JUSTICE VILLARAMA CASES FROM 2010-2011 http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com Zacaria A. Candao, et al v. People of the Philippines and Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.

186659710, October 19, 2011. Malversation; elements. The following elements are essential for conviction in malversation cases: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (4) he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. All the foregoing elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution in this case. Petitioners have not rebutted the legal presumption that, with the Disbursing Officers (Haron) failure to account for the illegally withdrawn amounts covered by the subject checks when demanded by the COA, they misappropriated and used the said funds for their personal benefit. Zacaria A. Candao, et al v. People of the Philippines and Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 186659-710, October 19, 2011. Jhorizaldy Uy vs. Centro Ceramica Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 174631. October 19, 2011. Dismissal; illegal. Resignation is defined as the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by personal reasons to disassociate themselves from their employment. It must be done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. In this case, the evidence on record suggested that petitioner did not resign; he was orally dismissed by Sy. The crucial factor is the verbal order directly given by Sy, the company president, for petitioner to immediately turn over his accountabilities. It is this lack of clear, valid and legal cause, not to mention due process that made his dismissal illegal, warranting reinstatement and the award of backwages. Moreover, the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal just three weeks later is difficult to reconcile with voluntary resignation. Had petitioner intended to voluntarily relinquish his employment after being unceremoniously dismissed by no less than the company president, he would not have sought redress from the NLRC and vigorously pursued this case against the respondents. Jhorizaldy Uy vs. Centro Ceramica Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 174631. October 19, 2011. Briccio Ricky A. Pollo vs. Chairperson Karina Constantino-David, et al., G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011. Right to privacy; unreasonable search and seizure. This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct. Petitioner questions the legality of the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent. He said this search violated his constitutional right to privacy. The right to privacy is a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Relying on US jurisprudence, the Court noted that the existence of privacy right involves a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). Once the right is established, the next inquiry is whether the search alleged to have

violated such right was reasonable. This proceeds from the principle that the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III, is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of unreasonable searches and seizures. In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, the court needs to balance the invasion of the employees legitimate expectations of privacy against the governments need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace. A public employers intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable. Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose. The search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct. Applying the above standards and principles, the Court then addressed the following issues: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the respondent Civil Service Commission Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer, reasonable in its inception and scope? Here, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include: (1) the employees relationship to the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item. The Court answered the first issue in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC, he normally would have visitors in his office. Even assuming that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, the same is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers. The CSC had implemented a policy that puts its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers. Under this policy, the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that computer resources were used only for legitimate business purposes. On the second issue, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in connection with an investigation of work-related misconduct. Under the facts obtaining, the Court held that the search conducted on petitioners computer was justified at its inception and in scope. Briccio Ricky A. Pollo vs. Chairperson Karina Constantino-David, et al., G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011.

Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla v. Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua. A.C. No. 6655. October 11, 2011. Attorney; misconduct. With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did not state the true consideration of the sale so as to reduce the capital gains and other taxes due on the transaction, respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful statement in a public document for an unlawful purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount much lower than the actual price paid for the property sold, respondent abetted in depriving the Government of the right to collect the correct taxes due. Not only did respondent assist the contracting parties in an activity aimed at defiance of the law, he likewise displayed lack of respect for and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment. By notarizing such illegal and fraudulent document, he is entitling it full faith and credit upon its face, which it obviously does not deserve considering its nature and purpose. Respondents actions violated not only Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Responsibility, but pertinent sections of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice as well. Thus, respondent is meted the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years. Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla v. Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua. A.C. No. 6655. October 11, 2011. Tomas P. Tan, Jr. v. Atty. Haide V. Gumba. A.C. No. 9000. October 5, 2011. Attorney; grave misconduct. Respondent attorney was found to have violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondents actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money to her through the use of documents and false representations and by taking advantage of her education and complainants ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by complainant, he would have never granted the loan to respondent were it not for respondents misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the property and that complainant could register the open deed of sale if respondent fails to pay the loan. By her misdeed, respondent has eroded not only complainants perception of the legal profession but the publics perception as well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for which she may be disciplined. Tomas P. Tan, Jr. v. Atty. Haide V. Gumba. A.C. No. 9000. October 5, 2011. People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog y Ramin, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011. Abuse of superior strength. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used excessive force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to his unarmed victim. As aptly observed by the appellate court: it has long been established that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressors natural strength over that of the victim, considering the

momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog y Ramin, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011. Engr. Jose E. Cayanan vs. North Star International Travel, Inc. G.R. No. 172954. October 5, 2011 Check; issuance for consideration. Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration which may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, it is presumed that every party to an instrument acquires the same for a consideration or for value. As petitioner alleged that there was no consideration for the issuance of the subject checks, it devolved upon him to present convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption and prove that the checks were in fact issued without valuable consideration. Sadly, however, petitioner has not presented any credible evidence to rebut the presumption, as well as North Stars assertion, that the checks were issued as payment for the US$85,000 petitioner owed. Engr. Jose E. Cayanan vs. North Star International Travel, Inc. G.R. No. 172954. October 5, 2011 City Government of Tuguegarao, represented by Robert P. Guzman v. Randolph S. Ting, G.R. Nos. 192435-36, September 14, 2011. Appeal; legal personality to appeal Sandiganbayans dismissal of case. The crucial issue in this case concerns petitioners legal personality to challenge before the Supreme Court the dismissal by the Sandiganbayan of the criminal cases against respondent. Petitioner is not the proper party to file the present action. Section 4 (c) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, clearly provides that in all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. A private complainant in a criminal case before the Sandiganbayan is allowed to appeal only the civil aspect of the criminal case after its dismissal by said court. Petitioner is not even the offended party or private complainant in the main case. While petitioners name was included in the caption of the cases as private complainant during the preliminary investigation and re-investigation proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman, it is the City of Tuguegarao which suffered damage as a consequence of the subject purchase of lands by respondent and, hence, is the private complainant in the main case. City Government of Tuguegarao, represented by Robert P. Guzman v. Randolph S. Ting, G.R. Nos. 192435-36, September 14, 2011. Alert Security and Investigation Agency, Inc., et al. vs. Saidali Pasawilan, et al., G.R. No. 182397. September 14, 2011. Termination; illegal dismissal. In the case at bar, respondent security guards were relieved from their posts because they filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against their employer for money claims due to underpayment of wages. The Supreme Court found that this was not a valid cause for dismissal. The Labor Code enumerates several just and authorized

causes for a valid termination of employment. An employee asserting his right and asking for minimum wage is not among those causes. Termination; abandonment of work. Petitioners aver that respondents were merely transferred to a new post wherein the wages are adjusted to the current minimum wage standards. They maintain that the respondents voluntarily abandoned their jobs when they failed to report for duty in the new location. Assuming that this contention was true, the Supreme Court held that there was no abandonment of work. For there to be abandonment: first, there should be a failure of the employee to report for work without a valid or justifiable reason, and second, there should be a showing that the employee intended to sever the employer-employee relationship. The fact that petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal is indicative of their intention to remain employed with private respondent. On the first element of failure to report for work, in this case, there was no showing that respondents were notified of their new assignments. Granting that the Duty Detail Orders were indeed issued, they served no purpose unless the intended recipients of the orders are informed of such. Therefore, the Court held that there was no abandonment of work in this case. Alert Security and Investigation Agency, Inc., et al. vs. Saidali Pasawilan, et al., G.R. No. 182397. September 14, 2011. National Power Corporation, represented its President Cyril Del Callar vs. Judge Santos B. Adiong, Regional Trial Court, BR. 8, Marawi City, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2060. July 27, 2011 Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent Judge failed to conduct a pre-trial conference contrary to elementary rules of procedure which he should have known all too well considering his long years of service in the bench. Such ignorance of a basic rule in court procedure, as failing to conduct pre-trial, sadly amounts to gross ignorance and warrants a corresponding penalty. As to the allegations of poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal principles in granting the motions for execution pending appeal for flimsy and unsupported reasons, the particular reasons relied upon by respondent judge for issuing the writ of execution pending appeal are so unreliably weak and feeble that it highlights the lack of knowledge of respondent judge with regard to the proper appreciation of arguments. Dire financial conditions of the plaintiffs supported by mere self-serving statements as good reason for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal does not stand on solid footing. It does not even stand on its own. National Power Corporation, represented its President Cyril Del Callar vs. Judge Santos B. Adiong, Regional Trial Court, BR. 8, Marawi City, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2060. July 27, 2011 Ruperto A. Ambil Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines/Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175457/G.R. No. 175482, July 6, 2011. Sandiganbayan; jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil Jr. is beyond question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado Sr. As to him, a Certification from the Provincial Government Department Head of the HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil Jr., over whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them the Sandiganbayan. Ruperto A. Ambil Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines/Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175457/G.R. No. 175482, July 6, 2011. Petra C. Martinez, In her capacity as General Manager of Claveria Agri-based MultiPurpose Cooperative, Inc. vs. Filomena L. villanueva/Office of the Ombudsman vs. Filomena L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196/G.R. No. 169198, July 6, 2011. Public officials; prohibited positions. Respondent in this case was charged with violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act 6713 for solicitation or acceptance of gifts by reason of public office. The CA found that RA 6713 was repealed by RA 6938; thus, respondent was not liable. The SC found the contrary. There was no repeal. The ban on Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) officials holding a position in a cooperative provided in RA 6938 should be taken as a prohibition in addition to those provided in RA 6713 and specifically applicable to CDA officials and employees. True, RA 6938 allows CDA officials and employees to become members of cooperatives and enjoy the privileges and benefits attendant to membership. However, RA 6938 should not be taken as creating in favor of CDA officials and employees an exemption from the coverage of Section 7(d), RA 6713 considering that the benefits and privileges attendant to membership in a cooperative are not confined solely to availing of loans and not all cooperatives are established for the sole purpose of providing credit facilities to their members. Public officials; misconduct. The prohibition in Section 7(d) of RA 6713 is malum prohibitum. It is the commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Therefore, it is immaterial whether respondent has fully paid her loans since the law prohibits the mere act of soliciting a loan under the circumstances provided in Section 7(d) of RA 6713. Neither is undue influence on respondents part required to be proven as held by the CA. Whether respondent used her position or authority as a CDA official is of no consequence in the determination of her administrative liability. And considering that respondent admitted having taken two loans from CABMPCI, which is a cooperative whose operations are directly regulated by respondents office, respondent was correctly meted the penalty of suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for violation of Section 7(d). Petra C. Martinez, In her capacity as General Manager of Claveria Agri-based Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. vs. Filomena L. villanueva/Office of the Ombudsman vs. Filomena L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196/G.R. No. 169198, July 6, 2011. Efren L. Alvarez vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011. Anti-Graft; undue injury. The term undue injury in the context of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act punishing the act of causing undue injury to any party, has a meaning akin to that civil law concept of actual damage. Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law. Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by a party as he has duly proved. Efren L. Alvarez vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011. Mark Clemente y Martinez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 194367, June 15, 2011. Illegal possession and use of false bank notes. The elements of the crime committed under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code are the following: (a) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to

order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments. Illegal possession and use of false bank notes. In this case, the Supreme Court, citingPeople v. Digoro, reversed and set aside the findings of the lower courts and acquitted petitioner of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false bank notes defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. In Digoro, possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz to use the P500 bill. Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge. Mark Clemente y Martinez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 194367, June 15, 2011. People of the Philippines v. Mads Saludin Mantawil, et al, G.R. No. 188319, June 8, 2011. Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drug, what is crucial is the identity of the buyer and seller, the object and its consideration, the delivery of the thing sold, and the payment for it. Implicit in these cases is first and foremost the identity and existence, coupled with the presentation to the court of the traded prohibited substance, this object evidence being an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime of possession or selling of regulated/prohibited drug. There can be no such crime when nagging doubts persist on whether the specimen submitted for examination and presented in court was the one recovered from, or sold by, the accused. Essential, therefore, in appropriate cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. The chain-of-custody requirement, set forth in Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, performs this function which ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody. In Malillin v. People, the Supreme Court ruled that the chain of custody requirements that must be met in proving that the seized drugs are the ones presented in court are as follows: (1) testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence; and (2) witnesses should describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the item. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no broken chain in the custody of the confiscated shabu. People of the Philippines v. Mads Saludin Mantawil, et al, G.R. No. 188319, June 8, 2011. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al v. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146, June 8, 2011. Administrative cases; res judicata. Dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding against the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability. Res judicata did not set in because there is no identity of causes of action. Moreover, the decision of the Ombudsman dismissing the criminal complaint cannot be considered a valid and final judgment. On the criminal complaint, the Ombudsman only had the power to investigate and file the appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan.

Double jeopardy; elements. Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. None of these requisites applies where the Ombudsman only conducted a preliminary investigation of the same criminal offense against the respondent public officer. The dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation does not constitute double jeopardy, preliminary investigation not being part of the trial. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al v. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146, June 8, 2011.

Dr. Rubi Li vs. Spouses Reynaldo and Lina Soliman as parents/heirs of deceased Angelica Soliman, G.R. No. 165279. June 7, 2011 Medical malpractice. An integral part of physicians overall obligation to patient is the duty of reasonable disclosure of available choices with respect to proposed therapy and of dangers inherently and potentially involved in each. However, the physician is not obliged to discuss relatively minor risks inherent in common procedures when it is common knowledge that such risks inherent in procedure of very low incidence. Cited as exceptions to the rule that the patient should not be denied the opportunity to weigh the risks of surgery or treatment are emergency cases where it is evident he cannot evaluate data, and where the patient is a child or incompetent. The court thus concluded that the patients right of self-decision can only be effectively exercised if the patient possesses adequate information to enable him in making an intelligent choice. The scope of the physicians communications to the patient, then must be measured by the patients need, and that need is whatever information is material to the decision. The test therefore for determining whether a potential peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patients decision. Cobbs v. Grant reiterated the pronouncement in Canterbury v. Spence that for liability of the physician for failure to inform patient, there must be causal relationship between physicians failure to inform and the injury to patient and such connection arises only if it is established that, had revelation been made, consent to treatment would not have been given. There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: (1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment. The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it. The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in the proposed medical treatment cannot thus be reduced to one simplistic formula applicable in all instances. Further, in a medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent, the plaintiff must prove both the duty and the breach of that duty through expert testimony. Dr. Rubi Li vs. Spouses Reynaldo and Lina Soliman as parents/heirs of deceased Angelica Soliman, G.R. No. 165279. June 7, 2011

Marcelo G. Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 170500 & 170510-11. June 1, 2011. Administrative cases; execution of Ombudsman decisions. Petitioners in this case raise the issue of whether administrative decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalties of dismissal and one-year suspension from office are immediately executory pending appeal. The Supreme Court held that it is immediately executory pending appeal. This is the rule provided for under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, dated September 15, 2003, which provides among others: An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course Under this provision, a respondent who is found administratively liable by the Office of the Ombudsman and is slapped with a penalty of suspension of more than one month from service has the right to file an appeal with the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. But although a respondent is given the right to appeal, the act of filing an appeal does not stay the execution of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman. Marcelo G. Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 170500 & 170510-11. June 1, 2011. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011. Administrative proceedings; due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. Petitioner here was adequately apprised of the charges filed against him and he submitted his answer to the complaint while the case was still under a pre-charge investigation. When the Office of the Legal Service conducted a summary hearing on the complaint, petitioner was again duly notified of the proceedings and was given an opportunity to explain his side. He was not denied due process. Administrative proceedings; length of service as an alternative circumstance. Length of service as a factor in determining the imposable penalty in administrative cases is not always a mitigating circumstance. It is an alternative circumstance, which can mitigate or possibly even aggravate the penalty, depending on the circumstances of the case. Where the government employee concerned took advantage of his long years of service and position in public office, length of service may not be considered in lowering the penalty. The Court will take this circumstance against the public officer or employee in administrative cases involving serious offenses, even if it was the first time said public officer or employee was administratively charged. Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; requirements; examples. The acts of respondent constitute the administrative offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, which need not be related to, or connected with, the public officers official functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee. Under the Civil Service law and rules, there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute the grave offense of Conduct

Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. However, the Court has considered the following acts or omissions, inter alia, as Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of office; failure to report back to work without prior notice; failure to safe keep public records and property; making false entries in public documents; falsification of court orders; a judges act of brandishing a gun and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation; and a court interpreters participation in the execution of a document conveying complainants property which resulted in a quarrel in the latters family. Procedural due process; right to cross-examine. While the right to cross-examine is a vital element of procedural due process, the right does not require an actual cross examination but merely an opportunity to exercise this right if desired by the party entitled to it. In this case, while National Police Commission Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 provides that the sworn statements of witnesses shall take the place of oral testimony but shall be subject to crossexamination, petitioner missed this opportunity precisely because he did not appear at the deadline for the filing of his supplemental answer or counter-affidavit, and accordingly the hearing officer considered the case submitted for decision. And even with the grant of his subsequent motion to be furnished with a copy of the complaint and its annexes, he still failed to file a supplemental answer or counter-affidavit and instead filed a motion to dismiss. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011. George Miller v. Secretary Hernando B. Perez, et al, G.R. No. 165412, May 30, 2011. Probable cause; definition. Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Probable cause; determination. To determine the existence of probable cause, there is need to conduct preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering which person or persons may be reasonably charged with a crime. It is well-settled that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information in court is an executive function which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties.George Miller v. Secretary Hernando B. Perez, et al, G.R. No. 165412, May 30, 2011. Estate of Pasto Samson v. Mercedes & Ruberto Susano/Julian Chan v. Mercedes and Ruberto Susano, G.R. No. 179024/G.R. No. 179086. May 30, 2011. Tenancy relation; elements. RA 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, defines a tenant as a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latters consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under a leasehold tenancy system. For a tenancy relationship to exist, the following

essential elements must be shown: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties. The presence of all of these elements must be proved by substantial evidence. Estate of Pasto Samson v. Mercedes & Ruberto Susano/Julian Chan v. Mercedes and Ruberto Susano, G.R. No. 179024/G.R. No. 179086. May 30, 2011. People of the Philippines v. Baida Salak y Bangkulas,G.R. No. 181249, March 14, 2011. Judicial Order; form. Accused-appellant assails the continuation of the trial against her notwithstanding the order of provisional dismissal earlier issued by the trial court following the repeated failure of the prosecution witnesses to attend scheduled hearings. Specifically, appellant argues that the case should not have been revived without the proper motion from the prosecution. The Supreme Court debunked accused-appellants contention and ruled that based on the case records, it shows that the provisional dismissal, which was declared in open court by the judge on September 25, 2001, was never reduced into writing after Special Investigators in this case (i.e., Kawada and Manguerra) appeared at the last minute of the said hearing. Moreover, it appears that the said issue was brought up by accused-appellants counsel in the next hearing and was settled when the trial court judge issued an order, again in open court, recalling and setting aside the September 25, 2001 order provisionally dismissing the case. Judicial Order; form. It bears emphasizing that an oral order has no juridical existence until and unless it had been reduced into writing and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the judge to the clerk of court for filing, release to the parties and implementation. In fact, even if it had been written and promulgated, or even if it had already been properly served on the parties, it is still plainly within the power of the judge to recall it and set it aside because every court has the inherent power, among others, to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. People of the Philippines v. Baida Salak y Bangkulas,G.R. No. 181249, March 14, 2011. Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011

of the OEC exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required by law is false. On the other hand, a petition for disqualification of a candidate may also be filed pursuant to Section 68 for committing prohibited acts referred to in said section. As to the ground of false representation in the COC under Section 78, the Court in a previous case elaborated that the misrepresentation must be material, i.e. misrepresentation regarding age,residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. In this case, the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) based on the allegation that Gonzalez was not a natural-born Filipino which was filed before the elections is in the nature of a petition filed under Section 78. The recitals in the petition in said case, however, state that it was filed pursuant to Section 4 (b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and Section 68 of the OEC to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification. The COMELEC treated the petition as one filed both for disqualification and cancellation of COC, with the effect that Section 68, in relation to Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, is applicable insofar as determining the period for filing the petition. This Rule provides the prescriptive period of filing to be not later than the date of proclamation. On the other hand, the procedure for filing a petition for cancellation of COC is covered by Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides as the prescriptive period to be within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy. Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 represents another attempt to modify by a mere procedural rule the statutory period for filing a petition to cancel COC on the ground of false representation therein regarding a candidates qualifications. Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 would supplant the prescribed period of filing of petition under Section 78 with that provided in Section 68 even if the latter provision does not at all cover the false representation regarding age, residence and citizenship which may be raised in a petition under Section 78. If the purpose behind this rule promulgated by the COMELEC allowing a petition to cancel COC based on the candidates non-compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements for elective office, such as citizenship, to be filed even beyond the period provided in Section 78 was simply to remedy a perceived procedural gap though not expressly stated in Resolution No. 8696, the Court, in a previous case, had already rejected such justification. Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v. Guillermo N. Carague, et al., G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011.

COMELEC; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held in this case that despite recourse to it, it cannot rule on the issue of citizenship of petitioner Gonzalez. Subsequent events showed that Gonzalez had not only been duly proclaimed, he had also taken his oath of office and assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to the candidates election and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Disqualification of Candidate; Period for Filing Petition. Petitioner Fernando V. Gonzalez and private respondent Reno G. Lim both filed certificates of candidacy for the position of Representative of the 3rd congressional district of the Province of Albay in the May 10, 2010 elections. On March 30, 2010, a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed by Stephen Bichara [SPA No. 10-074 (DC)] on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish father and a Filipino mother, and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625. The SC explained the difference between Cancellation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and Disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC. A petition to cancel a candidates COC may be filed under Section 78

Unlawful Expenditure for being Excessive; Factors. Price is considered excessive if it is more than the 10% allowable price variance between the price paid for the item bought and the price of the same item per canvass of the auditor. In determining whether or not the price is excessive, the following factors may be considered: (a) supply and demand forces in the market; (b) government price quotations; (c) warranty of products or special features; (d) brand of products. In this case, the issue was whether the computer units bought by Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) from Tetra were overpriced. The records showed that while the respondents found nothing wrong per se with the criteria adopted by the CDA in the overall evaluation of the bids, the technical aspect was seriously questioned. The final technical evaluation report was apparently manipulated to favor Tetra, which offered a Korean-made brand as against Microcircuits which offered a US-made brand said to be more durable, at a lower price. The SC concluded that the price per item of the PC units, laptop and UPS were overpriced by almost 50%. This comparison was based on the initial purchase of 23 PC units with the bid price by Tetra of Php1,269,630.00 (23 PC units, 1 unit 386 Tower and 1 unit 386 Notebook) under Disbursement Voucher No. 01-92-12-2399. There was an additional (repeat) purchase of 21 PC units for Php929,649.00 (same price per item of Php44,269.00) and one unit

UPS for Php86,000.00. The total contract price obtained by Tetra was Php2,285,279.00, of which COA disallowed the amount of Php881,819.00 representing the overprice per the auditors findings. Unlawful Expenditure; Liability of Public Officers. The SC held the petitioner liable personally and solidarily for the disallowed amount of Php881,819.00. The doctrine of separate personality of a corporation finds no application because the Cooperative Development Authority is not a private entity but a government agency created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6939 in compliance with the provisions of Section 15, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, respondents satisfactorily established that petitioner acted in bad faith when he prevailed upon the Development Academy of the Philippines-Technical Evaluation Committee (DAP-TEC) to modify the initial result of the technical evaluation of the computers by imposing an irrelevant grading system that was intended to favor one of the bidders, after the bids had been opened. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v. Guillermo N. Carague, et al., G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011. Republic of the Philippines v. Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr., G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011. P.D. No. 1529; requisites for registration of title. Existing law and jurisprudence provides that an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title must prove compliance with Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. The pertinent portions of Section 14 provide: SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. x x x x

There was no actual transfer of title from the owners-mortgagors to the foreclosing bank. Hence, the inclusion of the said charge in the total redemption price was unwarranted and the corresponding amount paid by the petitioners-mortgagors should be returned to them. Supreme Transliner, Inc., Moises C. Alvarez and Paulita S. Alvarez v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc./BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Supreme Transliner Inc., Moises C. Alvarez and Paulita S. Alvares; G.R. No. 165617/G.R. No. 165837. February 25, 2011; Supreme Transliner, Inc., Moises C. Alvarez and Paulita S. Alvarez vs BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 165617, February 25, 2011; BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs Supreme Transliner, Inc., Moises C. Alvarez and Paulita S. Alvarez, G.R. No. 165837, February 25, 2011. National Internal Revenue Code; capital gains tax; documentary stamp tax; if right of redemption exercised. Under Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 13-85 (December 12, 1985), every sale or exchange or other disposition of real property classified as capital asset under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) shall be subject to final capital gains tax. The term sale includes pacto de retro and other forms of conditional sale. Section 2.2 of Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 29-86, as amended by RMO Nos. 16-88, 27-89 and 6-92, states that these conditional sales necessarily includes mortgage foreclosure sales (judicial and extrajudicial foreclosure sales). Further, for real property foreclosed by a bank on or after September 3, 1986, the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax must be paid before title to the property can be consolidated in favor of the bank. Under Section 63 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, if no right of redemption exists, the certificate of title of the mortgagor shall be cancelled, and a new certificate issued in the name of the purchaser. But where the right of redemption exists, the certificate of title of the mortgagor shall not be cancelled, but the certificate of sale and the order confirming the sale shall be registered by brief memorandum thereof made by the Register of Deeds on the certificate of title. It is therefore clear that in foreclosure sale, there is no actual transfer of the mortgaged real property until after the expiration of the one-year redemption period as provided in Act No. 3135, or An Act or Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special Powers Inserted In or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages, and title thereto is consolidated in the name of the mortgagee in case of nonredemption. In the interim, the mortgagor is given the option whether or not to redeem the real property. The issuance of the Certificate of Sale does not by itself transfer ownership. RR No. 499 (March 16, 1999), further amends RMO No. 6-92 relative to the payment of capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax on extrajudicial foreclosure sale of capital assets initiated by banks, finance and insurance companies. Under this RMO, in case the mortgagor exercises his right of redemption within one year from the issuance of the certificate of sale, no capital gains tax shall be imposed because no capital gain has been derived by the mortgagor and no sale or transfer of real property was realized. Moreover, the transaction will be subject to documentary stamp tax of only PhP 15 because no land or realty was sold or transferred for a consideration. National Internal Revenue Code; non-retroactivity of rulings; exception. Section 246 of the National Internal Revenue Code sets out that rule on non-retroactivity of rulings. In this case, the retroactive application of Revenue Regulations No. 4-99 [to the transaction which took place before its effectivity is more consistent with the policy of aiding the exercise of the right of redemption. As the Court of Tax Appeals concluded in one case, RR No. 4-99 has curbed the inequity of imposing a capital gains tax even before the expiration of the redemption period [since] there is yet no transfer of title and no profit or gain is realized by the mortgagor at the

Under Section 14 (1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Republic of the Philippines v. Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr., G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011. Supreme Transliner, Inc., Moises C. Alvarez and Paulita S. Alvarez v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc./BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Supreme Transliner Inc., Moises C. Alvarez and Paulita S. Alvares; G.R. No. 165617/G.R. No. 165837. February 25, 2011; Mortgage; Redemption price; should not include CGT. Considering that herein petitionersmortgagors exercised their right of redemption before the expiration of the statutory one-year period, petitioner bank is not liable to pay the capital gains tax due on the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.

time of foreclosure sale but only upon expiration of the redemption period. In his commentaries [Hector] De Leon expressed the view that while revenue regulations as a general rule have no retroactive effect, if the revocation is due to the fact that the regulation is erroneous or contrary to law, such revocation shall have retroactive operation as to affect past transactions, because a wrong construction cannot give rise to a vested right that can be invoked by a taxpayer. Supreme Transliner, Inc., Moises C. Alvarez and Paulita S. Alvarez vs BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 165617, February 25, 2011; BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs Supreme Transliner, Inc., Moises C. Alvarez and Paulita S. Alvarez, G.R. No. 165837, February 25, 2011. Vicente Yu Chang and Soledad Yu Chang v. Republic of the Philippines; G.R. No. 171726. February 23, 2011. Public Land Act. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. 1073, in order that petitioners application for registration of title may be granted, they must first establish the following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Applicants must overcome the presumption that the land they are applying for is part of the public domain and that they have an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in their names arising from an imperfect title. Vicente Yu Chang and Soledad Yu Chang v. Republic of the Philippines; G.R. No. 171726. February 23, 2011.

of 65% of the par value was not absolutely and unconditionally accepted by DBP. DBP imposed several conditions to its acceptance and it is clear that Medrano indeed tried in good faith to comply with the conditions given by DBP but unfortunately failed to do so. Hence, there was no birth of a perfected contract of sale between the parties. Development Bank of the Philippines v. Ben P. Medrano and Privatization Management Office; G.R. No. 167004. February 7, 2011. People of the Philippines vs. Sevillano Delos Reyes y Lantican, G.R. No. 181039, January 31, 2011. Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of prohibited drugs; elements. In a prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. People of the Philippines vs. Sevillano Heirs of Ramon C. Gaite, et al. vs. The Plaza, Inc. and FGU Insurance Corporation; G.R. No. 177685, January 26, 2011. Contracts; quantum meruit. Under the principle of quantum meruit, a contractor is allowed to recover the reasonable value of the thing or services rendered despite the lack of a written contract, in order to avoid unjust enrichment. Quantum meruit means that in an action for work and labor, payment shall be made in such amount as the plaintiff reasonably deserves. To deny payment for a building almost completed and already occupied would be to permit unjust enrichment at the expense of the contractor. Contracts; rescission. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other. Respondent The Plaza predicated its action on Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which provides for the remedy of rescission or more properly resolution, a principal action based on breach of faith by the other party who violates the reciprocity between them. The breach contemplated in the provision is the obligors failure to comply with an existing obligation. Thus, the power to rescind is given only to the injured party. The injured party is the party who has faithfully fulfilled his obligation or is ready and willing to perform his obligation. Petitioners may not justify Rhogens termination of the contract upon grounds of nonpayment of progress billing and uncooperative attitude of respondent The Plaza and its employees in rectifying the violations which were the basis for issuance of the stoppage order. Having breached the contractual obligation it had expressly assumed, i.e., to comply with all laws, rules and regulations of the local authorities, Rhogen was already at fault. Respondent The Plaza, on the other hand, was justified in withholding payment on Rhogens first progress billing, on account of the stoppage order and additionally due to disappearance of ownerfurnished materials at the jobsite. Heirs of Ramon C. Gaite, et al. vs. The Plaza, Inc. and FGU Insurance Corporation; G.R. No. 177685, January 26, 2011.

