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Corporate Governance
Corporate governance is "the system by which companies are directed and controlled" (Cadbury Committee, 1992). It involves a set of relationships between a companys management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders; it deals with prevention or mitigation of the conflict of interests of stakeholders.[1] Ways of mitigating or preventing these conflicts of interests include the processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions which have impact on the way a company is controlled.[2][3] An important theme of corporate governance is the nature and extent of accountability of people in the business, and mechanisms that try to decrease the principalagent problem.[4] Corporate governance also includes the relationships among the many stakeholders involved and the goals for which the corporation is governed.[5][6] In contemporary business corporations, the main external stakeholder groups are shareholders, debtholders, trade creditors, suppliers, customers and communities affected by the corporation's activities. Internal stakeholders are the board of directors, executives, and other employees. It guarantees that an enterprise is directed and controlled in a responsible, professional, and transparent manner with the purpose of safeguarding its long-term success. It is intended to increase the confidence of shareholders and capital-market investors. [7] A related but separate thread of discussions focuses on the impact of a corporate governance system on economic efficiency, with a strong emphasis on shareholders' welfare; this aspect is particularly present in contemporary public debates and developments in regulatory policy (see regulation and policy regulation).[8] There has been renewed interest in the corporate governance practices of modern corporations since 2001, particularly due to the high-profile collapses of a number of large corporations, most of which involved accounting fraud. Corporate scandals of various forms have maintained public and political interest in the regulation of corporate governance. In the U.S., these include Enron Corporation and MCI Inc. (formerly WorldCom). Their demise is associated with the U.S. federal government passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, intending to restore public confidence in corporate governance. Comparable failures in Australia (HIH, One.Tel) are associated with the eventual passage of the CLERP 9 reforms. Similar corporate failures in other countries stimulated increased regulatory interest (e.g., Parmalat in Italy).
Rights and equitable treatment of shareholders:[9][10][11] Organizations should respect the rights of shareholders and help shareholders to exercise those rights. They can help shareholders exercise their rights by openly and effectively communicating information and by encouraging shareholders to participate in general meetings. Interests of other stakeholders:[12] Organizations should recognize that they have legal, contractual, social, and market driven obligations to non-shareholder stakeholders, including employees, investors, creditors, suppliers, local communities, customers, and policy makers. Role and responsibilities of the board:[13][14] The board needs sufficient relevant skills and understanding to review and challenge management performance. It also needs adequate size and appropriate levels of independence and commitment Integrity and ethical behavior:[15][16] Integrity should be a fundamental requirement in choosing corporate officers and board members. Organizations should develop a code of conduct for their directors and executives that promotes ethical and responsible decision making. Disclosure and transparency:[17][18] Organizations should clarify and make publicly known the roles and responsibilities of board and management to provide stakeholders with a level of accountability. They should also implement procedures to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the company's financial reporting. Disclosure of material matters concerning the organization should be timely and balanced to ensure that all investors have access to clear, factual information.
India
India's SEBI Committee on Corporate Governance defines corporate governance as the "acceptance by management of the inalienable rights of shareholders as the true owners of the corporation and of their own role as trustees on behalf of the shareholders. It is about commitment to values, about ethical business conduct and about making a distinction between personal & corporate funds in the management of a company."[21] It has been suggested that the Indian approach is drawn from the Gandhian principle of trusteeship and the Directive Principles of the Indian Constitution, but this conceptualization of corporate objectives is also prevalent in Anglo-American and most other jurisdictions.
Regulation
Legal environment - General
Corporations are created as legal persons by the laws and regulations of a particular jurisdiction. These may vary in many respects between countries, but a corporation's legal person status is fundamental to all jurisdictions and is conferred by statute. This allows the entity to hold property in its own right without reference to any particular real person. It also results in the perpetual existence that characterizes the modern corporation. The statutory granting of corporate existence may arise from general purpose legislation (which is the general case) or from a statute to create a specific corporation, which was the only method prior to the 19th century. In addition to the statutory laws of the relevant jurisdiction, corporations are subject to common law in some countries, and various laws and regulations affecting business practices. In most jurisdictions, corporations also have a constitution that provides individual rules that govern the corporation and authorize or constrain its decision-makers. This constitution is identified by a variety of terms; in English-speaking jurisdictions, it is usually known as the Corporate Charter or the [Memorandum and] Articles of Association. The capacity of shareholders to modify the constitution of their corporation can vary substantially.
