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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993 MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents. Marciano P. Defensor for petitioner. Nestor P. Ifurong for Maria S. Tatoy. Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents. RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J.: Filed directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in the present special civil action, is petitioner's so-called "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to Set Pending Incident for Hearing." Despite the impropriety of the mode adopted in elevating the issue to us, as will hereinafter be discussed, we will disregard the procedural gaffe in the interest of an early resolution hereof. The chronology of events preceding the instant motion is best summarized to readily provide a clear understanding and perspective of our disposition of this matter, thus: 1. On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698 was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 2. On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. 1 3. On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam DefensorSantiago," 2 which pertinently states in part: xxx xxx xxx 3. As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered extensive physical injuries which required surgical intervention. As of this time, her injuries, specifically in the jaw or gum area of the mouth, prevents her to speak (sic) because of extreme pain. Further, she cannot for an extended period be on her feet because she is still in physical pain. . . . . 4. On the other hand, the accused Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks leave of this Honorable Court that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings and further seeks leave of this Honorable Court that the recommended bail bond of P15,000.00 that she is posting in cash be accepted. xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and that by this motion, she be considered as having placed herself under the custody of this Honorable Court and dispensing of her personal appearance for now until such time she will (sic) have recovered sufficiently from her recent near fatal accident. Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully prayed that the warrant for her arrest be immediately recalled. xxx xxx xxx 4. Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution 3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest, unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her physical appearance before said court. On May 15, 1991, petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00, aside from the other legal fees. 4 5. On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in his office in the second floor of the Old NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street, Ermita, Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was accompanied by a brother who represented himself to be Atty. Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left unaided, after staying for about fifteen minutes. 5 6. Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution also on May 21, 1991, setting the arraignment of the accused for May 27, 1991, and setting aside the court's resolution of May 14, 1991 which ordered her appearance before the deputy clerk of the First Division of

said court on or before June 5, 1991. 6 7. In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She contended that for her to continue remaining under bail bond may imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing, an intention she would like to prove as baseless. 7 8. Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with Criminal Cases Nos. 12298 (for violation of Section 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019), 91-94555 (violation of Presidential Decree No. 46), and 91-94897 (for libel), respectively. Consequently, a temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, from proceeding with the criminal cases pending before them. This Court, in issuing said order, took into consideration the fact that according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet said contingency. 9. On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the arraignment of petitioner until further advice from the Supreme Court; and (b) the consideration of herein petitioner's motion to cancel her cash bond until further initiative from her through counsel. 8 10. On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order previously issued. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this Court's resolution dated September 10, 1992. 11. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner which reads as follows:

Considering the information in media to the effect that accused Santiago intends to leave the country soon for an extended stay abroad for study purposes, considering the recent decision of the Supreme Court dismissing her petition promulgated on January 13, 1992, although the same is still subject of a Motion for Reconsideration from the accused, considering that the accused has not yet been arraigned, nor that she has not (sic) even posted bail the same having been by reason of her earlier claim of being seriously indisposed, all of which were overtaken by a restraining order issued by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 99289 and No. 99290 dated May 24, 1991, the accused is ordered not to leave the country and the Commission on Immigration and Deportation is ordered not to allow the departure of the accused unless authorized from (sic) this Court. 10
The hold departure order was issued by reason of the announcement made by petitioner, which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the United States to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino communities in the United States in line with her crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft and corruption. In the instant motion submitted for our resolution, petitioner argues that: 1. The Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. 2. The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded basic principles of judicial comity and due deference owing to a superior tribunal when it issued the hold departure order despite the pendency of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with this Honorable Court. 3. The right to due process of law, the right to travel and the right to freedom of speech are preferred, pre-eminent rights enshrined not only in the Constitution but also in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which can be validly impaired only under stringent criteria which do not obtain in the instant case. 4. The hold departure order in the instant case was issued under disturbing circumstances which suggest political harassment and persecution.

5. On the basis of petitioner's creditable career in the bench and bar and her characteristic transparency and

candor, there is no reasonable ground to fear that petitioner will surreptitiously flee the country to evade judicial processes. 11
I. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over her person considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court. We reject her thesis for being factually and legally untenable. It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 12 The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. 13 In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and, correlatively, whether there was a valid posting of bail bond. We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein. It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional release as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May 15, 1991 and which is even attached as Annex C-2 to her own motion now under consideration. This is further buttressed by the fact that petitioner thereafter also filed a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and for the court to allow her provisional liberty upon the security of a recognizance. With the filing of the foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and necessarily admit her acquiescence to and acknowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond she posted, instead of adopting a stance which ignores the injunction for candor and sincerity in dealing with the courts of justice. Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally appear before respondent court to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the cash bond, who requested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand on the matter and accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence. II. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule of judicial comity when it issued the hold departure order despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court which dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle of judicial comity applies to prevent a court from interfering with the proceedings undertaken by a coordinate court, with more reason should it operate to prevent an inferior court, such as the Sandiganbayan, from interfering with the instant case where a motion for reconsideration was still pending before this Court. She contends further that the hold departure order contravenes the temporary restraining order previously issued by this court enjoining the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the criminal case pending before it. It will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision in the present case on January 18, 1992 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed in this case and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order it previously issued. It is petitioner's submission that the filing of her motion for reconsideration stayed the lifting of the temporary restraining order, hence respondent court continued to be enjoined from acting on and proceeding with the case during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. We likewise reject this contention which is bereft of merit. Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in an action for injunction shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the execution of a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal, 14 and we see no reason why the foregoing considerations should not apply to a temporary restraining order. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment,

hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action. 15 It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective, even though it is not final. 16 A dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction 17 and no formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect such dissolution. 18 Consequently, a special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction. 19 There must be a new exercise of .judicial power. 20 The reason advanced in support of the general rule has long since been duly explained, to wit:

. . . The court of this State, relying upon the last of the two clauses quoted, held that an appeal from an order dissolving an injunction continued the injunction in force. The evils which would result from such a holding are forcibly pointed out by Judge Mitchell in a dissenting opinion. He said: "Although a plaintiff's papers are so insufficient on their face or so false in their allegations that if he should apply on notice for an injunction, any court would, on a hearing, promptly refuse to grant one, yet, if he can find anywhere in the State a judge or court commissioner who will improvidently grant one ex parte, which the court on the first and only hearing ever had dissolves, he can, by appealing and filing a bond, make the ex parte injunction impervious to all judicial interference until the appeal is determined in this court." . . . Such a result is so unjust and so utterly inconsistent with all known rules of equity practice that no court should adopt such a construction unless absolutely shut up to it by the clear and unequivocal language of the statute. . . . . 21
This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades and was reiterated in a case squarely in point and of more recent vintage:

The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (directing the secretary of UDMC to call a stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not premature, despite the petitioners then pending motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The lifting by the Court of Appeals of its writ of preliminary injunction in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 17435 cleared the way for the implementation by the SEC's en banc resolution in SEC EB Case No. 191. The SEC need not wait for the Court of Appeals to resolve the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a preliminary injunction is immediately executory. It shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. . . . .22
On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is no question that with the dismissal of the petition forcertiorari and the lifting of the restraining order, nothing stood to hinder the Sandiganbayan from acting on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against herein petitioner. At any rate, as we have earlier mentioned, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied with finality in our resolution dated September 10, 1992. Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the instant special civil action for certiorari divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case therein. Whether generated by misconception or design, we shall address this proposition which, in the first place, had no reason for being and should not hereafter be advanced under like or similar procedural scenarios. The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation for the exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts. It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before them. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. 23 The inevitable conclusion is that for as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists and there is nothing to prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending before it. And, even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues to retain its jurisdiction over the principal action. III. It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right to travel and freedom of speech. First, it is averred that the hold departure order was issued without notice and hearing. Much is made by petitioner of the fact that there was no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure order was filed by the prosecution and, instead, the same was issued ex mero motu by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error. Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. 24 These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; 25 or

essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, 26 as well as to the due administration of justice; 27 or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; 28 and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 29 Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has the power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance. Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction. 30Such being the case, with more reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud on the court or the opposing party, the result of which is that the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. What ought to be done depends upon the particular circumstances.31 Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order, in justified consonance with our preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused. Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving for abroad to pursue further studies, there is no sufficient justification for the impairment of her constitutional right to travel; and that under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only when so required in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law. It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid and complete despite the absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the aforecited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. This was the ruling we handed down in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 32 to the effect that: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935): . . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the

reach of the courts. This was reiterated in a more recent case where we held: Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health." The submission is not well taken. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin, G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 197, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga v. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121). Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court). xxx xxx xxx

. . . Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes. 33
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate that such policy includes the matter of petitions or motions involving hold departure orders of the trial or lower courts. Parties with pending cases therein should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof. Where, as in the present case, a hold departure order has been issued ex parte or motu propio by said court, the party concerned must first exhaust the appropriate remedies therein, through a motion for reconsideration or other proper submissions, or by the filing of the requisite application for travel abroad. Only where all the conditions and requirements for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus indubitably obtain against a disposition of the lower courts may our power of supervision over said tribunals be invoked through the appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations therein. WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution, the same is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes 1 Annex 1, Consolidated Comment of Public Respondents. 2 Annex 2, id. 3 Rollo, Vol. II, 594. 4 Official Receipts Nos. 4292925, 5775510 and 3276456; Rollo, 595. 5 Annex 3, Consolidated Comment of Public Respondents. 6 Annex 4, id. 7 Annex 5, id. 8 Rollo, Vol. II, 599. 9 Ibid., Vol. I, 495. 10 Rollo, 644. 11 Rollo, 573. 12 Crespo vs. Mogul, et al., 151 SCRA 462 (1987). 13 Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, et al., 112 Phil. 781 (1961); Mendoza vs. Court of First Instance of Quezon, et al., 51 SCRA 369 (1973). 14 Capistrano, et al. vs. Pea, et al., 78 Phil. 749 (1947). 15 State vs. Neveau, 295 NW 718. 16 Poole, et al., vs. Giles, et al., 248 SW 2d 464. 17 42 Am Jur 2d, Injunctions S291. 18 Rochelle vs. State, 75 So. 2d 268. 19 43A CJS, Judgments 617. 20 Chasnoff vs. Porto, et al., 99 A 2d 189. 21 A.S. Watson & Co., Ltd. vs. Enriquez, et al., 1 Phil. 480 (1902). 22 Crisostomo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al., 179 SCRA 146 (1989).

