Preface

The immediate occasion for me to publish this outline is the need to

provide my audience \vith an intoducton to the lectures on the
P/i/sss/,s]Rig/twhich I deliver in the course of my offcial dutes. J
This textbook is a more extensive, and in partcular a more systematc,
expositon of the same basic concepts which, in relaton to this part of
philosophy, are already contained in a previous work designed to
accompany my lectures, namely my Loc/scic s]t/P/i/sss/icc/
Sciocs (Heidelberg, 1 81 7).
2
The fact that this outline was due to appear in print and thus to
come before a wider public gave me the opportunit to amplif in it
some of those Rcls whose primary purpose was to comment
briefly on ideas |sst//mgco] akin to or divergent from my own, on
frther consequences of my argument, and on other such matters as
would be properly elucidated i the lectures themselves. I have ampli
fed them here so as to clarif on occasion the more abstact contents
of the text and to take fuller account of related ideas |snt//ugo]
which are current at the present tme. As a result, some of these
Remarks have become more extensive than the aim and stle of a
compendium would normally lead one to el'ect. A genuine com
pendium, however, has as its subject-matter what is considered to be
the entre compass of a science; and what distnguishes it - apart,
perhaps, from a minor additon here or there - is above all the way in
which it arranges and orders .the essental elements Msot] of a
content which has long been familiar and accepted, just as the form in
which it is presented has its rules and conventons which have long
been agreed. But a philosophical outline is not expected to conform to
,
Philosophy oj Right
this patter, if only because it is imagined that what philosophy puts
forward is as ephemeral a product as Penelope's weaving, which is
begun afresh ever day.3
It is certainly tue that the primary difference between the present
outine and an ordinary compendium is the method which consttutes
its guiding principle. But I am here presupposing that the philosophi
cal manner of progressing from one topic to another and of conduct
ing a scientfic proof - this entre speculatve mode of cogniton - is
essentally different from other modes of cogniton.4 The realizaton
that such a difference is a necessary one is the only thing which can
save philosophy from the shamefl decline into which it has fallen in
our tmes. It has indeed been recognized that the forms and rules of
the older logic - of defniton, classificaton, and inference - which
include the rules of the understanding's cogniton [Ver
siooslooiois], are inadequate for speculatve science. Or rather,
their inadequacy has not so much been recognized as merely felt, and
then the rules in queston have been cast aside, as if they were simply
fetters, to make way for the arbitary pronouncements of the heart, of
fantasy, and of contngent intuiton; and since, in spite of this, reflec
ton and relatons of thought inevitably also come into play, the
despised method of commonplace deducton and ratocinaton is
unconsciously adopted. - Since I have flly developed the nature of
speculatve knowledge in my Sciocs]Lsgic,I have only occasionally
added an explanatory comment on procedure and method in the
present outline. Given that the subject-matter is concrete and
inherently of so varied a nature, I have of course omitted to
demonstate and bring out the logical progression in each and every
detail. But on the one hand, it mght have been considered super
fluous to do so in view of the fact that I have presupposed a familiarit
with scientfc method; and on the other, it will readily be notced that
the work as a whole, like te constucton ,os/iuoog] of its parts, is
based on the logical spirit. It is also chiefly from this point of view that
I would wish this teatse to be understood and judged. For what it
deals with is scioc,and in science, the content is essentally insepar
able from the frl.
It is tue that we may hear it said by those who seem to adopt the
most thorough approach that form is a purely exteral qualit, indif
ferent to the matter Sod] itself, which is alone of consequence;
frthermore, the task of the writer, especially the philosophical writer,
1 0
Prece
may be said to consist in the discovery of imi/s, the statement of
imi/s,and the disseminaton of imi/sand correct concepts.6 But if we
consider how this task is actually performed, we see on the one hand
how the same old brew is reheated again and again and served up to
and sundry - a task that may not be without its merits in educatng
and arousing the emotons, though it might sooner be regarded as the
superfluous product of over-zealous actvit - 'for they have Moses
and the prophets; let them hear them'.7 Above all, we have ample
opportunit to wonder at the tone and pretentousness that can be
detected in such writers, as if all that the world had hitherto lacked
was these zealous disseminators of tuths, and as if their reheated
brew contained new and unheard-of tuths which ought, as they
always claim, to be taken partcularly to heart, above all 'at the present
tme'. But on the other hand, we can see how whatever tuths of this
kind are handed out by one part are displaced and swept away by
tuths of precisely the same kind dispensed by other partes. And if,
amidst this jumble of tuths, there is something that is neither old nor
new but enduring, how can it be extacted from these formlessly
fluctuatng reflectons -how can it be distnguished and verifed other
than by scioiycmeans?
The imi/concerg ig/i,i/ics,ooi/sioiis at any rate a s/as
its ssiiisoooso/goiisoin o//ic/osooioo//icso/ii, oo
/igiso.What more does this tuth require, inasmuch as the thinking
mind Cisi] is not content to possess it in this proxmate manner?
What it needs is to be cs/oas well, so that the content which
is already ratonal in itself may also gain a ratonal form and thereby
appear justfed H free tg. For such tng does not stop at
what Lgen, whether the latter is supported by the exteral positve
authorit of the state or of mutual agreement among human beings, or
by the authority of inner feeling and the heart and by the testmony of
the spirit which immediately concurs with this, but starts out from
itself and thereby demands to know itself as united in its innermost
being with the truth.
The simple reacton |/o/io] of ingenuous emoton is to adhere
with tustng convicton to the publicly recognized tuth and to base
one's conduct and fed positon in life on this firm foundaton. But
this simple reacton may well encounter the supposed difficult of
how to distnguish and discover, among the io)oiicoiqs]sioisos,
what is universally acknowledged and valid in them; and this perplex-
I I
Philosophy ofRight
it may easily be taken for a just and genuine concer with the matter
Soc/-}itself. But in fact, those who pride themselves on this perplex
ity are in the positon of not being able to see the wood for the tees,
and the only perplexty and diffculty that is present is the one they
have themselves created; indeed, this perplext and diffcult is
rather a proof that they want something other than what is universally
acknowledged and valid, something other than the substance of the
right and the ethical. For if they were genuinely concered wit the
latter and not with te vooiqand onico/oni, of opinions and being,
they would adhere to the substantal right, namely to the command
ments of ethics and of the state, and regulate their lives accordingly. -
A frther difficult arises, however, from the fact that human beings
i/ioland look for their freedom and the basis of ethics in [the realm
of thought. But however exalted, however divine this right may be, it
is nevertheless tansformed into wrong if the only criterion of thought
and the only way in which thought can know itself to be free is the
extent to which it ivgs]s /oi is ooivsoh, oclos/g oo
vo/|and manages to invent something oico/ofor itself.
The noton |ssi//ug] that feedom of thought, and of spirit i
general, can be demonstated only by divergence from, and even
hostlit towards, what is publicly acknowledged might seem to be
most firmly rooted nowadays in /oiiso8ziliug]isi/sioi,for this
very reason, it might seem to be the essental task of a philosophy of
the state to invent and propound ,ioosi/i/s,and specifcally a
new and partcular theor. If we examine this noton |sni//sg] and
the actvit that is associated with it, we might well imagine that no
state or consttuton had ever previously exsted or were in exstence
today, but that we had os(and this 'now' is of indefnite duraton) to
start right from the beginning, and that the ethical world had been
waitng only for such intellectual constuctons, discoveries, and
proofs as are osavailable. As far as ooiois concered, it is readily
admitted that philosophy must recoge it os iiis, that the philo
sopher's stone lies hidden ss/, but ii/i oio iisy, that
nature is oiisoo/ii/ioiis] and that it is this ocioo/reason present
within it which knowledge must investgate and grasp conceptually -
not the shapes and contngencies which are visible on the surface, but
nature's eteral harmony, conceived, however, as the law and essence
iooiwithin it. Di/ico/sn,on the other hand, te state, or
reason as it actualizes itself in the element of self-consciousness, is
1 2
I
T
Prece
not supposed to be happy in the knowledge that it is reason itself
which has in fact gained power and authority Cc/i]within this ele
ment, and which asserts itself there and remains inherent witin it.'
iiis (. There are two kinds of laws, laws of nature and laws of
right: the laws of nature are simply there and are valid as they stand: they
suffer no diminuton, although they may be infringed in individual cases.
To know what the law of nature is, we must familiarize ourselves with
nature, for these laws are correct and it is only our notons |sni/ls ]
concering them which may be false. The measure of these laws is
exteral to us, and our cogniton adds nothing to them and does not
advance them: it is only our cogniton of them which can expand. Kow
ledge K isis of right is in one respect similar to this and in another
respect different. We get to know the laws of right in just the same way,
simply as they are; the citzen knows them more or less in this way, and
the positve jurist also stops short at what is given. But the diference is
that, with the laws of right, the spirit of refectona comes into play and
their ver diversity draws attenton to the fact that they are not absolute.
The laws of right are something /cis:,something |c]sohuman
beings. It necessarily follows that our inner voice may either come into
collision with them or concur with tem. The human being does not stop
short at te exstent eoDcsiss], but claims to have within himself
the measure of what is right; he may be subjected to the necessit and
power of exteral authorit, but never i the same way as to natural
necessit, for his inner self always tells him how things ought to be, and he
fnds within himself the confrmaton or repudiaton of what is accepted
as valid. In nature, the highest tuth is that a law c|siscic//,in laws of
right, however, the thing 8cd: is not valid because it exsts; on the
contary, everone demands that it should match his own criterion. Thus
a confict may arise between what is and what ought to be, between the
right which has being in and for itself, which remains unaltered, and the
arbitary determinaton of what is supposed to be accepted as right. A
disjuncton and confict of this kind is found only in the sphere 8sw of
the spirit, and since the prerogatve of the spirit thus seems to lead to
discord and unhappiness, we often tum away fom the arbitariness oflife
to the contemplaton of nature and are inclined to take the latter as a
model. But these very discrepancies Cgo siz]between that right which
has being in and for itelf and what arbitariness proclaims as right make
it imperatve for us to lear to recognize precisely what right is. In right,
aTranslator's note: Geist de Betracluung; Hotho's notes, on which Gans based this Addi
ton, simply read Geist ('spirit'): see VP R ttt, g.
b
Translator's note: 'Die Rechtgesete sind Geset:tes'; Hegel plays on the similarity of the
word Gmt: (law) and Geet:tes (someting laid down or posited).
1
3
Philosophy ofRight
The spiritual universe is supposed rather to be at the mercy of
contngency and arbitariness, to be gs-]rscks,so that, according to
this atheism of the ethical world, in:i/lies soisuit, and at the same
te, since reason is nevertheless c/ss supposed to be present in it,
tuth is nothing but a problem. But, we are told, this very circum
stance justfes, indeed obliges, every thinker to take his own initatve,
though not ioscrc/s]the philosopher's stone, for this search is made
superfuous by the philosophizing of our tmes and everyone,
whatever hs conditon, can be assured that he has this stone in his
grasp. Now it does admttedly happen that those who live within the
actualit of the stte and are able to satsf their knowledge and
voliton within it - and there are many of them, more in fact than
thnk or know it, for /csicc/(;this includes wso- or at least those
who csososos(;find satsfacton withn the state, laugh at such initat
ives and assurances and regard them as an empt game, now more
amusing, now more serious, now pleasing, now dangerous. This rest
less actvit of vain reflecton, along with the recepton and response it
the human being must encounter hs own reason; he must therefore
consider the ratonalit of right, and this is the business of our science, in
contast with positve jurisprudence, which is ofen concered only with
contadictons. Besides, the present-day world has a more urgent need of
such an investgaton, for in olden tmes there was stll respect and
veneraton for the exstng /s/o:olaw, whereas the culture 8i/:g
of the present age has taken a new directon, and thought has adopted a
leading role in the formaton of values. Theories are put forward in
oppositon to what already exsts Dcsioeo,theories which seek to
appear correct and necessary in and for temselves. From now on, tere
is a more special need to recognize and comprehend te thoughts of right.
Since thought has set itself up as the essental form, we must attempt to
grasp right, too, in terms of thought. If thought is to take precedence over
right, this would seem to throw open the door to contngent opinions; but
genuine thought is not an opinion about something i8cJ:, but the
concept of the thing 8cd: itself. The concept of the thing does not
come to us by nature. Everyone has fingers and can take a brush and
paint, but that does not make him a painter. It is precisely the same \vit
tg. The thought of right is not, for example, what everbody knows
at fst hand; on the contary, correct thinking is knmving csk:s
and recognizing the thing, and our cogniton should therefore be
scientfc.
1 4
Preace
encounters, might be regarded as a separate issue SoJ],developing
independently in its own distnct way, were it not that /i/sss/, in
general has incurred al kinds of contempt and discredit as a result of
such behaviour. The worst kind of contempt it has met with is, as
already mentoned, that everyone, whatever his conditon, is con
vinced that he knows all about philosophy in general and can pass
judgement upon it. No other art or science is teated with this
ultmate degree of contempt, namely the assumpton that one can take
possession of it outight.
In fact, what we have seen the philosophy of recent tmes proclaim
ing with the utost pretension in relaton to the state has no doubt
enttled anyone who wishes to have a say in such matters to the belief
that he could just as well do the same thing on his own account, and
thereby prove to himself that he was in possession of philosophy. I
any case, this self-stled philosophy has expressly stated that imi/
iis}comsi/lsloooi],but that tuth consists in what //o
)soc/ioivioo/'s/oi, siiso,oowi/osiosin relaton to ethi
cal subjects, partcularly in relaton to the state, goverent, and
consttuton. What has not been said in this connecton to fatter the
young in partcular?8 And the young have certainly taken note of it.
The saying 'for he giveth to his own in sleep' has been applied to
science, so that all sleepers have counted themselves among the
c/sso, but the concepts they have acquired in their sleep have of
course bore the marks of their origin.9 - A leader of this superfcial
brigade of so-called philosophers, Herr Fries, t had the temerit, at a
solemn public occasion which has since become notorious,!} to put
forard the following idea |srsi//oog]in an address on the subject of
the state and consttuton: 'In a people among whom a genuine
communal spirit prevails, all business relatng to public afairs would
gain its /})s//s,]si/s/iis]/iviogsocietes, steadfastly
united /, i/soc/ss]]nos/i,would dedicate themselves to
every single project of popular educaton and popular service'; and so
on. - The chief tendency of this superfcial philosophy is to base
science not on the development of thought and the concept, but on
immediate percepton and contngent imaginaton; and likewise, to
reduce the complex inner artculaton of the ethical, i.e. the state, the
architectonics of its ratonalit - which, through determinate distnc-
t
Hegel 's llOle: I have testfed elsewhere to the superfcialit of his science: see my Scece
a/Logic (imberg, r8r2), Intoducton, p. x."
I
S
Philosohy ofRight
tons between the various spheres of public life and the rights [BLh
iq] they are based on, and through the stict proportons in
which every pillar, arch, and buttess is held together, produces the
stength of the whole fom the harmony of its parts - to reduce this
refned /iueiw] stucture to a mush of 'heart, fiendship, and
enthusiasm'.'2 According to this noton |ssi//oog], the ethical
world, like the universe of Epicurus, should be given over to the
subjectve contngency of opinions and arbitariness; but of course
this isnot the case.13 By the simple household remedy of attibutng to
]/|gwhat reason and its understandirig have laboured to produce
over several thousand years, all the touble involved in ratonal insight
and cogniton, guided by the tg concept, can of course be
avoided. Goethe's Mephistopheles -a good authorit -says much the
same thing in lines which I have also quoted elsewhere:
Do but despise reason and science,
The highest of all human gif -
Then you have surrendered to the devil
And must surely perish. /4
The next step is for this view to assume the guise of iqas well; for
what lengths has such behaviour not gone to in order to lend itself
authorit! By means of godliness and the Bible, however, it has
presumed to gain the supreme justfcaton for despising the ethical
order and the objectvit of the laws. For it is surely also piety which
envelops in te simpler intuiton of feeling that tuth which, in the
world itself, is diversified into an organic realm. But if it is the right
kind of piet, it abandons the form of this [emotonal] region as soon
as it emerges from [the conditon of] inwardness into the daylight of
the Idea's mdevelopment Lo}/iug]and manifest abundance, and
it brings \vith it, fom its inner worship of God, a reverence for the
laws and for a tuth which has being in and for itself and is exalted
above the subjectve form of feeling.
The partcular form of bad conscience which betays itself in the
vainglorious eloquence of this superficial philosophy may be
remarked on here; for in the frst place, it is precisely where it is at its
ssisiii/ssthat it has most to say about siii,where its talk is driest
and most lifeless that it is freest with the words 'life' and 'enliven', and
where it shows the utost selfshness of empt arrogance that it most
ofen refers to the 'people'. But the distnctve mark which it carries
I 6
I
L
Preae
on its brow is its hated of law. That right and ethics, and the actual
world of right and the ethical, are grasped by means of i/sog/isand
give themselves te form of ratonalit - namely universalit and
determnacy -by means of toughts, is what consttutes i//o,and it
is mwhich is justfably regarded as the main enemy by that feeling
which reserves the right to do as it pleases, by that conscience which
identfes right with subjectve convicton. The form of rigt as a oq
and a /ois felt by it to be a o, cs//iiand a s/ocl/, for it does
not recognize itself in the law and thereby recognize its own feedom
in it, because the law is the reason of the thng Soc/] and reason
does not allow feeling to warm itself in the glow of its own partcu
larit Porilo/o|ii]. The /o is therefore, as I have remarked
elsewhere in the course of this textbook, the chief shibboleth by
which the false brethren and fiends of the so-called 'people' give
themselves away.
Since this arbitary sophisty has usurped the name of /i/sss/,
and persuaded a wide public that such actvites are philosophy, it has
almost become dishonourable to contnue to speak philosophically
about the nature of the state; and right-minded di/ic/] men can
not be blamed if they grow impatent as soon as they hear talk of a
philosophical science of the state. There is even less cause for sur
prise that goverents have at last directed their attenton to such
philosophizing, for philosophy with us is not in any case practsed as a
private art, as it was with the Greeks, for example, but has a public
exstence Lxisioz], impinging upon the public, especially - or solely
- in the service of the state. Goverents have had enough con
fidence in those of their scholars who have devoted themselves to this
subject to leave the development ,os/i/og] and import of philo
sophy entrely to them - granted that here and there, they may have
done so not so much out of confidence in science as out of indif
ference towards it, retaining teaching posts in philosophy only for
reasons of taditon Gust as in France, to the best of my knowledge,
chairs of metaphysics at least have been allowed to lapse). But their
confidence has frequendy been il repaid, or alteratvely, if they are
thought to be motvated by indifference, the resultant decay of
thorough knowledge Llooiis] should be regarded as the penalt
for this indifference. It may initally appear that this superfcial philo
sophy is eminendy compatble at least ,vith outward peace and order,
in that it never manages to touch the substance of tings Soc/o],or
1 7
Philosophy ofRight
even to suspect its exstence; it would thus have no cause to fear
police interventon, at least initally, if it were not that the state also
contained the need for a deeper educaton and insight, and demanded
that this need be satsfied by science. But superficial philosophy leads
automatcally, as far as the ethical [world] and right and dut in
general are concered, to those principles which consttute super
ficialit in this sphere, namely the principles of the Ss/isisas we find
them so clearly described by Plato.J6 These principles identf what is
right with so/]ciicoscosioisos,with so/]aic)/|ogcocrtia-
/crpcrtilo/r] csociciiso, and they lead to the destucton of inner
ethics and the upright conscience, of love and right among private
persons, as well as the destucton of public order and the laws of the
state. The signifcance which such phenomena Lnc/isugw] must
acquire for goverents can scarcely be reduced, for example, by the
claim that the very confdence shown by the state and the authority of
an offcial positon are enough to warrant the demand that the state
should accept and give free rein to what corrupts the substantal
source of all deeds, namely universal principles, and should even
allow itself to be defed, as if such defance were entrely proper. 'If
God gives someone an ofce, he also gives him sense |nico]','is
an old chestut which will scarcely be taken seriously by anyone
nowadays.
In the importance which circumstances have again led goverents
to attach to the way in which philosophers conduct thei business,
there is no mistaking the fact that the stdy of philosophy now seems
in many other respects to require an element Mso]of protecton
and encouragement. For in so many publicatons in the feld of
the positve sciences, as well as in works of religious edifcaton and
other indeterminate literature, the reader encounters not only that
contempt for philosophy which I have already referred to, in that
the very people who reveal that their intellectual development
Cclo/i/ug] is extemely retarded and that philosophy is com
pletely alien to them also teat it as something they have finished and
done with; beyond this, we also fnd tat such writers expressly
ipugn philosophy and declare its content, the csocioc/csgoiiisos]
Csand of physical and spiritual nature, the csgoiiisos]imi/,to be a
foolish, indeed sinfl presumpton, and that rcsso,and again rcses,
and in endless repetton rcsso is arraigned, belittled, and con
demned. Or at the very least, they let us see how, for a large prop or-
1 8
Prece
ton of those engaged in supposedly scientfic study, the claims of the
concept consttute an embarrassment from which they are neverthe
less unable to escape. If, I say, one is confronted with such
phenomena Lnc/ioug], one might almost begin to suspect that
taditon is )si/issias]ciw no longer worthy of respect nor
sufficient to guarantee is/rcoc and a contnued public exstence
Fiz] to the study of philosophy.ti8 - The declamatons and
presumptuous outbursts against philosophy which are so common in
our tme afford the peculiar spectacle on the one hand of being in the
right, by virtue of that superficialit to which philosophical science has
been degraded, and on the other of themselves being rooted in the
very element against which they so ungratefully tur. For by declaring
the cogniton of tuth to be a futle endeavour, this self-stled
philosophizing has reduced all thoughts and all topics isi/sc/w/,
just as the depotsm of the Roman emperors rscc//isiioaisos
between paticians and slaves, virtue and vice, honour and dishonour,
and knowledge Koiois] and ignorance.2o A a result, the concept
of tuth and the laws of ethics are reduced to mere opinions and
subjectve convictons, and the most criminal principles - since they,
too, are csociaiss are accorded the same status as those laws; and in
the same way, all objects, however barren and partcular pcrtilo/cr],
and all materials, however arid, are accorded the same status as what
consttutes the interest of all tng people and the bonds of the
ethical world.
It should therefore be considered a stoke of gss ]noofor science
- although in fact, as I have already mentoned,2i it is a ocssc
csosocof the i/iog8cc/]itself - that this philosophizing, which
could well have contnued to spin itself into its own web of sc/s/csiic
iss, has come into closer contact with actualit, in which the
principles of rights and dutes are a serious matter, and which lives in
t
Hegel' nole: I was reminded of such views on reading a letter ofJohannes von Muller
(Werke [Tubingen, 1 81 0-19], Part Vtt,p. 56), where he says of the conditon of Rome in
1803 when the city was under French rule: 'Asked how the public educatonal insttu
tons were faring, a professor replied: "On les tolere comme les bordels." " ` One can
stll even hear people recommendilg so-called 'ratonal theory' [Veunflehre], i.e. logc,
perhaps in the belief that no one in any case bothers about it any longer as a dry and
unfruitl science, or that, if this does happen now and again, those who study it vfnd
only vacuous formulae, neither benefcial nor detimental, so that the recommendaton
cannot possibly do any harm, even if it does no good either.
"Tralllalor's nole: 'They are tolerated, like the brothels.'
1 9
Philosophy oj Right
the lght of its consciousness of these principles, and that a o//|csplit
has consequently resulted between the two. It is i/isc r/ciiso s]
/i/sss/,iscaoc/iqwhich is the subject of misunderstandings, and I
accordingly come back to my earlier observaton that, since philo
sophy is /srciisos]i/rciisoc/,it is for that very reason the csr-
/osisos]i/rsoicoi/cctoc/, not the settng up of a sn/so
which exsts God knows where - or rather, of which we can very well
say that we know where it exsts, namely in the errors of a one-sided
and empt ratocinaton. I the course of the following teatse, I have
remarked that even Plato's Rqo//ic,a proverbial example of an mq
iec/,is essentally the embodiment of nothing other than the nature
of Greek ethics; and Plato, aware that the ethics of his tme were
being penetated by a deeper principle which, within ths context,
could appear immediately only as an as yet unsatsfed longing and
hence only as a destuctve force, was obliged, in order to counteract
it, to seek the help of that very longing itself. But the help he required
had to come fom above, and he could seek it at frst only in a
partcular xic/form of Greek ethics. By this means, he imagined
he could overcome the destuctve force, and he thereby inflicted the
gravest damage on the deeper drive behind it, namely fee infinite
personality. But he proved his greatess of spirit by the fact tat the
very principle on which the distnctve character of his Idea turs is
the pivot on which the impending world revoluton ted.
What is ratonal is actual;
and what is actual is ratonal.2
This convicton is shared by every ingenuous consciousness as well as
by philosophy, and the latter takes it as its point of departure in
considering both the sinioc/and the ociorc/universe. If reflecton,
[ng,Jr-wh r form the sub' 've consciousness e
--.' regards the rsoias ccioand looks beyond it D a spm of superior
knowledge, it fnds itself in a vain positon; and since it has actualit
only in the present, it is itself mere vanit. Conversely, if the Icis
seen as 'only an idea', a representaton |srsihug] in the realm of
opinion, philosophy affords the opposite insight that nothing is actual
except the Idea. For what matters is to recogne in the semblance of
the temporal and tansient the substance which is immanent and the
eteral which is present. For since the ratonal, which is synonymous
with the Idea, becomes actual by entering into exteral exstence
20
T
'
Prece
[Existenz], it emerges in an infnite wealth of forms, appearances, and
shapes and surrounds its core with a brightly coloured covering in
which consciousness at fst resides, but which only the concept can
penetate in order to fnd the inner pulse, and detect its contnued
beat even within the exteral shapes. But the infinitely varied circum
stances which take shape within this exteralit as the essence
manifests itself within it, this infinite material and its organizaton, are
not the subject-matter of philosophy. To deal with them would be to
interfere in things [Di1ge] with which philosophy has no concer, and
it can save itself the touble of giving good advice on the subject. Plato
could well have refrained from recommending nurses never to stand
stll with children but H keep rocking them in their arms; and Fichte
likewise need not have perfected his passpor rulations to the point of
'constuctng', as the expression ran, the requirement that the pass
ports of suspect persons should carry not only their personal descrip
ton but also their painted likenessP I deliberatons of this kind, no
tace of philosophy remains, and it can the more readily abstai from
such ulta-wisdom because it is precisely in relaton to this infinite
multtude of subjects that it should appear at its most liberal. I this
way, philosophical science wlalso show itself furthest removed fom
the hated which the vanit of superior wisdom displays towards a
multtude of circumstances and insttutons - a hated in which pett
ness takes the greatest of pleasure, because this is the only way in
which it can attain self-esteem [Selbstgeihl.
This teatse, therefore, in so far as it deals with politcal science,
shall be nothing other than an attempt to comprehend a1d portray the
state as a1 i1herently ratio1al entit. A a philosophical compositon, it
must distance itself as far as possible fom the obligaton to constuct
a state as it ought to be; such instucton as it may contain cannot be
aimed at instctng the state on how it ought to be, but rather at
showing how the state, as te ethical universe, should be recognized.
'Ioou 'P6oo, [oou xai i rorHla.
Hie Rhodus, hie saltus.24
To comprehend what is is the task of philosophy, for what is is reason.
As far as the individual is concered,ch individuany case a

