Santos, Julius Loren C. Special Proceedings Cases Rule 72 NAZARENO VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 138842.

October 18, 2000

Fatcs: On 15 March 1985 Natividad Nazareno filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Damages against spouses Romeo and Eliza Nazareno. Natividad avers in her complaint that she is the sole and absolute owner of a parcel of land located in Naic, Cavite, covered by TCT No. 51798. In April 1981 Natividad's brother, Romeo, and his wife Eliza convinced Natividad to lend them TCT No. 51798 to be used as collateral to a loan the proceeds of which would be used in the completion of the construction of the Naic Cinema on the subject property. Natividad agreed on the condition that title to her property would be returned within one year from the completion of the construction of the cinema. Accordingly, Natividad executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of spouses Romeo and Eliza over the lot. The sale was simulated because Natividad did not receive any consideration therefor. The cinema was completed but despite several demands by Natividad, the spouses refused to return Nativiidads title to the property, and had it transferred in their name. Spouses Romeo and Eliza alleged that the property is their inheritance and originally formed part of the estate of their late father Maximo Nazareno, Jr. The deed of sale was only resorted to for the purpose of distribution which was entrusted to Natividad. The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses Romeo. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and rule in favor of Natividad. On November 1996 Natividad filed a Manifestation and Motion with the Regional Trial Court of Naic praying for the issuance of a writ of execution as well as a writ of possession. Romeo and Eliza filed an Opposition contending that Natividads complaint never prayed that she be placed in possession of Naic Cinema. Neither did the Court of Appeals order that petitioner be placed in possession of the property. On 21 February 1997 the trial court granted the writ of execution but denied the issuance of a writ of possession as it was not included in the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals stated that Execution not in harmony with the judgment has no validity. It must conform more particularly to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision, as the only portion of the decision that becomes the subject of execution.

Issue: Whether or not the writ of possession should be granted.

Held: No. Petition denied. Petitioner cannot validly claim possession over the Naic Cinema since in her complaint and subsequent pleadings, she has admitted not being the owner thereof. On the contrary, she claims that the Naic Cinema belongs to the estate of her father. On the other hand, respondent spouses have asserted dominion over the Naic Cinema. Plainly, petitioner cannot wrest possession of the moviehouse from respondent spouses through a mere writ of possession as she herself even disclaims being the owner thereof. Ownership over the Naic Cinema must be threshed out in a proper proceeding. A mere prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession will not suffice.

Rule 74 McMICKING vs. BENITO SY CONBIENG G.R. No. L-6871. 15 January 1912

Facts: In 1902 one Margarita Jose, died and one Engracio Palanca was appointed administrator with the will annexed of the estate of the said Margarita Jose, and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao became his sureties. After the execution of this bond said Palanca, as such administrator, took possession of all the property of the said Margarita Jose. In 1904, Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco died in the city of Manila. CFI made an order directing the Palanca to furnish a bond to take the place of the undertaking upon which said Mariano Ocampo and Dy Cuyao. The bond thus required was duly filed and the new sureties thereon being Juan Fernandez, Luis Saenz de Vismanos and Alejandro Palanca. In the same year Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator of Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto qualified as sureties of the said administrator. Doroteo Velasco, as administrator, filed with the court a complete report and inventory of the property of the deceased, together with a statement of all his debts and liabilities. As a part of this report and inventory said administrator filed an instrument signed by all of the persons interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the partition of the estate among themselves without proceedings in court, at the same time assuming the payment of all obligations against the estate. The CFI, upon the request of the administrator and of all parties interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo, entered an order in said agreement. Pursuant to such agreement and order of the court approving the same, Doroteo Velasco, as administrator, delivered to the devisees and legatees of Mariano Ocampo, all of the property of said decedent pursuant to the terms of said agreement of partition, leaving in the hands of the administrator no property or thing of value whatsoever belonging to the said estate. From that time forward said administrator has not had in his possession or control any of the assets of the said estate and has not had any participation in the management thereof. At the time the agreement for participation was made and signed and at the time of the distribution of the property of the estate pursuant thereto, no committee had been appointed to hear claims against the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo, and no notice had been published to creditors of the said deceased to present their claims against the said estate in the manner prescribed by law. In 1908, Palanca was removed from office as administrator of the estate of said Margarita Jose and Jose McMicking, was appointed in his stead. Palanca refused to render an account of the property and funds of the estate of the said Margarita Jose. Instead of so doing, he retained possession of said propertyand funds, absconded with the same, and never returned to the Philippine Islands. In 1909, Jose McMicking, as administrator, made an application to the court for the appointment of commissioners of the estate of said Mariano Ocampo for the purpose of hearing claims against the estate. The commission having been appointed and qualified, a claim was presented to it by the plaintiff

