Socrates' Contest with the Poets in Plato's Symposium Author(s): Mary P. Nichols Source: Political Theory, Vol.

32, No. 2 (Apr., 2004), pp. 186-206 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4148131 . Accessed: 19/10/2011 16:02
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SOCRATES' CONTEST WITH THE POETS IN PLATO'S SYMPOSIUM

MARY NICHOLS P FordhamUniversity

Scholarshave recentlyarguedthatin the SymposiumPlato is critical ofSocrates andfalls closer than his philosophic spokesmanto the side of poetry in the old quarrelbetweenphilosophyand I poetry. Contraryto such interpretations, argue that on the basis of his experienceof a philosophic life, Socrates respondsto the poets Plato presents in that dialogue, offeringa superior understandingnot only of Love but of poetry itself Far from self-sufficient, but like Love "dwell[ing]always in need" and generatingthroughteaching,Socrates both requiresand supports political life. Thestate betweenpovertyand resourcethat accountsfor thepursuitof wisdom and its self-generationthroughquestioningothers also accountsfor the ongoing human activities thatkeeppolitical communities alive andflourishing.At issue is notsimplyPlato's attitude toward Socrates, but the very nature of philosophy and its relation to the political community. Keywords: Aristophanes;Alcibiades; Socrates; Plato's Symposium;philosophy

Plato's Symposiumis one of his most loved and discussed dialogues. Its occasion is a drinkingpartyat which the participants, includingthe famous comic poet Aristophanesand the rising young tragedianAgathon, deliver encomia to Love. Before the evening is over the gatheringis crashedby the drunkenAlcibiades, who within a year of the event would persuadeandlead Athensto a disastrousinvasionof Sicily. As his contribution the party,this to daring politician insists on delivering an encomium to Socrates. Plato in effect pits Socratesagainstthe poets, andraisesthe questionof the relationof philosophy to politics by the entranceof Alcibiades, whom Socrates was later accused of corrupting(see, e.g., Xenophon Memorabilia, I.ii). AlPlatoto be defendingSocrates understood thoughscholarshavetraditionally and his view of love and philosophyin the Symposium,some contemporary scholarshave found in thatdialogue evidence thatPlato himself is skeptical about his philosophic spokesmanand open to a more complex, and somePOLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 32 No. 2, April 2004 186-206 DOI: 10.1177/0090591703256093 ? 2004 Sage Publications

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times even a more "poetic"view of what is good abouthumanand political life. MarthaNussbaum,for example, arguesthatPlato offers us in the Symposium two irreconcilableviews of Love: whereasPlato's Socratesattemptsto "transcend merely personalin eros and ascend, throughdesire itself, to the the good," the myth of our distant past that Plato gives to Aristophanes reveals that"theobjects of [our]passions are whole people; not 'complexes of desirablequalities',but entirebeings, thoroughlyembodied,with all their idiosyncracies,flaws, and even faults."By presentingthese two alternatives in theSymposium, accordingto Nussbaum,Platoconfrontsus with an impossible choice: "philosophyand poetry ... cannot live togetheror know each other's truths,"she concludes. Thus while Nussbaum rescues Plato from Vlastos' critiquethat he reduces Love's objects to abstractqualities rather than embodied humanbeings, she yields up Socrates.' Arlene Saxonhouse follows suit. Drawingout the political implicationsof Nussbaum'sposition, she shows how the "self-sufficient"Socrates,"whole and complete in himself' is unable "to be partof a communityof men.""Plato'sdialogues with theirmany partsand multifacetedcharacters remindus of the dangers,"she of "the epistemological demandfor unity"that comes into conflict argues, with "thepoliticalneed for multiplicity."2 Similarly,Allan Bloom arguesthat "Platomakes Aristophanesthe expositor of the truest and most satisfying account of Eros that we find in the Symposium," and that Plato parodies "Socraticrationalism."3 While such interpretations serve as a healthy departurefrom the traditional scholarshipthatties Plato'spoliticalthoughtto the abstractidea of the of good and does not give its due to Plato's understanding humandiversity, tend to place Platoon the side of poetryin "theold quarrelbetweenphithey losophy and poetry"(Rep., 607b-c). Specifically,their "poetic"Plato questions the primacyof reasonin a good humanlife andtakesthe partof the particular ratherthan the universal,whether an attachmentto one's own or a I reductionof the good to the beautiful.Contrary such interpretations, shall to Socratesserves as a seriousphilosophicalternaarguethatin the Symposium tive to the poets Platopresentsin thatdialogue.Afterexaminingthe speeches aboutLove thatPlato gives to Aristophanesand Agathon,I shall arguethat Socrates' speech, based on his own philosophic life, responds to both of them, correctingtheir partialviews of Love and providingthe superiorunderstandingnot only of Love but of poetry itself. Socrates, far from selfsufficient,butlike Love "dwell[ing]always in need"(203d)4and generating throughteaching,therebyboth requiresand supportsongoing political life. At stakein the argument not simply Plato'sattitudetowardhis philosophic is spokesman,but the very natureof philosophyand its relationto the political

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as community.Thus I readthe Symposium a defense of Socratesto the political community.5

ARISTOPHANIC COMEDY When after several speeches on Love given by the symposiasts Aristophanes'turn rolls around,hiccups prevent him from speaking. The speakernext in line changes places with him (185c-e). By this means, Plato as in presentsAristophanes if he were a character one of his own comedies. In the Clouds,for example,Strepsiadesis not able to give the propergreetingto Socrates'new gods, a chorusof Clouds, as they come onto the stage, because he has to relieve himself (Clouds,295-96). Aristophanes' mockerylies in the contrastbetween the solemnity of the occasion, as Socrates' new divinities descend from heaven, and the bodily necessities thatdetermineStrepsiades' actions. Now, in the Symposium,Aristophaneshimself is preventedby a bodily necessity from speaking,andeven from speakingin worshipof a god, one that the symposiasts suppose has not hithertobeen recognized sufficiently (177a-c). The speeches to Love thus far reportedhave been overculminatesin a praiseof the blown, pretentious,andeven impious.Phaedrus' self-sufficient virtue that human beings achieve throughtheir own efforts, Athewithoutthe inspirationof the gods (180a-b), and Pausaniasinterprets nian law so that it discriminatesbetween a noble and base Love stemming from the gods, supporting one anddiscouragingthe other(182d ff.). And the now, duringEryximachus' speech aboutthe controlthathumanartor science noise exertsover the cosmos, and even over the gods, comes the inarticulate of Aristophanes'hiccups.6 In contrast to Phaedrus'and Pausanias'purportedlynoble lovers, and Eryximachus'powerfulcraftsmen,the proudestof Aristophanes'characters fail in theirenterprise,have no concernwith education,and develop no arts. They do not even have humanshape. Aristophanesoffers to tell not of their deeds, but of their sufferings (189d; cf. Phdr., 245c). In the earliest times, "theform of each humanbeing was roundall over, with back and sides in a circle," each with four arms, four legs, and two faces looking in opposite directions. The circular beings, which include male, female, and mixed types, areableto walkupright,buttheirfastestmovementis tumblingin a circle. Although these beings who tumble about like roly-polies, seem hardly the stuffheroesaremadeof, they were, Aristophanes relates,lofty andproud, and attemptedan ascent to heaven to assault the gods. At Zeus' bidding, Apollo punishedthem by cutting them into two. When the halves are overcome by intense longing for their other halves and desire to grow together