y, too, is its 0Bll time comprehended i1

It is just as foolish to imagine that any philosophy can
tanscend its contemporary world as that an individual can overleap
21
Philosophy ofRight
his own tme or leap over Rhodes.
25
If his theory does indeed
tanscend his own tme, if it builds itself a world csiisog/iis/,then
it certainly has an exstence, but only within his opinions - a pliant
medium in which the imagin
at
n can constuct anything it pleases.
With little alteraton, the saying just quoted would read:
Hccis the rose, dance /cc.

What lies between reason as self-conscious spirit and reason as

present actualt, what separates the former from the latter and
prevents it fom finding satsfacton in it, is the fetter of some abstac
ton or other which has not been liberated into [the form of the
concept. To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present
;7
and thereby to delight in the present - this ratonal insight is the
csoci/iciisowith actuality which phlosophy grants to those who have
received the inner call is cs/o, to preserve their subjectve
freedom in the realm of the substantal, and at the same tme to stand
with their subjectve freedom not in a partcular and contngent situa
ton, but in what has being in and for itself.
This is also what consttutes the more concrete sense of what was
described above in more abstact terms as the ooiqs]]noccsioi.
For )m in its most concrete signifcance is reason as conceptual
cogniton, and csoioi is reason as the substantal essence of both
ethical and natural actualit; te conscious identt of the two is the
philosophical Idea. - It is a great obstnacy, the kind of obstnacy
which does honour to human beings, that tey are unwlg to
acknowledge in their atttudes Csioug] anything which has not
been justfied by thought - and this obstnacy is the characteristc
propert of the modem age, as well as being the distnctve principle
of Protestantsm. What Luther inaugurated as faith in feeling and in
the testmony of the spirit is the same thing that the spirit, at a more
mature stage of its development, endeavours to grasp in the cscqiso
as to free itself in the present and thus find itself therein. It has
become a famous sayng that 'a half-philosophy leads away from God'
- and it is the same half-measure which defnes cogniton as an
ciciisoto the tuth - 'whereas tue philosophy leads to God'
/
8
the same applies to philosophy and the state. Reason is not content
with an approxmaton which, as something 'neither cold nor hot', it
'spews out of its mouth'
/
9
and it is as little content with that cold
despair which confesses that, in this temporal world, things are bad or
22
I
Preae
at best indiferent, but that nothing better can be expected here, so
that for this reason alone we should live at peace with actualit. The
peace which cogniton establishes with the actual world has more
warmth in it than this.
A frther word on the subject of issoiog iosim:isos on how the
world ought to be: philosophy, at any rate, always comes too late to
perform this functon. Athe i/sog/iof the world, it appears only at a
tme when actualit has gone through its formatve process and
attained its completed state. This lesson of the concept is necessarily
also apparent fom history, namely that it is only when actualit has
reached maturit that the ideal appears opposite the real and
reconstucts this real world, which it has grisped in its substance, in
the shape of an intellectual realm.30 When philosophy paints it grey
in grey, a shape of lfe has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated,
but only recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy; the owl of
Minerva begins its fght only with the onset of dusk.31
~
~
But it is tme to conclude this foreword; as a foreword, its fncton
was in any case merely to make exteral and subjectve comment on
the point of view of the work to which it is prefaced. If a content is to
be discussed philosophically, it wl bear only scientfc and objectve
teannent; in the same way, the author will regard any critcism
expressed in a form other than that of scientfc discussion of the
matter So/] itself merely as a subjectve postscript and random
asserton, and wl teat it with indiference.
Berln, zJune t zo
z
Intoducton

1
The subject-matter of i//i/sss/icc/sciocs]riis the Hcs]ri
the concept of right and its actualizaton.

Philosophy has to do with Ideas and therefore not with what

are commonly described as rcsocqis. On the contary, it
shows that the latter are one-sided and lacking i tuth, and
that it is the csocqialone (not what is so ofen called by that
name, but which is merely an abstact determinaton of the
ding) ,and i such a way that it
gives actualit to itself. Everg other than(tiisacflit
(wllCSite-d-brncept Itsel is tansitory oioc
Dcsio] , exteral contngency, opinion, appearance without
essence, untuth, decepton, etc. The s/c_which the concept
assumes i its actualizaton, and which is essental for cogni
ton of the csocqiitself, is different fom its ]no of being
purely as coIicept, and is the other essental moment of the
Idea.
1iiiso.The concept and its exstence [Eistt'lz] are two aspects [of
te same thing], separate and united, like soul and body. The body is the
same life as the soul, and yet the two can be said to lie outside one
another. A soul without a body would not be a living thing, and vice versa.
Thus the exstence Dcsio]of the concept is its body, just as te latter
soIroduced it. The buds have the tee witin m and
it entre stengt, altough they are not yet the tee itself. The
tee corresponds entrely to the simple image of te bud. If te body does
2
5
B+[sri; .t. tet buluU8H88

`
I
:

I
v
r
Philosophy ojRight
notcorrcspond to thc souI, it is awrctchcd thingindccd. f
cxstcnccDcs|andthcconccpt, ofbod andsouI,isthcIdca. Itisnot '
just a armony, Mothing Iivcswhich is
notinsomc way Idca. ghtis frdom, andin ordcrto bc

uuIy apprchcndcd, it must bc rccognizabIc in its conccpt and in thc

_
conccpt'scxstcncc Dcsi.

