Emp Grievance Research

International Journal of Management Reviews, Vol. 13, 4058 (2011) DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2370.2010.00283.
EmployeeEmployer Grievances: A Review

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Bernard Walker and Robert T. Hamilton

Department of Management, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand Email: bernard.walker@canterbury.ac.nz; bob.hamilton@canterbury.ac.nz
The focus of industrial conict has shifted from collective confrontation to grievances between employee and employer. This narrative review encompasses a range of international research on individual employeeemployer grievances. The literature is reviewed in four key stages: (1) the incidence of grievable events; (2) the employees response to a potential grievance issue; (3) the effectiveness of grievance processing; and (4) outcomes. The incidence of grievable events cannot be estimated precisely, because most are either not pursued by the employee or are settled informally (and so not recorded). Most research has been done on the second stage, investigating when a grievance will be pursued. The theoretical frame of exit, voice and loyalty, adapted from A.O. Hirschman (Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970) has been prominent, but a series of ndings have challenged the validity of this model and suggest a range of competing theories which may explain the apparent conundrum of negative outcomes associated with formal grievance procedures. The role of power has regained prominence, and this is part of a fuller understanding of grievance outcomes. The focus has been on the employee perspective, and it is now timely to broaden the focus, modelling a progression through a sequence of stages and emphasizing the role of employers in designing and managing grievance processes which are effective and fair.
Introduction
Employeeemployer conict is demanding increased attention from both managers and researchers. The decline of collective industrial relations and the individualization of the employment relationship have transformed employment relations. In the UK, the number of employment tribunal applications more than trebled between 1988 and 1996 (Burgess et al. 2001). In North America, there has been a similar effect, with the introduction of new federal employment legislation leading to a litigation explosion (Lipsky et al. 2003, p. 54) as employees increasingly led complaints and lawsuits. Individual disputes may now be the most relevant indicator of conict (Knight and Latreille 2000, p. 533), causing individual-level dispute processes to take on increased signicance for managers, employees and governments (Antcliff and Saundry 2009; Dickens
et al. 2005). Managers can be reluctant players in the dispute process, especially when employee performance is at issue and outcomes may impose signicant costs on employers (Den Hartog et al. 2004; Hutchinson and Purcell 2003, p. 23). Most research has taken the employee perspective, and more attention is needed regarding the role of managers and the design and operation of grievance processes that are fair to all parties. Grievance procedures are a complex and evolving area of research (Bemmels and Foley 1996). This review focuses on the mechanisms for aggrieved employees to protest and seek redress from some aspect of their employment situation (Feuille and Delaney 1992, p. 189). While these mechanisms are generally based on common principles, they vary, as do the legal frameworks in which they operate. These variations may explain why the major research streams in North America and the UK do not always
2010 The Authors International Journal of Management Reviews 2010 British Academy of Management and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
EmployeeEmployer Grievances cite each other. While previous studies have chosen to specialize in either unionized or non-unionized issues in isolation (Bemmels and Foley 1996; Bingham 2004; Colvin et al. 2006; Feuille and Chachere 1995; Feuille and Delaney 1992; Lewin 1990, 1999, 2004, 2005; Peterson and Lewin 2000), this review includes ndings from both areas. Research published in English language journals is predominantly from the USA, Canada and the UK and, while acknowledging this Anglo-Saxon bias, we point to recent work in a range of countries and cultures, including Barbados (Nurse and Devonish 2007), Germany (Behrens 2007), India (Varman and Bhatnagar 1999), Sri Lanka (Reade and McKenna 2007) and Turkey (Kozan et al. 2007). Internationally, the UK, Australia and New Zealand emulated many European nations by developing extensive statutory protections for individual employees, along with dispute resolution mechanisms through national labour courts or employment tribunals. In contrast, North America has its own mechanisms of employercentred access to justice, and employment at will remains the basic legal principle for most employment disputes (Colvin 2005; Colvin et al. 2006). Within this, the long-standing division between union and non-union situations gives rise to two distinct North American literature streams. In unionized sites, grievance provisions negotiated in collective bargaining agreements have been the classical means through which conict is managed and justice afforded to employees (Colvin 2003a; Lewin 2005). A grievance in this context is usually dened as a claim by an employee or the union that the employer has violated the contract (Feuille and Hildebrand 1995, p. 344).1 In non-union settings in North America, there has been a signicant expansion of dispute resolution systems which vary in scope and complexity, with differing procedures and protections available (Bingham and Chachere 1999; Colvin et al. 2006; Lewin 2005; Mahony and Klaas 2008). In place of the traditional union multi-step procedures culminating in neutral third-party arbitration, non-union
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41 systems have adopted a range of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) options including open-door systems, early mutual assessment, review panels (including peer-review), mediation and arbitration (Bingham 2004, p. 145; Feuille and Delaney 1992).2 Initially non-union provisions typically performed a similar role to union grievance procedures, dealing mainly with in-house matters of contractual violations and violations of organizations own policies. The term employment dispute resolution (EDR) is a broad term which encompasses a range of types of systems for resolving employment disputes outside a collectively bargained grievance procedure, using ADR options such as an ombuds programme, mediation or arbitration (Bingham and Chachere 1999 p. 95). These include programmes offered by administrative agencies and courts for resolving employment disputes, as well as employer-based systems (Bingham 2004 p.145). The scope of American EDR extends to cover not only the violations of contractual matters and in-house policies in nonunion settings, but also matters such as occupational safety disputes, workers compensation and complaints of discrimination under State and Federal law. In those latter areas, some of the more controversial forms of EDR are where employer-based programmes are substitutes for the legal remedies available through the courts and government agencies (Bingham and Chachere 1999). EDR systems can therefore exist both in non-union workplaces as well as in union settings, where they operate alongside union grievance procedures addressing matters outside the collective bargaining agreement. The focus of this review is on material published since the mid-1980s. The earlier research was predominantly on arbitration and was largely descriptive with few common themes (Bemmels and Foley 1996, p. 360). Moreover, organizations have been transformed in recent times through deregulation, the decline of manufacturing, and technological change. There have also been marked shifts in the nature of work, with reorganization of the workplace to embrace high-performance work systems, attened organizational structures and team-based approaches (Bamberger et al. 2008; Colvin 2003a; Kaminski 1999; Lipsky et al. 2003; van Gramberg and Teicher 2005). We review the grievance literature relating to
The term grievance procedures is used in a variety of ways, sometimes solely in relation to union procedures (Lewin 2004), while other writers use the term for both union and non-union procedures (Feuille and Chachere 1995; Feuille and Delaney 1992; Feuille and Hildebrand 1995). This current discussion will adopt the broader concept covering both union and non-union situations, as well as other formal employment dispute resolution systems outside North America.
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) options have been adopted in a range of areas, not solely employment, as an alternative to traditional avenues such as litigation.
2010 The Authors International Journal of Management Reviews 2010 British Academy of Management and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
42 the processes that inuence the initiation and course of an individual-level employment dispute. In terms of grievance outcomes, this review focuses on individual-level (rather than organizational-level) outcomes.3 We identify the four major stages in the process: the incidence of grievable events; the employees response to a potential grievable event (including grievance initiation); the effectiveness of grievance processing; and outcomes.
B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton adopt grievance procedures are bargaining choices which may be traded for wages, benets, work changes or other conditions. Similarly, employees who feel unfairly treated weigh up the costs and benets of grievance ling versus other options such as not ling or quitting (Peterson and Lewin 2000). Procedural-distributive justice theory, or organizational justice, is about how employees judge whether they have been treated fairly, and the ramications of this for organizational functioning in areas such as job satisfaction, commitment and withdrawal. Organizational justice to some extent followed from the due process4 approach of the 1970s and 1980s, which concerned the extent to which fair and orderly procedures provide aspects such as timeliness and impartiality (Olson-Buchanan and Boswell 2008b). Justice theory has applications to grievance initiation, but has been applied mainly to the grievance processing stage. Employees who think that they have been treated fairly will then engage in pro-social organizational behaviours. Conversely, treatment deemed unfair will give rise to feelings of resentment, which may lead to acts of retribution against the employer (Colquitt et al. 2001; Folger and Cropanzano 1998; Nowakowski and Conlon 2005). Organizational punishment/industrial discipline theory deals with issues of retaliation or revenge by the employer against individuals involved in taking a formal grievance. The employees are seen as having let the employer down and breached the informal code of behaviour that managers expect. Retribution can also be taken against the rst-line supervisor involved in the grievance. This theory addresses issues towards the end of the grievance process, and there is evidence that potential retribution does vary with grievance type and outcome (Arvey and Jones 1985; Lewin and Peterson 1999; OReilly and Weitz 1980; Olson-Buchanan 1996). These theories represent a range of perspectives proposed as potential explanations for various aspects of grievance behaviour. The stages of the
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Theoretical perspectives
There is no complete theory of individual-level employment dispute processes and Bemmels and Foley (1996, p. 361) suggest that any all-embracing theory would be incomprehensible. Research into grievance procedures is complicated by the variety of forms that these can take, and by a range of other factors (Bemmels and Foley 1996). A grievance resolution process will involve a sequence of different steps, and many individuals can become involved as a dispute progresses, with a shift from rst-line, local staff in the early stages to more senior staff from the union and the employer (and their professional advisers) as the dispute progresses to higher levels. There are, however, well-established theories that pertain to different phases of the grievance process. Exit, voice and loyalty has been a dominant theoretical approach in research on how employees respond to a grievance, and grievance outcomes. This came from Hirschmans (1970) model of consumer behaviour, which was adapted to explain the behaviour of individuals in the employment relationship, with Freeman and Medoff (1985) and others proposing that the grievance procedure functions as a voice mechanism. The individual employees loyalty to the rm is the key determinant of whether voice or exit behaviour will occur (Boroff and Lewin 1997). Compensating wage/efciency theory can be traced through the works of Ichniowski and Lewin (1987) and Cappelli and Chauvin (1991). The theory posits that employers and employees engage in a nancial costbenet reckoning with regard to grievances and grievance systems. In collective bargaining, union and management decisions to adopt or not
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For a discussion of the literature regarding the relationship between grievances and organizational-level outcomes such as productivity and organizational performance, see Lewin (1999).
Due process refers to a term of art from the Constitution dened by the courts to include notice, reasonable discovery of relevant evidence, an opportunity to be heard, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to counsel or a representative, an impartial hearing ofcer, a record of the proceedings, and a reasoned decision explaining what evidence persuaded the decision maker (Bingham and Chachere 1999, p. 114). As such, it concerns the extent to which fair and orderly procedures offer aspects such as timeliness and impartiality (Olson-Buchanan and Boswell 2008b).
EmployeeEmployer Grievances grievance process are analysed next, moving from the initial occurrence of grievable events through to post-grievance outcomes, outlining the questions that the theories seek to address.
43 relatively narrow range of statutory issues, including redundancy payments, wage deductions, breach of contract, discrimination and dismissal (Knight and Latreille 2000). For workplaces with 25 or more workers, the annual rate of these applications was 1.9 per thousand, or 0.2% of employees (Knight and Latreille 2000). Of those actually lodged, around 75% are resolved without the need for a formal hearing, with a substantial proportion using conciliation assistance (DTI 2004; Gibbons 2007, p. 9). Beyond these aggregated gures however, American, British, Canadian and other studies report wide variation in grievance rates across industries or sectors (Bemmels 1994; Bemmels and Foley 1996; Bemmels et al. 1991; Department of Labour 2003b; Earnshaw et al. 1998; Hayward et al. 2004; Lewin and Peterson 1988), but little is known about the causes of this variation (Bemmels and Foley 1996; Lewin 1999).
Incidence of grievable events