Rosalio S. Galeos v. People of the Philippines/ Paulino S. Ong v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 174730-37/G.R. Nos. 174845-52, February 9, 2011. Falsification of public documents; elements. The elements of falsification of public documents under Article 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are as follows: (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false. In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies. Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. Rosalio S. Galeos v. People of the Philippines/ Paulino S. Ong v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 174730-37/G.R. Nos. 174845-52, February 9, 2011. Development Bank of the Philippines v. Ben P. Medrano and Privatization Management Office; G.R. No. 167004. February 7, 2011. Sale; perfection of contract. As a rule, a contract is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the two parties. Under Article 1475 of the Civil Code, a contract of sale is perfected the moment there is a meeting of the minds on the thing which is the object of the contract and on the price. In the present case, Medranos offer to sell the shares of the minority stockholders at the price

Rosalino L. Marable vs. Myrna F. Marable; G.R. No. 178741, January 17, 2011. Marriage; annulment; psychological incapacity. Quarrels, financial difficulties, womanizing of petitioner sorry, no psychological incapacity. The Supreme Court found the testimony of the psychiatrist to be general, not in-depth, does not establish link between actions of party and his supposed psychological incapacity. No matter that the OSG did not present its own expert; it does not have the burden of proof in an annulment case. Rosalino L. Marable vs. Myrna F. Marable; G.R. No. 178741, January 17, 2011. People of the Philippines vs. Teresita Tessie Laogo, G.R. No. 176264, January 10, 2011. Illegal recruitment; elements. Recruitment and placement refers to the act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. When a person or entity, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons, that person or entity shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority are deemed illegal and punishable by law. And when the illegal recruitment is committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group, then it is deemed committed in large scale and carries with it stiffer penalties as the same is deemed a form of economic sabotage. But to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused, without being duly authorized by law, gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send them abroad for work, such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. It is important that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter, whether locally or abroad. Illegal recruitment; elements. Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority are deemed illegal and punishable by law. When the illegal recruitment is committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group, then it is deemed committed in large scale and carries with it stiffer penalties as the same is deemed a form of economic sabotage. But to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused, without being duly authorized by law, gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send them abroad for work, such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. It is important that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter, whether locally or abroad. People of the Philippines vs. Teresita Tessie Laogo, G.R. No. 176264, January 10, 2011. People of the Philippines vs. Jay Lorena y Labag, G.R. No. 184954, January 10, 2011. Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. In this case, there was no compliance with the inventory and photographing of the seized dangerous drug and marked money immediately after the buy-bust operation. Such non-compliance does not necessarily render void and invalid the seizure of the dangerous drugs. There must, however, be

justifiable grounds to warrant exception therefrom, and provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/s. Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody. While a perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible to achieve, an unbroken chain becomes indispensable and essential in the prosecution of drug cases owing to its susceptibility to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. Hence, every link must be accounted for. Among others, the transfer of the specimen from the provincial crime laboratory to the regional crime laboratory was unaccounted for Nobleza, who received the specimen from Bearis and conducted the initial field test on it, testified that after the examination and preparing the result, she turned over the same to the evidence custodian, SPO3 Augusto Basagre. Clemen, the chemist who conducted the confirmatory test at the regional crime laboratory, testified that she received the specimen from one P/Insp. Alfredo Lopez, Deputy Provincial Officer of the Provincial Crime Laboratory, the signatory of the memorandum for request for laboratory examination. The prosecution failed to present evidence to show how the specimen was transferred from Basagre to Lopez. Given the foregoing lapses committed by the apprehending officers, the saving clause cannot apply to the case at bar. Not only did the prosecution fail to offer any justifiable ground why the procedure required by law was not complied with, it was also unable to establish the chain of custody of the shabu allegedly taken from appellant. The obvious gaps in the chain of custody created reasonable doubt as to whether the specimen seized from appellant was the same specimen brought to the crime laboratories and eventually offered in court as evidence. Without adequate proof of thecorpus delicti, appellants conviction cannot stand. People of the Philippines vs. Jay Lorena y Labag, G.R. No. 184954, January 10, 2011. Heirs of the Late Nestor Tria vs. Atty. Epifania Obias, G.R. No. 175887, November 24, 2010 Jurisdiction; Office of the President. The Office of the President (OP) did not err in taking cognizance of the appeal of respondent, and the Court of Appeals (CA) likewise had jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of probable cause in a petition challenging the OPs ruling. Memorandum Circular No. 58, provides, among others: No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death wherein new and material issues are raised which were not previously presented before the Department of Justice (DOJ) and were not ruled upon in the subject decision/order/resolution, in which case the President may order the Secretary of Justice to reopen/review the case, provided, that, the prescription of the offense is not due to lapse within six (6) months from notice of the questioned resolution/order/decision, and provided further, that, the appeal or petition for review is filed within thirty (30) days from such notice. Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright and no order shall be issued requiring the payment of the appeal fee, the submission of appeal brief/memorandum or the elevation of the records to the Office of the President from the Department of Justice. If it is not readily apparent from the appeal or petition for review that the case is within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, the appellant/petitioner shall be ordered to prove the necessary jurisdictional facts, under penalty of outright dismissal of the appeal or petition, and no order to pay the appeal fee or to submit appeal brief/memorandum or to elevate the records of the case to the Office of the President

shall be issued unless and until the jurisdictional requirements shall have been satisfactorily established by the appellant/petitioner. Jurisdiction; Office of the President. In this case, the offense for which respondent was charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which is clearly within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President (OP) in accordance with Memorandum Circular No. 58. Respondents appeal was initially dismissed when Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Waldo Q. Flores issued the Resolution dated June 27, 2003 affirming in toto the appealed resolutions of the Secretary of Justice and adopting the latters findings and conclusions. However, subsequent to her filing of a motion for reconsideration of the said June 27, 2003 Resolution, respondent filed a Supplemental Pleading and Submission of Newly Discovered Evidence. The arguments of respondent in support of her motion for reconsideration were duly considered by the OP in reexamining the appealed resolutions. As the word may in the second paragraph of Memorandum Circular No. 58 signifies, it is not mandatory for the President to order the DOJ to reopen or review respondents case even if it raised new and material issues allegedly not yet passed upon by the DOJ. Hence, the OP acted well within its authority in reexamining the merits of respondents appeal in resolving the motion for reconsideration. Heirs of the Late Nestor Tria vs. Atty. Epifania Obias, G.R. No. 175887, November 24, 2010 Solid Bank Corp. Ernesto U. Gamier, et al. and Solid Bank Corp., et al. vs. Solid Bank Union and its Dismissed Officers and Members, et al. G.R. No. 159460 and G.R. No. 159461, November 15, 2010. Dismissal; illegal strike; distinction between union officers and mere members. The liabilities of individuals who participate in an illegal strike must be determined under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code which makes a distinction between union officers and mere members. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who knowingly participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. However, a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment if he does not commit illegal acts during a strike. Hence, with respect to respondents who are union officers, their termination by petitioners is valid. Being fully aware that the proceedings before the Secretary of Labor were still pending as in fact they filed a motion for reconsideration, they cannot invoke good faith as a defense. For the rest of the individual respondents who are union members, they cannot be terminated for mere participation in the illegal strike. Illegal strike. Under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, a strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption order and/or certification is illegal. So is a declaration of a strike during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike. In the present case, there is no dispute that when respondents conducted their mass actions on April 3 to 6, 2000, the proceedings before the Secretary of Labor were still pending as both parties filed motions for reconsideration of the March 24, 2000 Order. Clearly, respondents knowingly violated the aforesaid provision by holding a strike in the guise of mass demonstration. Illegal strike; proof of illegal acts. To justify termination of a union member who participated in an illegal strike, there must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice. Petitioners have not adduced evidence on such illegal acts committed by each of the individual respondents who are union members. The dismissal of respondent-union members are therefore unjustified in the absence of a clear showing that they committed specific illegal acts during the mass actions and concerted work boycott..

Illegal dismissal; backwages. The award of backwages is a legal consequence of a finding of illegal dismissal. However, assuming that respondent-union members have indeed reported back to work at the end of the concerted mass actions but were soon terminated by petitioners who found their explanation unsatisfactory, they are not entitled to backwages in view of the illegality of the said strike. Under the circumstances, respondents reinstatement without backwages suffices for the appropriate relief. Illegal dismissal; separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Since reinstatement is no longer possible given the lapse of considerable time from the occurrence of the strike, not to mention the fact that Solidbank had long ceased its banking operations, the award of separation pay of one (1) month salary for each year of service, in lieu of reinstatement, is in order. Strike; definition. Article 212 of the Labor Code, as amended, defines strike as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. The term strike shall also include slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities and similar activities. In the instant case, about 712 employees absented themselves from work in a concerted fashion for three continuous days. Considering that these mass actions stemmed from a bargaining deadlock and an order of assumption of jurisdiction had already been issued by the Secretary of Labor to avert an impending strike, all the elements of strike are evident in the Union-instigated mass actions. Solid Bank Corp. Ernesto U. Gamier, et al. and Solid Bank Corp., et al. vs. Solid Bank Union and its Dismissed Officers and Members, et al. G.R. No. 159460 and G.R. No. 159461, November 15, 2010. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Gregorio B. Saddi, A.M. No. P-10-2818, November 15, 2010. Court personnel; gross dishonesty. Saddis failure to turn over up to this time the full amount of his collections and to adequately explain and present evidence thereon constitute gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, and even malversation of public funds. The delayed remittance of his cash collections and failure to submit monthly reports of court funds he received constitute gross neglect of duty. Dishonesty alone, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Gregorio B. Saddi, A.M. No. P-102818, November 15, 2010. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. October 19, 2010. Statement of UP Professors. While the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. They expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived

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at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized. The statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The authors also not only assumed that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went further by directly accusing the Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They further attempt to educate this Court on how to go about the review of the case. The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of polluted sources, the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect. The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations. More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the decision alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court. We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the Vinuya decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. October 19, 2010. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, Secretary of Justice, L.M. Camus Engineering Corporation (represented by Luis M. Camus and Lino D. Mendoza), G.R. No. 177279, October 13, 2010. Assessment; validity of assessment notice; lack of control number. The formality of a control number in the assessment notice is not a requirement for its validity; rather the contents thereof should inform the taxpayer of the declaration of deficiency tax against the taxpayer. Both the formal letter of demand and the notice of assessment shall be void if the former failed to state the fact, the law, rules and regulations or jurisprudence on which the assessment is based, which is a mandatory requirement under section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Tax evasion; failure to comply with subpoena duces tecum not relevant to tax evasion; forum shopping. A violation of section 266 (failure to obey summons) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) involves a separate offense and hence litis pendencia is not present considering that the outcome of this complaint is not determinative of the issue as to whether probable cause exists to charge the taxpayer with the crimes of attempt to evade or defeat tax and willful failure to supply correct and accurate information and pay tax defined and penalized under sections 254 and 255, respectively, of the NIRC. For the crime of tax evasion in particular, compliance by the taxpayer with such subpoena, if any had been issued, is irrelevant. Thus, the Secretary of Justice erred in holding that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue committed forum

shopping when it filed the complaint for tax evasion during the pendency of its appeal from the City Prosecutors dismissal of the complaint involving the act of disobedience to the summons in the course of the preliminary investigation on the taxpayers correct tax liabilities for the taxable years 1997, 1998 and 1999. Tax evasion; lack of consent by taxpayer under investigation. Lack of consent by the taxpayer under investigation does not imply that the Bureau of Revenue (BIR) obtained the information from third parties illegally or that the information received is false or malicious. Nor does the lack of consent preclude the BIR from assessing deficiency taxes on the taxpayer based on the documents. In the same vein, the taxpayer cannot be allowed to escape criminal prosecution under sections 254 and 255 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) by mere imputation of a fictitious or disqualified informant under section 282 of the NIRC simply because other than disclosure of the official registry number of the third party informer, the BIR insisted on maintaining the confidentiality of the identity and personal circumstances of said informer. Voluntary Assessment Program; Revenue Regulations No. 2-99; Economic Recovery Assistance Payment (ERAP) Program; immunity. Revenue Regulations No. 2-99 explained in its Policy Statement that considering the scarcity of financial and human resources as well as the time constraints within which the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) has to clean the [BIRs] backlog of unaudited tax returns in order to keep updated and be focused with the most current accounts in preparation for the full implementation of a computerized tax administration, the said revenue regulation was issued providing for last priority in audit and investigation of tax returns to accomplish the said objective without, however, compromising the revenue collection that would have been generated from audit and enforcement activities. The program granted immunity from audit and investigation of income tax, VAT and percentage tax returns for 1998. It expressly excluded withholding tax returns. Since such immunity from audit and investigation does not preclude the collection of revenues generated from audit and enforcement activities, it follows that the BIR is likewise not barred from collecting any tax deficiency discovered as a result of tax fraud investigations. Voluntary Assessment Program; immunity. Availment by the taxpayer of the voluntary assessment program (VAP) under Revenue Regulations No, 8-2001, as amended, did not amount to settlement of its assessed tax deficiencies for the period 1997 to 1999, nor immunity from prosecution for filing fraudulent return and attempt to evade or defeat tax. From the express terms of the said revenue regulations, taxpayer is not qualified to avail of the VAP granting taxpayers the privilege of last priority in the audit and investigation of all internal revenue taxes for the taxable year 2000 and all prior years under certain conditions, considering that, first, it was issued a preliminary assessment notice (PAN) on February 19, 2001, and, second, it was the subject of investigation as a result of verified informed filed by a tax informer under section 282 of the National Internal Revenue Code duly recorded in the BIR official registry even prior to the issuance of the PAN, which are excepted from coverage of the VAP under said regulations. Moreover, the taxpayer cannot invoke the availment of VAP to foreclose any subsequent audit of its account books and other accounting records in view of the strong finding of underdeclaration in its payment of the correct income tax liability by more than 30% as supported by the written report of the Tax Fraud Division. Under the regulations, a taxpayer who has availed of the VAP shall not be audited except upon authorization and approval of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue when there is strong evidence or finding of understatement

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in the payment of its correct tax liability by more than 30% as supported by a written report of the appropriate office detailing the facts and the law on which such finding is based. Voluntary Assessment Program; estoppel. Given the explicit conditions for the grant of immunity from audit under the said revenue regulations, the Secretary of Justice erred in declaring that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is estopped from assessing any tax deficiency against the taxpayer after the issuance of the documents of immunity from audit/investigation and settlement of tax liabilities. The State can never be in estoppel, and this is particularly true in matters involving taxation. The errors of certain administrative officers should never be allowed to jeopardize the governments financial position. Voluntary Assessment Program; exception to rule that examination and inspection should be made only once a taxable year. The discovery of substantial underdeclarations of income by the taxpayer for taxable years 1997, 1998 and 1999 upon verified information provided by an informer under section 282 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as well as the necessity of obtaining information from third parties to ascertain correctness of the return filed or evaluation of tax compliance in collecting taxes (as a result of the disobedience to the summons issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue against the taxpayer) are circumstances warranting exception from the general rule in section 235 of the NIRC. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, Secretary of Justice, L.M. Camus Engineering Corporation (represented by Luis M. Camus and Lino D. Mendoza), G.R. No. 177279, October 13, 2010. Corazon D. Sarmienta, et al. vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No. 182953. October 11, 2010 Ejectment; forcible entry and unlawful detainer distinguished. Well settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Section 1 provides: SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. There are two entirely distinct and different causes of action under the aforequoted rule, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from the defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful

by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right thereunder. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior physical possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or building after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. Ejectment; unlawful detainer; allegations constitute case of unlawful detainer. In the present case, a thorough perusal of the complaint would reveal that the allegations clearly constitute a case of unlawful detainer:

3. Plaintiff is the registered owner of that certain parcel of land involved in the instant case covered by TCT No. 222603 containing an area of 9,936 sq.m. situated in Sitio Manalite, Phase I, Baranggay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, which property was place under community mortgage program (CMP); 4. Other defendants in the instant case are all member and officers of defendant AMARA who, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth entered into the premises herein and constructed their temporary houses and office building respectively, pre-empting plaintiff from using the premises thus, depriving the same of its prior possession thereof; 5. On September 2, 1992 as an strategy of the cheapest sort defendants, in conspiracy and collusion with each other, defendants as representative of Heirs of Antonio and Hermogenes Rodriquez, the alleged owner of the property at bar, filed civil case no. 92-2454 against plaintiff, lodge before Branch 73 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, seeking to annul plaintiff title; 6. Immediately upon final dismissal of such groundless, baseless and malicious suit, plaintiff demanded defendants to vacate the premises, but the latter pleaded with the former to be given a one (1) year period within which to look for a place to transfer, which period, upon pleas of defendants, coupled with plaintiffs benevolence was repeatedly extended by said plaintiffs tolerance of occupancy thereof, but under such terms and conditions. Due to failure to comply with their undertaking despite repeated demands therefor plaintiffs sent a formal demand letter upon defendants; 7. Upon receipt of the above-stated demand, defendants propose to become members of plaintiff, as qualification to acquire portions of the property by sale pursuant to the CMP, to which plaintiff agreed and tolerated defendants possession by giving the same a period until the month of December 1999, to comply with all the requirements pre-requisite to the availing of the CMP benefits but failed and despite repeated demands therefor, thus, the filing of a complaint with the Baranggay and the issuance of the certificate to file action dated February 8, 2000;