23 Peza, et al. vs. Alikpala, etc., et al., 160 SCRA 31 (1988); Aparicio vs. Andal, et al., 175 SCRA 569 (1989). 24 21 CJS, Courts 41. 25 State ex rel. Andrews, et al. vs. Superior Court of Maricopa County, et al., 5 P 2d 192. 26 In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Association, 114 ALR 151. 27 Fuller vs. State, 57 So. 806. 28 Clark vs. Austin, 101 SW 2d 977. 29 21 CJS, Courts 134. 30 Ibid., 136-137. 31 In re Slimmer's Estate 169 NW 536. 32 142 SCRA 149 (1986). 33 Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 195 SCRA 760 (1991).

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-15079 January 31, 1962

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GUILLERMO I. VENTURA, defendant-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Claro M. Recto for defendant-appellant. BENGZON, C.J.: Statement. This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal finding Guillermo I. Ventura guilty of illegal practice of medicine under Section 770 in connection with Section 2678 of the Revised Administrative Code, and sentencing him, this being his second offense, to pay a fine in the sum of P500.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay costs. Appellant, the accused, was charged with the above offense in an information which alleged that in February, 1955, he did, . "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and for compensation and reward, practice medicine in the said City (Pasay) by treating and applying electrical appliances to patients for the purpose of curing them with their ailments, diseases, pains, and physical defects from which they are suffering and by holding out himself to the public by means of signs, advertisements, and other means, to be a Doctor of Medicine." Facts. lower court found, as facts, the following: "... in the year 1949, the accused herein, Guillermo I. Ventura, was convicted by the court of first instance of Rizal of a 'similar offense' or illegal practice of medicine in the municipality of Pasay, now Pasay City and sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00 under the same legal provisions, or Section 770 in connection with Section 2678 of the Revised Administrative Code. "... by reason of certain complaints the National Bureau of Investigation had received from the President of the Philippine Federation of Private Medical Practitioners and from the Chairman of the Board of Medical Examiners, the National Bureau of Investigation on December 16, 1955, sent its morgue attendant Jose Natayan to the clinic of the accused at No. 2454 M. de la Cruz Street, Pasay City. Natayan was at that time suffering from pains in his back and he asked the accused to see his sickness. The accused attended to Natayan; wrote something on a piece of paper; and then he told him that he (Natayan) 'was sick of lumbago'. Thereupon, the accused asked Natayan to pay P5.00 and then asked him to pay the amount to a lady employee in the clinic which Natayan did. At the request of the accused, Natayan, then went around the other side of the clinic where he was given an enema of hot water by a male attendant. Then Natayan was asked to lie down on a table where his back was exposed to a big bulb for around fifteen minutes and afterwards to a red colored bulb for another ten minutes. Thereafter Natayan went back to the accused, who told him to come back to his clinic for six consecutive days. After that Natayan went back on the same day or December 16, 1955 to his office in the National Bureau of Investigation.

The following day, Natayan returned to the clinic of the accused with the National Bureau of Investigation raiding party composed of two agents, two attorneys and one photographer. After he was dropped by the National Bureau of Investigation agents about seven meters away from the clinic of the accused, Natayan proceeded to the office of the accused, who then and there told him that another treatment would be applied to him and that he would pay P3.00. After paying this amount and while Natayan was lying on a table about to be given treatment the National Bureau of Investigation agents raided the place. The accused herein, Guillermo I. Ventura, is not a duly registered masseur or a physician qualified to practice medicine. Issues. Appellant seeks a reversal here of aforementioned judgment of conviction on the grounds: (1) that the offense charged in the information had already prescribed; (2) that the laws involved are unconstitutional and void; (3) that granting that the said laws are valid, the accused should not have been prosecuted thereunder because he was not engaged in the practice of medicine; (4) that Congress, in passing House Bills Nos. 2405 and 357 recognized and believed in the efficacy of the drugless systems of healing and although said bills were vetoed by the President of the Philippines and thereby did not become regular statutes, they may be considered as concurrent resolutions formally establishing the drugless system of healing as a separate and distinct profession, not covered by Section 770 of the Medical Law; (5) that the complainants and the Government are estopped from prosecuting the accused under Section 770 because they were the ones who induced him to practice drugless healing after his conviction in 1949; and (6) that the accused has an implied license to practice drugless healing from the people of the Philippines and the Chairman of the Medical Board of Examiners. Discussion. Appellant, testifying on his behalf admitted that for the past 35 years, he had been practicing as a naturopathic physician, "treating human ailments without the use of drugs and medicines" and employing in his practice "electricity, water and hand" without a license to practice medicine; that during this time he had treated 500,000 patients, more or less about 90% of whom were healed, and that he had studied drugless healing in the American University, Chicago, Illinois for about four years. Invoking prescription, he argues that in view of the fact that he had begun the alleged practice of medicine thirty five years ago without the required license, the crime charged in the information had already prescribed.1 The records reveal that the accused began practicing his method of drugless healing 35 years ago. This practice was first discovered by the authorities in 1949. He was prosecuted and convicted therefor the same year. Sometime after he again set up a clinic. He had a lucrative clientele and nobody bothered him.
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However, at about February, 1955, the President of the Philippine Federation of Private Medical Practitioners, complained to the National Bureau of Investigation that appellant was advertising himself as capable of treating human ailments without drugs. Upon investigation, appellant was found to be without certificate of registration to practice such profession either from the Board of Medical Examiners or from the Committee of Examiners of Masseurs. So, this prosecution started in 1956. It is clear that the four-year period of prescription of the offense charged should be computed from February, 1955 when the National Bureau of Investigation discovered appellant's alleged illegal practice of Medicine. Appellant also questions the constitutionality of Section 770 in relation to Section 775 of the Revised Administrative Code. It is appellant's theory that to require, of any person whose business is merely to stimulate by mechanical means the nerves of the body, many years of study in medical schools, taking up obstetrics, general surgery, gynecology, bacteriology and many other sciences, is curtailment of the exercise of one's calling, a violation of the constitutional principle that all men have the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and are entitled to the equal protection of the law. It is furthermore theorized that inasmuch as drugless healing is not taught in any of the medical schools prescribed, how could the members of the Medical Board of Examiners pass on the competence of these drugless healers? . This same contention was presented to and settled by this Court in the case of People vs. Buenviaje who was convicted of illegal practice of medicine for practicing chiropractor.2 It held: There is very little force in this argument. The subjects in which an examination is required relate to matters of which a thorough knowledge seems necessary for the proper diagnosis of diseases of the human body and it is within the police power of the State to require that persons who devote themselves to the curing of human ills should possess such knowledge. In the instant case, we must again uphold these immutable concepts of the police power of the State. Under this power, the State may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud. As one means to this end, it has been the practice of different States, from time immemorial to exact in any pursuit, profession or trade, a certain degree of skill and learning upon which the community may