An individual-level employment dispute begins with a perception that a grievable event has occurred (Bemmels and Foley 1996, p. 362; Olson-Buchanan and Boswell 2008a), with the potential to develop into a formal grievance application. A number of studies have suggested that the incidence of grievable events is high, but there are only sparse data to enable their frequency to be determined (Bemmels and Foley 1996; DTI 2005a,b; Lewin 1999; Lewin and Peterson 1988). What is signicant is the apparent drop-off between the large numbers of potential grievances and the much smaller number led as grievances. Informal resolution among the parties represents an important early part of the process. In the USA, most workplace grievances are never put in writing, but are instead dealt with informally in discussions between workers and supervisors (Lewin 1999). As these disputes are not reected in the formal grievance statistics, their incidence is unknown. It is estimated that, in union rms for example, there are about 10 unwritten grievances for every one led formally (Lewin and Peterson 1988). In the non-unionized sector of North America, the source of ling data comes mainly from studies of individual companies. The denition of a grievance varies according to what the companys system allows and, overall, these studies suggest a mean annual ling rate of around 5%, or ve grievances per 100 employees (Lewin 2004, 2005). In contrast, union sector studies report a grievance-ling rate, across all sectors, of approximately 10%, twice that of non-union workers (Bemmels 1994; Bemmels et al. 1991; Lewin 2004; Lewin and Peterson 1988). Colvin (2003a) proposes that one reason for the lower non-union ling rate is the lack of due process protections compared with union systems. Conversely, union ling rates can also be elevated due to union-related economic and political motivations. These include links to contract renegotiation times when unions use grievances as an extra bargaining mechanism (Lewin 2005; Lewin and Peterson 1988). In the UK, grievance incidence data come instead from applications to an external forum, the state employment tribunal, whose jurisdiction covers a
Employee responses: grievance initiation