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8. As time is of the essence, and the fact that the defendants are mere intruders or usurpers who have no possessory right whatsoever over the land illegally occupied by them, trifling technicalities that would tend to defeat the speedy administration of justice formal demand is not necessary thereto, (Republic vs. Cruz C.A. G.R. No. 24910 R Feb. 7, 1964) however, to afford a sufficient period of time within which to vacate the premises peacefully another oral and formal demands were made upon the same to that effect, and demolish the temporary office and houses they constructed on plaintiffs property and instead defendants again, as representative to alleged Estate of Julian Tallano filed a complaint for ejectment against plaintiffs former President, Hon. Marcelino Aben which case, is docketed as civil case no. 4119, lodged, before branch 11 of this Honorable court, defendants obstinately refused to peacefully turn over the property they intruded upon in fact they even dared plaintiff to file a case against them boasting that nobody can order them to vacate the premises; 9. Defendants letter dated August 9, 2000, acknowledged actual receipt of plaintiffs two (2) formal demands letters. Thus, the issuance of Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman dated September 25, 2000; 10. As a result thereof, plaintiff was compelled to engage the services of the undersigned counsel in order to immediately institute the instant suit for which services plaintiff agreed to pay the amount of P35,000.00 plus P3,500.00 per court appearance; A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property, MAHA tolerated petitioners stay and gave them the option to acquire portions of the property by becoming members of MAHA. Petitioners continued stay on the premises was subject to the condition that they shall comply with the requirements of the CMP. Thus, when they failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate the property as their right of possession had already expired or had been terminated. The moment MAHA required petitioners to leave, petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying the land. Well settled is the rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled in favor of MAHA. Ejectment; unlawful detainer; sole issue is physical or material possession of property, independent of claim of ownership. As to petitioners argument that MAHAs title is void for having been secured fraudulently, we find that such issue was improperly raised. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Since the only issue involved is the physical or material possession of the premises, that is possession de facto and not possession de jure, the question of ownership must be threshed out in a separate action. Corazon D. Sarmienta, et al. vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No. 182953. October 11, 2010

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Glenn Y. Escandor, et al. G.R. No. 171685, October 11, 2010. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation. Although the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is vested with primary jurisdiction under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation for lands taken under the CARP, such determination is subject to challenge in the courts. The CARL vests in the RTCs, sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The jurisdiction of the RTCs is not any less original and exclusive because the question is first passed upon by the DAR. The proceedings before the RTC are not a continuation of the administrative determination. Additionally, the administrative orders providing for the guidelines in determining just compensation are mandatory and not mere guides that the RTC may disregard. Finally, although in some expropriation cases, the Court allowed the imposition of said interest, the same was in the nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance. In this case, respondents are not entitled to interest on the final compensation considering that petitioner promptly deposited the compensation for their lands after they rejected petitioners initial valuation.Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Glenn Y. Escandor, et al. G.R. No. 171685, October 11, 2010. Republic of the Philippines vs. Angelo B. Malabanan, et al., G.R. No. 169067, October 6, 2010 Appeal; modes of appeal from decisions of regional trial court. In Murillo v. Consul, we had the opportunity to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction; (2) by petition for review under Rule 42, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The first mode of appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law. Here, petitioners appeal does not only involve a question of law. Aside from the trial courts ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint, petitioner likewise questioned the other basis for the trial courts ruling, which refers to previously decided cases allegedly upholding with finality the ownership of the Malabanans over the disputed property. As correctly argued by petitioner, the question of whether the ownership of the Malabanans has in fact been sustained with finality is factual in nature as it requires the presentation of evidence. Since the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can be imputed on petitioner for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the CA through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. Question of law distinguished from question of fact. And in Leoncio v. De Vera, this Court has differentiated a question of law from a question of fact. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented

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by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. Republic of the Philippines vs. Angelo B. Malabanan, et al., G.R. No. 169067, October 6, 2010 Financial Building Corporation vs. Rudlin International Corporation, et al./Rudlin International Corporation, et al. vs. Financial Building Corporation; G.R. No. 164186/G.R. No. 164347. October 4, 2010. Attorneys fees. We have stressed that the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule, as they are not always awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Attorneys fees as part of damages is awarded only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. Financial Building Corporation vs. Rudlin International Corporation, et al./Rudlin International Corporation, et al. vs. Financial Building Corporation; G.R. No. 164186/G.R. No. 164347. October 4, 2010 Westmont Investment Corporation vs. Farmix Fertilizer Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 165876, October 4, 2010 Intra-Corporate Controversies; motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies specifically prohibits the filing of motions for reconsideration, to wit: Sec. 8. Prohibited pleadings. The following pleadings are prohibited:

Certiorari; period to file. The petition before the CA was filed out of time. A perusal of the allegations in the subject petition reveals that though it sought the nullification of the February 2, 2004 Decision of the RTC, what it questioned was the RTCs resolve to render a judgment before trial pursuant to Section 4, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for IntraCorporate Controversies. Said section provides, Sec. 4. Judgment before pre-trial. If, after submission of the pre-trial briefs, the court determines that, upon consideration of the pleadings, the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the parties, a judgment may be rendered, the court may order the parties to file simultaneously their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days from receipt of the order. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment, either full or otherwise, not later than ninety (90) days from the expiration of the period to file the memoranda. As correctly pointed out by the Farmix Group, it is very clear that the issues raised in the subject petition pertained to previous orders of the RTC the November 12 and December 3, 2003 Orders submitting the case for decision. The November 12, 2003 Order was received by WINCORP on November 13, 2003. It then filed a Manifestation and Motion adopting the UOB Groups motion for reconsideration of said order and even raised additional arguments. Thereafter, the RTC issued the December 3, 2003 Order denying UOB Groups motion for reconsideration but there was no mention of WINCORPs manifestation and motion. Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies specifically prohibits the filing of motions for reconsideration, to wit: Sec. 8. Prohibited pleadings. The following pleadings are prohibited:

(1) Motion to dismiss; (1) Motion to dismiss; (2) Motion for a bill of particulars; (2) Motion for a bill of particulars; (3) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of judgment or order, or for re-opening of trial; (4) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper, except those filed due to clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath; and Motion for postponement and other motions of similar intent, except those filed due to clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) With the above proscription, the RTC in the first place should not have issued the December 3, 2003 Order denying the UOB Groups motion for reconsideration, which WINCORP adopted. The remedy of an aggrieved party like WINCORP is to file a petition for certiorari within sixty (60) days from receipt of the assailed order and not to file a motion for reconsideration, the latter being a prohibited pleading. Here, WINCORP should have filed the petition for certiorari before the CA on or before January 12, 2004. It was, however, filed only on February 13, 2004. With that, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright for being filed late. (3) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of judgment or order, or for reopening of trial; (4) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper, except those filed due to clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath; and (5) Motion for postponement and other motions of similar intent, except those filed due to clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

With the above proscription, the RTC in the first place should not have issued the December 3, 2003 Order denying the UOB Groups motion for reconsideration, which WINCORP adopted. The remedy of an aggrieved party like WINCORP is to file a petition for

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certiorari within sixty (60) days from receipt of the assailed order and not to file a motion for reconsideration, the latter being a prohibited pleading. Here, WINCORP should have filed the petition for certiorari before the CA on or before January 12, 2004. It was, however, filed only on February 13, 2004. With that, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright for being filed late. Even if the sixty (60)-day period will be reckoned from WINCORPs receipt of the December 3, 2003 Order, the petition for certiorari was still filed out of time since it should have been filed on or before February 2, 2004. This Court can only conclude that WINCORP filed the petition for certiorari supposedly assailing the February 2, 2004 Decision as a subterfuge to make it appear that it was filed on time when in truth it was assailing an earlier order, the period for which to assail the same has long elapsed. Westmont Investment Corporation vs. Farmix Fertilizer Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 165876, October 4, 2010 People of the Philippines vs. Juanito Cabigquez y Alastra, G.R. No. 185708. September 29, 2010. Qualified Rape. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the crime of qualified rape is committed when the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity. People of the Philippines vs. Juanito Cabigquez y Alastra, G.R. No. 185708. September 29, 2010. United Airlines, Inc. vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 178788, September 29, 2010. National Internal Revenue Code; international air carriers; Gross Philippine Billings; regular income tax. Inasmuch as the taxpayer has ceased operating passenger flights to or from the Philippines in 1998, it is not taxable under Section 28(A)(3)(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), or on 2 1/2% of its Gross Philippine Billings (GPB). The correct interpretation of said provisions is that, if an international air carrier maintains flights to and from the Philippines then it shall be taxed at the rate of 2 1/2 % of its GPB, while international air carriers that do not have flights to and from the Philippines but nonetheless earn income from other activities in the country will be taxed at the rate of 32% [now 30%] of such income. National Internal Revenue Code; claims for refunds. Under Section 72 [Suit to Recover Tax Based on False or Fraudulent Returns] of the National Internal Revenue Code, the Court of Tax Appeals can make a valid finding that taxpayer made erroneous deductions on its gross cargo revenue; that because of the erroneous deductions, taxpayer reported a lower cargo revenue and paid a lower income tax thereon; and that taxpayers underpayment of the income tax on cargo revenue is even higher than the income tax it paid on passenger revenue subject of the claim for refund, such that the refund cannot be granted. On the assumption that taxpayer filed a correct return, it had the right to file a claim for refund of the Gross Philippine Billings (GPB) tax on passenger revenues it paid in 1999 when it was not operating passenger flights to and from the Philippines. However, upon examination by the CTA, taxpayers return was found erroneous as it understated its gross cargo revenue for the same taxable year due to deductions of two items. Having underpaid the GPB tax due on its cargo revenues for 1999, taxpayer is not entitled to a refund of its GPB tax on its passenger revenue, the amount of the former being even much higher than the tax refund sought. United Airlines, Inc. vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 178788, September 29, 2010.

People of the Philippines vs. Elpidio Parohinog Alejandro, G.R. No. 186232, September 27, 2010. Evidence; testimony of witness. The fact is that AAAs testimony is not flawless. However, it is but ordinary for a witness, a rape victim no less, to have some inconsistencies in her statements since not only had the rapes occurred four or five years prior to her testimony but her testimony pertains to facts and details of shameful events that she would rather forget. Truly, if not for the motivation to seek justice for the molestations she had gone through, AAA would choose to bury those details in the deepest recesses of her memory. Moreover, inconsistencies may be attributed to the well-known fact that a courtroom atmosphere can affect the accuracy of the testimony and the manner in which a witness answers questions. Likewise, inconsistencies in the testimony of a rape victim are inconsequential when they refer to minor details that have nothing to do with the essential fact of the commission of the crime carnal knowledge through force or intimidation. People of the Philippines vs. Elpidio Parohinog Alejandro, G.R. No. 186232, September 27, 2010. Gregorio Dimarucot y Garcia vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183975, September 20, 2010. Appeal; failure to file appellants brief. Under Sec. 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, a criminal case may be dismissed by the CA motu proprio and with notice to the appellant if the latter fails to file his brief within the prescribed time. The phrase with notice to the appellant means that a notice must first be furnished the appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed. The purpose of such a notice is to give an appellant the opportunity to state the reasons, if any, why the appeal should not be dismissed because of such failure, in order that the appellate court may determine whether or not the reasons, if given, are satisfactory. Appeal; failure to file appellants brief. In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner was served with a notice requiring him to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file appellants brief. Notwithstanding such absence of notice to the appellant, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in considering the appeal abandoned with the failure of petitioner to file his appeal brief despite four (4) extensions granted to him and non-compliance to date. Dismissal of appeal by the appellate court sansnotice to the accused for failure to prosecute by itself is not an indication of grave abuse. Thus, although it does not appear that the appellate court has given the appellant such notice before dismissing the appeal, if the appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration of, or to set aside, the order dismissing the appeal, in which he stated the reasons why he failed to file his brief on time and the appellate court denied the motion after considering said reasons, the dismissal was held proper. Likewise, where the appeal was dismissed without prior notice, but the appellant took no steps either by himself or through counsel to have the appeal reinstated, such an attitude of indifference and inaction amounts to his abandonment and renunciation of the right granted to him by law to prosecute his appeal. Gregorio Dimarucot y Garcia vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183975, September 20, 2010 Attorney; mistake binding on client. Petitioner cannot simply harp on the mistakes and negligence of his lawyer allegedly beset with personal problems and emotional depression. The negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the client. There are exceptions to this rule,

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such as when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the general rule results in the outright deprivation of ones property or liberty through a technicality. However, in this case, we find no reason to exempt petitioner from the general rule. The admitted inability of his counsel to attend fully and ably to the prosecution of his appeal and other sorts of excuses should have prompted petitioner to be more vigilant in protecting his rights and replace said counsel with a more competent lawyer. Instead, petitioner continued to allow his counsel to represent him on appeal and even up to this Court, apparently in the hope of moving this Court with a fervent plea for relaxation of the rules for reason of petitioners age and medical condition. Verily, diligence is required not only from lawyers but also from their clients. Gregorio Dimarucot y Garcia vs.. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183975,September 20, 2010. BGen. (Ret.) Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Hon. Jose R. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 173057-74, September 20, 2010. Judges; inhibition. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial. BGen. (Ret.) Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Hon. Jose R. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 17305774, September 20, 2010. Chevron Philippines, Inc. vs. Bases conversion Development Authority and Clark Development Corporation. G.R. No. 173863, September 15, 2010. Police power; taxation versus regulation. In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power, the determining factor is the purpose of the implemented measure. If the purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though the measure results in some form of regulation. On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed a regulation and an exercise of the police power of the state, even though incidentally, revenue is generated. In this case, the royalty fees were imposed by the Clark Development Corporation (CDC) primarily for regulatory purposes, and not for the generation of income or profits as petitioner claims. These fees form part of the regulatory mandate of CDC to ensure free flow or movement of petroleum fuel to and from the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). Being the administrator of CSEZ, CDC is responsible for ensuring the safe, efficient and orderly distribution of fuel products within the CSEZ. Addressing specific concerns demanded by the nature of goods or products involved is encompassed in the range of services which respondent CDC is expected to provide under the law, pursuant to its general power of supervision and control over the movement of all supplies and equipment into the CSEZ. Chevron Philippines, Inc. vs. Bases conversion Development Authority and Clark Development Corporation. G.R. No. 173863, September 15, 2010. Metropolitan Bank & trust Company, Inc. vs. The Board of Trustees of Riverside Mills Corp. Provident and Retirement Fund, et al., G.R. No. 176959, September 8, 2010. Corporation; dissolution. Under Section 122 of the Corporation Code, a dissolved corporation shall nevertheless continue as a body corporate for three (3) years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose and convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for which it was established. Within those three (3) years, the corporation may appoint a

trustee or receiver who shall carry out the said purposes beyond the three (3)-year winding-up period. Thus, a trustee of a dissolved corporation may commence a suit which can proceed to final judgment even beyond the three (3)-year period of liquidation. In the same manner, during and beyond the three (3)-year winding-up period of RMC, the Board of Trustees of RMCPRF may do no more than settle and close the affairs of the Fund. The Board retains its authority to act on behalf of its members, albeit,in a limited capacity. It may commence suits on behalf of its members but not continue managing the Fund for purposes of maximizing profits. Here, the Boards act of issuing the Resolution authorizing petitioner to release the Fund to its beneficiaries is still part of the liquidation process, that is, satisfaction of the liabilities of the Plan, and does not amount to doing business. Hence, it was properly within the Boards power to promulgate. Metropolitan Bank & trust Company, Inc. vs. The Board of Trustees of Riverside Mills Corp. Provident and Retirement Fund, et al., G.R. No. 176959, September 8, 2010. Metropolitan Bank & trust Company, Inc. vs. The Board of Trustees of Riverside Mills Corp. Provident and Retirement Fund, et al., G.R. No. 176959, September 8, 2010. Attorneys fees. Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code allows the award of attorneys fees in cases where the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. Attorneys fees may be awarded by a court to one who was compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his or her interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission of the party from whom it is sought. Retirement funds; trust. RMC was a company that set up a fund for its employees called RMCPRF. Petitioner contends that RMCs closure in 1984 rendered the RMCPRF Board of Trustees functus officio and devoid of authority to act on behalf of RMCPRF. It thus belittles the RMCPRF Board Resolution dated June 2, 1998, authorizing the release of the Fund to several of its supposed beneficiaries. Without known claimants of the fund for 11 years since RMC closed shop, it claims that fund had technically reverted to, and formed part of RMCs assets. Hence, it could be applied to satisfy RMCs debts to Philbank. The court disagreed with the petitioner in this case. A trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property which involves the existence of equitable duties imposed upon the holder of the title to the property to deal with it for the benefit of another. A trust is either express or implied. Express trusts are those which the direct and positive acts of the parties create, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to create a trust. Here, an express trust was created to provide retirement benefits to the regular employees of RMC. RMC retained legal title to the Fund but held the same in trust for the employees-beneficiaries. Employees trusts or benefit plans are intended to provide economic assistance to employees upon the occurrence of certain contingencies, particularly, old age retirement, death, sickness, or disability. They give security against certain hazards to which members of the Plan may be exposed. They are independent and additional sources of protection for the working group and established for their exclusive benefit and for no other purpose. Here, while the plan provides for a reversion of the fund to RMC, this cannot be done until all the liabilities of the plan have been paid. And when RMC ceased operations in 1984, the fund became liable for the payment not only of the benefits of qualified retirees at the time of