based upon the defalcation of said Engracio Palanca, as administrator, which claim was allowed by said commission and later approved by the court, which directed that the said claim be paid by Doroteo Velasco, if he had sufficient funds to make such payment. No part of the sum thus found to be due by the commission has been paid to the representative of the estate of said Margarita Jose. In 1905, Pio de la Barretto died and letters of administration were issued to Benito Sy Conbieng. In 1909, upon the application of McMicking, a committee was appointed by CFI Manila to appraise the estate of the said Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, and to hear claims presented against his estate. The claim so presented against the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, was disallowed by the committee thereof. Upon these facts the court having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, rendered judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint upon merits, without costs. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not there can be administration of estate even after the partition and division has already consummated. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that after the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and 597 have been fully consummated, no further administration of the estate can be had unless there occur the following requisites: 1. There must have been discovered a claim against the estate "within two years after such settlement and distribution of estate."2. The creditor holding the claim must be the person who moves the court for the appointment of an administrator. In the case at bar: 1. No debt was discovered during the prescribed period. It was nearly four years after the partition of the estate and the taking possession by the heirs of their respective portions before it was even discovered that Palanca had been guilty of converting the property of the estate to his own use; and, so far as the records shows, it was nearly five years before the alleged claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo was fixed; and 2. No creditor made his application. The necessary conclusion is that the appointment of commissioners to hear the claim above referred to was beyond the powers of the court and was without jurisdiction. The finding of the commissioners had no force or effect. It gave no right against the estate and none against the so-called administrator. This section creates a statute of limitations which deprives all debts which are not discovered within the prescribed time of the power of requiring an administration of the estate. The partition proceedings are proceedings out of court. Consequently there is no prescribed method of ascertaining and settling claims. The appointment of commissioners, the

publication of notice to creditors, and all the other proceedings necessary in cases of administration in court are not required in partition out of court It was not the intention of the law to pronounce the partition void of no effect simply because not all of the debts were paid before the partition was made. The fact of non payment cannot, then, because by the creditor as a reason for attacking the partition directly by asserting that, inasmuch as a payment of all the debts is a condition precedent to the right of partition, such partition cannot legally and validly take place while a debt is outstanding. The mere fact, therefore, that a creditor was not paid before the partition took place furnishes no ground for a revocation of the partition. It simply provides a fact which he may urge as a reason for the appointment of an administrator and the consequent administration of so much of the estate as may be necessary to pay the debt discovered.

Rule 74 Vda. De LOPEZ v. LOPEZ GR .No. L-23915. 28 September 1970 Facts: Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased husband filed with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and her legitimate children with the deceased. In an order dated March 30, 1964 the lower court approved the project of partition and declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes." Seventeen days thereafter, or on April 16, 1964, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez, 1 represented by their mother, Lolita B. Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition claiming that they were illegitimate children of, the deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-marital relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the estate given to them. The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that the proceeding had already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was already in the hands of the distributees; and that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy, which should be an independent action against the individual distributes. The Court finds that the said petition to reopen is not in order. In view thereof, the said petition to reopen is hereby denied for lack of merit.The movants asked for reconsideration, which was denied, and thereupon appealed directly to this Court. Issues: 1.) Whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding is proper? 2.) Whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was filed too late? Held: 1.) Of vital importance is the fact that appellants' motion to reopen, as well as the petition attached thereto, is based on their claim that they are illegitimate children of the deceased. On the face of such claim they are legal heirs of the deceased and hence entitled to share in his estate. Having been omitted in the partition presented by the judicial administratrix and approved by the Court, they were not bound thereby. A judicial partition in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto. No partition, judicial or extrajudicial, could add one iota or particle to the interest which the petitioner had during the joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership and certainly none of the co-owners may convey to the others more than his own of such definitive character to stop all means of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful share, such co-heir may still, within the prescriptive period, bring an action for reivindication in the province where any of the real property of the deceased may be situated.

2.) The motion to reopen was not too late. The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding closed did not become final immediately upon its issuance. It was no different from judgments or orders in ordinary actions. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in Special Proceedings." And judgments or orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30) days from notice to the party concerned. In this case appellants' motion to reopen was led only seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure. The remedy was therefore invoked on time.

