Rhetoric and Rationality: A Study of Democratization in the Soviet Union Author(s): Richard D. Anderson Jr.

and Bernard Grofman Reviewed work(s): Source: Public Choice, Vol. 93, No. 3/4 (1997), pp. 287-314 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30024303 . Accessed: 26/03/2012 10:01
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PublicChoice93: 287-314, 1997.

287

@ 1997 KluwerAcademicPublishers. Printedin the Netherlands.

Rhetoric and rationality: A study of democratization in the Soviet Union *

RICHARD D. ANDERSON, JR.' & BERNARD GROFMAN2 'Departmentof Political Science, Universityof California,Los Angeles, CA 90024-1472, U.S.A.;2Schoolof Social Sciences, Universityof California,Irvine, CA92717-5100, U.S.A. Accepted 12 July 1995 Abstract. Canpoliticalactorsuse rationalstrategies politicalconflictwhenestablishedinstifor tutions are unavailableto structurepolitical choices because the institutionsare themselves among the contested issues? In Soviet politics from 1985 to 1991, cross-cuttingcleavages placed in question the possibility of any stable outcome. We argue that a multi-dimensional issue space was reduced to a single dimension, along which Mikhail Gorbachevcould temown rhetoricandrhetorical porarilyoccupy a median,by the interactionbetween Gorbachev's tactics used by leaders of his nomenklatura opposition,by Boris Yeltsin as the leader of the democraticopposition,andby single-issue groupscalled neformaly.The matchbetween these four players' rhetoricsandthe four strategicoptionsidentifiedby a simple spatialmodel offers empiricalevidence that rationalstrategieswere availabledespite institutionalflux.

1. Introduction
Canpoliticiansfollow rationalstrategiesin the absenceof establishedinstitutions that structure is political choices? Democratization by definitiona time of institutionalflux, when the rule of politics are not fixed. We investigate whether rational strategies are possible in such circumstancesby comparing the expectations of a rationalmodel of political action to the rhetoricof the principle participantsin the Soviet transitiontowarddemocracyduring 1989-1990.
to Dorothy Green for bibliographicassistance and to Colleen Conniff, Melissa Dawson, AlexandraGrozdanic,Carla Thorson and JudithChase for researchassistance.For commentingon variousversionsof this paper,we also thankStephenAnsolabehere, Kathleen Bawn, BarbaraGeddes, Stephen Hansen, Thomas Schwartz,George Tsebelis, the participantsin a seminar arrangedat WashingtonUniversity in St. Louis by John Gilmour, participantsin the UCLA political economy lunch, attendees at the WesternPolitical Science Association Annual Meeting, and participantsin a conference on "RationalChoice Approaches to ComparativePolitics" at the University of California,Irvine. None of these people are responsible for any faults. This researchwas partiallysupportedby the Interdisciplinary Focused Research Programin Public Choice, University of California,Irvine; by the Academic Senate of the Universityof California,Los Angeles; and by the RAND/UCLA Centerfor Soviet Studies. * We are indebted

288 Much research presents politics in the Soviet Union before the August 1990 coup as a conflict pitting reformersagainst those officials within the nomenklatura(party and governmentbureaucrats) who tried to defend the status quo. Several observershave portrayedMikhail Gorbachevplaying a centristrole in this conflict: aware of some nomenklatura officials' fear that public demonstrationsorganizedby single-issue groups called "neformaly" might topple them frompower,he exploitedthe officials' anxietyto gain their grudging approvalof his proposals for limited reforms promising to ease public discontent (see Breslaner, 1989; Hongh, 1989; Bova, 1989; Roeder, to 1993). In this respectGorbachevemergesas a liberalizercomparable those said by several recent studies to occupy the political center between hardliners anddemocratizers duringtransitionsto democracyin variouscountries Di Palma, 1990; O'Donnell and Schmitter,1986; Przeworski,1991). (see The portrait Gorbachevoccupyinga medianin a unidimensional of politics of perestroika conceals a previouslyunrecognizedpuzzle. Reportinga survey of public opinionin the formerUSSR in 1990, FinifterandMickiewicz(1992) call attentionto the "multidimensionality attitudestowardthe complex of of reforms introducedin the Gorbachevera." They observe that preferences expressed on the issue of whether the state or the individual should bear responsibilityfor economic well-being were not correlatedwith supportfor a transitionto democraticinstitutions.Takingthe responsesto the question of state or individualresponsibilityas an index of supportfor Gorbachev's marketreforms,FinifterandMickiewicz concludethathe neededto assemble a coalition composed of separategroups of supporters differentkinds of for reform. Finifter and Mickiewicz's (1992) conclusions have since been questioned by Duch (1993) and by Miller et al. (1994). CriticizingFinifterand Mickiewicz for relying on a single item to measuresupportfor economic reform, both critics find that when measuredby scales composed of multiple items, with support democracy. for supportfor marketreformsis stronglycorrelated both critics reportCronbach'salphasfor their scales rangingfrom However, .58 (Duch) to maxima of .63 to .68 for subsamplesof their survey (Miller et al., 1994). Duch (1993), moreover,explicitly admits that factor analysis of the items used in his scale to measuremarketreformrevealedthe presenceof two dimensions.While the level of Cronbach'salphaacceptablefor the constructionof a unidimensionalscale is partlya matterof the researcher's taste, we would interpretthe critics' findings as failing to reject the Finifter and Mickiewicz conclusion about the multidimensionality popularattitudes of towardthis pair of issues. Finifterand Mickiewicz's (1992) findingof multidimensionality further is supportedby interviewswith rankingpoliticiansof the Gorbachev years who

289 recountdisagreementsover how to coordinatedifferentreformissues. Interviewed by one of the authorsin Moscow in October 1992, YuriProkof'ev recalledthatas second secretaryof the Moscow city committeein early-1989, he approached firstsecretaryto questionthe wisdomof Gorbachev's the effort to proceed with democraticand marketreformsat the same time. Prokof'ev arguedinstead that the Soviet partyshould emulatethe Chinese course, proceeding with market reforms in the near term and delaying the move to democracyuntil a marketeconomy was well established.Gorbachevlearned of the conversationand,encountering Prokof'evin a Kremlinstaircase,braced him with, "So you're a panicker!"(paniker,a word frequentlyencountered in Gorbachev'spublic speeches). Interviewedat the GorbachevFoundation in October 1993, former Politburomember and ideology secretaryVadim Medvedev said that several Politburomembers wanted to disentangle economic, agricultural, ethnic, and legal reformfrom the political reformsadvocated by Gorbachev,either delaying political reformor hastily completing a limited version in orderto avoid interferencewith otherpolicy issues. In general, multidimensionalissue spaces are highly unlikely to feature stable medians of the kind commonly (and we believe correctly) said to have been occupied by Gorbachev.Where institutionsare fixed, they may be designed to limit or prohibitcycling among outcomesfor which majority supportvaries dependingon the orderin which they are compared.InvestiNew Zealand,Nagel (1993) gating the same problem in nineteenth-century has recently arguedthat verbalbehavior,of a kind labeled "heresthetics" by William Riker (1982), could substitutefor the absence of institutionallimits on cycling. We prefer the term "rhetoric," used not in the meaning of but to "persuasion" in the looser originalsense "oratory," Riker'sneologism. the rhetoricused by Gorbachev,by leaders of the nomenklatura Examining opposition, by his radicalopponentBoris Yeltsin, and by the neformaly,we argue that rhetoricaltactics succeeded in creating a short-runstability by reducingthis multi-dimensional space to a single dimensionopposingradical reformersto the nomenklatura, dimensionalong which a medianwas tema to, porarilyavailableto Gorbachev.This temporarystabilitycontributed but also limited, the gradualistic transition towarddemocracymanifestduringthe period of perestroika. We use speeches as evidence becauseunlike otherpossible evidence about political strategiesin the Soviet period,speechesofferevidenceof whatbroad Soviet audienceswere directedto ascribeto individualactors.In a stimulating article, Andersonand Boettke (1993) havejustifiablymade much of the gap between rhetoric and performanceduring the Gorbachevyears. Gorbachev proposed economic reforms, but the resultingchanges in economic institutions redistributed for opportunities officials to extractquasi-rentsratherthan

