JOURNAL OF SPACECRAFT AND ROCKETS

Vol. 33, No. 2, March-April 1996

Investigation of Space Launch Vehicle Catastrophic Failures

I-ShihChang*
The Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, California 90245 The failures of the world's major space launch vehicles from Jan. 1,1984, through Dec. 31,1994, are reviewed. The cause of failure and corrective action for each failed vehicle are documented, the vulnerable areas of the vehicle are discussed, and the reliability of the major space launch vehicles from different countries in the world is compared. The review provided some of the lessons learned during the last 11 years and revealed that the propulsion subsystem is still the Achilles' heel of the space program. The intent is to pave the way for identifying the critical skills and processes needed to mitigate future space-related mission failures.

Introduction EXT to wars, nuclear reactor accidents, major transportation accidents, and natural disasters, a space launch failure is one of the most expensive losses in the national resources for a nation in pursuit of technological advancement. A space mission involving a large launch vehicle and a sophisticated satellite can easily cost hundreds of millions of dollars. This cost does not include the expense, time, and effort spent during the recovery period and the damage to national prestige. Therefore, it is very important that the recurrence of space-launch failures be prevented. In this paper, the space launch vehicle (SLY) failures over the last 11 years are reviewed. This review was one of the tasks carried out during the recovery program in the wake of the Titan IV K-l 1 launch-vehicle failure. TTie objectives of this study can be stated as follows: 1) provide information on the past space-related mission failures from Jan. 1,1984, through Dec. 31,1994; 2) document the cause of failure and corrective action for each failed SLY; 3) focus attention on the vulnerable areas of the vehicle; and 4) identify the critical skills and processes needed to mitigate future launch failures. The world space-launch data are collected first. A simple analysis then is performed to compare the reliability of the major SLVs from different countries. The cause of failure and corrective action for every U.S. vehicle are presented. Because of the lack of reported information, the cause of failure and corrective action for the foreign space launch vehicles are presented only selectively. Finally, lessons learned from the past worldwide space-launch catastrophic failures are summarized.

Electrical involves wire harnesses; electrical connectors; electrical power supply; electrical relay boxes; battery; solenoids. Other relates to environment; communication-, and so forth. U.S. and Foreign SLV Failures The SLV failures in the U.S. and in foreign countries during the last 11 years (Jan. 1, 1984, through Dec. 31, 1994) are given in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. These data are obtained from Refs. 14. The vehicle name, failure date, and payloads for each country are listed. The failed subsystems and the causes of failure are identified, based on the information reported in the references. There were 5 SLV failures in the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) space programs and 9 SLV failures in the U.S. non-DOD space programs. In comparison, there were 29 SLV failures in foreign countries during the last 11 years. Analysis of SLV Failures The success-failure records of the U.S. and foreign SLVs during the last 11 years are given in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Figure 1 compares the numbers of launch-vehicle subsystem failures, and Fig. 2 reveals the subsystem failure rate of the SLVs in the U.S. and in foreign countries during the last 11 years. Figure 3 shows the total

Classification of Subsystem Failures The failure of a launch vehicle is attributed to the problem associated with one of the following subsystems in this study. Propulsion consists of the main propulsion components of rocket motor, liquid engine, orbital maneuvering thruster, and attitude control thruster; combustion chamber; nozzle; solid propellant; liquid propellant; thrust vector actuator and gimbal mechanism; feed lines; control valves; turbopumps; ignitor; motor internal insulation and bondline. Structures include solid rocket motor (SRM) core support structures; motor case; ignitor housing; helium, oxidizer, and fuel storage tank structure; interstage structure; nose cone; payload fairing; support skirt. Avionics contains onboard software; circuit board; gyro; flight computer; attitude sensors; load relief sensors; range safety provisions; navigation and guidance control equipment; inertial measurement unit; flight instrumentation and telemetry equipment. Separation/staging comprises staging rockets; separation mechanism; electrical connection or wiring for separation control. Received Sept. 30,1994; revision received May 2,1995; accepted for publication May 4,1995. Copyright 1995 by I-Shih Chang. Published by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., with permission. * Distinguished Engineer, Vehicle Systems Division. Senior Member AIAA.
198

propulsion struct, avionics separa. Subsystem

electri.

other

Fig. 1 SLV subsystem failures.

4.

propulsion struct,

avionics separa. Subsystem

electri.

Fig. 2 SLV subsystem failure rate.

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199

Table 1 U.S. SLV failures

Vehicle 17.5. DOD Titan IV Titan 34D Atlas-Centaur Titan 34D Titan 34D
U.S. non-DOD Pegasus XL Atlas-Centaur

Flight K-ll D-3 AC-67 D-9 D-7

STEP-1 AC-74 AC-71 F-2 AC-70 CT-2 178 51-L AC-62

Fail date
08/02/93 09/02/88 03/26/87 04/18/86 08/28/85 06/27/94 03/25/93 08/22/92 07/17/91 04/18/91 03/14/90 05/03/86 01/28/86 06/09/84

Satellite Not announced Not announced Not announced Not announced Not announced STEP-la Navy UHF Follow-On21 Galaxy 1-R Comsat DARPA Microsatsa BS-3H Comsat IntelsatVI-3 NOAA-GOES 7 TDRSS 2 Intelsat V-9

Failed subsys.
Propulsion Propulsion Other Propulsion Propulsion
Avionics Propulsion Propulsion Separation Propulsion Separation Electrical Propulsion Propulsion

Cause of failure Motor case burnthrough (inadequate restrictor repair) Transtage fuel-tank leakage Vehicle launched in thunderstorm and struck by lightning Motor case burnthrough (insulation debond) Stage I engine propellant leakage and premature shutdown
Autopilot software used erroneous aerodynamic load coefficients Power loss and premature shutdown of the first-stage engine Centaur C-l engine failed to achieve full thrust Stage and payload separation anomalies Centaur C-l engine failed to achieve full thrust Second stage failed to separate because of incorrect interface wiring Stage I relay box electrical short Hot gas leaked through O-ring in the SRM joint Fuel line leaking in Centaur reaction control system

Atlas-Centaur Pegasus Atlas-Centaur Titan III Delta STS-Challenger Atlas-Centaur

"Satellites were launched under commercial launch service contracts.