An employee confronted by a perceived wrongdoing by their employer has options ranging from formal action, to informal action, or no action. The research focus has been on why some employees initiate formal action when others do not. Research has taken a number of different paths, with particular approaches dominating certain periods as the research has evolved. This review uses a modied grouping of the research compared with other authors (Bemmels and Foley 1996; Labig and Greer 1988), with three main categories: (i) applied studies of the individual and the context of their work; (ii) employee decision-making models; and (iii) studies associated with Hirschmans (1970) exitvoice loyalty model and competing alternative models. The individual and the context of work Early research into grievance ling behaviour focused on individual attributes such as demographic and job-related characteristics, as well as personality traits, and sought to discriminate between those employees who had led a grievance (lers), and non-lers (Allen and Keaveny 1985; Labig and Greer 1988; Lewin 1987; Lewin and Peterson 1988). This approach assumed that grievance-ling could be explained by the personal disposition or characteristics of the actor. The research generally produced
44 inconsistent ndings and was criticized for being descriptive rather than theory based (Bacharach and Bamberger 2004; Feuille and Hildebrand 1995; Olson-Buchanan 1997; Peterson and Lewin 2000). In the North American context, lers in union settings tend to be younger, male, better educated and hold more skilled jobs than non-lers (Peterson and Lewin 2000). Non-union lers, while also younger and male, are less well educated, have blue-collar roles and are white (Lewin 2004). British ndings vary, with more recent data showing employees who are white, male, aged 45 and over, and in managerial occupations as having an above-average incidence of claims (Hayward et al. 2004).5 North American research suggests that the issue is further compounded, with the relationships between demographic variables and ling also varying by grievance issue; for example, in non-union environments gender is the main determinant of performance evaluation and promotion grievances, whereas age is linked with discrimination grievances (Bemmels 1994; Bemmels and Foley 1996; Bemmels et al. 1991; Lewin 2004; Lewin and Peterson 1988). Other studies have explored the work context and possible work-related determinants, based on the premise that these may have independent effects on grievance ling. In union settings, supervision and job conditions are the most frequently grieved issues across a range of sectors (Bacharach and Bamberger 2004; Lewin and Peterson 1988), therefore more aversive supervision or job characteristics should result in increased grievance ling (Bamberger et al. 2008; Klaas 1989a). In unionized settings, higher perceived supervisor capability has been linked with lower grievance initiation rates (Bemmels 1994; Bemmels et al. 1991), but research regarding production and goal achievement has generated inconsistent ndings (Bacharach and Bamberger 2004; Bemmels 1994; Bemmels and Foley 1996; Bemmels et al. 1991).6 Secondly, concerning job conditions, no consistent link was found between technology variables (such as the need to follow strict
As examples of the inconsistency, in the USA Lewin and Peterson (1988, 1999) found that union grievants were more likely to be younger, less educated (rather than more educated), and ethnic minority workers, while Knight and Latreille (2000) proposed a different UK list comprising manual workers and ethnic minorities. 6 Bamberger et al. (2008) argue, however, that this research may now be somewhat dated given the changed nature of supervisory roles, with a new focus on leadership, coaching and mentoring (p. 233).
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B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton schedules and procedures, routines, and task interdependence) and grievance ling (Bemmels and Foley 1996; Bemmels et al. 1991; Peterson and Lewin 2000). While neither work conditions nor demographic factors have exhibited direct effects, Bamberger et al. (2008) proposed that demographic factors may, however, serve as a moderator in the relationship between aversive work conditions and grievances, nding stronger links for women and minorities. Unions and management are also inuential through their policies and practices. When management and unions have a policy of committing grievances to writing, grievance rates increase in the USA (Lewin and Peterson 1988), and similarly in Britain, legal requirements for in-house procedures brought increased formality and escalation of disputes among smaller businesses (Antcliff and Saundry 2009; Gibbons 2007). Managerial monitoring of employees was also linked with increased grievance rates in a large unionized company (Kleiner et al. 1995). In the USA, a union policy of taking certain grievances through the procedure was also positively related to grievance ling rates (Lewin and Peterson 1988). At a shop steward level, attempting to resolve disputes informally was negatively associated with grievance rates, while initiation (direct or indirect) of ling functioned in the opposite direction (Bemmels 1994; Bemmels et al. 1991). Among employees, the frequency of complaints to stewards was positively related to ling (Bemmels 1994; Bemmels et al. 1991). Once more, however, the situation was complicated by the fact that effects varied signicantly across grievance issues (Bemmels 1994). Employee decision-making models Another line of enquiry has addressed employee decision-making, focusing on the initial decision to le a grievance. Gordon and Bowlby (1989) assessed the role of reactance and attribution in grievance initiation. Reactance theory suggests that people will react to restore freedoms perceived to have been lost. Attribution theory is about how untrained observers make sense of the actions of others, attributing the causes to either the internal personal dispositions of the other party or to external factors. These authors found a signicant relationship between both reactance and attribution and the intention to le a grievance. The strongest intent occurred when there was a greater perceived threat to the workers freedom (high reactance) or where the offending actions were
EmployeeEmployer Grievances seen to be motivated by dispositional (personal) rather than environmental causes. Klaas (1989a) used expectancy theory as the basis for a model of decision-making, which sought to integrate the literature on both the determinants of, and behavioural responses to, grievance activity (Olson-Buchanan and Boswell 2008a). This divided the grievance ling process itself into several stages, commencing at the point where an employee perceives a grievance opportunity (p. 447). How employees react to such opportunities is critical. There are those motivated by a sense of unfairness due to perceived mistreatment, and others who will le for instrumental reasons such as political or economic gain. The model proposes a rational, calculative decision-making process (Klaas 1989a, p. 451) where, in terms of expectancy theory, employees assess the relative attractiveness or utility of ling. This takes into account factors such as the likelihood of winning, and expected remedies, and compares these with inaction, or alternative responses such as being absent, lowered productivity, quitting, or disruptive workplace behaviour (Bamberger et al. 2008). If those employees motivated