Personal Identity

Don Hubin

Copyright 2001, Donald C. Hubin

The Problem of Diachronic Identity

The problem of diachronic identity is the problem of what makes something one and the same object at different times.
Common sense has it that both persons and objects can persist through time, so that some objects can exist at two distinct times.

Intuitively plausible as this is, it is difficult to say what constitutes identity through time (diachronic identity).

A Puzzle About Diachronic Identity: Theseuss Ship

Theseus (shown here in distinctly medieval style) as he prepares to fight the minotaur.
(This is how they played Doom in earlier days.)

The Ship of Theseus

"The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned had thirty oars, and was preserved by the Athenians down even to the time of Demetrius Phalereus, for they took away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new and stronger timber in their place, insomuch that this ship became a standing example among the philosophers, for the logical question of things that grow; one side holding that the ship remained the same, and the other contending that it was not the same." Plutarch (Vita Thesei, 22-23)

Mereological Theory of Identity

Those who hold that the ship is not the same might appeal to the Mereological Theory of Identity (MTI).
MTI: For any compound objects x and y, x =y if, and only if, all parts of x are parts of y and all parts of y are parts of x.

Problems for MTI

Too Limited: It gives no criterion of identity for simple substances. Too Restrictive: On this criterion, there are precious few objects that persist through even short periods of time.

Embracing the Conclusion

Heraclitus held that nothing does persist through timeall is in flux.
Everything flows and nothing abides; everything gives way and nothing stays fixed.

Heraclitus ~540 - ~480 B.C.E.

Continuity Theory of Identity

Those who hold that the ship is the same might appeal to a Continuity Theory of Identity.
CTI: For any two objects x and y, x = y if, and only if, there is a series of objects (a1, a2an) such the in the series (x, a1, a2an, y) each element is minimally different from its predecessor and successor (it is usually required that there be spacio-temporal contiguity, also).

Problems for CTI

Too Permissive: Objects can morph to the degree that they are no longer the same object. Too Restrictive: Re-assembly case.

Identity of Different Kinds of Things

Simple substances Composites Artifacts Organisms Persons

Personal Identity
Personal identity concerns the identity of persons through time.
Does a person persist through time? If so, on the basis of what facts is this true? How could we know (if we could know) that another person has persisted through time? How could we know (if we could know) that we have persisted through time?

Lockes Account of Personal Identity

Distinction between the Concepts of Person and Human (Man) Criteria of Identity for Different Types of Things

John Locke (1632-1704)

Persons and Human Beings

What is essential to being a person is selfconsciousness, intelligence and rationality. It is conceivable for a nonhuman to be intelligent, selfconscious and rational.

Identity of Different Types of Things

Of Bodies (aggregates of matter):
Identity consists in sameness of the matter composing them.

Of Plants and Animals (including Humans):

Identity consists in the continuity of functioning (continuity of life processes)

Identity of Persons
Identity consists of sameness of consciousness.
Consciousness is a psychological process (it is not a substance).

Sameness of consciousness is not understood in terms of content but a certain lawlike relation of psychological states.
In particular, for Locke, memory was crucial.
Person B is the same person as person A because person B remembers the events that happened to person A (in a certain way).

Reids Criticisms of Locke

Lockes Theory Violates the Logic of Identity Lockes Theory Reverses the Order of Explanation of Memory and Identity

Thomas Reid (1710-1796)

The Logic of Identity

Whatever identity consists in, identity must be an equivalence relation. Lockes memory based relation is not an equivalence relation. (Brave Soldier Example) Therefore, Lockes memory-based relation is not identity.

Reversing Order of Explanation

Identity is presupposed by memory. Therefore, memory cant be the basis for identity. It is circular to explain identity by reference to memory if memory presupposed identity.

Hume on Personal Identity

Impersonalism: the radical solution to the problem of personal identity.
No problem of personal identity, because there are no persons.

David Hume 1711-1776

Impersonalism Made Plausible

Humes Empiricism Perceptions of the Self? Recovering Common Sense

Humes Empiricism
All that the mind can know about the world is mediated by the senses.
That which we cannot sense, we cannot have any idea of and, so, cannot know.