Rule 74 MANOTOK REALTY INC. Vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-35367 April 9, 1987

Facts: November 21, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a probate court in the special proceedings of the testate estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda, authorized Vicente Legarda, as special co-administrator, to sell the Legarda Tambunting Subdivision. On December 10, 1952, Legarda as co-administrator allegedly sold Lot 6, Block 4 situated at Tondo, Manila to Lucero. The sale was on an installment basis and Lucero paid an initial amount of P200.00 by virtue of which a receipt was issued by Legarda. Lucero took possession of the lot. In 1953, Lucero leased the lot to six persons, one is herein private respondent. Respondent constructed a house on Lot III, Block 2, and paid P15.00 as monthly rentals. On July 31, 1956, the probate court issued another order authorizing the Philippine Trust Company as administrator, to sell the subdivision. The lessees of Lucero, including the private respondent, defaulted in their payment of rentals. Ejectment cases were filed however, a compromise agreement was concluded. The tenants continued to pay monthly rentals to Lucero. Lucero waited the sending by Legarda of the formal contract but as none came, he could not make further payments. He went to PTC to show receipts of payment. The petitioner was subsequently awarded the sale of the entire subdivision. Notices were published in the newspapers addressed to the occupants to vacate the premises. Petitioner filed the complaint below for ejectment against the private respondent. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the petitioner to be the owner and entitled to the possession of the land. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the sale made by Legarda to Lucero was valid because the former acted within his authority as special coadministrator and that there was no need for the approval of the probate court of such sale. It also ruled that there was a consummated sale between Legarda and Lucero because they had agreed on the subject matter and the purchase price and that the latter paid part of the purchase price while the former delivered the land. The petitioner contends the appellate court committed an error of law. Issue: Whether or not the court erred when: a) it upheld the validity of the contract of sale between Legarda and Lucero; and b) it ruled that the approval of the probate court was not necessary for the validity of the said sale.

Held: The alleged sale made by Legarda to Lucero should have been embodied in a public instrument in accordance with Article 1358 of the Civil Code and should have been duly registered with the Register of Deeds to make it binding against third persons. The authority given by the probate court to Legarda specifically required the execution of necessary documents. Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court. An administrator under the circumstances of this case cannot enjoy blanket authority to dispose of real estate as he pleases, especially where he ignores specific directives to execute proper documents and get court approval for the sale's validity. Petition granted.

Rule 75 PASTOR, Jr. v. COURT OF APPEAALS G.R. No. L-56340. 24 June 1983 Facts: Pastor Sr a spanish subject died survived by his wife, two legitimate children Pastor Jr and Sofia, and an illegitimate child Quemada., Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor, Sr. The Probate Court, upon motion of Quemada and after an ex parte hearing, appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor, Sr. whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. On December 7, 1970, Quemada as special administrator, instituted against Pastor, Jr. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses Pastor, Jr. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. On February 2, 1971, Pastor, Jr. and his sister Sofia filed their opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing Quemada as special administrator. For two years after remand of the case to the Probate Court, Quemada filed pleading after pleading asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. Pastor, Jr. and Sofia opposed these pleadings on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First Instance. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the Probate Court. On March 5, 1980, the Pobate Court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will for March 25, 1980, but upon objection of Pastor, Jr. and Sofia on the e ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held on March 25. Instead, the Probate Court required the parties to submit their respective position papers as to how much inheritance Quemada was entitled to receive under the wig. Pursuant thereto, Pastor Jr. and Sofia submitted their Memorandum of authorities dated April 10, which in effect showed that determination of how much Quemada should receive was still premature. Quemada submitted his Position paper dated April 20, 1980. Atlas upon order of the Court, submitted a sworn statement of royalties paid to the Pastor Group from June 1966 (when Pastor, Sr. died) to February 1980. On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the Probate Court issued the now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by Atlas and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily on the ground that the Probate Court gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of Quemadas legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will. Issue: Did the court in its Probate Order resolved the issues of ownership and the intrinsic validity of the will?

Held: No. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the win, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed " subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu." [Parenthetically, although the statement refers only to the "intestate" aspect, it defies understanding how ownership by the estate of some properties could be deemed finally resolved for purposes of testate administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the estate be the owner of a property for testate but not for intestate purposes?] Then again, the Probate Order (while indeed it does not direct the implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate administration aspect must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator," which clearly implies that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of allowing Quemada to remain as special administrator of estate properties not covered by the holographic will, "considering that this (Probate) Order should have been properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will. " That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory was appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Rule 75