2
Jhc scicncc ofrghtisccrif /i/sss/,.Ithasthcrcforctodcvclop
thcHc,whichisthcrcasonwithnanobjcct Cgsic],outofthc
conccpt,orwhat cstothcsamcmng,mustobscrvcthcpropcr
mancntdcvclopmcntofthcthng8cc/]itsclfAsapart[ofphilo-
asadctcrmnatcsicrigsii,whichisthcrso/ianduuth
ofwhatrcit, andwhatprcccdcditis thc so-callcdrss]ofthat
rcsult. Hcncc thc conccpt ofright, so far as it csigiis /igis
conccmcd,faUs outsidc thc scicncc ofright,its dcducuonisprcsup-
poscd hcrc and is tobc takcnasgic. '
iiis (C). PhiIosophy forms a circIc. Ithas aninidaI orimmcdiatc
point- foritmustbcgnsomcwhcrc- apointwhichisnotdcmonsuatcd
and is not a rcsuIt. But thc stardng point ofphiIosophyis immcdiatcIy
rcIadvc,foritmustappcaratanothcrcnd-pointas arcsuIt.PhiIosophyis
ascqucnccwhichisnotsuspcndcdinmid-air,itdocs notbcginimmcdi-
atcIy,butis roundcdo|IwithinitscI|.
According to thc formal, non-phlosophcal mcthod ofthc
scicnccs, thc hrstthngwhchissought and rcqurcd,atlcast
for thc sakc ofcxtcmalscicnuncform, is thc
_
.Jhc
posiuvcscicnccofrightcannotbcmuchconccmcdwthths,
howcvcr, sincc its chcfam is to statc _gl
\
_ Rc/is], i.c. what thc parucular lcgal dctcrminauons arc.
Jhs is thc rcason for thc wamng. 'omis dcnnuo n iurc
. civlpcrculosa.''Andinfact,thcmorcincohcrcntandntcr-
:
nally conuadictory thc dctcrmnauons ofa [systcm oq rght
arc,thclcsspossiblcitwlbctomakcdcmuonswthnit,for
dcnnuonsshouldcontanunvcr)g
\ prcscntcontcxt,thcscwouIdmmcdiatclymakcthcconuadic-
sc,whatisunjust os |ra|/|cl]-
.
"Trnslator's I/Ote: 'In civil law all defnitons are hazardous.'
26
Introduaion
1-2
visiblc inallits nakcdncss. Jhus, in Romanlawcsreoisd
Rc/i],for cxamplc, no dchnuon ofa /ooc/igwouldbc
possiblc, for thc slavc coud not bc subsumcd undcr ,
indccd, thc status Sico ] ofthc slavc docs violcncc to that
conccpt. Jhc dchniuons of'propcrq' and 'proprictor' would
sccm cqually hazardousinmanysituauons.- But thc dcduc-
uon ofthc dch:iiuon maypcrhaps bc rcachcd by mcans of
cqmology, orchcflybyabsnacuon fromparucu
ulumtcIy bascon thc sni/
/oog] ofhuman bcings. Jhc corrccmcss ofthc dchniuon is
thcn madc to dcpcnd on its agrccmcnt\vith prcvailingidcas
|srsi//tgo] . Jhis mcthod lcavcs out of account what is
alonc csscnualtoscicncc-withrcgardtocontcnt,thcocssii,
s]i/i/iogScc/:]inandforitsclf(inthiscasc, ofright),and
withrcgard to form,thcnaturcofthcconccpt.nphilosophi-
cal cognuon, on thc othcr hand, thc chicf conccm is thc

andthcroutcbywhichithasbccomc a
istsprofaddcducuon.Jhus,givcnthatitscsioiis
ncccssary]riisy,thc sccond stcp is to look aroundforwhat
corrcsponds to it in our idcas |sni//tgo] and languagc.
Butthis conccptasitis foritsclfin its imi/maynotonlybc
dif!crcnt from our rqrsiciiss |sni//tg] of it: thc two
must also diffcr in thcir form and shapc. f, howcvcr, thc
rcprcscntauonisnotalsofalscnitscontcnt,thcconccptmay
wcll bc shown to bc containcd in it and prcscnt in csscncc
withinit,thatis,thcrcprcscntauonma bcraiscdtothcform
ofthc conccpt. But it is so far hom bcmgthc mcasurc and
`
critcrion ofthc conccptwhichisncccssaryandnuc foritsclf
that it must rathcr dcrivc its nuth hom thc conccpt, and
rccognizcandcorrcctitsclfwiththchclpofthclattcr.-Butif,
on thc othcr hand, thc formcr manncr of cogniuon with its
formal dchniuons, infcrcnccs, proofs, and thc likc has now
virtuallydisappcarcd,thc othcr modc whichhasrcplaccditis
abadsubsututc: thatis,dcas ingcncral, andhcncc alsothc
dca ofrightandits mrthcrdctcrminauons, arc takcnupand
asscrtcdinmmcdiatcfashionas]c/ss]csosososss,andour
* -` -~ .
natural or intcnsihcd fcclings, oursa:/crtand oi/osicso,
c thc sourcc ofright.' fthis is thc mostconvcnicnt
mcthodofall,itisalsothclcastphilosophical nottomcnuon
Philosophy ofRight
hcrc othcr aspccts of this vicw, which has immcdiatc
rc|cvancc 8czic/:tg] to acuon and not |ust to cogniuon.
Whcrcas thc mst- adnuttcd|yforma|- mcthod docs at|cast
rcquircthc]nu ofthcconccptinitsdchniuonsandthc]nt
of cccssc cogniuon in its proofs, thc modc ofimmcdiatc
consciousncss and fcc|ing makcs thc sub|ccuviq, con-
ungcncy,andarbiuarincssofknow|cdgcintoitsprmcip|c.-A
famIIiariqwith thc naturc ofscicnuhc proccdurc in phi|o-
sophy, as cxpoundcd in phi|osophica| |ogic, is hcrc
prcsupposcd.

Kightis in gcncra

(aroughitsntofhavingwithin
a [parucu|arj statc, and thisis thc princip|c which
undcr|Icsknow|cdgc Kcniois] ofright,i.c.i/cssiiivcscicccs]rig/i.
)) In tcrms ofcsocsi, this right acquircs a posiuvc c|cmcnt (c)
throughthcparucu|a

icttal dta)agop|c,itsstagcofkisisri-
ca/ dcvc|opmcnt, and thc who|c contcxt of rc|auons govcmcd by
ciorc/ occcssiq, '() through thc ncccssitywhcrcbya systcm of|cga|
right must contain thc c/|cciiso ofthc univcrsa| conccpt to thc
parucu|arandcxicmc/qgivcncharactcrisucsofob|ccts Ccgw sioe]
andinstanccs- an app|icauonwhichisno |ongcr[amattcrotj spccu-
|auvcthoughtandthcdcvc|opmcntofthcconccpt,but[ot|subsump-
uon by thc undcrstanding, (y) through thc /ttal dctcm auons
rcquircd forckiogcasisosinactua|iq.
. .. `= ..
If thc fcc|ings of thc hcart, [pcrsona|j inc|inauons, and
arbiuarincss arc sct up in opposiuon to posiuvc right and
|aws, phi|osophy at |cast cannot rccognizc such authoriucs.
Jhatforccandqrannymaybcanc|cmcntinposiuvcrightis
conungcnttothc|at|cr,andhasnothingtodowithitsnaturc.
atcr in this work ( [ [ z r r-zr ,), it wl bc shown atwhat
ustbccomc posiuvc. Jhc dctcm auo
wlbcdiscusscd in thatcontcxtarc mcnuoncd hcrc on|yin
ordcrtoindicatcthc|in:itsCrw zc]ofphiIosophica|rightand
atthcsamcumctoru|coutanypossib|cidca |srsic//og],|ct
a|onccxpcctauon,thatitssystcmaucdcvc|opmcntshou|dgivc
risctoaposiuvccodc of|aws suchasisrcquircdbyan actua|
z
Introducion
statc. - atural law or philosophical right is diffcrcnt hom
posiuvc right, but it would bc a gravc misundcrstanding to
distort this diffcrcncc into an opposiuon or antagomsm, on
thc connary, thcirrclauonislkc thatbctwccnnsututcsand
Fandccts.- With rcgardtothc historicalclcmcntinposiuvc
right strcfcrrcd to in [3 abovc), Montcsquicu statcd thc
nuc historical vicw, thc cnuincLhicavic

int,
tl:at lcgislauon in gcncral and its paruculartcauons

shouldnotbcconsidcrcdinisolauonandinthc absnact,but
-

rathcrasadcgcndcntmomcntwithinstotaliq, inthccon-
tcxt of all thc othcr dctcrminauons which consututc thc
.~-
!
y

2-3
thcir gcnuinc sihcancc, andhcncc alsothcir|usuhcauon.'
d da-

uons ofrightcsi/ccrioii_sk._
Jhis task, likc that ofrccognizingthc logical consistcncy of
suchdctcrminauonsbycomparingthcmwithprcviouslycxst-
inglcgal rclauons, is mcritorious and praiscworthywithnits
own sphcrc, and b

l
approach- unlcss,thatis to say, dcvclopmcnthomhistorical
isconmscdwithdcvclo
mc signihcancc ofhistorical canaua dhcauon is
it!muo4ich |. -.s1
which isvcryimportantand shouldbc
m ybomcinmnd,isatmcsamcumcavcryobviousonc,a
dctcrminauonofrightmaybcshowntobccnurclygrsoi
and cssisioiii/thcprcvai!ingcircosicocsand oiioglcgal
insutuuons, yct it may bc connary to right urai/ic/] and
irrauonal in and for itsclf, likc numcrous dctcrmnauons of

RomancivillawPnvcirdi]whichfollowcdquitcconsistcntly
hom such insutuuons as Roman patcmal authoriq and
Romanmanimony.Butcvcnifthcdctcrminauonsofrightarc
ri,nal,itisoncthingto dcmonsnatcthatthisis
so - and this cannot nuly bc donc cxccpt by mcans ofthc
conccpt - and anothcr to dcpict thcir historical cmcrgcncc
and thc circumstanccs, cvcntualiucs, nccds, and incidcnts
wmch lcd to thcir innoducuon. Jhiskind ofdcmonsnauon
and (pragmauc) cogniuon in tcrms ofproxmatc or rcmotc
historical causcs is ohcn callcd 'cxplanauon', or cvcn morc
29
Philosophy ofRight
commonly 'comprehension', in the belef Mioog] that this
kind of historical demonstaton is all - or rather, the one
essental thing - that needs to be done in order to cs/
the law or a legal insttuton, whereas in fact the tuly essental
issue, the concept of the thing Scc/], has not even been
mentoned. - Similarly, we ofen hear talk of Roman or Ger
manic 'csocqis s]ng/t', or of such 'csocqis of right' as are
defined in this or that legal code, although these codes contain
no reference to concepts, but only to general imiciisss]
ig/i,propositons of the understanding, principles, laws, and
the like. - By disregarding the diference in queston, it
becomes possible to shif te point of view and to tum the
request for a tue justfcaton into a justfcaton by circum
stances, a logical deducton from premises which may in
themselves ]sid]be as valueless as the conclusions derived
fom them, etc. ; in short, te relatve is put in place of the
absolute, and thin place of the nature of
the thing Scd itelf When a historical justfcaton con
fses an origin in exteral factors with an ori 'n in the con
cept, it unconsciously achieves the opposite of what it intends.
1 can be shown tat the origin of an insttuton was entel

xedient and necessary under the specifc circumstances of

the tme, e reqUements of the storical vie oint are
t.But 's is sup osed to amout-
.S
i

or since the original circumstances are no log

insttuton has thereb lost its me..
Thus if for example, the socsinsare justfed by an appeal
to their services in cultvatng and populatng areas of wilder
ness and in preserving scholarship through instucton, copy
ing of manuscripts, etc., and these services are regarded as the
reason Cnu and purpose 8siiooug] of their contnued
exstence, what in fact follows fom these past services is that,
since the circumstances have now changed completely, the
monasteries have, at least in this respect, become

s
and inappropriate. - Since it has now been shown that the
historical significance of origins, along with their historical
demonstaton and exositon, belongs to a different sphere
fom the philosophical view of the same origins and of the

