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Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff Author(s): Bernard S. Bachrach Source: The Journal of Military History, Vol.

66, No. 2 (Apr., 2002), pp. 313-357 Published by: Society for Military History Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3093063 . Accessed: 16/10/2011 15:47
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Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff*

Bernard S. Bachrach

T is clear that the term "general staff," as used by both professional soldiers and academics, creates numerous confusions.' Like the notion of "grand strategy," no definition of the term "general staff' meets the epistemological criteria of both necessity and sufficiency.2 For purposes of discussion, however, specialists have found it convenient to deal with a matrix of functions and characteristics which have been identified from the examination of various military institutions to which contemporaries have given titles such as "general staff" and "capital staff' or to groups that perform functions similar to units that are labeled in this manner.3 However, as Max Weber demonstrated more than a century ago, this type of effort has a certain circularity, in which mental ideals are constructed from empirical research and then their "reality" is found in the same sources.4 Nevertheless, this type of research process, if carefully controlled, can have heuristic value in regard to the adumbration of new information, which in turn can be deployed to refine and nuance our insights into the past. * An earlierversionof this paperwaspresented the AnnualConference the at of 30 Quantico,Virginia, April2000. I want to thank the History, Society for Military for members the audience theirhelpful of interventions particularly and Professor CliffordRogers the UnitedStatesMilitary of for commentary. Academy his stimulating 1. DallasD. Irvine,"TheOriginof Capital Journalof Modern Staffs," IIistory10 (1938): 161-79, providesan excellentsurveyof this subjectwith substantial bibliogServicePub.Co., 1944), whichis a usefulgeneralstudy. burg,Pa.:Military
and Development (Harrisraphy. See also J. D. Hittle, The Military Staff: Its IHistory 2. Bernard S. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire

of Press,2001), 1-2, for a discussionof the University Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: with the literature notionof grandstrategy, cited there. 3. Irvine,"TheOriginof CapitalStaffs," 161-79. and HenryA. Finch(Glencoe,Ill.:FreePress,1949), especiallyp. 90.
The Journal of Military History 66 (April 2002) 313-57 ? Society for Militarv History

4. Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. Edward S. Shils

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Modern scholars, in their efforts to identify the nature and function of a general staff, would seem to have given their attention to a group of fundamental characteristics. These scholars focus on what is styled "a permanent institution of the central government." Its purpose is seen as assisting "the supreme military authority of the state" with regard to "determining and implementing intellectually the higher directives which are to govern military activity." A general staff, it is further averred, is the body that oversees the collection during peacetime of specific information which is aimed at the intellectual preparation required for the conduct of future military operations. It is the role of the general staff, in this view, to make specific plans for possible wars and to take cognizance of a spectrum of relevant contingencies.5 Scholars interested in military planning, on occasion, have found it useful to look at premodern and even ancient history. Thus, for example, J. D. Hittle, who takes an evolutionary or developmental approach to these matters, focuses on the practical realization that no commander can do everything himself and thus must have assistants upon whom to lean, literally a human staff. Thus, he avoids the problem adumbrated by Weber, noted above, and starts at the "beginning" with a functional view. lie observes: "when some unknown warrior chief asked help or advice from one of his co-belligerents, military history saw the first function of the military staff."6In tracing the institutional evolution of staff organization, Hittle focuses upon the complexity of military operations as undergirding a concomitant need for detailed and sophisticated planning. Hittle, however, subscribes to a notion of the Middle Ages as a primitive Dark Age. He asserts that in the \Vest, "Military knowledge and its practice seem to disappear with culture after the fall of the Roman empire and the advent of the Middle Ages." He goes on to assert, "As a matter of fact, it is not until after the beginning of the 14th century that we begin to see the first of what might probably be called modern military development."7 Hittle's views, as set out in 1944, were not original but rather represent a fair description of the state of the question at that time.8 During
5. Irvine, "The Origin of Capital Staffs," 166-72. For a discussion dealing with the Roman and late antique world, see the arguments against effective long-term planning by Benjamin Isaac, The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East (Oxford:Clarendon, 1990), 373-408; and for the opposite position, which makes the case effectively, Everett L. Wheeler, "MethodologicalLimits and the Mirageof Roman Strategy,"Journal of Military IHistory57 (January 1993): 7-41 and 57 (April 1993): 215-40. 6. The Military Staff, 2-3. 7. Ibid., 25-26. 8. See, for example, the work of Charles Oman, History of the Art of Warin the Middle Ages, 2 vols. (1st ed., 1898; 2nd ed., 1924; reprint, New York,1964). This set of volumes is, itself, a major expansion of Oman's undergraduate thesis, written in 314 *
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the past half century, however, immense strides have been made in our understanding of medieval military history through the research of numerous specialists. Indeed, the military history of the Middle Ages and medieval warfare, like their ancient counterparts, are now highly technical fields into which nonspecialists venture at their peril and often with rather wrongheaded and very misleading results.9 This is especially so where "chivalry" becomes the focal point of military history.10 Yet, generalists in the study of medieval history and those who work in more modern areas of military history would seem still to be bound within a tradition of a medieval Dark Age that no longer is viable in regard to military history.

Charlemagne and Carolingian Militanr Planning It is the burden of this study to suggest that the great Frankish emperor Charlemagne (768-814) commanded a planning staff and resources which may be compared favorably with what was to develop in Europe during the later eighteenth and early nineteenth century, i.e., prior to the advent of modern communications and transportation technology. In this context, it is exceptionally important to emphasize that for almost a half century, Charlemagne's armies were overwhelmingly successful on several fronts, often in the same campaigning season, against adversaries with various strengths and weaknesses, through the deployment of different types of strategies and tactics. Indeed, Charlemagne conquered west central Europe between the Rhine and the Elbe, where, eight centuries earlier, the Romans had failed after some initial success; northern Italy as far south as Rome; most of the Balkans; and a substantial part of northeastern Spain." Between Alexander the Great in
1884. See Charles Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, rev. and ed. John H. Beeler (Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 1953). For the general picture of the historiographical development, see Bernard S. Bachrach, "MedievalMilitary Historiography," Companion to Historiography, ed. Michael Bentley (London: Routledge, 1997), 203-20. 9. Bachrach, "MedievalMilitary Historiography," 203-20, provides an overview of recent research. 10. This older tradition is very ably summarized by Dennis E. Showalter, "Caste, Skill, and Training:The Evolution of Cohesion in European Armies from the Middle Ages to the Sixteenth Century," Journal of Military History 57 (1993): 195-225, a non-medievalist, who has carefully read and perceptively analyzed the works of the chivalric tradition. However, the result is an excellent picture of a state of the question that is no longer viable. 11. For background detail, see Louis Halphen, Charlemagne et l'empire carolingien (Paris: A. Michel, 1949), 57-119; Margaret Deanesly, A IIistory of Early Medieval Europe from 476-911 (London: Methuen, 1969), 339-406; Rosamond McKitterick, The Frankish Kingdoms under the Carolingians: 751-987 (London:
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the later fourth century B.C. and Napoleon more than two millennia later, no other general in the West enjoyed such high levels of consistent offensive military success resulting in extensive territorial conquest. It may be pointed out, in addition, that Charlemagne dominated considerable territory beyond these above noted frontiers. He established "protectorates" of one or another sort over the lands and peoples beyond his borders through various strategic and tactical initiatives.12 It is important to emphasize, therefore, that Charlemagne ruled not only the greater part of what had been the western half of the later Roman empire but also resuscitated the imperial title, which, for all intents and purposes, had lain dormant in the Vest since 476 A.D.13 It is of more than antiquarian interest, in this context, that this empire, which Charlemagne created largely through military conquest and which he ruled effectively, lasted much longer than either of those built by Alexander and Napoleon. Moreover, Charlemagne, unlike Alexander and Napoleon, was outlived by his creation and was able to pass along both his title and his empire to his son Louis, who preserved its territorial integrity from outside forces for an additional quarter century.14 Adalhard of Corbie's De ordine palatii During the later eighth century or perhaps early in the ninth, Abbot Adalhard of Corbie (d. 826), a cousin of Charlemagne's, wrote a small handbook, libellus, which was entitled De ordine palatii.l1 Many imporLongman, 1983), 41-76; and Pierre Rich6, The Carolingians: A Family WhoForged Europe, trans. M. I. Allen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 96-120. 12. See Halphen, Charlemagne et l'empire carolingien, 57-119; Deanesly, A History of Early Medieval Europe, 339-406; McKitterick,The Frankish Kingdoms under the Carolingians, 41-76; and Rich6, The Carolingians, 96-120. More work needs to be done on the influence of Charlemagne'sconquests beyond the frontiers of the empire. 13. See the recent discussion by Bernard S. Bachrach, "Charlemagne's Military in Responsibilities 'Am Vorabendder Kaiserkronung,"' Am Vorabend der Kaiserkronung: Das Epos 'KarolusMagnus et Leo Papa' und der Papstbesuch, eds. Jorg Jarnut and Peter Johanek (Paderborn:Akademie Verlag,2001), 219-45. 14. For a recent biography of Louis the Pious, see Egon Boschof, Ludwig der Fromme (Darmstadt:Primus, 1996). Revue historique 183 (1938): 15. Louis Halphen, "Deordine palatii d'Hincmar," 1-9, and reprinted in Louis Halphen,A travers l'histoire du moyen age (Paris:Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), 83-91, argued, in a rhetorical tour de force but contrary to the accepted state of the question, that Adalhard never wrote such a tract. According to Halphen, Hincmar,archbishop of Rheims (d. 882), really wrote the work and then attributed it to Adalhard,who was an important adviser to Charlemagne,in order to give his own work greater authority. Halphen's effort has been shown to be without merit, and scholars are in general agreement that Adalhardauthored the text 316 *
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tant matters regarding the organization and functioning of the early Carolingian central government are treated in this little book by Adalhard, who was widely recognized both in his own time and by posterity as a leading adviser to Charlemagne.16 Indeed, Archbishop Ilinemar of Rheims, one of Europe's most learned men during the Carolingian era, identifies Adalhard as first (primus) among Charlemagne's leading advisers (primi consiliarii).17 Here, however, the focus will be on Adalhard's brief but vital discussion in chapters 29 to 35 of the libellus, which deal

under consideration here. The basic study of the problem as raised by Halphen is Jakob Schmidt, IIinkmars "De ordine palatii": und seine Quellen (Frankfurt-amMain: Johann WolfgangGoethe Universitiit, 1962). The leading specialist on Iincmar's career and work, Jean Devisse, Ilincmar, Archeveque de Reims, 845-882, 3 vols. (Geneva: Droz, 1975-76), 2: 992, fully accepted Schmidt's conclusions; and Hans HubertAnton, Fiirstenspiegel und IIerrscherethos in der Karolingerzeit (Bonn: L. Rohrscheid, 1968), 289, n. 732, summed up the state of the question: "Halphen's thesis found scarcely any agreement in [subsequent] research" ("Halphen's thesen fanden kaum Anklang in der Forschung"). Halphen's argument, though essentially undocumented, rested on the fact than no manuscript of Adalhard's text now exists, but what we do have survives in an Admonitio written by Ilinemar in 882. Since the seventeenth century, it has become common to give Hinemar'sAdmonitio by the title of Adalhard'slibellus, De ordine palatii, which was included by the archbishop of Rheims in his own work as chapters 13-36. The basic editions are: Ilincmarus de ordine Palatii, ed. and trans., with a commentary by Thomas Gross and Rudolf Schieffer in Monumenta Germaniae IIistorica. Fontes luris germanici Antiqui in usum scholarum separatim editi (IHannover: Hahn, 1980); and Hincmar, De Ordine Palatii, ed. and trans. Maurice Prou (Paris: F. Vieweg, 1884). An English translation was made by David Herlihy, HIistory of Feudalism (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1970), 209-27. All translations in this study are my own unless otherwise indicated. All citations of the text, Ilincmar, De ordine palatii, refer to the Gross-Schieffer edition by line with chapter numbers as established in the Prou edition and maintained in the margin by GrossSchieffer. References to the Gross-Schieffer commentary are to IIincmarus and to Prou'scommentary Hincmar. Concerning the dating of Adalhard'slibellus, De ordine palatii to the reign of Charlemagne, see Carlrichard Bruhl, "Hinemariana:I. Hinkmar und die Verfasserschaft des Traktats'De ordine palatii,"'Deutsches Archivfiir Erforschung des Mittelalters 20 (1964): 52-53. The effort by Heinz Lo0we, "Hinkmarvon Reims und der Apocrisiar: Beitrage zur Interpretation von De ordine palatii," in Festschritf fir Hermann Heimpel zum 70. Geburtstag am 19. September 1971, 3 vols. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1972), 3: 198-99, to undermine Brihl's dating criteria cannot be accepted. See the discussion by Bernard S. Bachrach, Early Carolingian
Warfare, 202-3.

