Causes and Traj ectori es of Local Conflict Among Pastorul

Peopl es in No rth east A frica

Jo n Abbink ' ABSTRACT Pastoralist (herd ing) societi es in Africa are cla imed to be pr one to vio lence due to structural conditions of envi ronmental vu lnerability, scarcity of resources and decentral ized soc io political organizatio n. Thei r contacts with expanding state struc tures . and with neighbo uri ng groUpS in di fferent socio-e con omie co ndi tio ns, are seen to add to ins tabili ty , due to the under lying hegemoni c proj ect of nation al states , wh ile major econo m ic and demographic changes also pla ya rol e. Thi s p aper presen ts a comp arative overvie w of general fact ors th at come into play in the ' pro duction of confl ict' in and between pastoral societies, focusin g on Northeast Africa. It is co ntended tha t whi le co n flict was a regu lar feature of life in traditional pastor al societ ies, its natur e and frequen cy have not ably chang ed in the con frontation with state forces, where by unr esolved tensions betw een traditional an d ' modem' ju dicial conflict reg ulation mechani sms playa role. Extern al agencies app roach these pa storal societies in conflict withou t p aying prope r attention to the lar ger po li tica l econo mic contex t in wh ich they ope rate and wh ich constra ins them in a polit ica l and Ideological sense. Some cas e ex amp les are adduce d to make this p oint. The se and other case studies revea l that struc tura l insta bility in contemporary pas tora l soc ieties is usuall y not properly interpreted by ou tside agenc ies and is not easily 'r esolv ed' . The pap er conclu des w ith a gene ral m odel or checkli st of conditio ns and facto rs of confl ict production in pasto ral societies . KEYW ORDS: past oralism, conflict, Ethi opia , state policy, reso urce sca rc ity, cult ure and ' ethn ic ' difference , conflic t me d iati on

Introduct ion Conflicts in Africa are still w idesp read and headl ine-catchi ng, as in Soma lia , the Ugan da-D lc Congo border (LRA depredations ), Sudan (D arfur), Chad, Niger, N igeria, and E thiopia (Ogaden), reflecting the probl em atic basi s of statehood, governance and econo mic (re)d istrib ution, and in ge nera l ind icative of the unresolved problem s o f deve lop m enta l ' mod erni ty' in a socio-politic al se ns e. T his paper focu ses the discussion ch iefly on causes of local co nflict in pa sto ral herd ing societies in Northeast Afri ca, w ith key exampl es from Ethiop ia, bo th on the level of inter-ethn ic and intra-ethn ic relat ions . In th e quest for ' solutions ' or for be tter use of

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Pastoral land use in Africa is substantial and in ma ny countries close to ha lf the terri tory IS semi-arid lowland occupied by pastoral peoples. Examp les are Somal ia , Sudan , Eth iop ia and Kenya. The population density is still re lati vel y low in these re gions, b ut, lik e mo st African countries, IS increasing fast. Average populat ion growth in Ethiopia and K en ya, for Instan ce, has been c. 2 .6 to 3% annuall y, and pa st orali st s share in this figure ) Past or ali sts are rur al people who depend for their main livelihood on the herd ing of livest ock mo stl y for subS istence and for trading of anima l pr od ucts. Among man y group s in southern Eth iopia th e average her de r fami ly has abo ut 30 -50 heads of cattl e Crop culti vati on is se condary and sometimes very limit ed, as they trade livesto ck or live stock products for food , e tc . in local markets. Ecological conditions in pastoral areas are by definition pr ecari ou s - sea sonal pastures necessitating transhumanc e, i.e. much mobi lity and somew ha t risky trave lling ; over dependence on insecure rainfa ll, resu lting in frequent drou ght ; underdeveloped hea lth or educational ser vice structures; and rem oten ess from political and eco nomic po wer centr es. Accordin g to one pop ular p aradigm , co n flict in pas to ra l societies is close ly tied to the se competitive ecologica l-economic co ndi tio ns of life in the sem i-arid zone whe re these peoples live: environ me nta l resou rce scarc ity in , now um ver sal , cond itions of pop ula tion grow th and shli nk ing of past or al areas wou ld lead to con fl ict and viol ence be twee n the compe tin g gro ups - in sho rt, ' resour ce co mpe titio n b reeds vio lence ' . A no ther paradigm, inherited fro m colo nial percep tio ns, is tha t pas to ra l pe opl es are cu ltura lly pr edisp osed to mili tan cy a nd violence , not only due to the harsh env ironmen t and the dangers the y face on an al mo st dai ly bas is (wi ld animal s, enem ies ), but a lso due to their ide al s of perso na l va lour and of ama ssing lives tock 'for its own sake ' - thi s wo u ld th en exp la in the ir incessan t ra id ing . In a dd ition , their ' egalitarian -democratic ' so ciety ba sed o n ki ns hi p and segme nta ry principles is o ft en see n as stimu lating their se lf-consc iously defended ide nt ity as independent p eople in area s where the central state was lo ng absent or at least quite weak in exerci sin g auth or ity. The S oma lis ar e often ment ioned as an example here. While these two paradigms , which cou ld b e called respectively "neo-Malthusian ' and the ' prim ord ialist' . carry grains of truth - e.g., there is environmental de gr adation an d dram ati c popu lation growth, and grou p identities m ore and more tend to b e held as rigid and ess entialized - they are only elements of " necessary but by far not suff ic ien t cxp lanatio.i of the general and pers istent caus es of conO ict in p astoral soc ieties. Wh at certai nly can b e sa id is thai pastoral societies are largely kin-ordered (lin ea ge s , clan s, etc . providing the b asi s of social solidarity) , committed to defe nce of thei r livest ock herd s, very mobi le an d ver satile, marked by low levels of technology (excep t, as \ VC wil l see , in weapon s) and vulnerab le to the vagaries of precarious natural co nd it io ns (Wo lde tensa e 2007) , state au thority (Hagmann & Alemrnaya 2008), and com pe tition from neighbourin g groups in sim ila r circum stan ces (cf. Meier, Bond & Bond 2007) . In this sen se , it see ms cl ear - and mus t be reco gnized in intervention policy - that in pa storal socie ties the thr esho ld s of

