. We all possess a box which we have private, privileged access to, so no one else can look in my box, and likewise I cant look in anyone elses box. However, I am told every box contains a beetle, and I know this because my own box contains a beetle. However, if I can never look in anyone elses box, I can never be certain that the object inside my box is in fact a beetle, as there is no standard of correctness which I can verify this assumption against. Wittgenstein states that without a publically verifiable object to act as a public standard of correctness, we can never know what is in our box. Likewise, this analogy can be applied to mental events, for example I do not know I am upset, unless I have learnt to use the mental vocabulary through public ostensive verification of perceiving other peoples behaviour. Therefore, to talk about the mind as something private is literally insignificant, and therefore we must reduce this to the idea that talk about the mind is equivalent to actual and possible mental states.


Ryle intends to dismiss the idea that the mind is a substance, yet just because there is no substance mind, it does not mean we are not able to talk about it with significance. University analogy Imagine a student being shown around a university. This student visits lectures, eats in the canteen, views the sports field, and gets shown every building on the campus. At the end of the day, the student turns around and says thank you for that tour, but could you show me the university now? By asking this question, the student has a mistaken idea of the university and is implying that it is a

substance which can be singled out and identified, and Ryle states that the Dualist makes the same Category Error with the mind, as instead of accepting everything we exhibit as mind, they go on to label the substance of mind, thus making the same error as the university student. By avoiding this over complication, Ryle manages to avoid the problem of other minds.


Fails to be a sufficient definition in use.

The primary aim of such a definition is to produce a definiens (definition), which does not contain the definiendum (the very thing which you are trying to describe), therefore Behaviourism is trying to redefine mental states without actually using mental states to describe it. However it fails to do so, and this can be shown via the following example. To state that Rachel Wants a Caribbean Holiday there are many subjunctive conditionals of this phrase, for example, If asked if she wants to go, she would say yes, If given a ticket, she would embark on the flight, If presented with a range of brochures, she would look at Caribbean ones. However each of these conditionals contains enthymatic mental termsIs only so if Rachel is not lying, Is only so if she isnt afraid of flying, Is only true if she is not bored of the brochures. Since lying, bored and afraid are mental terms, analytical behaviourism fails to provide an account for the mind which does not involve the mental itself, and therefore this fails as a definition in use. Forms a second problem Behaviourist may argue that they could overcome the first problem by producing a definition in use for each of the enthymatic terms, however these would fall short of the same criticism and this would lead to an endless series of subjunctive conditionals, which were labelled open questions by G. E. Moore. G. E. MOORESPRINCIPIA ETHICA There are two types of question, closed questions and open questions. e.g. Is a bachelor an unmarried man? according to Moore is a pseudo question as the definition is already firm and therefore this is labelled as a closed question. Alternatively, an open question is one that you can actually act upon, as its a question in that your definition or answer is not closed or complete. Moore states that for any definition to be successful it must be closed, as if it is left open a number of different statements could fit the definition and consequently the term becomes meaningless.

Moore Analytical behaviourism leads to an open question due to the infinite number of subjunctive conditionals.

You can assess all the actions and behaviours of people, yet you are still able to look at a person who is laughing and ask but is she really happy? without being certain of the answer. Therefore there is residue within the analytical behaviourists definition of mind, and unless all residues are disposed of, the definition will not be complete.

Therefore the analytical behaviourists definition of mind is insufficient as a definition in use.

If we questioned the definition of every word in our vocabulary in the way Moore is suggesting within the definition of mental states, then we would never be in positions to use words successfully, which possess a completely closed definition. e.g. The number 2 Infinite number of subjunctive conditionals for this, e.g. different series of equations which could produce this number etc., therefore it would be impossible to know every circumstance that could ever result in the number two. According to Moore open question we could not define two entirely correctly. Therefore, the behaviourist can apply the same theory to metal vocabulary, as we dont have to have seen every possible instance of anger to be able to recognise the correct use of the word when seen in the instance of others.

Furthermore when we define mental terms, we do not begin from afresh as we already have a clear idea of many different mental translations which we can use to help us define further instances, e.g. The case of Rachel (above) the enthymatic terms are not problematic as we have alternate definitions for these terms which do not contain the mental.


