Security Council

N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL
MODEL UNITED NATIONS

35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009
BACKGROUND GUIDE
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
S p e c i a l i z e d A g e n c i e s
 2008-2009 International Model United Nations Association, Inc. Used and distributed under license.
N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS
The 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009
September 2008
Nick Stefanizzi
Secretary-General
Boston University
Rosa Akbari Dear Delegates,

Director-General Welcome to NHSMUN 2009! I serve as the Undersecretary-General (USG) for Specialized
McGill University
Agencies, and this is my fifth NHSMUN and third on staff. I served as the Director and
Nancy Henry Assistant Director for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) during my first two years on
Conference Director staff, and as a delegate I was on the ICJ and Security Council, so Specials has been near and
Tufts University dear to my heart for a very long time now. I have always thought that the intimacy and
personality of our committees give our delegates a substantive experience that cannot be
Michelle Shevin
rivaled, and I am unbelievably excited to serve as the USG of Specials.
Chief of Staff
Barnard College
I’m usually a junior at Dartmouth College studying Economics and Classical Archaeology, but
Cristina Rade I’m taking the fall off to work an internship with the Naval Postgraduate School in sunny
Chief of External Relations Monterey, CA. My academic interests include international trade policy, the pottery of the
Adelphi University
Athenian empire, and the role of the UN in the modern world. In my spare time, I love
Ryan Burke arbitrarily changing the order of my Netflix queue and travel.
Director of Security
University of South Carolina My summer was spent working with your Directors to create the best background guides
possible. I can attest to the amount of thought, research, and analysis that went into making
Matthew Low Specials this year, and I can also guarantee that your conference experience will be the best
Under-Secretary-General
University of California,
possible. However, we fully expect you to put in a commensurate level of effort! Your research
Berkeley and analysis will be critical to make your committees a success.
Daniel Nowicki My only regret since I’ve become USG-Specials is that I’ll have far less interaction with
Under-Secretary-General delegates than I used to. So if you see me at any point during the conference, feel free to stop
Georgetown University
and ask me about archaeology, NHSMUN, college, or anything you want to chat about. I look
Deanna Maxfield forward to seeing you all in March, and good luck with your research!
University of Southern Sincerely,
California Jerry Guo
Emily Robertson
jerry.guo@gmail.com
Under-Secretary-General 860.420.7788
Duke University
Lisa Cuesta
University of Pennsylvania
Jerry Guo
Dartmouth College
NHSMUN is a project of the

International Model United
Nations Association, Incorporated
(IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-for-
profit, all volunteer organization, is
dedicated to furthering global
issues education at the secondary
school level.
N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS
The 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009
Nick Stefanizzi
Secretary-General September 2008
Boston University
Rosa Akbari
Director-General Dear Delegates,
McGill University
Nancy Henry Welcome to the 2009 National High School Model United Nations Conference. My name is Andrew
Conference Director Porter-Price and I will be your director for the Security Council. Currently, I am studying political
Tufts University science and economics at the University of Connecticut and am very involved in the UConn Model
UN Conference and the Beta Theta Pi Fraternity on my campus. I am unbelievably excited for this
Michelle Shevin
conference and I’m sure you will be too after all the long hours of very interesting research I’m positive
Chief of Staff
Barnard College you will put into preparing yourself for the topics! Trust me when I say that the more research you put
into these topics, the more you will grow fond of them! I attended four Model UN conferences in my
Cristina Rade two-year high school Model UN experience including two trips to the ever-growing and amazing
Chief of External Relations NHSMUN Conference! I was so impressed with the NHSMUN staff year after year that I applied to
Adelphi University
join the staff at the end of my senior year.
Ryan Burke
Director of Security The topics for the 2009 NHSMUN Security Council include the Situation in Somalia and the Situation
University of South Carolina in East Timor. Both crises have been long-standing problems for the international community and
have yet to be resolved. Concerning the situation in Somalia, the lack of unity between the Somali
Matthew Low people in forming a single legitimate government for decades has plunged much of the Horn of Africa
University of California,
into violence. Furthermore, because humanitarian aid has not been able to reach the coast of Somalia
Berkeley due to an increase in piracy, those who need the aid the most do not receive it and are consequently
forced to roam the country for aid and security.
Daniel Nowicki
Under-Secretary-General Likewise, the various political parties and foreign interests in East Timor have not allowed the country
Georgetown University
to form a government. After years of Portuguese, Japanese and Indonesian rule, the East Timorese
Deanna Maxfield people are finally beginning to participate in their own self-governance with UN peacekeeping missions
Under-Secretary-General working to stabilize the region since 1998. However, the assassination attempts on President Ramos-
University of Southern Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao necessitated a UN Security Council reevaluation of the
California legitimacy of peace in East Timor and the possibility of destabilization if another assassination attempt
Emily Robertson
actually succeeded.
Duke University Though the background guides I have prepared for you can serve as a great foundation to your
understanding of the topic, I would really encourage you to research your country’s position in even
Lisa Cuesta greater detail. Though you may not be able to find a lot of great historical resources online, I would
Under-Secretary-General suggest (if possible) researching the topics at a collegiate level library with sufficient resources. If you
University of Pennsylvania
do not know where to start with either topic, you should certainly reference the NRA resources, the
Jerry Guo rest of the bibliography, or me! Feel free to ask me questions via email about the topics, the University
Under-Secretary-General of Connecticut, the Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, or the meaning of life! I cannot wait to see you all in
Dartmouth College March!
Sincerely,
NHSMUN is a project of the
International Model United Andrew Porter-Price
Nations Association, Incorporated andrew.porter-price@uconn.edu
(IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-for-
profit, all volunteer organization, is
dedicated to furthering global Husky Village Unit 387-62
issues education at the secondary Storrs, CT 06269
school level.
The 2009 National High School Model United Nations
Security Council
A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

Delegate preparation is paramount to a successful and exciting National High School Model United Nations
2009 Conference. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in
your committee; these papers are designed to give you a description of the topics and the committee. They
will not give you a complete description of the topic areas and they will not contain the most up-to-date
information, particularly in regards to rapidly evolving issues. We encourage and expect each delegate to fully
explore the topics and be able to identify and analyze the intricacies of the issues. Delegates must be prepared
to intelligently utilize their newly acquired knowledge and apply it to their own countries’ policy. You will
find that your nation has a unique position on the topics that cannot be substituted for or with the opinions
of another nation.
The task of preparing and researching for the conference is challenging, but it can be interesting and
rewarding. We have provided each school with a copy of the Delegation Preparation Guide. The Guide
contains detailed instructions on how to write a position paper and how to effectively participate in
committee sessions. (Note: some position papers have unique guidelines that are detailed within respective
committees’ Background Guides.) The Guide also gives a synopsis of the types of research materials and
resources available to you and where they can be found. A brief history of the United Nations and the
NHSMUN conference are also included. The annotated rules of procedure complete the Delegate
Preparation Guide.
An essential part of representing a nation in an international body is the ability to articulate that nation’s views
in writing. Accordingly, it is the policy of NHSMUN to require each delegate (or double-delegation team) to
write position papers. The position papers should clearly outline the country’s policies on the topic areas to
be discussed and what factors contribute to these policies. In addition, each paper must address the Research
and Preparation questions at the end of the committee Background Guide. Most importantly, the paper
must be written from the point of view of the country you are representing at NHSMUN 2009 and
should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference. All papers should be typed and double-
spaced. The papers will be read by the Director of each committee and returned at the start of the
conference with brief comments and constructive advice.
You are responsible for sending a copy of your paper to the Director of your committee. Additionally, your
delegation is responsible for bringing a bound copy of all of the position papers—one for each committee to
which your school has been assigned—to the conference (to be submitted during registration). Specific
requirements of the bound copy have been sent to the faculty advisor/club president. In addition to position
papers, each delegation must prepare one brief summary statement on the basic economic, political, and
social structures of its country, as well as on its foreign policy. Please mail country summary statements to the
Director-General of NHSMUN 2009 at the address below. All copies should be postmarked no later than
February 16th and mailed to:
Rosa Akbari, Director-General Andrew Porter-Price

3631 av. Henri-Julien 106 Husky Village F2
Montréal, Québec H2X 3H4 Storrs, CT 06269
Canada
(Individual Position Papers)
(Country Summaries)
Delegations are required to mail hard copies of papers to the Director-General and Directors.
NHSMUN Staff will not consider e-mail submissions as an adequate substitution.
Delegations that do not submit position papers to Directors or Summary Statements to the
Director-General will be ineligible for awards.
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Security Council
COMMITTEE HISTORY
Since its establishment under the United Nations (UN) Charter in 1945, the Security Council (SC) has
continuously been an active and powerful asset to the organization as a body whose purpose is to “promote
the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security.” The Security Council was designed to
serve as a forum for global opinions with a select group of countries who often represent regional blocs. The
Council includes five permanent members and ten rotating members elected from the General Assembly. The
permanent members of the Security Council include the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation,
France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA). While the ten rotating members
have a vote in the council, the permanent members each have a veto power during the resolution process –
making their votes seemingly more powerful. Together, these member states serve as the decision-making
body of the United Nations.
The first problem the United Nations had was finding the balance between functioning as a global
government and becoming a passive entity that was ignored by its member states. The idea of a global
government emerged at the end of World War II. However, it was important that the organization maintain
its legitimacy - as Alexander Hamilton stated in the Federalist #15, “if there is no penalty annexed to
disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more
than advice or recommendation.” Though each nation within the United Nations has the right to national
sovereignty, those nations who choose to disobey the will of the collective United Nations can be sanctioned
– a form of punishment that limits economic activity with other nations – or, in more extreme and last resort
cases, collective military action by member states. When a situation arises among member states that is
deemed to threaten international peace, the SC is called upon to advise the parties involved and work towards
a peaceful resolution. The priority of the Council is always to find a peaceful solution in order to restore
security. Threats to international peace and security often arise as extreme emergencies or crises, requiring the
Security Council to take immediate and decisive action.
Delegates in the Security Council should have a general familiarity with the history of the Security Council
and their nation’s involvement in the council in order to make effective, educated decisions on both topics
and in changing situations. Some of the issues the Security Council has discussed in recent months include
the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire, the situation in Tibet, the elections in Lebanon, and the situation in
Myanmar.
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Security Council
SIMULATION
Debate
At this year’s conference, the Security Council will run similarly to how the Security Council of the United
Nations would be simulated. Delegates will represent each of the fifteen members of the real Security Council
from a number of different high schools, with one or two delegates for each country on the committee. The
committee will run according to standard parliamentary procedure and will be moderated by the Director and
the Assistant Director (AD). For more information on the Rules of Procedure, consult the Delegate
Preparation Guide or the end of this Background Guide.
The two topics for discussion will be Topic A: The Situation in East Timor and Topic B: The Situation in
Somalia. These topics will be discussed through two forms. The first is formal debate, during which any state
representative wishing to speak will be added to the speakers list and be allotted a specific amount of time,
ranging from 45 seconds to a time voted on by the delegates, to speak on the topic. The second form of
debate is caucusing – of which there are also two forms. During moderated caucuses, delegates wishing to
speak will be chosen by the director to speak for a time predetermined on a more specific subject.
Furthermore, delegates may use unmoderated caucuses to create networks of allies and brainstorm ideas for
working papers, resolutions, and amendments.
Role of the Dais
The Dais will work together to make the debate fair among all delegates and will serve as a resource to
consult during the conference. Throughout the conference, the Security Council will primarily be using
moderated caucus for debate. However, delegates may motion for a return to the speakers’ list or
unmoderated caucus which may or may not be entertained by the Dais before being voted on by the
committee. In a moderated caucus, delegates will be able to state a point within a more restricted time period
as recognized by the Dais. During an unmoderated caucus, the delegates will vote on a specific time period
for which to cooperate with other delegates in forming blocs, working papers, draft resolutions, or
amendments.
Role of the Delegates
It is the delegates’ responsibility to represent their assigned country as accurately as possible throughout the
duration of the conference. Delegates must be fully aware of their countries’ political, cultural, and social
standings. Although compromise and diplomacy are critical to passing legislation, delegates should not stray
far from their country’s actual position in order to come to a collective decision.
Delegates should remember that while all members of the committee are equally important, the permanent
five members of the committee would still be able to use their veto power to stop a resolution. It is critical
that delegates of the Security Council do enough research in order to adapt to changing situations. The
formation of blocs and cooperation between blocs will be important in drafting resolutions and debating
between nations. If delegates can do so, not only will the debate move faster, but the quality of debate will
also be more substantive.
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Security Council
THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR

TOPIC A
INTRODUCTION
Although Timor is only a tiny island in Southeast Asia, its geo-strategic importance has made it a significant
player in inter-Asian relations. During the colonial period, its geographic position allowed it to serve as both a
harbor for Portuguese trading ships and a link to the highly valued Asian spice trade. With the establishment
of a Portuguese colony on the island in 1511 the Timorese people were exploited for economic profit.
Portuguese influence in the area was weakened after World War II, prompting the colonial area known as
Timor-Leste, or East Timor, to assert its right to self-determination. In 1975, under the auspices of the Frente
Revolucionaria de Timor-Lest Independente (FRETILIN), East Timor declared independence from its Portuguese
colonizers. However, within two weeks of the declaration, neighboring Indonesia had invaded the island and
was pushing towards Dili, East Timor’s capital city. Between 1975 and 1999, repeated United Nations
resolutions asked Indonesia to withdraw its forces from East Timor because of alleged human rights abuses
and East Timor’s right to self-determination. However, it was not until 30 August 1999 that a special UN
referendum was held between Indonesia, Portugal, and the United States on the situation in East Timor. The
referendum resulted in East Timor’s independence with the assistance of the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), helping to establish the transitional government in Dili.
With the assistance of the United Nations, East Timor finally became a fully independent republic with a
parliamentary government in May 2002. On 27 September 2002, East Timor became a Member State of the
United Nations. Since then, UNTAET has been succeeded by a smaller UN peacekeeping force called the
UN Mission for the Support of East Timor (UNMISET), which was succeeded in 2005 by an even smaller
force known as the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL). However, just as violence in East Timor seemed
to have subsided, violence broke out again in 2006 and in early 2008, after a failed assassination attempt on
both the Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao and President Jose Ramos-Horta’s lives that forced Ramos-Horta
to leave the country for two months to receive adequate medical care in a safe environment. In addition,
more than 150,000 people have been forced to leave their homes due to the rebel violence. The death of the
President or the Prime Minister could easily destabilize the new state through increased corruption and
swelling refugee populations.
HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE
Portuguese Colonization
Portuguese trade ships first discovered the Southeast Asian island in 1511. The geographic location of Timor
allowed Portugal to establish significant trade ties with the regional spice market after settling on the island of
Solor in 1566. Timor soon became both a trading port and a launch pad into other parts of Southeast Asia.
The Portuguese brutally and quickly conquered the island after the defeat of the kingdoms of Sonbai and
Babli (Carey 24). Like many other colonial expansions of the period, the Europeans justified their invasion
on the religious salvation of the Timorese people, when in fact they were establishing a buffer against Dutch
aggression. The Roman Catholic Portuguese forcibly converted the Timorese in a push for religious
homogeneity.
Portuguese prosperity did not last. In 1749 the Dutch attempted to invade Timor several times, finally
succeeding in the Battle of Penfui, and subsequently gained the rights to settle inland (Hagerdal). As the
Dutch settled and expanded in the western portion of Timor, Portugal was forced to move the Timorese
capital city of Lifau, which is located on the northwestern side of the island, further east to Dili in 1769.
Although Lifau was originally established as the first colonial capital of the entire island, because of the
substantial Dutch force in West Timor, the original capitol was not secure enough for the Portuguese. Both
countries’ borders and control of the island was a continuous problem from the mid-1800s until 1913, when
“the Hague Court established the final border between Dutch (west) Timor and Portuguese (east) Timor”
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Security Council
(Pinto 4). “This resulted in the ‘Sentença Arbitral’, a decision … on 25 June 1914 which was signed in 1915.
This divided the island equally, with Dutch control in the west and Portuguese in the east. The Portuguese
retained the enclave of Oecussi Ambeno on the north-west coast (the site of the former, pre-1769,
Portuguese capital of Lifau), and the islands of Atauro and Jaco” (Carey 31). Though the borders were settled,
the tension between the two colonies remained and has exacerbated many of the challenges to the
maintenance of peace.
As colonial powers like Britain, France, and Germany became more powerful and spread throughout North
and South America, Africa, and Southeast Asia, it became more important for Portugal to expand and create
other colonies or exploit existing colonies for additional economic benefit. Consequently, in the 1860s
Governor Afonso de Castro began exploiting the East Timorese by forcing civilians into manual labor and
cultivation programs. Later, a 1908 ruling levied a heavy head tax on all male Timorese inhabitants between
the ages of 18 and 60 – hoping to keep males subdued under the Portuguese administration. However, this
heavy taxation and civilian maltreatment precipitated a 1912 Timorese rebellion, when up to “3,424 East
Timorese were killed and 12,567 wounded” (Pinto 6). The rebellion failed to affect change in the colonial
government. (See Appendix, figure I.)
W orld W ar II: Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere
Japanese aggression near the end of World War II made the fight for Southeast Asia critical. Hoping to force
alliances with other Asian countries, Japan formed the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere – a plot to
invade surrounding countries and establish puppet governments under Imperial Japanese control. Japanese
forces overran Indochina, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies in search of new markets and
commodities like oil, timber, and rubber that were needed to fuel the war effort (Pinto 7). When Japan had
reached Timor, a Timorese fighting force attempted to defend the island against 20,000 Japanese troops
(Carey 32). While they kept the Japanese force at bay for a year, the Japanese controlled the island by January
1943 (Budiardjo 4).
While the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was able to invade many countries, the puppet
governments they established were not effective in mobilizing a strong resistance to the Allied offensive. East
Timor suffered immense damage from the conflict, with about 14% of the pre-war population dead and
many communities ravaged (4).
Portugal Returns
After the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945
respectively, Japan capitulated on 15 August, formally ending World War II in the Pacific theater. Japan’s rule
over its colonies quickly ended, leaving West Timor to the Indonesian Republic and East Timor to the
Portuguese by December of 1949. Unfortunately, the Portuguese did little to help the East Timorese society
rebuild its infrastructure throughout the 1950s. In fact, the Portuguese even forced the Timorese to
“reconstruct government buildings and port facilities [and] their primary concern was to improve the
conditions for the cultivation of export crops” (Carey 32). Even while the United Nations trumpeted the
rights to self-determination for all peoples, the Timorese continued to be governed by colonialists and
suffered economic exploitation.
Because of the increasingly repressive Portuguese policies in the decades following WWII, rebellious political
parties, such as the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), began to form throughout the
country. These political parties were mostly run secretly throughout the 1970s, as there was a fear of further
Portuguese brutality. One aspect of the Portuguese brutality included establishing rigid social classes among
the Timorese during the 1950s. The census of the population can be seen in the Appendix (figure II: Census
Data) (Joliffe 42). Though the Portuguese attempted to integrate some Timorese into government
institutions, the great majority were treated unfairly as a result of this imposed class structure. Eventually, the
Portuguese government undertook steps towards decolonization, including the appointment of a new
governor of East Timor, Colonel Lemos Pires. Pires oversaw the decolonization process that led to a brief
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Security Council
period of Timorese independence (Taylor 38). However, political unrest in Lisbon made it increasingly
difficult for the Portuguese government to resolve the East Timor issue.
Political parties seize control
When a coup d’état in Portugal overthrew the fascist government of Marcelo Caetano on 25 April 1974, the
political parties in East Timor began operating publicly. The major political parties that emerged included the
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), a pro-Portugal conservative party, the aforementioned Revolutionary Front for
an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), a party supporting decolonization and full independence, and the
Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti), a small integrationist party. All of these groups wanted to take
control of the East Timorese government from the weak Portuguese administration because the coup d’état
in Portugal left the colonial government at a standstill.
Additional foreign interests in East Timor played a vital part in ending Portuguese control of East Timor.
Most notably were the Indonesian forces that were looking to lead one party to overthrow the government by
relaying false information; “early in August 1975, Indonesian General Ali Murtopo himself told UDT leaders
in Jakarta that a FRETILIN coup was imminent, and encouraged them to take preemptive action” (Carey 64).
With the UDT thinking that another party was soon to overthrow the weak Portuguese administration, on 11
August 1975, the UDT became the first party to seize control of the Portuguese administration in East
Timor.
After taking control of the government institutions throughout the country, the UDT began to enforce
policies similar to those the Portuguese government had adopted prior to the coup d’état in Lisbon. Though
the UDT was concerned with FRETILIN attempting to overthrow their newly formed government, the
UDT did not force members of FRETILIN out of the country or into prison. Eventually, this led to the
UDT’s collapse. FRETILIN’s mission of improving domestic conditions was far more accepted by the East
Timorese people than the pro-Portuguese affinity of the UDT. Consequently, after the UDT had overthrown
the Portuguese administration, FRETILIN seized power and removed the UDT members from the East
Timorese government.
The founders of FRETILIN, including Jose Ramos-Horta, the current President of East Timor, then
proceeded to establish a national government that focused on healthcare, education, nursery care, and
agricultural programs. “One of the most important areas of FRETILIN’s work was its program to tackle
widespread illiteracy which affected 93% of the pre-1974 population” (Carey 34) FRETILIN saw the illiteracy
of the country as a barricade to peace and rural development. “From October 1974, FRETILIN members
travelled widely, collecting material for a literacy handbook in Tetum, the most widely used of East Timor’s
many languages” (34) Additionally, while FRETILIN worked towards decreasing the rate of illiteracy
throughout the country, they also created a “health program in which treatments to deal with East Timor’s
most common diseases, including tuberculosis, malaria, and elephantiasis, were introduced in a framework
which combined modern treatments and the use of traditional cures” (34). The efforts FRETILIN put
toward increasing the standard of living for the nation made them more popular and legitimized their
governance of the people. “FRETILIN respected Portuguese symbols and institutions and called for a peace
conference that would include Portugal and Indonesia” and would formalize the process of decolonization,
providing East Timor formal independence (Pinto 17). On 28 November 1975, the Timorese government
under FRETILIN declared independence amidst Indonesian forces taking over Atabae, the first city to fall on
the western border of East Timor before the full-scale invasion. The invasion of another foreign power when
the nation was so close to independence led many East Timorese to join resistance forces in the hopes of
securing their freedom.
Domino Effect: Indonesia invades
Many Western powers were afraid of the Communist domino effect in Southeast Asia and the newly
independent Timorese government may have been persuaded by Marxist ideology if presented with the right
incentives. As a result, the United States of America established and developed friendly relations with
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Indonesia and supplied that country with military equipment, including 16 OV-10F Bronco ground-attack
aircraft to invade East Timor (Richardson). “By 1975, 90% of the military equipment being used by the
Indonesian army was supplied by the USA” (Budiardjo 9). The Western power believed that Indonesian
influence in East Timor would prevent the small island from falling to Communist influence.
Although Indonesian forces had been present on the island for some time, on 7 December 1975, the full-
scale invasion of East Timor took place. The capital, Dili, was swarmed with Indonesian troops throughout
the month. Fifteen to twenty thousand additional troops landed on 25 December 1975. The Indonesians had
a three-pronged plan of attack that included 6,000 troops landing in Indonesian Timor and then driving north
into Portuguese Timor. One battalion invaded from the northeast coast. The two forces were set to
eventually converge on Dili and crush any resistance. “Australian intelligence put the number of Indonesian
troops in East Timor at the time at 32,000 plus another 10,000 being held in reserve in West Timor”
(Budiardjo 23).
The Timorese resistance led by the political party FRETILIN and the Armed Forces for the National
Liberation of Timor Leste (FALINTIL) was manifested through brutal campaigns between 1975 and 1981.
The Indonesian campaigns focused on “pacifying the territory (1975 – 7), to “encircle and annihilate” the
population outside Indonesian-held areas (1977 – 8), and to hunt down FRETILIN groups through “fence of
legs” (pagar betis) operations” (Carey 36). However, because the majority of the Timorese supported the
resistance movement by FRETILIN and FALINTIL, campaigns such as the “fence of legs” operations, using
Timorese civilians as human chain search groups, often led to the capture of only a few resistance fighters
because the Timorese often found ways to hide the resistance fighters and lead the Indonesian troops away
from FRETILIN encampments. While the Timorese civilians were able to escape the Indonesian brutality at
first, before long the resistance fighters were unable to continue their large scale retaliation and began to
convince civilians to return to their homes. The resistance once again became an underground system of
retaliation against the foreign oppressors.
The Indonesian invasion and the ensuing rule over East Timor led to many human rights abuses and the
deaths of many Timorese civilians. One of the most startling accounts of the brutality of the Indonesian
occupation is given by Carmel Budiardjo in his seminal book The War Against East Timor:
“According to a Catholic priest who was in Dili after the invasion, as many as 2,000 citizens of the capital,
some 700 of them Chinese, were killed in the first days of the Indonesian invasion … Hundreds of Timorese
and Chinese were gunned down at random … In one such incident, a large number of Apodeti supporters
who had just been released from internment by FRETILIN, went out to greet their liberators (the Indonesian
troops, CB – LSL), to be machine-gunned for their trouble. A number of public executions were carried out
at random, and others with the help of Apodeti collaborators. One of the most bizarre and gruesome of these
atrocities occurred within 24 hours of the invasion and involved the killing of about 150 people. This
shocking spectacle began with the execution of more than 20 women who, from various accounts, were
selected at random … The women were led out to the edge of the jetty and shot one at a time, with the
crowd of shocked onlookers being forced at gun-point to count loud as each execution took place”
(Budiardjo 128).
“On 12 November 1979, Indonesia’s new foreign minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja estimated that 120,000