mediation and conflict resolution mechani sm s, it is re leva nt to und erstan d the nat ure of the recurring conflicts in pastoral societies, both Intcm all y and , predominanrjy, In their rel ations with wider structures, notably state authoritie s and busi ness enterpri ses. These pastoral societies occup y large trac ts of terr itory , oft en in bo rder areas.! Among the causes for conflict are environmental factors, livelihood dec line , certain cultural values/traditions, and state economi c or other policies , which in vario us combinations impinge on dispute generation and confli ct behaviour. Co nflict preven tion , resol ut ion and me diation structures are now a favourite subjec t o f inte rnationa l donor assi stance pro gr ammes , and are useful to expl ore , but I will argue that the expecta tion s and ideals of co nfl ict resolu tion in Africa , are in general too optimistic becau se o f the growing int ractab ility of conflicts. Man y of these conflicts, while locall y roo ted in long-term gr ieva nc es an d po wer struggle s, tend to become enmeshed with state (trans)fo rm ation processes as well as nati onal and globalized interests or ideologi es that are ha rd to man age and tend to be Imp osed on loc al societies. In addition , the wi ll and open nes s to med iat ion among many communities, even when induced to i1 by local elders or from abo ve, e.g. by state agents , seems to be in declin e. We see thi s in southern Somalia , Eri trea , and several parts of Ethiopia, when people pursu e local , sho rt-term interes ts and claim dominance. As an Ethiopian sa ying goes: "A king wanting reco nci liation ca n use a peasan t as mediator, but a peasant who does not want reconcil iation ca n 't eve n be re con ci led by a k ing " (So lomon 1992 : 60). The fac t is indeed th at suc h people re fusi ng co ncilia tio n (includi ng ma ny pas tora lists) n ow are q uite co mmon. In the co urs e o f thi s p ap er I will foc us on some examp les of pa storal societies that demon strate m ost of the fea ture s just m ent ion ed, and are , in co ntrast to their trad itional ima ge , far from iso la ted or rem ot e but in the midst of today 's global strugg les . De sp ite th ese w ider aspe cts , I w ill co nte nd th at efforts at co nflic t ana lysi s and of confl ict managem ent or transformation - wh ich is oft en the mo st we can get - ha ve to start in the local setting and must address the immedia te p rob lem s of the communiti es concerned . In anthropo logy and polit ica l Stu d ies there is a growi ng COnsensus on what facto rs are
invo lved in the gen eration of co nflict in pa stora l her di ng so ciet ies in Afri ca (se e the first
column in the model in the Appendix), but no t on the int eract ions between them and on the
trigger seq uences . E.g ., in man y cases , the scarci ty of pasture or wate r So urc es in an are a
trad ition all y sha red by at least two groups leads to tensions and fightin g (th e popula r
' reso urce competitio n ' theory , cf. Hom er- Dixon 1999; Markakis 1998), but in docum en ted
ot her ca se s result s in cooperat ion and agreements on reg ulated sha ring (Adano, et al. 2009).
So ho w is this ex p lained? What are ele m enis induc ing pastoral gro ups _ or cla n or ter rit orial
group s within a pastoral soc iet y - to tak e the path of accommodatio n in stead of con fl ict ? An
an swer ha s to be so ught in the int eractive patt erning of conflict situa tio ns in specific areas,
p ay in g attention to structural socio-e cono m ic conditions, ava ilab le techn ology (in cluding
weaponry ), cultural values (o r re pertoires), and st ate polic ies .

The soci o-ecollomi c basis of pasto ralist SOcieties

, While this paper IS partly based on field experiences in Southwestern Ethiopia in the late J 990s and early 2000s, I draw mostly upon secondary Sources and other document to make a more general argument. This IS why views and quotes from members of these past oral societie s are omitted here. .\ In 1974 Ethiop ia had c. 27 million people; a generation later, in 2009, an estimated 80 mln showing an unprecedented growth rate. The figures from the 2007 census (CSA 2008) show that the zones and woredas in all the pastoral areas of the country have seen a doubling of popu lation in the last 20-30 years. In imervrcws, pastoralists themselves often mention that the y see strong population growth that cannot be accommodated within their current production systems. See also Sahlu 2003.

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disputes and violent action are higher, which amo ng them is accepted as such, and culturally encoded . This does not mean, as anyone living in such a soc iety for a longer period knows, that peop le in those groups are necessarily ' more violently predisposed ' ; it is mostly a question of the specific living conditions and power relations with their neighbours and the wider society having shaped them. The prim ordia list and the neo-Malth usian approaches emphasize causality of one set ne of factors instead of in the interaction between natural and ec ologi cal conditions on the O hand and cultural reperto ires and values - related to gro up identity - on the other. This interaction takes shape in the agency of local groups (in this case pastoralists) towards hegemonic state policie s as well as unrelenting demographi c growth, which reduces the ratio of people and livestock per unit of available land - a process that has been going on for many decades . The growi ng presence of the state is evide nt in most pastoral areas , trying to incorporate them politically and econom ically, although it is weak in the provision of services or in controlling the means of violence. Th is process has a great impact on local group relations and even on the pastoral economy (cf. Abb ink 1997; Hagmann & Alemma ya 2008). One of the visible consequences is the gradual expansion of the economic presence of the state, through new markets, taxation, and administrative demands . This is even the case in post- 199 1 federa l Ethiop ia, where the official programme is local autonomy and decentr alization of power, and that has led in effect to a strengthening of the state in all peripheral areas of the country , notably throu gh processes of top-down cooptation. The policy packa ge of the state incl udes sedentarization programs for pastora lists (and rangeland development), conversion of the communal grazing lands of pastoral groups (redefined as 's tate land ' ) into private holdings for both richer herd owners and outsiders (for commercial enterprises") and given out in lease to foreign countries, with the state elite expecting to reap huge benefits"), as wel l as land alienation for othe r purposes. More than anything else, it is these processes that lead to a relative ' decline' or at least a weak ening of pastoralism: not the problems of the pastoral mode of production itself.