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again,they begin dying off due to hungerandinactivityin each other'sarms. This time Zeus moves theirgenitalsto theircut sides so thatthroughsex they might preservethe race, and finding some relief from theirlonging "turnto deeds and care for the rest of life" (190b-191d). Justas the gods punishourcircularancestorsfor theirpride,Aristophanes attacksthe prideof humanbeings. Punishedby the gods for theiroverreaching, our circularancestorsno longer look to heaven,but only to the earth,as they wanderabout searchingfor their other halves. Their motion is that of uprighthumanbeings, but theirforms bestow no dignity.Greektradition,in contrast,tells of Oedipus'answerto the riddleof the Sphinxthatunderstands the humanbeing in his prime-he moves erecton two feet, andcan therefore look ahead as he walks through life, and even up to the heav-ens.7But Aristophanes'two-footed human beings, who walk as we walk, are only halves. The gods position theirfaces not so thatthey can look wherethey are going, and surely not so that they can look up, but ratherso that they look down at their navels and remembertheir punishments.The half-beings are awareof "riddles": they "divine"they want something but they cannot say what it is (192c-d). They do not solve riddles. The ones who look up in Aristophanes' story, the circle-beings, do so not by walking as upright beings, butby rollingaroundlike a ball. Theirview of the heavensis momentary and unsteady,and since they have pairs of eyes on both sides of their heads, they cannotsee the heavens withoutat the same time seeing the earth. They resemble the disciples of the Socrates Aristophanescreates in the Clouds, who bend over investigatingthe things underthe earth,while their asses do astronomy(Clouds, 193-94). The vision of the high cannotbe severed from a vision of the low, and nothingin-betweengets much attention. Aristophanes'tale about pride and its fall mocks the pretensionsof the previous symposiasts. In contrast to Phaedrus,Aristophanesleaves little roomfor heroicvirtue,at least in the currentstateof humanlife. He attributes courage and manliness only to the acts of boys embracingtheir male lovers (192a). Unlike Pausanias,Aristophanesis completely silent about virtue, education,and nobility.As to law, it appearsnot as a means of encouraging noble love, as it had for Pausanias,butonly as compulsioncontraryto desire (191b). Unlike Eryximachus,Aristophanesdoes not mention art, knowledge, or science, andthe only artisanshe mentionsaregods (190e and 192d). It is Love who is "a doctor" who "cures"the ills of humanity (189d).8 uses "mind," "intelligence" or (nous) only in idiomaticexpresAristophanes sions, and his humanworld, finally, is virtuallyspeechless, as Plato renders himself by giving him hiccups.9Thereareno lovers andbelovAristophanes eds, so thatone mustpersuadethe other,as in Pausanias'speech (182b): each half is equally lover and beloved, equally attractedto his or her other half.

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Persuasionis unnecessary,andthe desireof the lovers is manifestin embracing or sex, not in conversing.It is not clear,in fact, if Aristophanes'embracing lovershavethe distancefromeach othereven to see each other,muchless converse.They do not wantto know the one they love so much as to become one with him or her.'0In fact, Love is not of the other,but of the whole they mightform(192e-193a). In Aristophanes'storyonly the gods speak(190c-e, 192d-e). When the half-beingslong to be unitedwith theirotherhalves, the soul of each plainly wants somethingelse, but as to what, it is "incapableof saying" (192c-d). In contrast to the first three speakers, then, Aristophanesrestores the power of the gods. In his story, "Zeusand the other gods" deliberateabout what to do with the rebels, Zeus contrivesa plan, and Apollo carriesit out. But while the gods play a crucial role in his tale, their role is to punish, to ensurethathumansremainin the weakenedstatein which they areno longer a threat.With the gods' oversight, humansno longer think any such "high thoughts"as moved theirancestors(190b). Aristophanes,as it were, restores the "snowyOlympus"and"murky in Tartarus" Phaedrus his assertionof that humansufficiencyexcised from Hesiod's poem (178b), but he places Olympus so out of reach that humans simply live in murky Tartarus."Aristophanes'humanbeings are shades of their former selves. While Phaedrus concentratedon the human in the absence of anything above or below, Aristophanesrestores the high at the cost of separatingit from anything below it. Disconnected from anythingabove, the humandisappears,along with the soul, andonly high andlow areleft, with no middleground.The only time thatAristophanes uses the word"soul"in his speech is whenhe says that the soul is "incapableof speaking"(192c). If the circularbeings had souls that were not reducibleto their bodies, they could not be severed into two. Humanslong for sex as a meansto unity,but it is only a corporealunity with theirotherhalves. Aristophanes expressesonly the half, only ourdesireto be with, even to be one with, the personwe love, andnot ourdesireto know him or her, even to see him or her. There is no conversationbetween Arisover sight in Aristophanes' speech. tophanes'lovers.Touchingpredominates More generally,Aristophanes'speech leaves no room for philosophy;longing or desire has nothingto do with wisdom. characters his Symposium in Aristophanes' speech are,as Aristotlesaid of comic characters,inferior to and uglier than ourselves (Poetics, I.v.1-2, I.ii.7). But if we see only the inferiorityof those on the comic stage, we might not see ourselves in them. Laughing at them would foster only a sense of Ourlaughterwould be as Hobbes describedall laughter,"a sudsuperiority. to den glory,"12andif the comic poet were attempting moderatepretensionhe would fail. On the otherhand,if Aristophanes' comedy remindsus of ourpre-

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tensions, as the wrinklesleft by Apollo do forthe half-beings,andwe see ourselves reflectedonly in whatis inferiorto ourselves,his mockeryrunstherisk of demoralizing.And therecould be no laughter; is a fact thatno one at the it doomedto at Aristophanes' cf. 222c). Forever symposium laughs speech(193e; physical separationfrom what they love and with eyes only for theirincompleteness, Aristophanes'humans never look to heaven. It is not surprising thatscholarshave consideredAristophanes'presentation humanbeings in of this speech to be tragic.'3And yet the comic poet, in the words of SaxonHe house,does not "upliftus with thebeautyof ournecessarytragedy." evokes fear and pity, "notby beautifyingthe fearful,but by depictingthe ugly."'4 Aristophanesrestores the divine, in the face of the sophistic enlightenment of the previous speakers, but in a way that makes it inaccessible to humanbeings. His move reestablisheslimits for humanlife. Agathon, who speaks next, proposes that the divine is accessible to humanbeings such as himself, as demonstratedby the ability of his poetry to move audiences. Loved by the god, the poet becomes one with him. Aristophanes'Zeus remainsvigilantagainsthumanhubris,while Agathon'sgod, Love, loves the poet, Agathonhimself. There are no limits.