Theory fails because it actually doesnt get anywhere near the mind, it only gets close to mental terms, and by doing so it doesnt provide a sufficient answer to the question what is the mind?

e.g. Zombies, (beings which are functionally isomorphic with humans, yet dont have a mind) The Behaviourist wouldnt be able to draw a distinction between the two, as they would have to admit that if the Zombie acted like a human and showed the same type of behaviour as a human, then they must possess the same mind as a human, meaning that the behaviourist would have to accept that Zombies are identical to humans, and by very definition this is wrong.

It fails can never provide you with any knowledge about whether or not we actually possess minds, as according to this example, we could all be Zombies.

If Zombies acted in exactly the same way to humans, and there was no physical difference between humans and Zombies, then there is no difference to matter, because as long as they act like humans we treat them in the same way. The whole point of Behaviourism is to reduce talk about the mind, not actual minds, as by very definition these can never be known, and therefore it doesnt matter whether we are all Zombies as the Behaviourist isnt claiming anything about the actual existence of actual minds.

Prima facie appears that they fail to find a sufficient definition in use for the mind without actually referring to the mental itself, this is not the case. All criticisms that Analytical Behaviourism denies what we actually believe to be the mind hold no relevance, as the whole point of this theory of mind is to avoid referring to the metaphysical substance of mind in the first place, and therefore to deny these things is simply the intention of the theory. Analytical Behaviourism doesnt deal with the mind, it simply states that talk about mental states reduces to talk about actual and possible behaviour. Provides a sufficient account for how we can know not only our own mind, but the minds of others.


The Functionalist claims that the mind should not be defined by what it is, but by what it does, and therefore the Functionalists theory of mind states that a creatures mental state can be identified by determining whether or not this creature possesses internal states and processes that contribute to causal roles.

These roles are the ability to have causal relations to stimulation, behaviour and when responding and interacting with one another, and due to this Functionalism is compatible with a materialistic account of the mind.

We can define any mental state by the set of causal relations it bears to environmental effects that occur to the body, other mental states and outward behaviour.


We would be wrong to talk about the mind for what it physically is, rather it should be defined by what it does, and its functional capacity.

e.g. Kidney filters blood, and therefore this is what we define Kidney as. When asked what is a kidney, you wouldnt reply with a description of its shape, size, colour or smell, but instead we would enlighten this person as to what the Kidneys function within our body is, and thus this is how the word Kidney is defined.

A dialysis machine is functionally isomorphic with a Kidney, as they both possess the same functional capacity.

Therefore a dialysis machine and a kidney are the same as their definition is simply defined via their causal roles. Similarly, the Functionalist would claim the same should be applied to talk about the mind, and our mental states are defined by our functional capacity to produce different possible outcomes.

Within Functionalism The brain is a device which receives complex inputs from sensory systems and effects equally complex outputs, and therefore the brain is a computational device and when we talk about the mind, we are simply describing this process.


There are a number of examples where it would appear that artificial intelligence could be functionally isomorphic with the human model if this was the case, the Functionalist would have to regard these machines as minded, since they cannot by defined by anything other than their causal roles. e.g. Turing test Designed to help distinguish between human and artificial intelligence.

Claims that if a machine was indistinguishable from a human being in terms of linguistic competence, then they should be regarded as the same thing, as they possess the same intelligence. To determine this, or pass the test a computer would have to successfully withhold a conversation with you via a keyboard so you could be fooled into thinking that it was a person, in this case due to the machine exhibiting intelligent behaviour, we should consider the machine in the same way as a person, and therefore the artificial intelligence of the machine is functionally isomorphic with

the human mind, and thus according to Functionalism these must be regarded as the same thing.

This prima facie appears to be a problem for Functionalists means we must regard machines and computers as minded, which many people fail to accept to be the case.