REYES v. DIAZ G.R. No. L-48754. 26 November 1941 Facts: The case involves an election protest and questions the jurisdiction of the lower court. Herein protestant-appellant Emilio Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy but its due filing is being questioned. The authority of the trial court to pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated to the protestant, which have not been challenged by Apolonio Diaz, is also questioned. Issue: What is the jurisdiction of the trial court? Held: Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers. In the instant, case, there is no such question of jurisdiction as above described. Both parties agree that if the due filing of the protestant's certificate of candidacy is proven, the trial court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is, therefore, no question between the parties as to what the jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either case. The real question between them is one of fact - whether or not the protestant's certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And not until this fact is proved can the question of jurisdiction be determined. Neither is the second question one of jurisdiction within the purview of the legal provisions above quoted. Whether certain ballots are or are not pertinent to the issue raised in the pleadings, is merely a question of relevancy of evidence. In order that a court may validly try and decide a case, it must have jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. But in some instances it is said that the court should also have jurisdiction over the issue, meaning thereby that the issue being tried and decided by the court be within the issues raised in the pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should be distinguished from jurisdiction over the subject-matter the latter being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties. Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction over the subject-matter is involved. In truth, jurisdiction over the issue is an expression of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. At any rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this function is without such importance as call for the intervention of this Court. Furthermore, this question of jurisdiction is unsubstantial. It is well-settled rule that the institution of suffrage is of public, not private, interest, and the court may examine all the ballots

after the ballot boxes are opened in order to determine which are legal and which are illegal, even though neither of the parties raised any question as to their illegality.

Rule 76 SUMILANG Vs. RAMAGOSA G.R. No. L-23135 Facts: On July 5, 1960 Mariano Sumilang filed with the CFI of Quezon a petition for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on December 1, 1959. The petition for probate was opposed by appellants alleging that it was made under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament. also claimed that they, instead of petitioner, were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased and prayed only for the disallowance of the will. Oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate mainly on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter because the last will and testament of the decedent, if ever it was really executed by him, was revoked by implication of law six years before his death. Oppositors also stated that before the testators death the parcels of land are no longer under his name and that he sold the parcels of land to petitioner Sumilang and to his brother Mario. Petitioner contends that oppositors have no legal standing in court and they are bereft of personality to oppose the probate of the last will and testament of the testators; and that oppositors have no valid claim and interest in the distribution of the estate of the aforesaid testator and no existing valid right whatsoever. December 26, 1967

Issue: Whether or not the oppositors have a legal standing in the case or an interest in the probate of the will.

Held: No. The petition below being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The court finds that they have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by

law and therefore and are totally strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate. They do not attempt to show that they have some interest in the estate which must be protected. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. The courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto.

Rule 84 and 90 SILVERIO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 178933. 16 September 2009 Facts: Beatriz Silverio died intestate and was survived by her husband Ricardo Silverio, Sr. Silverio, Sr. filed an intestate proceeding. However, Silverio, Jr. and Ricardo Silverio filed a petition to remove Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate. Silverio, Sr. was replaced by Silverio, Jr. as administrator. Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Motion of Reconsideration which was later on denied. Silverio, Jr. was authorized to immediately exercise his right as administrator of the estate. The court in its Omnibus Order also ordered Nelia Dee to vacate a property belonging to the estate. Silverio, Jr. was given letters of administration. Nelia Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order. The RTC recalled its ruling and reinstated Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate. Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the court. The court furthermore allowed that various properties of the estate be sold in order to partially settle estate taxes. One of the properties sold was the lot occupied by Nelia Dee. Dee filed a Notice of Appeal but this was contested by Silverio, Jr saying that the appeal was filed qo days beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Sec 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The RTC ruled in favor of Silverio, Jr. and reiterated its previous order to vacate the premises against Dee. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. It overruled the decision of the Regional Trial Court. The Notice to Vacate against Nelia Dee was annulled and set aside. Issue: Whether the possession of the property by Silverio-Dee is valid. Held: No. The alleged authority given by Silverio, Sr.. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to occupy the property is null and void since the possession of estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court as provided in Sec. 1 Rule 90 and Sec. 2 Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration in accordance with Sec. 3 Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court. With this in mind, it is without a doubt that the possession by Nelia S. Silverio-Dee of the property in question has absolutely no legal basis considering that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of administration, not to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right of the new Administrator to possess and manage the property for the purpose of settling the estates legitimate obligations.

Rule 78-90 VIZCONDE v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 118449. 11 February 1998 Facts: Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children. Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of 10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced by a Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT NO. T-36734. In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela property was issued to Estrellita. Then Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00). On the same year, Estrellita bought from Premiere Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paraaque using a portion of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a bank. After the Vizconde Massacre occurred the petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares with Rafael and Salud, Estrellitas parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. Ramon filed an opposition alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not les than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon pleaded for courts intervention to determine the legality and validity of the inter vivos distribution made by deceased Rafael to his children Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled In Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafaels children by right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita. The lower court ruled that the acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas was not for a valuable consideration. Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of the said transfer of property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.

