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GOODMAN

ON L I K E N E S S A N D D I F F F E R E N C E S OF MEANING

In his two papers 'On Likeness of Meaning' [ 1] and 'On some Differences about Meaning' [2] Nelson Goodman proposed and defended a certain treatment of synonymy which we shall briefly state and discuss. Then, quite informally and tentatively, we shall do some preliminary work on a semantical theory intended to embody Goodman's ideas. Goodman's proposal was briefly the following: Given any count-noun N, such as 'unicorn' or 'triangle', one can construct composite countnouns from it by prefixing such phrases as 'thought of a'. 'picture of a', or 'description of a', and the extensions of these compound nouns (called secondary extensions of N) are determined by criteria which are independent of those used in fixing the extension (called primary extension) of N itself. Then, two nouns N1 and N2 are synonymous just in case their primary and secondary extensions are the same. This proposal came with the claim that there are certain composite nouns, such as those formed by using the phrases 'description of a . . . ' or 'literal E n g l i s h . . . w o r d ' , whose extensions were different whenever the composites were formed from distinct nouns. E.g. according to ordinary English or rules supplied by Goodman, 'triangular figures which are not trilateral figures' was said to be a description of triangular figures but not a description of trilateral figures, so that 'triangular figure' and 'trilateral figure', having different secondary extensions, could not be synonymous. Since some of these secondary extensions comprise only concrete things (e.g. 'concretely inscribed description of') and already provide more than enough nonsynonyms, we may leave secondary extensions with abstract content (such as thoughts or concepts) out of account. But since synonymy, so defined, will never apply to any two distinct words, the notion is uninteresting and had better be replaced by that of likeness of meaning, where the likeness (not further analyzed by Goodman) should be of a degree or of a kind sufficient for a given purpose of discourse. Since Goodman published the papers we have mentioned, much work has been done, or has come to be better known, whose aim it was to
Erkenntnis 12 (1978) 3-16. All Rights Reserved Copyright ~ 1978 by D. Reidel Publishing Company Dordrecht-Holland

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explicate some notion of synonymy or of translation. Since those publications occurred, linguists have done extensive research regarding dictionary entries and transformational rules which were supposed to preserve synonymy. We have also learned much about the syntactical and algebraic properties of elementary formal theories which may be called 'synonymous' by virtue of interdefinability of their terms (bilateral interpretability). And in the framework of possible-worlds semantics, precise definitions have been provided (in terms of analysis trees) of general concepts of synonymy and of translation which are more discriminating than those of logical or necessary equivalence. Yet, these advances in the treatment of synonymy seem to have bypassed Goodman's proposal without either vindicating or refuting it, and no formal semantical theory is known to me whose intuitive ancestry could be traced back to Goodman's papers. This is all the more surprising as Goodman's ideas must have had considerable appeal. It is appealing, e.g., that interchangeability within certain contexts, which a theory of synonymy is supposed to legislate, is built into Goodman's notion itself; and those of us who would rather do semantics without possible worlds, possible things, and other would-be's and might-have-been's find it very attractive that Goodman proposed to work only with actual objects, and concrete ones at that. Why then don't we have something like a semantics of secondary extensions which could rival a semantics of possible worlds? In the hope of discovering what it would take to move from the Likeness toward a full-grown semantics, let us begin by examining more closely how the compound nouns and secondary extensions at issue could be generally characterized and formally represented. Given that (1) There are no unicorns

Goodman and most logicians are willing to grant also that (2) as well as (3) There are no heads of unicorns All unicorns are centaurs

and, by virtue of either (1), (2), or (3), that (4) All heads of unicorns are heads of centaurs.