Timorese had died since 1975” (Kiernan 594). Other less biased reports indicate the figure was higher. For
example, another source explained the death toll much differently. “On the eve of the Indonesian invasion in
1975 the colony had an area of about 7,300 square miles and a population of about 680,000 people, with an
annual growth rate of about 2 per cent. This means that today there should be at least 950,000 people in the
territory but, based on recent Indonesian statistics, the population of what is now designated the 27th
province of Indonesia was in 1993 only about 740,000 people, of whom about 150,000 are non-Timorese
who have in recent years moved into the territory” (Carey 59). This source places the death toll at
approximately three times the number than the Indonesian figure from 1979.
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Security Council
UN Referendum
Although Western powers such as the Untied States had helped Indonesia invade East Timor because of the
fear of the domino effect in Southeast Asia, the United Nations as a whole did not approve of Indonesia’s
invasion. By December 1975, the UN General Assembly (GA) and the Security Council (SC) had both
condemned the invasion and called for Indonesian withdrawal with resolutions A/RES/30/3484 and
S/RES/384. The SC also called for a special UN Representative to visit East Timor and assess the situation.
However, because of the violence throughout Timor, the special representative was often blocked from
visiting parts of East Timor. From 1976 to 1982, the GA repeatedly called for Indonesian withdrawal,
rejected the proposal of integration, and emphasized the importance of self-determination in East Timor.
Indonesia, conversely, did not acknowledge any wrongdoing, arguing that they had saved the country from
further destabilization after the Portuguese administration had been overthrown.
In A/RES/37/30, the GA instructed Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to initiate discussions “with
all parties directly concerned” and to report to the GA later in 1984 (A/RES/37/30). In that same year, the
UN Human Rights Commission also became involved in the situation in East Timor, openly supporting self-
determination for East Timor and condemning the human rights abuses by Indonesia. However, no real
progress was made on the issue until 1989 when Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar proposed a Portuguese
mission to East Timor to address international concerns about human rights abuses. Instead, the proposal
was ultimately aborted due to rising concerns about an additional foreign presence in East Timor and it is
speculated that the lack of UN oversight les to an infamous massacre at Santa Cruz by the Indonesian army in
November 1991 (Martin 126).
While human rights abuses continued throughout East Timor, the GA did not draft any resolution on East
Timor from 1983 until 1999, when international attention created enough pressure for the creation of a
special UN referendum between Indonesia, Portugal, and the United States on the situation in the country.
The referendum resulted in East Timor’s independence with the assistance of the UN mission to establish a
transitional government in Dili.
Independence
East Timor’s recent independence began with the fall of Indonesian President Suharto in May of 1998.
Domestic and international pressure on Suharto to resign increased after Suharto “engineered his ritual re-
election to a seventh five-year term. [Domestic] protests set off three days of destructive rioting in Jakarta
that caused at least 500 deaths and shocked the nation into a consensus that Mr. Suharto must go” (Mydans).
After resigning, Suharto turned power over to his vice president B.J. Habibe. Habibe offered East Timor
wide-ranging autonomy. However, because of the long-held animosity between the two sides, the only thing
that would appease the resistance fighters was full independence. Many Timorese thought the new
Indonesian dictator would be just as reluctant to grant independence as Suharto, but on 29 January 1999,
Habibie announced that he would be willing to separate East Timor from Indonesian territory if the
Timorese did not accept his offer of wide-ranging autonomy.
To determine what the Timorese wanted to do with their right to self-determination, a country-wide vote was
hosted by the United Nations. Many factors made this proposal extremely difficult; violence from pro-
Indonesian militia groups forced Timorese away from their homes and getting 450,000 Timorese to first
register and later actually vote was incredibly difficult. To make matters worse, “the announcement on 4
September 1999 that 78.5% of the East Timorese had voted for independence was the impetus for pro-
Indonesian militias and the Indonesian army to launch a destructive campaign throughout East Timor”
(Martin 131). This violence caused over 250,000 East Timorese to flee into West Timor. However, because
of UNTAET’s humanitarian subdivision, “125,000 refugees had repatriated by the end of 1999 ... and by the
end of UNTAET some 30 – 40,000 refugees remained in West Timor” (Martin 135). To help quell the
violence by these Pro-Indonesian militia groups and to protect the United Nations Mission in East Timor
(UNAMET), the Security Council approved INTERFRET, a coalition force led by Australia. Meanwhile,
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“Security Council resolution 1272 (25 October 1999) effectively entrusted UNTAET with
the full administrative powers of a state, a robust peacekeeping role, the coordination of
humanitarian assistance and economic development, and preparation for self-government.
However, the mandate left several key questions unanswered, including the roadmap leading
to self-government, the relationship of the governance and public administration component
to the future East Timorese government, and the mechanisms for consultation with the East
Timorese … The initial maximum authorized strength of UNTAET was 9,150 military,
1,640 police, 1,670 international civilian personnel (including 486 UN volunteers) and 1,905
East Timorese staff (mainly in administrative support functions)” (Martin 133).
While the SC had approved a sizable task force to stabilize East Timor, there were also many setbacks with
both the peacekeeping force and the degree of devastation East Timor had experienced. The violence
throughout the country had forced many Timorese to escape, “37 of a total of 58 power stations were
inoperable” (UNDAF), between 40 and 70% of East Timorese buildings had been destroyed, and all public
administrative activities had stopped (Martin 134). Furthermore, because West Timor is still under Indonesian
control, pro-Indonesian militias could easily strike the East Timorese and return to West Timor for
protection.
After the SC resolution entrusted UNTAET with full administrative powers in 1999, an East Timorese
transitional government became the next step. One of the first notable achievements of the UNTAET
mission included the successful election of a Constituent Assembly in 2001 and the finalization of a working
constitution. Additionally East Timor joined the United Nations as a member state on 27 September 2002,
which was however, a sign of progress for the newly independent nation.
V iolence Continues
In May of 2002, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was succeeded by a smaller
UN peacekeeping force called the UN Mission for the Support of East Timor (UNMISET). In 2005,
UNMISET was succeeded by an even smaller force called the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL). By this
point, the East Timorese government had been established as the ruling power for the country and the
United Nations forces there were no longer required. The government included a Constituent Assembly, a
working Constitution, a Prime Minister and a President. However, just as the government became more
secure and began forging national unity, “about 600 members of the army, known as Loromonu, from the
western part of the country, went on strike to protest what they contended was ethnic discrimination and a
lack of promotions by the military’s leadership. In April, the strikers were fired, and they formed a dissident
group that has battled the remaining army since then” (Perlez). In response to the protesting military, the East
Timorese government asked for military support from Australia, who quickly supplied the nation with 2,700
Australian troops to help protect the capital city of Dili from additional violence. Reports indicate that
because of the violence more than 100,000 refugees attempted to leave East Timor.
Allegations against Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri regarding his role in helping to supply the rebellious soldiers
forced President Xanana Gusmao to ask for his resignation on 26 June 2006, and he later selected Jose
Ramos-Horta to replace Mr. Alkatiri as Prime Minister.
On 20 May 2007, Gusmao stepped down from office to allow Horta to be sworn in as the President of East
Timor after winning the democratic election in the second round of voting. In August 2007, Gusmao was
sworn in as the Prime Minister.
Assassinations and Elections
In February of 2008, both President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao were allegedly targeted in
assassination attempts by former East Timor Defense Force Major Alfred Reinado and former Lieutenant
Gastao Salsinha, respectively. These men deserted the Timor Leste Defense Force in order to conduct a low-
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scale war against the current government. While Reinado died in the attempted assassination, Salsinha
escaped (O’Connor).
After the assassination attempts, East Timor elected to become a “state under siege” (Budi) Because of this
classification, every topic for discussion by the government was tabled excepting the efforts to find Gastao
Salsinha and the others who attempted the assassinations and stabilizing the present government. However,
“as part of the attempt to address East Timor's ongoing political crisis, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon
has agreed to a proposal to hold elections earlier than the summer of 2009 as scheduled” (Budi). These
elections, especially being the second round of free elections for East Timor, will be critical to the legitimacy
and stabilization of the government. President Ramos-Horta recently stated that “early elections in East
Timor can bring advantages to all [political parties]” (Budi). However, the Timorese political parties are still
debating the timeframe in which the elections should be held.
CURRENT STATUS
Peacekeeping M ission Evaluation
Though President Horta has asked UN peacekeepers to stay in the nation until 2012, the United Nations has
continued to pull its troops out of East Timor. The Security Council must assess the effectiveness of the
peacekeeping mission and might, because of President Horta’s concern, consider extending the mission. The
UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste’s mandate was “to support the Government in consolidating stability,
enhancing a culture of democratic governance, and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese
stakeholders in their efforts to bring about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion.”
If the mission is to stay, it is important for the mandate to include helping the economy stabilize and grow
stronger.
Refugees
Since World War II, East Timorese civilians have attempted to escape the violence of the Japanese,
Portuguese and Indonesian armies that have sought to exploit the nation. Although many refugees have
repatriated since the United Nations missions have improved the stability of the country, because of the rebel
violence, more than 150,000 people have been forced to leave their homes in recent years. These refugees,
living in camps, are not able to obtain steady employment and consequently, remain poor. In order to
stabilize the country, these refugees must be allowed and encouraged to return to their homes under secure
conditions.
Sustainability
In a joint program supported by the UN, the Inclusive Finance for the Under-Served Economy (INFUSE)
program is seeking to help the economically disadvantaged people of East Timor establish a sustainable
economy. “It seeks to contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in
particular the goal of cutting absolute poverty in Timor-Leste by one third by 2015, by increasing sustainable
access to financial services for the poor and low-income people.” While the United Nations is working to
increase the standard of living among the Timorese, President Ramos-Horta is also committed to the effort.
Horta, who has been involved in the political process since his early years in FRETILIN, worked to get the
water off the coast of East Timor legally under Timorese control. “The infamous Timor Gap Treaty (11
December 1989), which has attempted to divided East Timor’s offshore oil resources between Indonesia and
Australia, a matter subject to Portuguese litigation at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, is
perhaps the most blatant manifestation of this exploitation” (Carey 13). Though Indonesia granted the
Australian government possession over certain water areas between East Timor and Australia in 1989, Horta
continued to contest the validity of a treaty which does not even mention the rights and interests of the East
Timorese themselves.
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BLOC POSITIONS
W estern Bloc
Although Western involvement in East Timor previously led to the invasion of the island by Indonesia, most
Western governments have since then supported East Timor’s right to self-determination. Though Western
countries will want to avoid overstepping into an Asian dispute, most would still attempt to influence
decisions.
Asian Countries
Since the end of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the majority of Asian countries have developed
themselves and helped other countries as much as they could. “Asian countries were well represented within
UNAMET. Bangladesh, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and
Thailand, as well as Australia and New Zealand, were represented among the 270 civilian police, while
Bangladesh, Malaysia and Thailand, as well as Australia and New Zealand, contributed to the contingent of 50
military liaison officers” (Martin 130). These countries all see the development of economies throughout Asia
positively and the political unrest of one nation as a destabilizing for the entire region.
Africa
Countries across Africa, as a result of their own experiences with colonization, tend to support other nations
in their efforts to achieve self-determination. However, given the current challenges to development being
experienced across the African continent, it is unclear exactly the extent to which African nations would be
wiling and able to contribute to the resolution of the situation in East Timor. Domestic conditions in
individual African member states will determine their individual ability to contribute to international efforts.
COMMITTEE MISSION
Peacekeeping and Elections
The Security Council will have to evaluate the peacekeeping mission in East Timor and assess how to best
keep the nation secure and at peace. While it is the East Timorese government’s sovereign right to handle the
rebellion in the country, it is important for the United Nations to keep track of the electoral process in the
country and to prevent the country from becoming more unstable. The 2009 elections are the second round
of free and democratic elections in the country’s history, and they are extremely important to the legitimacy
of the established East Timorese government.
Sustainability: humanitarian aid and a better economy
East Timor has historically been a poor nation and its 2007 GDP per capita was US$ 2,500. Since the
Portuguese colonized and exploited the Timorese people in 1511, the harsh conditions the East Timorese
people have been subjected to have not allowed for investment in any sort of educational programs. When
some students were able to study at foreign universities after the Second World War, they realized the extent
to which their people were being oppressed and returned to the island to attempt to develop appropriate
institutions. However, a lack of national unity and faith in the government has led many of the poor and
unemployed East Timorese to rebel. This is why it will be important for the UN Security Council to
determine how best to strengthen this nation’s economy and establish a viable industry. While recent oil
discoveries in the sea south of East Timor will allow the government to set up programs for the unemployed
and boost their economy, a more sustainable plan must be created – especially as the rest of the world moves
towards reducing their dependence on oil.
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THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