16. The basic studies of Adalhard'scareer are Paul Bauters,Adalhard van Ihuise (750-826) abt van Corbie en Corvey (Oudenaarde: DrukkerijSanderus, 1964); and Henri Peltier,Adalhard, Abbe de Corbie (Amiens: Soci6te des antiquaires de Picardie, 1969). 17. De ordine palatii, ch. 12 (lines 218-20).
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with those institutions established by the early Carolingian royal court to undertake military planning.18 Each year, early Carolingian rulers, perhaps beginning with Charlemagne's father, Pippin I (d. 768), generally held two meetings which were attended by magnates. The first meeting of this sequence and the one under discussion here was a rather small affair. It took place usually at the winter-spring headquarters of the royal court sometime between November, when the king was accustomed to go into winter quarters, and the beginning of the new year, 1 March, or perhaps through the Easter holiday season.19 The second meeting, which was much larger
18. Although it is clear that Hincmar interpolated and even reworked some of the material provided in Adalhard'slibellus, chapters 13-28, there is a firm consensus that this was not the case with regard to chapters 29-36. See, for example, Schmidt, Ilinkmars "Deordine palatii", 42; Josef Fleckenstein, "Karlder Grosse und sein Hof,"Karl der Grosse: Lebenswerk und Nachleben, ed. W. Braunfelsand Helmut Beumann, 5 vols. (Disseldorf: L. Schwann, 1966), 1: 30; Walter Schlesinger, "Beobachtungenzur Geschichte und Gestalt der Aachener Pfalz in der Zeit Karlsdes Grossen," in Studien zur europaischen Vor-und Friihgeschichte, ed. Martin Glaus, Werner Haarnagel, and Klaus Raddatz (Neumiinster: K. Wachholtz, 1968), 262-63, 275. Devisse, Hincmar, 2: 992; F. L. Ganshof, "Charlemagneand the Institutions of the Frankish Monarchy,"in Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne, trans. B. and M. Lyon (Providence, R.I.:Brown University Press, 1968), 113, n. 96, and 119, n. 142, where Halphen'sargument is rejected. This is an expanded version of the article by Ganshof, "Charlemagneet les institutions de la monarchic franque," contributed to Karl der Grosse: Lebenswerk und Nachleben, 1: 349-93. Josef Fleckenstein, "Die Struktur des liofes Karlsdes Grossen im Spiegel von HinkmarsDe ordine palatii," in Zeitschrift des Aachener Geschichtsvereins 83 (1976): 5-22. Janet L. Nelson, "Legislationand Consensus in the Reign of Charles the Bald," Ideal and Reality in Frankish and Anglo-Saxon Society: Studies presented to J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, ed. Patrick Wormald with Donald Bullough and Roger Collins (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), reprinted without change in Janet L. Nelson, Politics and Ritual in Early Medieval Europe (London: IHambledon, 1986), 91-116; and Janet Nelson, Charles the Bald (London: Longman, 1992), 43, returned to Halphen'sdiscredited position and argued that Hinemar "lent an air of authority by claiming to incorporate the work of Abbot Adalardof Corbie." Indeed, Nelson has asserted, contrary to the continental consensus and without a fair examination of the prevailing arguments, that Hincmar fundamentally rewrote De ordine palatii, chapters 29-36, so that they represented the institutions of the reign of Charles the Baldand not those of the early Carolingians.Nelson's views have had a marked impact upon anglophone writers, who do not seem to have examined fully the German and French scholarly literature. In addition, the arguments that Nelson uses to defend her revisionist views are methodologically unsound. For a full review of the literature, a critique of Nelson's methods, and a defense of the status questionis, see BernardS. Bachrach, "Adalhard of Corbie'sDe ordine palatii: Some methodological observations regardingchapters 29-36," Cithara 41 (2001): 3-34. 19. The matter of when and how many meetings were held each year is a subject of considerable controversy. The basic research was carried out by N. D. Fustel de Coulanges, Ilistoire des institutions politiques de l'ancienne France, 7 vols. (Paris: Hachette, 1876-92), 7: 341-412, who made clear more than a century ago that 318 *
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than the planning session, generally was held in May or later in the year, i.e., at the time that the army was mustered for the forthcoming campaigning season.20 It was at the earlier of the two above mentioned meetings that a group of men whom Adalhard calls senior advisers and specialists, "seniores ... et praecipui consiliarii," gathered to plan operations for the forthcoming campaigning season.'

Intelligence Gathering Undergirding the initial phase of the planning process was, as has been the case throughout the history of the West, the acquisition of intelligence. Adalhard devotes an entire chapter of De ordine palatii to the
the sources contain no consistent terminology regardingassemblies in general, or, for that matter, regarding particular types of assemblies. Erich Seyfarth, Frankische Reichsversammlungen unter Karl dem Grossen und Ludwig dem Frommen (Leipzig: Universitat Leipzig, 1910), 4-10, also finds no consistent Terminologie but without reference to Fustel de Coulanges's earlier research on this point. Scyfarth (pp. 81-87), treats the planning meeting under discussion here as a "small gathering of important men" ("Kleine Optimatenversammlungen"). For the considerable research on later gatherings,see Joel T. Rosenthal, "The Public Assembly in the Time of Louis the Pious," Traditio (1964): 25-40; F. L. Ganshof, "Louisthe Pious Reconsidered,"Ilistory 42 (1957): 171-80, and reprintedin F. L. Ganshof, The Carolingians and the Frankish Monarchy,trans. Janet Sondheimer (London: Longman, 1971), 265-66; and Janet Nelson, "Legislationand Consensus," 226-27. All of this work is flawed by the fundamental methodological problem that the sources do not indicate what an "assembly" is considered to be. In addition, the sources do not define the competence of one or another "assembly,"and Carolingian writers do not agree in regard to what constitutes the responsibilities of an "assembly." Thus, of necessity, each modern scholar picks and chooses which gatherings are to be included (and which excluded) when attaching the label "assembly"to one or another particular meeting. This selection process often is carried out on the basis of criteria that are consistent with what the author already suspects to be the way things were on the basis of previous acquaintance with the sources and/or some previous scholarly work. In some situations the selections are made on the basis of what a particular scholar sees as the ultimate conclusion. In the end, the result of the selection process is that the scholar's findings generally confirm his original hypothesis. The converse can also be true when the researcher seeks to undermine an already existing set of labels. For some illumination of this methodological problem, which is fundamentally a case of circular reasoning, as noted above, in regard to grand strategy, see the discussion by Weber,The Methodology of the Social Sciences, 90. 20. Cf. the information collected by Seyfarth, Frankische Reichsversammlungen, 81-87. This subject needs much more work, especially in light of the time of the annual spring muster. Regardingthe latter, see BernardS. Bachrach, "Wasthe Marchfield Part of the Frankish Constitution?" Medieval Studies 36 (1974): 78-85, and reprinted with the same pagination in Armies and Politics in the Early Medieval West (London: Variorum,1993). 21. De ordine palatii, ch. 30 (line 480).
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royal court's effort to obtain intelligence for military purposes.22 He makes clear that the king gave orders that each person summoned to attend the royal court for whatever purpose, e.g., a great assembly, was to bring with him all of the information that he could gather. Adalhard emphasizes the king's concern that this effort was to be maintained in a most conscientious manner ("studiosissime"). Each man coming to court was to garner information from the region in which he lived and from beyond the frontiers, if he were positioned geographically to get such intelligence. The king further emphasized, in these orders summarized by Adalhard, that all avenues for the acquisition of information were to be accessed by these men in their intelligence gathering efforts. He makes clear that not only did the king command that these men were to use their own people as sources, but also that they were to try to secure information from strangers. Adalhard goes on to note that friends as well as enemies were to be, as we would say today, debriefed. Attempting to get information from enemies would seem to suggest that coercion was not to be eschewed. Indeed, in a departure from the traditional view that, for example, information provided by slaves, at least in judicial proceedings, was not to be given much importance, it was made clear that the status of a person who was to be interrogated was not to be a restriction on the search for information.23 Adalhard makes clear that the rulers under whom he served, Pippin I and Charlemagne, were exceptionally eager to obtain information. Indeed, the king is depicted as debriefing, i.e., undertaking an interrogatio, of everyone who came to court. Each man was questioned in regard to what was happening in the region from which he had come and concerning whatever other intelligence he might have obtained that could be of value. Adalhard emphasizes that this effort by the king was undertaken in order to ascertain whether these visitors to the royal court possessed any information worthy of consideration or what might be called military intelligence.24 This type of restless energy and a fundamental spirit of practically oriented inquisitiveness are clearly two of the several positive dispositions of character and behavior that are attributed to Charlemagne by confidants such as Einhard and Alcuin. These attributes are reaffirmed in rich detail by numerous contemporary anecdotes that later in the
22. Ibid., ch. 36 (lines 619-34) is devoted to this topic. 23. Ibid., ch. 36 (lines 621-26). 24. Ibid., ch. 36 (lines 619-34). The suggestion by McKitterick, The Frankish Kingdoms, 79, regarding the portrayal of government in De ordine palatii as "idealized" misses the point. A handbook by its very nature is an attempt to get it right so that those who follow its prescriptions will be successful. This is the case whether one espouses Nelson's view that Hincmar authored the sections on military administration or one holds, as do most scholars, that Adalhard was the author of these chapters.

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ninth century were collected by Notker at his monastery of St. Gall.25It is no less important that this type of behavior also would appear to have represented a mentalite which reached even to the level of contemporary epic poetry written in Latin and intended for the royal court. For example, in Waltharius, the Frankish king is depicted as personally interrogating a ferryman regarding a very well-armed stranger who exchanged a "foreign fish" for his passage across the Rhine near the royal court, which at that time was convened at the old Roman fortress city of \Vorms.26 Adalhard also provides insight into the types of intelligence that the court sought to obtain so that its planning operations would have an informed focus. These concerns are divided into two groups: those dealing with domestic matters that might need military intervention and foreign matters that likely would require the deployment of troops. In regard to the former, Adalhard gives special attention to the rise of particular types of conditions within the kingdom (regnum) itself. For example, the royal court deemed it necessary to know if the inhabitants of any region, or even those dwelling in some small corner of the kingdom, were sufficiently agitated (turbatus) to cause trouble that might require military action. Indeed, the government was interested whether there were even murmurs of discontent or other similar internal problems. The king, in addition, wanted to know the cause of each particular disturbance ("causa turbationis").2 With regard to foreign matters, Adalhard gives particular attention to the need to obtain intelligence concerning the potential for revolt by one or another subject people (gens subdita) living beyond or outside (extra) the frontiers of the regnum.28 The royal court also wanted information regarding any subject people from beyond the frontiers who in the near past had rebelled but had been suppressed. Obviously, when such information had been obtained, troop redeployments could be planned. Finally, Adalhard, in his list of specific examples, calls attention to the need to obtain reliable intelligence regarding one or another gens
25. Of the many attempts to sketch the personality of Charlemagne. that by Heinrich Fichtenau, The Carolingian Empire, ed. and trans. Peter Munz (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), 25-46, is the most complete. Fichtenau's defense of the value of the anecdotes collected by Notker is highly persuasive because these stories, he shows, are fully consistent in spirit and tone with what other more contemporary sources provide, such as Einhard. 26. Waltharius, ed. Karl Strecker, with a German translation by P. Vossen (Berlin: NWeidmann,1947), lines 428-63. For the dating of this poem to the early Carolingian era, see the literature cited in Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, 307. 27. De ordine palatii, ch. 36 (lines 626-30). In this context, he wanted to be able to decide which matters ultimately would go to a generalis consilium. 28. Ibid., lines 630-31.
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from beyond (extra) the frontiers of the regnum, which had not yet (necdum) been conquered, or, perhaps more precisely, had not yet been reduced to subject status (subdita). Here necdum not only indicates "not yet," but also implies that such a gens had been marked for conquest sometime in the future and that, therefore, plans would have to be made to carry out this policy. In this context, the court also needed information as to whether the leaders of such an as yet unconquered gens were planning offensive and perhaps covert offensive action (insidiae) against the assets of the regnum Francorum.29 Adalhard summarizes this chapter on intelligence gathering, especially with respect to situations that might arise beyond the frontiers of the kingdom, with several general observations. He concludes that not only was the king eager to obtain information concerning matters that presented an immediate danger to the safety and security of the realm, but he also wanted information in regard to other less imminent problems that might eventually raise security issues. However, perhaps most interesting is Adalhard's observation that the king was not interested solely in the facts of what was happening. Adalhard makes clear that the king also wanted to know the causes for the types of problems adumbrated above, and any other kinds of problems that his intelligence sources indicated could possibly arise.30 This emphasis on causes suggests the need for an in-depth analysis, possibly with a view to avoiding a similar situation in the future. It is certainly true that Adalhard's libellus, in general, was intended as a handbook for its readers concerning the right way to carry out the administration of government and, in the chapters under consideration here, in regard to what was appropriate concerning the acquisition of military intelligence. The effectiveness of Carolingian military operations, on the whole, might well permit the inference that intelligence gathering was generally done the right way as suggested in De ordine palatii. However, specific evidence corroborates this. For example, in a letter to Bishop Ghaerbaldus of Liege, Charlemagne discusses how his fideles have provided him with accurate information ("conpertum") from "every part of his regnum" regarding wars (bella) on the frontiers ("marcas"). Charlemagne, however, also indicates that he has been provided with intelligence, which obviously is of military value, concerning the likelihood of famine and concomitant poor weather conditions.31 In
29. Ibid., lines 623-32. 30. Ibid., lines 632-34.
31. Cap. reg. Fr., no. 124 (Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Legum sectio II

Capitularia I, ed. Alfred Boretius [Hannover: Hahn, 1883]). It is important, in this context, to emphasize that Charlemagne'spurpose in this letter was not to brag about the intelligence capabilities of his government, but to inform Ghaerbaldusthat he was 322 *
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this context, contemporary research indicates continuous and extensive contact, often based on exchanges of detailed written documents, between the Carolingian central government and the military commanders posted on the frontiers.32

Intelligence Evaluation and Planning All year long, through a myriad of sources of varying value, the royal court collected vast amounts of information that had potential for use as military intelligence. As at least some of this information became available, it was evaluated by the king, likely in a superficial manner, as noted above. However, at the court, men were assigned to the task of dealing with this information in a systematic manner so that it could be put into accessible form for the use of the government's senior military planners. Thus, before these planners met at court, a collection of detailed written documents was prepared for their use. Adalhard discusses the structure of these documents and emphasizes that they were very carefully organized into "specifically titled [or perhaps rubricated] topical units." As the Latin has it, they were denominata. Each unit or denominatum was then methodically organized ("ordinata") into groupings as specific chapters or capitula.33

to proclaim a series of fasts and prayers for the improvement of the weather and for the health of the crops. The intelligence information relayed to the prelate was only incidental. und Schriftlichkeit im Karolingerreich: 32. MarkMersiowsky,"Regierungspraxis Das Fallbeispiel der Mandate und Briefe," in Schriftkultur und Reichsverwaltung unter den Karolingern: Referate des Kolloquiums der Nordrhein-WestfJlischen Akademie der Wissenscuaften am 17J18. Februar 1994 in Bonn, ed. Rudolf Schieffer (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996), 109-66. I would like to thank Professor Charles Bowlus for providing reference to this important study. 33. De ordine palatii, ch. 34 (line 575), makes it clear that at both of the meetings (placita) discussed above, the process of having small councils work with previously prepared capitula, of the type noted infra, took place. Regarding the documents, see Adalhard,De ordine palatii, ch. 30 (lines 580-81). It is important to emphasize that these were not the normal "capitularies"published by the central government, but rather internal working documents used by a council. Cf. Nelson, "Legislation and Consensus," 217, who confounds these two types of documents. Regarding the classification of capitularies, see F. L. Ganshof, Recherches sur les Capitulaires (Paris: Sirey, 1958), 11-18. With regard to the complexity of the manuMordek,Bibliotheca capitularium regnum Francoscripts of these texts, see HIubert rum manuscripta. Uberlieferung und Traditionszusammenhang der frankischen I-errschererlasse (Munich: Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 1995).
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Senior Military Planners These reports (capitula), which were to be produced by the intelligence evaluators, obviously had to be completed before the planners gathered at their placitum, which, as noted above, generally was scheduled to begin during the winter and prior to 1 March. This planning group was composed of consiliarii, i.e., advisers, whom Adalhard would appear to divide into two specialized groups. One group he refers to as seniores; these clearly were older and more experienced men, i.e., senior advisers, and perhaps, though not necessarily, men of relatively high or higher status.34 The second group was composed of special advisers or specialists, i.e., praecipui consiliarii.35 It should be noted that this is the only time in the entire libellus that Adalhard uses the term praecipui consiliarii. These specialist consiliarii should not be confounded with consiliarii regis, a frequently used term, which generally denoted very high ranking nobles who served as advisers to the king.36The appropri-