by a sense of unfairness do not perceive ling as sufcient to restore equity, they are likely also to engage in alternative responses, whereas those ling for instrumental reasons are less likely to do this. OlsonBuchanans (1997) laboratory study demonstrated a link between such attitudinal-perceptual variables and grievance ling, nding that those more likely to le were satised with their job performance; rated their job performance highly; and valued rewards such as the compensation potentially available from ling. These ndings were interpreted as supporting Klaass expectancy model as well as being consistent with procedural-distributive justice theory (Lewin 2004). Cappelli and Chauvin (1991) developed their own efciency model of decision-making. Using data from a unionized organization, they identied that labour market conditions, such as high unemployment, and higher wage premiums (compared with the local labour market), were both associated with increased grievance ling. They proposed that employees who feel unfairly treated will weigh up the cost and benets (or effectiveness) of grievance ling, compared with other responses such as quitting or remaining silent, consistent with Klaas (1989a). In particular, Cappelli and Chauvin (1991) interpreted the labour market differential factors, that is, greater advantages of workers current jobs, as indicated by wage premiums or high levels of un-
45 employment in the outside market, as increasing the costs of exit, making grievance-ling the more attractive option. The proposed dynamics resembled the compensating differentials model of collective unionmanagement bargaining and decisions, in which grievance procedures may be traded for wages, benets, workable changes or other conditions of employment (Ichniowski and Lewin 1987; Peterson and Lewin 2000). Cappelli and Chauvins (1991) proposals were also consistent with the ndings of Brown et al. (1997) whose 30-year data from Germany and Britain showed the demand for grievance procedures to be cyclical: macro-level factors such as changes in the ow into unemployment and the vacancy rate exerted a much stronger inuence than changes in the legal infrastructure, with higher unemployment accompanied by increased demand.7 Bacharach and Bamberger (2004) extended and rened Cappelli and Chauvins (1991) efciency model. Their survey of unionized blue-collar workers found little support for the original efciency models proposed direct relationships between grievance initiation and either unemployment or wage premiums. To explain these apparently inconsistent ndings, their model introduced the concept of labour power derived from power dependence theory (Lawler 1992), meaning the employees perception of the extent to which the employer is dependent on the employee. They found that, under conditions of high labour power, the wage premium was positively associated with grievance ling as predicted by Cappelli and Chauvin (1991). However, under conditions of low labour power, the relationship between wage premiums and grievance ling weakened or reversed; higher wages were associated with a reduced likelihood of grievance ling. Thus labour power, or perceived employer dependence, was proposed as a key determinant of employees ling decisions. More recently, Olson-Buchanan and Boswell (2008a) proposed a model which seeks to unify the separate aspects of the dispute process into an integrated theoretical framework. This model differs from others by using a sense-making perspective which incorporates individuals perceptions before, during, and after grievance activity, providing an
In contrast however, using UK data, Burgess et al. (2001) proposed that the level of unemployment was not a signicant factor.
46 account of how individuals rst conclude they have been mistreated, and then respond to this mistreatment.
B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton step at which settlement occurs,8 and settlement rates (Dastmalchian and Ng 1990; Lewin 1999; Lewin and Peterson 1988; Ng and Dastmalchian 1989). Across both union and non-union settings, the bulk of grievances are typically settled at the rst or second steps (for example, 60% and 25% of non-union grievances, respectively, are settled at those steps), with only a very small proportion (around 2%) settled at the nal step of either procedure (Bemmels 1994; Feuille 1999; Lewin 2004, 2005; Lewin and Peterson 1988). Satisfaction measures typically consider parties perceptions of procedures, with the predominant issue being perceived fairness. Of particular importance is the organizational justice literature, addressing how employees determine whether they have been treated fairly, and the impact of those perceptions on organizational functioning (Bingham and Chachere 1999; Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; Greenberg and Lind 2000). Those extensive ndings indicate that employees who believe they are treated fairly will be favourably disposed toward the organization. This represents a broader theoretical framework which does have applicability across varying grievance systems. The conventional four factor model proposes that justice has distributive, procedural and interactional dimensions, with the latter including interpersonal and informational types (Colquitt et al. 2001, 2005). Recently, however, Nabatchi et al. (2007) have challenged this model, which is premised on interactions between two parties, proposing instead a six-factor model as more relevant to contexts such as workplace mediation which typically involve a third party. This model divides procedural justice into process and mediator aspects, as well as separating interpersonal justice into disputantdisputant and disputantmediator aspects. Applying the justice model to grievance processes, ndings generally conrm the importance of perceptions of fairness in employees assessments of the effectiveness of systems (Bemmels and Lau 2001; Blancero 1995; Blancero and Dyer 1996; Boroff 1991), with procedural justice components being particularly salient, consistent with the general organizational justice literature (Greenberg and Lind
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The exit, voice, loyalty line of research Hirschmans (1970) exitvoiceloyalty model has been the dominant employee decision-making model. Applying this model to industrial relations, Freeman and Medoff (1985) proposed that, by giving employees voice, unions produced positive benets for organizations (Boroff and Lewin 1997; Lewin 2005). The model predicted that, by offering this resort to voice rather than exit, employers would benet through reduced turnover, as well as learning about problems more quickly, and gaining more specic information to address the issues. Similarly, employees could also benet through being able to resolve disputes, restoring their employment relationship and allowing them to remain with the company. The traditional wisdom became that voice action, through grievances, was preferable for both employers and employees (Feuille and Delaney 1992). The research using Hirschmans (1970) model is not limited to the initial grievance-ling decision, but extends to other aspects, particularly the predicted grievance outcomes. Thus the debate encompasses a number of competing models which form potential alternative explanations for those outcomes. This research, discussed further below, has important implications for both understanding how employees respond to perceived mistreatment, and for possible changes in the employeremployee relationship.
Effectiveness of grievance processing