_D
1
T
Introducion
, concept of the ting, the two approaches can to that extent
o one another. But since they do not
always maintain such peacefl relatons, even in scientc
matters, Ishall quote something relatng to their mutual con
tact which appears in Herr [Gustav] Hugo's Ioi/ssls]i/
Hisis s]Rsco Lc L/r/oc/ rCs.lic/i s reisc/w
Rc/is,1790], and which wl also frther elucidate their sup
posed mode of oppositon.5 Herr Hug, out in the
passage in queston (ffh editon [1818], 53) 'that Cicero
praises the Twelve Tables, while /ssliogolcocat the philo
sophers',6 whereas 'the philosopher Favorinus teats them just
as many a great philosopher has subsequently teated positve
right'. I the same context, Herr Hugo replies once and for
to such teatent with the explanaton that 'Favorinus oor-
sissthe Twelve Tables ]osics/|ii/as the philosophers have
understood positve right'. - As to the correcton of the philo
sopher Favorinus by the jurist Sextus Caecilius in [Aulus]
Gellius' Ascisiiicc,x,i , it is primarily a statement of the
tue and lastng principle which must underlie the justcaton
of anything whose impact is merely positve.7 'Non ignoras',
says Caecilius very aptly to Favorinus, 'legum ssriooiiciset
medelas pro ism moribus et pro rerum publicarum
gon/os, ac pro utlitatum rcsoiio ratonibus, proque
viiism, quibus medendum est, ]vsn/os, oicri ac ]cii,
oo oos sicio csosisir, quin, ut facies coeli et maris, ita
rmatque )riooctempestatbus vcnior. Quid salubrius
visum est rogatone illa Stolonis . . . quid utlius plebiscito
Voconio . . . quid tam necessarium exstmatum est . . . quam
lex Licinia . . . ? Omnia icohaec s//|ircic et sric sunt
civitats opulenta . . + These laws are positve in so far as
ir sigcance and appropriateness are cirasicoiic/and
"Translalor's nole: 'You know very well that the advantages and remedies afforded by the
laws change and vary m accordance with the customs of the age and tpes of consttu
ton, with consideratons of present advantage and of defciencies to be remedied, and
that they do not persist m a constant state. On the contary, they are changed by te
storms of chance and circumstance, just as storms change the face of the' sea and sky.
What could be more salutary than the legal proposal ofStolo8 . . . , what more useful than
the popular decree ofVoconius,9 . . . , and what has been deemed as necessary . . . as the
Licinian law = = . ? And yet they have all been obliterated and obscured by the opulence of
the present stateIO .
31
Philosophy ofRight
commonly 'comprehension', in the belief Misog] that this
kind of historical demonstaton is all - or rather, the one
essental thing - that needs to be done in order to csr/o
the law or a legal insttuton, whereas in fact the tuly essental
issue, the concept of the thing Scc/], has not even been
mentoned. - Similarly, we ofen hear talk of Roman or Ger
manic 'csocqis s]rig//', or of such 'csocqis of right' as are
defined in this or that legal code, although these codes contain
no reference to concepts, but only to general imiociisoss]
ng/i,propositons of the understanding, principles, laws, and
the like. - By disregarding the difference in queston, it
becomes possible to shif the point of view and to tum the
request for a tue justcaton into a justfcaton by circum
stances, a logical deducton from premises which may in
themselves rsid]be as valueless as the conclusions derived
fom tem, etc.; in short, the relatve is put in place of the
absolute, and thin place of the nature of
the thing Scc/] itelf. When a historical justficaton con
fses an origi in exteral factors with an ori n in the con
ceRt, it unconsciously achieves the opposite of what it intends.
`
Bit can be shown that the origin of an insttuton was entrel
xedient and necessary under e specifc circumstances of
the tme, e requIrements of the storical vie oint are
fl e . But s is sup osed to amout-

or since the original circumstances are no lon

insttuton has thereby lost its me+.
Thus if, for example, the socsirisare justed by an appeal
to their services in cultvatng and populatng areas of wilder-
,
ness and in preserving scholarship through instucton, copy
ing of manuscripts, etc., and these services are regarded as the
reason Cmo and purpose Baiioog] of their contnued
exstence, what in fact follows fom these past services is that,
since the circumstances have now changed completely, the
monasteries have, at least in m respect, become

s
and inappropriate. - Since it has now been shown that the
hstorical signcance of origins, along with their historical
demonstaton and expositon, belongs to a different sphere
fom the philosophical view of the same origins and of the
` --
30
T
I

I
Introduction
concept of the thing, the two approaches can to that extent
'

to one another. But since they do not

always maintain such peacefl relatons, even in scientc
matters, I shall quote something relatng to their mutual con
tact which appears in Herr [Gustav] Hugo's Ioi/ssls]i/
Hisis s]Rsco Lc L//oc/ Csclic/i es eisao
Rc/is, 1
7
90], and whch wlalso frther elucidate their sup
posed mode of oppositon.s Herr Hug, out in the
passage in queston (ff editon [1 81 8], [)'that Cicero
praises the Twelve Tables, while /ssliogolcocat the philo
sophers'
/
whereas 'the philosopher Favorinus teat them just
as many a great philosopher has subsequendy teated positve
right'. In the same context, Herr Hugo replies once and for
to such teatent with the explanaton that 'Favorinus oo-
sissthe Twelve Tables ]osio/|ii/as the philosophers have
understood positve right'. Ato the correcton of the philo
sopher Favorinus by the jurist Sextus Caecilius in [Aulus]
Gellius' Asctsiticc,x,i , it is primarily a statement of the
tue and lastng principle which must underlie the justcaton
of anything whose impact is merely positve.7 'Non ignoras',
says Caecilius ver apdy to Favorinus, 'legum ssnooiiciset
medelas pro ism moribus et pro rerum publicarum
gon/os, ac pro utlitatum csoiio ratonibus, proque
viiism, quibus medendum est, ]vsn/os, oici ac )cti,
oo oos sicio csosisi, quin, ut facies co eli et maris, ita
m atque ]nooc tempestatbus vcnoio. Quid salubrius
visum est rogatone ilia Stolonis . . . quid utlius plebiscito
Voconio . . . quid tam necessarium exstmatum est . . . quam
lex Licinia . . . ? Omnia ico haec s//|icic et snc sunt
civitats opulenta These laws are positve in so far as
ir sigcance and appropriateness are cicosicoiic/and
"Translalor's nole: 'You know ver well that the advantages and remedies afforded by the
laws change and vary m accordance wit the customs of te age and tpes of consttu
ton, wit consideratons of present advantage and of defciencies to be remedied, and
that they do not persist m a constant state. On the contary, they are changed by te
stors of chance and circumstance, just as storms change the face of the' sea and sky.
What could be more salutar than the legal proposal ofStol08 , ., what more useful than
the popular decree ofVoconius,9 . , . , and what has been deemed as necessary , . . as the
Licinian law , , , ? And yet they have all been obliterated and obscured by the opulence of
the present stateJO = .
1
Philosophy ofRight
. their value is therefore entrely historical; they are accordin I
.he . and
goverents have done for te circumstances of their tme
and laid down for the conditons under which they lived is a
distnct issue ]which should be assessed by
htory, whse recogniton of it wlbe all the more profound u
such an assessment is supported by philosophical insights. I
shall, however, cite an example of Caecilius' frther attempt
to justf the Twelve Tables against Favorinus, because in so
doing, he employs the eterally deceptve method of the
understanding and its mode of ratocinaton, namely by so-
ligogssroseCm]ro/oi/iog Soid
g
that the latter has thereby een justed. He mentons the

w which, afer,. l had elapsed,

gave the creditor the right to Lthe deptor or to sell Hinto
slavery, or even, if there were several creditors,

ss /,tg t,} oo,so/oJcois_iss

oc/sriss/iii/,/s/so/ioaroscesssri/go/isoJvooiog
(a clause which would have benefted Shakespeare's Shylock
in IkMrc/oois]|oicand which he would most grateflly
have accepted).1l I support of this law, Caecilius puts
forward the gssorossothat it provided an additonal guaran
tee of good faitand-that, given the abominable nature of the
law, it wir intended that it should be enforcedY In his
thoughtlessness, he not only fails to refect that ths latter
provision 8siiog] fustates the former intenton, namely
that the law should guarantee good faith, but also overlooks
te fact that he h slt example immediately afer
wards of how the law on false witess was rendered ineffec
tual by its excessive severit. - But it is not clear what Herr
Hugo means whei e says that Favorinus did not ooosioo
the law; any schoolboy is capable of understanding it, and
Shylock would have understood better than anyone else the
clause in queston, which would have been of so much advan
tage to h,by 'ooesiooiog, Herr Hugo must have meant
only that degree 8i/ug] of understanding which is satsfied
aTranslalor's 1ole: The text in the Suhrkamp editon of Hegel's Werke Y11 reads Rechlsan
lei! ('legal share'). This is clearly an error for Redllsnadlleil, the correct reading as in
Ing's editon (PR 11, 102).
3
2
T
'
J
Introduction
if a gssrcssocan be found for such a law. - Incidentally, a
frther misunderstanding of which Caecilius convicts
Favorinus in the same context is one to which a philosopher
may readily confess without blushing - namely his failure to
realize that iooio, which the law specifed, 'as distnct
fom crcrc',as the only mode of tansport to be provided to
bring a sick man as witess to the court, should be understood
to signif not only a horse but also a coach or wagonP Cae
cilius was able to derve fom tis legal determinaton a fr
ther proof of the excellence and precision of the old laws, for
in determining how a sick witess was to be summoned to
testf in court, they even went so far as to distnguish not just
between a horse and a wagon, but even between diferent
kinds of wagon - between a covered and upholstered wagon,
as Caecilius explains, and a less comfortable one. We would
thus be lef with a choice between the severit of the original
law and the tivialit of such determinatons; but to descrbe
such things, let alone leared eXpositons of them, as 'tivial',
would be among the greatest possible afont to scholarship
of this and other kinds.
But in the textbook cited above, Herr Hugo also has occa
sion to speak of rciisoc/|qin connecton with Roman law, and
I was partcularly stuck by the following points. In his teat
ment of i/ns)si/sngios]i/siciisi/I/vIc//a
( 38 and 39), he says that 'people (in Rome) had many
needs and were obliged to work, requiring the cssisicoc of
draught animals and beasts of burden soc/ a son/vs
possess, that the territory of Rome consisted of alterate hills
and valleys, that the city stood on a hill, etc. - allusions which
.
were perhaps meant to flf the intentons of Montesquieu,
but which wlscarcely be found to have captured the latter's
spirit. He then points out (
4
0) 'that the positon with regard
to rig/iwas stll very far fom satsfing the /ig/sidemands o '
rcsso'. (This is quite correct; Roman family law
Fcihorc/i], slavery, etc. do not satsf even the most
modest demands of reason.) But in dealing with later periods,
Herr Hugo forgets to tell us in which of them, if any, Roman
law scii;f i//ig/si coss]rcsso. In 289, however,
Herr Hugo says of the classical jurists in the period s]i/
33
Philosophy of Right
/ig/siw/soi,os/i/ug]s]Rsco /ccscscioc'that it
has long since been notced that the classical jurists had a
philosophical educaton'; but 'few people are aware' (although
the many editons of Herr Hugo's textbook have ensured that
more people are now aware) 'that no category of writers is so
eminently deserving as these same Roman jurists is//ilo
to the mathematcians in respect of logical deducton fom
first principles or to the new founder of metaphysics in respect
of the stgly distnctve way in which they develop their
concepts - the latter being confirmed by the rocrlc//fact
that there are nowhere so many inc/sisisas in the classical
jurists and in Kant'. - That logical consistency which Leibniz
praises is certainly an essental characteristc of the science of
right, as of mathematcs and every other science of the under
standing; but this logical consistency of the understanding has
nothing to do with the satsfacton of the demands of reason
and with philosophical science.14 Apart fom this, however,
j' \ te very iceosisioof the Roman jurists and praetors should

be regarded as one of their greatest virtues, for it enabled

them to,. ble
.
sttutons, although they were at the same tme compelled to
bal distnctons on the ' , (as when they called
/ssm om what nevertheless amounted to an
inheritance)15 and even silly excuses (and silliness is equally
an inconsistency) in order to preserve the letter of the Twelve
Tables, for example by the ficton or pretenceb that a daughter
was a son( (see ]. G.] Heineccius, oiioiicioRsccnt
. . . /i/rI [rankfrt, 1 77 r] , tt. II, 2
4
).16 - But it is ludicrous
to see the classical jurists lumped togeter with Kant because
of a few iric/sissos divisions - partcularly those cited in
Note 5 to Herr Hugo's remarks - and to see this kind of thing
called 'development of concepts'.
__.,-
"Translator's note: Hegel uses here the Latn adverb callide.
b
Translator's note: Hegel uses the Latn and Greek ters fctio and mogtot.
(Translator's note: Hegel uses the Latn terms flia and flils.
3
4
Introduaion
Jhe basis Bseo] of right is the rc/ s]sirii in general and its
precise locauon and_ointofdegartureisthe , me wlis), so
that beedom consututes its substance and desuny Bsiioog] and
the system ofri ht is the realm ofactualized beedom, theworld of
spiritproduced fromwt itselfasa secondnature.
iiies d,C). The freedom of the wdl can best be explained by
reference to physical nature. For heedom is |ust as much a basic
determinauonofthewillasweightis abasic determinauon ofbodies. If
matterisdescribedasheavy,onemightUthatthispredicateismerely
conungent,butthisisnotso, fornothinginmatterisweightless. onthe
conuary,matterisweightitself.Heavinessconsututesthebodyandisthe
body.Itis|ustthesamewithheedomandthewill,forthatwhichisheeis
thewill.Wilwithoutheedomisanemp word,|ustasheedomisactual
onlyasworassub|ect.8utasfor theconnecuonbetweenthewilland
thought,thefollowingremarksarenecessary.Spiritisthoughtingeneral,
andthehumanbeingis disunguishedhommeanimalbythought 8utit
must notbeimagined sic/ csni//] thatahumanbeingt onthe
one handandwillsontheother,andthathehas thoughtinonepocket
and voliuon in the other, for this would be an empq representauon
|ssi//:g]. The disuncuon between thought and will is simply that
betweentheocaland racucalamtudes.8uttheyarenottwosq
faculues,ontheconuary thewillisa arucularwayofthinkingtg
uanslaungitselfintoexstencej csis], tgas edrivetogiveitself
exstence.This disuncuonbetweenthoughtandw|llcanbeexpressedas
follows.WhenIthinkofanob|ectCgosics,Imake itintoathought
and

e. Forit isonlywhenI thinkthatI am

with myself i ir and it is only by com rehendin it that I can
peneuate anob|ect, itthenoongerstanusUg osedto me and Ihave
epriveditofmat ualityofitsownwhichithadforitselfinop osiuonto
me. ustasAdamsaystoEve.'Youareeshofmyeshandbone ofmy
bone'/ sodoesspiritsay. 'Thisisspiritofmyspirit, anditsaliencharacter
has disappeared.' _entauon [(sni//:o_js a _mza@,
andthis is inherentinthought. Togeneralize somethin meanstothink
it. 'I' is thoughtandle the_._
ccount eve aruculari such as my character, temperamen ow-
edge Ksiss], and age. 'I' is t y_t -

yetacuve U m s

hecolourmlcanvasoftheworldis
beore itandinthis[theoreucal]atutudeIovercome
35
Philosophy ofRight
c::/ its oppositon and make its content my own. 'I' is at home
in the world when it knows it, and even more so when it has compre
hended it. So much for the theoretcal atttude. The practcal atttude, on
the other hand, begins with thought, with the I itself, and seems at fst
to be opposed [to the world] because it immediately sets up a separaton.
In so far as I am practcal or actve, Le
myself, and to determine myself means redsel to osit a diference. But
these diferences whic I posit are nevertheless also mine, the determina
tons apply to me, and the ends to which I am impelled belong to me. Now
even ifI let go of these determinatons and differences, Le. ifI posit them
in the so-called exteral world, they stll remain mine: they are what I
have done or made, and they bear the imprint of my mind Cisi.This,
then, is the distncton between theoretcal and practcal atttudes; the
relatonship between them must now be described. De teoretca!s
essentally contained wthin the practcal; te idea |ssi/og that the
two are separate must be reJecte , or one cannot have a wl witout
intelligence. On the contary, .. the
The wldetermines itelfd tis determinaton is primarily of an
inward nature, for what I will I represent to myself as my object Cgo-
sics.The animal acts by instnct, it is d by something inward and
is therefore also practcal; but it has no wl, because it does not represent
to itself what it desires. It is equally impossible to adopt a theoretcal
atttude or to think without a wl, for in tg we are necessarily actve.
The content of what is thought certainly takes on the form of being; but
this being is something mediated, something posited by our actvit.
These distnct atttudes are therefore inseparable: they are one and the
same thing, and both moments can be found in every actvit, of thinking
and willing alike.
With regard to the feedom of the will, we may recollect the
older method of cogniton. It simply presupposed the rqrso-
iciiso|ssihug] of the ,vland attempted to set up a defni
ton of the will by extactng it fom this representaton; then,
in the manner of the older empirical psychology, the so-called
rss]of the will's feedom was derived from the various feel
ings and phenomena L)ougo o Lsc/ioug] of
ordinary consciousness, such as remorse, guilt, and the like,
which could allegedly be /cioonly in terms of a ),vl.
But it is more convenient simply to adhere to the noton that
feedom is gico as a ]ciof consciousness in whch we must
simply //iw.