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'E thnic' con flicts ? Culture difference and valu es in conflict

Conflicts - certainly in pastoral societies - occur usually on a collective basis, not on an individ ual one. Indi vidua l violent disputes are usually labelled criminal or pathological. The many recent violent conflicts in Sudan , Ethiopia, Kenya and other countries are often said to be tied to the ethnic di fferen ces between the groups. Conflicts are rapidly extended to the entire ethnic group, seen as an extended or metaphoric kinship group. This is the case even though an incident ma y have started between individuals of herd ing groups in a small local context. In the last eighteen years in ethn o-federal Ethiopia, numer ous violent clashes are described as being betw een such ethnic or territ orial units that cherish a separate identity (Nuer-Anywa, Borana-Garri , Somali-Bo rana, Guj i-Borana, Afa r- Issa , Afar-Karrayu, Suri Anywa, Suri-D izi, Hamar-Borana, etc .; cf. Abbink 2006 ; Dereje 2006; Asnake 2009 ; Yasin 2008) . Historically, these groups indeed often have different ritual and cultural tradition s and
" Cf. the study of Tckele et al . 1994. l See Paul Vallely 2009.

languages or dialects, but shared much of the pastoral ways of life and their dealings with the natural environment. They also had well-establi shed traditions of conflict regulation that were based on debate, med iation, compensation and ritual recon ciliation via a ceremon y of blessings and oaths and jo int consumption of sacrificed animals. C ultural differences between pastoral groups were not a major cause for disput e or violence, as they shared much of the same challenges and values concerning male behavi our, gender relations, religious noti ons, rain rituals, etc. Some groups in conflict could even be considered part of the same peop le or linguistic community. The level of ' tolerance' toward violent acti on to redress perceived wrongs was higher among pastora l groups than among other s, and althou gh there were perhaps certa in codes of fighting (see Musa 1998 for the Somali of the past), there was a perception that some prob lems were better solved with forceful and violent action than with talking and negotiation. Amo n g some ethnic groups, e.g., the Guj i-Oromo (Taddes se 2009: 194), the Macca Oromo (Bartels 1983: 229 , 257); or the Bodj-M e' en (see Fukui 1979 for an influential stud y), there were or are ideals of spec ific violent performa nce and even cognitive ly rooted representations of violent action that had cultural value in the society. Having killed a large wild animal, e.g , lion or buffalo, or a human from another (ethnic) group enhanced the culturally required killer ' s status among peers, and was sometimes also required in orde r ( 0 qualify for marriage (the ' meritorious complex ' ; cf. Braukarnper 2002). The discourse of boasting and ' achievement' in having killed others that is prevalent amon g sections of the young generation in many of these pastoral peoples (but not only them) should not be underestimated . Among other s, for the Nuer or the Karimojon g (cf. Simonse 2005: 25 1) it has been argued that the raids on neighbouring groups were deemed necessari ly to accumulate sufficient livestock for the young (ma le) generation to be independent and to many (high bride-wealth). Whi le these ideals are variable and can undergo change, they we re at some point quite influential as motivational dispositions towards violent behavio ur and not easy to prevent. Generational opposition or tension would then under certain conditions be an Independent cause for violent behaviour. The differences between pastoral peop les and sedentary agriculturalists " 'ere significant and visible , often expressed in mutu ally antagoni stic images (of the o u- :I" S inferi ority or backwardness). Ideals on personhood and performance also diverged stro ngly. as did patterns of leadership and authority (cf. Abb ink 2004 on Sun and Dizi contlict). W h ile mediation structures also existed between them (e.g. for dealing with cases of cattle damaging field crops) and disputes were resolved via new agreements and compensation was paid, these structures in many cases are on the decline, or have come under pressure by interfering outside forces in recent decades. Notab ly in the inter-ethn ic, as opposed to the intra-ethnic, domain the)' have lost force. The Sudan ese region of Darfur is the most evident example of this (cf. Flint & De Waal 2005 , p. 58; Daly 2007 , p. 266). but as ethnographic studies and NGO research reports have suggested (see e.g. Wair agu 2007: 45: Yohannes et al. 2005; Abbink 2000), also in Kenya and Ethiopia such structures were neglected or lost status, either because of changing local power balances and new linkages to wider o utside networks. or due 10 misguided state appropriation of local media tion and biased intervention (ef. Ayalew 2001: 181, 183).