290 diminishingthe sum of quasi-rentsby relaxing state controls.We agree that greatlydivergedfrom rhetoric,butwhereasAndersonandBoetperformance tke (1993) ascribe the gap to Gorbachev'sstrategicinsincerity,we conceive policy actions by the Soviet governmentas a compoundcombining(a) Gorbachev's decrees (issued with the reluctantassent of Politburoconservatives who feared popularunrest if they refused) and (b) shirkingby rent-seeking bureaucrats,encouragedby the Politburoconservatives,who exploited the limits on his monitoring capacity to implement the decrees to their own advantageregardlessof Gorbachev'sintent (Anderson,1993: Ch. 2). Given our argument,we do not thinkthatGorbachev'sor his opponents'individual choicstrategiescan be assessed simply by observingtheirjoint, or "public," es. The texts printed in newspapersand stenographicrecords of meetings, on the otherhand,representsignals attributed the press to Gorbachevand by his variousopponentsas individuals.Because the pressmightmisreportwhat they actuallysaid, it would havebeen necessaryfor him andfor his opponents to consider how the press would reporttheir statementswhen deciding what to say, but since we have no direct evidence of the actual statements,but only the press reports,we do not model these decisions. We assume that for attentiveSoviet publics (and for us as observers),these texts could serve as (Peltzman,1984: 183) of Gorbachev'sandother "cheapsummaryindicators" actors' effortsto bid for supportfrom official andpopularaudiences political by offering political alternatives. 2. An informal model of Soviet politics, 1985-1991 Below we offeran abstract model of state-societyrelationsin the Soviet Union 1989-1990, identifying the strategicresourcesand constraintsfaced during by the various actors. Like all rationalmodels, this model gains tractability at the expense of oversimplifyingan admittedlyfar more complex reality. 2.1. Theplayers We model the game as havingfourkey sets of actors:Gorbachev his allies and (G), the conservativemembersof the nomenklatura (N), grass-rootsreformers "from below" (R) composed of neformaly("informals" unregistered or citizens' groups), cooperatives (privatebusinesses), and strike committees representingworkers,and Yeltsin and otherdemocrats. 2.1.1. Nomenklatura CommunistPartyofficialsandgovernment bureaucrats resistreformsare who decisive in thatno winningcoalitioncan exist withoutthem,since Gorbachev

291 did not control a stable majorityof the Politburo,as his formerspeechwriter recounts (Cherniaev,1993: 291, 295-297, 322) and as we documentbelow. The nomenklaturaofficials are assumed to be trying to preserve a status quo in which they enjoy a wide range of special privileges and control the enactmentand execution of official policy, but they are also unwilling to risk with a fully mobilized mass public losing office as a result of a confrontation conduct.When we use the word"nomenklatura" to enragedby theirarbitrary refer generallyto officials who opposed reforms,we remainawarethatsome members of the nomenklaturaat all levels welcomed reform even though it would reduce the existing powers and privileges of the nomenklatura as a whole. As Anderson and Boettke (1993: 108) point out, some supportive officials welcomed reformbecause they expectedto win even greaterpowers andprivilegesundera new system.In anycase, if we supposethatopponentsin the nomenklatura we were few or uninfluential, have difficultyunderstanding conservativeswent to the troubleof signalingtheiropposition why Politburo to reformor why Gorbachevengaged in issue packaging. 2.1.2. Gorbachevand his allies The motivationsbehind Gorbachev'sactions duringperestroikaremaindisputed even today. Following a substantialbody of literature,we shall treat him as a "balancer." existing rules,Gorbachev's lack of a PolitburomajorBy him from imposing his will on either the nomenklatura the or ity precludes reformson a varietyof public, and he seeks limited but still very substantial fronts in orderto placate an angry public thatmight otherwiseseek to expel the nomenklaturaconservativesfrom office. As a centrist Gorbachevmay seek enactmentof policy proposalsfavoredeitherby the reformersor by the nomenklatura, dependingon how fully each wing mobilizes its membersand theirpowers;that is, he may move eitherright or left. As long as both wings mobilize, however,he cannotmove all the way to eitherway. 2.1.3. Grass-rootsreformers Within two years after Gorbachev's succession in March 1985, the Politburo decided for the first time to tolerate the formationof interest groups not under the control of official organizations(see Berezovskii and Krotov, 1990: 19). One kind, the neformalyor "informal" organizations,proliferated rapidly.They were estimated to number30,000 by December 1987 and and 60,000 by March 1989 (althoughthese totals were never substantiated included many apolitical clubs devoted to leisure activities) (see Bonnell, was 1990). Anotherkind of special-interest organization the so-called "cooperative,"which sprangup after the passage of the Law on IndividualLabor Activity in May 1987. Cooperativeswerepartnerships (often individualentrewith theiremployees)engagedin a variety as partners preneursmasquerading

292 of privatebusinesses.Workers'committeesalso beganto appear,and in July 1989 coal miners workedup to a strikethat, althoughpartlyresultingfrom local disputes, spreadfrom the mines in the Kuzbassto the mines of Vorkuta and Donetsk. Not only coal miners struck;the head of governmentsaid that together with ethnic conflicts, strikes had cost 9.5 million person-days in the first four months of 1990, and seven million person-daysin all of 1989 (Pravda, 25 May 1990). Members of the neformaly,cooperativesand workers'groupscould exert and by pressureon the nomenklatura strikes,streetdemonstrations, campaignTwo CommunistParty authorssympatheticto the informalsdescribed ing. "informalassociations..., tryingto protheir challenge to the nomenklatura: mote their own opinions, revive and routinizedemocraticforms of struggle previously eliminatedfrom our practice,includingsome to which the estabare lished political and social-economic structures painfully sensitive: mass rallies, the nominationof their own candidatesfor people's deputy,and even the establishmentof parallel structuresof political power"(Churbanovand Nelinbin, 1990: 9). Our model does not depend on an assumptionthat every informalorganization forms preferencesalong only one issue dimension. As reformswere frustrated,informals particularlyin Ukraine, the Baltics and the Caucusus republics formed broad coalitions that linked issues within those republics, tying togetherdemandsfor nationalindependencewith ecologiparticularly cal concerns. Nevertheless,as long as the informalscan exert more pressure when both umbrellagroups and single-issue groupsjoin in protest actions, there is an incentive for reformersto adopt strategiesthat incorporatethe groups with single-issue preferences. 2.1.4. Yeltsinand the "democrats" While most neformalyorganizedfor change on particular substantive issues, during the campaign preceding the March 1989 elections individualcandidates and groups of supportersdeclaredtheir opposition to the Communist party's monopoly of the right of political organization.Prominentamong these candidates was Boris Yeltsin. These candidatesand their supporters gained the name "democrats" making demands for replacementof the by communistmonopoly with majorityrule. 2.2. Strategiesin the game With only one issue dimension (e.g., democracyversus authoritarianism, or the commandeconomy versusthe market),a centeror medianvoterposition would always exist. In contrast,in the multi-dimensional issue space documentedby FinifterandMickiewicz (1992), a single "center" positioncapable