The deducton i/cithe will is free and of /ci

the will and feedom are - as already remarked in 2 above -
L
Introduction
is possible only within the context of the whole [of philo
sophy]. The basic feaat siii is
initally ioihigocand that the detenninatons through which
it proceeds in its development,(l
i/ioliog|sm//o] to i/so bi are the way by which it prod-
uces Itsel as wil- w
.
ch, as practcal spirit in general, is the
proxmate tuth of intelligence. I have given an account of
these matters in my Lo./scic s]i/P/i/sss/icc/Sciocs
(Heidelberg, 1 81 7), 363-3
99
, and hope to deal with them
in greater detai on a fture occasion.3 It is all the more
necessary for me to contibute in this way to what I hope will
be a more thorough cogniton of the nature of spirit, because,
as I pointed out in the Lodscic (Remarks to 367), it L\
hard to imagine that any philosophical science can be in so
bad and neglected a conditon as that sctnos]siniwhich is
usually called 'psychology'.4 - And as for those elements
Msoi] of the concept of the will which are mentoned in
this and the following paragraphs of the Intoducton and
which result fom the premise referred to above, it Lpossible
to form an idea |ssi//o] of them by consultng the self
consciousness of any individual. In the first place, anyone can
discover in himself an abilit to abstact fom an what
soever, and likewise to determine himself, to posit any content

himself by his own agency; and he will likewise have exam-

ples of the frther detenninatons [of the will] within his self
consciousness.
5
The will contains (c)the element oor of the '!' 's
. pure reflecton into itself, in which every limitaton, ever content,
whetely through nature, through needs, desires,
and drives, or given and determined in some other way, is dissolved;
this is the limitless infnit of c/ss/oic/sicciiso or oicnc , m
pure thinking L onesel .
` -
Those who regard thinking as a partcular and distnctfCII0,
divorced from the will as an equally distnctfCIlty, and who in
additon even consider that thinking is prejudicial to the \vill -

37
Philosophy ofRight
cspcca||ythcgoodw|| showfromthcvcryoutsctthatthcy
arc tota||y gnorantofthc naturc ofthc wI|I (a rcmark whch
wc sha|| oftcnhavcoccasontomakconthssamcsub|cct).'-
' On|ysocs:iofthcw||s dchncdhcrc-namc|ythsc/ss/oi

sssi:Ii L c/sircciiohom cvcry dctcrmmauon n whch I
nndmysc|forwhIchIhavcpostcdmsc|, thct|Ighthom

a| thought i |ssi//oog] con-
sdcrstmsas cctntsc|f irsi:/]as frccdomandho|ds fast
to t,)lis s ogci:c rccdom r thc frccdom ofthc undcr-
_|srccdomofthc
c andpasson. f trcmanspurc|
thcorcuca|,tbccomcsnthcrc|gousrca|mthcHndufana-
` =
ucsm ofpurccontcmp|auon,but ft tums to ac

|t

c rca|mo5nau-

csm of dcsuucuon, dcmo|shng thc whoc csung soca|

a
gvcnord aunganyorganzauonwhchattcmp_
to rsc up ancw.' On|y n dcsumg somrthIng docs ths
|I5avc a fcc|Ing ofts own cxstcncc Dcsio] . It
wc|| bc|

that t w||s sposuvc conduon, for

nstancc thc

| cua|I
rc|
.
ous|fc,buttdocsnotnfact posuvcactua|Iqof

satonccgvcsrsctosom

aparucu|arzauonboth ofnsutuuons andndvdua|s, but

th

f
uc- auon mat os
ncgauvc frccdou arscs. Jhus, whatcvcr such frccdom
-
bc|Icvcs oioi] thattvv||s canntsc|ff rsi:/]bcnomorc
thananabsuactrcprcscntauon|ssi//ug],andtsactua|za-
uon can on|ybcthc fury ofdcsuucuon.
iiiso(,G). Itsnhcrcntnths c|cmcntofthcvvI||thatIamab|cto
ncc mysc|fnom cvcrying, to , and to absnact from
cvcryhng.' Thc human bcng a|onc s ab|c to abandon a|| Ug, cvcn
hsown|fc..Thcanma| cannot dothis,ta|ways
rcmans onlyncguvc,nadctcrmnauonwhchsa|cntotand towhch
t mcrc|y grows accustomcd.Thc human bcngs purc thnkngofhm-

sc|f,andon|ynthnkIngshcthispowcrtogvchimsc|funvcrsa|q,that
s,to cxgush all parucu|arity, a|| dctcrmnacy. Ths ncgauvc frccdom
Introduction

s
-
or is one-sided, but this one-sidedness
always contains within itself an essental determinaton and should there
fore not be dismissed; but the defect of the understand in is that it teats
" '
a one-side
di
aon as unique and elevates it to su reme status.
This form of freedom occurs fequen y U IStOry. The Hindus, for

example, place the highest value on mere persistence in the knowledge of

one's simple identt with oneself, on remaining within this empt space
of one's inwardness like colourless light in pure intuiton, and on
renouncing every actvity of life, every end, and every representaton
|ssi//ug.In this way, the human being becomes 8cloco.There is no
longer any distncton between the fnite human being and Brahman;
instead, ever difference [Dir enz] has disappeared in this universal
i
t.
This form [of feedom] appears more concretely in the actve fanatcism
of both politcal and religious life. A example of this was the Reign of
Terror in the French Revoluton, during which all differences of talent
and authority were supposed to be cancelled out c;gls/o.This was a
tme of tembling and quaking and of intolerance
partcular. For fanatcism wills only what is abstact, not what is art-
C,
o that whenever diferences emerge, it fnds them incompatble
,vith its own in ete acy an cancels er l is:c:q. his is why the
people, urmg the Frenc evo uton, destoyed once more the insttu-
tons they had themselves created, because all insttutons are incompat-]
ible with the abstact self-consciousness of equalit.

6
() I the same way, '' is the tansiton fom undifferentated
indeterminacy to [r

iiciiso, imiociiso, and e ssing of a

d
eterminacy as a content and object. - This content may frther be
g
v
en by nature, or generated by the concept of spirit. Through this
positng of itself as something imioci, 'I' ste s into xstence
Dcsio in general - the absolute moment of the oiio or c _
alcrizciiso of the
This second moment of imiociisois just as much ogciiciq
and cancellaton [tifleben] as the first - for it is the cancella-

. ton of the frst abstact ne atvit. - Just as the partcular is i n

"
general contained within the universal, so in consequence i s
tis second moment already contained within the frst and i s
.
.
merely a ssiiioof what the first alreJgy)s. The frst
mom
e
at i
e
fi
tself - not tue infnit
3
9
Philosohy ofRight
orthccsooiunvcrsaliqoIthc conccpt,butonlysomcthing
eimiooiandonc-sidcd. IorsinccitisabsuacbonIromall
dctcrminacy, itisitsclInotii/soidctcrminacy, and thc Iact
thatitis absuactand onc-sidcd consbtutcs its dctcrminacy,
dchcicncy,andhnitudc.- Jhcdi!Icrcnbabonanddctcrmna-
n oIthc two momcnts rc crrc to b to c oun M c
p lucwiscinthato!Kantctc.,cxccpt
tabon - '1',
as thc unboundcd (mthc mst proposibon oIhis Hs s]
Ks/g Uisswsc/o)s//r]),is takcnpurcly and simply as
somcthingssiiiv(andthusasthcunvcrsaIiqandidcnbqoI
thcundcrstanding). onscucntly, thisabsuact'I' fr iis

and li
gcncral,whcthcras agivcncxtcmallimitor as anacbviqoI
thc '!'itsclI-isthcrcIorcsomcthingmwd!oit(mthcsccond
proposibon). Jhc mrthcr stcp which spcculabvc philc-
sophy had to takc was to apprchcnd thc ogoiivii,which is
imancntwthinthcunivcrsalorthcidcnbcal,asinthc'1'-a
stcp thc nccd Iorwhichis notpcrccivcdbythoscwho Iailto
apprchcnd thc oo/is oI io)oii, and)oiio, cvcn m that
m ancntand absuact Iorm mwhich Iichtc undcrstood it.
1iiis:d,C).Thissccondmomcntappcarsasthcopposingonc.!tisto
bcapprchcndcdinitsunvcrsalmodc.itbclongsHhccdom,butdocsnot
consututcthcwholcoIhccdom.Thc'!'hcrccmcr cshomundifIcrcn `-
atcdindctcrminacytobccomcdi crcnuatcd,topositsomc
.
gdctcrmi-
natc as its contcntan objcct cgontoo .o notmcglywilI -!will
A wllwhich,as dcscribcd inthcprcviousparagraph,wiIlsonIy
thl,wlsosi/iogandi thcrcIorcnotawillatall.Thc
thing whic
to bc a , .ct that thc will wills
climitorncgauonT arucularLauoniswhatas arulc
is caBcd oughtusualIyrcgards thc st momcnt

_ i:amclythcindctcrmmatc, as mc a soutc an ghcrmomcnt, an con-
vcrse| cgardscmdas amcrcncgauonoIthisindctcrminacy. But
thisindctcrminacyisitsclImcrclyancgauonwmrcgardto thcdctcrmi-
natc,tonr:itudc:'!'isthissolitudcandabsolutcncgauon.Thcindctcrmi-
natcwl is to thich cxsts in mcrc
dctcrminacy.
1
Introduaion
6-7
(y)The will is the unt of both these moments -
into itsel and ereb restored to tmiversalt + It is individualit
[Einzelheit], the se/detenlinatiotl of the '!', in that it posits itself as th
negatve of itself, that is, as detenitzate and limited and at the same
tme remal s with itself [bei sicl], that is, in its idetity with itsel and
universalit; and in this detenninaton, it joins together with itself
alone. - 'I' detennines itself in so far as it is the self-reference of
negatvit. A this refretlce to itsel it is likewise indifferent to this
detenninacy; it knows the latter as its own and as ideal,
possibilit by which it is not restcted but in which it finds itself merely
it posits itself in it. - This is the freedm of the wl, which
consttutes the concept or substantalit of the wl, its gravit, just as
gravit consttutes the substantalit of a body.
Every self-consciousness knows itself as universal, as the

i=i ate, and as

partcular, with a detenninate object [Gegetstat], content,
and end. But these two moments are only abstactons; what is
concrete and tue (and everg tue is concrete)
universalit which has te partcular as its opposite, but this
ugh its reflecton into itself, has been
reconciled gte universal. This unit L
individuality, bul lts innediacy as a smg e urut - as in
idea [ Vortelltmg] of individualit - but rather in
cept of mdlVlalt (see Encclopae
d
a
of the
Pt
ces,9 1 1 2-1 1
4
);
/
in other words, this
individualit is in fact none other than the concept iw;f. The
first two moments - that the wlcan abstact from everg
and that it is also detennined (by itself or by something else) -
are easy to accept and grasp, bse tey tem
[liir sicl], moment of the understanding and devoid of tuth.
But it is the third moment, the te and speculatve (and
everg te, in so far as it is comprehended, can be
thought of only speculatvely), which the understanding
!efses to enter into, because the concept is precisely what the
understanding always aescnbes as incomprehensible. The
task of provmg and explammg m more detail this innennost
insight of speculaton - that is, infnit as self-referring
4
1
Philosophy ofRight
ncgauvq, ulumatc sourcc ofall aculifc, and cg(i-
sciousncss _bclongs,[oloi)purclyspcculauvcphilosoph.
-Jhconlythingwhichrcmainstobcnotcdhcrcisthat,whcn
wc say that il|//|sunivcrsal and that ilil/dctcrmincs
itsclf, wc spcak as ifthc wl wcrc alrcady assumcd to bc a
so/_ci_ o/sirci_.Butthcwlisnotcomplctcandunivcrsal
unul itis dctcrmncd, and unul ths dctcrniinauon is supcr-
scdcd and idcalizcd, it docs notbcccmc vvll unul it is this
sclf-mcdiaungacuvqand ths rctumintoitsclf
` `
|i|s.Yatispropcrlycallcd thcwlcontainsboththcprcccding
momcnts. 'I'assuchisprimarilypurcacdviq,thcunivcrsalwhichisvvith
itsclf/|s|d:],butthisunivcrsaldctcrmincsitsclf,andto thatcxtcnti no
longcrvvithitsclfbutposits itsclfas an othcrandccascstobcthcunivcr-
sal.Thcnthcthirditscs
cr, as itdctcrm:cs itsclf, itnctsclfand
docs not ccasc to hold fastto thc univcrsal. This, thcn, is thc concrctc
conccptoffrccdom,whcrcasthctwoprcviousmomcntshavcbccn found
to bc thoroughly absuact and onc-sidcd. But wc alrcady posscss Uis
frccdom in thc form offccling o]s g], for cxamplc in hicndshi
_

and lovc. nc-sidcdly within oursclvcs

clvcswith rcfcrcncctoan oUcr,cvcnwhilcknowingoursclvcs
in this limitadon as oursclvcs. In this dctcrminacy, thc human bcing
shouldnotfccldctcrmincd,onthcconuary,hc s his sclf-awarcns
only by rcgarding thc oUcr as othcr. Thu, frccdom lics ncithcr in
mdcIeimm u is both at oncc. Thc vvill which
limits itsclf cxclusivcly to a i/|s is thc vvill ofthc stubbom pcrson who
considcrs himsclfunhcc unlcsshchasi/|swill. Butthcwillisnotdcdto
somcthinglimitcd,onthcconuary, itmustprocccdmrthcr,forthcnaturc
ofthc vvill is not Uis onc-sidcdncss and rcsmcdon. _
somcthingdctcrminatc,ycttobcvvithoncsclf/|s|c/]inthisdctcrminacy
rcto thc univcrsal.

8
Jhc mrthcr dctcrmnauon ofcrt|co/cnzci|so (scc 6 abovc) con-
sututcsthc diffcrcnccbctwccn mc forms ofthc vvll. (a)inso far as
dctcrminacy is thc)mc/ynu}cnthcso/]ci|v
on thc onc hand and thc s/]ci|v as cxtcmal immcdiatc cxstcncc
4
2
Introduction 7
-
Lxisiz] on the other, this is the]ntal yntalc] will as sell-con-
sciousness,which)os anextenalworldoutsideitself. Aindivdu-

Lio

ii

determinacyintoitsell,itiss
fe

.thcp
isbsolutely uue and iis so (see
Lo./scic, 363)/ the relauon of consciousness consututes no
more than i/csa s]the will's ccmc. Jhis aspectwill notbe
separately [ir sic/] considered anymrther here.
iiiss(H).Theconsiderauonofthevvi'sdeterminacyisthetaskofme
understandingandisnotprimarll_.Thewlisdeterminedby
nomeans onlyin the senseofcontent,butalsoin thesenseofform. Its
determinacywlthregardtoformisitsendandthe accomplishmentofiu
end.Athrstthisendisonlyso/)aicandintenaltome,butitshouldalso
become e/]cuivc and throwoffthe dehciency ofmere sub|ecuviq. One
mayaskherewhyithasthisdehciency.Ifthatwhichisdehcientdoesnot
atthe same umestandaboveitsdehciency, theniu dehciencydoes not
exstforit.Forusananimalisdehcient,butnotforitself. Insofar asan
endissulIonlyours,iti forus adehciency,for tous,freedomandwl
aretheuniqofthesub|ecuveandtheob|ecuve.Hencetheendmustbe
positedob|ecuvely,andittherebyattainsnotanewone-sideddetermina-
uonbutonlyits realiauon.
aTranslator's tote: The distncton between the adjectve fm/al and the precediogfnnell
appears to carr no partcular sigoifcance. On subsequent occasions m the Rechts
philosophie (for example, 123 and Hegel's Remarks to 13, IS, I 1S, 135, 1 39, 261,
etc.), Hegel uses only fnl/ell.