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Hence, while these me di ation structures still exist (or at least the idea that they should be used), and indeed are o ften cherished by local socie ties, there is a develop ment toward their devaluation. This points to the fact that more than cultur al or ethn ic differences per se being the cause of growing violent confli ct, it is ofte n the interference of the centralizing state that in itself is a major disturbing factor. In its efforts to establish political hegemony and economic advantag e, it subverts autonomy and custom ary dispute resolution procedures, co-opting them and introdu cin g bribes and bias in the local system, and the state also tends to appropn ate pastoral land resources without proper alternatives or compensation." This pro cess is accompanied by a disco urse of dif feren ce and cultura l denigration that is still prevalent, and which inevitably leads to new grievan ces, disput es, and often vio lence. Even if there would be real material issues at the base of gro wing conflicts, such as shrinking pastures, land grabs, closing of acces s routes, state repr ession and popul ation or livestock growt h exceed ing the carry ing capaci ty of the trad itionall y ex ploited areas o f a group.' leading to ' resource competition' (cf. Getachew 200 I: 9 6-97), it depe nds on the traditions of conciliation and on j udicial state po licy whether conflict behaviour takes root or not. In addition, new formations of power and bureaucracy may simp ly preclude the effective recourse to customary , local-level conflict resolution mechanism s, as the ideological econom ic and judi cial dependence of rural populations on the state structures is grow ing. In Ethiopia there is the special case that the political system since 199 1 is structured along ethni c lines", with many regions and districts led by a dominant ethnic elite; and when dispute s arise on borders, wells or oth er matters, the local administration tak es the side of ' its own group ' , whatever the j udicial merits of the case . These thoroughly 'e thnicized ' political arenas breed instabil ity and a pol itics of ' trench warfare' . The model has led to the rap id escalation of local conflicts along reconstructed ethnic lines, which were then s ubse quently declared ' the cause' of the conflict. As one example I briefl y discuss here the recent Borana-Garr i conflict. Here we see that economic. polit ical. en vironmental and ' cultural' factors merge. leadi ng to notions of ethni c identity defin ing the contours of the dispute. In February 20 09 deadly clashes occurred between the Borana Orom o and the Garri pastoral groups. whereby c. 300 peop le were killed and 70,00 0 fled th eir
6 The latest threat In southern Ethiopia is the plan to build a huge dam, Gilgel Ill, in the Omo River, of which the future effects on local pastoral peoples (not consulted) seem grave. See Greste 2009. Another new development endangering the indigenous basis of agrarian and pastoral economies is the giving out of large tracts of land, notably in Ethiopia, (0 foreign concessionaries or countries, not intending to produce for the local market but for their own, i.e., overseas. This development will have a major impact on Ethiopian rural society, e.g., implying severance of the bond of the local people with the land, alienation from their social and cultural 'capital', and, at the most, employment of a part of them as low paid wage labourers. The agrrcultural demonstration effect of the foreign producers on Ethiopian rural producers will be minimal. because they will not have a "developm ent role For a study, see Cotula, et al. , 2 009. ) The decline of ' carrying capacity' is shown by the persistent out migranon of (impoverished) members of these societies or of those who have lost rights of access to land and cattle, and their search for wage labour or other sources of livelihood elsewhere. S Constitutional ly, sovereignty lies not in the Ethiopian people, but in the ' nations, nationalities and peoples' of Ethiopia (Constitution, Art. 8.1).

,on Abbinc.k '.>

homes. According to a BBe news message", it was apparen tly triggered by the construction of a new borehole. Th e Borana live in the Ororniya Region al State; the Gam, a less numerous pa storal group of mixed Somali and Oromo orig ins, live along and across the border of this State WIth the Somali Regiona l State (of Ethiop ia). Th is was not the first confli ct between them, and a clash in 2000 WIth many peop le kill ed and displaced ;" had app arently not been followed by an effec tive peace or reco nciliation agre ement. While in the past these two gro ups were not good friends either, such numb ers of victims and such a leve l of destru ction and expul sion were not known befo re. The Garri this time attacked Borana settlements at night , kill ed every one they met, destroyed and burnt the villages and cattle camps , and raided tho usands o f livestock. The past two yea rs rainfall had been very bad , and lack of water and pasture were crea ting hard ship among the two peop les. Th e new water borehole had ju st been cons tructed by the Oromiya regio nal governm ent for the Borana, and there was none for the Gam (w ho are in another state). In th eir attack, the Gam also destroyed the drillin g ri g. Much of the raided cattle was brought across the border to Kenya and sold there, impossible to retrieve. One Borana witn ess of the atta ck said: "The y came on foot, without veh icles, but they had bombs and missile launchers, and at that time we didn't have guns, only sticks to defend ourselves " . "They didn't want us to live well, and water is very important to us, so they attacked our water source." II One local Borana po litician was quoted as saying: "T he Soma lis [meani n g the Gam , JA) are problematic peop le" . .... "They are a lways push ing us. It's as if I give you a place to pitch your lent and the followi ng morn ing you are telling me to leave; the Borana are not accepting that ." In the absence of effective trans -eth nic media tio n or compensati on mecha n isms, the conflict saw no solution yet and Borana swore to take revenge. In this respect, the Borana were rep orted to be stockpiling weap ons, and in response , the Garri did the same. Gov ernmen t forces are for the time being stationed between the two groups, but no effec tive peac e procedures are yet in place.

Several fam iliar elemen ts are evident here: traditional tension between two ethno
linguistically d ifferent groups (cultural differe nce), hard ship due to drought (ecology) , the
new, ill-defined regional bord er dividing previously shared, ' open' pastu re land s of two
groups (politics), government poli cy of drillin g wells in one place , but not in ano ther

E Blunt, ' Water pipe sparks Ethiopian conflict' , BBC news, 12 March 2009 (online:
http://news.bbc.co.ulv hi/africa/7929104.stm, accessed 17-03-2009.
'2'' I" In 2UOO there was a violent clash between the rwo groups, then with c. 140 people massacred,
Including women and children, and hundreds displaced (see Abdurahman Arne 2006: 5).
II See precedmg footnote.

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(p olitics), a hi gh num b er o f victim s in a few da ys due to the use of lar ge quan tities o f mod em auto matic nfl es (new arm s techn ol ogy ':', d ifferenti all y intr odu ced amo ng, or acce ss ib le to , th e loc al gr oup s), an d the possible comm ercialization of raiding, as th e ca tt le we re part ly sol d in di stant m arkets, to out sid ers (economi cs ). In short, opp ortu nity structures for con flict are m ore prevalen t, due to different po sition ing of th e gro ups vi s-a- vis the sta te, and du e to durab le, structu ra lly entre nc he d d isp utes abo ut: (access to) mat eri al resources, p ol itical and legal power, access to e cono m ic o pportu nities ( incl ud ing ma rkets ), and ab ou t the re lati ve socio- culture rank ing o f groups w ithin a co ntext that ge ts more p er vasive. Grou p identity, so lid ified with a po li ticized app e al to 'ethnicity ' (b ehereseb ident ity), is marsh all ed to dra w the line s, even if factu al cu ltural di fferen ces we re qui te lim ited.