Perceptions of the Self?

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light of shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but perception...setting aside some metaphysicians...,I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement Treatise,I,IV,6).

Recovering Common Sense

Does this mean that people dont exist?
That depends on what you mean (says any philosopher). If, by person, you mean a substantial selfa subject of experience that is a continuing substance, then this does mean that people dont exist. If, by person, you mean something (but not some thing) that believes, hopes, intends, etc., then Hume need not deny that people exist.

Hume on Personal Identity

Since there is no self that endures unchanged, the identity of a person cannot be understood in terms of the persistence of a substance. It must be understood as a succession of parts, connected together by resemblance, contiguity, or causation.

Humes Heirs: Two Contemporary Theories of Personal Identity

Impersonalism Developed
Derek Parfit

Persons Recovered
David Lewis

Parfit on Personal Identity

There are intrinsically unanswerable questions about personal identity.
Fissioning Cases Fusioning Cases

Fissioning
Parfits Fissioning:
The Split Brain Experiments

A Better Illustration:
Human mitosis

Fissioning and Personal Identity

Post1
Ante

Post2

Is Ante identical with:

Both Post1 and Post2 Neither Post1 nor Post2 One, but not the other, of Post1 and Post2

Avoiding Absurdity: The Impersonalist Solution

The solution is to give up talk about personal identity.
Ante is not identical with either Post1 or Post2, but not because of the fissioning; we are never identical with any later person stage.

Survival Without Identity

Despite the fact that Ante is not identical with either Post1 or Post2, Ante survives the operation. Survival does not require identity.

Why Survival and Identity are Different Relations

Different logical properties of the relationships.
Number Identity
Must be one-one

All-or-Nothing
Is all-or-nothing

Survival May be many-one Admits of degrees

or one-many

What Matters in Survival

Psychological Connectedness
Direct psychological (causal) links between person stages

Psychological Continuity
Overlapping chains of psychological connectedness

Memories and Q-Memories

Building psychological connectedness as Locke did from memories is questionbegging.
Memory presupposes identity (or, Parfit would say, survival).

Q-memories are just like memories, but they dont presuppose identity (or any special relation) between the two person-stages.

Psychological Connectedness
Psychological connectedness requires direct psychological links like q-remembering (for quasi-remembering) or q-intending.
It is not transitive.
Thus, to take Reids example, the brave soldier is psychologically connected to the flogged boy and the general is psychologically connected to the brave soldier, but it does not follow that the general is psychologically connected to the flogged boy.

Psychological Continuity
Overlapping Chains of Connectedness
This relation is transitive.
Thus, the fact that there are overlapping chains of connectedness between the various stages of the Brave Soldier means that we can reason as follows: there is continuity between the flogged boy and the brave soldier and between the brave soldier and the general; therefore, there is continuity (but not connectedness) between the flogged boy and the general.

Tension in the Concept of Survival

Connectedness and continuity can pull us in opposite directions, producing ambivalence in our answer to whether someone survives. Parfit thinks that, in general, connectedness is more important in survival than continuity.
Reids case of the Brave Soldier is not a clear case of survival.

Newspeak About Survival

When speaking precisely, we should not talk about our past and our future as if weperson-stages that we areare going to be in our future or were in our past.
Past Selves and Future Selves Ancestral Selves and Descendant Selves

David Lewis on Personal Identity

Lewiss Project:
Reconcile two different answers to the question, What matters in survival?
Mental Continuity and Connectedness (MC&C) Identity

Why MC&C and Identity are Different Relations

Lewis agrees with Parfit that there are different logical properties of MC&C and identity. Number Identity MC&C
Must be one-one May be many-one or one-many

All-or-Nothing
Is all-or-nothing Admits of degrees

The Different Relata for MC&C and Identity

It is not surprising that identity and MC&C have different logical properties because, with respect to our interest in questions of survival, they relate different things.
MC&C related person-stages Identity is a relation that that a temporally extended person bears to herself and to no one else.
It is not a relation between person-stages (At least, that isnt what we are concerned with in questions of survival.)