TOPIC B
INTRODUCTION
Genocide and war have historically been major challenges for the entire continent of Africa, and the Horn of
Africa is certainly no exception. Since the end of World War II, when most of the African continent began to
gain independence from colonial powers, domestic, religious and ethnic differences have slowed the
development of national identities throughout Africa. This holds true in Somalia as well; from the beginning
of Somalia’s independence, the northern and southern halves of the country have not cooperated.
In the past two decades, as different regions of Somalia have declared independence, religious and ethnic
violence has spread throughout the country. Somaliland, which declared itself independent from Somalia in
1991, is still awaiting recognition from the African Union, which recognizes Somalia as the sole authority over
both nations. Although the United Nations attempted to solve the humanitarian crisis with the creation of a
peacekeeping operation in 1992, the mission met significant challenges and was soon thereafter removed
from the country. Until just recently, the world appeared to turn its back on Somalia and had allowed its civil
war to ensue. Currently, a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in the capital city of Mogadishu led by
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed encounters constant resistance from an Islamic insurgency. However, in 2006,
Ethiopian military forces agreed to help the TFG fight the Islamic insurgency in Somalia after it proclaimed a
jihad on Ethiopia.
The need for Somalia to establish a national government and to create a sense of national unity is essential to
the maintenance of international security in the Horn of Africa. With the help of the Ethiopian forces, the
new transitional federal government should be able to handle domestic issues and keep friendly relations with
its neighbors - most notably Ethiopia – which has traditionally been a major rival.
Among the many challenges that Somalia faces, attempting to get the many opposing parties to work together
may be the hardest of all. Although the Horn of Africa has suffered from violence since the start of
colonization, today the violence is between the Somali people themselves. With different cultures and
ethnicities, the Somali people disagree simply on how the government should provide for its people.
Numerous national peace conferences and United Nations (UN) resolutions have taken steps towards peace,
but have not fulfilled the objective. Because of the violence, a major humanitarian crisis has continued since
1991 and remains unresolved.
The Security Council must take action to prevent the possibility of destabilization in the Horn of Africa. The
major issues which will need to be resolved in order to prevent destabilization include the increase in acts of
piracy throughout the 1,800 mile coast of Somalia, the stabilization of refugee populations through adequate
humanitarian aid, and most importantly, the backing and improvement of the current internationally-
recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Although the TFG seems to be taking steps toward
mending the country, an insurgency has hindered progress in Somalia.
HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE
Somalia and Colonialism
For many years, the British, French and other European powers fought over the Somali region - seeking a
seaport between Europe and Asia. In 1887, Great Britain colonized the whole of Somaliland until the 1920s,
when Italy began to consolidate power over the region. Under Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini, Italy
occupied Ethiopia in 1925 and began to form Somalia Italiana – an Italian colony. However, after being
defeated in World War II in 1941, the Italians relinquished Somalia Italiana to the British Military
Administration (BMA). The BMA took this responsibility because of Britain’s past history with colonialism
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and it effort to decolonize. Though all of Somalia was united under the BMA, because the North and South
had different cultures and spoke different languages, the two halves did not cooperate.
After World War II, many African countries rapidly gained independence for a number of reasons. Among
the first were the right to self-determination espoused by the newly created United Nations and the
controversy over colonialism. Perhaps more importantly, colonial powers had domestic issues in
reestablishing strong economies in their home countries. Since the colonial powers were weak from fighting
in World War II, this took priority over making sure to establish effective borders for African countries upon
their independence. The BMA held power in the Horn of Africa until “1950, when a UN trusteeship territory
under Italian administration was established in ex-Italian Somaliland” (Brons 145) under GA UN Resolution
289. Although the Italian administration was initially supplied with 6,000 Italian soldiers, the weak Italian
economy caused the administration in Somalia to have a slim budget year after year. By 1952, this had led to
the repatriation of all but about 750 soldiers (Brons 145).
Although British Somaliland took steps toward modernization from 1950 to 1960, dissent between the
different competing clans became increasingly aggressive. When the colony was declared an independent
sovereign state in June 1960, the two sides, the northern and southern halves of Somalia – though sharing a
common Ethiopian enemy - quickly became opponents for control over their own government. When the
Somali government was unified, the two halves disagreed on virtually every issue, beginning with the
constitution and how the government was to function. The North rejected and voted against the South’s
proposed constitution and little progress was made for some time.
Though the government eventually became quite extensive, including an adequate constitution and supreme
court, the government ultimately decided to give the majority of its power to one man, the Executive
President, a rather common theme throughout Somali history.
Election Fraud, the 1969 Coup d’état, and the Ogaden Invasion
As the Somali government struggled to secure domestic peace and border security, fraud in public elections
lead to greater tensions between political parties. After President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated
by his own bodyguard on 15 October 1969, Prime Minister (PM) Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal manipulated
politicians to win their vote in selecting a new president from his own tribal clan. Between the chaos of the
assassination and the illegitimacy of the election – being almost a bidding contest for politicians’ votes - the
Somali army seized control of the country and installed General Siad Barre, a long-time military veteran and
leader, as the next President. The newly formed government then worked to unite the country by banning the
many different political parties, dissolving the national assembly, discouraging tribal clans, and establishing a
single official Somali language to become a one-party, socialist state.
However, while this newfound unity may have been good for establishing a single, working government,
many human rights groups disliked President Barre’s policies. For example, following Barre’s coup, his
government “adopted far-reaching legislative and administrative reforms that infringe on internationally
protected civil and political rights” (Somalia 16). These reforms, along with the declaration of a state of
emergency, which granted Barre additional powers, from 1979 to 1982 and the creation of the National
Security Service (NSS), a network of secret police, made politically rebellious factions disappear.
After banning political parties and centralizing power, President Barre then went on to prevent any type of
opposition group. By November 1986, Barre had unleashed a specialized fighting force called the ‘Red Berets’
on the Somali people. This force, with the NSS, lead to the abuse and deaths of Somali civilians throughout
the country.
The tensions of the Cold War also caused the West and the Soviet Union to struggle over the African nation.
The West had quickly become allies with Somalia, hoping to keep the regime under control by supporting
them with enough weapons to defend the country and to regulate domestic issues. However, “the amount of
United States military and economic aid to the regime was US$34 million in 1984; by 1987 this amount had
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dwindled to about US$8.7 million, a fraction of the regime's requested allocation of US$47 million”
(Somalia’s Difficult Decade). Even though the amount did not satisfy Barre, because of the alliance with the
US, Somalia was still receiving enough funds from the US and military supplies from the Soviets to increase
military capacity and strengthen the borders. In fact, “by mid-1974, about 1,725 Somali soldiers had been to
the Soviet Union for training, and the army had as part of its inventory an estimated 150 T-35 and 100 T-54
tanks, mostly fitted with 105-mm guns. Also, more than 300 armed personnel carriers, 200 coastal batteries,
50 MIG fighters, a squadron of Il-28 bombers, and an SA-2 ground-to-air missile complex” (Laitin).
Once President Barre had established his government and secured his power in Somalia, he decided to fight
for the Ogaden, a large region of Ethiopia where Somalis claim an ancient right to the land. Furthermore,
“the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and the resulting political turbulence in Ethiopia gave both the
Somali government and the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), an opportunity to take military
advantage of the turmoil that engulfed Ethiopia” (Somalia 27). With financial support from the US and a
strong military force by land and air, Barre seized the opportunity and invaded with over 40,000 troops.
However, as soon as the Somali army occupied the majority of the Ogaden, Ethiopia made an urgent plea to
the Soviet Union for their assistance in reclaiming the Ogaden. The Soviet Union decided that Ethiopia, who
had been allied with the US, was more likely to become socialist than Somalia was, and changed their
allegiance. Ethiopia was required to, and did, break off all ties with the United States of America. After
Ethiopia accepted the deal, Soviet generals in Somalia were ordered to Ethiopia and began training military
forces there. “About one week later the Soviet Union and Cuba began sending troops (more than 10,000
Cuban soldiers) and war equipment worth about US$ 1 billion (three times as much as the Americans had
sent in the previous 25 years) via air and sea to Ethiopia” (Brons 183). By March 1978, the newly trained
Ethiopian army was able to reclaim Ogaden and force the Somali army to retreat.
Lost Ogaden - found Civil W ar
As soon as Somali troops were forced to retreat and Ethiopia reclaimed the territory, secessionist forces in
Somalia began to grow stronger once again as faith in the government grew weaker. The Isaak clan, the
largest clan in Somaliland, had felt left out of the Somali government since the military coup in 1969.
However, when Somaliland became overwhelmed by the influx of an estimated 1.5 million refugees (Brons
187) from the Ogaden who crowded cities and created a land struggle after the Somali government granted
them land to settle in Somaliland, the Isaak clan established an anti-government political faction called the
Somali National Movement (SNM). Although Isaaks throughout the country were persecuted as a result of
the group’s establishment, the movement continued to grow because of the harsh punishments the Somali
army inflicted on its own people:
Africa Watch’s estimate of the number of people killed by government forces, shot point
blank, or killed as a result of aerial bombardment and artillery shelling and war-related
wounds, is in the vicinity of 50,000 – 60,000 ... The figures are so high because the army
sought both to punish Isaak civilians for welcoming the SNM attack and to discourage them
from further assistance to the guerrillas (Somalia 3).
The Somali government did not show much concern for civilian life, but the SNM was not much better. Like
the Somali army, the SNM was known for raiding cities and refugee camps and murdering civilians who
supported the Somali government and Ogaden refugees hoping others would return to Ethiopia. While the
SNM continued its campaign against the government and its supporters, Barre’s military forces, notably the
NSS and Red Berets, waged a counter-insurgency campaign primarily aimed at those SNM supporters in the
North and the various Isaak clan members throughout the country. However, the important SNM leaders
were based out of Ethiopia, leaving government forces to deal only with the SNM ground forces in the
North. It was not until “1988 when two years of peace talks between Siad Barre and Mengistu Haile Mariam,
president of Ethiopia, which had been under way since 1986, culminated in an agreement wherein the two
governments pledged to stop supporting any political opposition directed against the neighboring country”
(Brons 203). Although this forced anti-government forces into hiding within Somalia, the continued abuse of
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the Somali people by government forces led opposition groups to join together to fight against their common
enemy – the Somali government under Siad Barre. Though these groups were able to coordinate anti-
government efforts at first, in January 1991, once Siad Barre and his administration fled the country, the
opposition groups began to struggle over political power.
An interim government set up by the United Somali Congress (USC) and Manifesto wing declared Ali Mahdi
Mohamed as the interim president to the newly freed state, but soon many of the opposition groups felt their
contributions to the overthrow of Siad Barre were left unnoticed in the distribution of political power, and
consequently, the interim government and the peace did not last.
Somaliland
In 1991, Somaliland, the northern tip of Somalia, declared independence. Although the United Somali
Congress (USC) was established in early 1991, the old tension between northern and southern Somalia forced
clan elders to decide that it was time to become independent. Even without international recognition,
Somaliland has become a relatively peaceful and stable government, with a functioning parliament and police
force, its own symbols of statehood, refugees returning to the area to settle, and commercial activity
increasing.
There were, however, many challenges to the success of the Somaliland government. For example, the
original government set a two year mandate to accomplish a set of goals designed to establish the
government. However, when “little progress was made on drafting a new constitution and the state remained
politically vulnerable to shifts in power relationships between the clans” (Bradbury 461), tensions grew and
clan rivalries resulted in civil war. The violence was extremely damaging to the credibility of the newly
forming government, but after 33 clan peace conferences between 1991 and 1996, the Somaliland
government was able to settle differences between the clans by increasing the minority seats in the parliament
and adopting an interim constitution.
Later, “on 6 August 2001, the Somaliland parliament legalized the formation of political organizations and
scheduled presidential elections for February 2002” (Bradbury 463). The success of the free and democratic
district and presidential elections would ultimately legitimize the Somaliland government. However, once
again there were many challenges that Somaliland had never previously faced. The Somaliland Electoral
Commission (SEC) had never managed an election before, the voters had not been registered or informed of
the political process, and an attempted assassination on President Kaahin by forces from the neighboring
Puntland region of Somalia almost put the elections on hold. Fortunately, a number of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) helped inform the voters and supervise the voting procedure. “In January 2003, the
UN news information service noted that the year ahead held ‘opportunities and dangers’ for Somaliland,
predicting that the presidential elections could ‘either demonstrate Somaliland’s political maturity, or lead to
fighting’ ” (Bradbury 471).
UN Involvement
When fighting, famine, and chaos within Somalia broke out and in 1992, the United Nations took action to
prevent the complete destabilization of the Horn of Africa. The United Nations Operations in Somalia
(UNOSOM) was established in April 1992 to monitor the ceasefire and escort humanitarian supplies to
Mogadishu and soon thereafter, the Security Council approved Resolution 794, creating a coalition force
which would “ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia” (S/RES/794). Later that year,
“‘Operation Restore Hope’ began in December 1992 as an American-led humanitarian intervention mission”
called the United Task Force (UNITAF) (Brons 219). UNITAF was comprised of American, Pakistani,
Italian, and Malaysian military forces with financial support from various UN member states. Its mandate was
to assist the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in monitoring a ceasefire between warring
Somali factions and to ensure that humanitarian aid was reaching those in need. Furthermore, UNOSOM and