293 of commandingmajoritysupportin pairwisecompetitionagainstevery possible alternative- i.e., a single median or core - never exists except under the very restrictiveconditionthatthe supporters opponentsof the centrist and policy are distributedsymmetricallyalong every dimension(see, e.g., Riker, 1982; or Ordeshook,1986: 349-353). Five basic strategies,each with its own vulnerability, exist for coping with the absence of a core in multidimensionalpolitics. First, if subsets of the electoratehold particularly strongviews on each of the dimensions,it may be to assemble a coalition of "intenseminorities" (Downs, 157), butthe possible coalition is vulnerableto disruptionby "divide and rule" counterproposals (Kadane, 1972) and is very difficult to organize and enforce when any of the different interestgroups' goals conflict. Second, an organizermay seek to package a generally centristposition located at the medianon each issue dimension,but that strategyis vulnerableto coalitionscomposed of elements from both extremesandformedby makingspecialconcessions to a particular intense minority,especially if the views of the participantsin the coalition about a given issue are far from the median position on that issue.1 Third is disaggregationof political choices, separatingissues by acting along one dimensionat a time. This strategyproduceswhatShepsle (1979) called "strucsee (for turallyinduced"equilibrium literature, Krehbiel,1988), butit depends on prior agreementabout the institutionalstructurefor reachingdecisions. Fourthis ambiguityabout specific issues in favor of establishingprocedural norms, such as the idea thatchoices shouldbe made in a democraticfashion, but this strategy is vulnerableto warningsabout the consequences for specific issues of the adoptionof democraticprocedures(Shepsle, 1972). Fifth is advocacy of strong supra-majoritarian consensus, or supra-majoritarian decision procedures,in order to create policy positions that, once in place, are invulnerableto overthrow(Schofield, Grofmanand Feld, 1988), but by with a veto over change, this strategy broadeningthe numberof participants tends to privilegethe statusquo andis thereforeunsuitablefor reformerswho face significantopposition. If rationalaction were infeasible when establishedinstitutionsare unavailable to structure politics, this set of strategiesshouldnot describethe behavior of political actorsin the Soviet Union beforethe August 1991 coup. To refute this null hypothesis, we now turnto presentingevidence that the first strategy was pursued (unsuccessfully) by grass-rootsreformers,the second by Gorbachev,the third by his nomenklatura opponents,the fourthby Yeltsin and his fellow democrats;none of the four playerspursuedthe fifth, which is infeasible when significantoppositionto reformexists. Gorbachevproposed the adoptionof perestroika an "issuepackage"- a set of policy proposalsin as which acceptanceof any proposalwas said to be dependenton acceptanceof

294

Axis of
G

assertiveness

demands ethnic of Ethnic

Perestroika
N Q

Acceptance

Ecology reform Ecological demands

Figure 1.

all the rest. The nomenklatura's directly opposed such issue representatives packaging by proposing to separateissues. Yeltsin emphasizedprocedural changes over reformsof particular policies. We arguethatthe players' adoption of these three strategies,together with the failure of the neformaly to achieve any cohesive nationwide organizationand everyone's avoidanceof the infeasible fifth strategy,made possible the appearance the single issue of dimension along which Gorbachevis often portrayed occupyinga centrist as position. We can illustrateour hypothesizedSoviet bargaining game by simplifying it to two dimensions (which representissues of, e.g., ethnicity and ecology) as in Figure 1. In the two-dimensionalpolicy space presentedin Figure 1, the horizontal (leftward)arrowsymbolizes popularforces (neformaly)organizedto support ecological reform. The vertical (upward)arrow symbolizes popularforces (neformaly)favoringpolicies moreresponsiveto ethnicconcerns.2The probable outcome of bargainingone issue at a time is shown by the point N. We assume that the nomenklatura officials could affect policies actually pursuedby the Soviet state, and thattheirdecisions dependedon the combination of (a) their own policy preferencesand (b) theirdesire to avoid having the neformalyengage in excessive demonstrations, disobedience,strikes, civil

295
or otherprotestactions. We furtherassume that the willingness of the neformaly to stage protests depended on how many people they could summon into the streets to face possible police counteraction.Under these assumptions, each policy must be a tacit bargainbetween the nomenklaturaand the neformaly.Because not all neformalycare aboutpolicy change along all can issue dimensions, if the nomenklatura arrangeto have each issue negotiideal ated separately,the compromiseshouldbe closer to the nomenklatura's point. The pointN represents set of policies mostfavorable thenomenklatura the to thatalso pacifies the neformalylocatedalong any issue dimensionconsidered in isolation.3What the neformalyactually want we have symbolized by the point R, which representsthe platform that combines the preferredpoints of the neformaly organized along each separate issues dimension. While the policies at point N representthe best the neformaly can obtain from the nomenklaturaif they negotiate along each dimension separately,and the point R reflects what they might get if they could put together (and keep together) a coalition of intense minoritiesthat would breakup present policies power relationships,the point G is intendedto reflect"compromise" proposedby Gorbachev,a "perestroika package." As long as G is up and to the left of N, G correspondsto a point along either dimension which the neformalyalong thatdimensionstrictlypreferto what they can get from the nomenklatura bargainingone issue at a time. by that they can never get R as long as the nomenklatura retains the Knowing to decide policy, the neformaly should be willing to accept G. On the right other hand,the nomenklatura must fear thatif it rejectsG, the neformalyand will resolve theirdifferencesandformthe coalitionat or close to cooperatives in point R. Such a coalition wouldbe able to mobilize moreparticipants street demonstrationsand strikes than the neformaly along any single dimension, and consequently it might extract more far-reachingconcessions from the nomenklatura threatenthe destructionof the system whose privilegesthey or Thus G is an issue package attractive both the nomenklatura its to and enjoy. popularopposition (the neformalyand cooperatives)by bundlingthe diverse issue dimensionsinto a single all-or-nothing choice which all actorspreferto their availablealternatives. One obvious question is why the nomenklatura neformaly could not and This comprosimply convergeon a bargainat G, dispensingwith Gorbachev. mise would requirethe neformaly and cooperativesto organize themselves into a national coalition, or party,behind Yeltsin or some other leader, who would conductthe bargainingwith the nomenklatura. answeris straightOne As formationof a rivalpoliticalpartywas illegal untilFebruary1990, forward. a bargainingpartnerfor the nomenklatura could not emerge. Yeltsinhimself

296 remaineda member of the CommunistPartyCentralCommittee,subject to its discipline, until July 1990. The nomenklatura claimed an exclusive right to act as the sole institutionorganizedacrossissues. Its spokesmendenied the existence of any "otherpolitical force capable of ... resistingthe centrifugal tendencies in society" (Kriuchkovin Pravda, 5 Nov. 1989; cf. Ligachev, 9 Dec. 1989). What made Gorbachevindispensablewas a combinationof his assiduous effort to keep himself acceptableto as many groups as possible, and their reluctanceor inabilityto negotiatedirectlywith each other. can offer policies Alternatively,ratherthan accept G, the nomenklatura like those representedby the point Q in the figure. These offers disruptthe consensus among the neformalyin favor of Gorbachev'sissue package.The ecology-minded groupspreferQ to G, and Q is no worse thanthe minimum the ethnic-mindedgroups could extract.Shepsle pointedout that by forcing considerationof issues one at a time, germanenessrules in Congress could like preventthe considerationof alternatives Q, therebystabilizingthe policy (Shepsle, 1979). But in the Soviet context,no ruleprohibitsthe nomenklatura from offering Q, and indeed some officials' speeches did offer concessions on ecology that seemed intendedto break up alliances between ecological neformalyand ethnic separatists(for an example, see the next section). In the abstract,it would appear that, if the neformaly and cooperatives conservativeoppoGorbachev's remainedpredominantly single-issuegroups,4 nents should have been able to counterhis centriststrategyby offering confor cessions on selected policy issues to some of the democratsin return those democrats' departurefrom the democraticcoalition.5 Gorbachevsought to guardagainst attemptsto buy off key actorson a given issue dimension and thus reduce the size of the coalition pushing for reformby insisting that his proposals being treatedas a complete package. By proposingmovement in the direction of reform along several dimensions at once, claiming that any proposed reform would fail unless it was accompaniedby enactmentof all bids to the rest, he offeredall the neformalyan alternative the nomenklatura's to divide them. The response of the neformalyto the choice between Gorselective concessions dependedon bachev's packageand the nomenklatura's the neformalymemberships'relativetrustof Gorbachevand otherPolitburo members. Our model differs from explanationsof perestroikathat rely on as universal public antagonismto the nomenklatura, in our model even a slight "generalizedbenefit of the doubt"for the proponentof the issue package can be shown to be sufficientto safeguardthe package against selective concessions - a crucialpoint given the rapiddwindlingof Gorbachev's public supportduring 1989 (see Feld and Grofman,1991).6