and reputation, while investors expect to receive financial returns. For lenders, it is specified interest payments, while returns to equity investors arise from dividend distributions or capital gains on their stock. Customers are concerned with the certainty of the provision of goods and services of an appropriate quality; suppliers are concerned with compensation for their goods or services, and possible continued trading relationships. These parties provide value to the corporation in the form of financial, physical, human and other forms of capital. Many parties may also be concerned with corporate social performance. A key factor in a party's decision to participate in or engage with a corporation is their confidence that the corporation will deliver the party's expected outcomes. When categories of parties (stakeholders) do not have sufficient confidence that a corporation is being controlled and directed in a manner consistent with their desired outcomes, they are less likely to engage with the corporation. When this becomes an endemic system feature, the loss of confidence and participation in markets may affect many other stakeholders, and increases the likelihood of political action. There is substantial interest in how external systems and institutions, including markets, influence corporate governance.
Monitoring by the board of directors: The board of directors, with its legal authority to hire, fire and compensate top management, safeguards invested capital. Regular board meetings allow potential problems to be identified, discussed and avoided. Whilst nonexecutive directors are thought to be more independent, they may not always result in more effective corporate governance and may not increase performance.[34] Different board structures are optimal for different firms. Moreover, the ability of the board to monitor the firm's executives is a function of its access to information. Executive directors possess superior knowledge of the decision-making process and therefore evaluate top management on the basis of the quality of its decisions that lead to financial performance outcomes, ex ante. It could be argued, therefore, that executive directors look beyond the financial criteria. Internal control procedures and internal auditors: Internal control procedures are policies implemented by an entity's board of directors, audit committee, management, and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance of the entity achieving its objectives related to reliable financial reporting, operating efficiency, and compliance with laws and regulations. Internal auditors are personnel within an organization who test the design and implementation of the entity's internal control procedures and the reliability of its financial reporting Balance of power: The simplest balance of power is very common; require that the President be a different person from the Treasurer. This application of separation of power is further developed in companies where separate divisions check and balance each other's actions. One group may propose company-wide administrative changes, another group review and can veto the changes, and a third group check that the interests of people (customers, shareholders, employees) outside the three groups are being met. Remuneration: Performance-based remuneration is designed to relate some proportion of salary to individual performance. It may be in the form of cash or non-cash payments such as shares and share options, superannuation or other benefits. Such incentive schemes, however, are reactive in the sense that they provide no mechanism for preventing mistakes or opportunistic behavior, and can elicit myopic behavior. Monitoring by large shareholders and/or monitoring by banks and other large creditors: Given their large investment in the firm, these stakeholders have the incentives, combined with the right degree of control and power, to monitor the management.[35]
In publicly-traded U.S. corporations, boards of directors are largely chosen by the President/CEO and the President/CEO often takes the Chair of the Board position for his/herself (which makes it much more difficult for the institutional owners to "fire" him/her). The practice of the CEO also being the Chair of the Board is known as "duality". While this practice is common in the U.S., it is relatively rare elsewhere. In the U.K., successive codes of best practice have recommended against duality.
competition debt covenants demand for and assessment of performance information (especially financial statements) government regulations managerial labour market media pressure takeovers
The corporate bankruptcy and reorganization system also had serious problems. Indias system has been driven by the 1985 Sick Industrial Companies Act (SICA), which considers a company sick only after its entire net worth has been eroded, and it has been referred to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). As soon as a company was registered with the BIFR, it won immediate protection from creditors claims for at least four years. Between 1987 and 1992, the BIFR took well over two years, on average, just to reach a decision. Very few companies emerged successfully from the BIFR, and even for those that needed to be liquidated, the legal process took over 10 years on average, by which time the assets of the company were usually almost worthless. Protection of creditors rights had therefore existed only on paper in India, and its bankruptcy process was featured among the worst in World Bank surveys on business climate. This could well explain why Indian banks have historically under-lent and invested primarily in government securities.Though financial disclosure norms in India have traditionally been superior to most Asian countries, noncompliance with disclosure norms had been rampant and even the failure of auditors reports to conform to the law attracted only nominal fines and little punitive action. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in India has rarely taken action against erring auditors. While the Companies Act has always provided an excellent framework, and clear instructions for maintaining and updating share registers, in reality minority shareholders had often suffered from irregularities in share transfers and registrations. Sometimes non-voting preferential shares had been used by promoters to channel funds and expropriate minority shareholders. There were cases in which the rights of minority shareholders had been compromised by managements private deals in the relatively infrequent event of corporate takeovers. Company Boards had often been largely ineffective in their monitoring role, and their independence had been perceived as highly questionable. For most of the post-Independence era the Indian equity markets were not liquid or sophisticated enough to exert effective control over the companies. Listing requirements of exchanges enforced some transparency, but non-compliance was neither rare nor punished. All in all, therefore, minority shareholders and creditors in India had remained effectively unprotected despite the laws on the books. However, this relatively dismal environment started changing rapidly after the monumental economic reforms and the major liberalization programs initiated by the Indian government in the early nineties.