confidently rely, their possession being generally ascertained in an examination of parties by competent persons, or inferred from a certificate to them in the form of a diploma or license from an institution established for instruction on the subjects, scientific or otherwise, with which such pursuits have to deal.3 Appellant claims that his act of stimulating the affected nerves of the patients without use of any drug or medicine is not practice of medicine; that "practice of medicine" is confined only to the systems taught by the medical schools, namely, the regular, the homeopathic and the eclectic schools or systems. Section 770 of the Revised Administrative Code in no uncertain terms covers appellant's acts. The statutory definition as to what acts constitute illegal practice of medicine its provided in said Section 770 includes the acts and practices performed by appellant, By his own statements, he admitted to have continuously diagnosed and treated more or less 500,000 instances of different kinds of human ailments and to have prescribed remedies therefor. As regards the contention that there are at least two concurrent resolutions declaring formally that Congress has recognized the drugless methods of healing, we need not elaborate further than to say that not until such recognition is actually embodied in a statute, shall we extend consideration of such method. Appellant pleads that the lower court erred in not holding that the complainants and the government are estopped from prosecuting him because they were the ones who induced him to practice drugless healing after his conviction in 1949. He tried to show that medical practitioners, members of Congress, provincial governors, city mayors and municipal board members wrote to him requesting his help for persons suffering from all kinds of ailments; that municipal ordinances and resolutions were also passed authorizing him not only to practice his method of healing but also to put up clinics in some of municipalities; that he was even extended free transportation facilities to work in the Central Luzon Sanitarium in Tala, Caloocan, Rizal. Above plea cannot be sustained by this Court. The doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the government. 4 It is never stopped by mistakes or errors on the part of its agents, even assuming without conceding that said municipalities had encouraged appellant's practice. We cannot allow the bargaining away of public health and safety for the semblance of benefit to a few government officials, people or even municipalities. Similarly, there is no such thing as implied license to practice drugless healing by the mere fact that the Chairman of the Board of Medical Examiners had permitted appellant to serve free in the Central Luzon Sanitarium in Tala, Caloocan, Rizal, or that countless people persisted in engaging his services. For one thing, these people might have contracted his services on the mistaken notion that he was duly licensed to practice his profession; for another, a repetition of illegal acts can never make them legal. As additional argument, appellant urges acquittal under the new Medical Act of 19595 wherein the practice of physiotherapy is recognized as a distinct science. He claims coverage of said law on the ground that he practices physiotherapy by massage through physical devices and upon the recommendation of duly registered physicians. The above argument has no merit because there is strong evidence to the effect that appellant alone diagnoses his patients' ailments and applies the remedies therefor6 without written order or prescription by a registered physician. Judgment. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all parts and respects. Costs against appellant. Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De Leon JJ., concur. Padilla, J., took no part. Footnotes Sec. 1 (Act 3673). Violation penalized by special acts shall unless otherwise provided in such Acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: .
1

(b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month but less than two years.
2

47 Phil. 536. U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 225-233.

Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, L-11499, April 29, 1961; Koppel (Phil.) Inc. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, L-10550, Sept. 19, 1961. Republic Act No. 2383, Sec. 11. Exemptions. Preceding section shall not be construed to affect (a) any medical student duly enrolled in any approved medical college or school under training, serving without any professional fee in any government or private hospital, provided that he renders such service under the direct supervision and control of a registered physician; (b) any legally registered dentist engaged exclusively in the practice of dentistry; (c) any duly registered masseur or physiotherapist, provided that he applies massage or other physical means upon written order or prescription of a duly registered physician or provided that such application of massage or physical means shall be limited to physical or muscular development..
5 6

See Exhibit "A".