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For similar reasons one would also grant that all centaurs are unicorns and that all heads of centaurs are heads of unicorns, so that 'unicorns' and 'centaurs', and again 'heads of unicorns' and 'heads of centaurs' will all have the same (namely, null) extension. On the other hand, G o o d m a n rightly observes that we should not grant, on the basis of (1) that (5) or that (6) All pictures of unicorns are pictures of centaurs. There are no pictures of unicorns

For, even though the surface grammar of (3) and (4) is like that of (5) and (6) respectively, the phrase 'x is a picture of a unicorn' does not mean 'there is a unicorn of which x is a picture', the former phrase is properly applied to pictures from which the description 'x is a picture of a centaur' is withheld, and we have criteria for the correct application of these phrases which do not depend upon our first finding some unicorn or centaur and then checking whether a given picture might represent it. Already what we have said so far is probably a bit dubious regarding ordinary English, but not for reasons which would seem to endanger G o o d m a n ' s main proposal. It may well be the case, for instance, that the inferences of (2) from (1) or of (4) from (3) are not valid in English due to some requirements regarding relevant connection or existential import of universal statements in ordinary discourse. But G o o d m a n ' s theory presupposes basically only the notion of extension which can be defined as needed irrespective of how universal statements may be interpreted. It may also be doubted whether even (3) follows from (1) according to ordinary discourse and whether 'x is a head of a unicorn' really means 'there is a unicorn of which x is a head'. For suppose that G o d should choose to create detached unicorn heads and detached centaur heads without creating whole unicorns or centaurs. Such an act of creation seems logically possible, and it seems further possible that we might be able to distinguish these heads by clear criteria (such as, having one horn on the forehead) which do not depend on the existence of the entire creatures. This puts 'head of a centaur' into the same boat as 'picture of a

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centaur'. If there are many more examples of this kind than we had previously thought, this will diminish the range of applicability of standard logic, but will leave unaffected Goodman's analysis of synonymy itself. Goodman's proposal regarding synonymy requires only that there are expressions, like 'picture of a ' whose addition to a noun, like 'unicorn', has an extension which is in some sense independent of the extension possessed by the noun itself. Passing that by for the moment, let us examine the additional claim, that no two words are synonymous, which depends on the existence of compound nouns whose extension differs whenever the embedded nouns differ. The examples of secondary extensions mentioned by Goodman are ones introduced by such phrases as 'picture of', 'description of', and perhaps also 'thought of' and a few more. What further compounds would he regard as relevant in order to determine the secondary extensions of an English word? Perhaps any well-formed context should be considered or, at least, any context which is a count-noun. Maybe phrases like ' . . . which are so called by virtue of their three angles' are admissible contexts; they are ones whose application to 'triangles' has triangles for its extension whereas its application to 'trilateral figures' has null extension. Or the relevant compounds might include 'Tom's beliefs a b o u t . . , things' in which, if Tom is ignorant or insane enough, not even apparent paradigms of synonymy, like 'triangular' and 'three-angled', seem interchangeable under preservation of extension. If, in determining the secondary extension of a noun one is allowed to consider all nounforming compounds of English, no matter how deviously constructed or content-sensitive to phrasing they may be, then it is hardly surprising that no two words should have the same secondary extensions. And this conclusion would become completely inescapable if quotation contexts were allowed outright. On the other hand, there are a few indications that the compounds which give secondary extensions are not meant to be quite that arbitrary. For instance, in [2] p. 90, Goodman makes an exception of quotation contexts, though without saying why. And his examples, in so far as they are good unrevised English, seem all to belong to the 'of'-variety, like 'picture of' and 'description of'. In the interest of brevity, let us call 'representative' those objects which depict or describe, or otherwise

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serve to convey messages said to be 'about' certain entities. We want to speak of representation loosely and without having a particular theory in mind. In this terminology, pictures and descriptions of unicorns are representatives, and so are stories and whole theories about unicorns. Goodman's favorite examples of secondary extensions seem to be sets of representative objects and it is possible that no other secondary extensions were intended. It seems to me that the phrase 'description of a triangle', as it is ordinarily used, refers to something which is representative of triangles, something which is about triangles. And so understood, if it is necessary that all triangles are trilateral, then all descriptions of triangles are descriptions of trilaterals (whereby the particular description 'triangles which are not trilateral' is no exception). Now, it is surely possible to provide rules (such as those proposed in [1], p. 72, footnote) whose effect it is to make the extension of compounds beginning with 'description of' very sensitive to the properties of the describing phrase itself and very insensitive to the properties of the thing allegedly described. We could do that with pictures too by requiring, e.g., that something shall not be a picture of a triangle unless it makes all three angles especially conspicuous. But doing so makes descriptions or pictures no longer straightforwardly representative of objects but rather of objects-as-represented-ina-certain-way. 1 At any rate, two alternatives seem possible: one can let secondary extensions be determined by arbitrary contexts, whereupon interchange of synonyms will become trivial and word-sensitive secondary extensions become available. Or else, we confine secondary extensions to sets of certain kinds of objects, say those we have called 'representative', with the result that interchange of synonyms becomes problematic as well as Goodman's claim that there is a phrase of the required sort whose identical addition to different nouns will always have different extensions. I would not know how to give a reasonable formal expression to the former alternative because I do not know how to give a good semantical treatment to quotation contexts, to phrases like 'which are so called because of' and the difficulties I have in mind would arise in any other semantics as well. So, I am forced to choose the second alternative and will attempt to provide formal counterparts of representative objects. But the resulting notion of synonymy will not be faithful to Goodman's claim