TRAGIC VICTORY Agathon begins by criticizing all the previous speakers,for not one of them knows "the correct way" of making an encomium. Those speakers include not only the well-establishedpoet who has just spoken, but also his own lover Pausanias,who has evidently followed him for many years (177e and 193c, see Prot., 315c).'5Insteadof praisingthe god, Agathonclaims, the others have been simply explaining how happy human beings are for the locates the goods the god gives them. The arrogant Agathon,paradoxically, of superiority his speech in its greaterpiety.In contrastto the others,Agathon will say what sort of god Love is, and only then the gifts he bestows (194e195a). Agathonhas not, however,offeredto define his termsatthe outset.He will say "whatsort"Love is-not what Love is.16When he proceeds to describe Love as beautifuland good, we might be remindedof Polus, studentof the famous rhetoricianGorgias, who when asked what art Gorgias teaches claims merelythatit is "themost beautifulof arts," offering a reply to which Socratesobjects(Gorg.,448c). By the end of his speech, Agathonproducesa rhetorical flourishcharacteristic Gorgias,to which Socratescalls attention of deals with externals,with the appear(198c). Agathon,the rhetorician-poet, of ances, the beautifulattributes Love, and Love's virtues,or the manifesta-

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tions of goodness. ForAgathonthereis nothingbeyondthe appearances. The world belongs to the poets. for Agathon'sarguments the virtuesof Love arereminiscentof the sophistical reasoning of the Unjust Speech in the Clouds (1036 ff.). Love is just, becausehe rulesall Agathonargues,becauseall consentto his rule,moderate otherdesires, andcourageousbecausehe conquerseven the most divine warrior Ares, who fell in love with Aphrodite.In this account, virtue is hardly distinguishablefrom its opposite. The reign of Love means the end of right, whenjustice is reducedto consent, the end of self-restraint, when all desires yield to Love, and of courageous deeds, when the most warlike leaves his armoroutsidethe bedchamber. WhenAgathon'sLove holds sway,thereis no good otherthanthe beautiful.Like the UnjustSpeech, Agathonrecommends vice as the path to happiness,and takes comfort in that the gods too follow this path (Clouds, 1045-52 and 1079-82). Love is beautiful,Agathonargues,becausehe is young, delicate,supplein form, and of beautifulhue. Love's youth is clear from his avoiding the old, and always keeping company with the young, and of course the beautiful. Thus holds the old saying, Agathon notes, "like approacheslike" (195b). Agathon not only correctsPhaedrusfor saying that Love is the oldest god (195b), he implicitlydenies Pausanias'distinctionbetween a noble (or beautiful) Love and a base or vulgarone. For Agathonall Love is beautiful.Like the young Socratesreproached the old philosopherParmenides, Agathon by neglects the ugly (Parm.,21 1c-e; see 197b). He ignoresPausaniasin another way as well: Agathon'solderlovercould hardlyfind place for his own love in his beloved's paeanto young lovers. More generally,Agathon'sreferenceto the attractionof likes leaves no room for the mature lovers praised by Pausaniaswho educate theiryoung beloveds in virtue and philosophy. When Agathonuses the old saying, "like to like,"he is not using it in the usualway-to describethose who love each other.The ones who arealike are Love, who is young, and the young, whom Love loves. Agathon'sspeech is not abouthumanloversandbelovedsat all, butaboutthe "god"andhis favorthe ite. We learnexactly who this is when Agathondemonstrates "wisdom" of the god: Love mustbe wise, he argues,since to inspirepoets, Love himself mustbe a poet. Afterall, whatone does not haveor know,Agathonobserves, one could not give or teach to another (197a). With this move, wisdom becomes indistinguishable from poetry.And it is not just the young, but the young poet-Agathon himself-whom the god most loves. Agathon may be the first speakerto focus on Love as a god, but god and humanmerge.Thushis model for Love is the young lover,or poet, possessed by the god, who createsout of love for his own beauty.He is both lover and beloved, as self-containedas Aristophanes' embracinglovers long to be.17 In

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their differentways, each of these poets understands human fulfillment as humans seek their other halves, not radically idiosyncratic.Aristophanes' anyknowledgeor wisdom thattranscendstheirown andthatthey mighthold in common with others. For Aristophanes philosophy is not possible, whereasfor Agathonit is not necessary,since Love is the sufficientcondition for wisdom. Wisdom comes immediately,throughdivine inspiration,and it is expressedimmediatelythroughthe poet's creation.Thereis no striving,no conflict, no possibility of failure.Agathonthusleaves no place for suffering. As Bloom observes, in Agathon's speech "all the harsh things have been overcomeby the soft and gentle ones."'" poetry producestearsno more His than Aristophanes'produceslaughter. Can Agathonreally be a tragicpoet? Accordingto Aristotle,tragedypornobler(or more beautiful)thanourselves (Poetics, I.ii.7 and trayscharacters I.iv). Because even the noble suffer terrible things, tragedy may lead to despair about the human condition. If tragedy beautifies the suffering of tragicfigures,however,and moves us with thatbeauty,beautyappearssufficient. Not even sufferingcan destroyit. To understand sufferingas beautiful, thanthatof the however,is to see it fromthe perspectiveof the observerrather sufferer.After all, when we watcha tragedy,we sufferwithits tragicfigures. Sufferingwith another,however,is not the same as suffering,for it requires distance as well as identification.Tragic characterslearn by suffering (see Aesch., Agam., 174-78), but we learnby theirsuffering.Tragedymightlead its audienceto hope, inordinatehope, ratherthanto despair.Just as comedy might bind us to necessity more thanis necessaryby lettingus see ourselves in ourinferiors,tragedymightlead us to supposethatwe canbe free fromsuffering, or thatthereis no necessarylink to necessity. Tragedy'scontrivance, the god in the machine (mechane,see 191b), who appearsat a play's end to resolve conflict and reestablishorder,is not the corruptionof tragedy that Nietzsche claimed but its logical development.'9Later that evening, the drunken AlcibiadeswarnsAgathonnot to sufferthe deceptionfrom Socrates that he himself suffered.It is only a fool, Alcibiades says, who learnsfrom suffering(222b). This tragicpoet whom he addresses,however,alreadysupposes a world beyond suffering, which he describes in his speech. He has already heeded Alcibiades' advice. It is, in fact, the message of his own speech.