9
(o) In so far as the will's determinauons are iis 00B that is, its
im cntal(y reflected parucularizauon in general
`scontent, asthecontentL mevv,isitsendinaccordancewith
theformspecihedunder(a)above eitheritsinnerorsub|ecuveend
as represented in the act ofwilling, or its end as actualzed and
accomplishedthroughthe mediauon ofitsacuvityasituanslatesthe
sub|ecuve into ob|ecuviq.
4
3
Philosophy of Right
I
o
This content, or the distnct detenninaton of the will, is primarily
iici.Thus, the will is only ioiisyor orH or it is in general
the will in iis csoc i. Only when the will has itel
gosicois it ]riisywhat it is iiis_
Finitude, according to this detenninaton, consists in the fact
that what something is ioiisyor in accordance with it con
cept Ldiferent in its exstence Fmioz]or appearance fom
what it is ]riis] thus, for example, t
mutual exteralit of nature L space, but ]ryit is tme.
Two points should be noted in this connecton: first that,
because the tue is simply the Idea, we do not yet possess an
object or detenninaton in its tuth if we grasp it only as it is io
iisy or in its concept; and secondly, that something cscsocqi
or io iisylikewise exst, and this exstence Lxisioz] is a
shape proper to the object (as wit space in the above exam
ple). The separaton which is present in the fnite world
between being-in-itself and beig-for-itself at the same tme
consttutes the finite world's mere oisioc Dcsio] or

ccrcoc (immediate examples of this will arise in connec-

ton with the natural will and then with formal right, etc.). The
understanding stops at mere /ig-io-iisyand therefore calls
freedom in accordance . with this being-in-itself a co
|mag] , since it is indeed in this case
Meg/|c/kii]. But the understanding regards this detennina
ton as absolute and perennial, and takes the relatonship
Bei/sg] of freedom to what it wills, or in general to it
realit, merely as its c/icciiso to a given material, an appli
caton which does not belong to the essence of feedom itself.
In this way, the understanding has to do with the abstact
alone, not with the Idea and tuth of freedom.1
iiiso(G). The will which is a will only i accordance with its concept is
fee i itself but at the same tme unfee, for it would be tuly fee only as
a tly determinate content; i the latter case, it is free for itself, has
feedom as its object, and isfeedom. Whatever is stll only in accordance
with its concept, whatever is merely in itself, is only immediate, only
natural. We are also familiar with this in representatonal thought i:d
44
1
1
Introduction

IOI I
|sni//:ug.ahC Chd 8 u:|shum8nUCn ,+||o|s
!8Ony!hCQO

!Cn 8 t Ol tC8

8On8 nd CC

m,nd 8 IhCtOtC CCom _

8CCOtd8nCCWIhtI8 COnCCQ!.OWWh8!CX8!8 88_C!Onjn I8CldOC8 r
O!um8nUCngWhO 8t8uOn8 il /|=
WOrk.mg!\tCQtOCC88Ol8Cl-QtOduCuOnUO!hUygOngOu!Olhm8Cl

8nd Uy CduC8ung hm8Cl nW8tdy, n OtdCt !h8! hC m8y 88O UCCOmC

t8uOn8]r/|sy.

I I
hC W!! Wh:Ch 8 tCC 88 yC! On!y u iisy8 !hC i|ciOt ociorc/
,
W!!.hC dC!Ctmu8UOn8 Ol!hC dCtCnCCWhCh 8QO8!CdW!hn !hC
W!! Uy!hC 8C!-dC!CDgCOnCCQ!8QQC8tW!hu !hC mmCd8!CW!!
88 8n iici(; QtC8Cn! COn!Cn!. !hC8C 8tC !hC rics, sirs, co
iodiociisosUy WhCh !hC W!! hnd8 !8C!ln8!ut8!!_ dC!C_d. h8
COn!Cn!, 8!Ong W!h !hC dC!Ctmn8UOn8 dCVC!OQCd W!hu !, dOC8
udCCd Ot:gu8!Cn!hCW!8t8UOn8!_8Dd!ISu8 t8UOn8! u!8C!
Uu!CXQtC88Cdu8ODmCd8!C8 Otm, !dOC8nO!yC!h8VC!hCOtmO
t8UOn8!Q.' Fsr,!h8 COn!Cn! 18 8dm!!Cd!y CnUtC!y io,Uu! !h:8

Otm 8nd !h8!COn!Cn!8tC 8U!!dHCtCn!, 8O !h8!!hCW! 8c)oiiW!

ii/io iisy.
LmQ:tC8! Q8yChO!Ogy tC!8!C8 8nd dC8CtUC8 !hC8C dtVC8 8nd
nC!u8UOn8 8nd!hCnCCd8 dCtVCd Om!hCm88!CnCOun!Ct8
!hCm, Ot UC!CVC8 ! CnCOun!Ct8 !hCm, n CXQCtCnCC, 8nd
8!!CmQ!8 !O C!888[ m gVCn m8!Ct8! u !hC u8u8! W8y. YC
8h8!! d8Cu88 UC!OW Wh8! !hC s/]ciicC!CmCn! O!hC8C dtVC8
8, Wh8! 8h8QC t C!CmCn! 888umC8 n !8 Uu!h {WmOu! !hC
OtmOtt8UOn8!QWhCh!QO88C88C888dtVC), 8nd 8!8OWh8!
8h8QC ! 888umC8 n !8 CX8!CnCC Lxisioz] .
1|i|so .hC 8nHt8, !OO,h88 dtVC8,dC8tC8,8nd nCn8uOn8,Uu!!
h88 nOwl8ndmu8!OUCyI8 dtVClnOIhngCX!CC8 QtCVCnU !. u! mC
hum8n UCng, 88 WhOy ndC!Ctmn8!C, 8!8nd8 8UOVC h8 dtVC8 8nd C8n
dC!CtmnC 8nd QO8! !hCm 88 h8 OWn. hC dtVC i _8t! Oln8!utC, Uu! !O
QO8!!D Ih8 `
,
dC_Cnd8u_On mywl, WhCh !hCtClOtC C8nnO! 8QQC8 !O
'l8C! Ih8! !hC dtVC 8 gtOundCd n n8IutC.
45
Philosophy of Right

I 2
Jhcsystcm oIthis contcntasitisc/cswiin its immcdiacyin
thcwl cxsts only as a mulbtudc oIvaricd drivcs, cach oIwhich is
mc iogwc/along mc bmc somcthing
unvcrsal and indctcrmnatc which has all knds oIob|ccts Cgw-
sto]andcanbcsabsncdinallkindsoIways. !nasmuchasthcwl,
in t doublc indctcrminacy, givcs itsclI thc Iorm oI isicioc/ii,
Lisz//ii](scc 7), itisarcsolvingwill,andonlyisoIarasitmakcs
any rcsolubons atallis itan actualwll.
Jo rcsolvc on somcthing ics /sd/iw] is to canccl
c}/w]thatindctcrminacyinwhichcachandcvcrycontcnt
is inibally no morc than a possibiliq. But our languagc also
contains thc altcmabvc cxprcssion sid wid/|)w to
dccidc'],which indicatcs that thc indctcrminacy oIthc wl
itsclI, as somcthingncuualyctmtcly uiml, thc origial
sccdoIallcxstcnccDcsio], containsitsdctcrmiabonsand
cndswithinitsclI, andmcrclybringsthcmIorth Iromwthin.
"Trallslalor's nOle: Literally, 'to close someting'.
b
Trallslalor's nOle: Literally, 'to unclose oneself.
Byrcsolvng, thc wl posits itsclIas thc wl oIa spccihc indivdual
andasawlwhichdisbnguishcsiIIromccrhg c.Butapart
o sscdiatc will,
bccauscoIthcdiIIcrcnccbctwccnitsIormanditscontcnt(scc ii),
ispurcly)c/,its onlyappropriatcmncbonisthatoIc/sicctss/o-
iiso,anditscontcntisnotyctthccontcntandproductoIitsIrccdom.
I soIarasintclligcnccisai/iokiogpowcr,itsob|cct Cgw-
sico] and contcntrcmainooicnc/and thI
bchavcs as a univcrsal acbviq. !n thc will, thc univcrsal also
ch is mnc', as ioicioc/|q
Lioz/kii], and i thc immcdiatc, i.c. Iormalwl, itsignincs
absuact individualiq which is not yct mcd with its Ircc
univcrsaIq. !t is thcrcIorc inthcwll thatthcsigw]
)oiioe oIintclligcncc bcgins, and it is only by raisig itsclI

Introduction
once more to the level of thought and by conferring immanent
universality upon its ends that te wl cancels co]/i] the
difference of form and content and makes itself objectve,

ite wl. Thus those who believe that the human being is
ite in the realm of the wl in general, but that he - or
reason itself - is limited in the realm of thought, have little
understanding of the nature of tg and wl g. 1 I so far
as tg and wl g are stll distnct, it is rather the con
verse which is tue, and tg reason, as wl, is [reason]
deciding si.l oisc//i]o] on its own )oiio.
1 2-14
iiiso . A wlwhich resolves on nothing i not an actual wl ; te
characterless man can never resolve on anything. The reason Cnufor
such indecision may also lie in an over-refined sensibilit which knows
that, in determining something, it enters the realm of fnitde, imposing a
limit on itself and relinquishing yet it does not wish to renounce
bSuch a rpositon Cwi|iis dead, even ifits
aspiraton is to be beautfl.2 'Whoever aspires to great things', says
Goethe, 'must be able to limit himself.3 Only by making resolutons can
the human being enter actualit, however throcess may be; fof"
inera wou er emerge om that inwar rooding in whic it
reserves a universal possibilit for itself. ,

ib is Jt t actt.
The wlwhich is sure of itself does not therefe los ite lfiiatrt
determines.
"Translator's note: As T. M. Knox (Knox, p. 230, note) sunnises, the de of the original
must surely read d. Gans, who compiled the 'Additons', has simply taken this error
over from Hotho's tanscripton of Hegel's lectures (cf. VPR ttt, 1 31).
I
4
The fnite wl, purely with regard to its form, is the self-reflectng
io)oii'I' which is with itself [bei sic/sl/si](see
`
c1 its content, i.e. its various drives, and also above the frther
individual ways in which these are actualized and satsfed. At the
same tme, since it is only formally infnite, it is iito this content as
to the determinatons of its nature and of it exteral actualit (see
6 and i i);but since it is indeterminate, it is not resticted to this or
that content in partcular. To tis extent, this content is only a poss
ible one for the reflecton of the '/
,
into itself; it may or may not be
mine; and '!
,
is the sssi/i/iq of determining myself to this or to
4
7
Philosophy of Right
something else, of :lsss|ogbetween these determinatons which the 'I'
must in this respect regard as exteral.
1
5
The freedom of the wl , according to this determinaton, is or/|tror-
osss,in which the following two factors are contained: free reflecton,

which abstacts fom everg, and dependence on an inwardly or

given content and material. Since this content, which is
necessarythe same tme determined as a
possible content in oppositon to fee reflecton, it follows that
arbitariness is :st|ogsin the shape of wl.
The commonest idea |sstshsog} we have of freedom is that
of or/|trorosss* the mean positon of reflecton between the
will as determined solely by natural drives and the wlwhich
is fee in and for itself. When we hear it said that feedom in
general consists in _,such an idea
|sntsllmg} can only be taken to indicate a complete lack of
intellectual culture B|Nmgss Csolss} , for it shows not
te least awareness of what consttutes the will which is free in
and for itself, or right, or ethics, etc. Reflecton, the )mol

universalit and unity of self-consciousness, is the will's

o/stroacertamt of its ree om, but It IS not yet the tmtl of
this freedom, because it does not yet

0
at the subjectve side is stll something other

olics},

-
eterminaton therefore also
Instead of being the wlin its tuth, arbitariness is rather the
o. * In the conto
the tme of Wolf's metaphysics as to whether the wl is
actually fee or whether our knowledge of its freedom is
merely a delusion, it was arbitariness which people had in
mind/ To the certaint of this abstact self-determinaton,
which, as something
s:ssotsr, is not contained in that certaint and therefore
:sssts|t]sssts|s* although 'outside' here denotes drive
or representaton |sstsl/sog},or
flled in such a way that its content is not derived
Introdldion
. from its own self-deterg actvit as such. Accordingly,
' sOee self-determinaton is
immanent witn arbitariness, whereas the other element is
something given to it, arbitariness may indeed be called a
delusion if it is supposed to be equivalent to feedom. I all
as in that of Kant and subsequently in
Fries's utterly superficial revsion of it, feedom is nothing
oter than this formal self-actvit.2

a|t|so@.Since I have the possibilit of deterg myself in U or

that directon - that is, since I am able to choose - I possess an arbitary
will, and this is what Ua ler The choie which I have
lies in te Universalit of the will, whereby I can make this or that [thing]
mine. This [thing] which is mine is a partcular content and is therefore
incompatble with me; thus it is separate from me and is only potentally
mine, just as I am only the potentalit of unitg with it. The choice
therefore lies in the indeterminacy of the ` and the determinacy of the
content. Bcts content, the
agh it has in itself the aspect of infinit in a fonnal sense. None of
these contents iseping with it, and it does not tly have itelf in any
of them. It is inherent in arbitariness that the content i not determined
mine by the nature of my will, but by :sot:o, thus I am also
dependent on this content, and this is the contadicton which underlies.
@biariness. The common man thinks that he is fee when he is allowed
to act arbitarily, but this ver arbitariness implies that he is not fee.
When I will what is ratonal, I act not as a partcular jon|ulorss}
individual, but in accordance with the concepts of ethics in general: in an
etical act, I vindicate not myself but the thing [die Sache]. But a person
who does soperverse gives the greatest prominence to his par
tcularit Pori|ulo

eratonal is the high road which everone

follows and where no one stands out from the rest. When great artst
complete a work, we can say that it lcto be so; that i, the artst's
partcularit has completely disappeared and no osnsis apparent in
it. Phidias has no mannerisms; the shape itself lives and stands out. But
poorer artst is,!. e more we see of himself, of his partcularit and
arbitariness.3 If we stop our enquiry at arbitariness, at the human
being's abilit to will this or that, this does indeed consttute his feedom;
but if we bear fmly in mind that the content of what he wills i a given
one, it follows tat he is determined by it and is in this very respect no
longer fee.
49
Philosophy of Right
j I
Whateve:thewl has aeciaeate cheese (see 1
4
), itcaali|ewise
:eliauish (see
5
). 8utwith this essibili ei:eceeaiaiatum
beyeaa aayethe: ceateatwhich it may subsutute ie: the:evieus
eae,aaaseeac|o)o|ts,itaeesaetescaeemaituae,because
eve:ysuchceateatisaii!e:eati:emtheie:meithewl ] aaathe:e-
ie:eaite,aaatheeesiteeiaete:miaacy aamelyiaaete:miaacy,
iaaecisiea, e: absuacuea - is ealy the ethe:, eually eae-siaea
memeat.
That ceauaaicueawhich is the a:biua:ywl (see i
|
) ma|es its
ocoroo:casa|olca|:eia:ives aaaiacliaaueaswhchceaictwith
eachethe:iasuchawaythatuesausiacueaeieaeaemaaasthatthe
sausiacueaeitheethe:besube:aiaateae:sac:icea,aaaseea,aaa
siaceaa:iveisme:elythesimleai:ecueaeiitsewaaete:miaacyaaa
the:eie:e has ae ya:asuc| withia itsel( this aete:miaauea thatit
sheulabe sube:aiaatea e:sac:icea is the ceauaeataecisieaei
a:biua:iaess - whethe: the latte:is uiaea by calculaueas eithe
uaae:staaaiaastewhicha:ive,vlaiie:athe:eate:sausiacuea,e:
byaayethe:ceasiae:aueaeaeca:esteaame.
a|t|so.D:ivese:iacliaaaeasa:e:ima:ilyaceateateimewl, aaa
ealy :e1ecaea staaas abeve them,butthese a:ives Inc/c} themselves
becemeimelliatrc|/},:esueaeacheme:,aaaceaictwitheach
ethe:,aaa ithemvishtebesaasea. li,thea,lutalltheethe:s
asiaeaaacemtmyseliteoal,eaeeithem,laamyseliiaaaesuucave
limitaaea,ie:bymyve:yactlhave:eliauisaeamyuaive:s_i,whichis
agstemeialla:ives.uutitiseijustaslittlehelme:elytesube:aiaate
ce:taiaa:ivesteethe:sj- theceu:seeiacaeatewhichtheuaae:staaa-
ia usually :ese:ts - because ae ya:asac| bywhich they miht be
a::aaeaae:ae:isavailableh;:e;the!emaaaie:suchaae:ae:the:e-
ie:eusuallyeaasiateaieuslaatuaes. '
j
I 8
With:ea:atethe)sgco coteia:ivestheaea:aaceeitheaialecuc
issuchthat,as|oocotaaaheacealsess|t|vc,theaete:miaaueasei
5
0