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in that we will not make it a necessary truth that any two distinct words are non-synonymous. While Goodman accepts, as a consequence of his theory and supposed facts about English, that no two words are synonymous in English, he rejects just as emphatically the suggestion that some word might not be synonymous with itself, or that two occurrences of the same word might not be synonymous. Now, in conversation, my colleague John Pollock has drawn my attention to the fact that e.g. 'cardinals are red birds' describes birds but not dignitaries of the Church, and so both is and is not a description of cardinals. The same could be said of any word which is ambiguous in English and perhaps of any word which contains some indexical expression. If the theory is to be applied to a natural language, it seems therefore best to admit that there are indeed words which are not self-synonymous (or that there are non-synonymous equiform inscriptions). Then, assuming that it is extra-systematically justified to call exactly those words 'ambiguous' which are not self-synonymous, we can define and locate ambiguity in terms of the theory itself and then simply regard Goodman's claim (that synonymy is reflexive) as trivially true of the remaining words. In the sequel we shall simply avoid this problem by only considering the semantics of languages which are so constructed that ambiguity cannot occur. Returning to basics, Goodman's treatment of synonymy hinges on the occurrence of compounds, like 'picture of a centaur', whose extension is independent of that possessed by the embedded noun 'centaur'. But the semantically relevant sense of 'independent' in which this must be so is not entirely clear. Goodman is surely right in holding that the existence of pictures showing unicorns is independent of the existence of unicorns, in the sense that we can have the former without the latter. But for the purposes of a theory of meaning as opposed to an ontology, is that kind of independence good enough? If we were to admit meanings, would it not remain true that the meaning of the compound 'picture of a unicorn' would somehow depend on the meaning of 'unicorn'? I do not in fact think that such speculation regarding meaningdependence is very fruitful until a specific semantics is envisaged. But I believe that the following considerations regarding apparently valid inference patterns serve to sharpen the issue:

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Goodman warns that we must avoid a logical analysis of 'pictures of centaurs' which would make the following argument valid: (7) There are pictures of centaurs. Hence, there are centaurs.

Since such inferences become valid upon standard symbolization, he emphasizes (in [1], p. 70) that 'picture of a centaur' is really a single predicate which had perhaps better be written in the hyphenated form 'centaur-picture'. But, apart from the desire to block arguments like (7), what does it mean to say that 'picture of a centaur' is a single predicate? Its grammatical form in English is surely not that of a simple adjective. Perhaps the point is rather that we should translate this compound phrase of English into an uncomposed predicate of quantifier logic. But if we do, then we not only get rid of the undesirable argument (7), but we also lose as logical truths such desirable candidates as: (8) (9) All centaur-pictures are pictures. All Greek-god-pictures are god-pictures.

and inferences like the following will no longer have valid symbolic counterparts: (10) All centaurs are (necessarily, or on all accounts) mythological creatures. Therefore, (A) All pictures of centaurs are pictures of mythological creatures, (B) All descriptions of pictures of centaurs are descriptions of pictures of mythological creatures.

Now, if sentences like (8) are to be treated as valid, then 'pictures' has to be treated as an inferentially relevant part of 'centaur-pictures' irrespective of hyphens or other surface-grammatical form. And the validity of arguments like (10) seems to require that we also treat 'centaurs' as an inferentially relevant part of 'pictures of centaurs'. So, however ontologically independent these things may be and whether or not we revise either English or symbolization so as to make 'centaur-picture' grammatically

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simple, the desire to produce a semantics in which (8)-(10) become valid seems to require that we treat that phrase as semantically complex or, at any rate, so that it is semantically dependent on both 'centaur' and 'picture'. Still, undesirable inferences like (7) must certainly be blocked and equally the logical truth of sentences like

(ii)

Every description of a description of a centaur is a description of a centaur.