UNOSOM II were charged with disarming the violent inhabitants and clearing minefields for the civilian
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inhabitants. All of these measures worked toward promising the Somali people that the region would be a
safe and prosperous environment, which, in turn, would encourage refugees to return to their homes.
Although many Somalis accepted the force, their expectations that UNITAF would disarm the fighting
factions and establish peace swiftly could not be fulfilled. UNITAF was somewhat successful in establishing
friendly relations with the Somali public at first, but as time drew on, because the United Nations forces were
more focused on providing humanitarian aid instead of changing the political process and as more civilians
were killed in the crossfire, opposition groups convinced the public to blame the United Nations forces for
their own actions. Gradually, the Somali people refused to accept the foreigners as peacekeepers. In March
1994, many Western countries that had previously backed UNITAF pulled out of the country. Although the
original mandate had included the disarmament of Somali factions, because the UNITAF force had been
significantly downsized after the Western countries withdrew, the UN adopted resolution 897 in April 1994
which excluded the forced disarmament of Somali factions from the mandate. Once the remaining UNITAF
forces had lost Somali support for their mission, the rest of the UNITAF forces withdrew in March of 1995.
Though the UNITAF force did withdraw from Somalia, the UN did not completely lose hope for the
stabilization of Somalia. In fact, “the UN has organized over 10 highly publicized and costly reconciliation
conferences since 1993. Faction leaders, who have played the central role in these reconciliation conferences,
have dutifully signed agreements at every meeting. But each settlement collapsed soon after it was agreed,
sometimes within hours” (Ahmed 124). Additionally, the United Nations Political Office in Somalia
(UNPOS) was established in April 1995 to advance the cause of peace and reconciliation through contacts
with Somali leaders, civic organizations and the States and organizations concerned.
The Aftermath of UN involvement
Although the UN tried for years to moderate the crisis and establish a legitimate government in Somalia,
peace keeping operations ended in a stalemate or failure. Between 1991 and 1995, “the UN peace-
enforcement mission in Somalia resulted in a death toll of 135 UN soldiers, and hundreds of Somali fighters
and civilians, many of them women and children … UNITAF and UNISOM were not only incapable of
interrupting the general cycle of violence which had developed in the anarchic period, but through their
political misjudgments they even provoked additional violence directed against their own troops and
installations, adding another dimension of conflict to he civil war arena” (Brons 235). While not becoming
involved in the crisis was never a viable option, the consequences of withdrawing from the country further
destabilized the region.
Once the UN peacekeeping forces pulled out of Somalia in 1995, the nation quickly became an unguided,
stateless nation. Ruling warlords and clans took control of regions where they could, but no federal
government could be agreed upon. The northwestern region of Somaliland and the northeastern region of
Puntland declared independence and worked to establish their own legitimate governments. Commercial
activity in both of these regions were steadily growing as faith in their governments grew, but the warring
factions would not allow the other to succeed and the unpredictable African weather patterns often caused
problems for farmers.
Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and the Ethiopian military
Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, Somalia has been in an outright civil war. From this civil war, three
distinct groups have seemingly emerged – the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) and Ethiopian military forces.
The TFG developed as the strongest of over 15 national reconciliation conferences in Somalia since 1991.
The implementation of the TFG project was not put into effect until 2000 and officers were not chosen until
2004, following the approval of the government’s charter, but recent developments have yielded positive
results. However, as the TFG was establishing itself, the ICU was growing stronger throughout the
southwestern region of the country to the point of controlling the capital city of Mogadishu by early 2006.
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When Islamic forces overtook Mogadishu in 2006, Ethiopian forces helped the TFG troops force the ICU
out of the capital city even though both the African Union and the Arab League called on Ethiopia to stay
out of the conflict. As the TFG began establishing government offices, the African Union (AU) established
and implemented the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM’s mandate since its creation in 2007
primarily includes the safeguarding and support of the TFG while ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid
to the Somali civilians. Currently, South Africa has been a key player within the African Union in helping to
establish the details and negotiations between different Somali clans of how the TFG will function once it is
operational.
While the TFG and the Ethiopian military forces work together to institute a strong Somali federal
government, the ICU continues its insurgency all over the country. The ICU refuses to attend peace
negotiations until all foreign troops have left Somalia and the TFG can attend the negotiations themselves.
CURRENT STATUS
United Nations Resolutions
The United Nations has passed a number of resolutions in 2008 regarding the crisis in Somalia. Starting in
February 2008, the Security Council passed Resolution 1801 asking the Transitional Federal Institutions to
respect the decisions of the newly formed National Reconciliation Congress in forming the Somali
constitution. In April, the Security Council passed two resolutions – 1809 and 1811 - which highlighted the
importance of communication between the United Nations and the African Union by encouraging the
development of the African Union – United Nations panel that UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon
established. Finally, in May, the Security Council passed landmark Resolution 1814 which reinforced the arms
embargo that has been in effect since Resolution 744 in early 1992.
In March of 2008, the UN Secretary General reported on the situation in Somalia. Though the conclusion
seemed to be that the entire region is still hostile, there were many conclusions and recommendations made
by the SG that may help settle the crisis. First, Ban Ki-Moon believes that it is important to combine the
three main components of restabilization – politics, security, and programmatic. These areas are all mutually
dependent on one another and can only succeed if all succeed. Furthermore, by strengthening the UNPOS
capacity and refocusing its mandate, the team will be effective in helping to stabilize the country. Finally, the
Secretary General outlined a number of proposals which strengthen the political process in Mogadishu by
establishing the UNPOS office and withdrawing foreign forces while building up peacekeeping forces and
establishing communication to Somali citizens.
Piracy
Off the 1,800 mile long coast of Somalia, piracy of merchant shipping has become a major problem in recent
years, especially for the transportation of humanitarian aid to refugees in the country. In Resolution 1772, the
Security Council called upon “member states whose naval vessels and military aircraft operate in international
waters and airspace adjacent to the coast of Somalia to be vigilant to any incident of piracy therein and to take
appropriate action to protect merchant shipping.” However, because the piracy crisis has continued, the
Security Council passed Resolution 1816, which again called upon member states whose air and naval forces
were stationed in the region to protect the merchant ships and humanitarian aid headed for Somalia. In 2008,
over 15 attacks and 21 attempts on merchant shipping boats occurred off of the coast of Somalia (“Piracy
Attacks”). With more attention on the issue, the number of pirate attacks is expected decrease over the next
few years.
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Food Prices and M alnutrition
Because of the conflict between the government and the Islamic insurgency, the recent drought, the hyper-
inflation of the economy and the rise of global food prices, the cost of food has increased substantially and
has left many civilians without enough money to live. Demonstrators in Mogadishu quickly became rioters as
they protested the inflation of Somali shillings and the government’s lack of regulation to control the
inflation. “Global food prices have nearly doubled in three years, according to the World Bank, sparking riots
and protests in several poor countries” (Food Riots…). Additionally, the delayed start to Somalia’s April –
June rainy season has not helped the situation calm down. “The United Nations food security unit warned
recently that half of Somalia’s seven million people face famine, pointing to a drought as well as food prices”
(Troops fire…). Though the World Food Programme (WFP) has been attempting to reach the starving
Somali civilians, the humanitarian aid is often stopped by pirates claiming to be the Somali National Guard.
The Security Council has passed resolutions 1772 and 1816 requesting safe travel for the humanitarian ships
with the help of nearby naval escort ships, but the threat of piracy continues.
Refugees
Refugees have always been a challenge for Somalia. “From 1979 onwards, UNHCR and numerous NGOs
took up the refugee issue, bringing vast amounts of aid – food, medicine and related equipment, transport
facilities, such as trucks, cars and related spare parts, etc. – into the country. In 1980, US$ 132 million were
channeled to Somalia through UNHCR, including US$ 66 million for food” (Brons). Thousands of refugees
are currently fleeing the capital and to escape from the unrest. Human rights groups, including Amnesty
International, are calling the fighting in Somalia the worst in 17 years. In one recent fight in Mogadishu, 81
civilians were killed and more than 100 were wounded.
Transitional Federal Government’s Progress
While the Transitional Federal Government is internationally recognized and supported, it seems to lack the
potency to get clan factions to unite under a single Somali government. The continued Islamist insurgency in
Mogadishu has only made the TFG military forces in the capital city more apt to stay within the walls of the
Presidential palace and other military compounds – a factor which led to UNITAF’s distrust by the Somali
public in 1992.
Furthermore, involvement by the US in Somali affairs has not resulted in positive outcomes. Continued air
strikes by the US on known Islamic extremists and known Al Qaeda sites have lead to the deaths of ICU
leaders and many civilians. This targeting of ICU leaders has made the peace negotiations difficult, as the ICU
has stated that it will not stop fighting until all foreign troops have left the country.
Ceasefires
The most recent attempts at a ceasefire occurred in 2006, when Islamists controlled the capital Mogadishu
and signed a peace agreement with the Somali transitional government “for the good of Somalia” (“Somalia
cease-fire”). Some major headway was made in negotiations between the two sides, with talks held in
Khartoum with Arab League support. However, as recently as 7 October 2008, many of the Islamist
hardliners still refuse to “recognize the government or engage in peace talks until foreign troops withdraw
from Somalia” (“Ceasefire not Implemented”).
BLOC ANALYSIS
W estern Bloc
Though the United Nations has repeatedly attempted to solve the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, most
notably with the UNITAF peacekeeping force in the early 1990s, the western bloc still feels an obligation to
solve one of Africa’s biggest human rights crises. The Transitional Federal Government has been supported
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by the majority of western countries. Though the United States may be resentful and wary of returning to
Somalia to enforce the peace throughout the region, ultimately, the humanitarian crisis should encourage the
US and the rest of the west to take more advanced action.
However, the commitment to the global war on terrorism also creates a challenge for western nations in
developing a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Somalia. Many western nations are engaged in efforts to
eliminate terrorist or extremist Islamic organizations, of which, some are present in Somalia. The West has a
stake in the success of any government that gains control of Somalia – it may work with a Western style
model of government, while combating terrorism may be more difficult and relations more strained with an
Islamist government. In either case, Somalia presents the West with an opportunity to be peace-brokers in
the hopes of securing a friendly government in the future. They must regain the confidence of the Somali
people, a confidence that has been shaken in recent decades by ambiguous support by superpowers and
military strikes and incursions on Somali sovereign territory.
African Union
The African Union believes that the foreign alliances with the United States of America and the Soviet Union
decades ago made the situation much worse after alliances with Ethiopia were swapped. Though the African
Union may not be equipped to handle the magnitude of this crisis, it is still important that the situation be
regarded as an African issue. Most notably, South Africa has been working for the past year to get all parties
involved to attend a peace summit regarding Somalia and the Transitional Federal Government. A volatile
Somalia threatens the development of the entire continent, and African powers must be willing to be play
multiple roles in Somalia as peacekeepers and observers in elections if they were to take place. While Somalis
have a resentment of foreign powers on their land due to its complex colonial and post-colonial history, the
AU must extend a hand of friendship to its war-torn African neighbor.
Arab Bloc
The Arab Bloc has a unique opportunity to shape the outcome of the now stalemated political process in
Somalia. Somalis can most easily identify with its Arab neighbors to the north and across the Gulf of Aden.
They harbor less resentment against Arab countries when compared to their feelings about certain African
neighbors, such as Ethiopia. These states are uniquely positioned as the confidants, and therefore the
nurturers of, the success of Somali politics. Their actions will likely certainly influence the outcome of
whatever form the government may take in the coming years. Many Arab countries will likely support the
Islamic Courts Union in their struggle for political power in Somalia. While not a monolithic entity, many of
these countries (like Saudi Arabia) would like to see Islamic Shari’ah law implemented when the new
government comes to power.
COMMITTEE MISSION
The situation in Somalia appears to become worse by the day. Though some negotiations have been
underway for quite some time now, the Islamic insurgency continues to state that it will refuse to stop the
fighting until all foreign troops have left the country – a condition which prevents peaceful negotiations from
occurring. Furthermore, the African Union has been reluctant to allow the United Nations to send a sizeable
peacekeeping force, and the organization lacks the sufficient resources to fully mediate the many conflicts
happening on the continent. As a result, the factions in Somalia continue to fight without regard for civilians
and human rights abuses.
In order to establish international peace and security in the Horn of Africa, the Security Council will have to
work closely with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the African Union to host more peace
negotiations between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the National Reconciliation Congress
(NRC), and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). In these negotiations, it will be important to address the needs
of the Somali civilians and refugees who require humanitarian aid, how the humanitarian aid can safely reach
said civilians and refugees, and how a new Somali federal government could include all parties peacefully.
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While it is by no means expected as a product of these negotiations, an outline for an eventual ceasefire
would be one of the first necessary steps towards peace and reconciliation on the country. Furthermore, the
Security Council may suggest that certain regional bodies, such as the Arab League or the African Union,
restart negotiations on the status of foreign forces within the country with hopes of future power-sharing
talks in Mogadishu.
The Security Council may find it extremely beneficial to examine the reports of Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon when assessing the situation in Somalia and how the UN can go about solving the humanitarian crisis
and establishing a functioning government.
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RESEARCH AND PREPARATION QUESTIONS