Lewiss Strategy
Define a relation between personstages that matters for suvival and a relation between person stages that matters for identity of a temporally extended person. Show that the two relations turn out to be the same.

The R-Relation and the I-Relation

The R-relation is whatever relation a person-state-at-t1 must bear to a person-stage-at-t2 in order for us to say that someone survived from t1 to t2. The I-relation is whatever relation a person-state-at-t1 must bear to a person-stage-at-t2 in order for us to say that they are stages of one and the same person.

Lewiss Conclusion
The I-relation just is the R-relation. Thus, common sense is right to hold that identity is what matters in survival though it is not identity of person-stages (something that is impossible because they are defined as persons-at-a-time)
What matters is the the person-stages are stages of the same four-dimensional being.

Four-Dimensional Objects
An analogy to Three-Dimensional Objects

Consider a loaf of bread.

No slice is identical with any other slice.

Still, the slices form one loaf, extended beyond the depth of any single slice.

Four-Dimensional Objects
Three dimensional objects that are extended in time have four dimensions: height, width, depth and duration. We can talk about three-dimensional slices of these four-dimensional objects, but we must not confuse the slice with the entire object.

Persons as Four-Dimensional Beings

The term person refers to a fourdimensional beingthat is, one extended in time, as well as the three dimensions of space.
It is not identical with any of its temporal parts. Its temporal parts arent identical with each other. Nevertheless, these temporal parts are part of one and the same (four-dimensional) person.

Persons as Four-Dimensional Beings

Lewis on Persons
A person is a maximally interrelated (by MC&C) set of person stages.
This means that there exists no additional person stage that can be added to the set without diminishing the MC&C below the point (which is, really, anything but a point) required for survival.

The Problem Cases

But what of the problem cases (like fissioning) that led Parfit to reject identity. Three Problems
Fission Fusion Longevity

Fissioning
In a case of fission, two continuant persons share a common beginning.
The analogy to roads.

Fusioning

In these cases, two continuant persons share a common ending.

Just run the fissioning answer backwards.

A Problem for Lewis

Overpopulation: If Lewis is right and fissioning or fusioning were to become possible, there could be a lot more people than we tend to believe. We can never really tell how many people are in a room until we know if there is any fissioning or fusioning.

The Overpopulation Objection

What appears to be one person could, for all we can tell, be thousands.

Lewiss Reply
For most purposes, we count persons by tensed identity
That is, we count persons at a time or person-stages existing at a time. Think of the road analogy again.

Longevity
Consider Methuselah, who was supposed to have lived for 969 years. The person stages of old Methuselah, we can imagine, are not sufficiently R-related to those of young Methuselah to be person stages of the same person. Since there are infinitely many ways of cutting up these sets of stages into maximally integrated sets of person states, there are infinitely many Methuselahs.

Cutting Up Methuselah

Lewiss Reply
For most purposes, we count persons by tensed identity
That is, we count persons at a time or person-stages existing at a time.

Next Time: Time Travel

Meet me here next Monday (if you havent already done so) for us to talk about time travel.
Read All You Zombies (if it is available) and By His Bootstraps (electronic reserve) and Lewiss The Paradoxes of Time Travel (from the class readings page)

Ante is Identical with Both Post1 and Post2

This violates the transitivity of identity since Post1 and Post2 are clearly not identical with each other.

Ante is Identical with Neither Post1 nor Post2

This is unacceptable because if either Post1 or Post2 had survived the operation, we would say that Ante had survived.
How can a double success be a failure?

Ante is Identical with One, but Not Both, Post1 and Post2
There can be no nonarbitary grounds for identifying Ante with one rather than the other, so this answer is unacceptable.

Equivalence Relations
Equivalence Relations are: Symmetric
for any x and y, if xRy, then yRx

Reflexive
for any x, xRx

Transitive
for any x, y, and z, if xRy and yRz, then xRz

Identity as an Equivalence Relation

For any x and y, if x is identical to y, then y is identical to x (symmetry)

For any x, x is identical to x (reflexivity)

For any x, y, and z, if x is identical to y and y is identical to z, then x is identical to z (transitivity)

The Brave Soldier Example

Memory Memory

Time