Issue: Whether or not the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita is null and void and the Paraaque property be subject to collation. Held: The Supreme Court find that the probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors. Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they received from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. The purpose for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessors will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the contrary. Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it was donated, the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee. The Court ruled that the probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. The petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding, which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation. As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings. Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title. In the case at bench, however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matter outside the probate courts jurisdiction. The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitimate of any of Rafaels heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Paraaque

property. What was transferred to Estrellita, by way of a deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory basis. The order of the probate court presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. The Paraaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00 by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the present owner of the Paraaque property is not one of Rafaels heirs. Thus, the probate courts order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafaels estate. As it stands, collation of the Paraaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir in the Paraaque property. Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.

QUASHA ANCHETA PENA v. LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP. GR No. 174873. 26 August 2008 Facts: Raymond Triviere passed away. Proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Consuelo Triviere, before the RTC of Makati City. Atty. Syquia Atty. Quasha of the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses. Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation expenses. Citing their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under administration, the RTC denied in May 1995 the Motion for Payment. Atty.Zapata took over when Atty. Quasha died. Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment, for their own behalf and for their respective clients.LCN, as the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere filed its Comment /Opposition. LCN argued that its claims are still outstanding and chargeable against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere; thus, no distribution should be allowed until they have been paid; especially considering that as of 25 August 2002, the claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere amounted to P6,016,570.65 RTC issued an order stating that:the co-administrator Atty. Syquia is authorized to pay to be sourced from the Estate of the deceased as follows: a) P450,000.00 as share of the children of the deceased b) P100,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses c) P150,000.00 as share for the widow. LCN filed a Motion for Reconsiderationof the foregoing Order but it was denied by the RTC . LCN sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by assailing the order of the trial court. The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision essentially ruling in favor of LCN. The Court of Appeals modified the Order of the RTC by deleting the awards of P450,000.00 and P150,000.00 in favor of the children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively. The appellate court adopted the position of LCN that the claim of LCN was an obligation of the estate which was yet unpaid and, under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court, barred the distribution of the residue of the estate. Issue: Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the award in favor of the heirs of Taviere is already a distribution of the residue of the estate?

Held: While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the RTC Order was not yet a distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate, still, they did constitute a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the petitioner children and widow were already being awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been paid or provided for. In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following: [1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance distribution; and [2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate. There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into consideration.Hence, the Court does not find that the Court of Appeals erred in disallowing the advance award of shares by the RTC to petitioner children and the widow of the late Raymond Triviere.

GONZALES-ORENSE v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 80526. 18 July 1988 Facts: The issue arose when, having been retained by the private respondent on July 1, 1982, to represent her in the probate of her husband's will, the petitioner was subsequently dismissed on March 5, 1984. He claimed the stipulated attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the estate but the probate court, in its order dated December 8,1986, allowed him only P20,000.00 on the basis of quantum meruit. On December 19, 1986, he filed a notice of appeal from this order, and the probate court then transmitted the records of the case to the Court of Appeals, which notified the petitioner accordingly. On July 20, 1987, he submitted the brief for the appellant. The private respondent traversed with her brief for the appellee on September 8, 1987. On September 22, 1987, however, the Court of Appeals declared the petitioner's appeal abandoned and dismissed for his failure to submit his record on appeal as required under BP 129 and the Interim Rules and Guidelines. The petitioner then came on appeal by certiorari to this Court to ask that the said resolution be set aside as null and void. The petitioner contends that under the above rules it was not necessary for him to file a record on appeal because his appeal involves an ordinary claim for payment of attorney's fees which may be asserted against the private respondent either in the probate case or in a separate civil action. The appeal should therefore be covered by the general rule rather than by the exception. This was believed by the probate court, which directed the transmittal of the records in lieu of the record of appeal. The private respondent, for her part, supports the respondent court and argues that the above-cited provisions specifically exclude from the general rule special proceedings and other cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The period for appeal in these cases is retained at thirty days and the record on appeal is still necessary. This is a mandatory requirement which will lead to the dismissal upon failure to comply.

Issue: Whether, when an award of attorney's fees by the probate court is elevated to the Court of Appeals, a record on appeal is necessary. Held: It is settled that the fees of the lawyer representing the executor or administrator are directly chargeable against the client for whom the services have been rendered and not against the estate of the decedent. However, the executor or administrator may claim reimbursement of such fees from the estate if it can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to its benefit.