Not a problem at all no machine would ever possess the functional capacity to pass this test machines only process information via the process of Syntax, which reduces down to the manipulation of symbols. Syntactical processing requires no actual understanding of the events which are occurring, and instead deals with converting inputs into outputs, and therefore machines cannot intellectually respond to emotive related issues. However, as humans we can respond to these issues as we process information via semantics, which requires understanding of the subject. Furthermore, if there ever was an instance in the future where machines had progressed so much that they could actually pass the test, and there was no way of distinguishing between a minded human and a machine, then there is no difference to matter as the machine is functionally isomorphic with a human, just as the kidney is functionally isomorphic with the dialysis machine. Therefore, functionalism does not fail on this account.


Although functionalism may help in defining mind, it does not even begin to address the point of what it feels like to be experiencing a mental state, yet such feels are mental. It is these feels that make the mental states what they are. Functionalism claims to reveal the mind, yet it has not been successful in doing this, and is therefore guilty of the very thing it accused other materialist theories such as Behaviourism of doing.

e.g. Nagel highlights the first person and third person asymmetry. An objective functional account cannot deal with the subjective point of view of consciousness. what its like to be a bat suggests that only the bat can fully understand fully what it feels like to be a bat. Nagel states that even if I flew around pretending to be a bat, it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question, I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat, yet if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task. Therefore Nagel is reiterating the point that consciousness cannot be understood from an objective third-person point of view, as the objective facts do not reveal the subjective experience.

To know what its like to be a bat is simply the possession of a particular ability, and involves no factual content. To know is simply another functional capacity. Therefore, functionalists argue that Qualia, Intentionality and Subjectivity are actually irrelevant when defining the mind.


e.g. An individual sees the colour red as violet, so that their perception of colour is directly inverted to my perception. e.g when viewing a banana I might have the sensation of yellow, when this individual experiences blue. This individual is functionally isomorphic with me, as they receive all the same inputs, wavelengths of lights and outputs, yet they still perceive something different to me. No way of comparing our inner Qualia,we make the same observations, therefore have no way of telling that our perceptions differ in this way. Something fundamentally wrong w/ F functional isomorphism cannot be sufficient for defining the mind.

So long as this Quale state is caused by a red object, and causes us to believe that something is red, then it is a sensation of redness, whatever we experience within our private quale experience. The specific qualia are not essential to the type-identity of mental states; it merely serves as a feature which permits us to introspectively identify objects.


Only gets close to mental terms, and by doing so it doesnt provide a sufficient answer to the question what is the mind?

e.g. Zombies, (beings which are functionally isomorphic with humans, yet dont have a mind), F cant draw a distinction between the two have to admit that if the Zombie acted like a human and had the functional capacity to withhold a conversation with a human, then they must possess the same mind as a human, meaning that the Functionalist would have to accept that Zombies are identical to humans, (wrong by definition) Fails never provide any knowledge about whether we actually possess M we could all be Zombies.


If Zombies acted in exactly the same way to humans, and there was no physical difference between humans and Zombies, then there is no difference to matter, because as long as they act like humans we treat them in the same way. The whole point of Functionalism is to avoid defining the mind by what it is, but define it by what it does, and if these Zombies appear functionally isomorphic with humans then there is no difference to matter, and these should be regarded as the same thing.

Eliminates the problem of trying to define what the mind is via non-verifiable introspection, and instead provides a sufficient account for what the mind does.




Davidsons anomalous monism States that forms of mental states are identical to forms of brain states, but despite this the mental is not reducible to the physical.

e.g. Sensations of pain experienced in the mind, are said to be identical to c-fibres firing within the brain, (other mental sensations bear identity with a certain kind of neurological state within the brain.) The theory claims that the mind must therefore be causally related to the brain, and the mind supervenes upon the brain. Groups the mental and physical properties of an event together, and labels this combination as one mental event, consisting of both these mental and these physical properties.

DAVIDSON If mental event M is the cause of physical event P, then these events must instantiate a strict causal law. But, given the anomalism of the mental, the law cannot employ the mental description M, and must characterise M under a physical description in which M is a physical event. Therefore, all mental events are identical to physical events even though there are no psychophysical laws. Means we can observe a causal relationship between mental and physical events, e.g. His pain caused him to walk to the medicine cabinet and take an aspirin, By definition a mental event could not operate in a causal relationship such as this one, and therefore these mental events must also contain a physical event. Therefore Davidson maintains that all events are physical, but some physical events contain irreducible mental phenomena.

