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Dennis Ettlin, In Propria Persona

Dennis Ettlin 4520 Toucan Street Torrance, CA 90503 310-795-9507 IN PROPRIA PERSONA

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Los Angeles County Case No. YC064994 Lead for Consolidated cases Dennis ETTLIN, an individual; Petitioner/Plaintiff, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
) )

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AND CONSOLIDATED MATTERS

vs.

NOTICE OF VOID ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS BY JUDGE OBRIEN BASED UPON HIS FRAUD ON THE COURT FOR NOT DISCLOSING ILLEGAL PAYMENTS FROM LOS ANGELES COUNTY

Glenda VEASEY, an individual; Respondent/Defendant.

Ettlin v. Slawson, Ettlin v. Kriegler, Ettlin v. Taylor, Ettlin v. Kuhl, Cooper v. Weinbach, Cooper v. Levanas, Cooper v. Todd, Cooper v. Ashmann,

Case No. YC065018, Case No. YC065019, Case No. YC065021, Case No. YC065164, Case No. SC113064, Case No. SC113137, Case No. SC113135 Case No. SC113136, DATE: TIME: DEPT: Dept 59

NOTICE OF VOID ORDERS BY JUDGE OBRIEN 1

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Dennis Ettlin, In Propria Persona

NOTICE OF VOID ORDERS AND JUDGEMENTS This notice is made because Judge Robert OBrien has refused to recuse himself based on his receipt of the unconstitutional judicial payments from Los Angeles County. The notice is brought to conform this case to the legal reality that all the judgments and orders of Judge OBrien are void under law and to pursue case YC064994 with a proper judge with personal jurisdiction. This case needs certainty, which it presently lacks. Judge OBrien has taken payments from Los Angeles County, not disclosed such, refused to disqualify himself and thereby committed a fraud on the court. Plaintiff and defendant are both victims of this fraud on the court which has vitiated all case proceedings to date and voided all of Judge OBriens orders and judgments. He also violated Canon 4 D(1) of the Code of Judicial ethics by engaging in financial dealings with a person (L.A. County) who was likely to appear before the court on which he serves; Canon 3 E (2) by not disclosing the L.A. County payments; and 3E(1) and CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) by not disqualifying himself. Judge OBriens fraud on the court has caused the parties in this civil case and parties in the underlying family law case to remain in legal limbo. This case must be transferred to a judge who has not received payments from L.A. County, who can render objective decisions and relieve the parties of the netherland caused by the illegal L.A. County payments to Judge OBrien and his fraud on the court. The case needs to be completed, finalized and legal certainty achieved to avoid further problems in the future for the parties who are the victims of fraud on the court and violations of the Canons of the Code of Judicial Ethics and the California Code of Civil Procedure. L.A. County is an interested party in this civil case because the county must protect the judicial partnership with the L.A. County Child Support Services Department which establishes, modifies, and enforces financial and medical

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support obligation for children, enforces existing spousal support orders.... as required under Federal and State law. It is a collaborative partner with the Superior Court. It receives federal and state Title IV-D funding as a percentage of the amount expended by the department with floor and incentive for collections, under Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 655 and Section 658(a). Judge OBrien did not receive any retroactive immunity for presiding over cases such as the present one in which L.A. County had an interest and in which neither he nor L.A. County disclosed the L.A. County payments and in which he did not disqualify himself. LOCKYER-ISENBERG IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL The half-truth presented in Defendants pleadings that Lockyer-Isenberg authorizes payments denies the key ruling of both Sturgeon decisions; namely that Lockyer-Isenberg improperly prescribes those payments. Thus the whole of Lockyer-Isenberg is unconstitutional. DEFENDANTS ARE INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT JUDICIAL IMMUNITY Judge Strauss of San Diego Superior Court determined, in case 37-201100093476-CU-CR-CTL, that the Defendant Thomas Trent Lewis, sued as an individual (not a Judge), was not exempt from paying fees under Government Code section 6103. The court did not hear Lewiss motion for clarification as the fees were already paid at the time the motion was filed. Defendants payment of those fees acknowledged his acceptance of the Courts determination of Defendant as an individual. No alleged administrative action for return of those fees changes Judge Strausss actions and denial of the motion for clarification. Furthermore, by not filing the Demurrer immediately in San Diego, Lewis accepted the courts jurisdiction to treat him as an individual.

