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Joseph Romano PHIL 493 Negativity and the Dialectic of Self-Conciousness

This is the tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of the pure 'I'. Death, if that is what we want to call this non-actuality, is of all things the most dreadful, and to hold fast what is dead requires the greatest strength. Lacking strength, Beauty hates the Understanding for asking of her what it cannot do. But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devasation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself. It is this power, not as something positive, which closes its eyes to the negative...on the contrary, Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it.This tarrying with the negative is the magical power that converts it into being. -Preface to Pheneomenology of Spirit 32 What I have told you up to now about that model that is so characteristic of the structure of Hegel's thought holds good likewise for his philosophy as a whole. I mean this in a very strict sense. The facat is that what we might call the secret or the point of his philosophy is that the quintessence of all the negations it containsnot just the sum of negations but the process that they constitue-- is supposed to culmintate in a positive sense, namely in the famous dialectical proposition with which you are all familiar that 'what is actual is rational'. -Theodor Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics

The question of Hegel's teleology in the dialectic of self-consciousness is perhaps the most contentious in his philosophy: due in part, no doubt, to the role in which Phenomenology of Spirit serves as the structuring text of his ouvre. With Adorno, I claim that whether or not Hegel's dialectic asserts an essential positivity as the culmination of dialectical movement is the critical theoretical question at play not only in interpreting Hegel's text, but is also a foundational question for his philosophical sytem. As such, through an analysis of self-consciousness in the Master-Slave dialectic, this writer attempts to address this question of the 'positivity,' or telos posited in the process of 'negative supersession' in this section from Phenomenology. The dialectic of self-consciousness begins with a critique of consciousness and sensecertainty, of which Hegel asserts the breakdown once once recognizes that the basis of claims made with regard to sensuous reality are inextricably linked with the 'I' as universal, whose seeing is neither a seeing of the tree nor of this house, but is a simple seeing which, though mediated by the negation of this house, etc., is all the same simple and indifferent to whatever happens in it, to the house, the tree, etc. (Consciousness 102). Emblematic of Hegel's reliance of the history of philosophy in order to

eventually contruct a philosophy of history, this Hegelian 'I' evokes Kant's notion of the synthetic unity of apperception, and his claim about the subject-object relation: that the I think must accompany all of my representations, without which they would mean nothing to me. For Hegel though, his philosophy of self-conciousness begins where Kant's ends; Hegel concevies of self-consciousness as an historical process, and therefore he writes, The notion of self-consciousness is only completed in these three moments: (a) the pure undifferentiated 'I' is its first immediate object. (b) But this immediacy is itself an absolute mediation, it is only as a supersessionof the independent object, in other words, it is Desire. The satisfaction of Desire is, it is true, the reflection of self-consciousness into itself, or the certainty that has become truth. (c) But the truth of this certainty is really a double reflection, the duplication of self-consciousness (Self-Consciousness 176). Thus, and here we arrive at the cusp of the analysis of lordship and bondage, Hegel asserts that Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness (Self-Consciousness 175). To summarize, consciousness or sense-certainty is analagous to Kant's conception of the intuition as part of the faculty of representation: the immediate 'this-ness,' 'that-ness,' 'here-ness' or 'now-ness' of sensuous awareness. Yet, as soon as the realization is made that this intution is always already bound with an 'I,' to which the world of appearance appears, the 'I' becomes conscious of the 'I.' As such, this recognition can only be 'satisfied' for (or against, as in the Master-Slave dialectic) another self-consciousness. Hence, Hegel theorizes Recognition, or how Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, acknowledged (Lordship and Bondage 178). First, self-consciousness recognizes itself as coming out of itself, meaning that it simaltaneously is lost, in that self-consciousness is recognized as something external, as an other being (Lordship and Bondage 178). Moreover, at the very same time, self-consciousness supersedes this other being by not recognizing the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self (Lordship and Bondage 178). This form of self-consciousness does not have truth because it does not recognize the other, which is also it-self, as another selfconscioussness, or in other words, an-other being-in-and-for-itself. However, this supersession,