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RMCs closure but also of those who were separated from work as a consequence of the closure. Metropolitan Bank & trust Company, Inc. vs. The Board of Trustees of Riverside Mills Corp. Provident and Retirement Fund, et al., G.R. No. 176959, September 8, 2010. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, et al. G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010. Court decisions; statement of fact and law. The Constitution commands that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Judges are expected to make complete findings of fact in their decisions and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. The Court has sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction, notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were written; and even if there (was left) much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and comprehensibility, provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based, as when they stated the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability; or discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty; or quoted the facts narrated in the prosecutions memorandum, but made their own findings and assessment of evidence, before finally agreeing with the prosecutions evaluation of the case. On the other hand, the Court has expressed concern over the possible denial of due process when an appellate court failed to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, thus depriving the appellant of a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the trial court. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. The Court of Appeals (CA) decision in this case cannot be deemed constitutionally infirm, as it clearly stated the facts and law on which the ruling was based, and while it did not specifically address each and every assigned error raised by appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants were left in the dark as to how the CA reached its ruling affirming the trial courts judgment of conviction. The principal arguments raised in their Memorandum submitted before the Supreme Court actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged sufficiency of prosecution evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations of torture, probative value of ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances qualifying the offense and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court. Custodial investigation; right to counsel. Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. The police officers here claimed that upon arresting one of the accused and before questioning him, they informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent, that any information he would give could be used against him, and that he had the right to a

competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of counsel he will be provided with one. However, since these rights can only be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have been such a valid waiver by the accused, who was presented by the police investigators to the lawyer of the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall, for the taking of his formal statement only the following day and stayed overnight at the police station before he was brought to said counsel. Thus, the constitutional requirement had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, the Court rejected the appellants contention that the accused was not given a counsel of his own choice, as he never objected to the IBP lawyer when the latter was presented to him to be his counsel for the taking down of his statement. The phrase preferably of his own choice does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede or obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. Thus, while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsels appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. The Constitution gives the person under custodial investigation the right to a competent and independent counsel. The modifier competent and independent is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer. An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent. The right to counsel has been written into the Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel. Where the prosecution failed to discharge the States burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative value.

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Right to speedy disposition of cases. Section 16, Article III of the Constitution provides that all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. This protection extends to all citizens and covers the periods before, during and after trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. However, just like the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial, speedy disposition of cases is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays, which render rights nugatory. The determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court held that the delay of four years during which the case remained pending with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, et al. G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs.People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, et al., G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010 Murder; credibility of witness. It is axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not the one who rendered the judgment, but merely relied on the record of the case, does not render his judgment erroneous or irregular. This is so even if the judge did not have the fullest opportunity to weigh the testimonies, not having heard all the witnesses speak or observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Verily, a judge who was not present during the trial can rely on the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process. The validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial. Evidence; ballistics report. A ballistic report serves only as a guide for the courts in considering the ultimate facts of the case. It would be indispensable if there are no credible eyewitnesses to the crime inasmuch as it is corroborative in nature. The presentation of weapons or the slugs and bullets used and ballistic examination are not prerequisites for conviction. The corpus delicti and the positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime are more than enough to sustain his conviction. Evidence; ballistics report. Even without a ballistic report, the positive identification by prosecution witnesses is more than sufficient to prove accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, since the identity of the assailant has been sufficiently established, a ballistic report on the slugs can be dispensed with in proving petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs.People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, et al., G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010 Eugenio Feliciano, et al. vs. Pedro Canoza, et al., G.R. No. 161746, September 1, 2010. Prescription. Petitioners argue that the CA erroneously treated the action they filed at the trial court as one (1) for annulment of the extrajudicial settlement and applied the four (4)-year

prescriptive period in dismissing the same. They contend that the action they filed was one (1) for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Titles, Recovery of Real Property and Damages, and as such, their action was imprescriptible pursuant to Article 1410 of the Civil Code. Respondents, for their part, maintain that the CA did not err in holding that the deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of the partition and did not consent thereto, is merely fraudulent and not void. They stress that the action to rescind the partition based on fraud prescribes in four (4) years counted from the date of registration, which is constructive notice to the whole world. We affirm the ruling of the CA. As the records show, the heirs of Doroteo and Esteban did not participate in the extrajudicial partition executed by Salina with the other compulsory heirs, Leona, Maria and Pedro. Undeniably, the said deed was fraudulently obtained as it deprived the known heirs of Doroteo and Esteban of their shares in the estate. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Hence, an action to set it aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted. Such action for the annulment of the said partition, however, must be brought within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Eugenio Feliciano, et al. vs. Pedro Canoza, et al., G.R. No. 161746, September 1, 2010. Heirs of Jane Honrales vs. Jonathan Honrales/People of the Philippines and Heirs of Jane Honrales vs. Jonathan Honrales, G.R. No. 182651/G.R. No. 182657. August 25, 2010. Double jeopardy; defined. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. Double jeopardy; requisites. Thus, double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Double jeopardy; requisites. In the instant case, the Metropolitan Trial Court took cognizance of the Information for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide while the criminal case for parricide was still pending before the Regional Trial Court. There is no double jeopardy in the instant case. In Dioquino v. Cruz, Jr., the Supreme Court held that once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the Information is filed, it is there retained. Therefore, as the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in parricide was included in the charge for intentional parricide pending before the Regional Trial Court, the Metropolitan Trial Court clearly had no jurisdiction over the criminal case filed before it, the Regional Trial Court having retained jurisdiction over the offense to the exclusion of all other courts. The requisite that the judgment

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be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent. A decision rendered without jurisdiction is not a decision in contemplation of law and can never become executory. Heirs of Jane Honrales vs. Jonathan Honrales/People of the Philippines and Heirs of Jane Honrales vs. Jonathan Honrales, G.R. No. 182651/G.R. No. 182657. August 25, 2010. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146, August 25, 2010. Public officers; statement of assets and liabilities. Even an asset that was acquired through chattel mortgage must be declared and included in the Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL). The law requires that the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and in detail without distinction as to how the property was acquired. Respondent, therefore, cannot escape liability by arguing that the ownership of the vehicle has not yet passed to him on the basis that it was acquired only on installment basis. The requirement to file the SSAL not later than the first 15 days of April at the close of every calendar year must not be treated as a simple and trivial routine, but as an obligation that is part and parcel of every civil servants duty to the people. It serves as the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of officials and employees in the government in compliance with the Constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, promote transparency in government, and ensure that all government employees and officials lead just and modest lives. It is for this reason that the SSAL must be sworn to and is made accessible to the public, subject to reasonable administrative regulations. . Presidential Anti-Graft Commission; powers. The Court rejected respondents contention that he was deprived of his right to due process when the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) proceeded to investigate him on the basis of an anonymous complaint in the absence of any documents supporting the complainants assertions. Section 4(c) of Executive Order No. 12 states that the PAGC has the power to give due course to anonymous complaints against presidential appointees if there appears on the face of the complaint or based on the supporting documents attached to the anonymous complaint a probable cause to engender a belief that the allegations may be true. The use of the conjunctive word or in the said provision is determinative since it empowers the PAGC to exercise discretion in giving due course to anonymous complaints. Because of the said provision, an anonymous complaint may be given due course even if the same is without supporting documents, so long as it appears from the face of the complaint that there is probable cause. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146, August 25, 2010. NASECO Guards Association PEMA vs. National Service Corporation, G.R. No. 165442, August 25, 2010. Labor case; due process; reevaluation. A reevaluation is a process by which a person or office (in this case the DOLE secretary) revisits its own initial pronouncement and makes another assessment of its findings. In simple terms, to reevaluate is to take another look at a previous matter in issue. From a procedural standpoint, a reevaluation is a continuation of the original case and not a new proceeding. The evidence, financial reports and other documents submitted by the parties in the course of the original proceeding are to be visited and reviewed again. A reevaluation does not necessitate the introduction of new materials for review nor does it require a full hearing for new arguments. Hence, failure to order the presentation of new evidence in the reevaluation of an Order is not a violation of due process. NASECO Guards Association PEMA vs. National Service Corporation, G.R. No. 165442, August 25, 2010.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, et al, G.R. No. 159275, August 25, 2010. Certiorari; motion for reconsideration required; exceptions. As a rule, the special civil action ofcertiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure lies only when the lower court has been given the opportunity to correct the error imputed to it through a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution. This rule, though, admits the following exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in cases of urgency. As a fourth exception, the Supreme Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. In this case, aside from the public interest involved in the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth by the Government, it was shown that the issue herein raised by petitioner had already been squarely argued by it and amply discussed by public respondent in its assailed resolution. Hence, the requirement of prior filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with. Certiorari; appropriateness of remedy. Certiorari is also an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order (1) when the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and (2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. Recourse to a petition for certiorari to assail an interlocutory order is now expressly recognized in the ultimate paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, et al, G.R. No. 159275, August 25, 2010. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heir of Trinidad S. Vda. De Arieta. G.R. No. 161834, August 11, 2010. Agrarian reform; deposit of provisional compensation. The amount of provisional compensation that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is required to deposit in the name of the landowner if the latter rejects the offer of compensation of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657 should be the LBPs initial valuation of the land and not, as respondent argues, the sum awarded by DARs adjudication bodies as compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. The deposit of such provisional compensation must be made even before the summary administrative proceeding commences, or at least simultaneously with it, once the landowner rejects the initial valuation of the LBP. Such deposit results from the landowners rejection of the DAR offer (based on the LBPs initial valuation). Both the conduct of summary administrative proceeding and deposit of provisional compensation follow as a consequence of the landowners rejection. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heir of Trinidad S. Vda. De Arieta. G.R. No. 161834, August 11, 2010. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. vs. OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. and Spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez, G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010. Family Code; family home; exemption from foreclosure. We note that the claim of exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code, thereby raising issue on the mortgaged condominium unit being a family home and not corporate property, is entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual agreement of the REM. Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged

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condominium unit constitutes respondents family home, the same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the same Code allows the execution or forced sale of a family home for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. vs. OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. and Spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez, G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010. People vs. Rustico Bartolin, G.R. No. 179498, August 3, 2010. Qualifying rape; damage awards. Where the special qualifying circumstances of age and relationship, although not alleged in the information, are nonetheless established during the trial, the award of civil indemnity and moral damages in conviction for simple rape should equal the award of civil indemnity and moral damages in conviction for qualified rape. Truly, BBBs moral suffering is just as great when her father who raped her is convicted for qualified rape as when he is convicted only for simple rape due to a technicality. Thus, the Court modified the award of civil indemnity and moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each count of rape. People vs. Rustico Bartolin, G.R. No. 179498, August 3, 2010. Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia Brewery vs. Asia Brewery, Inc., G.R. No. 162025, August 3, 2010. Union; eligibility of confidential employees to join. Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. In the present case, there is no showing that the secretaries/clerks and checkers assisted or acted in a confidential capacity to managerial employees and obtained confidential information relating to labor relations policies. And even assuming that they had exposure to internal business operations of the company, as respondent claims, this is not per se ground for their exclusion in the bargaining unit of the rank-andfile employees. Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia Brewery vs. Asia Brewery, Inc., G.R. No. 162025, August 3, 2010. Luciano Briones and Nelly Briones vs. Jose Macabagdal, Fe D. Macabagdal and Vergon Realty Investments Corporation, G.R. No. 150666, August 3, 2010. Damages; moral damages; compensatory damages; attorneys fees. Take note of this case for its input on attorneys fees. Considering that petitioners acted in good faith in building their house on the subject property of the respondent-spouses, there is no basis for the award of moral damages to respondent-spouses. Likewise, the Court deletes the award to Vergon of compensatory damages and attorneys fees for the litigation expenses Vergon had incurred as such amounts were not specifically prayed for in its Answer to petitioners third-party complaint. Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation are recoverable only in the concept of actual damages, not as moral damages nor judicial costs. Hence, such must be specifically prayed foras was not done in this caseand may not be deemed incorporated within a general prayer for such other relief and remedy as this court may deem just and equitable. It must also be noted that aside from the following, the body of the trial courts decision was devoid of any statement regarding attorneys fees. In Scott Consultants & Resource Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we reiterated that attorneys fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of

the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorneys fees. Property; builder in good faith. Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the mistake was done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have built the house in good faith. When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448 of the Civil Code governs. This article covers cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful expenses they may have made on the subject property as provided in Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code. Consequently, the respondent-spouses have the option to appropriate the house on the subject land after payment to petitioners of the appropriate indemnity or to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than the value of the structures, in which case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent. Luciano Briones and Nelly Briones vs. Jose Macabagdal, Fe D. Macabagdal and Vergon Realty Investments Corporation, G.R. No. 150666, August 3, 2010. People vs. T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus, Jr., G.R. No. 178778, August 3, 2010. Parricide; elements. The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. People vs. T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus, Jr., G.R. No. 178778, August 3, 2010. People vs. Wilson Lopez, et al., G.R. No. 176354, August 3, 2010. Evidence; alibi. The defense of alibi to be believed, must be supported by the most convincing evidence, as it is an inherently weak argument that can be easily fabricated to suit the ends of those who seek its recourse. Alibi must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses; otherwise, it is fatal to the accused. Further, for alibi to prosper, appellants must prove not only that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that it was not physically possible for them to have been at the scene of the crime or within its immediate vicinity. In the present case, appellants alibi was corroborated by their

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relatives and friends who may not have been impartial witnesses. Thus, their defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the circumstantial evidence establishing their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. People vs. Wilson Lopez, et al., G.R. No. 176354, August 3, 2010. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Ramon P. Jacinto, G.R. No. 154622, August 3, 2010. Bouncing Checks Law; prejudicial question. The High Court dismissed respondents contention that the novation of the credit line agreement was a prejudicial question in the prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. According to the Court, the mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. The agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the gravamen of the offense being the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. Thus, even if it will be subsequently declared that a novation took place between respondents and petitioner, respondents are still not exempt from prosecution for violation of B.P. 22 for the dishonored checks. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Ramon P. Jacinto, G.R. No. 154622, August 3, 2010. Rey Vargas, et al. vs. Atty. Michael Ignes, et al., A.C. No. 8096, July 5, 2010. Attorney; engagement of private counsel by GOCC. In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation, we listed three (3) indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire a private lawyer: (1) private counsel can only be hired in exceptional cases; (2) the GOCC must first secure the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be; and (3) the written concurrence of the COA must also be secured. Failure to comply with all three conditions would constitute appearance without authority. A lawyer appearing after his authority as counsel had expired is also appearance without authority. Rey Vargas, et al. vs. Atty. Michael Ignes, et al., A.C. No. 8096, July 5, 2010. People of the Philippines vs. Alioding Sultan, G.R. No. 187737, July 5, 2010. Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of shabu; elements. For the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. All these requisites were met by the prosecution in this case. Corpus delicti; handling. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 was originally envisioned by the legislature to serve as a protection for the accused from malicious imputations of guilt by abusive police officers. The illegal drugs being the corpus delicti, it is essential for the prosecution to prove and show to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the illegal drugs presented to the trial court as evidence of the crime are indeed the illegal drugs seized from the accused. Section 21, paragraph No. 1, prescribes the method by which law enforcement agents/personnel are to go about in handling the corpus delicti at the time of seizure in order to ensure full protection to the accused. It reads: SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/ Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or

surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. However, Section 21 was not meant to thwart the legitimate efforts of law enforcement agents. Slight infractions or nominal deviations by the police from the prescribed method of handling the corpus delicti should not exculpate an otherwise guilty defendant. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 9165 adequately reflects the desire of the law to excuse from the rigid tenor of Section 21 situations wherein slight infractions in methodology are present but the integrity and identity of the specimen remains intact. It reads in part: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. In this case, the failure of the apprehending officer to immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the prohibited drugs in the presence of the accused as required by Section 21 can be considered as a slight infraction that does not automatically render the seized items inadmissible. There is a justifiable reason for such failure in this case as was explained by the police officer during his cross-examination. People of the Philippines vs. Alioding Sultan, G.R. No. 187737, July 5, 2010.