Goodman's theory of meaning would seem to be best clarified and vindicated if one could actually construct a semantics in accord with his ideas in which all these things would come to pass. Let us therefore discuss informally how one could take first steps in that direction. The formal language we have in mind should at least contain simple one-place predicates which can serve to symbolize such phrases as 'is a unicorn' and 'is a picture'. Goodman's examples of English words whose synonymy he proposed to test were in fact all count nouns like 'unicorns' which can be treated as predicates via 'is a unicorn'. He failed to mention how one would treat intransitive verbs like 'runs' which are usually also translated by symbolic predicates (are there not only unicorn-pictures but also run-pictures?). Also, he did not say how one could test relation expressions for synonymy, and I do not propose to examine here whether that would pose additional problems. Our formal language should also allow for the formation of compound predicates. I do not much like the hyphen as a symbol of composition, for 'unicorn-picture' should not remind us of conjunctive composition which i's probably at work in 'potato-salad' and 'panty-hose'. While we can also allow for conjunctive predicates, I would prefer to express the presently relevant mode of predicate composition by directly adding the word 'of' to the formal language and obtaining counterparts of 'picture of unicorn'. If we do so, then it will be hard to forbid, on principled and purely grammatical grounds, that unwanted compounds like 'unicorn of picture' or 'unicorn of unicorn' are also being formed. Let us allow them in grammar, but make their extensions null when we come to semantics. In order to do semantics, let us assign to well-formed expressions what we shall call 'quasi-meanings': Goodman-style substitutes for meanings. They should contain ordinary extensions, and they should also comprise

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some counterpart of secondary extensions. As we have a n n o u n c e d earlier, the objects in secondary extensions are here conceived as things which are representative of other objects. Of these representatives, e.g. pictures of unicorns, we think in two ways: Firstly, we think of them simply as objects, so that a picture of a unicorn is simply an object which ought to be in the extension of the predicate 'is a picture'. Secondly, we also think of them as having a more abstract function, that of representing other things. We formalize the abstract unicorn-representing function of a picture by letting the picture appear, within the quasi-meaning of 'unicorns' on a more abstract level, viz in a set of individuals. So, the quasi-meaning of a predicate like 'is a horse' should comprise (1) certain individuals: horses, (2) certain sets of individuals: sets of pictures, statues, descriptions, and other representatives of horses, (3) some sets of sets of individuals: sets of sets of pictures of statues of horses and other representatives of representatives of horses appearing suitably abstract within two pairs of braces, etc. These sets and sets of sets will do the work for us not only of secondary extensions, but also of tertiary ones, and more as needed. This entire description of the quasi-meaning of predicates is, of course, purely extra-systematic. Formally, the quasi-meaning assigned to a particular simple predicate may be any set whatever. It is only in their interplay with other notions about to be mentioned that the intended content of such quasi-meanings becomes clear. To say that something is a picture of a horse is to say that the entity in question is firstly a picture and hence an individual in the quasi-meaning of 'is a picture', and secondly a representative of horses and is in that capacity in one of the sets of individuals built into the quasi-meaning of 'is a horse'. Formally, we can say these two things about a horse-picture by associating with the word 'of' an operation (e.g. that of taking unions) which has the effect of lowering everything in a quasi-meaning to which it applies by one level of set abstraction while removing the individuals. Thus, the new predicate 'is of horses' will have a quasi-meaning which differs from that of 'is a horse' in that the former no longer comprises horses as individuals; rather, the individuals of the former will be representatives of horses, its sets of individuals will be sets of representatives of representatives of horses, etc. And the quasi-meaning of the compound predicate 'is a picture of a horse' can now be construed simply as the intersection of the quasi-meanings assigned to 'is a picture' and 'is