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 124981 July 10, 1998 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FREDERICK VILLAMOR y VILLA-NUEVA, alias "LEKLEK," GEORGE GABATO and DENNIS CUESTA, accused. FREDERICK V. VILLAMOR, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Seventh Judicial Region, Branch 29, Toledo City, convicting accusedappellant (hereafter VILLAMOR) of murder in Criminal Case No. TCS-2089. In an information filed on 20 August 1993, VILLAMOR, Eric Cantallejo, George Gabato and Dennis Cuesta were charged with murder, committed as follows:

That at around 10:00 p.m., more or less, of July 24, 1993, at the public plaza of Barangay Don Andres Soriano (DAS), Toledo City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill and acting with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot REYNOLD D. BROWN with a firearm, thereby hitting said victim on his head and which caused his untimely death. 2
U pon motion of accused Cantallejo, a reinvestigation was conducted as to his complicity in the crime. Then finding no probable cause against him, the prosecution filed an amended information 3 excluding Cantallejo as an accused and successfully moved for dismissal of the case as regards him. 4 Only VILLAMOR, however, was apprehended, his co-accused Gabato and Cuesta remaining at large. Thus, trial proceeded only against VILLAMOR, who, upon arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty. 5 The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Henry Montebon and Paul Joseph Berador as eyewitnesses; Dr. Crisostomo Abbu, the medico-legal officer; and Raymund Brown, the victim's father. On the other hand, the defense presented two witnesses, namely: VILLAMOR and Susana Abarico. The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Solicitor General in the Brief for the Appellee as follows:

Eyewitness Henry Montebon testified that around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 24, 1993, he was with his two friends: Jose Navarro and Paul Merador at the town plaza of DAS 6 Toledo City. [On] a nearby bench, he noticed the presence of appellant Frederick Villamor and [his] companions. Not long after, he also saw the victim Reynold Brown walking in the plaza. When the victim was about two meters away from the bench where appellant was seated, the latter suddenly stood up and fired at the former. The victim ducked and tried to run, but was again shot by appellant. This time, the victim fell to the ground seemingly lifeless. Montebon and his friends hurriedly gave assistance to the victim and brought him to a nearby hospital. The victim, nonetheless, died (TSN dated May 2, 1994, pp. 2-8).

Paul Joseph Merador corroborated the testimony of Henry Montebon. He positively identified appellant as the person who twice shot the victim when the latter passed by appellant's group (TSN dated March 22, 1995, pp. 2-9). Dr. Crisostomo [Abbu] testified that he [was the] Medico Legal Officer who examined the victim's dead body which sustained a fatal gunshot wound on the left parietal area above the left ear. He added that he recovered a thirty-eight (38) caliber slug from the right parietal area. The victim's death was caused by shock secondary to cerebral hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds (TSN dated May 4, 1995, pp. 2-7). Raymund Brown testified that as a consequence of the death of his son Reynold, he incurred the following expenses: P25,000.00 for the funeral as evidenced by an official receipt 7 issued by St. Francis Memorial Homes; P6,000.00 for the one-week vigil; P7,500.00 as financial assistance to the police for the arrest of VILLAMOR; and P25,000.00 as attorney's fees to the lawyer who assisted the family in the prosecution of this case. 8 On his part, VILLAMOR invoked self-defense. He claimed that he knew the victim Reynold as they were neighbors, and knew Reynold to be a violent person, having been involved in several stabbing incidents. In fact, prior to the night of 24 July 1993, VILLAMOR and Reynold figured in three altercations. The first took place on 24 December 1992 in a disco at Sitio Ocyou, Don Andres Soriano, where Reynold suddenly approached VILLAMOR's group and angrily asked his friend, Eric Cantallejo, where he came from. VILLAMOR then intervened as Eric was a close friend. For mediating between Reynold and Eric, VILLAMOR allegedly earned Reynold's ire. The second incident occurred the following year at the University of Cebu in Cebu City, where Reynold accosted VILLAMOR because of their previous misunderstanding. The third incident happened during the Sinulog festival in Cebu City in 1993 at the Boulevard Restaurant. Reynold again approached VILLAMOR's group and flared up, forcing VILLAMOR's, group to leave the place. Since then, VILLAMOR would see Reynold every week. 9 VILLAMOR recounted that on the evening of 24 July 1993, he visited his neighbor, Eric Cantallejo, who invited the former to stroll around the DAS plaza. They were then accompanied by co-accused George Gabato and Danilo Cuesta. At the plaza, while waiting for a bus ride to Cebu City, VILLAMOR noticed the presence of Reynold's friend, Henry Montebon, and another person, at the other side of the plaza. Suddenly, Reynold appeared, armed with a Batangas knife, and headed directly towards VILLAMOR's group. The latter scampered away, but Reynold chased and eventually cornered VILLAMOR and Dennis Cuesta, who had no other place to run as Reynold's friends were nearby. Reynold then attacked VILLAMOR and Cuesta and was about to stab them when Cuesta tossed a gun to VILLAMOR, who fired a warning shot. However, Reynold persisted, thus when the two were about a meter away from each other, VILLAMOR pleaded with Reynold not to do whatever he intended to. But, Reynold tried to stab VILLAMOR, who luckily avoided the thrust. Then when Reynold tried to stab VILLAMOR a second time, the latter shot Reynold, hitting his left ear. 10 The other defense witness, Susana Abarico, testified that she knew both Reynold, who was a regular visitor of her daughter, and VILLAMOR, who was a neighbor. Reynold frequented her neighborhood to ask about VILLAMOR's whereabouts. She was aware that the two had a misunderstanding and that sometime in December, Reynold, accompanied by a son of one Montebon, chased VILLAMOR towards the latter's house. 11 In its decision 12 of 14 December 1995, the trial court found VILLAMOR guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It further ordered him to pay the parents of Reynold Brown the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the latter's death, P25,000.00 as funeral expenses, and P10,000.00 as moral damages; and, to pay the costs. In finding VILLAMOR guilty of murder, the trial court noted: The prosecution have [sic] clearly and positively established that while the victim passed by the group of the accused, the latter immediately without warning shot the deceased, with the use of a firearm hitting the victim on the head. This was established by the testimony of the prosecution witness and corroborated by the testimony of the doctor on the physical evidence. After he was shot for the first time, the victim ran away and was chased by the accused Frederick Villamor. Thus, it is indubitable that the accused shot the victim who was unarmed at that time. In rejecting VILLAMOR's invocation of self-defense, the trial court held that he failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression on the victim's part; and ruled that VILLAMOR's allegation that Reynold looked for him on several occasions and in different places only strengthened the finding that VILLAMOR committed the crime with evident premeditation. The trial court likewise noted VILLAMOR's failure to show any stab wounds he suffered and the conspicuous absence of the knife allegedly used by Reynold. It then concluded that VILLAMOR's claim that Reynold was armed was merely a figment of the former's imagination. Finally, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses as no ill motive could be imputed to them to falsely testify against VILLAMOR.