297

3. Rhetoricalnichesand the Sovietbargaininggame

The model we have proposedimplies thatfour rhetoricalniches will be open for occupancy. The first is a niche for an issue-packager(Gorbachev),the second is a nicht for advocates for the status quo who will seek to fight the issue-by-issue delaying actions (the nomenklatura), third is a niche for and cooperatives),and the fourthis a single-issue groups (variousneformaly niche for advocacy of democraticprocedures(Yeltsinand others). In the firstniche, Gorbachevshouldpresentperestroika an issue package. as The purpose of the package is to counteractthe possibility that separate considerationof issues will divide the reformcoalition. He should also find ways to present himself as the center of a political spectrumdefined by the at nomenklatura one end and the democratsat the opposing end. In the second niche, spokesmen for the nomenklaturashould advocate any strategy that moves the bargaintoward N, the best available outcome for the nomenklatura. Their basic strategyshould be to call for considering issues separately,seeking to split the reformcoalition by selective payoffs. Calls for separationof issues can take variousforms, however.For example, nomenklaturaadvocates can call for a slowdown in the pace of reform on some issues while endorsing promptaction on others, or they can demand the prohibitionof some of the more extremistneformalyfor the purposeof moving the center of the political spectrumtowardtheirend by exclusion of the opposite extreme. In the third niche, advocates for the neformaly and cooperatives should advocate a strategy that moves the bargaintowardthe point R. With each groupdemandinga policy at the point on its own dimensionthatcorresponds to R, all the neformaly hope to organize a coalition of minorities that can insist on R. In the fourthniche, democratssuch as Yeltsintry to substitutefor the nonexistentcoalition of neformalyandcooperativesby introduction democratof ic procedures,particularly is majorityvoting. If the nomenklatura unpopular, candidatesfrom the neformalyand cooperativeswill defeat its candidatesin elections. Then a majoritarian legislaturecan adopt R, because the nomenklaturawill no longercontrolpolicy. The advantageof focusing on procedure ratherthan issues in the issues' divisiveness within the neformalyand cooperatives. We now turn to observationof whether Soviet political rhetoric fits into these niches. Of necessity our examples are limited. We believe them to be We representative. focus on the period from January1989, when candidates for the new Congress of People's Deputies were makingelection speeches, throughJune 1990, when decisions by the Congressof the CommunistParty

298 that gravely weakened the organs for leadershipof the nomenklatura, the PolitburoandCentralCommittee,changesthe incentivesfacingthe actors. 3.1. Niche 1: Gorbachev- an issue-packagingcentrist? The model implies that Gorbachev(and his allies) should package issues and explicitly identify themselves with the center. By simplifying multidimensional issue politics, an issue package makes plausible the claims by Gorbachev(and his allies) that they occupy the center of a unidimensional political spectrumwith conservativesat one end andradicaldemocratsat the other. We should begin by noting that the identificationof issue packaging in Gorbachev's rhetoric is complicated by the absence from Russian of any phrase that correspondsprecisely to "issue package."The word for "issue" is "vopros"(literally "question") the word for "package" "paket," and is but would say "paket voprosov."Gorbachevused a variety of words, nobody such as the noun "kompleks" complex), the adjective"vzaimosviazannyi" (a or the adverbs"odnovremenno" (interconnected), (simultaneously)and even "sinkhronno" (synchronously).We could legitimately have translatedany of these phrases as "issue package."Instead the literal translationsbelow undoubtedly seem more ambiguous than they are, because Russia did not present Gorbachevwith the linguistic resourcesto communicatethe idea of an issue package in terms convenientfor translationinto English. When we read passages like his statement,"The policy of perestroikais a system of interconnectedrevolutionary measureswhich can be expectedto accomplish theirgoals only if they are adoptedas a complex"(Pravda,24 Feb. 1989; see also 8 Jan., 27 Mar. 1989; 29 May 1990; MaterialyPlenuma Tsentral'nogo KomitetaKPSS,5-7 Feb. 1990:352), we do not see how to avoidthe inference that Gorbachev was presenting perestroikaas an issue package in which nothingwouldbe accomplishedunless movementon everyissue accompanied movementon any issue. In additionto positive statementsin favor of issue packaging,Gorbachev called attentionto proposalsfor the separation issues andexplicitlyrejected of them: [S]ometimes in our controversiesthe thought is expressed, one way or another,that we can tear some problemout of context, as they say,jump all over it and settle it. I don't thinkthat this is proposedfrom the worst motives. At the same time we know from the past and now from our own experience:as soon as we fall behindin one place, this immediatelyand So seriously affects many otherareasof perestroika. those who still think thatsome problemscan be tornout of contextor can be consideredoutside

299 their linkage with other problems and processes, they, first, are making a mistake themselves, and second, are confusing others,too (Pravda, 31 Mar. 1989). Similarly, When anyone says to us, is it really necessaryto take on so many things? - their opinions can be admittedas correctonly with respect to the fact thatthe burdenof completingmanytasks simultaneously crushing.But is we consider to be without foundationtheir argumentsthat it would be possible to delay political reformand the completion of othertasks and that one should first solve economic problems, feed the people, and so forth.Maybe these ideas are appealingto an uninformed person(Pravda, 8 Jan. 1989). In this last quotation,"solve economic problems" refersto specific proposthat would be advancedover the next year by Nikolai Ryzhkov (head of als the governmentwith its primaryfunction of managingthe economy), while "feed the people" refers to proposalsby Egor Ligachev,whe presided over the Secretariatwhere he bore special responsibilityfor agriculture.7 While Gorbachev most often justified his calls for coordinationacross issues by asserting a substantiveconnection among political and economic reforms, sometimes his criticisms of separatingpolitical change from economic reformwere voiced in termsthatdrewexplicit attentionto the conflict among social interests over reform.He explained that "earlierreforms- in 1953, 1965 and 1966 - perished precisely because as soon as they led to the need for profoundchanges, throughthe political superstructure mechanisms of defense of the old system were immediatelyput into motion, and everythingstopped, fell back into place" (Pravda, 25 May 1990). He urged in participants neformalyorganized"by interests"to unify within the "channel of perestroika," warningthem "againstthe dangerof becoming scattered, of separatinginto groupsof hobbyists,each in its own nook, and losing identity as a powerful force on our society."(Pravda, 16 Nov. 1989; cf. 26 Nov. 1989). Although Gorbachevdid not make explicit referenceto packagingissues in every speech, when he did not, an issue package was often implicit in the macro-structural organizationof his speech. Consider,for example, his speech to the First Congress of People's Deputies, the first nationallegislature chosen in openly contestedelections since 1917. The body of the speech consists of four sections. The first begins with the statementthat economic transformationsare the "foundationof perestroika." The second asserts that these transformations cannot proceed unless accompaniedby political democratization.The third section argues that perestroikais the means to

300 resolution of ethnic problemsfacing the multi-nationalSoviet society. And the fourth section says that perestroikacould neither fail to affect foreign policy nor succeed if the old foreign policy were continued(Pravda,31 May 1989). Gorbachevlocated himself in the political center by balancingcriticisms of democraticextremists with attackson conservativesin the nomenklatura for attemptingto delay perestroika(for example, Pravda, 31 Mar.,27 Apr., 31 May, 10 June, 19 July, 16 Nov., 10 Dec. 1989; 12 Apr., 12, 22 & 25 May 1990; Istvestiia, 28 May 1990). When Gorbachev'sattacks on demothe craticextremistswere not accompanied criticismsof the nomenklatura, by attacksnormallyappearedin the context of discussions of ethnic separatism (Pravda, 16 & 24 Feb., 2 June, 16 Nov. 1989; 15 Feb., 1 June 1990;Istvestiia, 14 Jan. 1990). Gorbachev'sreadinessto join the conservativeson the issue of ethnic separatismfollows naturallyfrom the strategywe have identified. Separationfrom the Soviet Union would have isolated the ethnic neformaly from their allies in the democraticcoalition. Gorbachev'sstrategyof issue packaging worked to move political outcomes towardthe democraticpole, but the withdrawalof the ethnic neformaly,by diminishingthe democratic coalition, would have moved politicaloutcomesbacktowardthe nomenklatura. Not only would be separatists'achievementof theirgoals pull themselves out of the democraticcoalition, but they would also deprivethe democratsof the supportof ecological and otherneformalyin the ethnicrepublics.Consequently,if Gorbachevwas to follow an issue-packagingstrategysuccessfully, ethnic separatismwas as much of threatto him as it was to the nomenklatura advocates. Thus, he welcomed assertion of ethnic interestsbut opposed separatists."We have taken and will firmly hold the course towarddemocratic development of society,"he said. "But we cannot fail to distinguish peaceful demonstrationsand rallies proceeding within constitutionallimits from extremists gatheringsthat provoke inter-ethnicconflicts and terrorize and frightenpeople of otherethnicities.In responseto people and groups of this kind, soft-heartednessand forgiveness are simply fatal and sometimes criminal"(Pravda, 20 Sept. 1989). advocates 3.2. Niche 2: Nomenklatura interests of The model implies that Politburorepresentatives nomenklatura should seek to divide the reformersby threetacticalappeals:for considering of and for issues separately, delay in democratization, for prohibition the more advocates extremistneformaly.A natural place to look for the nomenklatura's in the CommunistParty'sPolitburo,in which most of the twelve members were unsympatheticto Gorbachev'sissue package.9