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In man y con flic ts betwee n p ast oral gro ups and se de ntary -ag ric u ltural peo pl es , noti o n s of moral co mm un ity and affinity ar e ofte n not exten ded to th e oppo nent. T he co nflicts ar e m ore tenaci ou s and irrec on cil able. Ap art from histor ical enm ity du e to past camp aign s of vio le nt state forma tio n by large p astora list peoples (c.g ., the Ful ani states in Wes t Afr ica ) and recu rri ng structur al oppos itions between ways of lrfe and livelih ood system s , ther e are o fte n add itional cu ltural differ ence s , suc h as lan gua ge, traditi ons o f ori gin , auth ority stru ct ur es , presti ge ran king, religi ous trad ition, an d li fe-cycl e ritual s. T hese can lead to cn gr ained cultural perce ptions of ' differenc e ' tha t are a ct ivel y cherished as ' go od' or 'bad ' and , despi te overlapp in g zones of sim ilarity and sha red activit ies , are still socially repr odu ced o n both sides. In m an y case s, vio lent co nflic t n ow typ icall y take s the form o f ra ids by pastorali sts on sedentary peasan t cult ivators an d their fiel ds or villages , w ho are vuln era b le. ' 3 In th is pattern of con flict, expl oited by th e Sudanese state elite, ha s led to th e de vast a tion o f an en tire region and its sys tems of liveli ho od (cf. Dal y 20 07). These raid s, fo r a va r iety of rea sons , mak e many victims, an d the me agre possessi on s o f the cu ltiva tors (a few heads o f livest ock , cloth ing, o r mo ney) are ta ke n an d o ften le ave th em des titu te . Ret al iat ion is usu ally impossib le , be cau se th e p easants are less well- arm ed and m ore under the control of th e government. In pr e-state con ditio ns, the re wa s o ften a delicate , negot iat ed (c ontrac tua l) balance be twe en the se tw o k in ds o f gr oups , w ith right s and dut ies as we ll as some ritual com plem enta rity clearly de fi ne d . These notion s are now largel y ero ded, an d c on flict betw een sedentary farm ers and p ast oral gr ou p s ten ds to ev olve into cyc lic al local wa rfa re. Eco no mi c relations, not to speak of inter-marriage s , are th en declining steep ly. The D arfur sit uatio n is a prime example (cf Prun ier 2005 ; Dal y 200 7 ). Ethn ic ste reotypes gai n th e upper h and and become a facto r in enemy ima ges and further co n flict be hav iour.

Types and pal/em s ofconfl ict

ln th e type of societie s under di scu ssion , con flicts are o f a specific , historicall y w ell-att ested ki nd . They often follow simil ar lines or cyc les. Three types of confl ict can be d istinguished, w ithout sug gesti ng th at th e line s and op pos itions are alw ays c lea r o r foll ow neat ' ethn ic lines ' .

a) Wit hin pa storal gr oups.

Co n flicts bet ween p astoral p eop les hav e often a long h ist ory and sh ow elem ents of ' b alan ced ex chang e ' (n egat ive recip ro city), chara ct erized by rep et itive violent inc idents (ra id s, attacks) b ut al so co rrective mechan ism s of peace-m aking. Some affi nities b etwe en co nfl ic ting gro up s are mutuall y re co gni zed , based o n s im ilarities in the ir way o f li fe an d their cus toms, e.g ., thei r soc io-cultural fo cus on ca ttle or came ls an d certai n ritu al-reli giou s beliefs . But despite occasio nal co op erative agr eements in tim es of unexpe cted adversity affecting th em both, different pa st oral peo p les u su ally vie for pasture, liv est ock (ra ids in tim es of local drou ght, mea nt to replen ish lost herds) and wa te r sources. Ne verth eles s, co nquest and dri vin g out others wa s rare , let a lo ne m assi ve killing. In A frica th is p icture is cha nging, ho wever , s ince the late j 980 s, whe n p astoral gr ou ps occas ionally st arted to push ou t othe rs due to th eir larger nu mbers, better arm am ents, or selective state supp ort (ag ain, D ar fur' s pastoral- nomadic gr oup s are a goo d ex ample) . As note d, in all so cieti es , certain ly in Northea st A fri ca , customary disp ute or con flict resolut ion procedures seem to be under pr e ssure . so th at th e state is mor e and mo re exp ected , o r rel u ct antl y ca lled in , ' to resto re o rder' - and often a fte r it had po sit ioned itself as a pl ayer be n t to establi sh hegem ony and pur sue its own int erests A clear tendency no w ad ays is th at con fl ict sta rt s not so mu ch alo ng comm unal/ethni c line s b ut mo re alon g generatio nal an d ind ividu al line s: not th e ethn ic groups as a w hole battle another or h ave a strate gy of expa nsion, but some indi vidual s or soc ial strata w ithin a gro u p suc h as a young gen erat io n o r age gro up - perpetrate the violen ce . Howe ver , in its tu m it leads to the gra dual mobili zat ion of lar ger units of the same peopl e . Some pastor al pe op les have, however, due to popul at ion increase and regional m igra tion s, divid ed into sec tion s that co mba t one an other as if they w ere separa te 'eth nic ' grou ps . Th e Karim oj ong o f U gand a, for in stan ce, a soc iety flood ed by au to ma tic weap ons, see m no w to be irretrie vab ly split int o th ree antagonist ic gr oups : the Mathenik o, Pian and Bok ora (Sim on se 20 05: 25 0) , wh o rai d an d kill each ot her an d do neith er app eal to com pensation pr ocedures nor reconcile .

c) Betw een the state and local gr ou ps.

