MILITANCY IN FATA AND ITS IMPACTS ON GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN Usman Ullah Introduction: Over the years, many factors

have contributed to the emergence and expansion of insurgency in Pakistans Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), not least the Afghan Jihad, and the manner in which the United States and other nations abandoned the region after Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan. That created a vacuum, which attracted transnational militant networks. Pakistan and some Arab states encouraged and facilitated these individuals and networks to expand with an eye on their own strategic interests. A similar vacuum had long existed in FATA. The social and economic circumstances in FATA played a crucial role in the birth of militancy in these areas, as did the spread of extremist ideologies there. The research paper is an attempt to explore the dynamics of insurgency in a complex region at a crucial juncture. It briefly discusses the factors behind the evolution of militancy in FATA, role of Arab militants during Afghan-Soviet war and their influence on militant networks in FATA. Brief History Arab charities played a key role in the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s. Apart from strategic and financial support, Arab fighters also fought by their sides. Afghans seriously needed external support, thats why Arab treasuries were approached and various camps for training Arab militants were established. There was a competition among Afghan commanders in seeking Arab support.

According to a Pakistani intelligence report, some 5,000 Saudis, 3,000 Yemenis, 2,000 Egyptians, 2,800 Algerians, 400 Tunisians, 370 Iraqis and 200 Libyans were involved and fighting in Afghan-Soviet war.i Many Arabs from Muslim organizations banned in their respective countries took part in Afghan Jihad along Osama. Common objectives and inter-dependence in financial and operational areas brought Arab and Afghan militants closer. Due to long stay of Arab militants in Afghanistan differentiation between Afghan and Arab militants became difficult. Arabs played a key role in Afghan Jihad as they were posted with Afghan commanders as advisors. Dr. Abdullah Azam, a Sunni scholar who taught at the International Islamic University, Islamabad at that time, brought the first batch of Arab militants to Afghanistan in 1980 which later came to be known as AlQaida. After the death of Dr. Azam, Osama took over the management. Besides financial support Dr. Azam also worked in gathering human resources as well as delivering sermons regarding Jihad. He died in 1989 in a bomb blast in Peshawar. Osama replaced Azam and named the organization as International Islamic Front which eventually became Al-Qaeda. In 1988, Osama established an organization for Arab and other non-Afghan militants and made the Afghan province of Khost the centre of his activities.ii He launched his first training camp, The Lions Den in 1986,near Afghanistans Shawal Mountains. The area where he carried his training activities was under the control of Maulana Jalauddin Haqqani, who had the support of Harkatul Mujahideen (HM). HM had friendly relations with Osama. Central leader of HM Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khaleel and Osama became allies and the former took the responsibility of recruiting youth from Pakistans tribal areas for Jihad. The entire area of Waziristan came under the influence of Osama and became a second safe heaven for Arab militants who married local girls in order to strengthen their ties with local tribes. There were militants from Saudi-Arabia,

Algeria, Libya, Jordan, Behrain, Sudan, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq and many other countries arriving into Afghanistan and Pakistan driven by their passion for Jihad and for helping fellow Muslims. Many Arab militants and aid workers were either highly qualified individuals-with masters or PhD degrees-or students.iii Some of them were affiliated with various Jihad groups in their respective countries and dreamed of establishing an Islamic Caliphate through pursuing global Jihad. The Afghan war offered an opportunity to pursue that goal. In the beginning Arab militants did not have their own training camps and received combat training in Afghan camps. Later Shaikh Jameelur Rehman ,a Wahabi commander established Arab training camps and persuaded Arab militants especially from Wahabi sect. Extensive training courses were offered, such as fighting techniques including guerilla warfare, making bombs/explosives, use of various weapons, security and intelligence, logistics and supplies, medical aid and communications, etc. Most of the camps had some of the following facilities:iv i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. Open-air firing and demolition range and classroom facilities; Logistics transit base; Mosque, guesthouses, residences, prisons, stables; Radio station, grid station; Warehouse, weapon depot; and Networks of tunnels.