34. De ordine palatii, ch. 30 (line 480). The word senior can mean an elder person or an important person, or it obviously can have both meanings at the same time. Concerning Adalhard'susage in regard to senior in the administrative chapters to mean a senior or elder participant in a placitum, see chapter 35 (lines 592-93). The translation of senior as hohe by Gross-Schieffer,Hinkmar, 84, in regard to ch. 30 is not warranted either by context or by Adalhard'susage. By contrast, the Gross-Schieffer translation of senior as Alter (p. 93) in regard to chapter 35, is important because it virtually guarantees a reading of "elder"or senior participant in a placitum rather than old (hohes Alter) which would have been an appropriate way to render the Latin senex but not senior. 35. De ordine palatii, ch. 30 (line 480). 36. Ganshof, Recherches sur les Capitulaires, 22-23, calls attention to the use of experts in the preparation of the capitularies, i.e., men who are mentioned in the documents themselves. There is no reason to believe that these experts were among the higher rankingmen in Carolingiansociety. This gives us some warning not to confound the term praecipuus consiliarius, i.e., special adviser or "specialist,"with the term consiliarius regis. The latter is generally taken to mean a very high ranking adviser to the king. This point has been made in considerable detail for both Carolingian Italy and this same region in the immediate post-Carolingian era, with significant comparisons to the area north of the Alps, by Hagen Keller,"ZurStrukturdes Konigsherrschaftim karolingischen und nachkarolingischen Italien. Der 'consiliarius regis' in den italienischen Konigsdiplomen des 9. und 10. Jhdts.," Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 47 (1967): 123-233. Much anglophone scholarship is misleading in this regard. For example, Nelson, "Legislation and Consensus," 215, would seem to be translating "praecipui consiliarii," who are discussed in chapter 30, as though they were "the more influential men, the leading men" of the kingdom; such a translation is not warranted. In this context, she may well be following the flawed English rendering by Herlihy,De ordine palatii, 223, who mistakenly translated "praecipui consiliarii" as "the principal councilors." 324 *
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ate term for a principal councilor is primus consiliarius and, indeed, Archbishop llincmar of Rheims refers to Adalhard in this manner.37 In view of the fact that the planning group's main assignment was to handle matters of peace and war (see below), it is highly likely that all of these specialists, regardless of age or status, were military experts. The older, i.e., more senior, and perhaps more distinguished advisers probably were to lend their long experience of a more practical nature to the deliberations of the group. Wido, successor to the celebrated Roland as count of the Breton March, who corresponded with Alcuin, Charlemagne's friend and adviser, is likely the type of senior who was associated with the planning group.38 Another well-educated general who was close to both Alcuin and Paulinus, the patriarch of Aquileia, was Erich of
Friuli, commander of the eastern frontier in Italy.39 Such men had both

the experience and the education to carry out the military planning tasks at the highest level. In this context, it is important to emphasize that the Carolingians placed a high premium on training specialized governmental functionaries. In fact, Adalhard goes to some lengths to describe how a selection of educated young men, who were serving at court in minor posts as ministeriales, were perceived by their seniors to have exceptional talent. These young ministeriales then were seconded to one or another of the specialist cadres to obtain knowledge of that particular area, and they were trained to follow in the footsteps of their mentors.4? Charlemagne not only had specialists at court, but also had military commanders stationed on a rather long-term basis in various critical frontier regions and diplomatic experts with various well-established areas of geographical
competence, as well.41 The fact that the capitula under discussion here 37. Hincmar,De ordine palatii, ch. 12 (line 219-20), where Adalhardis regarded as primus among Charlemagne'sprincipal councilors ("primos consiliarios"). 38. RegardingW\ido,see Luitpold \Vallach, "Alcuinon Virtues and Vices: A Manual for a Carolingian Soldier,"IIarvard Theological Review 48 (1955): 175-95. 39. James Bruce Ross, "TwoNeglected Paladins of Charlemagne, Erich of Friuli and Gerold of Bavaria,"Speculum 20 (1945): 212-35. I hope to publish a prosopographical study on "Charlemagne'sGenerals" in the near future. 40. De ordine palatii, ch. 32 (lines 537-43). Ganshof, Recherches sur les Capitulaires, 22-23, calls attention to the use of experts in the preparation of the capitulaires, i.e., men who are mentioned in the documents themselves. 41. In addition to the Magister Judaeorum (Bernard S. Bachrach, Early Medieval Jewish Policy in Western Europe [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977], 99-101), see regarding specialized diplomatic cadres, Karl-Ferdinand Augustus: gouverneur de l'empire chr6tien-Idees et r6alites," \Verer, "IHludovicus in Charlemagne's IIeir: New Perspectives on the Reign of Louis the Pious (814-840), ed. Peter Godman and Roger Collins (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 31-32, n. 102. Also see, for example, Karl-Ferdinand\Werner,"Missus-Marchio-Comes.Entre l'administration centrale et 'administration locale de l'empire carolingien,"Histoire comparee de l'administration (IVe-XXVIIe siecles), ed. \erner Paravicini and Karl-Ferdinand
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were provided to the military planners in detailed written form, and not simply as oral reports, tends to support the notion that these men were not uneducated.42

The Agenda Adalhard makes it very clear that this planning council's primary task was to deal with matters of "war and peace" (rixa and pax).43 eIc further emphasizes that all of this planning was to take place well in advance of when action would be undertaken. The temporal framework for the planning, in general, would seem to have been for the forthcoming campaigning season, e.g., a half year or more in advance.44Accordingly, Adalhard makes a distinction between planning for new initiatives and for dealing with matters that already were in train.45With regard to the latter, Adalhard provides an interesting example and indicates that each frontier commander (marchisus) was authorized to make time-limited treaties (dextrae). However, it was the duty of the king's military planners to review these agreements and establish plans for the period following the expiration of the treaties.46 Adalhard makes clear that the planning group, upon reviewing the intelligence reports that were provided to them in the above mentioned capitula, were mandated to make the initial determinations for action. These, of course, were subject to royal approval. For example, if the planners concluded that an attack on enemy territory was a reasonable course of action-here Adalhard uses the term ratio-then they "determined . . . what action [actio] should be undertaken," i.e., they set out the broad plan.47However, they also did some operational planning and went so far as to indicate which particular troop deployments ("ordo agendi") were to be carried out.48 Finally, they followed the same planning process with regard to defensive operations.49
Werner (Munich: Artemis VXerlag, 1980), 191-239, and reprinted in Karl-Ferdinand Werner, Vom Frankenreich zur Entfaltung Deutschlands und Frankreichs (Sigmaringen: J. Thorbecke, 1984), 131-35. 42. Regarding the documents distributed to the planning council of specialist advisers, see Adalhard,De ordine palatii, ch. 30 (lines 580-81). 43. Ibid., line 488. 44. Ibid., lines 481-84, 490. 45. Ibid., lines 488-91, 486, and 492-93, respectively. 46. Ibid., lines 488-91, 486, and 492-93, respectively. Regardingthe meaning of dextra in the present context, see Gross and Schieffer,Hincmarus, 85, n. 200, with the literature cited there. 47. De ordine palatii, ch. 30 (lines 489, 492). 48. Ibid., lines 492-93. 49. Ibid., line 490. 326 *
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Security In addition to undertaking the planning of military operations, the Carolingian consiliarii are reported by Adalhard to have paid close attention at their annual meeting to matters of security. These advisers are said to have recognized explicitly the great need to keep the military plans made by this group and subsequently approved by the king, as very carefully guarded secrets, i.e., "sub silentio."50 Indeed, it is evident from Adalhard's observations concerning the importance of maintaining secrecy that the royal court in these instances operated on the premise that today we call "a need to know basis" ("ab alienis silentio").5l Secrecy, according to Adalhard, was widely recognized to thwart those "persons, who, because of the information [that they could obtain], might wish to stop or to undermine [the plans of the government]" and thus, when secrecy was maintained, such people "were not able to do this."52

Resources Adalhard's information concerning military planning at the early Carolingian court, as noted above, was provided (ca. 782) in a handbook or libellus, which likely was intended to describe how these things were supposed to be done. Whether the plans made by Charlemagne's planning staff actually could work depended on the resources to execute them. Thus, for example, in regard to intelligence gathering, the parade of large numbers of people who visited the royal court and the many soldiers who attended the annual muster, usually in May and sometimes later in the year, as well as those who served as representatives to the
50. Ibid., lines 493-94. 51. Ibid., lines 494-95. 52. Ibid., lines 494-500. The importance of intelligence gathering by the Byzantines is noted by Wheeler, "Methodological Limits," 234-38, with the literature cited there. Cf. P. 0. Long and Alex Roland, "Military Secrecy in Antiquity and Early Medieval Europe: A Critical Reassessment," History and Technology 11 (1994): 259-90. This work does not treat the Carolingians. However, their conclusions regarding the lack of importance of secrecy are not consistent with the behavior of the early Carolingians. Research thus far has not turned up any of the many copies of the detailed documents, i.e., the capitula, that were prepared for the military planners by the palace staff each year. Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude, at least tentatively, that the serious concern for security, noted by Adelhard, led to the destruction of the parchments or, more likely, to their scraping in order to save the valuable writing surface. In addition, a corollary may be inferred from the concern for security that was evidenced by the Carolingian government, i.e., Charlemagne and advisers believed, as did their Byzantine contemporaries, that at least some of their adversaries had both an interest in undertaking spying efforts and the capacity to carry out potentially damaging intelligence gathering operations in order to secure valuable information.
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general assembly, provided numerous opportunities for the government to gather data. In addition, senior secular officials, including counts, dukes, and missi dominici, on the one hand and religious dignitaries, e.g., bishops and abbots, on the other hand, were instructed to bring information to the king. Mapping The acquisition of information or intelligence, of course, is only the beginning of the process. Among other resources, military planners need sound geographical information.53 Thus, it may be asked whether the early Carolingians had available the kind of geographical and topographical information that would make it possible to draw up strategic or even operational plans that could be sufficiently accurate to have functional value.f4 In this context, therefore, it must be emphasized, at the broadest possible level, that the planning of Carolingian military strategy did not occur in an intellectual vacuum with regard to the geography of the western half of the empire.55 Indeed, Charlemagne, like his father King
53. Irvine, "The Origin of Capital Staffs," 174-76; and Isaac, The Limits of Empire, 401. 54. Isaac, Limits of Empire, 401-7, denigrates the command of geographical information not only by the Romans in the later empire but also by the Byzantines. However, Isaac does not deal with the medieval West. With regard, for example, to the capacity of Alfred the Great to deploy sound geographical knowledge, see John Peddie, Alfred, the Warrior King (Phoenix Mill, U.K.: Sutton, 1999), 66-70, 148-63; and Richard Abels, Alfred the Great: War, Kingship and Culture in Anglo-Saxon England (London: Longman, 1998), 194-99. Isaac's views regarding late Roman command of geographical information are thoroughly undermined by Wheeler, "The Mirage of Roman Strategy," 232-33. 55. This is not the place to reexamine the matter of the "Carolingian Renaissance." However, see J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, The Barbarian West, 400-1000, 3d rev. ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1967), 98-103, who convincingly affirms the importance of learning for Charlemagne's successes. The author seems to be admonishing an earlier generation which believed in the "Dark Age." Nevertheless, there is a more modem and far more subtle version of the early Middle Ages as a Dark Age which emphasizes minimalism and primitivism. See, for example, M. T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), who would seem to have retreated somewhat in the 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993), 12, 20-21; and Brian Stock, The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983). This Tendenz is justly criticized by Rosamond McKitterick, "Introduction," The Uses of Literacy in Early Medieval Europe, ed. Rosamond McKitterick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 2, because "it begins too late and is too categorical about the irrelevance of the earlier period." Brian Stock, Listening for the Text: On the Uses of the Past (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), seems to be less certain concerning the irrelevance of the early Middle Ages, but he does not appear to be convinced that the immense output of written work from the Carolingian scriptoria was very much read. 328 *
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Pippin, followed a program aimed not only at building the royal library through a constant flow of new acquisitions, but also at encouraging the acquisition of books by both monastic libraries and private individuals throughout his regnum.i6 In this context, it is of particular importance that the Carolingian court showed considerable diligence in the acquisition of books containing geographical knowledge. In addition, a scholarly consensus has begun to develop that the Carolingian geographers working with these older texts surpassed their classical models in some theoretical matters.57 However, as will be seen, Carolingian study of geography was not
without practical significance, as well. During the early Middle Ages, in

general, and among the Carolingians in particular, substantial evidence indicates a very lively interest both in geographical knowledge and in
maps.58 Charlemagne himself is known to have possessed three engraved table-top maps. One of these depicted the city of Rome and another the city of Constantinople; the third was a map of the entire world ("totius mundi descriptionem").59 It seems likely that these engraved maps were based upon texts available at Charlemagne's court, i.e., Descriptio urbis and the mapa mundi that Romae, Descriptio urbis Constantinopolis had been commissioned by the Emperor Theodosius II ca. 435; these all included distance measurements.60 56. Concerning the efforts of Pippin I and Charlemagne to develop the royal library, as well as their general interest in the acquisition of new books and the making of copies of manuscripts, see BernhardBischoff,Manuscripts and Libraries in the Age of Charlemagne, trans. and ed. Michael Gorman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Donald Bullough, "Roman books and Carolingian renovatio," Church History 14 (1977), and republished with corrections in Donald Bullough, Carolingian Renewal: Sources and Heritage (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 1-38; and Rosamond McKitterick,The Carolingians and the Written Word (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1989). 57. See, for example, P. Gautier Dalch6, "Traditionet renouvellement dans la representation d'espace geographique au IXe siecle," Studi Medievali ser. 3 (1983): 121-65; and W. Bergmann, "Dicuil'sDe mensura orbis terra," in Science in Western and Eastern Civilization in Carolingian Times, ed. P. L. Butzer and Dietrich Lohrmann (Basel: BirkhauserVerlag, 1993), 525-23. A useful review of the literature for the early MiddleAges is provided by Natalia Lozovsky, The earth is our book: geographical knowledge in the Latin West ca. 400-1000 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), who, however, does not have a feel for the practical or real world use of geography. 58. O. A. W. Dilke, Greek and Roman Maps (Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 1985), 166-82; and P. D. A. Harvey, Medieval Maps (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 7-37, provide useful introductions to this difficult topic, which requires further intensive research. 59. Einhard, V Karoli, bk. II, ch. 33 (Eigenhard, Vie de Charlemagne, ed. and trans. Louis Halphen [Paris: LibrairieAncienne IHonore Champion, 19231). 60. In trying to account for Charlemagne's table-top maps, it is important to note that copies of the Descriptio urbis Romae and the Descriptio urbis ConstantiMILITARY HISTORY