Therefore all mental events necessarily involve physical events.

Davidson therefore says Reasons can act as causes. e.g. if someone were to kick me in the leg, I would feel pain, and we would say that this pain causes me to grab the area which was kicked. Prima facie appears the raise the problem that a mental event has caused a physical event, which seems contradictory if the two are not related in some way, and there appears to be no psychophysical relationship. AM aims to explain this psychophysical causation, pain is a mental event, which according necessarily includes the neural event, and therefore we can say that the pain caused us to act in this way as its the subvenient neural base that causes that pain. Therefore, the reason for my pain also acts as the cause of my pain.

For anything to be involved in a causal relationship, it has to be a public event. Desires and mental events cannot be the causes of our actions as we have private and privileged access to our desires, and they are not something public which can be verified. However, for a cause to be a valid cause it must be subjected to a public labelling of a public object, via a public standard of correctness. It would be a contradiction to claim we could provide this with mental events. e.g. if I had not chosen I would not be in the room is not open to public verification, unlike purely physical events which are.

Malcom has failed to understand Davidsons mental events Instead of viewing both the subvenient neural base, and the mental desires as one mental event, he is regarding the two as two separate private events. Therefore, once Malcom has adopted Davidsons definition of mental event, this problem appears irrelevant as these events can still be publicly verified due to the physical content.

Any causal relation has to be viewed as an instance of a general regularity in nature.

In other words, if reasons act as causes they must be able to be involved in causal events. However, causal events must follow the laws of nature and due to the nature of mind, we could only ever be certain of our own, and therefore we cant create a general rule for all minds which would follow a certain law-like pattern, and thus there can be no

general laws concerning private mental events, and to claim otherwise would result in a contradiction. This is because statements that describe laws of nature must be synthetic, as they are concerned with matters of fact, however Davidsons theory appears to be concerned with explaining the meaning of terms such as desire and belief.

AM is analytic and not synthetic, and as a result it could never provide us with facts about the world.


Mental events can be subjected to the laws of nature Hume has failed to understand the definition of mental events which Davidson has adopted. These events are not entirely mental they can still be applied to the laws of nature, and all criticisms are simply dealing with the old terminology.

When we analyse causality, there are two levels on which this can be done, 1. ontologically, (how causal events actually are in the world), 2. Via deductive nomological (a higher level causal explanation, based entirely analytically on the meaning of words). Causal explanation at the deductive nomological level obtains between statements which describe events and not between events themselves Therefore, Davidson distinguishes between singular causal statements and causal explanations, and via this hopes to show that the descriptions of events are analytic, but the events to which they refer are synthetic. e.g. boiled eggs were produced by boiling, ANALYTIC

The SYNTHETIC claim that the boiling of the egg was causally responsible for the state of the egg is still true. This same idea can be applied to mental states such as desire. e.g. the intention to enter the room will result in the entering, is an analytical statement, as by definition this is what intention means, however, this does not stop the intention actually causing the entrance (synthetic). These mental events can still be applied to events within the world and do not solely tell us about the meaning of words like Hume was trying to claim.

Davidsons position entails the view that only the physical is involved in causation, and the mental events are causally impotent.

It is only the physical features of the mental event which are causally operative. Kim accuses Davidson of falling into the hands of epiphenomenalism.

e.g. if a person is in a state of anger, then they are experiencing the irreducible mental qualia of anger, which is a results of the neural activity within their brain. This anger develops that this person punches a wall to relieve themselves of some of this anger. After hitting the wall, this person experiences the mental sensations of relief, pleasure and pain, but this action was caused by further neurological reactions taking place within the brain. Therefore, it appears that the mental sensations of anger, pain and pleasure were simply impotent bi-products of the physical and chemical activity taking place within the brain. Kim all mental sensations are impotent bi-products of the neural base which alone is responsible for the cause and effect of such actions. Davidson has to accept that although he would like to claim that the entire mental event (including both the mental and physical) caused the person to punch the wall, it is the case that only the physical aspect played any part in this causal relation, and the act of punching the wall could have taken place with or without the accompanying mental experience of anger.