SOCRATES'REFUTATION AGATHON OF Socrateswill not speakin the mannerof the othersymposiasts,he insists, beautifulthings to Love regardlessof their truth,but in his own attributing

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way. Specifically,he will begin by askingAgathona few questionsabouthis speech. Socratesas it were calls Agathonupon stage not to be admiredfor his play by thirtythousandGreeks (175e, 194b) but like a tragic figure to have his errorabout Love exposed and corrected."Is Love of something or of nothing?"Socratesfirst asks Agathon. Before letting him take a stab at the question, Socratesexplains that he is not asking whetherLove is Love of a mother or a father (199d). Incest, the classic crime in Greek tragedy, is implicit in Agathon'sendorsementof Love as "liketo like."One is most like of one's own. Agathon's understanding the lover as self-sufficient,his love directedtowardhimself and his own productions,makes Love incestuous. Socrates'warningaboutan answerhe does not wantto his questionis therefore appropriate Agathon. And it implicitly correctsAristophanes'prefor sentationof Socratesin the Cloudsas someone who teachesthatincest is naturalandthe sacredsanctionagainstit merelyconventional(Clouds, 1371-77, 1427-32, 1443-45).20 Thus not only Socrates'allusion to incest, but his very questionis a good one for Agathon,who identifiedlover andbeloved (see 204c). ForAgathon, Love is, in a way, of nothing, as it is not directedto an object outside itself. When Socrates asks whetherLove is of something, or of nothing, he asks whetherLove resemblessomethingthatcan be understood only in relationto otherthanitself. Forexample,a fatheris fatherof someone, anda something motheris a motherof someone, of a son or a daughter.Socrates'examples call attentionnot only to relationship,andtherewithmutualdependence,but to the relationship betweenparentsandtheiroffspring.Whatone generatesis both one's own and also other.Agathon's speech ignores the latter. Following the patternof Socrates'examples,AgathonagreesthatLove is "of something,"of thatwhich it desires or loves, of what it does not have or possess andof which it is in need. Agathonhimself said, Socratespoints out, that matterswere arrangedby the gods througha love of beautifulthings. Love, he implied,is love of beauty.Love is not of ugliness. And so Love lacks and is in need of beautifulthings, as well as good ones, inasmuchas the good are beautiful.Love, then, is neitherbeautifulnor good (200a-201b).21 of Agathonadmitshe knew "nothing" what he was saying (201b). But if Agathonknows nothingat all, and if thereis no truthin his beautifulspeech, he has no way out of his perplexity.Nothingcomes fromnothing.He is truly at a loss, as Socratesso often claims of himself, andneeds in effect a miracle, a "god in a machine"to help him. But Socratestypically proceeds to search afterproclaiminghis perplexity,and now he has recourseto a contrivance,a kind of god in a machine, who enters in a tale that constitutes Socrates' speech aboutLove. More precisely, Socrates'"god in the machine"is not a him love matters" (210d). god, but a foreignpriestess,Diotima, who "taught

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Conjuringsomeone more than humanbut less than divine, Socrates completes his drama,as it were, by serving as a messengerfrom an oracle. Like oracular pronouncementin tragedies (see, e.g., Sophocles, OT, 787-93, 1176-77), Socratesoffers truthto those who inquire,althoughthattruthdoes not lead to tragic doom.

SOCRATES' AND THEDAEMONIC PROPHETESS Diotimaresemblesthe goddess of Parmenides' poem, who educateshim, The just as Socratessays Diotima taughthim.22 differencesbetween the two are also instructive.Diotima is not a goddess, but a humanprophetess,and she educates the young Socrates not about "what is," but about what lies between divine andhuman.Herargument this: thatLove is not itself beauis tiful andgood does not meanthatit is ugly andbad. Rather,it is between god and mortal,and a greatdaemon,for the daemonic,which includesall divination and prophecy,serves as a link between the mortalsand gods, carrying messages and prayersin both directions,because "god does not mix with human." Thus the daemonic"inthe middle [of humansand gods] fills up the intervalso that it binds togetherthe whole itself' (201-203a). Withoutdaemons there would be no link between the partsof the whole, and therefore strictly speaking,no whole. Middles, or that which lies between, are double-edged,as illustratedby the midpointof a line, whichjoins two line segmentsandalso separatesthem, bothholdingthemtogetherandholdingthemapart(cf. 222d-e). Diotimacan thereforeaddressAristophanes Agathonat once: to the former,she offers and the linkjoining the humananddivine he left severed;to the latter,the separation betweenhumananddivine whose necessity he denied.She ties the desire for completeness describedby Aristophanesto Agathon's identificationof the beautifuland the good with one's own. When lovers strivefor theirown, they strive for something higher, outside themselves. Diotima has in effect merged the comic poet's emphasis on lack and need with the tragedian's emphasison the beautifuland good. Diotima's formulationallows us to see Aristophanes'and Agathon's speeches as halves, each in need of the other. This does not mean,however,thatjoining themis an easy matter. Diotima does so only by introducingthe daemonic-something thatlinks divine and human.To serve this purpose,which neitherdivine nor humancan perform, the daemonicmustdifferfromboth. Yetif the daemonichas nothingin common with those things it links, it would have no pointof contact.Presumably it differs from each of the things it connects by virtueof its being mixed of elements possessed by those things it links. But a link is necessarybetween

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god andhuman,Diotima says, becausegod andhumando not mix. Canthey, then, be mixed in the daemonic?Diotimahighlights the difficultyby speak(thnetos) (202e), using the word ing of what lies between god and "mortal" not for humanbeing, but a word relatedto the verb "todie" (apothneskein). How can one be in-between mortaland immortal?To say that one's mortal partdies, while one's immortal partlives foreverconfirmsthatsomethingcan be only one or the other.If somethingis needed to bind togethermortaland immortal,it must be composed of both, ratherthanonly one or the other:if only mortalor immortal,the binderwould need somethingin turnto bindit to the one unlike itself. On the other hand, if the binderwere both mortaland immortal,it would need somethingto bind itself together. The same difficulty emerges when Socrates asks Diotima, "Who are Love's fatherand mother?"23 Since god and mortaldo not mix-indeed, that is why there must be some thirdto join them (203a)-Love's parentsmust both be one or the otherto mate. But if they are one or the other,how could Diotimarespondsto Socrates'questionwith a theygeneratean in-between?24 myth aboutLove's birth.As we might expect if god and mortaldo not mate, Love's mother,Poverty,and his father,Resource, are more alike than their names at first suggest. Poverty, in the myth, is very resourceful. And Resourcehimself is in need of her to bringforthhis offspring;a resourceis a resource not in itself, but only for the sake of some purpose.The common translation the Greekword for "resource" "means," "way," of or indicates as thatit mustbe understoodin termsof a relation,just as, to use Socrates'earlier illustration, motheror a fatheris a parentof someone. But if Povertyand a Resourcearemixed beings, who aretheirparents?Diotima'smyththerefore reproducesthe question:how can one accountfor somethingbetween mortal and divine? The myth does move the issue forward,however,in one way. In orderto establishthe possibility of middles, Diotimahad referredto correctopinion, which partakesof wisdom inasmuch as it is correct,but of ignoranceinasmuch as it cannotgive an accountof why it is correct(202a). But how do we know that correctopinion exists? Perhapsall opinion is false opinion. Correctopinioncan be identifiedonly fromthe outside, only by someone who is wise. If correctopinion knew its correctness,it would be knowledge and not opinion. Or,if it understoodthatit was opinion and not knowledge, it would question its correctness, or become philosophy. When Socrates inquires about Love's parents, he questions the intelligibility of an intermediate, which could exist as a link between human and divine, only if it were not needed as a link, only if humananddivine could mix. Socrates'questionthus demonstratesthat he knows that he does not understand,and even that he understands problem.To answerhis question,Diotima gives a mythical the