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A substantial number of geographical works were written during the late antique era and were based, by and large, on Agrippa's map, which was completed during the early first century A.D.61Many of these works were, in turn, available to the Carolingians. Thus, for example, De mensura orbis terrae, which may have served as an expanded written text for the Theodosian map, discussed above, was well known to the Carolingians.62 In addition, the Carolingians had the text Situs orbis terre vel regionum, which was probably written in the eighth century by an
author whose identity has been lost.63 This text, like the De mensura

nopolis were included in the Speyer codex. This late ninth- or early tenth-century manuscript was copied most likely from a codex that had been assembled at the Carolingian court during the reign of Louis the Pious, i.e., ca. 825. The codex upon which the Speyer manuscript was based was created from a substantial collection of texts, mostly of an "administrative"nature and dating to the later Roman empire, that had been assembled at the Carolingiancourt considerably prior to the creation of the 825 codex. The terminus for the Speyer progenitor of 825 A.D. is suggested by the presence of De mensura orbis terrae, which was compiled by the Irish scholar Dicuil at about that time. The fact that Charlemagne already had three finely executed table-top maps, i.e., of Rome, Constantinople, and the World, well before his death in 814, strongly suggests that texts of the urban descriptiones, mentioned above, were already at court considerably before 814. Since Dicuil's work was clearly based upon the Theodosius map, this map likely was also in the Carolingiancourt library before ca. 825. Thus, the possiblity that the Theodosius map, like the urban descriptiones, served as the basis for one of Charlemagne'stable-top maps, i.e., the map of the world, should not be ignored. Indeed, it is even possible that Dicuil, in addition to the Theodosian map, also used Charlemagne'stable-top map, which arguably remained at the court following the emperor's death (cf. Einhard, V Karoli, bk. II, ch. 33). J. J. G. Alexander, "The Illustrated Manuscripts of the Notitia Dignitatum," in
Aspects of the Notitia Dignitatum, ed. R. Goodburn and P. Bartholomew (Oxford:

British Archaeological Reports, 1976), 19, observes on the basis of Dicuil's work that the manuscript from which the Speyer manuscript was copied likely was executed ca. 825 and further calls attention, with some confusion, to Charlemagne's table-top maps. He then asks rhetorically whether the two urban descriptiones could have been derived from an illustrated Notitia. 61. See the discussion by James Tierney, "Introduction," Dicuili, Liber de Mensura Orbis Terra, ed. James Tierney with contributions by L. Bieler (Dublin: Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 1967), 17-22, concerning the AgrippaMap. 62. Tierney, "Introduction,"22-26; and cf. Natalia Lozovsky, "Carolingiangeographical tradition: Was it geography?"Early Medieval Europe 5 (1996): 25-43, who, in this context, does not appreciate the value of geography for military planning and operations.
63. P. Gautier Dalche, "Situs orbis terre vel regionum: Un traite inedit du haut

Moyen Age," Revue d'Histoire des textes 12-13 (1982-83): 149-79, puts the date of the text as early as the later seventh century. Cf. Lozovsky, "Carolingiangeographical tradition," 26, n. 5. 330 *
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noted above, was used for teaching purposes at the Palace school and at less well-known schools in various parts of the Carolingian regnum.64 The Irishman Dicuil produced his own extensive De mensura orbis terrae, which included, among other texts, the much older De mensura orbis terrae mentioned above. Dicuil's work likely was completed early in the reign of Louis the Pious (814-40), Charlemagne's son and successor, at whose court he worked.65 The independent value of Dicuil's De mensura is beyond the scope of the present study; however, it provides a substantial amount of information regarding the extensive resources available for teaching and studying geography at the royal court. Dicuil drew upon dozens of classical and late antique sources. Some of these were original texts such as Pliny the Elder's Historia Naturalis and others were available to him fromflorelegia.66 It is not without interest here that the Carolingians have gained a reputation for being expert at the composition offlorelegia on an exceptionally wide spectrum of subjects for practical use. Sometimes a particularly specialized florelegium with a rather circumscribed technical scope is referred to as a Liber Manualis, i.e., a manual or handbook.67 Charlemagne, it is generally agreed by modern scholars, was in the forefront of ordering such handbooks to be compiled for practical purposes, and surviving manuscripts sustain this reputation. As Eva Matthews Sanford observed: "Charlemagne ... is known to have directed the compilation at least of handbooks for the study of history, astronomy, and other sciences as well as for theological studies."68 In the context of seeking out high quality texts on geography, it is worthy of note, as well, that Bishop Lull of Mainz, who came from England to serve the Carolingians and was a close confidant of Charlemagne's, played a role in trying to advance geographical knowledge in
64. Tierney, "Introduction," 20-22; and followed by Lozovsky, "Carolingian geographical tradition," 26-27, 31-37. However, she finds it difficult (p. 33) to "locate a disciplinary context beyond the seven liberal arts in which these tracts would fit" and, lacking interest in military matters, she wonders if they could have served for "exegesis"? 65. Tierney, "Introduction," 11-17. Dicuil worked at the Carolingian court where he taught several subjects at the palace school. He probably arrived there prior to Charlemagne's death. 66. Tierney, "Introduction," 17-33. 67. Regarding the Carolingian penchant for having suchflorelegia created, see Eva Matthews Sanford, "The Use of Classical Latin Authors in the Libri Manuales," Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philolgical Association 55 (1924): 190-248. We await eagerly the projected volume Lesflorileges in the series Typologie des Sources. 68. Sanford, "The Use of Classical Latin Authors in the Libri Manuales," p. 92. Among those other sciences was geography, as noted by Tierney, "Introduction," 17-33.
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the regnum Francorum. It seems that Anglo-Saxon intellectuals, like their Carolingian counterparts, were very much interested in geography. Scholars have concluded from reading the relevant chapters in Orosius's History (a text also available to the Carolingians) that the Anglo-Saxons saw the study of geography as important and thus set out to acquire useful classical texts. For example, Benedict Biscop purchased a volume on cosmography at Rome and brought it back to England, where Bede read it and declared it a "wonderful work." A generation after Bede's death (ca. 770), Bishop Lull made known his effort to obtain a collection of books on cosmography ("libros cosmografiorum") from the library at York.69 When they attended the palace school or other important Carolingian schools as students, the men who later served the royal court in the specialized capacity of military planners, praecipui consiliarii, had available to them a substantial library of largely accurate geographical texts of practical value. In this context, it is also important to note that the Roman corpus of works on surveying, known generally as Agrimensores, was very popular in the Carolingian empire.70 Many of the manuscripts in this corpus, which were copied during the early Middle Ages, were illustrated both with maps and with diagrams.71 These visual aids were, in general, designed for the purpose of teaching students the skills of surveying and techniques for making maps of various kinds.72 Among the more important "maps" available in the Carolingian era were itineraries. Both the early Carolingians and Charlemagne's contemporaries produced itineraries similar to those used by the Romans and perhaps based upon earlier texts, to provide crucial information regarding important travel routes. Furthermore, the Roman tradition of making road maps and drawing up itineraries clearly was utilized during the early Middle Ages. The best surviving examples of the latter, of course, deal with the pilgrimage routes to the holy land, i.e., Itinera Hierosolymitana, which provide crucial information regarding times and distances between stopping places. These itineraries, which may perhaps be thought of as travel handbooks, recorded, among other things, both the actual lineal measurements of distances between places and
69. Here I follow the brief remarks by Wilhelm Levison, England and the Continent in the Eighth Century (Oxford: Clarendon, 1946), 42, who cites the relevant sources. The level of Lull's success remains to be determined. ed. L. D. 70. R. J. Tarrant, "Agrimensores," in Texts and Transmission, Reynolds (corrected reprint, Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 1-13, provides both an excellent introduction to the manuscripts and a good bibliography. The introductory volume by O. A. W. Dilke, The Roman Land Surveyors: An Introduction to the Agrimensores (Devon: David and Charles, 1971), is still very useful. 71. Tarrant, "Agrimensores," 1-13, with the literature cited there. 72. Dilke, Roman Land Surveyors, especially 31-46 and 109-25. 332 *
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travel time between such key locations.73 Narrative accounts such as Willibald's Hodoeporicon also provided all kinds of additional detailed information relevant to such travel.7 While knowledge gained from books was certainly very important to Charlemagne and his entourage, it is important to emphasize that the Carolingians carried out their military operations overwhelmingly within what had been the western half of the Roman empire. By the end of the third century A.D., this region was serviced by an elaborate system of primary, secondary, and tertiary roads. In some local areas, the network of roads was even more elaborate.7, This same road system, including the roads built through the Alpine passes and in the Pyrenees, was still very much intact throughout the West during the reign of Charlemagne and his successors.76 The Carolingians, in fact, maintained the ancient custom (antiqua consuetudo), more or less as set out in the Codex Theodosianus, that the local authorities were to keep both roads and bridges in good repair.77Parenthetically, it is of interest that similar efforts were imposed by Anglo-Saxon rulers in England as part of the so-called "Trinoda necessitas."'7

In Gaul and the Rhineland, even the mansiones, i.e., the stoppingoff places along the Roman roads, were maintained on these same old
73. Regardingthe background, see Dilke, Greek and Roman Maps, 112-29; and for surviving early medieval texts, see Itinera IHierosolymitana,saeculi IIII-VIII,ed. P. Gever (Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1898). 74. See, for example, Hugeburc,I-odoeporicon S. Willibaldi, ed. Oswald HolderEgger, in Monumenta Germaniae listorica, Scriptores (HIannover:Hahn, 1888), XV.1. Bishop Willibald of Eichstatt, who died c. 786, is believed personally to have related the story of his journey to the above mentioned nun. See the brief discussion by Levison, England and the Continent in the Eighth Century, 42-43. 75. RegardingRoman roads, see Raymond Chevallier, Roman Roads, trans. N. H. Field (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976). 76. Concerning the continued use of Roman roads, see Jean Hubert, "Les routes du moven age," in Les Routes de France, depuis les origines jusqu'i nos jours (Paris: Association pour la diffusion de la pensce francaise, 1979), 25-56; additional information is provided by Chevallier,Roman Roads, passim. 77. Theodosiani Libri cum constitutionibus Sirmondianis et Leges Novellae, XV, 3.6, ed. T. Mommsen and P. Meyer, 2 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1905); Cap. reg. Fr., I, no. 91, ch. 4; no. 93, ch. 7. Quite correctly, work on bridges is considered an antiqua consuetudo in these Carolingian documents. These efforts were carried on even during the reign of Charles the Bald, Charlemagne'sgrandson, whose reign was considerably less successful than that of his grandfather.Cf. Janet Nelson, Charles the Bald, 25, 30, who, nevertheless, tends to exaggerate Charles's successes. 78. Cf. W. H. Stevenson, "Trinoda Necessitas," English Historical Review 29 (1914): 689-703; and these are emphasized by Nicholas Brooks, "The development of military obligations in eighth- and ninth-century England,"in England Before the Conquest: Studies in primary sources presented to Dorothy Whitelock, ed. Peter Clemoes and Kathleen Hughes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 69-84.
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routes during Charlemagne's reign.79 It is clear that the existence of the Roman road system in the western half of the empire provided massive advantages in planning to the Carolingians. To put a finer point on the matter, Charlemagne's military planners had available to them geographical knowledge of the western half of the Roman empire and access to a transportation infrastructure of roads and bridges for military operations that was superior to that enjoyed by Julius Caesar and other Roman generals of the late Republic and early Empire. Indeed, this transportation infrastructure was built by the Romans only following their conquests.80 Even the region between the Rhine and the Elbe had seen a Roman imperial impact on its topography with regard to the building of roads both before and after the defeat suffered by Varus in 9 A.D. by Arminius (Herman the German of anglophone textbooks).81 In addition, some modest road building had gone on in the post-Roman period east of the Rhine, as the Merovingians extended their domination into territory that had not been an enduring part of the erstwhile empire in the West.82The Carolingians under Charlemagne would seem to have undertaken an accelerated road building program east of the Rhine, and they gave special attention to bridge building efforts in order to support their military operations in Saxony and secure their conquest of the region. In this context, two bridges were put across the Elbe to control the right bank of the river.83
79. F. L. Ganshof, "La Tractoria: Contribution a l'etude des origines du droit de gite," Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 8 (1928): 69-91; and Carlrichard Brihl, Fodrum, gistum, servitium regis: Studien zu den wirtschafts Grundlagen des Konigtums im Frankenreich und in denfrankischen Nachfolgestaaten Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien vom 6 bis zur Mitte des 14 Jahrhunderts, 2 vols. (Cologne: Bohlau, 1968). 80. Regardingthe roads in Gaul prior to the Roman conquest, see the introducobservations by Chevallier,Roman Roads, 12-15, with the bibliography,227-28; tory and Nicholas Purcell, "The Creation of Provincial Landscape:The Roman Impact on Cisalpine Gaul,"in The Early Roman Empire in the West, ed. Thomas Blaggand Martin Millett (Oxford: Oxbow, 1990), 7-27. 81. Colin M. Wells, The German Policy of Augustus: an examination of the archaeological evidence (Oxford:Clarendon, 1972), 239-40. 82. Concerning roads in northwest Germany, see J. R. Forbes, Notes on the History of Ancient Roads and their Construction (Amsterdam:Noord-HollandscheUitgevers-Mij., 1934), 38-46; and Karl-FerdinandWerner, "Missus-Marchio-Comes," 232, with the literature cited there. Ian Wood, "The Frontiers of Western Europe: Developments East of the Rhine in the Sixth Century,"The Sixth Century: Production, Distribution and Demand, ed. Richard Hodges and William Bowden (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 231-53, deals with Merovingianpolitical expansion beyond the Rhine and what may be considered trade, but he fails to address the necessary infrastructure (roads, bridges, ferries, and fords) that made these eastward efforts both possible and on occasion successful. 83. Werner,"Missus-Marchio-Comes," 232, n. 144. 334 *
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Geographical knowledge as set out in the handbooks, which served to educate the military planners at Charlemagne's court, focused, often in considerable detail, on the very road system that serviced the part of the western half of the empire in which the Carolingians campaigned.4' This important geographical information, moreover, was neither a military secret nor even the special preserve of the army. Indeed, such information would seem to have been well known to men who were not primarily a part of the military establishment. This is made clear, for example, from even a cursory examination of the letters and other writings of Einhard, Charlemagne's close confidant and biographer. In a not especially unusual passage, while discussing the translation of the relics of the Saints Marcellinus and Peter, Einhard notes that it is "a trip lasting five days from the city of Argentoratus, which is now called StrasThe bourg. ... down the Rhine ... to Portus ... and Michelstadt.... latter lies in the German forest known today as Odewald and is located about six leagues from the Main River."85 This type of "macro-geographical" information was complemented by vast bodies of very detailed local topographical data which were available in written form. It was customary for the Carolingian government, both at the central and at the local levels, as well as for lay and ecclesiastical magnates who controlled major public or private landed assets, to have these resources inventoried. Estates were described not only in terms of the type of lands available, e.g., arable, meadow, and forest, but also in terms of the numbers of inhabitants, animals, tools, and other assets, as well as the rents they owed to the proprietor and the taxes owed to the government.86 The government used these documents for tax purposes of various types.8 Following Roman imperial tradition, exceptionally detailed topographical descriptions were made of landed resources.88 Thus, when one or another piece of property was given by a distinguished donor, e.g., the king or a great noble, to a monastery, these
84. See, for example, De mensura orbis terrae (numerous editions listed by Tierney, "Introduction,"22, n. 1) and copied by Dicuil, as noted above. De mensura, as discussed earlier, may have served as an expanded written text for the Theodosian map at Charlemagne'scourt. 85. Einhard, Translatio et miracula Marcellini et Petri, bk. I, ch. 8. ed. Georg Weitz, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores (Hannover: Hahn, 1888),

XV.1.