As the petitioner's claim for attorney's fees is not a claim against the estate of the private respondent's husband, he could have filed it in an ordinary civil action, in which event an appeal therefrom will not be regarded as involved in a special proceeding requiring the submission of a record on appeal. It appears, however, that it was not filed in such separate civil action but in the probate case itself, which is a special proceeding and so should be deemed governed by Rule 109 on appeals from such proceedings. The appeal would come under Subsection (e) thereof as the order of the probate court granting the challenged attorney's fees "constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing." The consequence is that the exception rather than the rule in BP 129 and the Implementing Rules and Guidelines should be followed and, therefore, the record on appeal should be required. In view of these circumstances, and in the interest of justice, the Court feels that the petitioner should be given an opportunity to comply with the above-discussed rules by submitting the required record on appeal as a condition for the revival of the appeal. The issue raised in his appeal may then be fully discussed and, in the light of the briefs already filed by the parties, resolved on the merits by the respondent court.

CRUZ v. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS GR No. 6497. 3 November 1910 Facts: Juan M. Cruz was imprisoned in Bilibid Prison after he was found guilty of two criminal cases. He was first sentenced of imprisonment for a term of three years and subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in paying the fines and then a term of two years imprisonment for the second case. Juan Cruz had already finished serving his sentence and is now asking to be freed but the warden of the Bilibid prison refused to o so. Juan Cruz then filed a writ of habeas corpus. The warden explained that the five year term was already finished but Juan Cruz must still serve the subsidiary imprisonment on account of his failure to pay the fine in his first case. Issue: Whether Juan Cruz should be released. Held: Yes. Prior to the passage of Act No. 1732, Courts of First Instance had no authority to impose subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay fines in cases of conviction for violations of the Acts of the Philippine Commission, and such errors when committed have been corrected by this court in those cases which were appealed. In the case at bar the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction of the offense described in the complaint for which the petitioner was tried. It had jurisdiction of the prisoner who was properly brought before it. It had jurisdiction to hear and decide upon the defense offered by him, but it did not have power to sentence the petitioner to subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of the fine imposed. It is therefore clear that that part of the judgment is void. This court at this time has no power to correct this error committed by the court below, neither has it power to remand the case to the trial court for that purpose. The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes a punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid. The petitioner has served out, according to the return of the respondent to the order to show cause, the entire part of the sentences which the court below had power to impose, and adhering to the rule that that part of the sentences imposed by the court below in excess of its jurisdiction is void, the petitioner is entitled to his release.

DIRECTO v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS G.R. No. L-37108 Facts: This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Antonio Directo against the Director of Prisons, praying for the reason given that the latter be ordered to set him at liberty at once. The ground of the petition is that petitioner is illegally detained in Bilibid Prison by virtue of a re-amended sentence which is void because it was imposed by the Court of First Instance of Manila after having lost jurisdiction. On January 12, 1931, the herein petitioner, Antonio Directo, was committed to Bilibid Prison under a final sentence of the Court of First Instance of Manila. It was without jurisdiction when it amended the original sentence on January 26, 1932. And if the amended sentence was void for lack of jurisdiction of the court which imposed it, the reamended sentence imposed on February 2, 1932 was also void, although its purpose was to enforce the provision of the Penal Code which makes penal laws retroactive so far as they favor the accused, for the remedy in such a case would be the writ of habeas corpus. It appearing that up to this date March 26, 1932, the petitioner has served only one year, two months, and fourteen days, there is still a balance of about nine months and nine days to be served by him. Issue: Whether or not the reduction of the penalty for imprisonment shall validly grant the writ of habeas corpus. Held: We are of opinion and hold: (1) That article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which makes penal provisions retroactive so far as they favor the accused, provided he is not an habitual criminal, does not authorized a court whose sentence has become final and executory to make a substantial amendment, and any amendment made in such sentence, though it be to give effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused, would be null and void for lack of jurisdiction; and (2) that the only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused when the trial judge has lost jurisdiction over the case, is the writ of habeas corpus. By virtue whereof, the petitioner herein not having extinguished the penalty of the Revised Penal Code, the petition for the writ of habeas corpus is hereby denied and dismissed March 28, 1932