Evolution of Militant Groups in FATA There are many factors involved in the evolution of militant groups in FATA, like the warrior culture of the tribesmen, the proliferation of Jihad culture after Soviet-Afghan war and after Soviet withdrawal the emergence of Taliban during civil war in Afghanistan in the 1990s and its

cascading effect in Pakistan tribal areas, the war on terror and the consequent concentration of Pakistani and transnational militant networks in these areas. Militant networks in Pakistan sought Soviet-Afghan war as a baseline during which Pak-Afghan border areas and even Peshawar became a hub of militants of Pakistani, Afghan and other nationalities. Joining Afghan war by Pakistani Pashtoons as well as non-Pashtoons was due to the realization of a threat to Islam. These troops were encouraged by U.S, Pakistan and Middle Eastern countries. The students mainly of Deobandi school of thought Binori Town, Karachi in 1980s crossed the border to Afghanistan. Before that Arshad Ahmed, Abdul Samad and Sial visited Peshawar and joined Harkatul Inqilab-e-Islami led by Nasrullah Mansoor. Irshad returned to Pakistan with the aim to prepare more students as militants for the 'holy war'. maulana Noor Muhammad persuaded Irshad to establish training camps in Wana, South Waziristan, Which was called Darul Islam. This worked as a launching-pad for the militancy in FATA. Wana was full of CIA and ISI agents supporting training and recruiting facilities along with Afghan and Pakistani Jihad organizations. Arab militants also made camps in Shakai and Nawai Ada near Wana. Donations from Middle Eastern mosques were gathered to support the cause. Main Hubs of Militants Jamia Haqqania, Akora Khattak was the centre of NWFP and Afghan students. Maulana Abdul Haq was having close ties with the right-wing Afghan politicians. Soviet Union invaded in 1979. Haq was the first to issue edict that fighting against Soviet Union was Jihad. He prepared many Afghan students for the purpose that crossed the border in order to take part in jihad against the Soviets. Maulana Madudi of Jamat-e-Islami also gave the same version and thus JI was involved in Soviet-Afghan war from the beginning. Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami of Jamia Binori Town

Karachi students was persuaded by Maulvi Abdul Haq to take part in Afghan Jihad but they were already engaged with Harkatul Inqilab-e-Islami of Afghanistan. HuJI was the first Pakistani organization having two training camps, one in Wana and other in Afghanistasn. Maulana Masud Alvi and Fazlur Rehman Khaleel, a skilled fighter who had worked with HuJI, formed an independent organization called the Harkatul Mujahideen (HM), which became very popular. Around 3,000 militants were recruited in HM from Kashmir, NWFP and Punjab. Its headquarters were set in Miranshah. HM established links with Arab militants and Jihadi leaders. HM militants would cross the border from Miranshah into Afghanistan. The strategic area appealed to Osama when he visited in 1984. Haqqani won ISI support and started giving training to Osama's Arab volunteers. Haqqani became a hero for Wahabis in Gulf countries and raised huge funds from there. Pakistani region bordering Afghanistan, became a hub for ISI, Arab volunteers and Wahabi students because of Haqqani's patronage. CIA in Islamabad regarded Haqqani as most influential Pashtoon battlefield commander.v The three key actors , i.e. Haqqani, HM leader Maulana Khaleel and Osama developed a high level of mutual coordination. HM used to recruit tribesmen for Jihad and used Laden's money to gain support of tribal elders. All the Jihad camps in Pakistan's tribal areas were operated by ISI with the backing of CIA. By 1986, they set up large and secret infrastructure for guerilla training along Pak-Afghan frontier. They also provided specialized syllabus and training manuals to these training camps.vi Distribution of Militant Networks across Tribes Pakistan's tribal areas have been divided administratively into seven political units or agencies-Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristanand four Frontier Regions (FRs)-Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan.

1.