In this appeal VILLAMOR contends that: The prosecution was not able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder due to the following grounds, to wit: 1. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CRIME OF MURDER. 2. THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES ARE BIASED AND INCREDIBLE, CONSIDERING THAT IT ALL CAME FROM THE [SIC] REYNOLD BROWN'S CLOSE FRIENDS OR ASSOCIATES. 3. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE TESTIMONY OF [VILLAMOR'S] AND HIS WITNESS WHICH CLEARLY SHOWED THAT THE LATE REYNOLD BROWN WAS THE AGGRESSOR AND THAT [VILLAMOR] WAS MERELY DEFENDING HIMSELF FROM A GREATER HARM POSED BY THE AGGRESSIONS OF REYNOLD BROWN. VILLAMOR argues that there was provocation on the part of Reynold Brown since he and his group were already at the plaza prior to VILLAMOR's arrival and that it was Reynold who approached VILLAMOR's group. VILLAMOR likewise assails the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses and questions their impartiality, it having been established that said witnesses were close friends of Reynold. Moreover, VILLAMOR faults the prosecution for not presenting any police officer who responded and immediately proceeded to the scene of the incident. VILLAMOR further stresses that the trial court should have accorded greater weight to his evidence that Reynold was the aggressor who posed a threat to VILLAMOR's life. To this end, Susana Abarico confirmed that Reynold had been inquiring about VILLAMOR's whereabouts and had gone out of his way and as far as Cebu City to "finish off" VILLAMOR. Finally, VILLAMOR questions the trial court's appreciation of treachery, maintaining that he initially fired a warning shot and Reynold was hit only with the second shot. Since Reynold was thus forewarned, there was no treachery. Consequently, the crime committed, if any, was only homicide and not murder. On the other hand, the State, in the Appelle's Brief filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, debunked VILLAMOR's arguments. It contends that having invoked self-defense, the burden of evidence shifted to VILLAMOR, and it was thus incumbent upon him to prove, relying on the strength of his evidence and not the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, the presence of all the elements of self-defense, which he failed to do. Clearly, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Reynold Brown; neither was there a reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel any attack, nor lack of provocation on the part of VILLAMOR. The State maintains that assuming VILLAMOR acted in self-defense, it was improbable for him not to have presented any eyewitness other than himself, considering that several people were present during the incident. It was also undisputed that the interval between the two shots was five seconds, which was not a sufficient time for Reynold to have escaped from VILLAMOR after the alleged warning shot. That Reynold ignored the warning shot, as claimed by VILLAMOR, did not by itself mean that he was determined to kill VILLAMOR. The State then emphasizes the fact that VILLAMOR failed to present in evidence the Batangas knife and any medical certificate showing his stab wounds. The State likewise asserts that the witnesses for the prosecution were more credible. The fact the eyewitnesses for the prosecution were close friends of the victim did not per se impair their credibility, especially where no motive could be attributed to them to testify against VILLAMOR other than the desire to punish the perpetrator of the crime. Besides, the general rule is that the factual findings of the trial court should not be disturbed where the evidence supported such findings. The State, citing People v. Villanueva, 13 finally maintains that the killing of Reynold Brown was committed with treachery since the attack against Reynold was sudden and without warning and with his back turned to VILLAMOR. We affirm VILLAMOR's conviction. At bottom, VILLAMOR's grievances deal with issues of fact, which, in turn, hinge upon the credibility of the witnesses. Well-settled is the rule