In ma ny A fric an countries the stat e is weak and dys functiona l, not pro vid ing ser vices or effe ctive le ga l redress to citizen s, but it is st ill exp anding its ad m in istrative an d mi li tary presen ce in many form e rly outlyi ng areas . The aim s are p olitical an d econ om ic: stab ilizarion of b order areas, co ntro lling o f insur gent a ctivities, and ope nin g up lan d for ex ternal investment or resource ex trac tion 14 and tak ing a share of pro fits and taxe s. T he dev elop u .cnt of game p arks for touri sm is al so one exampl e; having recentl y created problem s an d controversy , e. g. in sou thern E thio pi a (cf. the experiences with the E U fu n ded Nati onal Pa rks proj ect, 1994 -1998 , and th e Afric an Pa rk s Foundati on , 2004-2 008) , Local peo pl e in ma rgi nal pasto ral area s are seldo m consul ted, a nd are co nfron ted w ith state encl osure s , hun tin g b ans
I ' During my fieldwork period among the Sun agro-p astoralists in Southern Ethiopia in the 1990s, many such raids were carried out on Dizi villages. Markakis (2004: 26) mentions a raid of the Pok ot on the Marakwct III northern Kenya, where 50 Marakwet were killed. The list of such conflicts IS long. The Darfur war is marked by a consistent and organized pattern of destructive attacks of pastoralists (or former pastoralists), augmented by state-supported militias of bandit s and robbers, on the sedentary farming populations In central Darfur. " One example among many is the campaign of the state authorities III Niger against the Tuareg in the north because it wants to mine the uranium found in their area. See e.g., the ' SSC news message ' Niger's Tuareg rebels demand share of uranium cash' , 23 July 2009, accessed 10 August 2009 at: (hnp:l/www.reutcrs.com.article/ latestCrisis i idUSL20 182 175)

b) Between pastoral group s an d sed en t ary far mi ng populations.

I' See, for instance, Mkutu 2003 and 2007 ; also Mirzeler & Young 2000 for the Karimojong case.

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Jon Abinnk
and prohibitions on rnobiht y. When clashes occur between two past oral gro ups or a pastorall group and a fann er group. the gove rnment often comes in too late and lets the con flict rage on before efforts at mediation or settlement are attempted . A state-sponsored peace cere mony or agreeme nt is often incompl ete and does hardly set abo ut to solve the underlyin g long-term probl ems, because for addressing them politi cal reform and costl y polici es for development are needed. Many of the prob lems between groups relate the heritag e of colonia l borders , across which pastoral groups move to exploit traditi onal seasonal pasture land, alth ough they are formall y not allowed to do so any longer as nominal citizens of another country. Lon g-term ecological and political developmen ts or decisi ons have had eco nomi c consequences that induce people to take actio n or to resist, sometimes in violent ways. But there is also the persistent view by outside rs that pastoralists live in quite differ ent spaces, far from ' civilization' . Comm on forms of violent action among pastoral popul ations as well as sede ntary fann ing people (although the latter more oft en as victims) are: * livestock raidin g * attack on villages * targeted or random killings " ambushes to rob people * attacking traders or traveller s going to the markets, and * abductions. When disput es arise, the impul se among the contending parties no wadays is often not to send a delegat ion and ask for discussion and negotiation thro ugh established channels, but to 'crea te facts ' by acts of viole nce, to intimida te, eliminate or to chas e out pe ople from disput ed areas by one of the mean s or tactics just mentioned (see also the model in the Appendix). Thi s leads to spirals of violence that are not easily broken . not eve n by customary ritu al leaders or religio us fig ures. A neglected issue of attentio n here is the na ture of the violence perp etrated in contempo rary conflicts: ' new ' forms of abuse and cruelty in fighting often create deep psychological sca rs and implacable hatred amon g pe ople. Conflicts in additi on often lead to dam aging livelihood prospects, as fields cannot be safely cult ivated. with food scar city the result. and livestock cannot optimally access essen tial grazin g areas, leadin g to their wea kening and often death.