Waziristan

The permanent settlement of the Wzir tribes is in Afghanistan and in the Pakistani territory of Birmal along Durand Line. Since the Soviet-Afghan war, the Wazir tribes had been under the sway of two 'spiritual leaders', Maulana Noor Muhammad, the patron of the HuJI in Waziristan, and Maulana Ainullah. These militants harbored foreign fighters and later fight against government forces as well. They gained combat experience from fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s under the command of senior Mujahideen commander Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani, and were later declared 'wanted' by the United States for involvement in acts of terrorism. There are three major tribes living in Waziristan-the Mehsuds, the Wazirs and the Bhittanis. There is a tussle between the Wazir and Mehsud tribes. When the government launched operations against militants in the Wazir-dominated area, the Mehsud tribes chose not to oppose the government. The Wazirs acted in a similar manner when military operation began in the Mehsud areas, allowing the government to take advantage of the tribal rivalry. The Wazir tribes live in the areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier, which enables them to illegally cross the border from either side. Nek Muhammad, an articulate and charismatic militant leader and a hero to anti-US militants, belonged to the Wazir sub-tribe of Yagulkhel Sharrakh. In the late 1990s, Nek led militants from Waziristan at the battlefronts of Bagram Airbase, Panjsher, Takhar and Badghis, sites of some of the bloodiest battles the Taliban fought against Ahmed Shah Masud's fighters. Nek was first exposed to the influence of foreign militants when he was a sub-commander at kargha in mid 1990s. During this period, the former Russian garrison of Rishkhor in the southern suburbs of

Kabul was converted into a training camp for Al-Qaeda. Nek Muhammad was killed in South Waziristan in June 2004 when a house was hit by US warship missiles. Baitullah Mehsud took charge as the operational commander of the tribal militants after Nek Muhammad was killed. The differences within the Taliban ranks played to the advantage of Pakistani forces, which solely surrounded the entire area. 2. Bajaur Bajaur Agency has been under the influence of numerous militant networks including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban movement, Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-eMuhammadi (TNSM), and Jamatul Mujahideen. Most of the people killed in a drone strike in Damadola village of Bajaur on January 13, 2006 were associated with the banned TNSM, which is considered one of the main allies of the Taliban. Bajaur Agency gained strategic importance during the Soviet-Afghan war on account of its geographical location. It was the most suitable location for setting up training camps as Jihad organizations already had their presence there. In May 2005 the Pakistani government reached two agreements with the tribes in Bajaur and in the neighboring Mohmand Agency, urging them not to co-operate with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Later, a leader of the TNSM, Maulana Inayatur Rehman, was arrested. He had close links with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and was running a camp in Bajaur where terrorists were trained. 3. Malakand

Bakhtzaman, a Jumat-e-Islami (JI) activist, formed Ansarul Mujahideen in the scenic Malakand region of Pakistan soon after the soviet in vision of Afghanistan. Malakand was a hub of jamat-e-

Islami (JI) and Islami Jamiat Talaba (IJT). Bakhtzaman led a group of militants to Afghanistan where they were trained in camps operated by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and other Jihad commanders. Ansarul Mujahideen established another camp with the help of Hizb-e-Islami in Afghan branch of kunar. When these two camps filled with the militants, a third camp was established named Al-Badr. It became so popular so that Ansarul Mujahideen was renamed as Al Badr Mujahideen. 4. Khyber

The two rivals in Khyber agency are Lashkar-e-Islam and Ansarul Islam. Clashes between the two groups give government a chance to use force. The government formed a peace committee comprising elders of various local tribes to maintain peace in Bara. 5. Kurram

The Shia tribes on Parachinar, the headquarters of Kurram agency did not support al Qaeda and the Taliban due to ideological differences. Instead, they supported the Pakistani forces efforts against the militants. However, many Sunni tribesmen provided shelter to al Qaeda militants. This tribal agency has been a recruitment centre for the Taliban for many years. Post-911 Developments and Emergence of Local Taliban Groups By the middle of November 2001 it has become clear that the Taliban could not withstand the fierce US air strikes. Members of the Taliban regime started to flee afghan cities around that time in order to prepare for future battles. The members and the top leadership of al Qaeda and the Taliban managed to escape and found refuge across Afghanistans eastern border with Pakistanin the federally administered areas (FATA).vii The porous border became concentrated with Al-