86. For an introduction to these texts, see Robert Fossier, Polyptyques et Censiers (Turhout: Br6pols, 1978); and for some very perceptive criticism, see Walter Goffart, "MerovingianPolyptychs: reflections on two recent publications," Rome's Fall and After (London: Hambledon, 1989), 233-53. 87. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, 56-57. 88. With regard to Roman tradition, see E. M. Wightman, "Peasants and Potentates: An Investigation of Social Structure and Land Tenure in Roman Gaul,"American Journal of Ancient History 3 (1978): 97-128.
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descriptiones were included, when thought necessary, in the document in which the transaction was recorded. At least two copies of each of these documents generally were written up. One was kept in the archives of the donor, e.g., the royal archives or the archives of the noble donor, and the second copy was kept in the archives of the beneficiary.89 Thus, when it was necessary to plan a military operation, the men at the court who were responsible for such efforts were in a position to obtain copies of relevant geographical descriptions from already existing documents of various types. This material could be accessed directly from the royal archives at the court if the relevant text were available there, or perhaps with a somewhat greater effort copies could be obtained from those who possessed lands in the area under study. It should not be assumed, however, that military commanders in the field carried with them geographical excerpts from these documents, although the possibility that one or another commander did so cannot be ruled out a priori. An interesting example of such a detailed local geographical description was incorporated by one of Charlemagne's court scribes in a document issued on 14 September 774 which recorded the king's gift to Fulrad, Abbot of St. Denis. The document provides a "verbal map" of a stretch of woodland that was part of the great forest that belonged to the royal treasury (fiscus) at Kinzheim.90 The part quoted below is intended merely to provide a sense of the immense body of topographical detail that was available at Charlemagne's court or to his court functionaries. The boundaries of the above mentioned gift are described from a starting place "at the Laima river in the area that is called Bobolinocella." The boundary goes from there "to where the Aetsinisbach flows into the Laima and then along the course of the Aetsinisbach to where it rises. [The land of the gift] includes Nannenstol and the mountain in its environs." Down from this hill flow five streams, each of which is crossed in the process of drawing up this description. These are, in the order mentioned, "the Rumbach and then Thidinisbach, then the other Rumbach, and the Bureberch. Finally, the area [of the boundary goes to] where the third Rumbach flows into the Aschinisragnus." The latter is followed upstream
89. With regard to the archives of a noble, see, for example, Patrick Geary, The Aristocracy in Provence: The Rh6ne Basin at the Dawn of the Carolingian Age (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 12-20. In general with regard to the Carolingian government, a useful introduction is provided by Robert-Henri Bautier, "La chancellerie et les actes royaux dans les royaumes carolingiens," Bibliotheque de 'Ecole des chartes 142 (1984): 5-80. 90. Dip. Karol., vol. 1, no. 84 (Die Urkunden der Karolinger, eds. Engelbert Muihlbacher, et. al., in Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Diplomata [Hannover: Hahn, 1906]).

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through the forest to its headwaters at the boundary [of the gift]. [At this point the boundary of the gift once again] follows the course of the Laima river into the valley [with the gifted lands] on both banks through the woodlands at Garmaringa and Otolinga up to Deophanpol. Then the boundary follows a line across the Laima river from the bank [opposite Deophanpol] up to where the Audenbach flows into the Laima and then goes to where this same little stream flows up to its sources at Stophanoberct through the entire mountain valley up to Stagnbach, then through Riuad into the woods [once again] at Odeldinga and Garmaringa and on through to the border [of the gift] at Deophanpol.91 None of Charlemagne's maps have survived. Consequently, it is difficult to ascertain whether the Carolingians had the cartographical skill to translate the topographical data discussed above into maps of a type upon which soldiers of the nineteenth or early twentieth century found it necessary to rely. However, the importance given by Carolingian educators to the Agrimensores, noted above, might suggest that a wide variwere ety of skills were taught so that properly trained specialists available to illustrate what may be considered the "verbal" maps under discussion.92 In a more illustrative vein, it should be noted that the "Plan of St. Gall," which was executed only two or three years after Charlemagne's death, has led scholars to conclude that the Carolingians had a strong interest in graphic precision, a penchant for careful attention to detail, and an acceptable appreciation of scale.93 The jury is still out on the quality of Carolingian cartography, as contrasted, for example, to the mastery of high quality techniques for the purpose of executing complicated architectual plans. However, it is very important to make clear concerning whatever ultimately may be concluded in this regard, that no intellectual imperative required Charlemagne's military planners or soldiers to rely on the type of visual maps that soldiers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are seen to have needed. Clearly, the detailed description of the gift from the Kinzheimfiscus, quoted above, was regarded as sufficient for the potential adjudication of property disputes and thus permits the assumption 91. Ibid., no. 84. 92. It is likely that important projects such as Charlemagne'sprecocious effort to build a Main-Rhine-Danubecanal benefited from the type of knowledge conveyed in the manuals of the Agrimensores. Cf. Hans Hubert Hoffmann, "Fossa Carolina Versuch einer Zussammenschau," in Karl der Grosse: Lebenswerk und Nachleben, 1: 437-53, who does not deal with matters of surveying and mapping. 93. \W.Horn and E. Born, The Plan of St. Gall, 3 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); and P. D. A. Harvey, The History of Topographical Maps (London: Thames and Hudson, 1980), 131-32; and note the observations by Dilke, Greek and Roman Maps, 176, who calls attention to the "exact draughtsmanship"of the "Plan of St. Gall."
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that it was capable of being followed for more pedestrian purposes. Indeed, we must remain open to the possibility that Charlemagne's planners were, at least, as well served by verbal maps as they were served by Roman numbers. Or to put it another way, neither ancient nor early medieval calculation relied either on arabic numbers or, more particularly, on the zero to do the rather sophisticated arithmetical calculations needed for logistic planning, which are discussed below.

Logistic Resources It seems clear that Charlemagne's military planners had the resources available to produce geographically sound plans, both for extended operations over long distances and specific deployments in rather circumscribed areas. In addition, the Carolingians engaged in the gathering of intelligence on a grand scale to inform these plans. Nevertheless, modernists undoubtedly will wonder if the Carolingians had organized an infrastructure capable of providing the logistic support needed to sustain these efforts. Adalhard, in the above mentioned De ordine palatii, pays considerable attention to logistic matters. He makes it very clear that detailed planning was absolutely necessary in order to sustain the very large numbers of people who were associated with the court, both while it was on the move and when it was in winter quarters. These logistic demands included the care and feeding of the household troops, i.e., the rank and file of the military household.94 In this context, it is to be emphasized that the military units which composed the royal obsequium were a very important element both at the court and in the early Carolingian army itself.95 With regard to logistics, of course, the numeracy of the planners may perhaps be made an issue by those who would imagine the Carolingian world as the haven for ignorant "Dark Age" warriors unable to add or subtract, much less divide and multiply.96 It is perhaps of some importance that, at present, it cannot be ascertained whether Varro's Libri Logistorici survived into the Carolingian period. This handbook provided methods and tables for the calculation of logistic needs, among other things, for late Roman and perhaps even for early medieval com94. Adalhard,De ordine palatii, chs. 23-25, 27, (passim).

Medieval in 95. Bernard Bachrach, S. Europe," Warand Societyin the "Early


Ancient and Medieval Worlds:Asia, The Mediterranean, Europe, and Mesoamerica,

Mass.:Harvard and NathanRosenstein(Cambridge, ed. KurtRaaflaub University Press,1999), 271-307. and see 96. Fora discussionof primitivism a repriseof the "Dark Model," Age S. Warfare: the discussionby Bernard Bachrach, a-proposa new "Magyar-Ottonian Francia 27 (2000 [appeared minimalist 20011):211-30. interpretation,"
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manders.97 Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that the amassing and organizing of large quantities of food in order to supply both the court and the army likely required no more than the basic arithmetic that rustics
commanded in order to count the hundreds, if not thousands, of eggs,

chickens, pigs, and modii of grain that they regularly raised and/or collected. Indeed, the arithmetic needed by shepherds to count their vast flocks of sheep, keep records of the new lambs, and identify which animals were to be slaughtered, probably was not dwarfed by the needs of
the army.98 Arithmetical skills of an elementary nature were, of course, well developed throughout society and were based on the very widespread use of the so-called "finger calculus," also called the "Calculus of Victorius." This ancient technique is based upon a system of calculation that uses the finger joints in a manner that appears similar to the way in which the counters of an abacus serve to identify various quantities. Knowledge of the finger calculus was widely defused throughout early medieval society and, in one or another variation, is even used today in some parts of \Vestern Europe. The finger calculus provided the opportunity for the execution of a broad spectrum of arithmetical functions that were required to add, subtract, multiply, and divide well into the tens of thousands, without worrying about the putative difficulties that many modern observers would seem to believe were inherent in the use of Roman numerals. Indeed Roman numerals, like the alphabetic system used by the Greeks, were markers for results arrived at by "mechanical" means.99 97. Bernard S. Bachrach, "The Education of the 'Officer Corps' in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries," in La noblesse romaine et les chefs barbares du IlIe au VIIIsiecle, in quarto, ed. Fran9oise Vallet and Michel Kazanski (Paris: Association francaise d'arch6ologie merovingienne, 1995), 7-13. Sidonius Apollinarus had a copy of this text during the latter part of the fifth century. He had a second copy made from his exemplar and sent it to his friend Namantius, who commanded a fleet with amphibious capabilities that operated on the Atlantic coast with its headquarters at Bordeaux. See Sidonius Apollinarus, Epist. VIII, vi, 13-18 (Gai Solii Apollinaris Sidonii Epistulae et carmina, ed. Christian Liitjohannin Monumenta Germaniae IIistorica, Auctores antiquissimi (Berlin: Veidmann, 1887). When these very valuable libri actually ceased to be used has yet to be ascertained. 98. See, for example, Das Polyptychon von Saint-Germain-des-Pres, ed. Konrad Elmshauser, Andreas Hedwig, and Dieter Hagermann (Cologne: Bohlau, 1993), passim, for extensive examples of rustics providing various types of quantitative information for administrative purposes. 99. See the discussion by E. Alfoldi-Rosenbaum,"The Finger Calculus in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages: Studies on Roman Game Counters I," Fruhmittelalterliche Studien 5 (1971): 1-9; and the additional remarks by Dhouda, Manuel pour monsfils, ed. and trans. Pierre Rich6 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1975), 294-95, nn. 5, 6. This is a topic in need of considerable study. In 1973-74, I had the opportunity to see a version of a finger calculus being used in the market at Poitiers in France, and the following year Professor Wesley Stevens of the University of Winnipeg made similar observations.
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At a higher level of intellectual attainment, it was certainly fortunate but hardly accidental that arithmetical skills of a rather more complicated nature were taught to the young men who attended school at the Carolingian court and other lesser centers of education. For example, the often discussed Propositionsfor Sharpening Youth, associated with Alcuin but surely going back, at least, to Bede and probably earlier, illustrate a level of numeracy and a capacity to handle interesting number problems that few contemporary high school or even college students in the United States could be expected to solve. Given the obvious difficulty of at least some of the problems identified in the Propositions, it is certainly to be doubted that all of Charlemagne's military planners were equally capable in mathematical skills, but it would be presumptuous to assert, in the face of this surviving text tradition, that none of them were.100 Nevertheless, this level of mathematical skill was fundamentally consistent with various related scientific accomplishments attributed by modern scholars to the Carolingians.'10 It may be added in this context that the Carolingians were well supplied with manuscripts of classical texts for the study of geometry. These, along with the Agrimensores, were useful for drawing up plans for the siting of fortifications, making maps, and marking roads. Indeed, toward the mid-eighth century the court was provided not only with geometrical texts in Latin but also with texts in Greek.102These Latin and Greek works, it is generally agreed, not only were used for teaching mathematics but also had an obvious practical application for cartography.103 By the early ninth century at the
100. Alcuin, Propositiones ad acuendos juvenes in Patrologia cursus completus, series Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne, vol. 101 (Paris: Apud Migne, 1851), chs. 4, 9, 13, 19, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 52, 53, provide situations that would have value for developing logistic models and other military related matters. Cf. Alexander Murray, Reason and Society in the Middle Ages (corrected ed., Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), 153, 155, 164, who indicates most of the relevant facts regarding this text, but whose interpretation, at least in so far as we might understand the capabilities of the Carolingians to make practical use of arithmetic for military purposes and particularly with regard to logistics, is far wide of the mark. 101. For a sound appreciation of "scientific" accomplishment in the early Middle Ages, see Wesley M. Stevens, "Cycles of Time: Calendrical and Astronomical Reckonings in Early Science," Time and Process: Interdisciplinary Issues, The Study of Time VII, ed. J. T. Fraser and Lewis Rowell (Madison, Conn.: International Universities Press, 1993), 51. 102. Rosamond McKitterick, "Royal Patronage of Culture in the Frankish Kingdoms under the Carolingians: Motives and Consequences," in Settimane di Studio de Centrol Italiano di Studi sull'alto medioevo, 39 (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi Sull'alto Medioevo, 1992), 93-129, and reprinted with the same pagination in Rosamond McKitterick, The Frankish Kings and Culture in the Early Middle Ages (London: Variorum, 1995), 99. 103. Cf. the extreme minimalist postion of Murray, Reason and Society, 141-57, who tries to explain away the materials that have survived and were copied while fail-

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latest, it was found useful to translate a collection of geometry texts into