I
I
I
Introduction

1 6-19
the immediate will are gss,thus ooi s said to be /, ootsrsgss.But
in so far as they are stsno|oot|sssootsrs,opposed to freedom and
to the concept of the spirit in general and therefore osgot|vs,they must
be e,thus oois said to be /,ootoe|l.I
n
t
h
is situaton, the
decision in favour of one asserton or te other likewise depends on
subjectve arbitariness.
a|t|so.The Christan doctine that man is by nature evil is superior
to the other according to which he is good. Interpreted philosophically,
this doctine should be understood as. follows. spirit, man is a fee
being Ussw} who is in a positon not to let himself be determined by
natural drives. When he exsts in an immediate and uncivilized
::gs/|usts} conditon, he is terefore in a situaton in which he ought
not to be, and fom which he must liberate himself. This is the meaning
of e

doctine of original sin, without which Christanit would not be

te religion of freedom.

I 9
Underlying the demand for the sn)cot|sos]tlsnvssis the general
idea |sstsl/sog} that they should be feed fom the ). of their
immediate natural determinacy and from the subjectvit and con
tngency of their cso/sot, and restored to their substantal essence.
The tuth behind this indeterminate demand is that the drives should
become the ratonal system of the will's determinaton; to grasp them
thus in terms of the concept is the content of the science of right.
The content of this science can be expounded, with reference
to all its individual moments sU: h as right, propert, moralit,
family, the state, etc., in the following form: man losby nature
a drive towards right, ooolssa drive towards propert and
morality, ooolssa drive towards sexual love, a drive towards
sociabilit, etc. If one prefers to accord the dignit of a
philosophical shape to this form of empirical psychology, then
this, in the light of what has passed in recent tmes for philo
sophy (as was earlier noted) and contnues to pass for it, can
be achieved otlscsst simply by declaring that man finds
within hmself, as a ]as]l|scsosc|sssosss,that he wills right,
propert, the state, etc. This same content, which appears
here in the shape of drives, will recur later in another form,
namely that of st|ss.
_
5
1
Philosophy of Right
20
Wen reflecton applies itself to the drives, representng them,
estma em, and co p em wi one another and then with
the means they employ, their consequences etc. , and with a sum total
of satsfacton - i.e. with loocss
_
-it confers )molsovcnoliqupon
t material and purifies it, in this exteral mannertits crudit and
niversalit of thought is the
b

:
(cf 1 87).
ats . In happiness, thought already has some power over the
natural force of te drives, for it is not content with te instantaneous, but
requires a whole of happiness. This is connected with educaton to the
extent that educaton likewise implements a universal. But two moments
are present in the ideal of happiness: the first is a universal which is
superior to all parcularites; but secondly, since te content of this
universal is in tur merely universal pleasure, the individual and partcu
lar, i.e. a finite quantt, reappears at tis point, and we are compelled to
retur to the drive. Since the content of happiness lies in te subjectvity
and feeling ]og}of everyone, this universal end is itself partcular
onl:t/or},so that no tue unit ofcontent and fonn is yet present within
it.
2 1
The tuth, however, of this formal universalit, which is indetermi
nate for itself and encounters its determinacy in te material already
mentoned, is: m lcwil , sr)ccs. When
the wlhas universalit, or itelf as infinite form, as it content, object
Ccgcostoo,and end, it is fee not ony tsc}but also )rtsc[-it is
the Idea in its tuth.l
`
The self-consciousness of the will, as desire and drive, is
'` : `
scosssss, just as the rearm of the senses in general denotes
-
~
exteralit and hence that conditon in which self-conscious-
I I
' nral to itself. The c:/vcwil-

i- ; the
wlwhich los/cogoo)rtsc}has as its object the wl
itelf as such, and hence itself i its pure universalit. This
unversalit is such that the coof the natural and the
or/olonq Por/lslontt} with which te natural is likewise
52

Introduaion
nvcstcd whcn t s prcduccd by rcfIccbcn arc supcrscdcd
wthn t. But ths prcccss whcrcby thc parbcuIar s su_cr-
scdcd and rascdtc thc unvcrsaI swhats caIIcdthc acbv_
Itlsst. Jhc scII-ccnsccusncss whch purhcs and rascs
ts cbjcct, ccntcnt, and cnd tc ths unvcrsaIq dccs sc as
tlssgltosssn|og|tss}n thc wl. Hcrc s thcs|ototl|:l|t
/s:sssclsorthat t s cnIyas tl|ol|ogntcIIgcnccthatthcwl
s uuIytscIIand hcc. Jhc sIavc dccs nctLncwhs csscncc,
hs nhnq and hccdcm, hc dccs nct Lncw hmscII as an
csscncc- hcdccsnctLncwmmscIIassuch, Icrhcdccsnct
tl|ol hmscII. Jhs scII-ccnsccusncss whch ccmprchcnds
ttscIfas csscncgh thcughtandthcrcbydvcststscIIcI
!c ccnmgcnt and thc unuuc ccnsbtutcs thc grncgIc cI
nght, cI mcraI_, and cI aII cthcs. Jhcsc whc spcaL
phIcscphcaIIy cIrght, mcraIty, andcthcsand atthc samc
bmc sccL tc cxcIudc thcught, appcaIng nstcad tc IccIng,
hcart, cmcbcn, and nsprabcn, bcar wmcss tcthc prcIcund
ccntcmpt ntc whch thcught and sccncc havc IaIIcn, Icr n
thcr casc, sccncc tscII, havng sunL ntc dcspar and tctaI
Iasstudc, cvcn adcpts barbarsm and mcughtIcssncss as ts
prncpIc and dccs cvcrythng t can tc rcb manLnd cI aII
uuth, wcrth, and dgnq.
2022
.~``-` ~
a|t|s(H).Jruthi phIcscphymcanstha(thcccnccptccrrcspcndstc _
,A bcdy, IcrcxampIc, s rcaIq, and mc scuI s thc ccnccpt. But
scuIandbcdycughttcmatchcncancthcr,adcadbcdythcrcIcrcsuIIhas
cxstcncc ists:z},but nc Icngcr a uc cnc, Icr t s a ccnccptIcss
Doss|} . thatswhythc dcadbcd

s.
uuth s suchthat what t wIIs, .c.ts ccntcnt, s dcnbcaI wth thc wl
tscII, scthatIrccdcm s wIIcd by hccdcm.
J|hc

n and IcrtscIIs tm/,|o)o|ts,bccauscts

dthcrcIcrcnctscmcthngwhchtsccs
asssrcrasal||totson thc ccnuary,
tc
.urthcrmcrc,tsnctjustapcssbIq,prcdspcs-
bcn, cr:oo:|q stst|o),butue;a|ts|o oosol|q(|{o|tso:ts),
.- `-
bccausc thc ccnccpt's cxstcncc Doss|o}cr cbjccbvc sgssto/:ls}
cxtcmaIqs nwardncss tscII.
5
3
Philosophy oj Right
!Icnc thcrcIcrc spcaLs cnIycIthc IrccwIIas such, wthcut
spccqngthattsthcwIIwhchs Irccnand]cr|tss,cncs
spcaLng cnly cIthcrs|sss|t|s: tcwards Irccdcm cr cIthc
naturaIandhntcwII(scc{ i i),andthcrcIcrcnct-whatcvcr
cncmaysayandbcIcvc- cIthcIrccwII.- Whcnthcundcr-
standng rcgards mc nhmtc mcrcIy as scmcthng ncgabvc
and hcncc as /so|tsslsrs, t bcIcvcs that ts dcngthc
nhntc aII thc mcrc hcncur by pushng t cvcr mrthcr away
anddstancngtasscmcthngaIcn.!nthc IrccwII, thcuuIy
nhntchas actuaIqand prcscncc- thcwIItscIIs thc dca
whchs prcscntwthn tscII
a1|t|es 3).!nhnqhas rghtly bccn rcprcscntcd by
crcIc,bccauscasuaghtIncrunscnndchitcl anddcnctcsthatmcrcl
bvc and asc nhntywhc ,unlLc uucnhnq,dccsnctrctumntc
IS uly nhntc, cr t s nct just a USSI q and
cncnthcccnuary,tsrxtcma cxstcnccISILM ardncss, ts
cwn scI

OnIy n ths hccdcm s thc wII ccmpIctcIy |tl |tss}/s|s|d|

bccausc t has rcIcrcncc tc ncthngbuttscII, sc thatcvcryrcIabcn-
shpcIqsoo:scnscmcthngstlsrthantscIIsthcrcbycImnatcd.
- !tstms,crramcrtstmtltscII,bccausctsdctcrmnabcnccnssts
nbcngnts sx|stso:sDoss|o}~ .c.asscmcthngcppcscdtctscII-
whattsnts ccnccpt, thats,thcpurcccnccpthasthcntubcncI
tscIIastscnd and rcaIty.
!t [thcwIIj st|vssol,bccauscaII ltntabcnand parbcuIarndvdu-
aIq |zslls|t} arc supcrscdcd wthn t.
_dcrcnccbctwccnthcccnccptandts cbjcctCsgsostocrccntcnt,
cr, cxprcsscd n ancthcr Icrm, M c df!crcncc bctwccn c wlI`s
subjccbvc bcng-Icr-tscII and ts bcng-n-tscII, cr bctwccn ts
odss|vsandrcscIvngndviduaIq [cn thc cnchandj and ts unvcr-
saIqtscII[cnmc cthcrj .
Jhc varcus dctcrmnabcns cIm|vssol|qarc gvcnnIcgc
(scc o:/sos|o s]tlsPl|lsssl|:olSoso:ss, { { i i ~i z).
i
54
Introduction
The frst thing which the expression 'universalit' suggests to
representatonal thought |sstsllw} is an abstact and
exteral universalit; but in the case of that universalit which
has being in and for itself, as defined here, we should m
neither of the universalit of reflecton - i.e. :ssool|qor
tstol|q- nor of that o/stroctuniversalit which stands outside
and in oppositon to the individual - i.e. the abstact identt
of the understanding (see Remarks to 6). The universalit in
queston is :soostswithin itself and consequently has being
for itself, and it is the substance of the self-consciousness, its
immanent generic character Cottsog} or immanent idea; it is
the concept of the free will as the so|vssoll|:lotsos/so
its object, which smsotss |ts stsv|oot|so and is identcal
22-26
with itself in this determinaton. - The universal which haS]
"
)
bein in and for itself is in eneral
r
and it can be understood only in this speculatve way.
The ss/)sa|vs, as far as te will in general is concered, denotes the
E|ozslls|t} (see 7) a
st|o:i rsits conce t which has bein | |tss}The subjectvit of
the will therefore denotes (o)srs]m, the o/sslstsso|qof the self-

consciousness with itself, in which the self-consciousness, as,

is totally inward and o/stro:i/,dependent upon itself - i.e. the pure

:srto|oqof itself, as distnct fom tuth; () the o|:sloof the will

as arbitariness and as the co tngent con
, will may pursue; (y) one-sided form in general (see 8), in so far as
wiled, whatever its content, is stll only a content
belonging to the self-consciousness, an unaccomplished end.
(a) The will, in so far as it has itself as its determinaton and is thus in
t and tuly itself, is the tstol/,s/sa|v |I;
() but the s/)s:t|vswill, inasmuch as it locL tls|s o|ts)m of self-
consciousness, is the willrmerse in its ob' ect or conditon,
whatever the content atter may be - it is th,
!
!
the ethical will/ or the will of the slave,rsttous will, etc.; )

.`
55
Philosohy of Right
(y) finally, s/)s:tvqis te one-sided form opposed to the subjectve
determinaton of the will, and is thus the immediacy of exstence
Doss:} as ool exstence xstso}

s/)s:ivsuntl its end

These logical determinatons of subjectvit and objectvit
have been listed here in order that we may expressly note in
relaton to them - since they will ofen be employed in what
follows - that, like other distnctons and antthetcal
determinatons of reflecton, they pass over into their
opposites on account of their fitude and hence of their
dialectcal nature. Other such antthetcal determinatons,
however, a fied signifcance for representatonal
thought |sstsllsog}and for the understanding, because their
identt is stll only of an oorkind. In the will, on the other
hand, such anttheses -which are supposed to be abstact, yet
at the same tme determinatons s] tls l/which can be
known- ony ostls:soosts- lead by themselves to their own
identt and to a confsion of their meanings, a confsion into
which the understanding quite unwitngly falls. - Thus the
will, as feedom tloor/sog,is subjectvit itself; subject
ivit is accordingly te will's concept and hence its objectvit;
but its subjectvit, as opposed to objectvit, Lfinitude; yet in
this very oppositon, the will is not with itself but involved with
te object, and its fnitude consists just as much in the fact
that it is not subjectve, etc. - Thus, the significance to be
attached in what follows to the subjectve or objectve aspects
of the will should in each case be apparent from the context,
which defnes their positon with reference to the totalit.
atso(. It is usually believed that te subjectve and objectve are
fnl opposed to one anoter. But this is not te case; they in fact pass
over into one anoter, for tey are not abstact determinatons like posi
tve and negatve, but already have a more concrete signifcance. If we
frst consider te term 'subjectve'" tis may denote an end peculiar to a
specifc subject. In tis sense, a very brk
-
its purpose Sc:/s} i purely subjectve. But the same term may also be
applied to te content of the wl, and it i ten roughly synonyous wit
.a
.
tto the subject.
Thus bad actons, for exam Ie, are merely subjectve. - n,
wmaYso describe a
_
'1' f
5
6
Introduai01l
its object 6cgcsstc and which possesses the power to abstact from
'
aI content. Thus, subjectvity may have a wholly partcular
jcri|ls/crc} signifcance, or it may mean something eminently justfed,
since everying which I am u recognize also has the task of becoming
mine and gaining its validit in me. Such is the infnite greed of subject
ivit, which collects and consumes everg

e
of
r
pure 'I'. he objectve may te un erstoo in no ess varied ways.
We
iM erstand by it everg which we make our object [sos
gcgcssto/|d},whether such objects are actual exstences L|stcszcs} or
2628
are mere thoughts which we set up in oppositon to ourselves. But we also
comprehend [under objectvit] the immediacy of exstence [Dasehz] in
which the end is to be realized: even if the end is itself wholly partcular
jct|ls/cr} and subjectve, we nevertheless call it objectve as soon as it
makes it appearance. But the objectve will is also that in which tuth is
present. Thus the wlof God, the ethical wl , is objectve. Finally, we
may also aes
c
'be as objectve the wlwhich i

completely immersed in
i
ts
object O/)clt},such as te vof te child, which is founded on tust and
li
ubjectve feedom, and the wl of the slave, which does not yet }
know itself free and is consequently a will with no will ofits own. In this
sense, eve wl hose actons are ided by an alien authori and which

The absolute determinaton or, uone prefers, the absolute drive, of

the free spirit (see 21) is to make its freedom into its object Ccgco-
stco} to make it objectve both in the sense that it becomes the
ratonal system of the spirit itself, and in the sense that this system
becomes immediate actualit (see 26). This enables the spirit to be
for itself, as Idea, what the wl is in itself. The abstact concept of the
Idea of the wlis in general tlc]cc|lll|:l |l/tlc]cc|l
_
The actvit .9f the wl consists in cancelling cqslc/co} the con
.tadicton between subky d objectvity and in tanslatg its
E! s from their suQjc.c.tve determnaton into an objectve one, whe
at the same tme remainin
!
|tl |tsc}in this objectvit :Apart fom
the formal mode of consciousess (see 8) in which objectvit is
present only as immediate actualit, this actvit is the csscot|clcls-
omtof the substantal content of the Idea (see 2i a development

57
Philosophy of Right
n whch thc ccnccpt dctcrmncs thc I1so, whch s |tss}at hrst
= -~
o/stro:/, tc [prcducc] thc tctaIq cIts systcm. Jhs tctaIq, as mc
substannaI cIcmcnt, s ndcpcndcnt cI thc cppcsncn bctwccn a
mcrcIy subjccnvc cnd and ts rcamancn, and s tlssosn bcth cI
thcsc Icrms.