Qaeda and Taliban. People provided shelter to these extremist groups. Pakistan army has established 186 check posts along Pak-Afghan border to contain the passage of these groups. Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Waziristan waged extensive war against the US troops and Karzai government until Pakistani government launched an operation against them in 2004. The militants had taken many US nationals and afghan government officials captives and used them as bargaining chips to negotiate the release of Taliban and Al-Qaeda detainees in Afghan prisons. US captives released revealed that they were detained in Pakistani territory. US threatened Pakistan to use force against Taliban in FATA and also suggested support of US troops. Pakistani government asked tribal leaders to surrender foreign militants. Exchange of fire between Pakistan armed forces and tribal militants became the norm. Incidents of abduction of US and Afghan officials increased alarmingly so that US pressurized Pakistan government to take serious action. Pakistan government found it difficult to launch extensive operation against militants as FATA was not under there direct control. This was the first time when tribes were tolerating troops on their soil. Tribal leaders sought it normal to support Taliban as they were not terrorist in their view. Tribal leaders held that they would cooperate the government in arresting Arab militants if they were sent back to their native countries instead of being handed over to the United States. American pressure was mounting on Pakistan amid intelligence reports that suggested that Osama and Al-Qaeda members were hiding in Pakistani tribal areas. Militants activities increased when military operation failed, government sought to approach several deals with them. Tribal elders formed a lashkar in the light of their agreement with government to punish those who had helped Taliban and Al-Qaeda but that was merely on eye wash and the logistic

got from government were ultimately used against Pakistan military in Wana operation in March 2004. Wana Operation and Shakai Agreement Pakistan government was hesitant in initiating military action against Al-Qaeda due to the socio-political implications of the area. US pressure enhanced, Pakistan government attributed a large sum of money on the recommendations of political agents, among tribal Maliks, for the tribesmen to betray Al-Qaeda militants they had sheltered, but Maliks betrayed the government and kept the money with them. After the failure of these tactics, Pakistan government launched first full scale military operation in Wana in March 2004. Pakistan government described the operation as a success, reporting the killing of a large number of militants and showing least number of military loss, but the facts were told differently by Taliban who claimed that more than 1,000 Pakistani troops were killed.viii Before the military operation began, many Al-Qaeda Arab militants had fled Wana. US troops though did not directly participate in the operation but they had a satellite monitoring center in Wana. After Wana operation was halted, Pakistan government reached an unwritten agreement known as Shakai agreement with Nek Muhammad, who represented pro-Taliban militants, on March 27, 2004 at Shakai. The Peshawar corps commander of Pakistan army visited Neks village to discuss the deal which was mediated by two pro-MMA tribal parliamenterians. President Musharraf argued that there were still round about four or six hundred militants in the area after the Shakai agreement. The most highlighted point of the deal was that Pakistan military agreed upon pulling its troops out of Wana in the return to the release of 12 paramilitary

troops and two government officials that were captured by Zalikhel tribesmen in clashes at Kalosha, March 18, 2004. The very first verdict (unwritten) of the deal was very rigid and was unacceptable to the government thats why a second deal was approached which contained eight points.ix 1.Government forces would evacuate the area immediately after the announcement of the agreement. 2.The government would pay compensation for the death and destruction of properties of the tribes during the operation. 3.The government would do his best to minimize its interference in the tribal areas. 4.The government would release all the innocent people arrested during the operation. 5.The government would give a one month deadline to all foreign militant to surrender to the government or pledge to start leading a peaceful life after getting themselves registered with the authorities. The tribal society will vouch fir their future conduct. 6.The Peshawar corps commander would visit Wana along with the FATA secretary and the ISI director as a goodwill gesture towards the local tribes. 7.The tribesmen would never conduct any violent activity in Pakistan. 8.The tribes would never allow the use of their territory against any other country. The unwritten deal was finalized. Nek Muhammad in his address to the gathering said that the tribesmen were like nuclear weapons that the government could use against the country enemies or against itself. Under Shakai agreement responsibility of tribal elders was to assist the authorities in the registration of foreigners thats only they were to be allowed to live in Pakistan as refugees. However Nek and his followers rejected the government contention that they were