that generally, the factual findings of the trial court will not be disturbed since it is in a better position to appreciate the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses, having observed their deportment and manner of testifying. 14 VILLAMOR fails to convince us that the trial court overlooked certain facts which, if considered, might result in his acquittal. The testimonies of Henry Montebon and Paul Joseph Berador were not only forthright and consistent, but likewise more in accord with human experience. The close friendship they shared with the victim did not by itself give rise to the presumption of ulterior motive nor did it taint their credibility. Other than such relationship, VILLAMOR failed to impute any ill motive for these two witnesses to testify falsely against him, thus, it is reasonable to presume that it was only their desire to seek justice for the death of their friend which compelled them to testify before the court.15 They could not have accomplished that objective nor rest with a clear conscience were they to implicate an innocent person in the commission of so grave a crime. Verily, if an accused had really nothing to do with a crime, it would be against the natural order of events and of human nature, and against the presumption of good faith, that a prosecution witness would falsely testify against him. 16 Indeed, a careful review of the record reveals that VILLAMOR did not act in self-defense when he killed Reynold Brown. Where self-defense is invoked in an accusation for homicide or murder, an accused admits that he killed the victim and the burden of the evidence is then shifted to the accused. 17 If was, therefore, incumbent upon VILLAMOR to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in defense of himself, and in so doing, must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. 18 The three elements of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 19 Even taking VILLAMOR's version of the events at face value, specifically, that Reynold approached VILLAMOR with a knife, the same is unable to support a finding of unlawful aggression on the victim's part. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. 20 Here, aside from VILLAMOR's uncorroborated and self-serving claims, the record is bereft of any evidence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. For one, the locus criminis was a public place where people congregated, came and went about freely. Thus would it seem nearly bizarre that the victim openly and menacingly brandished a knife while approaching VILLAMOR. More importantly, other than his self-serving allegation, VILLAMOR was not able to prove that the victim was actually armed with a Batangas knife and attempted to stab VILLAMOR that fateful night. The witnesses for the prosecution denied having seen any knife and, indeed, none was retrieved from the scene of the crime. They likewise refuted VILLAMOR's claim that the victim attempted to harm the former. Without a doubt, VILLAMOR's narration of events did not show any real danger to his life. Hence, the absence of unlawful aggression bars VILLAMOR from claiming self-defense. 21 What likewise does not bode well for VILLAMOR is his claim that the gun was merely thrown to him by his companion Dennis Cuesta when they were allegedly cornered by the victim. Plainly, this was incredible and contrary to human experience and the ordinary course of events. Since Dennis too was allegedly under attack by the victim, both instinct and reason would have dictated that he keep the gun to himself and not throw it to VILLAMOR. On the other hand, VILLAMOR's victim, Reynold Brown, was unarmed and defenseless, innocently on his way to meet his friends in the plaza. There was no provocation on his part immediately prior to or at the time of the incident; certainly, Reynold was unaware of what was to transpire, otherwise, he would have avoided passing nearby the bench where VILLAMOR and his friends gathered around. Oddly, VILLAMOR admitted he was not alone that night, thus it would have been to his benefit that he presented any of his companions to corroborate his testimony. However, two of his companions are his co-accused who have remained at large; while as regards Eric Cantallejo who was dropped from the information as an accused, why he was not presented as an eyewitness raises suspicion and casts doubt on VILLAMOR's credibility. Moreover, his claim that the prosecution failed to present any policeman who responded to the incident as a witness should not be taken against the prosecution. If such testimony would have benefited VILLAMOR, then he should have made the effort to produce said witness. VILLAMOR, moreover, admitted during cross examination that immediately after the incident, he fled from and never returned to Don Andres Soriano, except only upon his arrest four months later in Carmen, Cebu. 22 As he offered no explanation for such conduct, the same constituted flight, which is competent to evince his guilt. 23 As to the last issue, we uphold the trial court's finding that Reynold Brown was killed with treachery, thus qualifying the crime to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take. 24 The prosecution's evidence clearly established that the manner by which VILLAMOR twice fired the gun at the victim was sudden and unexpected, as testified to by Henry Montebon thus:

Q Where was this Frederick Villamor situated at the time that he shot Reynold Brown? A He was with his friends near the gate of the plaza drinking. Q Do you know the friends of the accused Frederick Villamor who he was drinking with? A Yes,. sir. Q Who were they? A There were Dennis Cuesta, George Gabato, and a certain Inday Cantalejo. ATTY. VILLORDON Your Honor, please, I would like to manifest that it took the witness thirty (30) seconds he had a hard time remembering the names. COURT How far were they from where you were? A From her [sic] to that wall is about ten (10) meters. ATTY. GONZALES Q Now where did this Reynold Brown where did he come from? ATTY. VILLORDON No basis. ATTY. GONZALES There was already a statement that Reynold Brown was shot inside the plaza, so where did this Reynold Brown come from? ATTY. VILLORDON No basis. COURT At the time when you said the accused was drinking with his friends near the gate where was Reynold Brown? ATTY. GONZALES There was a statement that he saw Reynold Brown being shot by Frederick Villamor. COURT You ask the witness at the time they were drinking where was Brow?

ATTY. GONZALES I adopt the question of the Court. A I saw that he was walking towards us. Q Where was he walking and where did he come from when you first saw him? A He came from the road behind me. He went inside. Q And then where did he go? A He was walking towards us. Q Was he able to reach you? A No, sir. Q Why? A Because he was shot b[y] Frederick Villamor. Q How many times did this Frederick Villamor shoot Reynold Brown? COURT While he was walking where was the accused when he was walking towards you? A The accused was seat[ed] on the bench. Actually Frederick Villamor was not seating [sic] on the bench he was seating [sic] near the plants while his friends were seating [sic] on the bench. Q And this Brown passed by the place where the accused was seating [sic]? A Yes, sir. Q How far was he? A Just very near to where the accused was seating [sic]. Q What happened when Reynold Brown passed by? A When Reynold Brown passed by the place where the accused was the accused immediately pulled his firearm and stood up and shot Reynold Brown. Q How many times? A Two times. Q Was Brown hit? A At the first shot he was not hit but at the second shot he was already hit.