Magdalena Hidalgo, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179793, July 5, 2010. Employees; government agency. The Armed Forces of the Philippines Commissary and Exchange Services (AFPCES) is a government agency performing proprietary functions. By clear implication of law, all AFPCES personnel should therefore be classified as government employees and any complaint for illegal dismissal involving such employees should be filed with the CSC and not the NLRC. Such fact cannot be negated by the failure of AFPCES to follow appropriate civil service rules in the hiring, appointment, discipline and dismissal of employees. Neither can it be denied by the fact that AFPCES chose to enroll its employees in the SSS instead of the GSIS. Such considerations cannot be used against the CSC to deprive it of its jurisdiction. Hence, the Labor Arbiters decision in the illegal dismissal case filed by AFPCES employees is a total nullity for having been rendered without jurisdiction. Magdalena Hidalgo, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179793, July 5, 2010. Republic of the Philippines vs. Domingo Espinosa. G.R. No. 176885, July 5, 2010. Public lands; registration. All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State. Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant. A notation on the advanced survey plan stating in effect that the subject property is alienable and disposable is not sufficient to establish the actual legal classification of the disputed lot. It is not the kind of evidence required by law to establish that the land is alienable and disposable. The approved survey plan merely identifies the property preparatory to a judicial

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proceeding for adjudication of title. Republic of the Philippines vs. Domingo Espinosa. G.R. No. 176885, July 5, 2010. People of the Philippines vs. Calonge y Verana, G.R. No. 182793, July 5, 2010. Aggravating circumstance; treachery. In the killing of victims in this case, the trial court was correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the attack is so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no opportunity either to avert the attack or to defend himself. Indeed, nothing can be more sudden and unexpected than when a father stabs to death his two young daughters while they were sound asleep and totally defenseless. Parricide; elements. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. Parricide; penalty. Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for parricide is composed of two (2) indivisible penalties,namely, reclusion perpetua to death. Evidence; circumstantial evidence. The oft-repeated rule has been that circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven and the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person. People of the Philippines vs. Calonge y Verana, G.R. No. 182793, July 5, 2010. Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Joseph Jude Carantes, et al., G.R. No. 181274, June 23, 2010. Philippine Economic Zone Authority; jurisdiction over building and fencing permits. By specific provision of law, it is the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), through its building officials, which has authority to issue building permits for the construction of structures within the areas owned or administered by it, whether on public or private lands. Corollary to this, PEZA, through its director general, may require owners of structures built without said permit to remove such structures within 60 days. Otherwise, PEZA may summarily remove them at the expense of the owner of the houses, buildings or structures. Considering that, in this case, a fencing permit is issued complementary to a building permit and that, within its premises, PEZA may properly issue a building permit, it is only fitting that fencing permits be issued by PEZA within such premises. Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Joseph Jude Carantes, et al., G.R. No. 181274, June 23, 2010. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, represented herein by Dir. Gen. Lilia B. De Lima vs. Joseph Jude Carantes and all the other heirs of Maximino Carantes, G.R. No. 181274. June 23, 2010

Appeals; late filing excused in interest of substantial justice. It is settled that an appeal must be perfected within the reglementary period provided by law; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory. Before the Supreme Court, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. Even then, review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and may be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. In the case at bar, the Docket Division of the OSG received a copy of the CA decision on November 7, 2007. It was not until February 1, 2008 or almost three (3) months however, that the OSG, for petitioner, filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. The OSG pleads for understanding considering the scarcity of its lawyers and the inadvertence of the temporarily-designated OIC of Division XV in overlooking that the CA decision was adverse to PEZA. While the Court realizes the OSGs difficulty in having only three (3) lawyers working full time on its cases, the OSG could have easily asked for an extension of time within which to file the petition. More importantly, as the government agency tasked to represent the government in litigations, the OSG should perform its duty with promptness and utmost diligence. However, upon careful consideration of the merits of this case, the Court is inclined to overlook this procedural lapse in the interest of substantial justice. Although a party is bound by the acts of its counsel, including the latters mistakes and negligence, a departure from this rule is warranted where such mistake or neglect would result in serious injustice to the client. Indeed, procedural rules may be relaxed for persuasive reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. More so, when to allow the assailed decision to go unchecked would set a precedent that will sanction a violation of substantive law. Such is the situation in this case. Injunction; requisites. Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a particular act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction. As a main action, injunction seeks to permanently enjoin the defendant through a final injunction issued by the court and contained in the judgment. Section 9, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides, SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction. Two (2) requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. Particularly, in actions involving realty, preliminary injunction will lie only after the plaintiff has fully established his title or right thereto by a proper action for the purpose. To authorize a temporary injunction, the complainant must make out at least a prima facieshowing of a right to the final relief. Preliminary injunction will not issue to protect a right notinesse. These principles are equally relevant to actions seeking permanent injunction. Philippine Economic Zone

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Authority, represented herein by Dir. Gen. Lilia B. De Lima vs. Joseph Jude Carantes and all the other heirs of Maximino Carantes, G.R. No. 181274. June 23, 2010 People of the Philippines vs. Susan Latosa y Chico, G.R. No. 186128, June 23, 2010. Parricide; exempting circumstance; accident. Since appellant argues that the exempting circumstance of accident should be appreciated by the Court in her favor, it is therefore incumbent upon her to prove with clear and convincing evidence that the following essential requisites of the exempting circumstance are present: [i] she was performing a lawful act; [2] with due care; [3] she caused the injury to her husband by mere accident; and [4] without fault or intention of causing it. The Court however, found it incredulous that the pointing of the gun towards her husbands head and pulling the trigger be considered as performing a lawful act with due care. People of the Philippines vs. Susan Latosa y Chico, G.R. No. 186128, June 23, 2010. Office of the City Mayor of Paraaque City, et al. vs. Mario D. Ebio and His Children/Heirs namely, Arturo V. Ebio, Eduardo, et al., G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010 Parties; indispensable party. Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a final decree would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence. In contrast, a necessary party is one whose presence in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy but whose interest is separable such that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them. In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of Paraaque from proceeding with its implementation of the road construction project. The State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action where no positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation shall be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it be an indispensable party if none of its properties shall be divested nor any of its rights infringed. Preliminary injunction; right in esse. We also find that the character of possession and ownership by the respondents over the contested land entitles them to the avails of the action. A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing. It should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never arise. In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the local government of Paraaque for the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local government of Paraaque. From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Paraaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not

confer, ownership. Office of the City Mayor of Paraaque City, et al. vs. Mario D. Ebio and His Children/Heirs namely, Arturo V. Ebio, Eduardo, et al., G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010 Office of the City Mayor of Paraaque City, et al. vs. Mario D. Ebio and His Children/Heirs namely, Arturo V. Ebio, Eduardo, et al., G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010. In the June of 2010 case of Office of the City Mayor of Paraaque City, et al. vs. Mario D. Ebio and His Children/Heirs namely, Arturo V. Ebio, Eduardo, et al., G.R. No. 178411. June 23, 2010 , the Court noted that the State does not have any authority to convey a property through the issuance of a grant or a patent if the land is no longer a public land. It then stated: Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Property; Ownership; Alluvial Deposits. In case you ever wondered who owns land formed by alluvial deposits, wonder no more. The ownership of such land is governed by Article 84 of theSpanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code. Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. According to this article, accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands. In this regard, Article 457 of the Civil Code states that [T] o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. Property; Ownership; Prescription. In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the local government of Paraaque for the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local government of Paraaque. From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one conclusion can be made: that for more than 30 years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Paraaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership. Property; Ownership; Registration Does Not Confer Title. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of

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lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership. Office of the City Mayor of Paraaque City, et al. vs. Mario D. Ebio and His Children/Heirs namely, Arturo V. Ebio, Eduardo, et al., G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010. The People of the Philippines vs. Lito Macapanas y Ecija, G.R. No. 187049, May 4, 2010. Rape; evidence. The fact that AAA did not immediately reveal that she was raped by appellant does not necessarily impair AAAs credibility. It is settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. Death threats cannot be taken against the victim. The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. In this case, the delay in reporting the sexual assault was reasonable and explained: AAA explained that she did not immediately inform anyone of her ordeal because she was ashamed and afraid because appellant had threatened to kill her. Thus, her reluctance that caused the delay should not be taken against her. Neither can it be used to diminish her credibility nor undermine the charge of rape. The People of the Philippines vs. Lito Macapanas y Ecija, G.R. No. 187049, May 4, 2010. Allan C. Go, doing business under the name and style of ACG Express Liner vs. Mortimer F. Cordero/Mortimer F. Cordero vs. Allan C. Go, doing business under the name and style of ACG Express Liner, et al.,G.R. No. 164703/G.R. No. 164747, May 4, 2010 Appeal; findings of fact of lower courts conclusive upon Supreme Court. The existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court. We see no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA that respondents acted in bad faith and in utter disregard of the rights of Cordero under the exclusive distributorship agreement. Jurisdiction; submission to jurisdiction by voluntary appearance and request for affirmative relief. We find no error committed by the trial court in overruling Robinsons objection over the improper resort to summons by publication upon a foreign national like him and in an action in personam, notwithstanding that he raised it in a special appearance specifically raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them in the manner required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss filed by Robinson specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack of personal jurisdiction, it must be noted that he had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the time provided in the summons by publication. Such motion did not state that it was a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by publication issued by the court and praying for additional time to file a responsive pleading. Consequently, Robinson having acknowledged the summons by publication and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief in his motion for additional

time, he effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial courts jurisdiction. He is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even before this Court. Parties; real party-in-interest. First, on the issue of whether the case had been filed by the real party-in-interest as required by Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which defines such party as the one (1) to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The purposes of this provision are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy. A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. On this issue, we agree with the CA in ruling that it was Cordero and not Pamana who is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines as shown by the Certification dated June 1, 1997 issued by Tony Robinson. Petitioner Go mentions the following documents also signed by respondent Robinson which state that Pamana Marketing Corporation represented by Mr. Mortimer F. Cordero was actually the exclusive distributor: (1) letter dated 1 June 1997; (2) certification dated 5 August 1997; and (3) letter dated 5 August 1997 addressed to petitioner Cordero concerning commissions to be paid to Pamana Marketing Corporation. Such apparent inconsistency in naming AFFAs exclusive distributor in the Philippines is of no moment. For all intents and purposes, Robinson and AFFA dealt only with Cordero who alone made decisions in the performance of the exclusive distributorship, as with other clients to whom he had similarly offered AFFAs fast ferry vessels. Moreover, the stipulated commissions from each progress payments made by Go were directly paid by Robinson to Cordero. Respondents Landicho and Tecson were only too aware of Corderos authority as the person who was appointed and acted as exclusive distributor of AFFA, which can be gleaned from their act of immediately furnishing him with copies of bank transmittals everytime Go remits payment to Robinson, who in turn transfers a portion of funds received to the bank account of Cordero in the Philippines as his commission. Out of these partial payments of his commission, Cordero would still give Landicho and Tecson their respective commission, or cuts from his own commission. Respondents Landicho and Tecson failed to refute the evidence submitted by Cordero consisting of receipts signed by them. Said amounts were apart from the earlier expenses shouldered by Cordero for Landichos airline tickets, transportation, food and hotel accommodations for the trip to Australia. Allan C. Go, doing business under the name and style of ACG Express Liner vs. Mortimer F. Cordero/Mortimer F. Cordero vs. Allan C. Go, doing business under the name and style of ACG Express Liner, et al.,G.R. No. 164703/G.R. No. 164747, May 4, 2010 Allan C. Go, doing business under the name and style of ACG Express Liner vs. Mortimer F. Cordero/Mortimer F. Cordero vs. Allan C. Go, doing business under the name and style of ACG Express Liner, et al., G.R. No. 164703/G.R. No, 164747. May 4, 2010. Damages; amount in tort interference. The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract can be held liable. Respondents were therefore correctly held liable for the balance of petitioners commission from the sale. Damages; moral; exemplary; attorneys fees. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the

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requirements of an award of exemplary damages are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established; (2) that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; and (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. The award of exemplary damages is thus in order. However, we find the sums awarded by the trial court as moral and exemplary damages as reduced by the CA, still excessive under the circumstances. Moral damages are meant to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injuries unjustly caused. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. Moral damages are not punitive in nature and were never intended to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant. There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. Trial courts are given discretion in determining the amount, with the limitation that it should not be palpably and scandalously excessive. Indeed, it must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered. Because exemplary damages are awarded, attorneys fees may also be awarded in consonance with Article 2208 (1). Damages; solidary liability. Respondents argument that he cannot be held liable solidarily with the other party for actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees awarded to respondent since no law or contract provided for solidary obligation in these cases, is bereft of merit. Conformably with Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for the quasi-delict is solidary. Obligations arising from tort are, by their nature, always solidary. Quasi-delict; human relations. The failure of respondents to act with fairness, honesty and good faith in securing better terms for the purchase of high-speed catamarans from AFFA, to the prejudice of the petitioner as the duly appointed exclusive distributor, is proscribed by Article 19 of the Civil Code. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional. Quasi-delict; tort interference. While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides: Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a

valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification. In this case, the presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. As to the third element, the Supreme Court cited its ruling in So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals that noted how authorities have debated on whether interference may be justified where the defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. One view is that, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferers interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection. Moreover, justification for protecting ones financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. The court noted that as early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, it had held that where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind ones conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler. While the court does not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others, the conduct complained must transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. Malice connotes ill will or spite, and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. The act of the respondents in inducing Robinson and AFFA to enter into another contract directly with ACG Express Liner to obtain a lower price for the second vessel resulted in AFFAs breach of its contractual obligation to pay in full the commission due to the petitioner and unceremonious termination of the petitioners appointment as exclusive distributor. Such act may not be deemed malicious if impelled by a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. The attendant circumstances, however, demonstrated that respondents transgressed the bounds of permissible financial interest to benefit themselves at the expense of the petitioner. Allan C. Go, doing business under the name and style of ACG Express Liner vs. Mortimer F. Cordero/Mortimer F. Cordero vs. Allan C. Go, doing business under the name and style of ACG Express Liner, et al., G.R. No. 164703/G.R. No, 164747. May 4, 2010. Mayor Quintin B. Saludaga vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 189431 & 191120, April 7, 2010. Election case; forum shopping. Forum shopping is the institution of two (2) or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs. There is forum shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one (1) forum, or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari. Under paragraph 2, Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, if the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum

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shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. In determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendencia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. For the principle of res judicata to apply, the following elements must be present: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. In the present case, the second element is wanting. Under Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a division shall be resolved by the Commission en bancexcept motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order. When the COMELEC, Second Division issued the September 4, 2009 Order, the appeal of respondents election protest was still pending resolution by the COMELEC en banc. Clearly, the September 4, 2009 Order of the COMELEC, Second Division granting execution pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration is in the nature of an interlocutory order one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. Therefore, in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure, any motion to reconsider such interlocutory order of the division shall be resolved by the division which issued it. Otherwise stated, the Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner to question the September 4, 2009 Order issued by the COMELEC, Second Division had to be resolved also by the Second Division, not by the COMELEC en banc. Since the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction over petitioners Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, its January 20, 2010 Resolution does not amount to res judicata in relation to the present petition. Notably, in the certificate of forum shopping of Saludagas Petition before us, he disclosed that an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the September 4, 2009 Order is also pending before the COMELEC en banc. Even then, the mere filing of a separate case, as in the original action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner in G.R. No. 189431, after filing a responsive pleading in the other case, does not necessarily constitute forum shopping. To reiterate, there is forum shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one (1) forum, or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari. Clearly, there is no forum shopping in this case to warrant an outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 189431. Election case; motion for execution pending resolution of motion for reconsideration. On May 3, 2007, the Supreme Court promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC or the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials. Section 11(a), Rule 14 of said rules sets the criteria for execution pending appeal as follows: SEC. 11. Execution pending appeal. On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court, while still in possession of the original records, may, at its discretion, order the execution of the decision in an election contest before the expiration of the period to appeal, subject to the following rules: (a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with three-day notice to the adverse party. Execution pending appeal shall not issue without prior notice and hearing. There

must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal. The court, in a special order, must state the good or special reasons justifying the execution pending appeal. Such reasons must: (1) constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injury or damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal; and (2) be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of the protestee or the victory of the protestant has been clearly established. By analogy, this standard is also applicable in the grant of execution pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a division of the COMELEC. Petitioner assails the September 4, 2009 Order for three (3) reasons. First, the Second Division of the COMELEC failed to certify and elevate the records of the case upon the lapse of ten (10) days in accordance with Item 6(b) of Comelec Resolution No. 8654. Second, the September 4, 2009 Order was signed by the Presiding Commissioner alone. Lastly, respondents Motion for Execution Pending Motion for Reconsideration does not satisfy the criteria in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC. We shall tackle each objection separately. On August 4, 2009, the COMELEC promulgated COMELEC Resolution No. 8654 for the purpose of adopting rules on the payment of COMELEC appeal fees and on the disposition of motions for reconsideration of decisions, resolutions and orders on election protest cases, appeal cases and special relief cases of a division to conform to our ruling in Aguilar v. COMELEC and Insoy. Item 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 8654 provides: 6. If a motion for the execution of the decision or resolution of the Division is filed prior to the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, or within two days after the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration and the case was not yet certified to or elevated to the Commission en banc, the Division may, at its own discretion: a. Certify and elevate the case, together with the Motion for Execution as part of the records of the case, to the Commission En Banc within the two day period as prescribed in Section 5, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. b. Stay for a period of not more than ten (10) days from the filing of the Motion for Execution, the elevation of the case to the Commission En Banc, in order to resolve said Motion for Execution. Upon the expiration of the tenday period, the Divisionshall immediately certify and elevate the case, together with all the records, to the Commission En Banc for appropriate action. (Emphasis supplied). Prior to the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution issued by a division of the COMELEC or during the pendency of such motion for reconsideration but before the case is certified or elevated to the COMELEC en banc, the motion for execution may be

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acted upon by the division that issued the decision or resolution. Under Item 6(a), a division of the COMELEC may choose to elevate both the main action and the motion for execution to the COMELEC en banc. Item 6(b), on the other hand, contemplates a situation where the division decides to rule on the motion for the execution of its decision or resolution. In the latter, the division may defer the elevation of the case to the Commission en banc in order to resolve the motion. After the lapse of ten (10) days from the filing of the motion for execution, however, the division shall immediately certify and elevate the case, together with all the records including the motion for execution to the Commission en banc for appropriate action. This describes the second scenario when the COMELEC en banc may rule on a motion for execution pending the resolution of the motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of a division. In the case at hand, respondent filed a motion for execution of the Resolution dated August 12, 2009 on August 13, 2009. Thus, the Second Division of COMELEC had only until August 23, 2009 to resolve the same. In the Order dated September 4, 2009, Presiding Commissioner Ferrer, acting for the Second Division, justifies the delay in the resolution of the motion for execution by saying that it was in the interest of fair play that he required petitioner to file a comment. The Presiding Commissioner posits that the 10-day period is reckoned from the day the Second Division received petitioners comment on September 1, 2009. We cannot agree. In accordance with the express provision of the law, the ten (10) days within which a division of the COMELEC may suspend elevating the case to the Commission en banc is to be counted from the filing of the motion for execution. The language of the law is clear, plain and too simple to invite a different interpretation. Moreover, nowhere in COMELEC Resolution No. 8654 does it say that a comment is required, much less, indispensable before the division may rule on a motion for execution. ter the lapse of the 10-day period, the only power (and duty) that a division has is to certify and elevate the case, together with all the records, to the Commission en banc, for appropriate action. Hence, upon the lapse of the 10-day period or after August 23, 2009, the Second Division no longer had jurisdiction to rule on respondents motion for execution. Having done so, the September 4, 2009 Order is void for having been issued by the COMELEC, Second Division without jurisdiction. Indeed, even if said Order was promulgated within 10 days from the filing of the motion for execution, it would still be void because Presiding Commissioner Ferrer alone signed it. justify the Presiding Commissioners action, public respondent COMELEC invokes Section 6 (d), Rule 2 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure which provides, SEC. 6. Powers and Duties of the Presiding Commissioner.-The powers and duties of the Presiding Commissioner of a Division when discharging its functions in cases pending before the Division shall be as follows: xxxx (d) To sign interlocutory resolutions, orders or rulings and temporary restraining orders in cases already assigned to the Division; x x x x. However, this provision has been qualified by the amendment introduced by the Commission en banc as reflected in the Excerpts of its regular en banc meeting held on December 5, 1996. The relevant portion of the Excerpts reads:

3) The ponente in the preceding two paragraphs shall prepare interlocutory orders for signature of the Chairman or Division Chairman. Orders of substance, however, shall be referred to the Division/En Banc for clearance. (Emphasis supplied.) An order resolving a motion for execution is one (1) such order of substance that requires more than the lone imprimatur of the Division Chairman. This is so because execution pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration may issue only upon good or special reasons contained in a special order. To reiterate, such reasons must: (1) constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injury or damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal; and (2) be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of the protestee or the victory of the protestant had been clearly established. These stringent requirements demand more than a cursory evaluation of a motion for execution pending reconsideration. Hence, the need to refer such order for clearance by the Division or the COMELEC en banc, as the case may be. This amendment is reflected in Item 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8654 which identifies the division as the one (1) in possession of the discretion to either: (1) certify and elevate the case, together with the motion for execution, to the Commission en banc within the two-day period prescribed in Section 5, Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, or (2) stay, for a period of not more than ten (10) days from the filing of a motion for execution, the elevation of the case to the Commission en banc, in order to resolve said motion. Alternatively, upon the expiration of the 10-day period, the decision may immediately certify and elevate the case, together with all the records, to the Commission en banc for appropriate action. e discretion to allow execution pending reconsideration belongs to the division that rendered the assailed decision, order or resolution, or the COMELEC en banc, as the case may be not to the Presiding Commissioner. To be sure, a writ of execution pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration of a decision of the division is not granted as a matter of right such that its issuance becomes a ministerial duty that may be dispensed even just by the Presiding Commissioner. Election case; questions of fact addressed to COMELEC. Finally, in his Verified Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner raised factual issues, specifically, on the appreciation of votes and the discrepancy in the number of votes credited to each candidate in four (4) precincts. However, the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. After all, it is the constitutional commission vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Hence, we deem it proper to remand this case to the COMELEC en banc, in order that it may resolve petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 12, 2009 on the merits. Mayor Quintin B. Saludaga vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 189431 & 191120, April 7, 2010. Spouses Basilio and Norma Hilaga vs. Rural Bank of Isulan, etc., G.R. No. 179781. April 7, 2010. Rural Banks Act; redemption of mortgaged lands. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended by Republic Act Nos. 2670 and 5939, specifically provides for the redemption period for lands foreclosed by rural banks. It provides in part as follows: Loans may be granted

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by rural banks on the security of lands without Torrens titles where the owner of private property can show five years or more of peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession in the concept of an owner; x x x or of homesteads or free patent lands pending the issuance of titles but already approved, the provisions of any law or regulations to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, That when the corresponding titles are issued the same shall be delivered to the register of deeds of the province where such lands are situated for the annotation of the encumbrance: x x x Provided, That when a homestead or free patent land is foreclosed, the homesteader or free patent holder, as well as their heirs shall have the right to redeem the same within two years from the date of foreclosure in case of a land not covered by a Torrens title or two years from the date of the registration of the foreclosure in case of a land covered by a Torrens title x x x. In Sta. Ignacia Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we summarized the rules on redemption in the case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of land acquired under our free patent or homestead statutes as follows. If the land is mortgaged to a rural bank under Republic Act No. 720, as amended, the mortgagor may redeem the property within two (2) years from the date of foreclosure or from the registration of the sheriffs certificate of sale at such foreclosure if the property is not covered or is covered, respectively, by a Torrens title. If the mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the two (2)-year redemption period pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141). If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may redeem the property within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the redemption period also pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act. In the present case, petitioners admit that when the property was mortgaged, only the tax declaration was presented. Although a free patent title was subsequently issued in their favor on August 4, 1976, petitioners failed to inform the creditor rural bank of such issuance. As a result, the certificate of sale was not registered or annotated on the free patent title. Petitioners are estopped from redeeming the property based on the free patent title which was not presented during the foreclosure sale nor delivered to the Register of Deeds for annotation of the certificate of sale as required under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. Petitioners cannot fault respondent for the non-registration of the certificate of sale because petitioners did not inform the respondent bank that a Torrens title had already been acquired by them on August 4, 1976. By their silence and inaction, petitioners misled the respondent bank to believe that their only proof of ownership was the tax declaration. Thus, the two (2)-year redemption period shall be reckoned from the date of the foreclosure. For the same reason, petitioners assertion that they will have five (5) years from the date of registration of the sale to redeem the foreclosed property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act has no merit, the reckoning period for the redemption period being properly from the date of sale. But even assuming arguendo that petitioners can avail of the five (5)-year redemption period provided under Section 119 of the Public Land Act, they still failed to exercise their right of redemption within the reglementary period provided by law.

As mentioned earlier, Section 119 of said Act expressly provides that where the land involved is acquired as a homestead or under a free patent, if the mortgagor fails to exercise the right of redemption, he or his heirs may still repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the two (2)-year redemption period. The auction sale having been conducted on April 20, 1977, petitioners had until April 20, 1984 within which to redeem the mortgaged property. Since petitioner only filed the instant suit in 1999, their right to redeem had already lapsed. It took petitioners twenty-two (22) years before instituting an action for redemption. The considerable delay in asserting ones right before a court of justice is strongly persuasive of the lack of merit in petitioners claim, since it is human nature for a person to enforce his right when the same is threatened or invaded. Spouses Basilio and Norma Hilaga vs. Rural Bank of Isulan, etc., G.R. No. 179781. April 7, 2010. People of the Philippines vs. Jonjie Esoy, G.R. No. 185849, April 7, 2010 Conspiracy; elements. Accused contends that the mere fact that they boarded the jeepney at the same time does not mean that they acted in conspiracy. This contention was rejected since conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. Here, all three accused boarded the jeepney at the same time; two sat strategically in front of the victim while the other sat behind him; two of them drew out their balisongs and swung the same at the victim; and all hurriedly alighted from the jeepney at the same time. Their original and principal intention was undoubtedly to stage a robber with use of violence. Conspiracy has been established and all of them are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since the act of one is the act of all. The People of the Philippines vs. Jonjie Esoy, G.R. No. 185849, April 7, 2010 Krizia Katrina Ty-De Zuzuarregui vs. The Hon. Joselito C. Villanueva, et al., G.R. No. 183788, April 5, 2010. Pleadings; verification and certification of non-forum shopping; substantial compliance by subsequent submission. Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. The primary question that has to be resolved in this case is whether the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, erroneously signed by counsel, may be cured by subsequent compliance. Generally, subsequent compliance with the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping does not excuse a party from failure to comply in the first instance. A certification of the plaintiffs counsel will not suffice for the reason that it is the petitioner, and not the counsel, who is in the best position to know whether he actually filed or caused the filing of a petition. A certification against forum shopping signed by counsel is a defective certification that is equivalent to non-compliance with the requirement and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition. However, there are instances when we treated compliance with the rule with relative liberality, especially when there are circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified. In the case of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, while we said that, strictly, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification, the verification, signed by petitioners counsel in said case, is substantial compliance inasmuch as it served the purpose of the Rules of informing the Court of the pendency of another action or proceeding involving the same issues. We then explained that procedural rules are instruments in the speedy and

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efficient administration of justice which should be used to achieve such end and not to derail it. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, we categorically stated that while the petition was flawed as the certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, such procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice. Finally, the Court has also on occasion held that the party need not sign the verification; a partys representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification. Here, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioners counsel. Upon receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing her petition for noncompliance with the rules, petitioner submitted, together with her motion for reconsideration, a verification and certification signed by her in compliance with the said rule. We deem this to be sufficient compliance especially in view of the merits of the case, which may be considered as a special circumstance or a compelling reason that would justify tempering the hard consequence of the procedural requirement on non-forum shopping. Krizia Katrina Ty-De Zuzuarregui vs. The Hon. Joselito C. Villanueva, et al., G.R. No. 183788, April 5, 2010. People of the Philippines vs. Tirso Sace, G.R. No. 178063, April 5, 2010 Evidence rape; proof beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant claimed that the fact that he was wearing a bloodstained shirt did not mean that he committed the crime charged. He alleges that if he was guilty, he would have not have helped in searching for AAAs body. However, his conviction was upheld by the High Court stating that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt for in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence, as in this case. People of the Philippines vs. Tirso Sace, G.R. No. 178063, April 5, 2010 People of the Philippines vs. Romulo Garcia, G. R. No. 177740, April 5, 2010 Evidence; rape. Accused contend that AAA was never sexually abused because the medico-legal findings showed that there were no signs of swelling on her vagina when she was examined. However, the Court stated that the lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. Even the fact that the hymen of the victim is still intact does not rule out rape since research show that the hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus. In any case, for rape to be consummated, full penetration is not necessary. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. People of the Philippines vs. Romulo Garcia, G. R. No. 177740, April 5, 2010 Mediserv, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Special Former 13th Division), et al. G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010. Certiorari; grave abuse of discretion. Finally, we note that the instant petition was filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which requires the existence of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion exists where an act of a court or tribunal is performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. No

such grave abuse of discretion exists in this case to warrant issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Pleadings; certification of non-forum shopping; substantial compliance through subsequent submission. Unquestionably, there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to hold that Landheights has substantially complied with the verification and certification requirements. We have held in a catena of cases with similar factual circumstances that there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Court when there is a belated submission or filing of the secretarys certificate through a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision dismissing the petition for certiorari. In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, this Court acknowledged that it has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of these certifications and has applied the rule of substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances with respect to the contents of the certification. It also conceded that if this Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification against forum shopping for compelling reasons in previous rulings, with more reason should it sanction the timely submission of such certification though the proof of the signatorys authority was submitted thereafter. The Court is aware of the necessity for a certification of non-forum shopping in filing petitions for certiorari as this is required under Section 1, Rule 65, in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. When the petitioner is a corporation, the certification should obviously be executed by a natural person to whom the power to execute such certification has been validly conferred by the corporate board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents. Generally, the petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatorys authority. However, we must make a distinction between non-compliance with the requirements for certificate of non-forum shopping and verification and substantial compliance with the requirements as provided in the Rules of Court. The Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification on the justification that such act constitutes substantial compliance. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. CA, the Court allowed the filing of the certification fourteen (14) days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines, the Court reinstated a petition on the ground of substantial compliance even though the verification and certification were submitted only after the petition had already been originally dismissed. In Havtor Management Phils. Inc. v. NLRC, we acknowledged substantial compliance when the lacking secretarys certificate was submitted by the petitioners as an attachment to the motion for reconsideration seeking reversal of the original decision dismissing the petition for its earlier failure to submit such requirement. In the present case, Landheights rectified its failure to submit proof of Mr. Dickson Tans authority to sign the verification/certification on non-forum shopping on its behalf when the required document was subsequently submitted to the Court of Appeals. The admission of these documents, and consequently, the reinstatement of the petition itself, is in line with the cases we have cited. In such circumstances, we deem it more in accord with substantive justice that the case be decided on the merits. Procedural rules; liberal construction. It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial justice. Mediserv, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Special Former 13th Division), et al. G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010.