bound to bring the foreigners to the authorities for registration. Conflicting interpretation of the agreement were expected as it was unwritten and lacked details. The US military was keen to interfere in the striking hideouts of militants but Pakistan opposed it. As they were capable of hunting down Al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects. Shakai Operation Despite the Shakai deal, attacks on security forces by tribal militants continued in Waziristan. Government claimed that round 200 wanted men were hiding in Shakai. Government sent 8,000 military and paramilitary troops while 3,500 more troops reached on April 2, 2004. Military blocked the root from Wana to Shakai. FATA tribes were also ready for the battle. Shakai is considered as an ideal place for guerilla warfare. After the Shakai operation, the local tribes mens dislike towards Pakistan forces increased in the militants distributed thousands of pamphlets against the army in South Waziristan. The pamphlets alleged that the WANA operation and the other activities by Pakistan forces were part of the American agenda and that Pakistan government was dancing to Americas tune. The pamphlets urged the masses to remain loyal to the militants as they were Sacrificing their lives for Islam. Nek was killed by a smart bomb on June 18, 2004. Even after the death of Nek the militants attacks on the security forces did not stop. As a last resort, the government imposed economic sanctions on the tribes in order to compel and then to cooperate. Initial impact of sanction was that tribal militants expanded their operations to the urban areas of the NWFP. As intensity raised high, the tribal militants agreed to resolve the issues with the government. The government was under so much pressure that it briefly agreed to give registration under fake names so that their true identity was not revealed.

After the failure of mediators, the government tried to establish the direct contacts with the militant leadership regarding their registration are the stopping of attacks against the Pakistani troops. The foreigners were almost ready for registration when an abrupt change in the negotiation suspended which minimized the importance of the registration issue in tribesmens eyes. In July, 2004, military operation expand from Wana, Shakai to Mehsud populated areas like Kewan, Manzai, Kaniguram and Makeen. Mehsud were cooperative but a few attacks on military troops made it clear that Mehsuds were supporting militants. Regarding Mehsud territory brought under enhancing militancy, the government carrot-and-stick approach. The military operation against the wazir tribesmen had stirred anti-government sentiments among the Mehsud tribes as well. When insurgency increased in Mehsud areas, and Mehsud leaders replaced that of Wazirs, government had to soften its approach towards the Wazirs. Ahmadzai wazirs agreed to cooperate with government in tracking down foreigners in the area. They handed over some wanted men to the government. The army resumed talks with Wazir militants and in October 2004, a truce was finalized with the help of Bajaur Agency political agent, Pirzada Khan and some others. The abduction of two Chinese engineers and later the rescue of one while the death of the other in October 2004, increased the hatred against the local and foreign militants among the masses of the area. This persuaded the tribal elders to cooperate with the government in order to end the insurgency. Pakistan army believed that most of the Al-Qaeda militants were hiding in North Waziristan in Miranshah and Mir Ali region in 2005. Thats why Pakistan army expanded the

military operation to North Waziristan in September 2005 as Mehsuds were residing there. Tribal elders assured the government that they would not provide sanctuary to foreign militants. Presence of 243 illegal access points to Afghanistan in North Waziristan was a crucial issue which provided a safe passage to militants whenever an operation was launched there. Situation aggravated and North Waziristan a safe haven for foreign militants despite government efforts to flush them out of the region. Local tribal leaders openly supported the militants. On February 22, 2005, the government signed an agreement with Mehsud tribes along with Baitullah Mehsud on the same grounds as it was done with Ahmedzai tribes. The deal was called Sararogha Agreement, and Baitullah agreed that he would not cooperate with foreign militants and would help government against tribal militants, but he violated the terms with the government by supporting the Talibanization process in South Waziristan. He started to portray himself as Ameerul momineen and established a parallel administration in the area in May 2005. In September 2006, the government and the local Taliban signed a peace agreement in Miranshah. The Taliban had been following a unilateral ceasefire since June 2006. The peace agreement was known as Miranshah peace agreement. Militant Landscape after Miranshah Agreement Miranshah agreement, September 2006, gave considerable increase to the influence and infrastructure of militants in these tribal areas. Government agreed upon not to attack militants and to release the detainees held during military action, while the militants agreed that they would not set parallel administration in the agency or attack the army personnel. The agreement led to restoration of peace temporarily in North Waziristan. Following the agreement the militant groups working separately, emerged as an effective fighting force against military deployed in

FATA. Since the agreement signing, record increase in suicide attacks and other terrorist activities was reported in almost all parts of the country. Things spiraled so much out of control that the then president and chief of army staff, Parvez Musharraf declared emergency due to quickly deteriorating law and order situation in the country. Local militant groups 1. Tehrik-e-Taliban :