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account of Love's parentsthatexplains Love's intermediate statusby reference to Love's philosophizing. Philosophy replaces correct opinion as the "middle"between ignorance and wisdom: in seeking wisdom the philosopheris not yet wise, nor is he so ignorantthathe doesn't know thathe doesn't know (204a-b). Inasmuchas her story aboutLove's originsrespondsto Socrates' questioning,it is not surprisingthat she describesLove as if she were describing Socrates: scheming after the beautiful and the good, a great hunter,desirousof wisdom, philosophizingall his life, and even going barefoot (203c-e). Justas ignorancealone cannotexplain philosophizing,lack alone cannot explainlove of the beautiful.If Love is neitherbeautifulnor ugly, anddesires whatit lacks, it would desirethe ugly as muchas the beautiful.Theremustbe somethingbeautifulaboutthe love of beauty.Moreover,humancomplexity is manifestnot only in ourseekingknowledge,butin ourgeneratingorgiving birth. As resourcefuland needy beings, we give birth, the former attribute makinggenerationpossible, the lattermakingit necessary.Simple emptiness could not give birth,for it would have nothingto give. Nor would anything sufficient unto itself require generationfor its fulfillment. It is when the (needy) lover meets someone with a beautifulsoul, Diotima says, thathe is "resourceful" (euporei) in speaking to him about virtue, and about what a man shouldbe andpursue(209b-c). Need finds resourceswithinitself, good and resources generate speeches about what is good. ThereforeDiotima's furtherrevelationsaboutLove as creative,generative,poetic, andeven about lovers as pregnantbuild on her earlierstatementsaboutLove as in-between. It is only throughher account of generationthat Diotima will be able to explain how somethingcan be "between"mortaland immortal.

LOVEAS PROCREATIVE Diotimareachesthe generativecharacter Love in responseto anotherof of Socratesis unableto Socrates'questions."Of what use is Love to humans?" what the lover of the beautifulderivesfrom beautifulthings. Only when say Diotima substitutesgood thingsfor beautifulones, does Socratesunderstand thatLove is useful, because when we love the good things andpossess them, we arehappy(204c-205a). But since everyonedesiresto be happy,andhence to possess good things, everyone is a lover. Socrates wondersat this result. Diotima attemptsto explain through an analogy between lover and poet, We whose literalmeaning in Greek is "maker." give one sort of maker,the poet, the nameof poet, whereasthe termshouldapplyto artisansof all kinds, just as we applythe term"lover"to only one sortof lover (205b-c). But even

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if our way of speaking obscures the similaritiesbetween things, it is also based on a perceptionof their differences. We single out poets from other craftsmenandloversfromotherhumanbeings for good reason.25 beautiThe ful cannotbe reducedto the good. To love the good-which is to love that the good be ours and that we therebybe happy-is to love ourselves. But this does not exhaustthe experience of Love, as indicatedby Socrates'question about Love's use. If Love Earlierin the evemerelyled us to ourgood, its use wouldbe unquestionable. ning Phaedrushad given examples of lovers who gave their lives for those whom they loved, such as Alcestis for Admetus (179b-c). Whereasto love the good is to love ourselves, to love the beautifulbrings us outside of ourselves. It is not that Aristophanesdid not leave a place for the love of the good, when he definedLove as love of one's own completion(205e), butthat he did not leave a place for love of the beautiful.Withoutthe latter,love of the good mergesinto love of one's own. Diotimathereforedoes not explainLove simply in termsof the good, as opposed to the beautiful.Although she demonstratesthe use of Love by referenceto the good, she reintroduces beauthe tiful, arguingthatthe lover desires to give birthin the presenceof the beautiful. Loversarepregnant, claims,26 only the beautifulacts as midwife, she and relief from the pains of labor.By generation,by leaving behind providing somethingnew in the place of the old, mortalbeings partakeof immortality. Even the beautifulitself may seem useful in Diotima'saccount,butthegeneration that it makes possible itself leads us beyond ourselves.27 Parentsare to do anythingto preserveandnurture theiryoung, "tofightto the finwilling ish ... for the sakeof those theyhavegenerated,andto die on theirbehalf;and they are willingly rackedby starvationand stop at nothing to nourishtheir offspring"(207a-b). It is fittingthatSocratesinventsa womanto answerthe previousspeakers, whose downplaying generation,offspring, and children is consistent with theirhomosexuality(178b, 179c, 180d, 186e).28 the previoussymposiasts Of Aristophanes alone describes the generation of offspring by men and women. But he presentedgenerationnot as a need or a desire of the parents, but merelyas a by-productof theirlonging for somethingelse (191c).29And althoughAgathonfocuses on the poet's productions(196e- 197a), they come to solely fromthe inspiredpoet. No otherhumanbeing inspiresor contributes his creationsin any way. Agathonmay presentLove as the youngestgod, but he does noteven raisethequestionof his parents,unlikeSocratesandsome of the other symposiasts(cf. 195b with 178b, 180d, and, of course, 203a). His presumptionof self-sufficiency is relatedto his homosexuality,as is love of one's like to love of oneself. Socrates therefore invents someone other to

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addressthese men-a prophetess,whose inspirationdistinguishesher from other human beings; a foreigner, who is a strangerin Athens; and, most in important this settingof male homosexuals,a womanwho points dramatito whatis missing from the previousspeeches by presentingall human cally beings, men as well as women, as pregnant. Replyingto them all, the woman Socratesinventspresentsa differentview of generation,at all levels of human life. Diotima moves from the generationof childrento the ways in which the desire for immortalityis satisfied throughfame. Like Aristophanesbefore her,she addressesthe hubrisof the firstsymposiasts.But ratherthanpresenting the gods' mutilationof the circle-beingsas punishmentfor their aspiraare tions, she indicatesthathumanaspirations achievedonly in the contextof community.The "immortalmemory"that Alcestis and Achilles sought for themselves, Diotima explains, is one "thatwe now hold" (208d) (emphasis added).They are dependenton futuregenerations,even on poets. Diotima's examples include a legendaryking of Athens, who dies "on behalf of the kingdomof his children"(208d). Diotima'semphasison generationandoffspringalso allows for noble deeds for the sake of one's city. Again, Diotima indicates the limits of the desire for autonomy that the other symposiasts revealin theirspeeches, withoutdeprivinghumanstrivingof all satisfaction. Indeed, Diotima next refers to the virtue of prudenceas an offspring of the love for immortality, well as a rangeof activitiesthatsustainandflourishin as communities. political The offspringmost worthyof memory,"prudence the rest of virtue" and includethe productionsof poets, craftsmen,and statesman,Diotima (209a), says, indicatingthe positive side of those whom Socratesclaims in theApology to have examined in search of wisdom. An image of Plato's Socrates in appearsagain,when Diotimarefersto those pregnant soul who seek someone beautifulandattemptto educatehim by speakingto him aboutvirtueand what his pursuitsshould be (209b-c; see Apol., 29e-30a, and 3 lb).30Just as nurturing completes generation,so does teaching complete Love. The element of nurturing remainsfor Diotima even at the highest level, when she describesthe ascentof the loverto the knowledgeof beautyitself, permanent and unchanging, unmixed with anything ugly-"the perfect end" of the lover's labors,as a resultof which he will give birthto and nurture phannot toms of virtuebut truevirtue.It is only when he gives birthto truevirtueand nurtures Diotimaconcludes,thathe becomes "dear the gods andimmorto it, tal, if it is possible for any humanbeing" (212a). The lover's ascent may reachan "end"in knowledge of the beautiful,but thatend is thereforealso a beginning.In responseto Aristophanes,Diotima