German for teaching purposes in Francia
Orientalis.'04

It is clear that

universal numeracy was as unnecessary for Carolingian logistical planning as it was to be for William the Conqueror to have Domesday Book made almost three centuries later. Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that Charlemagne did undertake an effort to extend the teaching and learning of computing throughout his regnum."'' It may be noted parenthetically that many of the practice problems found in Propositions evidence a specific application to military matters. This is especially the case for so-called "packing problems," where techniques were adumbrated for the calculation of the number of houses or soldiers' barracks that could be built within the walls of a fortification.106 It is of some importance, perhaps, that the barracks of the Trelleborg fortresses were "packed" in consonance with the teaching in Propositions and, indeed, they were measured out according to the Roman
foot.'07 It might be suggested

that the "Plan of St. Gall," discussed

above,

was designed by men who had the learning found in Propositions available to them. However, this line of enquiry is well beyond the scope of the present study.
ing to engage the Agrimensores. Regarding the importance of the Agrimensores in this context, see Lon R. Shelby, "Geometry," in The Seven Liberal Arts in the Middle Ages, ed. David L. Wagner (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 200-203. 104. See, for example, Richard H. Rouse and R. M. Thomson, "Censorius," in Texts and Transmission, ed. L. D. Reynolds (corrected reprint, Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 49. 105. P. M. McGurk, "Carolingian Astrological Manuscripts," in Charles the Bald, Court and Kingdom, ed. M. T. Gibson and Janet Nelson, 2nd rev. ed. (Oxford: British Archaeological Reports, 1990), 317-32. Cf. Murray, Reason and Society, 181, 195, who does not seem to realize that there was a vast Carolingian effort at governmental "censuses," which in their component parts were commensurate with Domesday Book. Cf. the information compliled in Fossier, Polyptyques et Censiers. Murray's observation, Reason and Society, 180-81, that "the Norman commissioner who in witnessed ... what was probably the first bloom of 1086 put down '2 1/2 villeins'... a statistical sense in medieval Europe," is far off the mark. The Carolingian polyptychs are filled with fractions and statistics; see, for example, Das Polyptychon von ed. Elmshauser et al., passim; and the old but not yet outSaint-Germain-des-Pres, dated study by James Westfall Thompson, "The Statistical Sources of Frankish History," American Historical Review 40 (1935): 625-45. Concerning William's planning, see two articles by Bernard S. Bachrach, "On the Origins of William the Conqueror's Horse Transports," Technology and Culture 26 (1985): 505-31; and "Some Observations on the Military Administration of the Norman Conquest," in Anglo-Norman Studies 8 (1986): 1-25. 106. Alcuin, Propositiones ad acuendos juvenes, chs. 27, 28, 29. I want to thank my graduate student Peter Burkholder, who has worked on this text and called to my attention the order of difficulty in calculating answers to these problems. The modern approach to these problems is to use calculus. 107. See concerning Trelleborg, Peter H. Sawyer, The Age of the Vikings (London: E. Arnold, 1962), 129-35.
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Infrastructure Once it is recognized that Charlemagne's chief functionaries and their underlings had the numerical skills to count up the quantities of supplies that were needed for any particular military campaign, it next may be queried whether the government provided an infrastructure to accomplish such an effort. Thus, it is of great importance to emphasize, in this context, that the church, which controlled at least half if not, indeed, as much as two-thirds of the arable land in Gaul, was heavily taxed to support military operations. For example, the monastery of St. Germain-des-Pr6s in Paris provided in excess of 50 percent of its in-kind and monetary income on an annual basis in response to government taxes to support Carolingian military operations.108 Frequently, abbots complained regarding the heavy tax burden that was imposed on their monasteries for the support of the army's campaigns.109By the latter part of the ninth century, Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims, the leading prelate in the regnum Francorum, readily admitted that 40 percent of the church's resources were legitimately at the disposition of the government for use by the army. He did this in a rather obvious attempt to reduce the burdens that were, in fact, imposed by the royal government but which exceeded 40 percent.110

Magazines Prepositioned supplies, which could be made available easily and in a timely manner to the troops, are regarded by modern military analysts as very important to the success of large campaign forces on the march and in the field. In this context, the establishment of what we call "mag108. Jean Durliat, "Lapolyptyque d'Irminonpour l'Armee,"Bibliotheque de 'ecole des Chartes 141 (1983): 183-208. 109. See, for example, complaints by abbots such as Benedict of Aniane as recorded by Ardo, VitaBenedicti, ch. 39, ed. W. Wattenbach,Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores (Hannover:Hahn, 1888), 15.1.; and Servatus Lupus,Epist., nos. 16, 24, 45 (Loup de Ferrieres, Correspondance, ed. and trans. Leon Levillain, 2 vols. [Paris: H. Champion, 1927, 1935]), concerning the great economic burden imposed by the government requirements that the abbots have their forces participate in expeditionary military operations. It is likely that such whining, like most complaints concerning taxes throughout the history of Western civilization, was a topos of sorts. However,the weight of these great burdens surely was not the pure imagination of the abbots who complained. 110. Hincmar of Rheims, Collectio de ecclesiis et capellis, ed. Martina Stratmann, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Fontes iuris Germanici antiqui (Hannover: Hahn, 1990), 119-20; cf. Janet Nelson, "The Church's Military Service in the Ninth Century:A ContemporaryView?"Studies in Church History 20 (1983): 15-30, and reprinted in Janet Nelson, Politics and Ritual in Early Medieval Europe (London: Hambledon, 1986), 117-32. 342 *
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azines" are an important part of military planning."' Charlemagne would appear to have been not unaware of this aspect of preparing his operations. Thus, as part of his strategy of conquest in the east, Charlemagne built strongholds in various parts of the conquered Saxon territory as he gradually subdued the region. He also incorporated already existing enemy fortifications, which he captured, into a system for maintaining control of the region. Many of these strongholds, moreover, were cited along various rivers, e.g., Eresburg on the Diemal, Biraburg on the Eder, Esesfelth on the Stor, and various castella on the Elbe and Saale.12 Because of the riverine connection, large quantities of grain and other supplies could be transported with comparative ease by ship to these fortifications and stored there until needed by Charlemagne's armies operating in various parts of Saxony. In cases where the rivers initially were not very deep or when the larger rivers were low during certain seasons of the year, boats rather than ships could be used. In addition to postitioning fortifications so that they could be used as supply bases for future operations, the Carolingians also exploited monastic resources. For example, monasteries were given lands by the royal government so that they could establish new foundations in propitiously located environments along important routes for purposes of supporting military operations. In effect, the church provided depots for army support services along routes that were to be taken by the army.113 An illuminating example of the way in which the Carolingian military deployed ecclesiastical resources can be adumbrated in regard to Charlemagne's military planning during the winter of 772-73. At this time, he was preparing for a campaign in Saxony but ultimately was

111. Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logisticsfrom Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 17-26, recognizes the importance of magazines and observes that "Magazines, of course, had never been entirely unknown" (p. 17). 112. See Bernard S. Bachrach, "Charlemagne's Cavalry: Myth and Reality," Military Affairs 47 (1983): 181-87, in 40., and reprinted in Armies and Politics in the Early Medieval West (London: Variorum, 1993), 7-8. 113. This argument is developed in considerable detail by Wilhelm Stormer, "Zur Frage der Functkion des kirchlichen Fernbesitzes im Gebiet der Ostalpen vom 8. bis zum 10 Jahrhundert," in Die Transalpinen Verbindungen der Bayer, Alemannen und Franken bis zum 10 Jahrhundert, ed. H. Beumann (Sigmaringen: J. Thorbecke, 1987), 379-403; and deployed effectively by Charles Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, and Magyars: The Strugglefor the Middle Danube, 788-907 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995). See more recently, Reinhold Kaiser, Churritien im Friihen Mittelalter (Basel: Schwabe, 1998), regarding a number of agreements made with magnates in the region to facilitate Carolingian operations. I owe this reference to Professor Bowlus.
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forced by the deteriorating relationship between the papacy and the Lombard king to invade Italy in 773.114 Charlemagne did not want to undertake an invasion of Italy at this time and dispatched numerous embassies throughout the winter and spring of 773 in order to avoid the need to carry out military operations in the south. Nevertheless, Charlemagne was not about to be caught unprepared if an invasion of Italy were to prove unavoidable. No later than early March 773, he summoned Abbot Frodoenus of Novalesa to the royal court, which then was meeting at Quierzy north of Paris.115The monastery of Novalesa controlled some 34,500 square kilometers of land in the contemporary French departments of Alpes-de-haute Provence, Alpes-Maritimes, Bouches-du-Rhone, Drome, Hautes-Alpes, Isere, Savoie, Var, and Vaucluse. Also included in the lands belonging to the monastery of Novelesa was much of the contemporary Italian province of Piemonte.116 The resources from these lands were of obvious logistic importance for any Carolingian army mobilized in the north and march17 ing to Italy.

While Frodoenus was at Quierzy, Charlemagne granted to the monastery of Novalesa substantial immunities from the jurisdiction of the local counts and their officials in these above mentioned regions, which were within the regnum Francorum and subject to its govern114. This is a very complicated matter with which I intend to deal in the future. For the general picture, see Jan T. Hallenbach, Pavia and Rome: The Lombard Monarchy in the Eighth Century (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1982). 115. Dip. Karol., no. 74, makes it clear that Frodoenus was at Quierzy with Charlemagneno later than 25 March 773, and by that date sufficient time had passed for detailed negotiations to have been concluded between the abbot and functionaries at the Carolingiancourt that resulted in a substantial grant to Novalesa. In light of the distances involved and the difficulties of travel during the winter, Charlemagne could not have sent his messengers to Novalesa for the purpose of summoning Abbot Fordoenus to the royal court later than the beginning of March 773, and it is likely that they were dispatched to Italy somewhat earlier. 116. The basic work on the holdings of Novalesa during the early Carolingian period remains Geary,Aristocracy in Provence; see p. 1, regardingthe order of magnitude of Novalesa's resources. This volume also includes Geary's edition and translation of the Testamentum of Abbo, whose lands formed the basis for Novalesa's holdings in the early Carolingianera. 117. With regard to the relevant road systems, see E. Oehlmann, "Die AlpenJahrbuchfiir Schweizersche Geschichte 3 (1878): 197-205; W. pisse im Mittelalter," A. B. Coolidge, "Charles the Great's Passage of the Alps in 773," English Historical Review 21 (1906): 493-505; WalterWoodburnHyde, Roman Alpine Routes (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1935), 55-56, regardingthe Carolingians;and of particular importance with regard to the lands controlled by the monastery of Novalesa, see Edouard Baratier,Atlas historique: Provence; Comtat Venaissin, principaute d'Orange, comte de Nice, principaute de Monaco (Paris:A. Colin, 1969). 344 *
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ment.s18Among other rights and obligations, Abbot Frodoenus, acting as a substitute for the government's officials, was given the full administrative responsibility for securing the required logistic support from the vast array of lands owned or held by Novelesa, should Charlemagne find it necessary to lead or send an army to invade Italy.19 Charlemagne chose to deal directly with the abbot, who was in a position to coordinate the levies in men and materiel owed from the estates of Novalesa. Without such a grant of immunity, the local counts in each of the administrative regions in which Novelesa had resources would have retained the responsibility for the levying of troops and supplies from the monastery's lands.'12 In this case, the use of the administrative cadres of Abbot Frodoenus would seem to have been regarded by Charlemagne and his advisers as a considerably more efficient option than reliance on the efforts of local comital officials in a dozen or so separate jurisdictions.121 The summons of Abbot Frodoenus to the royal court, along with the above mentioned administrative arrangements, provide detailed insight into the time frame of Carolingian military planning, even in emergency situations. By the beginning of March 773, i.e., at least two months before a final decision in regard to whether to campaign against the Saxons or in Italy was to be made, Charlemagne was already working to assure the availability of satisfactory logistic support some 700 kilometers along his route of march to the south, should he have to abandon his plan to campaign in the northeast and undertake an invasion of the Lombard kingdom. Among the vast properties owned by the monastery of Novalesa, many scores of estates were situated in regions that the Carolingian armies would traverse.122

118. Dip. Karol., no. 74. 119. In general, Maurice Kroell, L'immunitefranque (Paris: A. Rousseau, 1910); and for the particular perspective emphasized here, see Alexander Callander Murray, "Immunity, Nobility, and the Edict of Paris," Speculum 69 (1994): 18-39. Barbara H. Rosenwein, Negotiating Space, Power, Restraint, and Privileges of Immunity in Early Medieval Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), fails to appreciate the military dimension of immunities when seen in context, and does not treat this particular immunity. 120. Concerning Carolingian military organization, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Wafare, 51-83. 121. For additional source references and scholarly discussion, see Werner, "Missus-Marchio-Comes," 151. 122. Testamentum Abbonis, ed. Geary, passim, regarding the xvast holdings of Novalesa which could provide the resources to support Carolingian military operations for an Italian campaign. See also Geary's map, p. 13.
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Intellectual Background Carolingian military planning had many aspects, and in this context, Charlemagne's well-documented interest in historiae and res gestae antiquorum is of considerable importance.123Charlemagne undoubtedly subscribed to the traditional value that those who would pursue statecraft and particularly those who sought military success were required to study the histories.124 Thus, it is of more than passing interest that
123. Einhard, V Karoli, ch. 24. N.b. as Halphen makes clear in his edition, p. 72, n. 1, this recognition of the importance of the study of history is not found in Suetonius's biography of Augustus. Charlemagne's intellectual interests are discussed in Bachrach, "Charlemagne's Military Responsibilities," 232-39, with a detailed review of the scholarly literature. Whether Charlemagne fully understood the Latin read to him from books that had been written by ancient historians such as Florus and Valleius Patericulus, or from handbooks such as those of Frontinus or Vegetius, is not controversial. I tend to follow the arguments of Roger Wright, Late Latin and Early Romance in Spain and Carolingian France (Liverpool: Francis Cairns, 1982), regarding the ability of people during the Carolingian era and even beyond to understand Latin when it was read aloud. See the discussion by Rosamond McKitterick, The Carolingians and the Written Word, especially 10-14. Note also Michel Banniard, "Language and Communication in Carolingian Europe," in The New Cambridge Medieval History, 2: c. 700-c. 900, ed. Rosamond McKitterick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 695-708. In addition, Charlemagne's entourage included more than enough well-educated men to explain obscure points of latinity if necessary. See, for example, Dip. Karol., no. 112, where the grammarian Paul not only was in Charlemagne's entourage during the return march from the Friuli campaign, but also was given a considerable gift by his king at this time. Charles refers to him as "a very venerable man named Paulinus who is a master [magister] of the grammatical art." Perhaps more important, with regard to Charlemagne's ability to understand or to have Latin texts explained to him, are his comments concerning the Libri Carolini. See regarding these texts the useful summary remarks by T. F. X. Noble, "From Brigandage to Justice: Charlemagne, 785-794," in Literacy, Politics, and Artistic Innovation in the Early Medieval West. Papers Delivered at "A Symposium on Early Medieval Culture" Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA, ed. Celia M. Chazelle (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1992), 49-75; and Visio Domni Karoli Regis Francorum, 74-76, ed. Patrick Geary, "Germanic Tradition and Royal ideology in the Ninth Century: The Visio Karoli Magni," Friihmittelalterliche Studien 21 (1987): 274-94, and reprinted in Patrick Geary, Living with the Dead in the Middle Ages (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), 50-76, where Charlemagne's ability to read and write is taken for granted. For a different perspective, see Michael Richter, "Die Sprachenpolitik Karls 7 (1982): 412-37, and reprinted in Michael des Grossen," Sprachwissenschaft Richter, Studies in Medieval Language and Culture (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1995), 86-108. 124. For the background, see J. Brian Campbell, "Teach Yourself How to Be a General," Journal of Roman Studies 77 (1987), 13-29; and J. Brian Campbell, The Emperor and the Roman Army, 31 BC-AD 235 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 325-32, which provides a useful introduction to these matters for the period indicated in the title. With regard to the early Middle Ages, see Bachrach, "The Education of the 'offi346 *
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when Charlemagne ordered the planning to be undertaken for his first Saxon campaign, three abbots (Haribertus of Murbach,125Gundelandus of Lorsch,126and Sturm of Fulda,l27)were summoned to the royal court. In the present context, it is noteworthy that the abbots of Murbach were rarely invited to visit the Carolingian court. Indeed, there is evidence for only one visit prior to January 772.128Similarly, abbots of Lorsch were not habitues of the Carolingian court prior to the audience that Gundelandus received in the winter of 772. In fact, there are no references to earlier visits. Haribertus, Gundelandus, and Sturm shared one thing in common in the context of Charlemagne's planning for an invasion of Saxony. Each abbot possessed in his monastic library a copy of one of the three Latin narrative sources that provided a detailed account of Roman operations in the region between the Rhine and the Elbe rivers, which had been lost by the empire, in large part as a result of Varus's defeat at the hands of Arminius in the infamous Teutoburger Schlacht of 9 A.D.129Valleius Paterculus's Historia was known to the Carolingians and, indeed, at least one additional copy appears to have been made at the Abbey of Murbach