As mentioned in the Note on Research and Preparation, it is imperative that delegates answer each of these questions in their
position papers.
TOPIC A
1. How does your nation feel about the right self-determination?
2. What does your nation believe is the best course of action to bring peace to East Timor?
3. Has your nation contributed to the United Nations coalition forces helping to secure East Timor and
establish its independent government? Does your nation believe these missions have been successful?
4. How has your nation dealt with rebellious factions in the past?
5. Does your nation have experience dealing with electoral corruption?
6. Was your nation once a colonial power? What was your nation’s policy regarding colonialism and
decolonization?
7. How balanced are the political parties in your nation?
8. How has your nation dealt with refugees and/or humanitarian crises?
TOPIC B
1. How does your country feel about the Western presence in the Middle East and Africa?
2. Who has the ancient right to the land in the Horn of Africa?
3. Should Somaliland have the right to secede from Somalia and form its own government?
4. How can the Somali clans who have been raised in a heritage of war and violence establish a free and
fair government?
5. How has your country contributed to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia?
6. Should the African Union or the greater international community recognize Somaliland as its own
government?
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following documents have been hand-selected by Directors to further aid in delegate preparation. Please make a concerted
effort to read and analyze these documents prior to the conference.
TOPIC A
UN Sources
A/RES/30/3484. 12 December 1975