301 Advocacy of separatingissues (the conservatives'first strategy)took several different forms. As we would have expected, some Politburomembers reformsbut only on the condition that their expressed supportfor particular advocates separatethose reformsfrom otheraspects of the reformdemands, issue areas (such as agrior claimed that special circumstancesin particular culture) necessitated the isolation of those issues from the overall reform package.In addition,some Politburomembersarguedthatindividualpolicies proposedin Gorbachev'sissue packagewere inconsistentwith his otherproimmediate posals, or simply singled out variousindividualissues as requiring attention. Politburoconservativesinsisted that the developmentof separatistmovements among ethnic minorities, dramatizedin some cases by outbreaksof communal violence, be resolved before perestroikacould continue. Gorbachev arguedthat ethnic conflicts could not be settledexcept by continuing his package of reforms, on the grounds that the conflicts originatedin the Soviet state (Istvestiia, 14 suppressionof ethnic rightsby the overcentralized 2 May 1990). In contrast,PolitburomembersVorotnikow, Shcherbitskii, Jan., could not Zaikov,Chebrikov,Ryzhkov and Ligachev arguedthatperestroika withoutaction to maintainthe supremacyof centralinstitutions. proceed had Ligachev said a "seriousblunder" been made when the leadershiphad without "discern[ing]the chief danger"(emphasisin begun democratization and "fatalthreat"posed by "powerfulforces of a nationalist,sepaoriginal) ratist,anti-socialisttrend"which had been "lying in wait"to take advantage of of democratization (chairman (Materialy,5-7 Feb. 1990: 164). Vorotnikov the Russianlegislature)said, "Weclearlylack the strengthfor a simultaneous advancealong all axes. Perhapsit would be worthwhileto think again about effortson the priority, ... decisive, shockelementsof perestroika concentrating It seems thatthe ethnic parameters perestroika of shouldbe viewed precisely throughthe prism of all these problems."10 While Gorbachevconcurredwith calls for firm action against ethnic separatists who were inciting violence, he criticized those who, "speakingof the need for action without delay,"proposed "to reduce the whole job to measuresandputtingout fires"withoutrecognizingthe need to extraordinary or integratean innovativeethnicpolicy into a largerprogram democratization (Pravda, 2 June 1989; cf. 15 Feb., 28 Apr. 1990). for Besides ethnicity,conservativesalso chose the issue of "discipline" their that arguments actionon particularly pressingor criticalproblemsshouldprecede furtherdemocratization. Lack of "discipline"referredto a broadrange of social pathologies - failure to observe contracts,absenteeismfrom work, thefts, bribe-taking,maladministration, crime, summons to civil disobediand violence. A contrast developed between Gorbachevand conserence,

302 vative members of the Politburoon the sequencing of democratization and restorationof discipline. In a series of public speeches, Gorbachevargued that measuresto restorediscipline had alreadybeen tried but had proved to be inadequateby themselves. The only remedy to indisciplinewas a "welldeveloped sense of citizenship"thatcould emergeonly in a democracy.Laws and decrees could maintaindiscipline only if most citizens complied voluntarily,and in any case "abig job of creationof legal norms"by representative institutionslay ahead before the law could accomplish its task (Pravda, 16 Mar. 1989; see 27 Apr., 18 May, 10 June, 20 Sept., 10 Dec. 1989; 9 & 29 May 1990). "We need today above all to use the opportunitiesinherentin Gorbachevsaid, "to introducefirm public orderbased on condemocracy," science [and]to strengthen legality andstatedisciplineon all levels"(Pravda, 7 Nov. 1990; cf. 16 Feb. 1989). While Gorbachevarguedthat the solution to indiscipline was more democracy,PolitburomembersZaikov, Ryzhkov, Shcherbitskiiand Nikonov all arguedthatfurtherdemocratization depended on measures to restore discipline. Zaikov (head of the Moscow party comof mittee) said that "strengthening conscious discipline"was "the very first conditionfor the developmentof democracy"(Pravda, 11 Mar.1989; for the others, see ibid., 8 June, 18 July, 14 Dec. 1989; 29 Feb., 4 Mar. 1989). Togetherwith Ryzhkov and Zaikov (Pravda, 16 June, 21 July 1989; 25 May 1990), both Chebrikov and his replacementat the KGB and later in the Politburo,Kriuchkov,disagreedwith Gorbachev'sview that harsherlaw enforcementcould not succeed unless accompaniedby furtherdemocratization and legal reforms.Chebrikovsaid: "We alreadyhave quite a few good laws which really reflect the will of the people ... The essence of the matter lies ... in the practiceof applyingthe legislation..."(Pravda, 11 Feb. 1989; see this also 28 June, 9 July, 2 Sept. 1989; 8 Feb. 1990). Gorbachevinterpreted disagreementfor the public, claiming that the issue of discipline was being raised to impede democratization."Amongsome people, of course, talk of discipline is nothingbut yearningfor the old days. This exists for sure, comrades. What can I say: he talks about discipline, but thinks about the strong hand, a returnto the rule thatonce it has been said, do it and don't discuss it. This is present,for sure"(Pravda, 31 May 1989). Agricultural policy was anotherareathatconservatives soughtto severfrom the reformpackage. PolitburomembersLigachev and Nikonov, who shared demanded the responsibilityfor agriculture, arguedthatspecialcircumstances isolation of agricultural from Gorbachev'soverallpackageof reforms policy designed to increase individualautonomyrelativeto institutionsdirectedby nomenklatura appointees.Both Nikonov and Ligachev arguedthat improvements in the food supply were preconditionsto furtherreforms.As Nikonov said, the food problemdeserved attention"at the front of the line" and "can

303 least be deferred"(Pravda,26 Feb. 1989). Ligachevcalled the food issue "the very firstpriority"(Materialy,5-7 Feb. 1990: 163; cf. Pravda, 21 July 1989). Ligachevcriticizedproposalsto improvefood suppliesby "abolishingthe collective and state farms, distributing land to the peasants,and denationalizing the land"as a first step to the "denationalization all means of production." of He rejectedthese proposalsas inappropriate conditionsprevalentin Soviet to farming:"theoverwhelmingmajorityof peasantsdo not wantto takethe land and leave the collective and state farms"(Pravda, 7 July 1989; cf. 18 June 1990). Accordingly,he and Nikonov gave a series of speeches during 1989 in which they advocated an increase of investmentin agricultureand food the processing and othermeasuresto strengthen existing farmorganizations, controlledby nomenklatura appointees,instead of Gorbachev'sproposalsto make farmersand food processorsmore autonomous(Pravda,7 &9 Feb., 2, 7 & 16 Apr., 17 May, 16, 17 & 30 June 1989). memebersof the Politburo Ecology was yet anotherareawhereconservative indicated a willingness to push for reform, but only if ecological issues were separatedfrom broaderreform questions. PolitburomembersZaikov, Chebrikov,Nikonov, Ligachev and Vorotnikovall portrayedthemselves as welcoming public pressuresfor action on the ecological issue.11In a speech in the former republic of Moldavia, Chebrikov(the formerKGB chief now assignedto legal reformandlaw enforcement)encouragedlocal public outcry of about ecological damage caused by the centralization decision-makingin far from informationabout the consequences of environmentally Moscow, harmfulpolicies. But, at the same time, Chebrikovcalled on the ecological movementto divorceits demandsfromthe issue of ethnicrights,insistingthat all decisions must remainsubjectto "obligatorycoordinationwith all-union interestsaccordingto the principlesof socialist internationalism (Pravda, ... 11 Feb. 1989). Politburo members Ryzhkov and Vorotnikovtried to limit the scope of democratizationby claiming that Gorbachevmust choose between his proposals for economic reformsand for democratization. They endorsedin the abstractboth democratization Gorbachev'sproposalfor "social reorienand tationof the economy,"which referred a shift of resourcesfromproduction to of investment goods to consumer goods, food and housing. But, Ryzhkov said, "The economy is incapable of operatingand developing favorablyin conditions of a democracyof public rallies [mitingovoidemokratii]."l2 Opposition to extremism characterizedstatementsby Ligachev, Zaikov, Vorotnikov,Chebrikov, Ryzhkov, and Shcherbitskii,who all warned that extremists were taking advantageof the democraticliberties introducedat Gorbachev'sinitiative to pursue anti-socialistgoals. Ligachev said, "Under the cover of democracyand 'glasnost,'extremist,anti-socialistandnationalist