cer corps' in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries," 7-13; and Bernard S. Bachrach, "Gregory of Tours as a Military Historian," in The World of Gregory of Tours, ed. Kathleen Mitchell and Ian Wood (Leiden: Brill, 2001), forthcoming. For the Middle Ages, the locus classicus regarding the importance of the study of history remained Isidore, Origines, I, xliii, in Isidori Hispalensis episcopi Etymologiarum sive Originum libri xx, ed. W. M. Lindsey, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1911). See Jacques Fontaine, Isidore de Seville et la culture classique dans l'Espagne wisigothique (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1959), 180-85, regarding Isidore's view of history and some observations about its impact. 125. Dip. Karol., vol. 1, no. 64. 126. Ibid., no. 65. 127. Ibid., no. 63. 128. For this invitation to an abbot of Murbach to the Carolingian court on a prior occasion, see ibid., no. 17. 129. With regard to the location of the battle, see Wolfgang Schliiter, Georgia Francius, and Frank Berger, Kalkriese-Site of the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest? (Regensburg: Stadtsmuseum, 1994). Concerning the importance of this battle in historiographical perspective, see Henning Buck, Arminius. Geschichte-Mythos-Literature. Katalog einer Ausstellung der Justus Moser-Gesellschaft Osnabriick und der Universitatsbibliothek Osnabriick vom 06.09.12.1990-09.02.1991 (Osnabriick: Universitit Osnabriick, 1990); and with greater detail and a broader scope, Richard Kuehnemund, Arminius, or The rise of a national symbol in literature from Hutten to Grabbe (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, 1953). For an interesting review of the German scholarly literature, as contrasted to vulgarisation, but which also advances the "nationalist" hypothesis, see, for example, William A. Oldfather and Howard V. Canter, The Defeat of Varus and the German Frontier Policy of Augustus (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1915), 9-20.
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during the later eighth century.'30 Florus's Historia was also well known to the Carolingians. The monastery of Lorsch possessed a copy, and several additional copies would seem to have been made in its scriptorium during the later eighth and early ninth centuries.131 Finally, a manuscript of Tacitus'sAnnales, books 1-6, which is relevant in the current context, is known to have been at Fulda. At least one additional copy was made of this text at the monastery toward the middle of the ninth century at the latest.132 It may be noted here that these histories remain our best Latin sources regarding Roman military operations in Germany during the early empire.'33 It is hypothesized here that Charlemagne, likely acting at the request of one or more of his "special counsellors," chose to have the abbots of Murbach, Lorsch, and Fulda attend his court during this period when the invasion of Saxony was being planned. This was done, I would argue, so that Haribertus, Gundelandus, and Sturm could bring with them to the court copies of the above mentioned texts for study by the king's military planners. One cannot go so far as to suggest that Charlemagne's well-documented interest in the compiling of technical handbooks, discussed above in regard to the geographical material, led to the making of a Liber Manualis containing texts dealing with Roman military operations east of the Rhine. However, such a possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand.'34 Without all of the information gathered together and presented above, it would seem to be a rather circular argument to suggest that Charlemagne must have had a "general staff" of some kind in order to undertake Carolingian military planning because his armies were overwhelming successful over the course of almost half a century. However, in the context of Charlemagne's record of consistent military success, the Carolingians were especially adroit at one particular type of strategic operation which they used with great frequency, i.e., the long-distance pincer movement. It was normal operating procedure for Charlemagne to send several large forces into the field from different directions, with
130. See the discussion by L. D. Reynolds, "Velleius Paterculus,"in Texts and Transmission, 431-33; and Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries, 148. 131. See the discussion by P. K. Marshall,"Florus,"in Texts and Transmission, 164-66. 132. See regardingthis manuscript, R. J. Tarrant,"Tacitus,"in Texts and Transmission, 406-9; Bischoff,Manuscripts and Libraries, 150, 153. 133. See, for example, Dieter Timpe,Arminius-Studien (Heidelberg:C. Winter, 1970). 134. Much work needs to be done on Carolingianfloralegia. Not only is there no published corpus of the surviving texts, and no effort has been made to identify those texts which no longer survive but about which we do have some information. The importance of the lost texts, i.e., perdita, is that we have an opportunity to ascertain what once had existed.
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orders to converge on an enemy position located many hundreds of kilometers from the respective home bases of these army groups. The armies ordered to undertake such operations were highly successful at getting to the right place at the right time.135 Charlemagne's armies engaged in long-distance pincer operations were materially aided by the ability to calculate and recalculate their locations when needed. During daylight hours, the Carolingians had the technology available to identify their latitude so as to recheck their positions in concert with the information that was available in their "itinerary" type of road maps.136In addition, the Carolingians had implements for ascertaining the time during the night. This technology obviously facilitated all kinds of operations with regard to more or less precisely timed attacks or maneuvers during hours of darkness.137 Parenthetically, it may be noted in regard to marches of truly exceptional length that the Carolingian calendar was superior to that which had been used by the Romans; thus, Charlemagne's armies could keep track of time with great accuracy in the course of executing long-term convergence or pincer movements.138 One or another Carolingian pincer movement carried out over great distances may well have succeeded on occasion simply because of dumb luck. However, consistent success with these complicated long-distance operations required much more than the occasional smile offortuna. The acquisition of vast amounts of intelligence data, the careful examination of these data, the drawing up of plans based upon sound geographical and topograpical information, and an effective logistic infrastructure are all necessary for the continued success of sophisticated and successful troop deployments in enemy territory by large armies for purposes of territorial conquest over the long course. To think
135. The major contribution to the study of Carolingian warfare by J-F. Veret bruggen, "L'Arm6e la Strategie de Charlemagne,"in Karl der Grosse: Lebenswerk und Nachleben, 1: 420-34, is his development of the evidence that Charlemagne relied very heavily on and was exceptionally successful in using pincer movements with several large armies at the same time. 136. Wesley Stevens, Bede's Scientific Achievement: Jarrow Lecture, 1985 (Newcastle: Bealls, 1985), 19-20; Wesley Stevens, "Sidereal Time in Anglo-Saxon England,"in Voyageto the Other World:The Legacy of Sutton Hoo, ed. C. B. Kendall and P. S. Wells (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 125-52; and Stevens, "Cycles of Time," 28. 137. See Bruce S. Eastwood, "The Astronomy of Macrobius in Carolingian Europe:Dungal'sletter of 811 to Charles the Great,"Early Medieval Europe 3 (1994): 117-34. Regardingthe general ability to tell time at night, see S. McClusky,"Gregory of Tours,Monastic Timekeeping, and Early Christian Attitudes to Astronomy,"Isis 81 (1990): 8-22, with the literature cited there. Concerning Pacificus of Verona, who probably died in 844 but perhaps as late as 846, see S. Livesay and R. Rouse, "Nimrod the Astronomer,"Traditio 37 (1981): 219-20. 138. Stevens, "Cycles of Time," 51.
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otherwise is to deny the very essence of what we have learned from the study of military history over the centuries.

The Magistratus The discussion thus far leads us to wonder whether a particular general term, as contrasted to special terminology in reference to specific personnel, such as senior consiliarius and/or praecipuus consiliarius, was used regarding Charlemagne's military planning group. Or does the Carolingian military planning group, discussed above, represent yet one more case of a peculiar circumstance, very familiar to historians of the
premodern era, i.e., "la chose avant le mot."139 In this context, however,

it is interesting that the anonymous author of the Annales mettenses priores, writing for the Carolingian court nobility ca. 805, makes a point of calling attention to a military planning group that worked under Charlemagne's great-grandfather, the Mayor of the Palace Pippin II. According to this account, Pippin called together this group, which the author of the Annales calls the Magistratus, to draw up a plan for the invasion of Neustria in 687.140 The term for this plan is consilium, i.e., the traditional Roman imperial terminology used for a developed military plan, and obviously consistent with early Carolingian interest in imitatio imperii.l14 After receiving the plan from the Magistratus, Pip139. See the perceptive observation regarding this phenomenon by Wheeler, "The Mirageof Roman Strategy,"22-23. 140. Annales mettenses priores, ed. B. von Simson, in Monumenta Germaniae
Historica: Scriptores 8). The basic modem Untersuchungen zur and Irene Haselbach, in Usum Scholarum (Hannover: Hahn, 1905) an. [sic] 690 (p. work on the Annales has been done by Hartmut Hoffmann, karolingischen Annalistik (Bonn: L. Rihrscheid, 1958), 9-68; "Aufstieg und Herrschaft der Karolinger in der Darstellung der

sogenannten Annalen Mettenses priores," Iistorische Studien 412 (1970): 1-208.


Numerous other studies, moreover, have explained why the Metz annalist wrote, but no consensus exists. For example, Walthar Schlesinger, "Kaisertum und Reich-

steilung. Zur divisio regnorum von 806," in Forschungen zu Staat und Verfassung,
Festgabe fiir Fritz Hartung, ed. R. Dietrich and G. Oestreich (Berlin: Duncker and Humbolt, 1958), 9-51, and reprinted in Walthar Schlesinger, Beitrdge zur deutschen des Mittelalters, 2 vols. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Verfassungsgeschichte Ruprecht, 1963), 1:193-232, with an afterword on 345. For more recent work regarding these Annales, see the interesting study by Yitzhak Hen, "The Annals of Metz and the Merovingian Past," in The Uses of the Past in the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 175-90, who seems to date the text to 806 rather than 805 and casts doubt on efforts to identify the author as a woman. 141. Annales mettenses priores, an. [sic] 690 (p. 8), as noted above. For the use of the term consilium in the same sense as a military plan, also see an. [sic] 690 [sic] (p. 11) and an. [sic. ] 692 (p. 13). For a discussion of the term consilium as a military plan by Latin authors, see Wheeler, "Methodological Limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy," 216-17.

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pin is reported to have examined it and then, upon finding it satisfactory, ordered the mobilization of the Carolingian army.142 It would perhaps be less than prudent to conclude, on the basis of an account written more than a century after the fact, that Pippin II, as early as 687, had a fully developed court planning staff of special advisers, e.g., praecipui consiliarii, on military matters similar to that described by Adalhard in his libellus. However, by calling attention to such a group and to the planning process itself, the author of the Annales undoubtedly understood that contemporaries in the early ninth century would be aware of the existence of the present king's military planners. In short, this author may well have conjured up a fantasy for the reign of Pippin II as Mayor of the Palace. Yet, the account very likely was projecting back in time a contemporary institution held in sufficiently high regard by Charlemagne's court, so that by attributing such a process to a distant Carolingian ancestor of great illustriousness, the latter was made to seem even more formidable.14

Conclusion Modern scholars, especially those smitten with "the idea of progress," may feel it counterintuitive to consider the Carolingian Magistratus to have been a "general staff' and men such as the precipui conseliarii, i.e., the special advisers on military matters, as trained officers of that body. Thus, before suggesting that Charlemagne's military planning and operations were guided by a general staff, it is important that the nonspecialist reader gain some insight into the scale of several relevant aspects of Carolingian society which compare favorably with more modern situations. Charlemagne's empire was comprised of more than one million square kilometers and included all of what is today France, western Germany, northern Italy to Rome, most of the Balkans, and much of northeastern Spain.144Specialists in early medieval demography now contend effectively that this empire had a population of about 20

142. Annales

mettenses

priores, an. [sic] 690 (p. 8), "When Pippin [II] had

received the plan, i.e., consilium, from the Magistratus, which it had been considering in its meeting (quod apud se versabat), he was exceptionally pleased [and] he mobilized the army (exercitus)." See the discussion by Bachrach, Early Carolingian
Warfare, 202-3.