and globalization, gave rise to several investigations into ways to fix the corporate governance situation in India. One of the first such endeavors was the Confederation of Indian Industry Code for Desirable Corporate Governance, developed by a committee chaired by Rahul Bajaj, a leading industrial magnate. The committee was formed in 1996 and submitted its code in April 1998. Later the SEBI constituted two committees to look into the issue of corporate governance-the first chaired by Kumar Mangalam Birla, another leading industrial magnate, and the second by Narayana Murthy, one of the major architects of the Indian IT outsourcing success story17. The first Committee submitted its report in early 2000, and the second three years later. These two committees have been instrumental in bringing about far reaching changes in corporate governance in India through the formulation of Clause 49 of Listing Agreements (described below). Concurrent with these initiatives by the SEBI, the Department of Company Affairs and the Ministry of Finance of the Government of India also began contemplating improvements in corporate governance. These efforts included the establishment of a study group to operationalize the Birla Committee recommendations in 2000, the Naresh Chandra Committee on Corporate Audit and Governance in 2002, and the Expert Committee on Corporate Law (J.J. Irani Committee) in late 2004. All of these efforts were aimed at reforming the existing Companies Act of 1956 that still forms the backbone of corporate law in India.
Conclusions
This article outlines the salient features of the Indian corporate governance system. While on paper the Indian legal system provides one of the highest levels of investor protection in the world, the reality is different with slow, over-burdened courts and significant corruption. Much of the countrys extensive small and medium enterprises (SME) sector displays relationshipbased informal control and governance mechanisms, inhibiting financing and keeping the cost of capital at levels higher than necessary, even though India ranks high on the ease of getting credit, and has a well-functioning banking sector with one of the lowest proportions of non-performing assets. Even among large companies, shareholdings remain relatively concentrated with promoters and family business groups continuing to dominate the corporate sector. There is significant pyramiding and tunneling among Indian business groups and, notwithstanding copious reporting requirements, evidence of earnings management. This is not surprising: concentrated ownership and family control are important in countries where enforceable legal protection of minority property rights is relatively weak. Familycontrolled businesses provide an organizational form that reduces transaction costs and asymmetric information problems under these conditions. Most of the corporate governance problems noted here, far from being unique to India, are in fact commonplace in Asia, and are present in many other economies as well. In particular, corporate governance in India does not compare unfavorably with any of the other major emerging economies: Brazil, China and Russia. Despite the above corporate governance shortcomings, the Indian economy and its financial markets have started attaining impressive growth rates in recent years, and display an exceptionally high level of optimism. The reason is that India is now clearly and strongly committed to sustaining and rapidly furthering the major economic reforms and the liberalization started in the early nineties.
Specifically, the Securities and Exchanges Board of India established as a part of these reforms, has a rigorous regulatory regime to ensure fairness, transparency and good practice, and the National Stock Exchange of India, also established as part of the reforms, functions efficiently and transparently to now trade among the highest number of trades in the world, just behind NASDAQ and NYSE. The traditional Bombay Stock Exchange has also reformed effectively. Most importantly, the corporate governance landscape in the country has been changing very fast over the past decade, particularly with the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley type measures in Clause 49 of the listing agreements, and legal changes to improve the enforceability of creditors rights. We are also seeing the rise of companies like INFOSYS that are free from the influence of a dominant family or group, and make the individual shareholder their central governance focus. There is a strong momentum for continuing reforms, and the monumental changes that have already taken place pave the way for more changes to come. All these positive developments should arguably help Indian industry ensure that their financial gains reach their investors fairly and transparently, and enable it to sustain its new-found prosperity and growth.