By stating that all mental events have physical descriptions, Davidson makes them fully a part of the physical world, and thus they are causally operative.

These mental events are not simply epiphenomena, as the crucial element is the event itself, not the features that the event possesses. Kim appears to have confused the two.


If mental events are caused by underlying physical events then it is difficult to see how mental events have any independent powers, and therefore within themselves mental events are still causally impotent. Davidsons apparent response to Kims criticism doesnt seem to address the point Kim was pursing, as even after accepting that the mental event should be viewed as a whole it could still be argued that the mental phenomena is simply a bi product of the neural subvenient base.

Apply Ockhams Razor the inconclusion of the mental properties of an event actually adds nothing the its ability to describe the causal relationship between the event and subsequent events, and therefore it seems Davidsons theory would benefit from the removal of all mental properties Therefore anomalous monism fails to provide the psychophysical relationship which it strived to define, and consequently fails as a theory of mind.


e.g. Caloric was a word used to describe the heat coming from a radiator, but in reality it doesnt actually exist. Therefore it wasnt ontologically/ intertheoretically reduced, it was ELIMINATED from our vocabulary

Folk psychology how the general society talk about the mind Churchlands want to show how this folk psychology will be ELIMINATED as vastly superior explanatory hypothesis are found e.g. I am in pain as to have explanatory potency if it tells us anything about the mind but this explain, predicts or does NOTHING Therefore folk psychology is an empty space waiting to be filled its REDICALLY DEFECTIVE We wouldnt ontologically / intertheoretically reduce it, instead we would simply ELIMINATE IT Saying pain = c-fibres firing creates a hypothesis you can do something about! To simply say I am in pain says nothing, and therefore we should simply get rid of it A theory which does not explain something is not a theory at all

Claims made about Q, I and S are incoherent with PUBLIC language We learn things because they are taught to us via ostensive verification (the PL, PO, PSOC) BUT any claim made about Q, I and S is private (which it must be by very definition) Therefore we CANT actually claim to know anything about it as there is no public standard of correctness (e.g. Beetle in a Box) Therefore, any talk about the mind is NONSENSICAL so we ELIMINATE IT

Anything we use to talk about mental vocabulary is idle (not doing anything) The one thing that marks MENTAL from PHYSICAL is INCORRIGABILITY anything about the physical world is corrigible (it can be corrected as found via experience, contingent truths etc) BUT mental phenomena is not e.g. If Sandy has a mental experience, I cant correct it as its incorrigible e.g. PARALELL WORLD exactly the same as our world, except for one different- the people of that world dont think their mental language is incorrigible. We go any visit

that other world, and in that world we can question Petes happiness due to his behaviour. In this world we can still do the same, and therefore the fact that our mental vocab is incorrigible is insignificant Mental vocabulary has been ELIMINATED because its IDLE WE ARE JUST A PHYSICALLY FUNCTIONING BODY AND BRAIN


Q, I and S are irreducible and therefore we cant eliminate them and place them within the physical explanations ! (e.g. MBI essay)

Churchland says that you cant deny Q I and S in the current conceptual framework we possess. We need a new one in order to do this e.g. People who think the world is flat would have said it was stupid to say its spherical, and therefore this idea would have been discounted as irrelevant, as they refused to get out of their conceptual framework. However, now we KNOW the world is spherical, and understand our NEW FRAMEWORK

To have a concept or belief you need somewhere to hold them! MIND EM denies beliefs, but you need a belief to prove that self refuting i.e. To hold the belief I have no beliefs you HAVE to hold a belief! This is because you need belief in order to deny belief EM denies mental states, but in order to grasp that, you NEED mental states (i.e. cogito) I cant NOT be minded as it would be a contradiction to claim that I could THINK that I dont possess a mind.

There is no certain facts that the mind ISNT reducible to the brain, and these facts may develop in the future, therefore we CANT ELIMINATE unless we are certain this is the case.