304 elements have become more active. They advance slogans againstthe Party ..." (Pravda, 17 June 1989). He and other conservativescalled for defense of the CommunistPartyagainst attacksby "darkforces"and "demagogues" who were tryingto mobilize the neformalyagainstPartyrule. Ryzhkov said, "All kinds of scum has risen to the surfaceon the wave of healthyprocesses in the society. It does harm,and we do not reactto it in any way. Democratic leagues, rallies of a dubious orientation- to much of this we just silently consent" (Pravda, 21 July 1989; see also 21 Jan., 11 Feb., 2, 3 & 12 Mar., 17, 28 & 30 June, 2 July, 9 Aug., 14 Dec. 1989; 8 Feb., 25 & 30 May 1990; Materialy, 5-7 Feb. 1990: 119, 165; ibid., 11, 14 & 16 Mar. 1990: 91-95, 130). meritof all threetacticswas Fromthe conservatives'viewpoint,a particular consistency with their claim that they fully supportedGorbachev'sprogram of perestroika and were disagreeing with him only over minor points of implementation.In this way they confusedthe issue betweenthemselves and Gorbachev,both in the eyes of many Soviet citizens (Cherniaev,1993: 319322) and for some foreign analysis (Surovell, 1991). By undermining public who bore the blame for actionswhich may have been supportfor Gorbachev, instigatedby conservativessuch as the April 1989 Tbilisi massacre(Sobchak, 1991: 80-104), public confusion limited his ability to distancehimself from nomenklatura support. 3.3. Niche 3: Neformaly,cooperatives,and strikers Neformaly,cooperativesand strikerscan exert more pressureon the nomenklatura if they can cooperate, and therefore our model implies that their strategy should be to build local and national coalitions of groups pursuing differentparticularinterests.In some locales this strategysucceeded, in others it failed, but conflicts of interestamong diverse groupspreventedthe emergence of any encompassingall-unioncoalition. Most "reform"groups (neformaly and cooperatives)organizedarounda "single issue" about which they had intense concerns. Neformaly pursued ecological restoration, tolerance of cultural practices or religious observance, ethnic rights, rehabilitationof victims of political repression,feminism, rights of militaryofficers, and otherparticularistic goals. Cooperatives increasedincomes for theirmembers.Strikerssoughtwage increases, sought occupationalsafety measures,improvementsin the supply of foodstuffs and consumer goods, and control of the workplace.These pressuresfor change on particularisticissues raised a variety of more general political question, in including the expansion of rights of participation politics with the associated freedoms of expression and association, the developmentof market institutions to replace the command economy, regulationof the marketto

305 safeguardthe environmentand to maintainsocial welfare, and devolution of power from the central governmentto the ethnic republics, especially Russia. Although some of the neformaly agreed on the need for change to be achievedfrom below, their ability to coalesce in favorof democraticreforms was hamperedby the conflicts of interestsnaturalwithin a movementcomposed of single-issue groups. These conflicts are evident both from survey research and from direct observationof the neformaly.Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) conclude from theiropinion surveythatproponentsof political democracywere actuallymore likely to oppose thanto welcome a reduction of of the state'srole in the economy,while proponents economicreformswere not necessarily proponentsof the right to strike or protest (Sobchak, 1991: 860-861). These contradictionsin mass public opinion found reflection in conflicts among organized neformaly.Some ecological neformaly opposed marketthatwouldpermitbusinesscooperatives'demandsfor an unregulated es to do furtherdamageto the environment. Strikingcoal minersattackednot the official ministriesbut also the formationof cooperativesin food seronly vice and retailing (Mandel, 1991). Russiannationalistneformalydemanded preservationof the Union, while Russian democraticclubs often welcomed the separatistaspirationsof neformalyin the ethnic republics. In the late 1980s, local neformalybegan to combine into coalitions, often called "clubs"or "fronts," combiningvarioussingle-issuegroupsandintended to presenta broad-gaugeoppositionto the bureaucracy. Some groups developed full-fledgedpolitical platformsspanningvirtuallythe entirespectrumof ideological principles (monarchism,anarchism,christiandemocracy,social democracy,nationalism,fascism), but the membersof these political groups were the most likely to suffer arrest for their activities. The single-issue neformaly were much more likely to encounterofficial tolerance. Despite tendenciestowardpoliticizationand coalition, the neformalyremainedorganized only at a local level, failing in an August 1988 attemptto organizean umbrellaorganizationspanningthe Union or even the RussianRepublic. The experience of Moscow political clubs gives a sense of the difficulties experiencedin organizingcoalitions amongthe neformaly.In the fall of 1986 a group called the Club for Social Initiatives,KSI, formed with the support of the newspaperKomsomol'skaia Pravda. During 1987 KSI encourageddiscussions among other neformaly leading to the creation of a Federationof Socialist Public Clubs. But those groupsready to take an open standagainst socialism as practicedin the Soviet Union, togetherwith S. Skvortsov'sFund for Social Initiatives,split off from the Federation. Then two Marxistswithin the Federationtook their followers out to form a groupcalled "SocialistInitiative."By the summer1988 forty-six of these groupsthencoalesced againin

306 the Moscow PopularFront,which then built an electoralalliance with a second coalition called the Moscow Associationof Voters.These in turnbecame the basis for a RussianPopularFront,formedin the fall of 1989 but encompassing only about fifty groups (Berezovskii and Krotov,1990: 88), and for a competing Interregional Association of DemocraticOrganizations (Semina, 1990: 164-165; Ivanitskii,1990: 287). While the Moscow PopularFront scored dramaticvictories in the March 1990 elections, the forty-six groups participatingin it encompassedonly a tiny fractionof the city's neformaly; of for example, representatives six hundredneformalyattendeda conference on ecology sponsoredby the city's communistpartycommittee(Pravda, 21 June 1989). Popularfrontsoutsidethe RussianRepublic,like the well-known Sajudis in Lithuaniaand Rukh in Ukraine,were more stable and managed to combine more single-issue concerns under one roof (particularly linking ethnic independencewith ecology), butby virtueof theirambitionsfor independence from the USSR, their formationwas antitheticalto a Union-wide organization. While the political clubs schismed and fused, private cooperatives outside the state sector found themselves defendingtheirvery existence against They needed to lobpressure from the governmentand Partybureaucracy. in the form of paying bribes) for permissionto operate.As a by (normally nationalspokesmanfor the cooperativemovementtold an interviewer,especially during 1990 "cooperativesexperiencedmerciless persecution... they were annihilatedin batches, prohibited,robbed ...." Under these pressures, the cooperativeswere able to form a nationallobby called the USSR League in of Associated Cooperatives(Kruglianskaia Istrestiia,7 Aug. 1991; Illesh' in andRudnerin ibid., 5 Mar.1990;Matukovskii ibid., 12 June 1990) buttheir association did not reach beyond the cooperativesto other kinds of interest groups.13 The failure to form a nationwidecoalition of neformaly,cooperativesand strikers may also have been an adaptiveresponse to the danger of police repressionof which the popularmovementremainedconscious. Laba(1991), following Piven and Cloward (1979), argues that mass movements facing police repression are better advised to avoid consolidation into a bureaucratized organization,because dispersion of authoritymakes their leaders harderfor police to identifyandtheirgroupseasier to reconstitute afterpolice actions. 3.4. Niche 4: Yeltsin and other democrats Ourmodel proposesthatone way to deal with incompatiblereformdemands is to emphasize the goal of majorityrule ratherthan specify issue positions, in especially since issues were divisive amongthe participants neformalyand