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of a horse', where the individuals in that intersection are conceived as being those pictures which are also representatives of horses. G o o d m a n did not tell us whether the centaur-pictures in his secondary extensions were to be just vaguely centaurish looking or whether each of them was to be a picture of some definite centaur or other, or even a picture of a certain centaur; nor did he discuss whether those differences matter. Similarly, when we interpret a predicate like 'is a horse' in the manner just discussed, we make use of objects which are thought of as being representatives of some horse or other, but we bypass the question which particular horse it might be of which one of them should be a representation. We make use of a picture, say, which is horserepresenting in a sense which does not even require that there are any horses; but if Trigger is a horse and is in fact depicted, we have no semantic machinery for expressing that a horse-picture is representative specifically of Trigger. I think we could provide for such machinery by building into each interpretation some special relation of (de re) representation which should intuitively obtain between individuals x and y just in case x is a representative of y. We could then make the following distinctions: we would still have the individuals which are members of the quasi-meaning of 'is a horse', all of which are thought of as horses, and those individuals which are in sets within that quasi-meaning and are conceived as horse-representing. From among the horse-representing individuals just mentioned, we can single out those which bear the new relation of (de re) representation to some horse (within the same quasimeaning). Horses so related will be ones of which there are representations. Not every horse-picture need be of a horse, nor is it necessary that every horse is depicted. Whenever there is a horse which is represented by a picture then that picture is horse-representative, but not vice versa. However, so long as we do not have any symbolic names, no special relation symbol of the object-language which might express representation, and no intention of expressing fancy de re~de dicto distinctions by means of quantifiers, it does not seem necessary to use a special relation of representation, and for greater simplicity we leave the quasi-meanings of predicates as previously characterized. For certain purposes (e.g. in interpreting a modality like 'it is analytic that') one would like to assign quasi-meanings not only to predicates but also to formulas and sentences. When it comes to atomic formulas, it

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seems easiest and fairly plausible to let their quasi-meanings be the same as those of the predicates they contain. In connection with formulas, we must also worry about satisfaction or truth. So, let us say that a formula like 'x is a horse' shall be true of an object just in case that object is an individual and is in the quasi-meaning of 'is a horse' (which is also the quasi-meaning of 'x is a horse'). I suppose that the connectives can be treated in the expected manner: the quasi-meaning of a disjunction should be the union of the quasimeanings of the disjuncts, and the quasi-meaning of a negation should be the complement (relative to the class of all finite sets whose ultimate membership-ancestors are individuals) of the quasi-meaning of its unnegated part. So long as we do not want to bestow too much philosophic depth upon the intepretation of quantifiers, I suppose their interpretation can proceed as it is usual in either the objective or the substitutional way. The satisfaction conditions should pose no problem. A theory of meaning which might be of interest to a logician should presumably concern some language which is strong enough to express some of its meaning relations. To do that, one could introduce some symbol expressive of synonymy. But if we had a symbol which serves to say that one formula is meaning-contained in another, then that symbol would have greater expressive power and synonymy could be defined as mutual meaning-containment. And if we had a primitive symbol which could be read 'it is analytic that' and conditionals, rightly interpreted, then such an operator could be used to express meaning-containment, and even more than that, e.g. the analyticity of all tautologies. Let us therefore have such an operator, as well as formulas of the form 'it is analytic that 4~" and let us agree that such formulas shall be true (of an individual) just in case the quasi-meaning of ~b itself is universal (i.e. comprises all finite sets which are founded on the individuals). Assuming that the quasi-meaning of a conditional is as expected, it will turn out to be universal just in case the quasi-meaning of its antecedent is contained in that of its consequent so that e.g. 'if x is a king then x is male' will be analytic if all kings are males, all pictures of kings are pictures of males, all songs of pictures of kings are songs of pictures of males, etc. Further, the quasi-meaning of a formula having the form 'it is analytic that ~ ' is conveniently taken to be universal or null as the quasi-meaning of ~b itself is universal or null.