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Dennis Ettlin, In Propria Persona

In the instant case, Judge OBriens October 12, 2011 orders upholding the demurrer were based solely on Defendant Veaseys representation of the complaint as erroneously sued and served against a judge. Neither Defendant not Judge OBrien addressed the actual complaint (YC064994) against the actual Defendant, an individual. SBX2 11 RETROACTIVE IMMUNITY The very idea of "retroactive immunity" ... is so radical, so repugnant to the most basic principles of the "rule of law," and so profoundly offensive that Sen. Robert Kennedy (who had been the Attorney General when, prior to 1965, the banks broke the law with their mergers), as well as then-Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, together engaged in extraordinary efforts to try to put a stop to this Congressional travesty. Congress in 1965 attempted to enact a law retroactively legalizing the mergers by six large banks, which clearly -- as a federal court found - were illegal under our nation's antitrust laws. The banks knew at the time they were violating anti-trust laws, did it anyway, and dared the people to act. When courts began ruling that their behavior was illegal, the banks ran to Congress for a law granting them amnesty, claiming that the consequences would be ruinous if they were held accountable under the law. Likewise, after the Fourth Appellate Court, in Sturgeon I, with an unlikely twinge of conscience, held the judicial payments were unconstitutional; the Administrative Office of the Courts knew the consequences were huge if they were held accountable under the law and then together with the California Judges Associated they co-sponsored and scared the legislature into passing, under the cover of darkness, the hasty and flawed SBX2 11 with retroactive immunity. Judge OBrien did not receive any retroactive immunity for presiding over cases such as the present one because L.A. County had an interest and because

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Dennis Ettlin, In Propria Persona

neither he nor L.A. County disclosed the L.A. County payments and in which he did not disqualify himself. SBX2 11 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL Plaintiff asserts SBX2 11 is unconstitutional. In 2010, the California Commission on Judicial Performance also determined SBX2 11 to be unconstitutional. Thus, continued payments by the counties and courts are illegal, no retroactive immunity exists for Judges who accepted the bribes, and cases in which Los Angeles County was directly or indirectly a party become void. The unconstitutionality of judicial benefits is not new. In fact, it is a long simmering debate and intrusion by Judges, at least in Los Angeles County, into the labor-management relationship between the State and the Judges. In 1976 the Attorney General issued an opinion that health insurance benefits were unconstitutional; The Attorney General has issued an opinion that a statute permitting superior and municipal court judges to be covered under county health insurance programs is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496 (1976). The constitutional provision at issue states: The Legislature shall prescribe compensation for judges of courts of record. Cal. Const. Art. VI, 19 (as amended in 1974; emphasis added). The Attorney General argues that, Because of the use of prescribe the Legislature cannot delegate the authority granted to it by Article VI, section 19 of the Constitution. Any attempt to make such a delegation would be constitutionally invalid. 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. at 497. The Attorney General reasons that benefits such as health insurance are part of compensation, that the effect of the statute in question is to allow counties to determine this aspect of a judges compensation, and thus the statute is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. In 1988 the County of Los Angeles, Office of the County Counsel, advised Frank Zolin, County Clerk/Executive Officer of the Superior Court that it would be permissible for the county to pay additional benefits for judges, although he acknowledged the Attorney General had opinions otherwise. He encouraged the

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court to dare the Attorney General to file suit. Leading up to the new legislation for Trial Court Unification, a memorandum was generated in 1995 that again laid out the law and updated the Attorney Generals opinion on the unconstitutionality of such county benefits. The Commission staff memorandum then expressed a fear of the voters and went on to conclude that the legislature should take action and gamble on the validity of the delegation of authority. Although there is certainly a possibility that SB 162 will be held to be an invalid delegation of legislative authority ., a case can be made that this will not occur. The problems that would be created if it is held invalid are substantial. (emphasis added)
(see Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority; California Law Revision Commission Staff Memorandum; Memorandum 95-77, Study J-1201; November 27, 1995)