_ __ -" on AhQinls _ _
In many pastoralist areas, state auth or ities have given up the semblance of exe rc ising consensual authority, and ' rule' by force and vio lence (Darfur, north ern Uganda , the Og aden, northeast Kenya), alth ough claims to sovereign power over the areas are not give n up . As noted above, in other areas in.habited by pastoral people s, state autho rity and its poli c ing functions are gradually expanding in symb olic and material from (offices, police stations, erc.). although they are neither very efficient nor fair. Incorporation of the marginal p astoral areas is thus ofte n part of a state (re)bui lding process, whereby cooptation and contr ol are see n as essential. Th is policy from above has political and eco nomic co nsequences , e.g. ove rall disempowerrn ent of local people in their own areas , resented by past oralists for pol itico-econ omic and cultural reasons. Trans-bo rder economic activities - e.g., transhurnan ce or livestock trade - are often also hindered by the state authoriti es, with the intent to control them and collect taxes, but the effect is to redu ce the potential economic local benefits, to distu rb customary pattern s of exch ange, and introduce an often arbitrary ' legality' of certain eco nomic pra ctices. In additi on , land expropriations for external investment are often made without consultation of local peop le, let alone compensatio n. The cultural hegemony of state policy and its civili zatio nal narrati ves or ideolog y leads in many cases to predict able depreciation of local traditions. A pr ime example is the sta te prohibit ion, some years back, of ceremonia l stick duelling - dee med 'vio lent' - among the Suri people in southwest Ethi opia, or the interference of the Ethio pia n state in Borana-Oromo ritu als such as the gu mi gaayyo, a big init iation and generatio n-set ceremony held every eight years (The last one was in 2004) . Th e authorities then descen d on the Borana ceremonial meetin g place with a host of officia ls and media people seemin gly to ' annex' this event , intendi ng to determine much of the proceed in gs and to advise on ' policy outcomes' . This seems to show a lack of respect for an important loca l cultural trad ition and incon ectly puts political demands on it. At the same time, the state auth orities have great difficulty or reluctance in i",,,cs:i:-.g in educational, medical, infras truct ural and other facilities in the pastoral areas, or to put acceptable political mechanisms in pla ce that prevent conflict or effecti vely allow medi an on 111 cases o f emerging disput es. There is much scope for taking the pastoral areas more seriously in this respe ct, all the more so because pastoral peop le link up with their eth nic or regional brethren across national borders (So ma li, Afar, Gabbra, M aasai, etc.). In their dealings with pastorali sts, state authorities wo uld also d o bett er to reco gnize the relative autonomy of pas toral peoples, both po litically and economically . Sedentary rain fed agricul ture will not be possible in the pastoral areas and in general livestock herding is more viable there than other agra rian pursuit s. This means for exa mple that the usual plans for the "sedentarization' of pastoralist peop le should be modified . Th e state should also, perhaps with NGO assistance, institute confl ict warning systems and establish a work ing local j ustice system that utilizes both the appea ls to local customary mechanisms of di spute resolution as well as to a modem court system. If these things are in place , then the ratio nality of appeali ng to them, inste ad of grabbing the gun, is more evident. Donor countries have provided funding for such initiatives, but they have not been effectively used or moni tored. In sum, the state authorities might be called upon to recognize the spec ificity of pastoral problems and their wider impact on sedentary popul ations, and enhance the politi cal representati on of pastoralists in over-arching structures (cf. Lister 2004 ) so that they can build

The impact of state p olicies and trails-border link ages of'pastoralist conflicts While no one doub ts that the mod em state, also in developing countries, has a prim e role to play in de-escalatin g con flicts, maint ain justice, and invest in service prov isio n and ' deve lopment', there are conditions that make all this difficult. For exampl e, a problem for state authorities is to effectively counter-act long-term eco logical and economi c changes in the pastoral areas : there is climate change , less rainfall, demographic expansion, and periodic livestock disease. T here are trans-bo rder conflicts or civil wars impacting on nei ghbouri ng groups , including the rapid spread of modern arms, often procured in one country and used in another. The impa ct of the southern Somalia con flicts on Ethic-So mali border areas is one example ; the expansion of the Nuer in the Ethio-Sudanese bord er area (Garnbe la), threatemng the Anywa people, another.

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local alliances and become partners in developing policies more towards compromise and I- coopera tion with their sedentary neighbours. In Ethiopia, this is partly happening on ~~~ I regIOnal and zonal levels, where pastoral representa tives are gradually more visible allowed t o all' their views. Developing policie s on the . ground, however , also r equ~r:~ rec ogm zing the useful pra ctical role of local (and up to a pomt, international) NGOs. "
.Traditiona l ' conflict m an ag em ent Procedures: p rosp ects and realities A start to conflict management , or rather transformati on of conflict into manageable structures, is to depart from the immediate concern 0 f the parties in a specific conflict: what are the casualties and the damage, how do they dis cursively frame their problem s and I oppos ition to others in a historical perspective, and tryi ng to weigh who tells what version of the disp utes and why. The traje ctory of conflict can be analysed in event sequences and against the background of contextual factors, like (see the model in the Appendix) the long. term conditions of inequality, marginalization, environmental stress (Me ier, Bond & Bond 200 7). and problemat ic state policies of hegemon y and incorporation . Th e third step is to reconstruct the ' trigger even ts' , or the immediate agency of those involved, and address them concretely. Here decision-theory is needed: who initiates/decides on violent action, who joins and why? In view of the pre cari ous long-term political-e cological conditi ons of pastor al and agro-pa storal groups in Afri ca, it is impossible to expect that they will no t be in conflict in the foreseeable future . But the puzzle or the cause for worry is the press ure on the mediation struc tures , of procedure s of agreement-re aching and of shared action that could maintain or restore (some of) the commo n economic activities (e. g., sharing wells, dry season pastures, use of stretches of bush or forest) that the groups cu stomarily resorted to, and to a large extent still do (cf. Desalegn et al. 2005 ; Lemma 2008; Ahmed & Yarcd 2008) . Here the mode m states in the Hom of Africa have mostly failed , eith er in ' early warn ing' and polic ing or in taki ng the problems and emerging violent conflicts of these groups seriou sly - probably becaus e the latter were seen as located in ' marginal', ill-serviced areas, of no direct political significanc e to the state . As the persisten t Ogaden conflict in southeast Ethiopia (a new round of violent confrontations started in 2007, and is still going on) has show n, this was a great miscalc ulation: pastoral group s are more and more involved in trans-border resistance movements, criminal activities (co mmercial cattle rustling), and perhaps also in radical milit ant (if not terrorist) activities: see the O gade n National Liberation Front's (ethnic Somalis) attack in April 2007 on an oil exploration site in Ethiopia , killing 74 people in cold blood ; activ ities of Somalis in the Kenya and Ethiopia frontier areas (cf. Osambia 2000 ); the Darfur-Chad rebel and criminal movements; or the Karirnojong disturbances in northeast Uganda (Simonse 2005). Phase one of a polic y towards conflict resolution is to study (rem nants of) tradit ional mecha nisms of mediation and examine how they cou ld be revived or given new leases of life, perhaps with new externall y provided incentives. Externally imposed top-down measures, like the massive use of force, have a temporary clamp-down effect but rarel y a beneficial long-term impact. Phase two m ight be a bringing together of local pastoral gro ups or peo ples
I ~ In Ethiopia this is now a big problem because of a new law (of 2009)severely restricting if not crippling the activities and mandates of NGOs in the country.
~h