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says thatgenerationis not a mereby-productof lovers'desirefor satisfaction, butthe end of thatdesire,andeven has a furtherend, nurture education.31 and In the Phaedrus, Socrates elaborateson the role of the teacherthat is sugthat gestedhere-as well as the "immortality" is his: thereSocratesdescribes someone employing "theartof conversation," literally "thedialectical art," who
takinghold of a fittingsoul, plantsandsows with knowledgespeechesthat... arenot barren but have seed, whence otherspeeches growing in othercharacters, able to carry are this on, everimmortal,andmakehim who possesses themhappyas faras it is possible for a humanbeing. (Phdr.,276e-277a)

In concluding his speech in the Symposium,Socratesclaims that he is persuaded by Diotima and that he tries to persuadeothers (212b). Of all the speeches delivered at the Symposium Socrates' alone culminates in an attemptto perpetuateitself in this manner(cf. 193a-b).

PLATO'SSOCRATES After Socrates stops speaking, Aristophanes objects to an allusion Diotima made to his speech when she criticizedthose who say that Love is eitherof the half, or of the whole, regardlessof the good (205e). Havingpreceded his narration his conversationswith Diotima with a discussion with of Agathonthatled the tragicpoet to acknowledgethatLove was neitherbeautiful nor good, SocratesprovokesAristophanesinto a discussion in which he will arguethatLove does aim at the good. If one understoodSocrates'argumentthatLove is not of one's own unless it were good in abstraction fromthis broadercontextin which he is respondingto Agathon'sposition as well, one but mightsupposethatSocratesoccupies not theplace of an intermediary one side of a dichotomy.Rosen, for example, suggests thatthe dialogue is moving toward"adiscussionof the whole andthe natureof the good, andthereby [toward]a criticismof the city, which diluteslove of thegood by love of one's own."32In contrastto the position that Love is love of one's own, Socrates' position may look apolitical and transcendent,as he explores the extent to which one's own is qualified,or even subordinated the beautifuland the to But Socrates questions not only Aristophanes' position but also good. Agathon's. Agathon's position that Love is beautiful and good presumes the selfsufficiency of the lover. When Socrates responds that Love lacks what it

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desires, or desires beyond itself, he remindshim of humaninsufficiency,dependence,andrelationship.Love is "of something," as a fatheris a father just of a son or daughter, brotherof a brotheror sister(199d-e). When Socrates a presentsDiotima's teaching that Love generates,and that generation-and he nurturing-is a mortal'sway to immortality, remindsAgathonof deathin a way thatlinks mortalsto theiroffspring,to futuregenerations,and to their communities more generally. His emphasis on limitation, in contrast to Agathon'son self-sufficiency,places humanbeings in politicalcommunities. Contraryto Agathon, love is not simply beautiful and good; contraryto Alcibiades' advice to Agathon, learningdoes come by suffering. Aristophanes,on the other hand, presents human beings as needy, but their need leads them to the apoliticalembraceof lovers; only sex provides momentaryrelief from their longing so thatthey can providelife's necessities. Althoughthis takesthe form of politics for the boldest andthe manliest, their activity remainsreactive:it becomes possible only because of a trick thatgods perpetrate theirbodies, andit serves life's preservation on (191c-d, Socrates'responsethatone loves one's own only insofaras it is good, 193a).33 in contrast,makesroom for a politics thatstrivesto ensurethatone's own is good, a politics that goes beyond mere necessity or preservationas human beings seek to lead good lives. Insofaras the beautifulcannotbe reducedto the good, self-interestedpolitical actionmightbe mediatedby the beautiful. It is Socrates' intermediateposition between lack and possession, and not that of either of these poets, that leaves open this possibility. The lovers whom Diotima describes generate and nurture,not only children,but also laws of politicalcommunities, inventionsof artsor crafts,poetic productions, about virtue, and even virtue itself in the souls of others (208espeeches of 212a). The understanding Love that underliesSocrates'philosophic life thus underlies political life as well. That is, the state between poverty and resource that accounts for the pursuit of wisdom and its self-generation throughquestioning others also accounts for the ongoing human activities thatkeep political communitiesalive and flourishing. Socrates' brewing conversation with Aristophanes is interruptedby Alcibiades' "abrupt" entrance into the gathering (213a).34It is not until Alcibiades has had his say that Socratesresumes his conversationwith the poets. Alcibiades insists thatif he is to join the othersin deliveringencomia, his mustbe not to Love but to Socrateshimself (45d). Socratesmay be competing with Aristophanesand Agathon in describingLove, but Alcibiades, whose speech draws"images"or "likenesses"of Socrates(215a), competes with Plato himself.35

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AlcibiadescomparesSocratesto Silenus statues,for example,whose ugly exteriorsmay be splitopen to reveal"divineandgolden"images, "altogether beautifuland wondrous"(216d-217a, 222a). So too does Socratesdisguise himself as a lover of beautifulyoung men, but is really "full of moderation" within and contemns all the things most people pursue(216d-e). Similarly, and Socratesconceals his wisdom, claimingthathe is "ignorant knows nothing" (221d-e, 216d), but when opened his speeches are intelligentand contain "everythingproperto examine for one who would be noble and good" (222a). Socrates'ironyis only deception(218d). Alcibiades'Socratesresembles Aristophanes'Socrates from the Clouds in his self-sufficiency-his asceticismanddisdainfor ordinaryhumanlife (cf. 220a-b with Clouds,41517, 439-42, and 737, and cf. 219c and 221b with Clouds, 223)-but with a "rhetorical" of cover, his presentation himself as a lover and as an ignorant man who seeks the truthfromothers.In Alcibiades'view, Socratesis all need on the outside,butall resourceon the inside. Alcibiadesunderstands nothing in-between emptiness and fullness, ignorance and wisdom.36 Like he Chaerophon, supposesthatSocratesmust be wise, but he needs no oracle to confirmit (see Apol., 20e-21a). In Alcibiades, Plato demonstrates how Socratesis likely to appearto the even when its members are representedby a man as political community, as extraordinary Alcibiades,andone in whom Socratestook a specialinterest (see e.g., Alc. I, 108a-b, and Gorg., 481d). Like the Athens that later sentenced Socratesto death,Alcibiadesunderstands Socratesbothas superiorto other human beings and also as having nothing to contributeto them, too resourcefulto need a communityandtoo poor to have a partin one (see, e.g., with Apol., 21a and 31d-e). Plato'sinclusionof Alcibiades in the Symposium his "accusing"encomium to Socrates (222a) is thereforeominous. It is of course appropriatethat he arrive too late at the party to hear Diotima's descriptionof philosophy as a link between poverty and resource,just as Plato arrivedtoo late for his own images of Socratesto moderatethose prevailing at the time of Socrates' trial. Plato cannot change the past, even thoughhe tries to change the future. The evening being late, our narrator Aristodemusnods off and catches only the driftof Socrates'concluding discussion with the poets: Socratesis compelling Aristophanesand Agathonto agree that "it belongs to the same manto know how to compose comedy andtragedy," that"whoeveris by and art a tragic poet is also a comic poet" (223d). In light of the prominenceof AristophanesandAgathonatthe symposium,the dialogue'sconclusionis no mere "sideissue" (see 222c). Althoughour sleepy narrator misses the details of the argument,Socrates'speech aboutLove has alreadyimplied its meaning. WhenAristophanes presentshumanbeings as poor,in need of resources