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The Sturgeon I decision called the Legislatures bluff in the 1997 LockyerIsenberg Trial Court Funding Act. Now the substantial problems of unconstitutionality and bias accrued over the last 15 years must be made whole. Sturgeon I was no surprise or rogue ruling. Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008) Rev. denied 12/23/08, held that the L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court judges violated Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution because the 1997 LockyerIsenberg Trial Court Funding Act, while it DID authorize judicial benefits, it did NOT set any standards for exercising the delegated authority and THUS the authorization under Lockyer-Isenberg of judicial benefits payments by counties to Superior Court judges was an unconstitutional delegation of power. As of December 23, 2008 the judicial payments made by Los Angeles County became bribes. As of December 23, 2008 Judges lost all immunity for taking such payments. As of December 23, 2008 Government Code Sections 810 and 821.6 were not applicable. After the Sturgeon I decision, the State legislature hastily passed and the
NOTICE OF VOID ORDERS BY JUDGE OBRIEN 6

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Dennis Ettlin, In Propria Persona

Governor signed Senate Bill SBX2 11, which became effective 5/21/09. The judiciary and the legislature tried to do in two months what they failed to do in 30 years. It is no surprise that SBX2 11 is also unconstitutional. Senate Bill SBX2 11 attempted to give retroactive immunity such that no governmental entity, shall incur any liability or be subject to prosecution or disciplinary action because of benefits provided to a judge under the official action of a governmental entity prior to the effective date of this act on the ground that those benefits were not authorized under law. With that one line the Judicial Council attempted to replace the same one inch stack of Federal Authorities cited in Court Counsels Demurrer in the ETTLIN and COOPER cases and undoubtedly will be copied for Plaintiff LOCATELLI. While SBX2 11 attempted to give immunity for receiving the money which was not authorized under the law, Senate bill SBX2 11, Section 5, did not, however, give retroactive immunity to judges or temporary judges who had received the county payments and did not disclose such and presided over cases in which the county had an interest. It did not give immunity for being disqualified as a judge in the past, present or future. The Los Angeles County interest in the Plaintiffs family law case is the critical point avoided by Court Counsel and Kevin McCormick. Plaintiffs claims are firmly based on, and supported by evidence on, the Title IV-D monies received by Los Angeles County and the partnership of the Superior Court with the Title IV-D agencies. Senate bill SBX2 11 acknowledged both the criminality of the payment of judicial benefits by the counties to the judges and also the loss of immunity protections under current state and federal laws by attempting to give all parties to the bribes limited retroactive immunity. The immunity in SBX2 11, Section 5, effective 5/21/09, is not part of California government codes. Most importantly, the attempted immunity is unconstitutional under the California Constitution, ARTICLE 1, SECTION 9 that states A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law

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impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed. Furthermore, the legislation conflicts with the constitutional responsibilities of the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP). The extensive CJP analysis and arguments show the legislatures attempt to usurp constitutional powers and requests an opinion from the California Attorney General on the constitutionality of SBX2 11. The Fourth Appellate Courts decision in Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, __Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010), the so-called Sturgeon II concluded on page 14: As the parties have recognized, SBX 211 both preserved the status quo ante Sturgeon I and commenced a process by which the Legislature looks to adoption of a comprehensive judicial compensation scheme. As we have explained, this response to Sturgeon I meets the requirements of the Constitution and is wholly sensible under the circumstances. The Legislature is uniquely competent to deal with the complex policy problem of establishing a judicial compensation scheme which both assures recruitment and retention of fully qualified judicial officers throughout the state while at the same time providing equity between judges in different parts of the state. By the same token our role in ensuring that the more general requirements of the Constitution have been met is, under our system of separate governmental powers, quite limited. (emphasis added) If SBX2 11 meets the requirements of the constitution as stated by the court, why would taxpayers challenge it? The Appellate Court makes it clear that their statement of constitutionality (which Court Counsel likes to use) only applies to the three issues raised by Sturgeon. They also feel quite limited in ensuring the Constitution is fully met and are not willing to fully address this issue. The Sturgeon case and SBX2 11 only address the payment of county judicial benefits. Plaintiffs civil action is undertaken, in part, as one of the citizen challenges encouraged by Sturgeon II but, more importantly, to address the issue of bias, the non-disclosure of the payments, and the resulting fraud on the court that Sturgeon does not address. Since Sturgeon I and Sturgeon II both affirm that judicial payments are not a county responsibility, since the county is allowed (with conditions under SBX2