143. It is important to emphasize that the author of the Annales mettenses priores was aiming to glorify the Carolingian dynasty. For the latest affirmation of this theme, see Hen, "The Annals of Metz," 175-90. The possibility that a fully developed Magistratus functioned at the Carolingian court as early as 687 is broached by Military Responsibilities," 232-33. Bachrach, "Charlemagne's
144. Werner, "Missus-Marchio-Comes,"
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million people.145This population was considerably larger than that of the French kingdom, which was the largest and most populous of the Christian regna of the high Middle Ages, i.e., prior to the Black Death.l46 Parenthetically, in a comparative context, the population of the Carolingian empire at the height of Charlemagne's reign was of the same order of magnitude as that of the United States of America on the eve of the Civil War. In the course of this conflict some 3 million men were placed under arms from both sides during a five-year period. More than 650,000 men died and at least 1 million were wounded. In deeper perspective, it should be noted that the Carolingian population was arguably twice the size of the white population of the Confederate states from which 60 percent of the able-bodied men of appropriate age served in the military. The Confederacy, economically, was an agrarian society, which after 1863 could not depend upon black slave labor to work the land.147 In light of the size of the population of Charlemagne's empire, it should not be surprising that those who study Carolingian military
145. Regardinga population with an order of magnitude in the range of 20 million, see the material treated by Reinhard Schneider, Das Frankenreich (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1982), 124; and the discussion by MaximilianGeorg Kellner,Die Ungarneinfiille im Bild der Quellen bis 1150: Vonder "Gens destanda" zur "Gensadfidem Christi conversa" (Munich:VerlagUngarisches Institut, 1997), 113. For a somewhat in more conservative view, see David Herlihy, "Demography," Dictionary of the MiddileAges, ed. J. R. Strayer, 12 vols. (New York:Scribner, 1984), 4: 139-40, who, unfortunately, would seem not to have had the opportunity to incorporate the earlier German work into his observations. Herlihyvigorously rejects the high population figures of between 14 and 15.5 million for Francia occidentalis under Charlemagne, projected on the basis of regional samples by Ferdinand Lot, "Conjectures d6mographique sur la France au IXe siecle," Le Moyen Age 23 (1921): 109-37, and reprinted in Ferdinand Lot, Recueil des travaux historiques de Ferdinand Lot, 3 vols. (Geneva-Paris:Droz, 1968-73), 3: 465-521. 146. See the very high estimate by Herlihy, "Demography," 141, who argues, on the basis of the fragmentaryhearth count of 1328, that France had a population of some 15 million prior to the Black Death. This very high estimate is consistent with Herlihy's view (p. 139) that the European population underwent a huge increase between ca. 1000 and ca. 1250 and was stable between 1250 and the onset of the plague. 147. See the data discussed by MarisA. Vinovskis, "HaveSocial Historians Lost the Civil War? Some Preliminary Demographic Speculations," in Toward a Social History of the American Civil War, ed. Maris A. Vinovskis (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1990), 4-9. The percentage of men in relation to the general population who were under arms in the Carolingianempire for offensive military operations likely was similar to the percentage during the Roman empire. However,it must be emphasized that most Roman soldiers were full-time members of the military, while most expeditionary soldiers in the Carolingianarmy were militia men who served on a part-time basis. Concerning the size of the Roman army, see Ramsey McMullen,"HowBig Was The Roman Army,"Klio (1980): 451-60, with citations to various scholarly studies and contro352 *
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anci the CarolingianGeneralStaff Charlemagne

demography now see the emperor as being able to put into the field for offensive military operations, intended for the conquest of enemy territory, several armies in any given year, which when taken in the aggregate could reach a total in the neighborhood of 100,000 effectives.'48

versies. The basic work on the order of magnitude of the imperial population remains Julius Beloch, Die Bev6lkering der grieschisch-remischen Welt (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1886), 507; but see, as well, for background, Peter A. Brunt, Italian Manpower, 225 BC-AD 14 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). 148. For the greater part of the twentieth century, scholars have believed that medieval armies and especially early medieval armies were very small. This has been, in general, the legacy of Hans Delbriick, History of the Art of Warwithin the Framework of Political Iistory, trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (\Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1982), III. Hans Delbriick, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, III, 2nd ed. (Berlin: G. Stilke, 1907). However, Karl-FerdinandWerner, "Heeresorganization und Kriegsfiihrungim deutschen Konigreich des 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts,"Settimane ci Studio de Centro Italiano sull'alto Medioevo 15 (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi Sull'alto Medioevo, 1968), 791-843, effectively challenged and, indeed, overturned this consensus. Werner's view that the Carolingians had the capacity to mobilize very large armies would seem now to be the norm, at least among specialists in medieval militarv historv. This is the position, in any case, that is sustained in the magisterial synthesis by Philippe Contamine, La Guerre au Moyen Age, 4th ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994), 101-3. The new consensus is now reflected, as well, in by J.-F. Verbruggen,The Art of Warcfare Western Europe during the Middle Ages, from the Eighth Century to 1340, trans. Sumner Willard and S. C. M. Southern, 2nd ed. (Woodbridge,U.K.: Boydell, 1997), 283, wvhooriginally believed that Carolingian and Contamine in arguing for large armies were small, but now has followed \Werner armies. Bachrach, Early Carolingian lWarfare,135, reflects this new consensus, as well. For a thoroughgoing critique of Delbriick's methods, see Bernard S. Bachrach, "Early Medieval Military Demography: Some Observations on the Methods of HIans Delbriick," in The Circle of 'War,ed. Donald Kagayand L. J. Andrew Villalon (Woodbridge, U.K.:Boydell, 1999), 3-20. The lone specialist in early medieval military history who has held out against this consensus is Timothy Reuter. He argues for small armies which, in essence, he discredited methods, as primitive warbands of warsees, in the tradition of Delbriuck's riors led by unreliable nobles bent on the acquisition of booty. Reuter's minimalist ideas are set forth in two articles: "Plunderand Tribute in the Carolingian Empire," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 5 ser. 35 (1985): 75-94; and "The End of Carolingian MilitaryExpansion," in Charlemagne's eI-ir, 391-405. However, only in his latest study ("Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare," in Medieval Warfare:A History ed. Maurice Keen [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], 13-35), does Reuter venture to provide an estimate of the size of Carolingian
armies. He writes: "it . . . seems doubtful that armies much larger than 2,000-3,000

could have survived for any length of time" (p. 30). In order to sustain this minimalist view, Reuter opines that a possible clue regardingthe size of Carolingianarmies is to be found in "casualty lists." Thus, he paraphrases part of an entrv in the Annals of Fulda, which he contends provides "a list of those who fell in Saxony in a battle against an invading band of Northmen" (p. 28). This paraphrase, however, provides only a small part of the list that is found in the Annals of Fulda, an. 880. For the full
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These armies were, in general, much larger than those mobilized by any monarch during the high or later Middle Ages for offensive military operations.'49 The notion of large Carolingian armies, which, as noted above, specialists in medieval military history now generally accept as being available to Charlemagne, are controversial only among doctrinaire minimalists who still believe in a rather peculiar version of the long-discredited "Dark Age."'50 In addition to a large population from which to draw human resources, Charlemagne enjoyed the use of a far larger bureaucracy for the administration of his empire at the local level than did the government of any kingdom in the high or later Middle Ages. This advantage, however, did not lie with the Carolingians simply because Charlemagne had a well-developed government bureaucracy at the royal court or because smaller administrative centers had been established in each of
Latin text, see Annales Fuldenses, ed. and trans. Reinhold Rau in Quellen zur karolingischen Reichsgeschichte, 3 (Darmstadt: Rutton and Loening, 1960), an. 880.

Reuter'ssecond and only other "quantitativeexample" of a "casualty list" (p. 28) is drawn from the Annals of the Rheims historian Flodoard (Les Annales de Flodoard), ed. Philippe Lauer (Paris: A. Picard, 1905), p. 19), and concerns the v'ery bloody battle of Firezuola. Here Reuter reports that "The casualties . . . amount to a mere fifty." Flodoard, however, gives the casualty figure as 1,500, not 50. In consonance with Flodoard'saccount, it should also be pointed out that Liudprandof Cremona, the only other source worthy of scholarly consideration in this context (Antapodosis, bk. II, chs. 65-66, ed. and trans. Reinhold Rau, in Quellen zur
karolingischen Reichsgeschichte, 8 [Darmstadt: Rutton and Loening, 19711), does

not provide a casualty figure. However, he does observe that so many men died at Firezuola that it was difficult to find soldiers in the region more than a generation after the battle (ch. 66).
The idea that casualty lists, treated in a proper historical manner, may possibly

provide a clue to the size of armies poses an interesting question that undoubtedly
requires further research. However, Reuter's abuse of the sources that he cites, whether the result of a calculated effort to mislead the non-specialist or merely convenient incompetence, does not advance our understanding in this matter. Moreover, in the present context, it should be pointed out that Reuter, who has provided an annotated translation of The Annals of Fulda (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), must be assumed to have been aware at some time in his career of the nature of the full casualty list (p. 88) that he "abbreviated" in order to make his minimalist argument. It also may be noted that in this very same entry in Tlie Annals of Fulda, i.e., an. 880, a "casualty list" of 5,000 is given for a Viking army. Reuter does not mention this list. 149. See Contamine, La Guerre au Moyen Age, 159-69, regarding the order of magnitude of royal armies during the high Middle Ages. With regard to the large size of collective forces drawn from throughout Europe for the First Crusade, see Bernard S. Bachrach, "The Siege of Antioch: A Study in Military Demography," War in History 6 (1999): 127-46. 150. See the review article by Bernard S. Bachrach of Medieval Warfare: A History, ed. Maurice Keen (New York, 1999), in Journal of International History 22 (2000): 886-90.

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and the CarolingianGeneralStaff Charlemagne

the six to seven hundred counties (civitates, pagi) of his empire.'51 Nor was the balance struck in Charlemagne's favor because he controlled a minimum of six hundred units of the royal fisc, each with its own administrative cadre, or because some 180 royal palatia with their highly trained staffs were at his disposal.-52 Indeed, it was not the extensive communication infrastructure between the center and the periphery that alone gave Charlemagne his advantage.153Nor was it the firm control that the royal court exercised over these provincial resources through the missi dominici that marks the superiority of Charlemagne's
system.154

The striking difference between Charlemagne's administration and that of rulers in the high and later Middle Ages was not in the size of his secular governmental bureaucracy at both the central and local levels, although these infrastructure assets were not inconsiderable. Rather, Charlemagne's administrative advantage lay in his thoroughgoing control of the church.155Charlemagne, as contrasted to kings in the post-reform era of the high Middle Ages and beyond, had at his disposal not only the administrative cadres but also the great wealth of very many hundreds of episcopal and monastic institutions located throughout the empire for sustaining Carolingian administration, in general, and military operations, in particular.156The exact number of religious establishments
151. Werner,"Missus-Marchio-Comes,"191-92. See McKitterick,The Carolingians and the Written Word, with the literature that she discusses. 152. Werner, "Missus-Marchio-Comes," 231-32, with the extensive citations regardingthe palatia andfisci, in notes 142 and 143, respectively. 153. Mersiowsky, "Regierungspraxis und Schriftlichkeit in Karolingerreich," 109-66. 154. Werner,"Missus-Marchio-Comes,"201-2. et 155. F. L. Ganshof, "L'Eglise le pouvoir royal dans la monarchie franque sous Pepin III at Charlemagne,"Settimane di Studio de Centro Italiano sull'alto Medioevo, 7 (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi Sull'alto Medioevo, 1960), 95-141, and reprinted as "The Church and the royal power under Pippin III and Charlemagne,"in The Carolingians and the Frankish Monarchy, trans. J. Sondheimer (London: Longman, 1971), 205-39. 156. In France, the power of the royal government and its ability to deploy ecclesiastical resources declined precipitously following the reign of Charles the Bald (d. 877). In Germany, royal power, in general, and power over the church, in particular, was far more formidable and lasted until the investiture controversy. See, for example, Leo Santifaller,Zur Geschichte des ottonisch-salischen Reichskirchensystems, 2nd. ed. (Vienna: H. Bohlaus Nachf., 1964); and J. Fleckenstein, "Hofkapelle und Reichsepiskopat unter Heinrich IV,"Investiturstreit und Reichsverfassung (Sigmaringen:J. Thorbecke, 1973), 117-40. It is very important to remember in this context that the French and German kingdoms each shared only a part of what had been Charlemagne's empire. Thus, even with population increases and growth in secular administrative cadres in both kingdoms through the high Middle Ages, neither reached the extent of what Charlemagne had ruled.
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BERNARD BACIIRACH S.

throughout the Carolingian empire during Charlemagne's reign has yet to be ascertained with any degree of certainty by modern scholars.'57 However, research has begun on this difficult project, and it has been demonstrated that by ca. 700, a century before Charlemagne's official resuscitation of the imperial title in the West, in excess of 550 monasteries existed in Gaul alone.158 The seventh century is generally seen by modern scholars as a period in which neither economic nor demographic growth was particularly dynamic as compared, for example, to the following century and one-half which saw the development of what may be considered unified Carolingian rule. However, it now is known that during the seventh century no fewer than 320 new monasteries were founded in Gaul, and all but 90 of these were located in the putatively more backward northern parts of the regnum Francorum.159 By the next century, some monasteries, such as St. Riquier, controlled entire towns with populations in
the neighborhood of 10,000.160 Many other religious establishments, of

course, were rather smaller, and some may even have been comparatively poor by comparison with great houses such as St. Denis and
Fulda.161

Intuition exercised by scholars, especially those who have been influenced by the idea of progress, and a firm grasp of the historical evidence are not the same. Now an outline of Carolingian military planning and its resources is available. Obviously, only an outline is possible here, because dozens of actual military operations cannot be analyzed in appropriate detail in a single article-length publication.162Yet, it remains
157. Cf. Werner, "Missus-Marchio-Comes,"117-18, regardingthe great importance of the church to Carolingian administration but without numbers for these establishments. 158. Ilartmut Atsma, "Les monasteres urbains du nord de la Gaule," Revue d'Histoire de l'Eglise de France 62 (1976): 163-87. 159. Ibid., 168. 160. Hariulf,Chronique de l'abbaye de Saint-Riquier (Ve siecle-1104), ed. Ferdinand Lot (Paris: A. Picard, 1894), Appendix 7; and Robert Fossier, La Terre et les hommes en Picardie, 2 vols. (Paris: B. Nauwelaerts, 1968), 1: 191-94, accepts the information concerning the demographic and economic development of Centula in the early Carolingian era. Theodore Evergates, "Historiographyand Sociology in Early Feudal Society: The Case of Hariulfand the 'Milites'of Saint-Riquier,"Viator 6 (1975): 35-49, has argued that both the text of the inventory of 831 and the descriptio of Centula are later medieval documents. These criticisms have been dealt with by Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, 299, n. 96. 161. Regarding monastic demography, see Ursmer Berliere, "Le nombre des moines dans les anciens monasteres," Revue Benedictine 41 (1929): 231-61; 42 (1930): 19-42. Much more work is needed in this key area of study. 162. See, for example, Bachrach, Early Carolingian UWarfare, 202-42, where King Peppin's war of Aquitanian conquest, 760-68, is examined in detail. I hope to study Charlemagne'smilitary operations in comparable detail in future studies. 356 *
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for those concerned with the broad sweep of military history in the Vest to assess these arguments and to find a place to integrate Charlemagne and the Carolingian Magistratus into their general surveys. Whether it is ultimately concluded that Charlemagne was a precocious military administrator whose work came to a dead end or the father of the modern general staff may, in fact, be the operative question for further research in this area.

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