Grievance processing refers to when, where, and how grievances are resolved (Bemmels and Foley 1996, p. 372). The focus is on the grievance system, but research ndings are often intertwined with details of the structures and procedures in a particular context, thus restricting their generalizability. Numerous measures have been used to evaluate grievance processing, but the two main criteria are speed and satisfaction (Budd and Colvin 2008). First, the speed literature emphasizes the length of time until settlement (Lewin and Peterson 1988; Ponak and Olson 1992; Ponak et al. 1996), the level or
The steps of a typical grievance procedure consist of: (1) discussion with the employees supervisor; (2) a formal written grievance submission handled by the union grievance committee and management; (3) a formal grievance meeting with additional higher-level management representatives; (4) in some instances a fourth step of grievance mediation, culminating in third-party neutral arbitration.
EmployeeEmployer Grievances 2000; Lewin 1999; Nowakowski and Conlon 2005; Nurse and Devonish 2007). Specically, for employees, the fairness of the process can be more important than speed (Gordon and Bowlby 1989; Lewin 1999), with perceived procedural justice leading to a belief in overall workplace justice (Fryxell 1992), and to satisfaction with the union and management (Fryxell and Gordon 1989). Use of grievance procedures, which can itself be used as a criterion (Bingham 2004), has also generally been found to be associated with the perceived fairness of the system, with positive employee perceptions of procedure effectiveness related to increased employee use (Lewin and Peterson 1988, Mesch and Dalton 1992; Peterson and Lewin 2000). Blancero and Dyer (1996) for example, report systems perceived as credible, accessible and safe were used more, while Colvin (2003a) suggested that using non-managerial decision-makers produces a neutrality effect which then inuences use. There is, however, a lack of consensus as to what actually constitutes effectiveness in grievance procedures (Lewin 1999). Budd and Colvin (2008) argue that, for both union and non-union contexts, this needs considerable theoretical development. They propose the three central concepts of equity, efciency and voice as core standards which could be used for comparison and evaluation of procedures. The evaluation of dispute resolution systems takes on particular signicance with regard to nonunion procedures and EDR systems using alternative resolution processes. Comparisons are made between these newer systems and traditional avenues, including union-based grievance procedures, in terms of the various measures of effectiveness. Among these, a key question concerns the extent to which the newer alternative systems provide workplace justice, especially for employees (Bingham 2002, 2004; Colvin 2003a, 2005; Klaas et al. 2006; Mahony and Klaas 2008). Traditional systems contain strong procedural safeguards with well-established due process protections. Bingham and Chachere (1999) report, however, that very few studies have examined procedural due process aspects within non-union procedures and in employer-designed EDR plans (Bingham 2004). The studies that have examined non-union procedures have generally found varying employee-protections, often offering much less due process than unionnegotiated procedures. Both Feuille and Delaney (1992) and Feuille and Hildebrand (1995) reported
47 that non-union systems varied widely in terms of their procedural formality (that is, the extent and specicity of the procedural rules) but, compared with union procedures, these offered only modest levels of due process protection and independence from management, especially the nal decisionmaker. Feuille and Chachere (1995) noted that nonunion procedures tended to give management a markedly greater share of process-control and decision-control over complaints, with limits on due process aspects. Specic shortcomings are identied for each of the various ADR forms (Budd and Colvin 2008; Mahony and Klaas 2008); however, Binghams (2004) review of the existing evidence suggests that mediation produces better organizational outcomes than either no intervention or arbitration. System design is an important inuence upon the justice afforded by grievance procedures. Unlike bilaterally negotiated union procedures, non-union and EDR systems can be designed unilaterally and imposed by an employer. An especially controversial issue concerns the ability of an employer to impose binding arbitration, precluding employees access to external forums for statutory claims, as a condition of employment (Bingham 2004; Mahony and Klaas 2008). Research suggests that mandatory arbitration of discrimination claims may have adverse effects on both procedural and distributive justice (Cohen and Domagalski 1998). Mahony and Klaas (2008) summarize what is known concerning how the differing ADR procedures affect employees. Alternative dispute resolution can enhance workplace justice; however, justice may be denied, for example when employers institute mandatory systems requiring employees to waive their right to pursue claims through the courts. The newer dispute resolution systems are essentially private, being condential and/or in-house systems, and the paucity of studies means that comparatively little is known concerning their impact on the justice afforded to participants, or whether the functioning of alternative systems may even undermine the enforcement of public law (Bingham 2004).
Outcomes
Grievance outcomes have been studied over different time intervals: the immediate winners and losers in the formal process; the implications over the shortto-medium term for employees who remain with the employer; and when the grievance process (irrespec-
48 tive of outcome) is linked with the eventual termination of the employeeemployer relationship. Individual systems identify which party is more likely to win; for example, in the North American union environment, Feuille and Hildebrand (1995) suggested that most grievances are resolved in the employees favour. These authors noted, however, that there was no single explanation for why employees prevail in some grievances and not in others, and this is symptomatic of the lack of theoretical development. Determinants investigated include the grievants work background (Klaas 1989b), the industrial relations climate of the organization, the salary of the grievant, the grievance issue (Ng and Dastmalchian 1989), the nature of the forum (labour versus employment arbitration) (Bingham and Mesch 2000; Klaas et al. 2006), as well as demographic factors such as the gender of the grievant and/or decisionmaker (Bemmels 1991; Dalton and Todor 1985; Dalton et al. 1987). Firm size is implicated: smaller rms are both more likely to be involved in dispute hearings (Department of Labour 2007) and more likely to lose compared with large rms (Saridakis et al. 2008). Representation is another recurrent topic; for example, while Antcliff and Saundry (2009) recently found no links with UK company grievance hearing outcomes, high union density was linked with more favourable outcomes for employees. McAndrew (1999) found professional representation was associated with a greater likelihood of successful outcomes in the New Zealand employment tribunal. Post-settlement outcomes: competing explanations Much of the early research used in support of Hirschmans (1970) exitvoiceloyalty model was at a very broad level, assessing the effects of union coverage by comparing factors such as quit rates among workers who were, or were not, covered by grievance procedures. As such, this research did not focus on the processes involved in the grievance procedures themselves. A major challenge arose when a series of studies reported negative outcomes following grievance ling and settlement, seeming to contradict the received wisdom and raising questions about the exitvoice model as a sufcient explanation of employee behaviour. First in non-union organizations, Lewin (1987) used individual worker data to compare employees and supervisors involved in grievances with those who were not. One year after grievance settlement,