NOTICE OF VOID ORDERS BY JUDGE OBRIEN 8

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11) to terminate or reduce all payments and since the county is clearly an interested party in all divorce and traffic cases; therefore the continued payments must be in the countys interests. Those county interests are the Title-IV-D incentives and huge reimbursements as well as the penalty assessments on traffic tickets. Those county interests are the basis now for judicial recusal and void orders in most divorce and traffic cases. SBX2 11 deemed prior payments as criminal and in need of criminal immunity. The bill granted immunity for monies paid and received prior to July 2009. This attempted ex post facto immunity is unconstitutional and furthermore did not and could not restore Plaintiffs Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection lost during the proceedings of Plaintiffs family law case. Senate bill SBX2 11 did not even attempt to give immunity for the biases inherent in the nature of a bribe. Commissioner Veasey, likewise, did not disclose the county payments and then presided over a case in which the L.A. County Child Support Services Department is a very interested party as it establishes financial ...support obligations for children, enforces existing spousal support orders... as required under federal and state law and is a collaborative partner with the Superior Court. The Sturgeon II decision was decided on only three very narrow grounds. The relevant portions state: Shortly after we filed our opinion in Sturgeon I and while the Legislature was in a special session, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed legislation which addressed the constitutional defect we identified in Sturgeon I. In particular, the legislation required that all counties continue to provide sitting judges with whatever benefits the counties had provided as of July 1, 2008. The Legislature permitted the counties to terminate this obligation, but not with respect to sitting judges and only after giving the Administrative Office of the Courts and any affected judges 180 days' notice. On remand Sturgeon asserted the legislation was invalid on three grounds. He argued the legislation was outside the scope of the Governor's proclamation calling the special session, did not adequately prescribe benefits judges are to be provided, and in any event violated equal protection principles by continuing a statewide system of unequal judicial benefits. The
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trial court rejected these contentions and granted the county's motion for summary judgment. The legislation Sturgeon challenges, as enacted, implemented an interim response to the constitutional issues we addressed in Sturgeon I. As we shall explain, the legislation fell within the scope of the Governor's proclamation, adequately prescribed the benefits that must be provided to judges and did not intrude upon any judge's right to equal protection of the laws. Accordingly, we affirm. But the disturbing portion of the decision is the final paragraph of the decision, which contradicts the above opening statement by stating that SBX2 11 is not a permanent response to the constitutional issues. How can a law be temporarily constitutional? It either is or is not constitutional. Again, the Fourth Appellate Court, acknowledges the contradiction, but this time refuses to again call the Legislatures bluff, and encourages these particular civil suits by stating: However, on its face SBX 211 is not a permanent response to either the constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I or the difficult problem of adopting a compensation scheme that deals with varying economic circumstances in an equitable and efficient manner. Thus, we would be remiss in discharging our duties if we did not state that while the Legislature's interim response to Sturgeon I defeats the particular challenges asserted by Sturgeon in this litigation, that interim remedy, if not supplanted by the more comprehensive response SBX 211 plainly contemplates, most likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility. We are confident that the Legislature within a reasonable period of time will act to adopt a uniform statewide system of judicial compensation. The SBX2 11 Section 2 is unconstitutionally vague about the same terms and conditions as were in effect on that date. Since the Fourth Appellate Court is deferring to the taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury decisions on whether the countys terms and conditions were defined anywhere and thus are arbitrary (and unconstitutional) or whether they were one year payments and thus terminated on June 30, 2009. Section 2 only identifies judges as recipients. No