Jon A bin nk

..- -----1 ---

on Ab bi n k

---

in arenas of discussion. In fact, this kind of development is occurrin g in southern Eth iopia in ,he past five years, where some N GOs have succe ssfully stimulated pasto ralists to take the initiative in a series of meetings, whe re issues of conflict and peace-makin g co uld at least be discussed (see AEPDA 2008 , IRlN 2009), and tn some instan ces have led to a mm gau on of specific local confl icts.
CO I/elusioll : towa rds the accept an ce an d m anagem ent of structural instability

As was noted at the start of this pap er, expec tations of conflict resolution in areas of conflict. notably in marginal pastoral areas, are in general too hi gh-strung. Und erlying ecological economic, political and cultural problem s arc long-term and persistent , and local politi cal culture in deve loping countries in Afr ica is largely authoritarian and state-cen tred , not geared 10 the effective flow and use of local traditi ons or initiatives. Cycles of conflict are often the result. lt is sensib le to start with the recognition that in pastoral areas the relati ons among pastoral groups themselves, as we ll as between pastoral peop le and cultiva tors o r state agents, are structurally unstab le. Mirzeler & Young (2000: 426) even have talked about the Karimojong as a situation with ' a stable from of diso rder' . But sometimes new ru les of access to resources and balanc es of power can emerge from persis tent violent conflict (cf. Unruh 2005). The role of the state ca n of course be important in contrib uting to conflict management (cf. Yohannes e l al. 200 4: 34-35). But it must be seen as one partn er , and must rather provide the wider normative and institutional framework for devel opin g so lutions, but not prescribe them with armed force and administrative rigour from above, Po licies that tie in with local views and initiatives, find socio-cultural reson ance, and appea l to trans-group cooperation in areas of common interest (e.g., common property managemen t) are to be stimulated. As said, there are also initiatives from within pastoral peop les themse lves to at least start addressin g problem s. Th is was evident in Decemb er 2007 in the large meet ing of representatives of I7 pastoral peop les in the Sudan - Ethiop ia border area, held in Kangaten, southern Ethiopia." Only by patien tly building on the results of such mee tings can any headway be made in addressing conflic t and its underl ying causes , as we ll as in refl ectin g on the revival or adaptive reconstruction of (customary) dispute resoluti ons acceptabl e to all.

I.

w ww

See lR1 news message, ' Ethiopia: healing the scars of conflict', 17 December 2007 (online: 1\ irinnews.org/Report.aspx'.'Reportld=75843). See also the report of AEPDA 2008, cited above.
<7

J on A b in n k

_
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J.Qll Ah b iD-. "k "

Ac know le dgem ent

r am gr atefu l to the pa rticipa n ts at th e Wo rks ho p on trad iti onal co nfl ict resoluti on , a t the Bonn Ce n tre for Conve rsion (B o nn , 2 7 M arc h 2009) , for their critical conunen ts o n an ea rlier version ' th is paper. I also thank th e tw o ano nymous revie w ers o f EJSS H for th eir ca re fu l read ing of the t~ and th eir critic ism and va luab le suggestions , urg ing me to imp rove this pap er. "]
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Yasin Mohamm ed Yasi n. 2008 . "The regi on al dyn ami cs of the Afar and Iss a-So mali conflict in the Hom o f Africa." In Wolbert Smid t & Kin fe Ab raham, ed s, Di scu ssing CO llflict in Ethiopia . COllflict M anag ement and R esolution. Munster - Ziirich: Lit Verlag, pp. 23-28 Yoha nnes Gebre -M ichael, Ka ssa ye Had gu & Zerihun Am ba ye. 2005 . Addressing pastoralist conflic t in Et hiopia: the cas e of the Kuraz and Ha mer Su b districts of South Zone. Nairob i - Ad d is Ababa - London : Africa Pe acef'orum- EPRDA - S afe rW o rld .

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APPENDIX: Sketch of a gener ative mod e of violent conflict (in pastoral societies)
Iufrast ruetur a l conditions and root cau ses (longue dude factors)

Precipita ting or pro xima te causes (short-c ycle factors) Bad leadership: internal or by state agents Development project interventions

Positive intervening f actors:

Appeals and de-escalating actions by ritual leade or.elders rs pre-emp tive action by neutral Slate agents mediating role of local or foreign NGOs trans-group co llective action by women' s'groups

Economic inequality Political marginalization Direct, visible exploitation by outs iders Erosion of customary dispute resolution mechanisms

-)

High number of livestock deaths due to disease or ep i d~m i~ Commercial livestoc k raids (fuelled by outsiders)
Triggers:

- group monopolization of we lls

Limited or blocked market access Land alienation (by state or comp anies, e.g.
for national parks)
Disputed border location
Genera tional opposition (young vs. old)
Cultural traditions validating aggressive
action (initiation, raiding, masculinity ideals)

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Sharp increase,in the spread of modern arms (automatics) Lack of rainfall causing acute crisis: drought and/or food scarcity

- raids on cattle

-7

- inter-group hom icide - village raid - revenge attack

ARMED
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CON
-7 PLl CT

-7

Play upon ethno-culrura) difference via (in)forma l ranking and inferiorization Humiliating actions of non-group members vis-a- vis cultural traditions or specific custom,

- abduction/abuse of females or children

state land grab - state repressive measures/campaigns territorial infringement

Environme uai deprivatio n or degradation,

i due \0 natural or political-economic causes

State incorporation, or appropriat ion

of local powers, e.g. of tradition al mediators or local ritual leaders

-7

Cases o f abuse or bios in the legal system agoinst a group, and lack of protective and policing activity
Negative intervening fa ctors:

Individual criminal acts Specific divide-and-ru le tactics by Incitement by either outsiders or b'TOUp members

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