B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton both performance ratings and promotion rates were lower, but turnover rates (especially voluntary turnover) were signicantly higher, for grievance lers compared with non-lers. No signicant differences existed between the ler and non-ler groups in these areas prior to, or during, grievance ling and settlement. The effects were greater when employees proceeded to higher steps of the grievance process or won the dispute. A similar pattern of outcomes occurred among the supervisors of the employees in grievances, with lower promotion rates and performance ratings, and higher turnover rates (especially in voluntary turnover) post-settlement (Lewin 1987). Using a similar pre-test, post-test, control-group design on unionized organizations, Lewin and Peterson (1988), and later Lewin and Peterson (1999), obtained analogous results, nding that grievants again had lower performance ratings and promotion rates plus higher turnover rates. Furthermore, among union groups, there were also lower work attendance rates. As with Lewin (1987), this was despite there not being signicant differences between the groups before or during grievance ling and settlement (Lewin 1999). Once more, the supervisors of grievants also experienced the same outcomes, including increased involuntary turnover (Lewin and Peterson 1999; Peterson and Lewin 2000). Employees who used grievance procedures and their direct supervisors appeared to suffer negative outcomes in the short to medium term postsettlement. The exitvoiceloyalty model was interpreted as predicting that voice action should have resulted in improved performance, along with a reduction in turnover (exit). However, the results obtained were the reverse of this. In contrast, an organizational punishmentindustrial discipline model (Arvey and Jones 1985; OReilly and Weitz 1980; Sheppard et al. 1992) predicts that grievance lers will be punished for violating the informal rules of the organization. Thus, one potential explanation is retaliation, meaning that employees who le grievances will be punished for doing so, as will their supervisors (Lewin and Peterson 1999). The declines in work attendance, performance ratings and promotion rates, along with increased turnover, all matched this model. Managers may have sought reprisal so that grievants would win the grievance battle in the short run but lose the career war in the long run (Feuille and Delaney 1992, p. 224). Evidence for this is also to be found in Lewins (1987) original study, where internal surveys indicated that
EmployeeEmployer Grievances fear of management reprisal was the main reason for not ling, even though a large proportion of employees believed they had one or more issues that merited a grievance. An alternative explanation is that of revealed performance; that is, the negative post-settlement outcomes may be due to actual behavioural differences, with grievants and their supervisors genuinely being poorer performers. Under this scenario, the true performance of this group may have been lower all along but, prior to grievance ling, this had not been detected. The process of grievance ling and resolution, however, prompts employers to pay closer attention to their performance, which then reveals the performance decits (Lewin and Peterson 1999; Olson-Buchanan 1996). Exploring this issue, Klaas and de Nisi (1989) analysed performance evaluation records from a unionized organization. They found that postgrievance outcomes varied according to the type of grievance, with employees who led personal grievances against their supervisors disciplinary actions being signicantly more likely to receive lower ratings (especially if the employee won), whereas employees who led policy grievances concerning management policies experienced little impact on their ratings (Lewin and Peterson 1999). These negative consequences disappeared when employees were rated by a different supervisor from the one involved in the grievance. Klaas and de Nisi (1989) therefore proposed that the differences in ratings were due to managerial reactions, with managers responding negatively to grievances directed against them, consistent with a punishment model. Overall, the consistent ndings of negative, and potentially punishment-like, outcomes across these studies represented a strange irony, since grievance systems are intended to protect employees (Boswell and Olson-Buchanan 2004). On the basis of the evidence available, it seemed that the outcomes were at least partly due to grievance-lers being punished, consistent with an organizational punishmentindustrial discipline perspective (Klaas and de Nisi 1989; Lewin 1987). There were limitations in these studies, however, as they had been limited to aggregate-level analyses using archival data. As a consequence, little was known about the comparison group of non-lers, particularly whether or not they had actually experienced some perceived mistreatment, and hence a deterioration in their relationship with the organization.
49 Lewin and Boroff (1996) and Boroff and Lewin (1997) both addressed this shortcoming using eld study samples which consisted exclusively of employees who believed they had been unfairly treated at work, comparing mistreated employees who did choose to le with those who did not. In contrast to earlier research, the studies found a negative relationship between loyalty and exit, with more loyal employees being less likely to leave the organization, consistent with the exitvoiceloyalty model. However, contrary to this exitvoiceloyalty model, there was a negative relationship between loyalty and ling, with loyal employees actually less likely to use grievance procedures. As with Lewin (1987), fear of reprisal was negatively associated with ling. These two studies seemed to add to the increasing body of research that called into question the core conceptual foundations and the empirical validity of the exitvoiceloyalty framework (Boroff and Lewin 1997, p. 60). Furthermore the researchers now concluded that, rather than exercising voice, loyal employees suffer in silence (Boroff and Lewin 1997, p. 60). Olson-Buchanan (1996) sought to clarify the extent to which these punishment effects reected an actual change in grievants behaviour. The design of this study was different from previous research in several key aspects. In place of the correlation analysis which had limited the ability to assess causality, Olson-Buchanan (1996) instead used a laboratory simulation. This study involved a group of people who all experienced a similar complaint (mistreatment), but who either did or did not have the opportunity to voice their discontent through the grievance procedure. Finally, where earlier research had measured performance indirectly through supervisors ratings, OlsonBuchanan (1996) sought objective measures. The ndings created several interesting new perspectives on post-grievance outcomes. First, in terms of access to a grievance system, employees who had access were signicantly less likely to exit, compared with those without access, suggesting that, by providing a voice option, this (simulated) grievance system had potential to mitigate the negative effects of a dispute, and thus reduce turnover, consistent with procedural justice theory. In terms of ling activity, while previous studies had suggested that lers had higher turnover, this study found instead that grievance lers had lower turnover intent, consistent with a key exitvoice prediction. However, once more, grievance lers had signi-