307 cooperativeswho were most eager for change. Yeltsin's goal is to emerge as a focal point for coordination(acting as a leader in the sense suggested by he Calvert(1992) of public pressureon the nomenklatura; attemptsto direct attentionto common interestsby downplayingdivisive particulars. issues in favorof a generalizedsupport Some reformersavoidedparticular thattook the formof a focus on procedure. procedural The for democratization focus and its relationshipto issue conflicts dividingthe mass movementwas evident to Soviet observers.V. Ginzburg,a seniorAcademicianandPeople's Deputy who was a Gorbachev adherent,wrote: "I am impressed that the arousedactivity of the masses, or in any case of a noticeableportionof the populationand of the deputiesof variousranks,is takingthe form of endless debates on questions of procedure..." (Istvestiia, 17 May 1990).14Another observer commented, "The liberals, including those of 'neformaly' origin, standin these disputes in defense of the absolutewill of the majority..."as a means of reconciling "conflictinginterests"(Mareeva,1990: 78). reformover stands Yeltsin'sspeeches displaythis preferencefor procedural on issues. Evidence about his rhetoric before the August coup is sparse, since as Yeltsin himself commented after his election as chairmanof the Russian Republic legislature, the official media had subjected him to an Yeltsin addressedmany of his speeches to street "information blockade."15 and official newspapersdid not recordtheirtexts. Nonetheless, what rallies, is striking about his available speeches is his focus on procedureand his avoidance of the contentious issues that were dividing the opposition to the nomenklatura. Soviet commentatorsoccasionally remarkedon Yeltsin's reticence about issues. The writerDaniil Granincommented,"Some readers will not be satisfied by Yeltsin's too scanty, rather undeveloped remarks ... about where we are going ... I think this self-restraintis understandable (LiteraturnaiaGazeta, 5 Sept. 1990; see also Tretiakovin Moscow News, 1989; No. 16). In each available text, Yeltsin calls for various proceduralchanges that would make possible majorityrule. In a speech in Perm in December 1988 he affirmedthe "needto make the new electoralsystem as directas possible" and urged "nationwidereferendums" "the genuine expressionof the will as of the entire people" (Trehub in Report on the USSR, 13 Jan. 1989: 68; see also Report, 24 Feb. 1989: 64). In his electoral platform of March 1989, Yeltsin wrote, "It is necessary to struggle against the existing elitist stratumvia the transferof powerto elected bodies ..."(quotedin bureaucratic Lane, 1990). Addressingthe first Congress of People's Deputies in May, he called for introduction a "constitutional by path"of a procedurefor choosing the "leaderof the state among alternativecandidaciesby general, equal and directelections"andfor "arealtransfer powerfromthe partyto the Soviets" of

308 Otchet,Vol. II, DeputatovSSSR,Stenograficheskii (PervyiS"ezd Narodnykh Moscov: IzdanieVerkhovnogoSoveta SSSR, 1989: 43-49). for After winning election to the Congress,he begancampaigning adoption of the multi-party system. In a radio interview he called for nationwide discussions leadingto its enactment(Report,17 Mar.1989: 32). In December Yeltsin repeated his appeal from the floor of the Congress after publicly issuing a summons for a general strike in favor of multipleparties (Report, the 15, 22 & 29 Dec. 1989: 34-35). Interviewed next month,Yeltsinsaid, "We must recognize in the constitutionthe opportunityfor any political, socialpolical, social organizationto participateon equal terms in the life of the In countryand to strugglefor its authorityon the basis of its own platform." the same interview he explained that "moredemocratic,radicaldecisions" were the purposeof his campaignfor a seat in the Russianparliament.16 Their priority concern for majorityrule was the reason that Yeltsin and his allies earnedthe title "democrats." a rhetoricthatcoupled attackson By while avoidwith demandsfor thoroughdemocratization the nomenklatura controversialissues, Yeltsin focused ordinarycitizens' attentionon their ing sharedexperience,nottheirconflictinginterests."PeopleidentifywithYeltsin. He is a victim of dislike on the part of higher-ups- who of us hasn't been in the same position? And he is being slighted for refusingto look for their approval- who hasn'tdreamedof doing this?And the mainthing- he speaks with everyone, those below and those above, in a similarway and on equal terms, smashing the hierarchicalbarrierswhich everyone, especially those below, is fed up with"(Tretiakovin MoscowNews, 1989: No. 16). 4. Discussion If the availability of rationalpolitical strategiesto actors depended on the presence of established institutionsthat structurepolitical choices, rational theories should not be capable of classifying the actors' observedbehaviors when institutionalproceduresare in flux. In Soviet politics between 1985 and 1991, grass-rootsreformerstried the well-known strategyof forming a coalition of intenseminorities,butthey failed becausethey were mostly organized in single-issue pressuregroups (the neformaly),their issue concerns were diverseand conflicting,and on any given issue these groups'bargaining memFor position was weakerthanthatof the nomenklatura. reform-minded bers of the elite, two alternativestrategieswere available.First, they could of downplay specific issues in favor of advocatingdemocratization decision second, they could try to puttogetheran issue packageof reforms procedures; with somethingin it for everyoneand emphasizethe need for this issue package to be treatedas a unifiedwhole. We haveprovidedsome evidence thatthe

309 the Yeltsinchose the firststrategyandGorbachev second.Politburoopponents of reform respondedby advocatingconsiderationof issues one at a time, a strategyknown to be suitable for blocking or delaying reformsby dividing the reformcoalition. In the presence of opposition,none of these actorstried the supra-majoritarian vetoes over change. strategythatwidely distributed Acceptance of our model depends on observing that Gorbachevlacked a the a had majorityin the Politburo.If his program commanded stablemajority, would have enabled his institutionalrules in force within the nomenklatura by majorityto introducedemocraticinstitutions decree.He wouldhavelacked any reasonto adopta complicatedstrategyof issue packagingor to occupy a and centristposition between conservativemembersof the nomenklatura the more extremereformgroups.Thus we shouldhave foundthatanti-packaging (and anti-democratic)strategies figured in the public statementsof at least six of the twelve 1989 Politburomembers. In fact, the evidence provided in the previous section shows that seven of the Politburo'stwelve members advocated issue separation(Ligachev, Chebrikov,Shcherbitskii,Ryzhkov, Vorotnikov, Zaikov,Nikonov). We believe we can reject an alternative explanationfor this pattern,namely that issue separationwas a result of division of responsibilitiesamong Politburomembers,with each advocatingthe priorityof his own responsibilities and only the GeneralSecretaryresponsibleto providea comprehensive program.The 1989 Politburoincluded a GeneralSecretary,eight issue specialists and three persons with territorial We responsibilities.17 have quoted some commentsby issue specialists advocatingtop priorityfor theirareas of speresponsibility.But amongthe conservatives,we also findthe agricultural cialist Ligachevsaying thatethnicconflictdeservedtoppriority, economic the specialistRyzhkovemphasizinglaw andorder,andthe law andorderspecialist Chebrikovcalling for priorityattention ecological issues. Meanwhile,all to certhreeconservativeswith territorial responsibilitiesalso call for separating tainissues, even thoughthey arenot issue specialists.Countering Gorbachev's calls for pursuingall reformsconcurrently, each conservative(issue specialist or not) demandsthat otherreformsproposedby Gorbachevbe deferreduntil after resolution of the issue in question. Finally, all four Politburomembers whom we identify as Gorbachevsupporterswere issue specialists, but their speeches (which we have not presented)advocate Gorbachev'spackage of reforms.The decision whetherto advocate issue separationor packagingis an indication of a Politburomember'spolitical identityas a conservativeor reformer,not a consequence of issue specialization. as Studiesof perestroika often view Yeltsinandthe nomenklatura anchoring the left and right sides of a single dimension, with Gorbachevmoving over time from right to left (although with some reversals)as Yeltsin's support