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To what extent does the semantics just outlined conform to Goodman's ideas? For a start, if we identify the extension of a predicate with the intersection of its quasi-meaning and the set of individuals, it will be possible that two predicates have the same extension without having the same quasi-meaning for just the reasons Goodman had in mind; and if we define synonymy as mutual inclusion of quasi-meaning, many coextensive predicates will fail to be synonymous. However, we have arranged our semantics so that, contrary to Goodman's claim, it will not be either provable or analytic that distinct predicates are always non-synonymous. That is so, apart from formal reasons, because we took the things in the secondary extensions to be representatives and allow for the possibility that e.g. triangular figures and three-angled figures are represented by exactly the same objects. It is possible that Goodman used the phrase 'secondary extension' so that e.g. the extensions of 'pictures of dragons', 'pictures of pictures of dragons', etc. were all regarded as secondary extensions of 'dragons'. At any rate, our semantics allows explicitly for many levels of representativeness and makes clear that synonymy requires not merely sameness of the first level (of all representatives) but also of all higher levels (of all representatives of representatives, etc.). The quasi-meanings that we assign to predicates comprise individuals, classes of individuals, classes of classes of these, etc. But in making use of such non-individuals, we follow Goodman himself (see [1], p. 71). We indulge in this bit of Platonism simply because we do not want to face all difficulties at once, and expect that nominalism could be restored if we tried. Is it true that expressions having the same quasi-meaning are interchangeable in all sentences under preservation of truth? - Well, within the limits imposed by the vagueness of our account and the poverty of the object-language under consideration, it certainly seems so. But one could enrich the language by contexts within which even synonyms should not be interchangeable. Disregarding quotation contexts and their kin, it seems that the interchange of expressions in contexts which are descriptive of a person's beliefs should be governed by criteria quite different from those which concern synonymy. But, in spite of the fact that it does not guarantee global conditions of interchange, synonymy has its place in discussions relating to correct language use and seems to be fairly well

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captured by requiring that the objects to which synonyms apply should have the same direct and indirect representatives. Among the sentences and inference patterns (7)-(11) which were mentioned earlier, does the semantics we have sketched make exactly those valid or invalid which it should? - Assume that the notions of an interpretation, of truth under an interpretation, and of validity were defined as expected. Then check: The sentence 'there is a picture of a unicorn' will not imply 'there is a unicorn' since the quasi-meaning of 'x is a unicorn' may be devoid of individuals (and the non-individuals it contains do not count). The quasi-meaning of a predicate like 'is a picture of a centaur' is the intersection of the quasi-meanings of 'is a picture' and 'is of a centaur' and hence included in the former so that it will be true (in fact, analytic) that all pictures of centaurs are pictures. Assume that it were analytic that if x is a centaur then x is a mythological creature. Then the quasi-meaning of 'is a centaur' will be included in the quasi-meaning of 'is a mythological creature', and hence all pictures of centaurs to be found in the former will also be pictures of mythological creatures occurring in the latter and, similarly, all descriptions of pictures of centaurs will be descriptions of pictures of mythological creatures. Finally, since we formally represent being a representative by being a member of a set, and since membership is not transitive, it will not be valid (as it should not be) that every description of a description of a centaur is a description of a centaur. The semantics just outlined has been left quite informal in the expectation that its expression within pure set theory would be routine if the ideas were really worth the effort and annoyingly distractive otherwise. Although we have engaged in no more than a preliminary discussion of a theory which might embody Goodman's ideas, we feel confident that such a theory can indeed be constructed and hope, for the sake of nominalism, actualism, and plain good sense, that something like it might rival the success of possible-worlds semantics.

The University of Rochester, College of Arts and Science, Rochester, New York, U.S.A.

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R O L F A. E B E R L E NOTE

1 As reported in [2], 94-95, Clarke raised a similar objection against compounds which implicitly mention words, and he even proposed a possible way of characterizing 'implicit mention', a proposal which Goodman then successfully attacked. The justice of the objection does not seem to depend on the objector's success in precisely defining the troublesome contexts. But if I had to do it, I would attempt to use the identity conditions directly; the rough idea being that objects whose identity conditions are like those of words are themselves structurally as good as words, and mention of them is like mention of words. BIBLIOGRAPHY [1] Goodman, Nelson, 'On Likeness of Meaning', Analysis, Vol. 10 (1949), p p . 1-7. Reference in the present text is to a revision of that paper printed in Linsky, L. (ed.), Semantics and the Philosophy o[ Language, Urbana, Ill., pp. 67-74. [2] Goodman, Nelson, 'On some Differences about Meaning', Analysis, Vol. 13 (1953), pp. 90-96. (Manuscript received 13 November 1975)