simaltaneously both the 'success' and 'failure' of this first move of self-consciousness, is necessary because in order for self-consciousness to become certain of itself as the essential being, it must supersede this other to assert itself as the essential being. Yet, what also occurs here is that selfconsciousness proceeds to supersede its own self, for this other is itself (Lordship and Bondage 179). This movement of self-consciousness in relating to itself, in the pursuit of becoming certain of itself, is the movement of only one self-consciousness. For self-consciousness to be true selfconsciousness, this same dialectical process must also occur simaltaneously in the other; For the other is equally independent and self-contained, and there is nothing in it of which it is not itself the origin...Each sees the other do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the same (Lordship and Bondage 182). This demand of the other, and simaltanously by the other, is the animating force (desire for self-certainty) in the movement of this dialectic. Moreover, Hegel makes an important clarification of the properties of this self-consciousness: Each is for the other the middle term, through each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself...They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another (Lordship and Bondage 184). This result is the pure Notion of recognition, of the duplicating of self-consciousness in its oneness, appears to self-consciousness (Lordship and Bondage 185). Yet, this Notion of recognition is the purely abstract movement of self-consciousness. This movement manifests itself in the world, at first, through an inherent inequality or disunity: one being only recognized, the other only recognizing (Lordship and Bondage 185). The mutual recognition of each self-consciousness mutually recognizing the other has not yet occurred. This disuinity must result from a life or death struggle because what is at stake for both selfconsciousnesses is the proof that each is more than just a body. This is the desire of self-consciousness to assert itself as the essential being. Yet, if this struggle actually ends in death, nothing has been achieved. Only if one self-consciousness submits to the other does self-consciousness learn that life is as essential

to it as pure self-consciousness, hence one's body is as essential as being more than just a body. At first blush, the lord seems to have achieved this self-certainty in this trial by death. After the lord has succeded, the lord is the consciousness that exists for itself, but no longer merely the Notion of such a consciousness, rather, the lord is a self-consciousness that exists for itself only in so far as this selfcertainty is mediated through another conciousness, in other words, mediated through the recognition of the slave of the lord's self-certainty as being-for-itself (Lordhsip and Bondage 190). However, the lord does not yet have the truth of self-consciousness, because the recognition received from the slave is from a consciousness that is distorted and deformed. For the lord, this recognition is not true recognition because in the eyes of the lord, the slave is not a self-consciousness that exists in-and-for-itself: the slave's consciousness for the lord is not purely for itself but [purely] for another, i.e. is a merely immediate consciousness, or consciousness in the form of thinghood (Lordship and Bondage 189). The recognition of self-certainty that the lord receives from the slave is not true recognition because this object does not correspond to its Notion...what now really confronts him is not an independent consciousness [being-for-itself], but a dependent one. He is, therefore, not certain of being-for-self as the truth of himself. On the contrary, his truth is in reality the unessential consciousness and its unessential action ((Lordship and Bondage 192). The slave's servitude makes him a dependent consciousness, and therefore is a mere object or thing, from which true recogintion cannot arise. Thus, the lord, in the dialectic of self-consciousness is in fact the slave. By the same token, the slave becomes the lord. The lord, through the eyes of the slave, is the essential reality; hence the truth for it is the independent consciousness for itself (Lordship and Bondage 194). But, as per the abstract notional movement of self-consciousness, the slave also recognizes himself in the other (the lord) and thus, is implicitly the essential being for self. The slave has undergone the necessary experience, in actuality, of everything solid and stable...shaken to to its foundations...this pure universal moment, the absolute melting-away of everything stable, is the simple, essential nature of self-consiousness, absolute negativity, pure being-for-self, which consequently is