UN GA calls for Indonesian withdrawal
A/RES/31/53. 1 December 1976

UN GA rejects integration and calls for an act of self-determination
A/RES/32/34. 28 nov 1977

UN GA repeats the call for self-determination
A/RES/33/39. 13 dec 1978

UN GA again asserts East Timor’s right to self determination
A/RES/34/40. 21 nov 1979

UN GA again calls for self-determination in East Timor
A/RES/35/27. 11 nov 1980

UN GA again calls for self determination for East Timor
A/RES/36/50. 24 oct 1981

UN GA again calls for self-determination in East Timor
A/RES/37/30. 4 nov 1982

UN GA again re-asserts self-determination in East Timor. It instructs the UN SG to initiate discussions ‘with all parties
directly concerned’ and to report to the 1983 GA
A/RES/53/240. 29 June 1999

Financing of UNAMET (East Timor Mission).
A/RES/54/246A. 23 December 1999

Financing of UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
A/RES/54/246B. 7 April 2000

A/RES/54/246C. 15 June 2000


Question of East Timor
A/RES/54/96H. 15 December 1999

Assistance for humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and development for East Timor
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A/RES/54/20B. 7 April 2000

Financing the UN Mission in East Timor
A/RES/54/20A. 29 October 1999

Financing of UNAMET (East Timor mission)
A/RES/55/228B. 14 June 2001



A/RES/56/296. 27 June 2002

Financing of UN Transitional Administration in East Timor and the UN Mission of Support in East Timor.
A/RES/56/283. 22 May 2002

Participation of East Timor in the World Summit on Sustainable Development and its preparatory process.
A/RES/56/282. 1 May 2002.

Question of East Timor.


A/RES/57/327. 18 June 2003

Financing of UN Transitional Administration in East Timor and the UN Mission of Support in East Timor.
A/RES/58/260B. 18 June 2004

Financing of United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor

A/RES/59/13B. 22 June 2005

A/RES/59/13A. 29 October 2004

A/RES/60/271. 30 June 2006

A/RES/61/282. 29 June 2007

A/RES/62/257. 20 June 2008

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S/RES/384. 22 December 1975

UN SC unanimously condemns invasion and instructs SG to send a special representative to East Timor
S/RES/389. 22 April 1976

UN SC again calls for Indonesian withdrawal
Non-UN Sources
Budi, Setyo. "East Timor: Sympathetic Politicians Protect Horta’s Assailants." IPS - Inter Press Service 3 Apr.
2008. Lexis Nexus News. 17 May 2008.
News article on the attempted assassination of President Horta and PM Gusmao and the capture of the assailants.
Budiardjo, Carmel, and Liem S. Liong. The War Against East Timor. Bath, UK: The Pitman P, 1984.
Excellent background and chronology dating from 1974 independence to 1984. An excellent resource on the Indonesian invasion
and their occupation of East Timor.
Carey, Peter, and G. Carter Bentley. East Timor At the Crossroads: the Forging of a Nation. New York:
University of Hawi'I, 1995.
Excellent background and chronology dating from 1974 to 1995. Fair resource on historical background. Includes a few
testimonials and implications for the future.
Fitzgerald, Brian F. "Horta v. Commonwealth: The Validity of the Timor Gap Treaty and Its Domestic
Implementation." The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 44 (1995): 643-49.
Excellent article explaining the Timor Gap Treaty as of 1995.
Goulart, Guido. "East Timor's President Returns Home After Recovering From Assassination Attempt." The
Associated Press 17 Apr. 2008. Lexis Nexus News. 17 May 2008.
News article on the recovery of President Horta and his return to East Timor.
Goulart, Guido. "East Timor President Meets Rebel Who Tried to Kill Him, in Tearful Surrender." The
Associated Press 29 Apr. 2008. Lexis Nexus News. 17 May 2008.
News article on the meeting between President Horta and his assailants.
Gunn, Geoffrey C. East Timor and the United Nations: The Case for Intervention. New York: Red Sea
Press, 1997.
Excellent resource on UN Intervention in East Timor.
Hagerdal, Hans. “Facts about Sonbai Kecil and Sonbai Besar.” Royal Timor 2007.
<http://www.royaltimor.com/Sonbai_Article.html>.
A brief history of East Timor.
Kiernan, Ben. "The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia." Critical Asian Studies 2003. EBSCOhost. 9
July 2008.
Report on the variances in population censuses between 1975 and 1980.
Jolliffe, Jill. East Timor: Nationalism & Colonialism. St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland P,
1978.
Good book focusing primarily on the colonial impact and the political parties which over threw the Portuguese.
Martin, Ian, and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh. "The United Nations and East Timor: From Self-Determination to
State-Building." International Peacekeeping 12 (2005). EBSCOhost. 8 July 2008.
Great resource following the UN’s involvement in East Timor since 1999.
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Mydans, Seth. "The Fall of Suharto: the Overview, Suharto, Besieged, Steps Down After 32-Year Rule in
Indonesia." The New York Times 21 May 1998. 10 July 2008.
New York Times article about the resignation of Indonesian dictator Suharto which led to the UN referendum granting self-
determination and independence to East Timor.
O’Connor, Patrick. “East Timor: Plot thickens as leader of alleged “coup” attempt surrenders.” World
Socialist Web Site 2 May 2008. <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/may2008/etim-m02.shtml>.
Describes very recent events on the island that have threatened its stability as a burgeoning democracy.
Perlez, Jane. "Australian Forces Intervene to Halt Fighting in East Timor." The New York Times 26 May
2006. 9 July 2008
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/26/world/asia/26timor.html?scp=3&sq=east+timor+violenc
e&st=nyt>.
News article on Australian intervention in East Timor in May 2006.
Perlez, Jane. "East Timor Resignation Raises Hopes for End to Violence." The New York Times 27 June
2006.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/27/world/asia/27timor.html?scp=14&sq=east+timor+violen
ce&st=nyt>.
News article on resignation of Prime Minister Alkatiri in June 2006.
Perlez, Jane. "Ramos-Horta is Appointed New Premier of East Timor." The New York Times 9 July 2006. 9
July 2008
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/09/world/asia/09timor.html?scp=16&sq=east+timor+violen
ce&st=nyt>.
News article reporting on FRETELIN political activist Hose Ramos-Horta as the new President of East Timor.
Pinto, Constancio, and Matthew Jardine. East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance.
Boston, MA: South End P, 1997.
Superb, easy to read background on the Timorese struggle since Portugal in 1511. Testimony of Constancio Pinto, a resistance
fighter. Includes 1995 peace plan by current President Jose Ramos-Horta.
Richardson, J. “Strange Bedfellows: US Aids for Indonesia.” Mother Jones 26 Aug 1999.
<http://www.motherjones.com/news/special_reports/east_timor/features/usaid.html>.
A brief history of US-Indonesia military aid relations.
Taylor, John G. East Timor: the Price of Freedom. New York: Zed Books, 1999.
Good book focusing on the Indonesian invasion of East Timor and its aftermath.
Turner, Michele. Telling: East Timor: Personal Testimonies 1942 - 1992. Kensington NSW, Australia: New
South Wales UP, 1992.
Personal testimonies of Timorese from 1942 to 1992.
"UNMIT: United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste." UNMIT. 2008. United Nations. 17 May 2008
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmit/index.html>.
Background information on the UNMIT
TOPIC B
UN Sources
A/RES/289. 21 December 1949