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authority is provided to pay Court Counsel or Commissioners. The Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) is also very interested in this matter and has requested an opinion from the Attorney General. The SBX2 11 Section 4 is unconstitutional because the Judicial Council is now paying judicial benefits to commissioners, Court Counsel and others, as will be determined at trial. (The payments in SBX2 11 Section 2 made by L.A. County to Commissioners are called warrants by the L.A. County Auditor because they are issued by L.A. County but funded by the Judicial Council.) The continued payments by the counties under Section 2 now makes these Judicial Council payments a continued obligation, which is prohibited by Section 4. The opinions of the CJP are that these payments are unconstitutional. The CJP has requested the Attorney Generals opinion in this matter because the judges are clearly biased. Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court is deferring to the taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury decisions on whether the Superior Court payments obligated by the county payments are legal and constitutional. The SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity is unconstitutional, has not been challenged in the Appellate Court and preserved the status quo ante Sturgeon I. The attempted immunity is unconstitutional under the California Constitution, ARTICLE 1, SECTION 9 states A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed. Furthermore, SBX2 11 Section 5 legislation conflicts with the constitutional responsibilities of the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP). The extensive CJP analysis and arguments shows the legislatures attempt to usurp constitutional powers and requests an opinion from the California Attorney General on the constitutionality of SBX2 11. Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court refused to call the legislatures bluff a second time, and is now deferring to the taxpayers and judges themselves, Plaintiff will seek damages by filing civil suits asking for jury decisions on the constitutional questions of whether the judges have immunity from civil liability

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and if so whether the Plaintiff is due damages for the biases bought by the L.A. County bribes. LOS ANGELES COUNTY IS NOT A SOVEREIGN ENTITY Los Angeles County is not a sovereign entity; only the Federal Government and each of the 50 states are sovereign within the United States of America. Therefore, under Lockyer-Isenberg and under SBX2 11, Los Angeles Countys actual payments to a judge are no different than payments (hypothetically) by Plaintiff. Both are bribes. LOS ANGELES COUNTY IS AN INTERESTED PARTY Judge OBrien collected the judicial payments from 1989-1999. The stated purpose of Los Angeles County payments is to retain judges in Los Angeles County. The favorable disposition related to job location choice reasonably and easily carries over to a general pre-disposition toward Los Angeles County, its supervisors and its law enforcement officials in matters where the county has an interest. The favorable disposition purchased by the Los Angeles County judicial payments certainly extends to protecting a judicial colleague in this civil case as well as protecting the underlying stream of Title IV-D monies. The partnership of L.A. County and with the Los Angeles Superior court is clearly documented (in lead case YC064994) for all Family Law and Traffic Court cases. The L.A. County Payments are bribes as they influence Judges, in family law cases, to award unequal custody and thus by L.A. County Child Support Services Department (CSSD) guidelines establish higher custody payments from noncustodial parents. The L.A. County Child Support Services Department establishes financial .... support obligations for children... as required under federal and state law and works as a collaborative Partner with the Superior

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Court. The payment of money by L.A. County, to the judge who rules on the amount of child support (which taken in the aggregate) directly determines the expenses of the L.A. County Child Support Services Department. The amount of those expenses then directly determines the amount of money that the L.A. County Child Support Services Department receives in Title IV-D federal and state funds. ($176 million received from Title IV-D compared to the small $3 million cost to L.A. County.) The annual $30 million cost of judicial benefits was cost effective for L.A. County at a ratio of 6:1 for just that one single program. The higher the number and monetary amount of support orders against non-custodial parents, the higher the expenses of the L.A. County Child Support Services Department, the higher the amount of Title IV-D federal and state funding. L.A. County has a direct interest in the judge setting the greatest number and the highest monetary child support orders. L.A. County is a real party in interest in every divorce case as it reaps a huge financial benefit. The payments by L.A. County to the judge in a divorce case have no purpose other than to influence the judges decision to create a non-custodial parent and a subsequent high child support order, which frequently requires use of federally funded enforcement resources. Commissioner Veaseys acceptance of the L.A. County bribes and her sitting on a case in which L.A. County is an interested party voids all her orders and judgments. Judge OBriens protection of Commissioner Veaseys failures to disclose the county payments to Plaintiff, also constitutes an extrinsic fraud on the court. All of Judge OBriens (case YC064994) and Commissioner Veaseys (case YD041085) orders are and will be void. EXTRINSIC FRAUD Extrinsic fraud is a basis for setting aside an earlier judgment. See U.S. v. Throckmorton 98 U.S. 61 (1878) since fraud on the court vitiates the entire