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to satisfy theirlongings, he does not see the possibilityof a marriage between and Resource. His speech is notably silent about the beautiful.But Poverty Povertybegets nothingwithoutResource.In Agathon'saccount,by contrast, the lover,inspiredby Love, generates,buthe generatesalone, andthereis no or nurturing education.He is not awarethatResourcedoes not beget without Poverty.But thereis no laughterwithoutResource,nortearswithoutPoverty. WithoutDiotima'scontribution, low (comedy) loses its connectionto the the high, and the high (tragedy)loses its connectionto the low. Poetrydegenerates either into the demoralizingworld of Aristophanes'speech or the saccharineone of Agathon's. The former's "comedy"resembles a degenerate form of tragedy,whose sufferinglacks nobility,while the latter's"tragedy" resembles a degenerateform of comedy, self-contentonly by blindingitself to the ugly. To the one, Diotima insists that Poverty can marryResource (restoringthe laughter),and to the other,thatResourcemust marryPoverty the (restoringthe tears).She therebydemonstrates connectionbetweencomand tragedy, while preserving their difference. The same poet might edy therefore compose both, inasmuch as both are based on the connection between the beautiful and the ugly, a connection implied in Diotima's account of the intermediatestatus of Love. To preserve comedy, the poet mustunderstand Love is "of something," just of oneself. To preserve that not he must understand that Love is not simply beautifuland good. tragedy, Socrates'final argumentaboutcomedy and tragedyis thereforenot a reflection of the speeches of the poets he has heardat the symposium,37 except in the sense thateach falls shortof this task.It is rather reflectionof his own a and of his own philosophic activity on which it is based. Socrates, speech, therefore,might have arguedalso that it belongs to the same man to know how to compose poetryand to philosophize.Because we do not hearthe full report of Socrates' final conversation,we cannot know whether Socrates made this argumentas well. Even if Socrates'argumentabout comedy and tragedyimplies anotheraboutpoetryand philosophy,however,drawingout thatimplicationmighthave been moreuseful to Plato,who "unit[es]the high and the low in his representation Socrates,"38 to the two poets with than of whom Socratesis speaking.OrperhapsSocrateshadjust enoughdoubtin the aboutphilosophyandpoetrynot to drawit out for his interlocutors argument (cf. Rep.,450d-45 la). At severalpointsin his lessons fromDiotima,Socrates expresseshis wonder,as when she explainsLove as generation(208b-c). The evidence for Socrateswas not all in. Plato'sdialogues were not yet available. They might have dispelled Socrates'possible doubts that the one who is a poet by artis a philosopheras well, even if they would not have dispelledhis wonder.

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NOTES
1. MarthaNussbaum,The Fragilityof Goodness: Luckand Ethics in Greek Tragedyand Philosophy (Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1986), 166-67, 173-74, 197, 199; GregoryVlastos, Platonic Studies(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1973), 31-32. 2. Arlene Saxonhouse,Fear of Diversity: The Birth of Political Science in Ancient Greek Thought(Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press, 1992), 160, 182, 184; see Nussbaum,Fragility of Goodness, 181, 195, 197. 3. Allan Bloom, "TheLadderof Love,"in Plato's "Symposium," trans.Seth Benardeteand with commentaries Allan Bloom and Seth Benardete(Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress, by as the that 2001), 104-5, 127, 135-39. Forotherinterpretations understand Symposium criticalof Phoenix 31 (1977): Socrates,see Michael Gagarin,"Socrates'Hybrisand Alcibiades' Failure," 22-37; MarkJ. Lutz,Socrates'Educationto Virtue (Albany:StateUniversityof New YorkPress, 1998); Stanley Rosen, Plato's Symposium, 2d ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987). 4. References in parentheses,unless otherwise noted, are to Plato's Symposium.Translations from the Greek are my own, althoughI have relied on Seth Benardete,"Symposium," in Plato's "Symposium." Greektext is Platonis Opera,ed. J. Burnet(Oxford,UK: Clarendon, The 1979). 5. WallerR. Newell, RulingPassion: TheEroticsofStatecraftin PlatonicPoliticalPhilosophy (Lanham,MD: Rowman& Littlefield,2000), andGaryAlan Scott,Plato's Socratesas Educator (Albany:StateUniversityof New YorkPress,2000) also defendSocratesas a teachercognizantof political needs and goods. 6. Scholarspointout thatEryximachus, with his emphasison natural science, resemblesthe Socratesof the Cloudswhom Aristophanesmocked,for example, George KimballPlochmann, BucknellReview(May 1963): 1-18; Bloom, "Lad"HiccupsandHangoversin the Symposium," der of Love,"98; Lutz, Socrates'Educationto Virtue,62. 7. Seth Benardete,"Sophocles'Oedipus Tyrannus," Ancientsand Modems, ed. Joseph in a Cropsey(New York:Basic Books, 1964). See also Leon Kass, Toward More NaturalScience (New York:Free Press, 1985), 286-88. 8. Leo StraussOn Plato's Symposium (Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press, 2001), 123, 130. 9. Aristophanessays we should choose a beloved "to our taste"(literally,"to our mind," 193c-d), andthatthose descendedfrom males "payno attentionto" (literally,"donot have their in minds on," 192b) marriageand children. See Benardete,"On Plato's Symposium," Plato's lb. 59; "Symposium," Strauss,OnPlato's Symposium,132. Cf. Pausanias' speech, 181c-dand 181 Also note the advice Eryximachusgives to Aristophanesat 189b-c. 10. Strauss,On Plato's Symposium,140, 150. 11. Rosen, Plato's Symposium,47-48. 12. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan,ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York:Collier Macmillan, 1962), 52. 13. For example, Rosen, Plato's Symposium, 157; Lutz, On Socrates'Educationto Virtue, 71; Newell, Ruling Passion, 74; Strauss,On Plato's Symposium,141. 14. Saxonhouse,Fear of Diversity, 163-64; see also Nussbaum,Fragilityof Goodness, 17273. 15. Unlike the other pair of lovers presentat the Symposium,Phaedrusand Eryximachus, AgathonandPausaniasneverspeakto each otheror referto each otherby name duringthe evening (see, e.g., 176c and d, and 177a and c). Even Eryximachus,whose bold speech praisesthe