Q Where was he hit? A On the head. Q How far was the accused to Brown at the time he shot Brown? A At the first shot from here to that lawyer which is about two (2) meters. Q Do you mean to say the accused followed Brown? A At [the] first shot when Brown was not hit Villamor followed Brown and shot him again. Q At the first shot what was the position of the accused? A He was facing the victim. Q How did Brown reacted [sic]? A He immediately ducked and he went under the railings. Q Did he not run? A He acted to run. xxx xxx xxx Q The second time he was shot how far was the accused to [sic] the victim? A The distance between the hand of the accused to the head of the victim is about one-half (1/2) meter. COURT Proceed. Q After shooting Reynold Brown for the second time what did the accused do? A They [sic] ran together with his friends. Q These friends you are referring to [are] George Gabato, Dennis Cuesta and Inday Cantalejo? A Yes, sir. Q By the way, what did these friends of the accused Frederick Villamor what were they doing when this accused shot the victim?

A They stood up and somebody shouted shot [sic] him more. 25

This was corroborated by the other eyewitness, Paul Joseph Berador. Indeed, VILLAMOR's attack on the unarmed victim was sudden, unprovoked and unexpected. It was done in a manner which directly and specially insured the execution of the act without any risk to VILLAMOR arising from the defense which the victim may have made. Treachery

was thus present in the instant case, which qualified the crime to murder.

26

We disagree, however, with the observation of the trial court that the past enconters between the victim and VILLAMOR established evident premeditation on the part of the latter. Three requisites must be duly proved before evident premeditation may be appreciated, namely: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 27Evident premeditation is based on overt acts and must be evident, not merely suspected, indicating deliberate planning. There must be a demonstration, by untoward acts, of a criminal intent that is notorious and manifest. 28As no proof thereof was offered in this case, the above conclusion of the trial court was clearly based on speculation. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of 14 December 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Seventh Judicial Region, Branch 29, Toledo City, in Criminal Case No. TCS-2089 finding accused-appellant FREDERICK VILLAMOR y VILLANUEVA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a principal in the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the parents Reynold Brown the sums of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, P25,000.00 as funeral expenses and P10,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellant. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
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Footnotes 1 Original Record (OR), Criminal Case No. TCS-2089, 203-208. Rollo, 22-27. Per Executive Judge Gualberto F. Delgado. 2 Rollo, 4. 3 OR, 41-42. 4 Id., 43. 5 Id., 55. 6 Acronym for barangay Don Andres Soriano. 7 Exhibit "E," OR, 180. 8 TSN, 4 May 1995, 10-12. 9 TSN, 1 September 1995, 2-5. 10 TSN, 1 September 1995, 5-8. 11 TSN, 12 October 1995, 2-4. 12 Supra note 1. 13 225 SCRA 353 [1993]. 14 People v. Simon, 209 SCRA 148, 156 [1992]; People v. Gornes, 250 SCRA 270, 275; People v. De Leon, 245 SCRA 538, 545 [1995].

15 People v. Viente, 225 SCRA 361, 368-369 [1993]; People v. Silvestre, 244 SCRA 479, 490 [1995]; People v. De Leon, 248 SCRA 609, 622-623 [1995]. 16 People v. Enciso, 223 SCRA 675, 686 [1993]. 17 People v. Gomez, 235 SCRA 444, 451 (1994); People v. Hubilla, Jr., 252 SCRA 471, 479 [1996]; People v. Galas, 262 SCRA 381, 402 [1996]. 18 People v. Ybeas, 213 SCRA 793, 801 [1992]; People v. Rivero, 242 SCRA , 354, 358 [1995]; People v. Gutual, 254 SCRA 37, 45-46 [1996]. 19 Art. 11, Revised Penal Code; People v. Gomez, supra note 17 at 451; People v. Camahalan, 241 SCRA 558, 569 [1995]; People v. Hubilla, Jr., supra note 17 at 479; People v. Galas, supra note 17 at 403 [1996]. 20 People v. Bayocot, 174 SCRA 285, 292 [1989]; People v. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653, 667 [1993]. 21 People v. Silvestre, supra note 15 at 491. 22 TSN, 1 September 1995, 16. 23 People v. Alvero, Jr., 224 SCRA 16, 33 [1993]; People v. Aliviado, 247 SCRA 300, 310 [1995]; People v. Villegas, 262 SCRA 314, 323 [1996]. 24 Art. 14 (16), Revised Penal Code. 25 TSN, 2 May 1994, 4-7. 26 People v. Kempis, 221 SCRA 628, 645-646 [1993]; People v. Villegas, supra note 23 at 323; People v. Cabodoc, 263 SCRA 187, 203 [1996]. 27 People v. Narit, 197 SCRA 334, 349 [1991]; People v. Barba, 203 SCRA 436, 458 [1991]; People v. Buka, 205 SCRA 567, 587 [1992]; People v. Boniao, supra note 20 at 672. 28 People v. Narit, supra note 27 at 350.

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