Question of the Disposal of the former Italian colonies
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Security Council
S/RES/744. 23 January 1992

Resolution which calls upon nations to participate in an arms embargo, including the delivery of weapons and military equipment,
on Somalia to prevent the growth of the civil war violence.
S/RES/794. 3 December 1992

Resolution which authorizes coalition forces to enter Somalia and handle the humanitarian crisis.
S/RES/1744. 20 February 2007

Resolution which establishes the mission in Somalia and recognizes the work of the Transitional Federal Institutions.
S/RES/1766. 23 July 2007

Resolution which reaffirms the arms embargo on Somalia and extends the length of the Monitoring Group in Mogadishu.
S/RES/1772. 20 August 2007

Resolution which recognizes the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) and the threat of piracy on the coast of Somalia.
S/RES/1801. 20 February 2008

Resolution which renews the authorization of member states of the African Union to maintain a mission in Somalia for another
six months and encourages the Transitional Federal Institutions to respect the decisions of the National Reconciliation Congress
in its constitutional process
S/RES/1809. 16 April 2008

Resolution which stresses the need for continued communication between the United Nations and the African Union and
welcomes the development of a African Union – United nations panel to discuss the in-depth details of the continuing
peacekeeping mission in Somalia.
S/RES/1811. 29 April 2008

Resolution which extends the length and redefines the mandate of the Monitoring Group,
S/RES/1814. 15 May 2008

Resolution which strengthens the arms embargo, asks all member states and factions in Somalia for continued support and
protection of all AMISOM, United Nations and humanitarian personnel, and requests that the Secretary General of the
United Nations continue to deepen his involvement in the Somali crisis.
S/RES/1816. 2 June 2008

Resolution facing the piracy crisis on the coast of Somalia preventing safe travel for merchant ships and humanitarian aid.
Non-UN Sources
Adow, Mohamed A. "Somalia Clashes 'the Worst Since 1991'" CNN. 21 Apr. 2008. 12 May 2008
<http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/04/21/somalia.fighting/index.html?iref=newssearch
>.
News article on the violence following the death of Muslim sect leaders by Ehtiopian forces in April of 2008.
Ahmed, Ismail I., and Reginald H. Green. "The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and
Somaliland: Local-Leve Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction." Third World Quarterly
20 (1999): 113-127. EBSCOhost. 20 June 2008.
Truly magnificent resource on the history of Somalia and the secession of Somaliland.
Brons, Maria H. Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State: Somalia. Utrecht, Netherlands: International
Books, 2001.
In-depth history of and theories to the creation and dissolution of the state of Somalia. Great explanation of the UN resolutions
involving Somalia starting on page 231. Includes maps of the different territories of Somalia throughout the time period.
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"Food Riots Turn Deadly in Somali Capital." Associated Press. 5 May 2008. 25 May 2008
<http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iCVfiXYK9HcAD4LjDdLf3ycGS2_w>.
News article on the food riots in Mogadishu which resulted in the death of five rioters and explains the global food crisis’ effect on
Somalia and the World Food Program (WFP).
Gettleman, Jeffrey. "Somalia's Government Teeters on Collapse." New York Times 29 Mar. 2008. 20 June
2008
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/29/world/africa/29somalia.html?scp=41&sq=somalia&st=ny
t>.
A news article that highlights the challenges facing the Somalian TFG, the AU force, and rebuilding the failed state.
Gettleman, Jeffrey. "Somalia Reconciliation Conference Opens, But Soon Stalls." New York Times 16 July
2007. 20 June 2008
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/16/world/africa/16somalia.html?scp=4&sq=somalia%20pirac
y&st=nyt>.
A news article discussing the failure of a Somalian Reconciliation Conference.
Gettleman, Jeffrey, and Eric Schmitt. "U.S. Forces Fire Missiles Into Somalia At a Kenyan." New York Times
4 Mar. 2008. 20 June 2008
t>.
Article on American missile attacks on “known Al-Queda targets”
Kertcher, Chen. The Search for Peace - or for a State: UN Intervention in Somalia. Jerusalem: Gitelson Peace
Publications, 2003.
History of the United Nation’s intervention in Somalia from 1992 – 1995.
Laitin, David D. "The War in the Ogaden: Implications for Siyaad's Role in Somali History." The Journal of
Modern African Studies 17 (1979): 95-115.
Excellent detailed history of Ogaden invasion in 1970s.
Lederer, Edith M. "Security Council Wants UN Peacekeepers in Somalia." ABC News. 15 May 2008. 15 May
2008 <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=4867570>.
News article about the Security Council unanimously approving a resolution encouraging UN involvement in Somalia.
Nguyen, Katie. "Civilians Targeted in Somalia Conflict: Amnesty." ABC News. 6 May 2008. 12 May 2008
<http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=4793510>.
News article about the many reported cases of human rights abuses by Somali parties and Amnesty International’s call to remove
Ethiopian troops from Somalia and replace them with United Nations peacekeeping forces.
"Piracy Attacks Map." IMB live piracy map 2007. ICC Commercial Crime Services. 13 Aug. 2008
<http://www.icc-ccs.org/extra/display.php?yr=2008>.
Excellent live resource on pirate attacks worldwide. Dates back to 2005 year to year.
“Somalia cease-fire deal reached.” CNN World News 22 June 2006

<http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/06/22/somalia.fighting/index.html>.
News article on the “ceasefire” of 2006.
“Somalia: 'Ceasefire Not Implemented Yet' -Islamist Leader.” Garowe Online 7 October 2008
<http://allafrica.com/stories/200810070547.html>.
News article on the failure of the ceasefire.
Somalia: a Government At War with Its Own People. Washington, D.C.: The Africa Watch Committee,
1990.
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Security Council
Testimonies about the killings and the conflict in the north of Somalia.
Somalia: Several Challenges Limit U.S. and International Stabilization, Humanitarian, and Development
Efforts. United States Government Accountability Office. GAO, 2008. 27 June 2008.
In-depth report on the limitations that the United States and the World faces in dealing with the crisis in Somalia.
"Somaliland Paper Condemns AU for Avoiding Country's "Independence"" The Somaliland Times 6 July
2006. Lexis Nexis News. 25 May 2008.
News article explaining how the African Union has continually ignored Somaliland’s application to be recognized as an
independent African state.
"Timeline: Somalia." 18 June 2008. BBC. 20 June 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1072611.stm>.

Extensive timeline of events since early history of Somalia.
"Troops Fire on Rioters in Somalia, Killing 2." New York Times 6 May 2008. 20 June 2008
t>.
News article discussing the actions of TFG troops against rioters in Mogadishu.
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N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL

MODEL UNITED NATIONS

Rosa Akbari Dear Delegates,

NHSMUN is a project of the

A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

Rosa Akbari, Director-General Andrew Porter-Price

Role of the Dais

Role of the Delegates

THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE

W orld W ar II: Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere

Political parties seize control

Domino Effect: Indonesia invades

Assassinations and Elections

Peacekeeping M ission Evaluation

Peacekeeping and Elections

Sustainability: humanitarian aid and a better economy

THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE

Somalia and Colonialism

Lost Ogaden - found Civil W ar

The Aftermath of UN involvement

United Nations Resolutions

Food Prices and M alnutrition

Transitional Federal Government’s Progress

RESEARCH AND PREPARATION QUESTIONS

1. How does your nation feel about the right self-determination?

5. Does your nation have experience dealing with electoral corruption?

7. How balanced are the political parties in your nation?

5. How has your country contributed to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia?

A/RES/30/3484. 12 December 1975

A/RES/31/53. 1 December 1976

A/RES/32/34. 28 nov 1977

A/RES/33/39. 13 dec 1978

A/RES/34/40. 21 nov 1979

A/RES/35/27. 11 nov 1980

A/RES/36/50. 24 oct 1981

A/RES/37/30. 4 nov 1982

A/RES/53/240. 29 June 1999

A/RES/54/246A. 23 December 1999

A/RES/54/246B. 7 April 2000

A/RES/54/246C. 15 June 2000

A/RES/54/194. 17 December 1999

A/RES/54/96H. 15 December 1999

A/RES/54/20B. 7 April 2000

A/RES/54/20A. 29 October 1999

A/RES/55/228B. 14 June 2001

A/RES/54/228A. 23 December 2000

A/RES/55/172. 14 December 2000

A/RES/56/296. 27 June 2002

A/RES/56/283. 22 May 2002

A/RES/56/282. 1 May 2002.

A/RES/56/249. 24 December 2001

A/RES/56/104. 14 December 2001

A/RES/57/327. 18 June 2003

A/RES/58/260B. 18 June 2004

A/RES/58/260A. 23 December 2003

A/RES/59/13B. 22 June 2005

A/RES/59/13A. 29 October 2004

A/RES/60/271. 30 June 2006

A/RES/61/282. 29 June 2007

A/RES/62/257. 20 June 2008

S/RES/384. 22 December 1975