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case, all orders from that court or any subsequent court are void as none of the courts had subject matter jurisdiction. No court has the lawful authority to validate a void order. See Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920) a void order is void at all times, cannot be made valid by any judge, nor does it gain validity by the passage of time. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated in the case of Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954): A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding does not give the appearance of justice. In essence, by making all L.A. Superior Court judges eligible for the L.A. County payments, L.A. County has bought the L.A. Superior Court. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in the case of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) at Slip Opinion page 16 in relevant part: ...... just as no man is allowed to judge his own cause, similar fears of bias can arise when, without the consent of the other parties, a man chooses a judge in his own cause. By making the payments available to every L.A. Superior Court judge, no party in a divorce case received a fair trial, as the judge was biased to rule to benefit the L.A. County Child Support Services Department over the interests of the parties to the case. Likewise, by making the payments available to every L.A. Superior Court judge as individuals, no party in a civil case decided by the Judges of the Superior Court can receive a fair trial, as the judge is biased to rule for any benefit to L.A. County over the interests of the other parties to the case. The data (see case filings) in the Judicial Council of California report titled, Historical Analysis of Disparities in Judicial Benefits, dated December 15, 2009, as well as the Superior Court auditors data (see case filings) and the Los Angeles County auditors data (see case filings), combined with the 2010-2011 L.A. County proposed budget Trial Court Operations section (see case filings) show and demonstrate a clear pattern that L.A. County has bought the L.A. County

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Superior Court without the consent of the other party opposing them in any case. The L.A. County interest and partnership with the court is clearly documented for all Family Law cases (see case filings). Along with the payment information for Robert OBrien in the complaint, Plaintiff has serious doubts that any Los Angeles County judge can be impartial during a jury trial on damages due to the biases inherent in the L.A. County bribes. Furthermore, since Los Angeles judges have failed to recuse themselves, the real and perceived biases constitute fraud on the court and the Los Angeles Plaintiffs COOPER and ETTLIN and San Diego Plaintiff LOCATELLI are all denied due process by denying them the right to an impartial tribunal. In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). FOURTH APPELLATE COURT CALLED FOR THESE CIVIL SUITS The Fourth Appellate Court deferred to this taxpayer challenge in its decision of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, __Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010) (Sturgeon II). However, on its face SBX 211 is not a permanent response to the constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I [and] that interim remedy [SBX2 11], if not supplanted by the more comprehensive response SBX 211 plainly contemplates, most likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility. (emphasis added) Plaintiffs actions are a direct application of the guidance and expectation of the Fourth Appellate Court ruling. COURT COUNSEL IS BRIBED AND BIASED Payments to Court Counsel Brett Bianco are similarly unconstitutional and illegal. His direction of the filings by Kevin McCormick of Benton, Orr, Duval and

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Buckingham are an expenditure of public funds on behalf of individuals. Those, too, are illegal expenditures. JUDGE ROBERT OBRIEN REFUSED TO RECUSE HIMSELF Judge OBrien received Los Angeles County payments from 1989-1999. Based on his refusal to recuse himself all his orders and judgments are void under the U.S. Supreme Court precedents of Throckmorton, supra and Vallely, supra.

Dated: March 12, 2012 Respectfully Submitted ______________________________________ DENNIS M. ETTLIN, In Pro Per

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PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 111 N. Hill Street, Dept 59 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Central District - Stanley Mosk Courthouse YC064994, lead case PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: Dennis Ettlin RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: Glenda Veasey, an individual I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing took place. My residence or business address is 2608 E. Victoria St. #108 Rancho Dominguez, CA 90220 On March 12, 2012, I served by first class mail, a copy of the following document NOTICE OF VOID ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS BY JUDGE OBRIEN BASED UPON HIS FRAUD ON THE COURT FOR NOT DISCLOSING ILLEGAL PAYMENTS FROM LOS ANGELES COUNTY on the interested parties in this action (SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST) by enclosing a copy thereof in an envelope and depositing the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with the postage fully prepaid at RANCHO DOMINGUEZ, CALIFORNIA I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 12, 2012 at Los Angeles County, California, ________________________________ FRED SOTTILE

PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL --CIVIL

SERVICE LIST

Defendant: Kevin M. McCormick Benton, Orr, Duval and Buckingham 39 North California Street, Post Office Box 1178 Ventura, California 93002

PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL --CIVIL