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powerof artoverthe cosmos, beganwith a kindof deferenceto Pausanias,who spokebeforehim (185e-186a). 16. Strauss,OnPlato's Symposium,156;Bloom "Ladder Love,"117;Rosen, Plato's Symof posium, 181. 17. Rosen, Plato's Symposium,169;Bloom, "Ladder Love,"120; Benardete,"OnPlato's of 188-90. Symposium," of 18. Bloom, "Ladder Love," 112, 116, 121. 19. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of Wagner,trans. Walter Kaufmann(New York:RandomHouse, 1967), 111. 20. 1 thereforedisagreewith Bloom thatSocrates'allusion to incest revealsmore abouthim than aboutAgathon, a sign that "Socrateswill thinkmore shamelessly"than his conventional interlocutor. Accordingto Bloom, Agathon"keepsEroswithinthe boundsof the conventional," in contrastto Socrateswho remindsus of what"is naturally by possible [but]forbidden the gods." "Ladder Love,"125. But it is Agathonwho is shameless.And it is Socrateswho does notmean of incest when he asks about Love, who thus reminds Agathon that some things are forbidden. Rosen, in contrast,arguesthatSocrates'allusionto incest is directedagainstAgathon,butnevertheless comes close to Bloom's position aboutthe shameless characterof philosophywhen he distinguishesincest as "theself-destructiveaspectof the desire for divine perfection"(emphasis added),rightly to be feared, and concludes that "thosewho wish to be gods or causa sui, must come to termswith, or laughat thatfear"(Rosen, Plato's Symposium,214-15). Both Bloom and Rosen acceptAristophanes' view of Socrateson this issue. But thatSocratesis one who investigates mattersabove and below the earthratherthanhumanand political life. 21. Discussions of the "logic"of thisargument be foundin Nussbaum,Fragilityof Goodcan ness, 176-81, and in A. W. Price, who replies to it, Love and Friendshipin Plato and Aristotle (Oxford,UK: Clarendon,1989), 18-20. 22. Saxonhouse,Fear of Diversity, 174, n. 16 23. Thereexisted variousaccountsof Love's parents,none authoritative given theirvariety. See R. G. Bury,TheSymposium UK: W. HeffnerandSons, 1969), 22, note ofPlato (Cambridge, on 178B. 24. This difficulty explains why one might assume that Poverty is mortal and Resource tend to do. See Bury,TheSymposium Plato, xl. Lutznotes divine, as scholarsnot surprisingly of thatthe perfectionof the divine, its lack of need or desire, is the impedimentto mating.He suggests that Diotima addressesthe difficulty by having Povertywait until Resource is drunkand sleepy before lying beside him. Lutz, Socrates' Educationto Virtue,87. But would a perfect only points being, withoutneeds, drink,drinktoo much,andsleep? Again, Diotima's"solution" to the problem. 25. As Bloom observes, by pointing out that only certain individuals are called poets, Diotima"alertsus to the mysteriousfact thatpoetryis privilegedbecauseit catersto the longing for the beautiful." of Bloom, "Ladder Love," 136. 26. Therehas been criticismof Platofor appropriating for pregnancy the male. (Forreference to this literature, Saxonhouse,FearofDiversity, 176.) Diotima'sstrikingstatement, see however, does not so much merge male and female roles in reproduction, begetting(gennao) and giving birth(tikto),as acknowledgethe complexitynecessaryfor generation.In otherwords,Love has a fatherand a mother. 27. See HarryNeumann'scriticismof Diotima as a sophist and of her utilitarian accountof the beautifulin "Diotima'sConceptof Love,"AmericanJournalof Philology 86 (1965): 39-43, 47-48. 28. For discussions, see Saxonhouse, Fear of Diversity, 174, 176; Rosen, Plato's Symposium, 70, 101-2; Newell, Ruling Passion, 78-79.

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of 29. Lutz, Socrates'Educationto Virtue, Newell, RulingPassion,74; Bloom, "Ladder 69; Love," 142. 30. Although Socrates claims in the Theaetetusthat as midwife he does not generatebut questions others, he also admits that he is in partthe "cause"when those whom he questions "givebirthto manybeautifulthings"(Th., 150c-d).As to Socrates'practiceof midwiferyin that very dialogue, at the end Theaetetusdeclares that in his conversationwith Socrates "I for one have said even more on account of you than all I used to have in myself' (Th., 210b). See of Neumann,"Diotima'sConceptof Love,"57, for a differentinterpretation this issue andits relevance to the Symposium. 31. Thus I disagree with those commentatorswho suppose that Diotima omits generation of when she describesthose who reachthe end of theirlaborsin theircontemplation the beautiful itself, for example, Bloom, "Ladderof Love," 147, and Saxonhouse, Fear of Diversity, 173. of Neumann,in contrast,acknowledgesthe importance generationfor Diotimaeven at the highest stage of Love, butarguesthatfroma Socraticpointof view this is a defect in heraccountinasmuchas beauty"is loved not for its own sake,butas the meansby which mortalscan give birth." "Diotima'sConcept of Love,"39, 41-44. 32. Rosen, Plato's Symposium,284; see also Strauss,On Plato's Symposium,244. 33. See Strauss,On Plato's Symposium,149-50. Or, as Newell argues,politics becomes a conventionalmeans of holding in check our primordialdesires.Ruling Passion, 73-74. 34. Rosen understands to Alcibiades' interruption represent"theimpossibilityof remaining in the presenceof the divine throughthe mediumof speech."Rosen, Plato's Symposium,279. But Alcibiades interrupts Socrates'contemplation the beautiful,andnot even the account of not of the lover's contemplationof the beautiful,butSocrates'conversationwith Aristophanes. 35. Nussbaumalso notes this connectionbetween Alcibiades and Plato, but suggests not a FragilcompetitionbutthatAlcibiadesserves as "apoet, andan inspiringgod of poets (Plato?)." ity of Goodness, 193. 36. This is confirmedin the Alcibiades II, whetherit was writtenby Plato or someone who understoodthis characteristic Alcibiades. See Alc. II, 139a-b.See also Euthd.,276a-c. of 37. For a contraryargument,see Saxonhouse,Fear of Diversity, 158, 183. 38. Diskin Clay, Platonic Questions: Dialogues with the Silent Philosopher (University Park:PennsylvaniaUniversityPress, 2000), 138-39.

Her MaryP.Nichols is a professorofpolitical science at Fordham University. mainareas of interestare historyof political thought,especially Greekpolitical theory;politics and literature;andpolitics andfilm. Her books includeCitizens and Statesmen:A Study of Aristotle's Politics, and ReconstructingWoody: Art, Love, and Life in the Films of Woody Allen.