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Polytechnic University of the Philippines Vs. Golden Horizon Realty Corporation/National Development Company Vs. Golden Horizon Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 183612/G.R. No. 184260, March 15, 2010 Lease; right of first refusal; distinguished from option to buy. In the seventies, NDC had entered tinto two contracts of lease with a company called Golden Horizon Realty Corporation (GHRC). These each had a term of 10 years, renewable for another 10 upon the consent of the parties. In addition GHRC was granted an option to purchase the leased property. Before the expiration of the second lease contract, GHRC sought to exercise its option to renew the lease and requested priority to negotiate for the propertys purchase should NDC opt to sell. NDC did not respond to this request but even after the expiry of the term kept on accepting the rentals. GHRC learned that NDC had decided to secretly dispose of the land which prompted GHR to take legal action. Meanwhile, then President Aquino issued a memorandum order ordering the transfer to the National government of that NDC property. The National Government in turn transferred the property to PUP. The issue is whether the transfer of the property violated the option that had been granted to GHRC. An option is a contract by which the owner of a property agrees with another that the latter shall have the right to buy the formers property at a fixed price within a certain time. It binds the party who has given the option, not to enter into a contract with any other person during the period designated, and within that period, to enter into such a contract with the one to whom the option was granted, if the latter decides to use the option. On the other hand, a right of first refusal is a contractual grant, not of a sale of a property, but of first priority to buy the property in the event the owner sells the same. As distinguished from an option contract, in a right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right of first refusal would eb dependent not only on the owners eventual intention to enter into a transaction with another, but also on terms, including the price, that are yet to be firmed up. The option given to GHRC is obviously a mere right of first refusal and this is not disputed by the parties. What PUP and NDC assail is the conclusion that such right of first refusal subsisted even after the expiration of the original lease period when GHRC was allowed to continue staying in the leased premises under an implied renewal of lease. They argue that the right of first refusal provision was not carried over to such month-to-month lease. The court found this position untenable. Evidence shows that at the time NDC began negotiating for the transfer of the land to PUP, the right of first refusal was subsisting. Hence, whether or not the right of first refusal was carried over to the implied lease, is irrelevant. Polytechnic University of the Philippines Vs. Golden Horizon Realty Corporation/National Development Company Vs. Golden Horizon Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 183612/G.R. No. 184260, March 15, 2010 Rene Ventenilla Puse Vs. Ligaya delos Santos-Puse, G.R. No. 183678, March 15, 2010 Administrative due process. Petitioners allegation of improper venue and the fact that the complaint was not under oath are not sufficient grounds for the dismissal of the complaint. Well to remember, the case was an administrative case and as such, technical rules of procedure are liberally applied. In administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. The intention is to resolve disputes brought before such bodies in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner possible. Petitioner was likewise amply afforded administrative due process the essence of which is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The records show that petitioner filed the following: (1) Compliance-Answer to the

Complaint; (2) Rejoinder; (3) Position paper; (4) Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Board of Professional Teachers finding him guilty as charged; and (5) Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He attended the preliminary conference and hearing where he was able to adduce his evidence. With the opportunities he had, he cannot claim he was denied due process. Rene Ventenilla Puse Vs. Ligaya delos Santos-Puse, G.R. No. 183678, March 15, 2010 People of the Philippines Vs. Raymond Fabian y Nicolas, et al., G.R. No. 181040, March 15, 2010. Dangerous Drugs Act; evidence; proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court sustained the finding of the lower court that the prosecution sufficiently established appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the illegal sale of and illegal possession of dangerous drugs in violation of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecution proved that appellant Fabian illegally delivered a plastic sachet containing shabu to appellant Macalong, who knowingly possessed the same. Moreover, the subject drugs were also proven to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, as evidenced by Chemistry Report No. D-367-04 conducted by Forensic Chemical Officer and PO1 Jennifer G. Tantoy of the PNP Crime Laboratory. People of the Philippines Vs. Raymond Fabian y Nicolas, et al., G.R. No. 181040, March 15, 2010. Sandra Y Eriguel vs. Commission on Elections and Ma. Theresa Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010. COMELEC; ballot appreciation. The records of the case indicate that the COMELEC en banc proceeded to conduct a fresh appreciation of the contested ballots without first ascertaining whether the ballots to be recounted had been kept inviolate. The COMELEC cannot proceed to conduct a fresh appreciation of ballots without first ascertaining the integrity thereof. COMELEC; elevation to en banc without division decision. The COMELEC, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, is bound to follow the provision set forth in Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

It therefore follows that when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in the present case, the Commission is constitutionally mandated to decide the case first in division, and en banc only upon motion for reconsideration. Indeed, it is a basic doctrine in procedural law that the jurisdiction of a court or an agency exercising quasi-judicial functions (such as the COMELEC) over the subject-matter of an action is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties. Neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence of the court,

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more particularly so in election cases where the interest involved transcends those of the contending parties. This being so, the Special Second Division of the COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it immediately transferred to the Commission en banc a case that ought to be heard and decided by a division. Such action cannot be done without running afoul of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Instead of peremptorily transferring the case to the Commission en banc, the Special Second Division of COMELEC, should have instead assigned another Commissioner as additional member of its Special Second Division, not only to fill in the seat temporarily vacated by Commissioner Ferrer, but more importantly so that the required quorum may be attained. Sandra Y Eriguel vs. Commission on Elections and Ma. Theresa Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010. People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Tamayo y Tena, G.R. No. 187070, February 24, 2010. Dangerous Drugs Act; evidence. In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. The Supreme Court held that to sustain a conviction, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses must be unequivocal, definite and straightforward. More importantly, their testimonies must be consistent in material respects with each other and with other testimonies and physical evidence. People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Tamayo y Tena, G.R. No. 187070, February 24, 2010. Wilfredo M. Baron, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 182299, February 22, 2010. Dismissal; due process. In the dismissal of employees, it has been consistently held that the twin requirements of notice and hearing are essential elements of due process. The employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) a notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (2) a subsequent notice informing the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. With regard to the requirement of a hearing, the essence of due process lies simply in an opportunity to be heard, and not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held. Likewise, there is no requirement that the notices of dismissal themselves be couched in the form and language of judicial or quasi-judicial decisions. What is required is for the employer to conduct a formal investigation process, with notices duly served on the employees informing them of the fact of investigation, and subsequently, if warranted, a separate notice of dismissal. Through the formal investigatory process, the employee must be accorded the right to present his or her side, which must be considered and weighed by the employer. The employee must be sufficiently apprised of the nature of the charge, so as to be able to intelligently defend himself or herself against the charge. Dismissal; serious misconduct. Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial and unimportant. Such

misconduct, however serious, must nevertheless be in connection with the employees work to constitute just cause for his separation. In the present case, the Court found substantial evidence to prove that a serious misconduct has been committed to justify termination from employment. The Certified Public Accountant and Corporate Finance Manager of the company submitted a report dated February 19, 2000 stating that in spite of managements memorandum, the keys to the office and filing cabinets were not surrendered. It was likewise stated in the report that petitioner Wilfredo Baron pulled out some records without allowing a representative from the internal audit team to inspect them. He noticed Wilfredo Baron deleting some files from the computer, which could no longer be retrieved. Moreover, a member of the audit team saw Cynthia Junatas (another petitioner) carrying some documents, including a Daily Collection Report. When asked to present the documents for inspection, Junatas refused and tore the document. In addition, the audit team discovered that MSI incurred an inventory shortage of One Million Thirty Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Eight Pesos and Twenty-One Centavos (P1,030,258.21). It found that Wilfredo Baron, the operations manager, in conspiracy with the other petitioners, orchestrated massive irregularities and grand scale fraud, which could no longer be documented because of theft of company documents and deletion of computer files. Unmistakably, the unauthorized taking of company documents and files, failure to pay unremitted collections, failure to surrender keys to the filing cabinets despite earlier instructions, concealment of shortages, and failure to record inventory transactions pursuant to a fraudulent scheme are acts of grave misconduct, which are sufficient causes for dismissal from employment. Wilfredo M. Baron, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 182299, February 22, 2010. Irene Sante and Reynaldo vs. Hon. Edilberto T. Claravall, etc., et al., G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010. Jurisdiction; computation of jurisdictional amount in complaint for damages. Section 19(8) of BatasPambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, states. . . Relatedly, Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99 was issued declaring that the first adjustment in jurisdictional amount of first level courts outside of Metro Manila from P100,000.00 to P200,000.00 took effect on March 20, 1999. Meanwhile, the second adjustment from P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 became effective on February 22, 2004 in accordance with OCA Circular No. 65-2004 issued by the Office of the Court Administrator on May 13, 2004. Based on the foregoing, there is no question that at the time of the filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004, the MTCCs jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to P300,000.00. But where damages is the main cause of action, should the amount of moral damages prayed for in the complaint be the sole basis for determining which court has jurisdiction or should the total amount of all the damages claimed regardless of kind and nature, such as exemplary damages, nominal damages, and attorneys fees, etc., be used? In this regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-94 is instructive: 2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where

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the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. (Emphasis ours.) In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the recovery of damages for the alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent by reason of petitioners utterance while they were at a police station in Pangasinan. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that respondents main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint. Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case. Pleadings; amendment of complaint. Lastly, we find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the RTCs order allowing the amendment of the original complaint from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. While it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court, here, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction over the original complaint and amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right. Irene Sante and Reynaldo vs. Hon. Edilberto T. Claravall, etc., et al., G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010. Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the President,G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010. Judicial review; requisites. The courts power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Respondents assert that the second requisite is absent in this case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. The question on standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, summarizing the rules culled from jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials. Public officials; multiple office. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the MARINA, we are hardly persuaded by respondents submission that respondent Bautistas designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board, which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the following as members: Executive Secretary (Office of the President), Philippine Ports Authority General Manager, Department of National Defense Secretary, Development Bank of the Philippines General Manager, and the Department of Trade and Industry Secretary. It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words hold the office were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in

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Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in possession and administration, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, VicePresident, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. Civil Liberties Union traced the history of the times and the conditions under which the Constitution was framed, and construed the Constitution consistent with the object sought to be accomplished by adoption of such provision, and the evils sought to be avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the Marcos regime, of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of selfenrichment. The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission would draft into the proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration, which were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and employment. Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the President,G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010. Goodrich Manufacturing Corporation & Mr. Nilo Chua Goy vs. Emerlina Ativo, et al., G.R. No. 188002, February 1, 2010. Quitclaim; elements. It is true that the law looks with disfavor on quitclaims and releases by employees who have been inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities and frustrate just claims of employees. In certain cases, however, the Court has given effect to quitclaims executed by employees if the employer is able to prove the following requisites, to wit: (1) the employee executes a deed of quitclaim voluntarily; (2) there is no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties; (3) the consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (4) the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. Quitclaim; validity. In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled that the employees executed their quitclaims without any coercion from the company following their voluntary resignation from the company. The contents of the quitclaim documents are simple, clear and unequivocal. The records of the case are bereft of any substantial evidence to show that the employees did not know that they were relinquishing their right short of what they had expected to receive and contrary to what they have so declared. Put differently, at the time they were signing their quitclaims, respondents honestly believed that the amounts received by them were fair and reasonable settlements of the amounts, which they would have received had they refused to voluntarily resign from the said company. Far East Bank and Trust Company (Now Bank of the Philippine Islands) and Rolando Borja, Deputy Sherrif vs. Sps. Ernesto and Leonor C. Cayetano, G.R. No. 179909, January 25, 2010, In Far East Bank and Trust Company (Now Bank of the Philippine Islands) and Rolando Borja, Deputy Sherrif vs. Sps. Ernesto and Leonor C. Cayetano, G.R. No. 179909, January 25, 2010, the principal executed a special power of attorney in favor of her daughter authorizing her to contract

a loan from a bank and to mortgage the principals two lots. The principal also executed an affidavit of non-tenancy for the approval of the loan. The bank granted a loan secured by two promissory notes and a real estate mortgage over the principals two lots. The mortgage document was signed by the agent and her husband as mortgagors in their individual capacities, without stating that the agent was executing the mortgage contract for and in behalf of the principal. The bank foreclosed the mortgage due to non-payment of the loan. A notice of public auction sale was sent to principal. The latters lawyer responded with a letter to the bank requesting that the public auction be postponed. The letter went unheeded and the public auction was held as scheduled wherein the mortgaged properties were sold to the bank. Subsequently, the bank consolidated its title and obtained new titles in its name after the redemption period lapsed without the principal taking any action. Around five years later, the principal filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties with damages with the regional trial court (RTC) of Naga City. The principal sought nullification of the real estate mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure sale, as well as the cancellation of the banks title over the properties. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the principal, holding that the principal cannot be bound by the real estate mortgage executed by the agent unless it is shown that the same was made and signed in the name of the principal; hence, the mortgage will bind the agent only. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTCs ruling. It held that it must be shown that the real estate mortgage was executed by the agent on behalf of the principal, otherwise the agent may be deemed to have acted on his own and the mortgage is void. However, the CA further declared that the principal loan agreement was not affected, which had become an unsecured credit. The Supreme Court held that the principal is not bound by the real estate mortgage executed by the authorized agent in her own name without indicating the principal. It is not sufficient for the principal to have authorized the agent through a special power of attorney to execute the mortgage on behalf of the principal; the mortgage contract itself must clealy state that the agent was executing the mortgage contract for and on behalf of the principal. FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. SPS ERNESTO & LEONOR CAYETANO GR No. 179909, January 25 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.: FACTS: Respondent Leonor C. Cayetano (Cayetano) executed a special power of attorney in favor of her daughter Teresita C. Tabing (Tabing) authorizing her to contract a loan from petitioner and to mortgage her two lots. Petitioner loaned Tabing P100, 000.00, secured by two promissory notes and a real estate mortgage over Cayetanos two properties. The mortgage document was signed by Tabing and her husband as mortgagors in their individual capacities, without stating that Tabing was executing the mortgage contract for and in behalf of Cayetano. Petitioner foreclosed the mortgage for failure of spouses Tabing to pay the loan. The mortgaged properties were sold to petitioner through public auction. Subsequently, petitioner consolidated its title and obtained new titles in its name after the lapse of redemption period. Five years later, Tabing, on behalf of Cayetano expressed the intention to repurchase the properties for petitioner gave respondent the chance to buy back the properties by joining a bidding. Respondent

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however, filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure sale as well as the cancellation of petitioners title over the properties. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of respondents, holding that Cayetano cannot be bound by the real estate mortgage executed by Tabing unless it is shown that the same was made and signed in the name of principal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs ruling. ISSUE: Whether or not the principal is bound by the real estate mortgage executed by the authorized agent in her own name without indicating the principal. HELD: NO. It is a general rule in the law of agency that, in order to bind the principal by a mortgage on real property executed by an agent, it must upon its face purport to be made, signed and sealed in the name of the principal; otherwise, it will bind the agent only. It is not enough that the agent was in fact authorized to make the mortgage, if he has not acted in the name of the principal. Neither is it ordinarily sufficient that in the mortgage the agent describes himself as acting by virtue of a power of attorney, if in fact the agent has acted in his own name and has set in his own hand and seal to the mortgage. Notwithstanding the nullity of the real estate mortgage executed by Tabing and her husband, we find that the equity principle of laches is applicable. Records show that respondent could have filed an action to annul the mortgage on their properties, but for unexplained reasons, they failed to do so. They only questioned the loan and mortgage transactions after the lapse of more than five years from date of foreclosure sale. Celestino A. Martinez III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L. Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010. Ballots; nuisance candidates. Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed. We therefore hold that ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the elections. Accordingly, the 5,401 votes for MARTINEZ or C. MARTINEZ should be credited to petitioner giving him a total of 72,056 votes as against 67,108 total votes of private respondent. Petitioner thus garnered more votes than private respondent with a winning margin of 4,948 votes. Election protest; nuisance candidates. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. Election contests, therefore, involve the adjudication not only of private and pecuniary

interests of rival candidates, but also of paramount public interest considering the need to dispel uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the law contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. A nuisance candidate is thus defined as one who, based on the attendant circumstances, has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed, his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and not counted for either of them. In elections for national positions such as President, Vice-President and Senator, the sheer logistical challenge posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission to exercise its authority to eliminate nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or serious intention to mount a nationwide campaign. Electoral tribunal; judicial review. The judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The power of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the final outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only MARTINEZ or C. MARTINEZ written on the line for Representative, votes which should have been properly counted in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes, after considering all relevant circumstances clearly establishing that such votes could not have been intended for Edilito C. Martinez who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment.

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