310 grew and the conservatives'following diminished.While we sharethis view, it is only compatible with Finifterand Mickiewicz's evidence of a complex multi-dimensionalsocial reality if we can specify how multiple dimensions became reducedto one. While the FinifterandMickiewiczevidencehas been challenged, disagreementsabouthow specific issues relateto largerconcerns areprecisely whatpolitics, in the formof issue packagingandissue separation, is is about. A crucialelement in the explanationof the politics of perestroika choices: to separate rhetoricthatoffereda pairof alternative binary leadership or to package issues, and to package issues or to decide them by majority rule. If the conservatives'rejection of the issue package would have forced them to accept the choice between it and majorityrule, while the reformers' rejection of the issue package would have forced them to accept the choice could occupythe centristposition Gorbachev between it andissue separation, often ascribedto him. Both Gorbachev'sissue packagingandYeltsin'sdemandsfor majorityrule helped to counteractthe tendencyfor the movementof grass-rootsreformers to fragments.In this mannerthe interactionbetween their strategieshelped to sustainthe oppositionbetween a popularmovementfor reformand official conservatism that stabilized the Soviet polity while its institutionswere in flux. At the same time, however, their strategiesalso combined to impede to stoppedresisting completionof the transition majorityrule.HadGorbachev Yeltsin's demands for majorityrule, he would have eliminatedthe pair of binary alternativesin favor of a single choice between majorityrule and the While we have not issue-by-issue decisions offered by the nomenklatura. thatraisesquestionsbeyondthe providedthe evidence for a furtherargument scope of this paper,we would suggest that issue packaginginitially worked suffereda general inability or for Gorbachevbecause the Partybureaucrats to communicatewith the single-issue groups.This reluctance unwillingness limited their ability to circumventGorbachevby makingtheirown deal with the pressuregroups,as did the single-issuepressuregroups'skepticismabout offers of side deals. the sincerityof bureaucrats' The ability to build a broad coalition for reformcapable of withstanding attemptsto split it into its component (issue-specific) parts was critical to the process of democratization the Soviet Union. Studies of transitionsto in in many countrieshave relied on the same tripartite classification democracy of elite actors as hard-liners,liberalizers,or democratizers,and we suspect that the coalition-buildingtactics we have identifiedmay have played a role in these cases too.

311 Notes
1. Such a strategymay still succeed if enough actorsprovide a certainbenefit of the doubt to the position advocatedby the centristleaderandrefuse to considerproposalsto deviate from that leader's policies unless the expected gain is substantial(Feld and Grofman, 1991). 2. The implications of Figure 1 below can readily be generalizedto more than two issue dimensions, to include, for example, the marketreformssought by the cooperatives.For simplicity, and withoutreal loss of generality,we will develop our exposition in only two dimensions. thatall neformalywere single3. While we have simplifiedthe representation pretending by issue pressure groups with ideal points located along one of the axes, modifying this of oversimplificationdoes not affect the basic structure the model as long as some neformaly are indifferentto policy change along other issue dimensions, or would normally focus all theirenergy only for change on the policy dimensionaboutwhich they are most concerned. 4. See discussion in the next section of their failureto build nationwidecoalitions. issue wouldacceptselective concessions 5. If the neformalymost concernedwith a particular on that issue in returnfor withdrawingfrom the democraticcoalition, the nomenklatura would gain. The willingness of membersof these neformalyto join mass protestactions would diminish, weakening the ability of the democraticcoalition to mobilize protesters. Diminutionin the scale of protestwould force Gorbachev'sissue packagedown andto the rightalong otherdimensions.Hopingto breakup the generaldemocraticcoalition,various conservativestriedthe tactic of proposingselective concessions to particular single-issue groups (especially on the issue of ecology), but theirsuccess was limited. See below. 6. Acceptance of Q, in returnfor defecting from the alliance with neformalylocated along otherdimensions (see Figure 1), requiresthatthe ecology-mindedgroupsandotherneforthat maly not distrustassurancesby the nomenklatura the policies symbolized by Q will in fact be forthcoming.If the neformalysee Gorbachevas more crediblethanthe leaders of the nomenklatura,they may prefer his package even if it offers less. In the Soviet case Gorbachev'sissue package would have been safe against selective concessions if proposals by the nomenklatura faced a negative benefit of the doubt, in the form of To widespreaddistrustof its representatives. protectGorbachev'sissue package against offers like Q, a bias againstthe nomenklatura need not be universalamongthe population. The Feld and Grofman(1991) findings requireonly that a sufficient minority of voters reject the blandishmentsof challengers,with the adequacyof the minoritydependenton the ideological distance between the incumbent and the center of the policy space. If Gorbachevoccupied such a centralposition, a small numberof neformalymemberswith anti-nomenklatura bias would have been sufficientto protect him against challenges at points like Q. 7. For an instance of Ligachev's proposalwithin one month of Gorbachev'sstatement,see Pravda, 7 Feb. 1989; for anotherGorbachevrebuttal,16 Mar.1989. 8. We certainly do not wish to claim that Gorbachev'sadvocacyof an issue package never allowed him to emphasizedifferentpartsof the packageatdifferenttimes. As he explained, "In the process of transformations there may be stages, priorities,one or anotherrate of But is change - in otherwords, full synchronization out of the question." at the same time, he made it clear that "(p)erestroika should move consistently along all axes. We cannot allow a big gap in the execution of the planned measures"(Pravda, 16 Nov. 1989; cf. Materialy, 5-7 Feb. 1990: 352. in 9. During 1989 and until its transformation July 1990, the Politburocomprised twelve voting members(includingGorbachev).Gorbachevlackedcontrolof the Politburodespite having been able to secure the retirementof the most conservativemembersof the 1985 Politburo.In September1989, the CentralCommittee'sacceptanceof the resignationsof

312
three of the remainingconservatives(Chebrikov,Nikonov and Shcherbitskii)seemingly titled the Politburo balance in Gorbachev'sfavor. But one of their replacementsalso revealedhimself as a conservative(Kriuchkov, KGB chief) andthe othertwo (Ivashko the and Masliukov),while clearly less conservativethatthe figuresthey replaced,were at best uncertainadherentsof democratization.See Pravda, 3 May, 30 June 1990; cd. Sakwa, 1990: 16-20. Materialy, 19-20 Sept. 1989: 86-87, emphasis added;for additionalsimilar statements by Vorotnikovand other conservatives,see Pravda, 11 Feb., 1 4 & 11 Mar., 16 June, 21 July, 2 Sept. 1989; 25 May 1990. For statementsby the last three,see Pravda,26 Feb.,2 July 1989;30 June 1990;Sovetskaia Rossiia, 23 May 1990. Pravda, 25 May 1990; see also ibid., 14 Dec. 1989, Materialy,5-7 Feb. 1990: 120; for Vorotnikov,Materialy, 19-20 Sept. 1989: 86; for an attackon this position by Politburo member Sliun'kov, see Materialy,5-7 Feb. 1990: 218. We have drawn this discussion of grass-movementsfrom Hosking, Aves and Duncan (1992); Maliutin(1988); Sakwa (1990): 203-218; White (1990): 39-40; Brovkin(1991); Lane (1990): 100. Ginzburg'scomment echoed a statementby Gorbachevthree weeks earlier(Pravda, 28 Apr. 1990). Ogonek, 16-23 Mar. 1991. See also SovetskaiaMolodezh' (Riga), translatedin FBISSOV-90-021, 31 Jan. 1990; for instances of censorship,see Reporton the USSR,31 Mar. 1989: 32, and comparethe TASS reportof 31 July 1989 with Izvestiia's summaryon 1 August of Yeltsin's statementto the SupremeSoviet. KommunisLiteraturnaiaGazeta, 24 Jan. 1990. See also XIX Vsesoiuznaiakonferentsiia ticheskoiPartiiSovetskogoSoiuza: Stenograficheskii Otchet,Vol. 2 (Moskow:Politizdat), 57; Pravda, 17 Dec. 1989; 6 Feb., 8 July 1990; SovietskaiaRossiia, 25 & 30 May 1990; Ogonek, 16-23 Mar. 1990; and videotapeof Yeltsin's addressto the rally in front of the Moskva hotel, 4 Feb. 1990. As conservativeswe identify the two agricultural specialists(LigachevandNikonov), one issue specialist with responsibilityfor the economy (Ryzhkov),one issue specialist with responsibility for law and order (Chebrikov),and three with territorialresponsibilities those we identify as Gorbachevsupporterswere (Zaikov, Scherbitskii,and Vorotnikov); all issue specialists,in foreignpolicy (YakovlevandShevardnadze), ideology (Medvedev), or the economy (Sliun'kov).

10. 11. 12.

13.

14. 15.

16.

17.

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