50 cantly lower objective job performance than nonlers, contradicting exitvoice predictions. One new insight was the nding that conict between an employee and manager does affect the employees objective job performance, and not simply the managers evaluation; having a basis for dispute, on its own, was associated with both lowered job performance and increased turnover intent. Overall, these ndings revived support for the exitvoice model, but importantly, at the same time they did not completely support the organizational punishment theory, since the so-called punishment effects seemed also to reect changes in actual behaviour, rather than being entirely due to managerial retribution. Boswell and Olson-Buchanan (2004) further separated out the role of experiencing mistreatment as distinct from voicing the mistreatment. Signicantly, they found that the experience of mistreatment on its own was signicantly linked to exit, and that grievance ling was somewhat incidental to this. This suggests that some of the negative outcomes may be partly due to the initial experience of mistreatment itself, and not solely a consequence of taking grievance action. Consistent with the organizational justice literature, a person who perceives mistreatment may respond by changing their behaviour and/or leaving. The type of mistreatment was also particularly important; drawing on Klaas and De Nisis (1989) distinction between grievance types, they found that personalized mistreatment was linked with higher work withdrawal than policyrelated mistreatment. Throughout this exploration of Hirschmans model, one core assumption which had remained largely unchallenged was the way in which voice had only been operationalized in terms of the use of a grievance system. Using a eld study, OlsonBuchanan and Boswell (2002) broadened the options for voice to include varying degrees of formality. Contrary to Boroff and Lewins (1997) claim that loyal employees will just suffer in silence, they found that loyal employees do actually use voice, but prefer, and use, less formal methods, and that use of these methods is associated with lower intent to quit; all of which were consistent with the exitvoiceloyalty model. Pursuing a similar theme, Luchak (2003) reconceptualized voice, proposing two separate forms: direct voice, involving employees efforts to remedy issues directly with another member of the organization; and representative voice, which
B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton involves communicating indirectly through a thirdparty representative or process. Luchak (2003) also reconceptualized loyalty, and the eld study ndings suggested that differing forms of loyalty were related to different expressions of voice. Employees attached through an affective, emotional bond were more likely to use direct voice, whereas employees with a more rational, calculated attachment were more likely to use representative voice. In summary, it seems that after grievances have been settled, employees do experience negative outcomes, particularly in the areas of performance, promotion, attendance and exit. The unanswered question, however, concerns the precise causes of this. It is unclear as to whether, and perhaps to what extent, these outcomes are consequences of actual differences in employees work behaviour, or whether they result from punishment and retribution from employers. Shifting the focus from the actual grievance procedures, there may even be behaviour changes which result purely from the original mistreatment incident, as distinct from any grievance activity. The issue is not straightforward, and it is possible that there may even be several of these supposedly contending options at work, each partially contributing to the overall effect. Amidst the debate, one signicant conclusion emerges. If the dispute sequence is triggered by deterioration in the relationship between the employee and their employer, it would seem that formal grievance activities often do not restore that relationship irrespective of whether or not the grievance procedures themselves contribute to that deteriorated state. Reinstatement or separation Unlike situations where the grievant remains with the employer during and immediately after the grievance being resolved, cases involving dismissal and subsequent reinstatement are different. There are again marked differences across national settings. In the Canadian setting for example, reinstatement has typically been restricted to workers under a collective agreement (Eden 1994; Williams and Taras 2000) whereas, in situations such as New Zealand, reinstatement is potentially available to all workers as the primary remedy for dismissals (Employment Relations Act 2000 s125), although it is rarely sought by applicants (Department of Labour 2003a,b; McAndrew et al. 2004).
EmployeeEmployer Grievances The North American reinstatement literature is limited by the fact that it is rather dated and tends to focus on arbitration awards for dismissal cases. In terms of incidence, reinstatement occurs in about half the grievance cases with disciplinary action substituted for dismissal (Lewin 1999; Williams and Taras 2000). Simply being awarded reinstatement is only part of the issue however, and the success of reinstatement is sometimes dened in terms of the numbers who are both awarded reinstatement, and who actually choose to return to work. There is wide variation among the ndings regarding such returns, with gures ranging from 38% to 91% (Eden 1994; Lewin 2005; Malinowski 1981; Williams and Taras 2000). Either way, it would seem that a signicant number of grievants are reluctant to return to work, but the specic dynamics that account for this phenomena are not clear. Some propose that unionization is a relevant factor, with union settings associated with the higher return rates (Eden 1994). Alongside this, one reason frequently cited by employees is again fear of retaliation from the employer (Bemmels and Foley 1996; Lewin 2005). The issue does not end at the point when a reinstated employee chooses to return to work, as there are major issues concerning the actual viability of post-reinstatement employment. Despite the fact that employers report being generally satised with the subsequent performance of reinstated workers (Lewin 2005; Williams and Taras 2000), and postreinstatement discipline problems are not signicant (Lewin 2005), turnover is nonetheless high. While earlier studies suggested that reinstated employees were not subject to repercussions (Ponak 1991), other evidence again suggests that unfair treatment after reinstatement is the main reason for this turnover, implying that employee fears of retaliation may be well founded, and surveys of non-union employees do report unjust treatment following reinstatement (Bemmels and Foley 1996; Eden 1994; Lewin 2005; Trudeau 1991). Lewin (1999) notes that reinstated Canadian workers report high levels of unfair treatment post-reinstatement and have signicantly higher turnover rates than other employees, while earlier British research suggests that reinstated employees also experienced difculties in their organizations (Dickens et al. 1984). Again the results differ by setting, with surveys of employers in unionized workplaces reporting high rates of actual returns to work, as well as favourable evaluations of employee performance, whereas a non-union survey indicated the reverse (Eden 1994).
51 Other survey ndings suggest that employers can resent reinstatement orders (Malinowski 1981), believing that reinstatement negatively affects both workforce morale and working relationships between reinstated workers and other employees (Lewin 2005; Ponak 1987). Employees who have been completely exonerated can be signicantly more likely to leave their employment than those partially exonerated (Lewin 1999; Williams and Taras 2000). Workplace size may also be signicant, with workers more easily integrated into large-scale workplaces, while positive unionemployer relationships and workplace culture may also assist reintegration (Williams and Taras 2000). Overall, the research suggests that, while employees may obtain a reinstatement award, the broader workplace dynamics often result in the demise of the relationship. These ndings raise signicant questions concerning the extent to which reinstatement is effective as a remedy for unjust dismissal (Eden 1994, p. 99) and, importantly, there remains a lack of theory to explain such outcomes (Lewin 1999).
Conclusions and further research