2
9
Rts any cxstcncc Doss|o} n gcncraIwhchs thc o|stso:scIthc

]ss|h.Kght s thcrcIcrc n gcncraI Irccdcm, as !dca.

!n thc Kannan dchnncn Bsst|mg} cI rght (scc thc
nucducncn tc Kant's Ilsss]R|gltMstol,s|s:lsq-
ios sr Rsotslslrs, gj), whch s aIsc mcrc wdcIy
acccptcd, thc csscnnaI cIcmcnt Msso/} s 'thc /|tot|so cIl
my Irccdcmcror/|tro|l/nsuchawaythattmaycccxst
wth thc arbuary wlcIcvcrycnc cIsc n acccrdanccwth a
unvcrsaI Iaw'.Onthccnchand,thsdchnncnccntanscnIy
aosot|vsdctcrmnancn- that cIImtncn, and cn thc cthcr
hand, thcpcsnvc [cIcmcntj - thc unvcrsaIIawcrsc-caIIcd
'Iaw cIrcascn',thc ccnscnancc cIthc arbuary wII cIcnc
ndvduaI wth that cIthc cthcr - amcunu smpIy tc thc
IamIar[prncpIccfjIcrmaIdcnntyandthcIawcIccnuadc-
ncn. Jhc dchnncn cIrght n qucsncn cmbcdcs thc vcw,
cspccaIIy prcvaIcnt sncc Kcusscau, acccrdng tc whch thc
substannaIbassand prmat Iactcrs suppcscdtcbc nct thc
wII as rancnaI wII whch has bcng n and Icr tscII cr thc
sprt as tms sprt, but wl and sprt as thc on|:slor
ndvduaI,asthcwIIcIthc ds
dsnncnvc arbuarncss. Oncc ths prncpIc s acccptcd, thc
rancnaI can cI ccursc appcar cnIy as a Imtancn cn thc
Irccdcmn qucsncn, and nct as anmmancntrancnaIq, but
cnIyasancxtcmaI and IcrmaI umhs vcw s dcvcd
cIanyspccuIanvcmcughtands rcmtcdbythcphIcscphcaI
ccnccpt, andhas atthc samcnmc prcduccd phcncmcna Lr-
s:ls|mmgo} n pccpIc's tnndsandn thc actuaIwcrId whcsc
tcrr[ng naturc s matchcd cnIy by thc shaIIcwncss cIthc
thcughts cnwhch thcyarc bascd.'
5
8
Introducion 28-3 1
Right is something sttcr/,so:rc, for the simple reason that it is the
exstence Doscio}of the absolute concept, of self-conscious feedom.
- But the )mol|s of right and also of dut! - arises out of the
diferent stages in te development of the concept of freedom. In
oppositon to the more formal, i.e. src o/stro:t and hence more
limited kind of right, that sphere and stage of the spirit in which the
spirit has determined and actualized within itself the frther moments
contained in its Idea possesses a higher right, for it i the srccsooctc
sphere, richer within itself and more tuly universal.
Each stage in the development of the Idea of freedom has its _
t, because it is the exstence of freedom in one
of its own determinatons. When we speak of the oppositon
between moralit or ethics and r|glt, the right in queston is
merely the inital and formal right of abstact personalit.
Moralit, ethics, and the interest of the state - each of these is
a distnct variet of right, because each of them gives deteri
nate shape and exstence to )ccs. They can come into
:slls|soonly in so far as they are all in equal measure rights; if
the moral point of view of the spirit were not also a right -i.e.
feedom in one of its forms - it could not possibly come into
collision with the right of personalit or with any other right,
because every right embodies the concept of freedom, the
highest dterminaton of spirit, in relaton to which everg
else is without substance. But a collision also contains this
frther moment: it imposes a limitaton whereby one right is
subordinated to another; only the right of the world spirit is
absolute in an unlimited sense.
The method whereby the concept, in science, develops out of itself
and is merely an |oocotprogression and producton of its own
determinatons is likewise assumed to be familiar from logic. Its pro
gress does not depend on the asseron that various circumstances orc
rcscoi or on the subsequent ol|:ot|s of the universal to such
material of exaneous origin.
59
z
Philosophy of Right
Thethe

t,

s
_the partcularizatons of universal but also produces them,
is w at I call |ols:t|:.I consequently do not mean that k of
di an object Csgsstoo,propositon, etc.
given to feeling or to the immediate consciousness in general,
and dissolves it, confses it, develops it this way and that, and
is solely concered with deducing its opposite - a negatve
mode which fequently appears even in Plato. Such dialectc
may regard as its fnal result the . opposite of a given idea
|sntsl/sog},or, as in the uncompromising manner of ancient
sceptcism, its contadicton, or, in a lame fashion, an orsx-
|ot|so to the tuth which is a modem half-meae
ligher dialectc of the concept consIsts not mere y M produc
ing and apprehending the deteminaton as an opposite and
linItng factor, but in producing and apprehending t
content and result which it co tains; and it is this alone which
. makes it a eslsst and immanent pro ession. This
- ialectc, then, is not an otsmo actvit of subjectve thought,
but the ve ssslof the content which puts forth its branches
and fruit organically. This development of the Idea as the
actvit of its own ratonalit is something which thought,
since it is subjectve, merely observes, without for its part
adding anything exta to it. To consider something ratonally
means not to bring reason to bear on the object fom outside
in order to work upon it, for the object is itself ratonal for
itself; it is the spirit in its freedom, the highest apex of self
conscious reason, which here gives itself actualit and
engenders itself as an exstng world; and the sole business of
science is to make conscious this work which is accomplished
by the reason of the thing So:ls} itself. "-
The stsm|aot|ssin the development of the concept are on the one
hand themselves concepts, but on the other hand, sice the concept is
essentally Idea, they have the form of exstence Doss|o}, and the
series of concepts which results is there ore at the same tme a series
o; this is how science should regard them.
*
60
T
I

T
IntroduaiOl
In te more speculatve sense, the sss]sxistso:sof a con
cept and its ctsm|ooare one and the same ting. But it
should be noted tat the moments, whose result is a frther
determined form [of the concept], precede it as determina
tons of the concept in the scientfc development of the Idea,
but do not come before it as shapes in its temporal develop
ment. Thus the Idea, in its determinaton as the family,
presupposes those determinatons of the concept fom which,
in a later secton of this work, it [i.e. te Idea] wlbe shown to
result. But the other side of this development is that these
inner presuppositons should also be present for themselves as
sloss, such as the right of property, contact, moralit, etc.,
and it is only at a more advanced stage of culture Bi/ug]that
the moments of development attain this distnctve shape of
exstence.
3 1-32
a|t|so .The Idea must contnually determine itself frther within
itself, for it is initally no more than an abstact concept. But this inital
abstact concept is never abandoned. On the contary, it.erelys
contnually richer in itself, so that the last determinaton is also the
ons which previously exsted only in them
selves thereby attain their fee self-sufciency, but in such a way that the
concept remains the soul which holds everything together and which
arrives at Its own differentaton only through an imanent jocess.-ae
therefore say that the concept arrives at anything new; on the
contar, the last determinaton coincides in unit with the frst. Thus,
even if the concept appears to have become fagented in its exstence,
this is merely a semblance, as is subsequently confrmed when all its
details finally retur in the concept of the universal. In the empirical
sciences, it i customar to analyse what is found in representatonal
thought [Vortelzmg], and when the individual instance has been reduced
to te common qualit, this common quality is then called the concept.
This is not how we proceed, for we merely wish to observe how the
concept determines itself, and we force ourselves not to add anything of
our own thoughts and opinions. What we obtain in this way, however, is a
series of thoughts and another series of exstent shapes, in which it may
happen that the temporal sequence of their actual appearance is to some
extent diferent fom the conceptual sequence. Thus, we cannot say, for
example, that property exsted before te family, although propert is
nevertheless dealt wit first. One might accordingly ask at this point why
do not begin with the highest instance, that is, with the concretely tue.
The answer wlbe that we \vish to see the tuth precisely in the form of a
i
Philosohy of Right
result, and it is essental for this purpose that we should frst comprehend
the abstact concept itself. What is actual, the shape which the concept
assumes, i therefore from our poit of view ony the subsequent and
frther stage, even uit should itself core frst in actualit. The course we
follow i that whereby the abstact forms reveal temselves not as exstng
for themselves, but as untue.
SUDMSIONS

33
In accordance with the stages i n the development of the Idea of the
wlwhich i fee in and for itself the wlis
A. sots its - ce t i therefore absg,
and its ostw:sDosso}is an immediate exteral thing Sods} , ~
the s here of o/strouor onoolnI:t
B. ,ce tstss]determined as ss/-
vs:vsol:q zsllst} in oppositon to the sovssol~ the
rtly as
something exteral, an ostwtsn,with these two aspect of the
Idea sotsonly tlrssgl socl stlsr, the Idea in its division or
ori:slorexstence Exstwz},tlsnglts)tlsss/)s:ivs/lin rela
ton to the right of the world and to the rgltof the Idea -which,
however, los/sogonly tss]~ tlsslsrsjsrolq, ;
C. the soqand twtlof these two abstact moments - the thought
Idea of the good realized in the interally rsashand i te
otolsr/,- so that feedom, as the ss/stoo:s,exsts no less as
oaso/qand os:sssqthan as ss/)s:ivswl; - the Isoin its univer
sal exstence Exstwz}in. and for itself; [the sphere of stl:ol l}.
But the ethical substance is likewise
(a) ootsrolspirit; - the )q,
(b) in its vssoand osoroo:s,~ :vlss:st,,
(c) the stotsas feedom, which is equally universal and objectve in
the fee self-sufficiency of the partcular wl; this actual and
organic spirit (o) of a people (/) actualizes and reveals itself
trough the relatonship between the partcular natonal spirits (y)
62
I
1

IntroduaiOl
and in world history as te universal world spirit whose rgltis
ssrss.
That a thing So:/s} or content which is posited only in
accordance with its :so:qtor as it is otss]has the shape of
soor of /eg, i presupposed fom speculatve logic;
the concept which exst for itself in the fnn s]tls:so:qti
something different, and is no longer immediate. - The
principle which determines the above subdivisions is likewise
presupposed/ The subdivisions may also be regarded as a
lstsr:olpreview of the parts [of the book], for the various
stages must generate themselves fom the nature of the con
tent itself as moments in the development of the Idea.
Philosophical subdivisions are certainly not an exteral classi
ficaton - i.e. an outward classifcaton of a given material
based on one or more extaneous principles of organizaton -
but the immanent differentaton of the concept itself. -
Msmlq and stlcs, which are usually regarded as roughly
synonymous, are taken here in essentally distnct senses.2 Yet
even representatonal thought |sntsllsog} seems to dis
tnguish them; Kantan usage prefers the expression srolq,
as indeed the practcal prnciples of Kant's philosophy are
confned throughout to t concept, even rendering the point
of view of stl:simpossible and in fact expressly infringing and
destoying it. But even if moralt and ethics were etmologi
cally synonymous, this would not prevent them, since they are
now different words, fom being used for different concepts.
a1|t|so.When we speak here of right, we mean not merely civil right,
which is what is usually understood by this term, but also morality, ethics,
and world history. These likewise belong here, because te concept
brings toughts together in teir te relatonship. If it is not to remain
abstact, the fee wlmust frst give itself an exstence Doss|o},and the
primary sensuous consttuents of this exstence are tings Scas:},i.e.
exteral objects D|ogs}.This frst mode of feedom is te one which we
should know as proe, te sphere of formal and abstact right; propert
in its mediated shape as :sotroa,and right in its infngement as :rsand
so|slsst,are no less a part of this sphere. The feedom which we have
here is what we call te person, tat is, the subject which is fee, and
indeed fee for itself, and which gives itself an exstence Doss|o}in te
realm of tings ScJ:so} .But this mere imediacy of exstence is not in
32-33
Philosohy of Right
keeping with feedom, and the negaton of this determinaton is the
sphere of morality. I am then free no longer merely in ths immediate
thing [Sadie], but also in a superseded immediacy - that is, I am fee in
myself, in the subjectve realm. In this sphere, everg depends on my
insight, my intenton, and the end I pursue, because exteralit is now
regarded as indifferent. But the good, which is here the universal end,
should not simply remain with me; on the contary, it should be realized.
For the subjectve wldemands that what is interal to it - that is, its end
- should attain an exteral exstence [Dasei11], and hence that the good
should be accomplished in exteral exstence [Existe1/z]. Moralit and the
earlier moment of formal right are both abstactons whose tuth is
attained only in ethical li. Thus, ethical life is the uni of the wlin it
, conce{t and the wl of the individual [ds Eirlzelrle11], that of the
ege
f love and feeling [Empf1Idll1lg] - the f1il; here, the individual
[ds lldividl1ll11l] has overcome [atifehobell] his personal aloofess and
finds himself and his consciousness within a whole. But at the next stage,
we witess the disappearance of ethical life in its proper sense and of
substantal unit: the family becomes fagmented and its members behave
towards each other as self-sufcient individuals, for they are held
together only by the bond of mutual need. This stage of civil socet has
ofen been equated with the state. But the state emerges only at the third
stage, that of ethical life and spirit, at which the momentous unifcaton of
self-sufcient individualit with universal substantalit takes place. The
right of the state is therefore superior to the other stages: it is feedom in
its most concrete shape, which is subordinate only to the supreme
absolute tuth of the world spirit.