After Miranshah agreement TTP emerged as most potent and organized group of Pakistani Taliban. Its militants were involved in suicide bombings, attacking government and civilian a like. As this was inspired by Al-Qaida philosophy. The TTP is made of around forty local militants groups that joint hands in South Waziristan under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud in 2007. Ladha area in South Waziristan its main head quarter. Resistance against army, enforcement of Shariat and unity in operation against NATO forces in Afghanistan are among the stated objectives of TTP. 2. Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi

This militant group was founded by Maulana Sufi Muhammad, a veteran of the Afghan Jihad, in 1989. There have been suspicions of Al Qaida support for TNSM militants in Swat in terms of finances and fresh recruitment from the tribal areas. Malakand division of the NWFP and Bajaur agency in the tribal areas are the strong holds of TNSM, where it runs camps to train militants. In 2002, the TNSM was banned under Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). In 2005, Fazlullah revived the TNSM with more radical focus, making it a local chapter of the TTP. PPP coming to power in 2008, initially opted for a dialogue with militants in Swat on 16thFebuary 2009, but the fate of this agreement was not different from the previous ones and the Taliban militants started

attacking the Pakistan army in Swat. The government scraped the peace agreement and launched operation Rah-e-Rast in the region on May 11, 2009 which continued for almost four months and succeeded in dislodging the militants from Swat and other areas 3. Lashkar-e-Islami

This group started activities in Bara sub division of Khyber Agency of FATA in 2005. It is also known as Mangal Bagh group. The Lashkar-e-Islami has woven to focus on eliminating social voices from the society. 4. Ansarul Islam This is a Deobandi militant out fit operating in Khyber agency and has been in clashes with Lashkr-e- Islam. 5. Waziri Taliban Hafiz GulBahadar and Mulvi Nazir militant groups who operate of North Waziristan agency forged an alliance in June 2008, known as Waziri Taliban. Its area of influence is confined to South Waziristan and North Waziristan agencies. It has relations with TTP. Peace deal with Pakistan government resulted in cessation of military operation in exchange for expulsion of foreign militants from the area but did not materialize. 6. Asmattullah Shaheen group This group belongs to Bhittani tribe, residing in Jandola village of FR Tank. It became powerful militant commander after 2006 with allies across South Waziristan agency. After an armed clash with fellow tribal militant commander Turkistan Bhittani in August 2008, aligned himself with

TTP and was made head for the Jandola area. He was among the twenty most wanted TTP commanders. 7. Turkistan Betani group This is a group which has the backing of government against Taliban groups having influence in South Waziristan and Tank. Small group comprised of Bhittani tribes men commanded by Haji Turkistan Bhittani. Bhittani fought in Soviet-Afghan war in 1980s. Taliban Groups in Tribal Areasx No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 10 (12) 11 (13) 12 (14) Name Baitullah Group Shehryar Group Said Alam Group Mullah Nazir Group Abbas Group Noor Islam Group Haji Sharif Group Sect Deobandi Deobandi Tribe Mehsud Mehsud Mehsud Ahmadzai Wazir Ahmadzai Wazir Ahmadzai Wazir Ahmadzai Wazir Ahmadzai Wazir Ahmadzai Wazir Karmazkhel Wazir Bhittani Head Baitullah Mehsud Shehryar Mehsud Said Alam Mullah Nazir Commander Abbas Noor Islam Haji Sharif Haji Omer Ghulam Jan Commander Javed Commander Awal Khan Area of Concentration SWA1 SWA SWA SWA SWA SWA SWA SWA SWA SWA Jandola, SWA

Deobandi Deobandi Deobandi Deobandi

Haji Omer Deobandi Group Ghulam Jan Group Deobandi Javed Group Awal Khan Group Angaar Group Bhittani Group Deobandi Deobandi Deobandi Deobandi

Bhittani

Asmaatullah Saheen Qari Bahadar

Gul Bahadar Group

Deobandi

Utmanzai Wazir

Jundola, SWA (not SWA) Gul NWA2

13 (15) 14 15 16

Daur Group Group Khaliq Haqani Group Wahidullah Group Saifullah Group

Deobandi Deobandi Deobandi Deobandi

Daur Daur

Sadiq Noor

NWA

17 18 19 20 21

Abdul Rehman Group Deobandi Manzoor Group Deobandi

Haleem Group Deobandi Maulvi Faqir Group Deobandi of TSNM Tehrik Jaish Islami Deobandi Pakistan