implicit in this consciousness (Lordship and Bondage 194). In fact, the slave acutally brings this state of consciousness, in himself, through his actual service to the lord. It is not an inherent quality of the slave's subjective position, since the slave is a self-consciousness. However, it is preceisely through his service, through work, however, the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is (Lordship and Bondage 195). The difference between the lord's satisfaction of self-consciousness and slave's is as follows: The lord's satisfaction of self-consciousness is incomplete, since he receives recognition from a consciousness that is not for itself, a fleeting [satisfaction], for it lacks the side of objectivity and permanence (Lordship and Bondage 195). The salve's satisfaction of self-consciousness is true satisfaction because through his 'work' desire [is] held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing (Lordship and Bondage 195). As such, work gives form and permanence to the negative relation to the object [work] (Lordship and Bondage 195). Work for the slave, in other words, is a formative activity of making something, and thus demonstrates his own independence through the independent being [of the object] that he makes, and thus sees in this object, this other, his own permanent independence (Lordship and Bondage 195). This object becomes a signifier of the slave's independence because of the negative significance of fear, since the object that he makes is in service of the enjoyment of the lord. However, since this object is made for the lord, this obejctive negative moment is none other than the alien being before which it has trembled, i.e., the lord himself. Thus, the slave posits himself as a negative in the permanent order of things, and thereby becomes for himself, someone existing on his own account, though this satisfaction of self-consciousness is not mastery over the whole of obejctive being, since this would be the illusion under which the lord falls (Lordship and Bondage 196). The result is that the slave reclaims himself for himself, by himself through his work accompanied by the absolute fear of losing his life. As such, he satisfies his selfconsciousness as master over some things, but not all things. Regarding this dialectical process of self-consciousness as a whole, one must evaluate the status

of the negation of the negation, the final move of the slave recognizing his being for self through the negativity of his work and fear. Is something 'positive' asserted? The answer is yes, the slave asserts his independence (being for self) as a result of this negativity. And this independence is asserted as not only the result of this process, but also as the process itself. This is what makes Hegel's teleology so complex; it is a dynamic, historical conception of self-consciousness that only progresses and satisfies its desire for self-certainty through negation. However, for Hegel this negation of the negation asserts a substantive independence, the actual indepedence of the slave, through his own recognition of himself through an object that he makes. Yet, this negation of the negation serves as Hegel's conception of philosophy as a whole. For Hegel, philosophy is conventionally misconceived and related as antithetical, suggesting that previous philosophical works are treated as false and must make way for a new truth. However, Hegel finds this conception of philosophy to be incorrect because he conceives of the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of truth rather than requiring acceptance or contradiction, (Preface to Phenomenology 2). This is the first indication of Hegels teleology in the Phenomenology, since it implies a hierarchy in that he believes philosophical systems do not work to contradict one another, but rather to assimilate the truths of previous methods in the aim of attaining a truth that can adequately account for reconciliation for the consciousness in its context. Truth is the aim of philosophy, and Hegels conception of philosophy is such that the end is a universal truth beyond particularity,i.e. Absolute Knowing. Thus, with retrospection towards previous philosophical systems, it can be seen that they aim toward universal truth only insofar as it is allowed by their context, resulting in particular rather than universal truth. The supersession and synthesis of these particular truths is the means to the end of universal truth in itself. This claim is seen on the level of the particular instance of the dialectic of self-consciousness

insofar as Hegel strives for the universality of a satisfied self-consciousness, which as we have seen, lies with the slave. He claims that both work and fear are universal negative moments, and as a result, when the slave recognizes its own being for self by himself, through work, he has achieved universally true self-consciousness. For Hegel, the in-itself is a possibility for thought, even though the process of knowing the in-itself is a purely negative process. As such, Adorno's critique leveled against Hegel is well made: It is preceisly this point, the positive nature of the dialectic as a whole, the fact that we can recognize the totality as rational right down into the irrationality of its individual components, the fact that we can declare the totality to be meaningfulthat is what seems to me to have become unteneable (Adorno 19). However, Adorno's critique presupposes that we can comprehend the dialectic as a whole, meaning that the Hegel's dialectic takes the same form in each instance. Though I would like to offer comment, I do not have the expertise at this time to give a contribution to this line of inquiry. Though, my gut instinct is that, given the 'post-modern' turn, there are valid critiques made by Adorno and others against the teleology of truth in Hegel's system.

Works Cited Adorno, Theodor W., and Rolf Tiedemann. Lectures on Negative Dialectics: Fragments of a Lecture Course 1965/1966. Cambridge: Polity, 2008. Print.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Arnold V. Miller, and J. N. Findlay. Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford: Clarendon, 1977. Print.

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