Grievance research has moved away from what Bemmels and Foley (1996) refer to as systems approaches to a focus on specic aspects of grievances, but this has produced a fragmented and incomplete picture, with a lack of theory evident across the stages of the grievance process. Although there are descriptive data on the incidence of grievances, few explanations are offered. Research into decision-making processes has been dominated by a narrow focus on employees initial ling decisions as part of the grievance initiation stage. Within this there have been some notable developments, with attention moving from the earlier models based on compensating wage/efciency theory (Cappelli and Chauvin), for example, to other promising models as proposed by Bacharach and Bamberger (2004) and Olson-Buchanan and Boswell (2008a). Outside this, however, the range of other decisions that employees make, as well as the involvement of parties such as unions and management, have been little explored. Considerable effort has gone into investigating the conundrum of post-settlement outcomes, but this has produced mixed ndings concerning the role of exit voiceloyalty and the alternative explanations of organizational punishment, revealed performance and behaviour changes due to the mistreatment itself.
52 Many studies have in common Hirschmans exit voiceloyalty theory, but we question whether this model remains relevant as a core framework for analysing employment disputes. Instead, Lewins (2007) recent pilot work concerning the reactions of managers to these post-settlement ndings suggests a new direction for both researchers and practitioners, addressing what employers do in response to negative post-settlement outcomes. This work could extend to an exploration of the divergence between the intent of legislators and designers, and the actual outcomes, across a range of settings. While the role of organizational justice theory has been afrmed in relation to grievance processing, the lack of theory persists in this area and is reected, for example, in the absence of agreed measures of effectiveness (Budd and Colvin 2008). This need is heightened as the issue of justice takes on increasing importance, especially in relation to non-traditional forms of dispute resolution. At the same time, newer organizational approaches such as employee involvement and self-managing teams may represent a new environment, bringing new, less formal forms of dispute handling, yet this issue has been little explored (Colvin 2003a,b, 2004). Similarly, although the existing research suggests that reinstatement may not be effective, there is little theory to explain this (Lewin 1999). Together, these factors lead to the broader issue of how grievances are framed in future research. Grievances need to be reconceptualized as dynamic processes which move through multiple stages and involve a cast of actors (De Dreu and Gelfand 2008; Klaas 1989a). In addition, their heterogeneity needs to be recognized in a more sophisticated typology of grievances. Many studies have noted differing effects by grievance type (for example, see Bemmels 1994; Klaas and de Nisi 1989; Boswell and Olson-Buchanan 2004; Ng and Dastmalchian 1989; Olson-Buchanan and Boswell 2008a), and the conict literature contains a longstanding recognition of the need to distinguish conict types (Jehn 1995, 1997; Jehn et al. 2008; Jameson 1999), yet this has not translated into a conceptually based grievance typology. This reframing requires researchers to develop a longitudinal understanding of each partys perspective. There is no evidence to assume, for example, that the initial ling decision is the sole decision made by an employee as the grievance process unfolds (Lewin 1999). Nor can it be assumed that the nature of that decision and what motivates prior and
B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton subsequent decisions, will be the same as the decision to le. There is a need to understand the factors inuencing a partys decisions throughout all the stages of a grievance, and the research also needs to be broadened to include the perspectives of all parties involved. To take one issue, despite propositions about managerial retribution, there is no signicant body of research on what inuences managers attitudes and conduct with respect to grievance claims and their settlement. There has been work concerning the role of managers in a variety of related areas; for example, disciplinary decisions (Judge and Martocchio 1995; Klaas and Dellomo 1997; Klaas and Wheeler 1990; Rollinson 1992, 2000), in arbitration (Bingham and Chachere 1999; Bingham and Mesch 2000), as well as in the selection and function of newer ADR procedures (Colvin 2003a; Klaas et al. 2006; Mahony and Klaas 2008). In contrast with the extensive work on employee grievance-perspectives, there is a need to develop the employer side of grievances (Dennison and Corby 2005; Klaas et al. 1999; Lewin 2004; Mahony and Klaas 2008). The conceptual model proposed (but not tested) by Olson-Buchanan and Boswell (2008a) of how an employee experiences, makes sense of, and responds to mistreatment is an important step in the direction of more developed theory. This model integrates earlier insights regarding separate components of the grievance process, and proposes a set of processes which potentially extend across the multiple stages of a grievance. Furthermore, the model points to the need to capture the interaction of parties, and integrate concepts from the conict literature (Folger et al. 2005; Jameson 1999; Pondy 1967, 1992; Pruitt and Kim 2004; Thomas 1976, 1992) to produce more dynamic theory. Exploring such a perspective may indicate that the intent to resolve disputes and restore relationships through the later, more formal stages of the grievance process may be misguided (Antcliff and Saundry 2009; Ury et al. 1988). The chances of achieving full resolution which addresses and resolves the core issues associated with a conict may be low and, instead, formal grievance activities may only achieve closure or settlement, but not preserve the employment relationship (Pruitt and Kim 2004). While the pre-ling stage of grievances seems to represent an area where much successful resolution occurs, it remains little explored. To use Lewins (1999) terminology, there remains a need to develop preventive conict resolution approaches which use
EmployeeEmployer Grievances the informal consultation and discussion which typically occur in the rst stage in the grievance process, rather than focusing on reactive conict approaches of subsequent formal grievance handling where the relationship has deteriorated and may decline even further. This reconceptualization of grievances must include the longstanding industrial relations concept of power which has regained prominence in the contemporary debates regarding ADR options (Colvin 2005; Mahony and Klaas 2008; van Gramberg 2001). As Bingham observes: I bring to this discussion a particular frame: power. Control over dispute system design makes a fundamental difference in both what form a workplace conict management system takes and how it functions. The key distinguishing feature in new workplace systems is that employers design them unilaterally, without union participation. They are designed by employers in order to meet employer interests. (Bingham 2005, p. 131) Research into the role of power is not limited to system design and the newer dispute procedures. Aside from passing mention in the rst generation of research (Lipsky and Avgar 2004), the concept has received little explicit attention in the grievance literature, despite the prospect of powerful players being involved on one or both sides of a dispute. The issue of power takes on greater signicance for employees, given the decline in union coverage and the concurrent individualization of the employment relationship. The existing research does examine a range of variables such as those associated with expectancy models, post-grievance outcomes and management retribution, which have connotations of power and could be reframed as power-related phenomena. Bacharach and Bamberger (2004), however, are among the few recent researchers actually to take the step of reconceptualizing one specic set of variables, in their case labour market factors, as explicitly power-related elements. This reframing of the phenomena in terms of power does not occur in the majority of the research though. Managers now face increased pressure to deal directly with employee grievances. New human resource management methods involve companies designing their own in-house conict management procedures (Colvin 2003a; Costantino and Merchant 1996; Gadlin 2005; Lipsky and Avgar 2004). At the same time, there are also external pressures as governments move to decentralize dispute resolution to the workplace level, promoting earlier, low-level
53 resolution among the parties directly involved (Chapman et al. 2003; Cullinane and Donald 2000; Earnshaw et al. 2000; Van Gramberg 2006). The difculties of research access in this eld are well recognized (Bingham 2005, 2007; Bingham and Chachere 1999, p. 97; Lewin 1999, p. 171), nonetheless, further development of research is needed to ensure that new procedures are well-grounded in theory, effective in practice and are fair to all parties.
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International Journal of Management Reviews, Vol. 13, 4058 (2011) DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2370.2010.00283.

EmployeeEmployer Grievances: A Review

Bernard Walker and Robert T. Hamilton

Incidence of grievable events

Employee responses: grievance initiation

Effectiveness of grievance processing

Conclusions and further research

B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton

B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton

B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton

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