Utmanzai Wazir Turi khel Commander Utmanzai Saifullah Wazir Daur Abdul Rehman Daur Commander Manzoor Daur Haleem khan Mamond Maulvi Faqir Bajaur Commander Waliur Rehman Haji Naimatullah Dr Ismail Maulana Abdullah

Abdul Khaliq NWA Haqani Wahidullah Spalga, NWA

Mirali, NWA Eidaq, NWA Mirali, NWA Bajaur Bajaur Agency

22 23 24

Karawan Naimatullah Dr. Ismail Group Maulana Group Omer Group

Deobandi

Bajaur Bajaur Bajaur

Jamaat-iIslami Abdullah Deobandi

25

Deobandi

26

Sha Sahib Group

Ahle Hadiath

Qandhari sub Omer Khalid tribe of Safi Tribe Mohmand

Bajaur Agency Bajaur Agency Utamzai, subDistrict Bajaur Mohmand Agency Lakaro area, Mohmand Agency

Conclusion The support of Mujahideen and recruiting the Pakistani youth for Jihad or holy war in Afghanistan has proven a headache for Pakistan. Pakistan provided sanctuary to the warriors against soviet forces. The later formation of Taliban as an organized force with the help Pakistani Intelligence Agency (ISI) has become now threat to the national integration. Hence Talibanization of Waziristan is the result of US intervention in Afghanistan and subsequent military actions that strenthen the process of talibanization. Taliban organizations Waziristan spread from south to north like epidemic. Their organization and activities brought Waziristan to the world attention. On one hand they claimed Sharia but at the same time the principles of Sharia are violated by them. The Talibanization is not only challenge for law enforcement agencies and government of Pakistan but the local socio-economic and political system got disturbed. The distributed and independent network of Taliban helped them to deter Pakistani forces. The domination of Taliban and challenging the writ of the state in Waziristan was not acceptable to the government and number of operation took place in Waziristan. In reaction Taliban attacks on civilian and religious places and killing of innocent people and religious leader. The beheading of agents and number of other illegal action of Taliban labeled them as militant and terrorist in media and political discussion. So the respect and support of Taliban decreases with the passage of time and now they are facing financial constraint. In the struggle of domination not only Taliban or military personnel but many innocent civilian lost their lives. Had there would be no US invasion in Afghanistan, they would not back to Waziristan and there would be no military operation and disturbance in Waziristan.

Selected Bibliography Anderson, Jon L. The Lions Grave: Dispatches from Afghanistan. New York: Grove Press, 2003. Giustozzi, Antonio. Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007. London: C Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd, 2007. Jalalzai, Musa Khan. Taliban and the Post-Taliban Afghanistan: Terrorism, Al-Qaeda and the Qila-e-Jangi Massacre. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Pub, 2003. __________. The Pipeline War in Afghanistan. Lahore: Mobile Institute of International Affairs, 2000. Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2000. __________. Jihad: the Rise of Militant Islam in South Asia. Lahore: Vanguard, 2002. Zaeef, Abdul Salam. My Life with the Taliban. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2010. Journals and Magazines Ahmed, Khalid. Terrorism in Tribal Areas of Pakistan. South Asian Journal Ashraf, TAriq Mahmud. Military Operations in FATA: Eliminating Terrorism or Preventing the Balkanization of Pakistan. Terrorism Monitor, South Asia (June 2008).

Notes

Daily Ummat (Urdu), Karachi, September 27, 2003. Saleem Safi, Afghanistan: Roles of America, Taliban, Osama and Pakistani Religious Parties, (Lahore: Danies Sara, 2002), pp. 43-54. iii Muhammad Amir Rana and Mubasher Bukhari, Arabs in Afghan Jihad, (Lahore: Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2007), p.11. iv Rana and Bukhari, pp.18-42. v Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, (London: Penguin Books, 2004), pp. 156-7. vi George, Crile, Charlie Wilsons War, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2003), p.335. vii International Crisis Group, Pakistans Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, Asia Report, No. 125, December 11, 2006, p. 13. viii Amir Rana, Daily Times, September 6, 2002. ix Irfan Mughal, weekly Wajood (Urdu), Karachi, May 4, 2004. x Muhammad Amir Rana, Taliban Insurgency in Pakistan: A Counterinsurgency Perspective.
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