REAL v. TROUTHMAN G.R. No. L-23074. 24 May 1967 Facts: Policarpio Real, litigating as a pauper, filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Jessie Trouthman, a married man, allegedly persuaded his daughter, Lilian Real, by means of deceit, force, threats, intimidation and misrepresentation, to elope and live with him, without the knowledge and consent of her parents, and that she has since then been detained by Trouthman and prevented from returning to appellant in violation of Article 403 of the Civil Code. An order was issued for Trouthman to appear before it and produce the said Lilian Real. In his answer the respondent alleged that Lilian Real went voluntarily with him and that at the Police station, she herself, in the presence of her parents, explained that she voluntarily left home to go with him, thus causing the Police authorities to consider the case closed. After hearing, the lower court found that Lilian Real had attained the age of majority on May 16, 1964 and that respondent was not detaining her nor restraining her liberty or freedom nor preventing her from returning to her parents, hence the lower court dismissed the case. Issue: Whether or not the fact that Lilian Real attained the age of majority is a valid ground for the dismissal of the petition. Held: The Supreme Court enunciated that Article 403 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 403. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, a daughter above twenty-one but below twenty-three years of age cannot leave the parental home without the consent of the father or mother in whose company she lives, except to become a wife, or when she exercises a profession or calling, or when the father or mother has contracted a subsequent marriage. The Court has left with no other alternative but to order the dismissal, because as of now, 1967, Lilian Real is already more than 24 years of age and hence is unquestionably beyond the coverage of Article 403.

********(Wrong case title REPUBLIC v. CLORIBEL)******** ONG SEE HANG v. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION G.R. No. L-9700. 28 February 1962 Facts: Petitioners who are Chinese nationals are natives of Amoy , China . They left Amoy to live in Hongkong but with intentions to return to their native place. Their desire to return to Amoy was, however, frustrated when the Chinese communists took over the Chinese mainland. While in Hongkong, they made a trip to Japan and on their return to Hongkong, they passed through the port of Manila where they arrived on November 3, 1952. They were allowed by the Philippine Immigration authorities for the purpose of taking another means of transportation to Hongkong, for which they were given up to November 28, 1952. Despite the period of time given them within which to leave the Philippines , and notwithstanding the availability of surface and air transportation to Hongkong, petitioners failed to comply with the condition imposed for their temporary stay in the Philippines . On November 29, 1952, warrants for their arrest were accordingly issued by the Immigration authorities, but the warrants were, subsequently, lifted upon representations made that petitioners would leave for Formosa , through the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines , but up to this date no action had been taken on the said application by the Chinese Nationalist government in Taipeh. Petitioners having failed to leave the Philippines pursuant to the condition the Immigration authorities, on April 20, 1953, issued warrants for their arrests. After due investigation, during which they were allowed to bail, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration found that petitioners have violated the condition of their temporary stay, thus rendering themselves subject to deportation accordingly, the Board rendered a decision ordering their deportation: Pursuant to the said decision, the First Deputy Commissioner of Immigration issued warrants of deportation against petitioners who are presently confined in the Detention Station of the Bureau of Immigration Engineer Island, Manila, under the custody of the said detention station. Petitioners Tan Chi Piek and Lee Kim Hua have been under detention since April 21, 1954; and the rest of the petition since April 12, 1954. The trial court denied petitioners' petition for habeas corpus, but allowed their provisional release on bail pending their actual deportation in its decision dated June 11, 1954. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners' has the right to bail. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that aliens in deportation proceedings, as a rule, have no inherent right to bail and that a person arrested or detained cannot be released on bail, unless that right is granted expressly by law.

The right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution may not be invoked in favor of petitioners, considering that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action and the order of deportation is not a punishment for a crime, it being merely for the return to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders. The fact that petitioners herein instituted the present habeas corpus proceeding before the Court of First Instance of Manila does not place them in the custody of said court, so as to deprive the Commissioner of Immigration of his supervision over them and of his discretionary power to grant bail. The Court pointed out that in Collector of Customs vs. Harvey, et al., 34 Phil. 503: The writ of habeas corpus which was presented in the lower court did not put the relator into the custody of the court. The courts can not enlarge the rights of Chinese aliens simply because they have presented a writ of habeas corpus. If they are not entitled to bail during the pendency of the petition for the writ of habeas corpus, they are much less entitled to it after the court has denied their petition. And in the instant case, the lower court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Rule 108 CHUA WEE v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-27731. 21 April 1971 Facts: Chua Wee and Pacita Topenio filed a petition with the Manila Court of First Instance for the correction of the birth records in the office of the local civil registrar of their four children by changing their nationality from Chinese to Filipino, and their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate. They alleged in their petition that Chua Wee is a Chinese citizen, while Pacita Topenio is a Filipino citizen, both of legal age, single and residing at 1400 F. Doroteo St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; that they have been living as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; that out of their common-law marital relations, four children were born in Manila, that the entries in the records of the Manila civil registrar to the effect that the aforesaid children are Chinese citizen and, except the fourth child, are their legitimate children, are wrong; because the petitioners are not legally married and that the aforesaid four children being all illegitimate should follow the citizenship of their mother Pacita Topenio who is a Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the entries sought to be corrected are very substantial and controversial, affecting as they do the citizenship and status of the children of petitioners, and that such petition for the correction is not the appropriate remedy, which remedy can only be secured in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved. The court sustained the motion to dismiss and accordingly dismissed the petition as well as denied the motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court as proceeding in rem which requires the publication of the petition once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation and therefore covers controversial issues. Held: The Supreme Court held that Article 412 of the New Civil Code is the only substantive law covering the alteration or correction of entries in the civil register which alteration or correction can only be effected through a judicial order. From the time the New Civil Code took effect until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which should be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of correcting entries in the civil register. If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning

citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code. It may be stated at this juncture that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the cancellation or correction of the entries in the Civil Registry relating to civil status. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the Civil Registry, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto. The entries which may be cancelled or corrected are specifically enumerated. While "birth" is mentioned as one of the entries that may be corrected or cancelled, this includes only such particulars as are attendant to birth. Other details, such as nationality or citizenship are not included. Rule 108 also covers citizenship but only as regards its election, loss or recovery. But this certainly has no relevance to the instant petition, which, as hitherto stated, seeks a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship.

SISON v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-58087. 27 December 1982 Facts: Petitioners, assisted by their grandmother, Gertrudes Reyes, as they were minors, submitted a Petition to respondent Court for correction of their surnames from "de la Cruz", as entered in their respective Birth Certificates, to "Sison". The Trial Court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on April 6, 1979 and citing all interested persons to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. Copy of this Order was served on the Civil Registrar and on the Solicitor General. The Order was duly published in the Evening Express, a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three consecutive weeks as required by the same Order. The State, through the Solicitor General, filed an Opposition alleging that the corrections requested were substantial or controversial in nature and that the summary procedure for correction of entry in the Civil Registry under Art. 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined to mere clerical errors. The Trial Court promulgated a Decision denying the Petition on the grounds raised in the Government's opposition. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was similarly denied. Hence, the instant recourse. Issue: Whether or not the proceeding for the correction of the entries is summary in nature. Held: The only way by which a name can be changed legally is by appropriate proceeding under Rule 103; that is, through a petition for Change of Name, since a person's legal name is what appears in the civil register, not the name by which he was baptized or by which he has been known in the community. In this case, the proceedings below were not summary pursuant to the rulings in the Matias case and in the more recent one of Kumala Salim Wing vs. Ahmad Abubakar. The proceedings were not summary, considering the publication of the petition made by order of the court in order to give notice to any person that might be interested, including direct service on the Solicitor General himself. In his "Manifestation/Motion in Lieu of Respondents' Brief", the Solicitor General has departed from his posture below in the light of the Kumala Salim Wing case, and has recommended that the Decision appealed from be reversed. The recommendation is well taken. WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Judge, dated March 31, 1980, is hereby set aside, and another one rendered granting the prayer for the change of petitioners' surname entered as "de la Cruz" in their respective records of birth with the Civil Registrar of San Juan, to "Sison", which is their true surname.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VALENCIA G.R. No. L-32181. 5 March 1986 Facts: Leonor Valencia filed a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. Pursuant to the order of the trial court dated February 4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the, Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on the Solicitor General. the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The order likewise set the case for hearing and directed the local civil registrar and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest under the entries whose corrections were sought, to file their opposition to the said petition. An opposition to the petition was consequently filed by the Republic on February 26, 1970. Thereafter a full blown trial followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying and presenting her documentary evidence in support of her petition. The Republic on the other hand cross-examined respondent Leonor Valencia The trial court issued a judgement granting the instant petition and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of the City of Cebu to make the necessary cancellation and/or correction on the following entries: Oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines appealed by way of this petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the correction of the Petitioners citizenship and civil status and also that of he minor children. Held: It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an appropriate proceeding. If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the

Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings. To follow the petitioner's argument that Rule 108 is not an appropriate proceeding without in any way intimating what is the correct proceeding or if such a proceeding exists at all, would result in manifest injustice. It would be a denial of substantive justice if two children proved by the facts to be Philippine citizens, and whose five sisters and brother born of the same mother and father enjoy all the rights of citizens, are denied the same rights on the simple argument that the "correct procedure" not specified or even intimated has not been followed. Petition denied.