Table 2 Foreign SLV failures

Country

Vehicle
CZ-2E CZ-3 CZ-3

Fail date

Satellite Optus B2 Comsat STTW 5 Exp. GEO Comsat PAS-3 Eutelsat 2F5, Turksat 1 Japanese Superbird B Intelsat VA-5 Spacenet F-3, ECS-3 IRS-1E SRS2(Rohini) SROSS Kosmos 2281 Gorizont Comsat Kosmos 2243 Kosmos 2227 Kosmos Kosmos Kosmos Kosmos Kosmos Kosmos 2084 Kosmos 1917,1918,1919 Kosmos Kosmos 1838, 1839, 1840 Kosmos 1817, Ekran-16A Kosmos Kosmos Kosmos 1783 Kosmos 1612

Failed subsys.

Cause of failure

China

12/21/92 12/28/91 01/29/84 12/01/94 01/24/94 02/22/90 05/31/86 09/12/85 09/20/93 07/13/88 03/24/87 05/25/94 05/27/93 04/27/93 12/25/92 02/05/92
08/30/91 06/25/91 10/04/90 08/09/90 06/21/90 02/17/88 01/18/88 04/24/87 01/30/87 12/29/86 10/15/86 10/03/86 11/27/84

France

India

Ariane 42P Ariane 44LP Ariane 44L Ariane 2 Ariane 3 PSLV ASLV ASLV SL-14 Tsyklon SL-12 Proton SL-4 Soyuz SL-16 Zenit SL-16Zenit SL-16 Zenit SL-8 Kosmos SL-16 Zenit SL-12 Proton SL-6 Molniya SL-12 Proton SL-12 Proton SL-12 Proton SL-12 Proton SL-12 Proton SL-14 Tsyklon SL-6 Molniya SL-14 Tsyklon

Structures Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion

Avionics Other Electrical

CIS

USSR

Separation Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion Avionics Avionics Avionics Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion

Structural flaw in the rocket's fairing caused explosion Premature third stage shutdown Third stage failed to restart Blockage or leakage of LOX on the third-stage engine Third-stage turbopump shutdown because of overheating Cloth clogging first-stage piping, vehicle exploded Improper ignition of third-stage engine Failure of third-stage hydrogen valve Rocket veered off course during second-stage separation High winds and premature cutoff of strap-ons at 150 s Stage 1 did not ignite because of short circuit Second and third stages failed to separate State 2 and 3 engine failures because of fuel contamination Explosion caused by residual propellants in the final stage Second stage blew up shortly after orbital insertion Second-stage malfunctioned Second-stage failure Second-stage failure Vehicle exploded over launch pad because of engine failure Stage 2 engine failure because of fuel line clogged by a piece of rag Fourth-stage failure Stage 4 engine failure because of fuel contamination Stage 3 engine failure because of fuel line destruction Stage 4 control-system failure because of instrument defect Stage 4 control-system failure because of relay component defect Stage 3 control-system failure because of relay contact separation Launch vehicle failure Launch vehicle failure Launch vehicle failed to shut down at perigee

Table 3 U.S. SLV success-failure record

Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total Success rate, %

U.S. non-DOD U.S. DODa U.S. Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure 12 6 4 5 6 16 14 10 12 12 8 105 95.5
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 5

9 11 2 3 5 2 12 7 15 11 18 95 91.3

1 0 2 0 0 0

2 1 1 1 9

21 17 6 8 11 18 26 17 27 23 26 200 93.5

1 1 3 1 1 0 1 2 1 2 1 14

Includes all DOD-involved government space launches.

numbers of successes and failures, and Fig. 4 shows the success rate of the space launches for the U.S. and for foreign countries. The launch success rate from Jan. 1, 1984, through Dec. 31, 1994, is 95.5% for U.S. DOD and 91.5% for U.S. non-DOD. The DOD missions are subjected to detailed technical oversight and launchreadiness certifications and have a better launch success rate than that of commercial programs, even though the same launch system is used for the two categories of launches. In comparison, the launch success rate during the last 11 years is 100% for Israel and Japan, 97.9% for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)AJSSR, 92.1% for France, 89.3% for China, and 50% for India. Note that there were only two space launches for Israel and six for India. This implies that the rates shown here can vary significantly for these two countries in the future. It is important to point out that a decrease in the launch success rate usually translates to many millions of dollars lost to space-related mission failures.

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CHANG

Table 4 Foreign SLV success-failure record

Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total Success rate, %

China Success Failure

2 1 2 2 4 0

France Success Failure

4 3 2 2 7 7 5 8 7 7 6 58 92.1 0 1 1 0 0 0

India Success Failure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 50.0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3

Israel Success Failure 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 100.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Japan Success Failure

3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 23 100.0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CIS/USSR Success Failure 96 98 90 94 89 74 74 59 53 46 48 821 97.9 1 0 3 2 2 0 3 2 2 2 1 18

5 0 3 1 5 25 89.3

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3

0 0 0 2 5

Propellant Cut, Pressurized and Burning

800

I SUCC.I
o 700
2 600

I fail

400 300

200 100

200

2.0 U

USA

China France

India

Israel Japan CIS/USSR

Country

Fig. 3 Space launch log.

Fig. 5 Restrictor repair and propellant cut.

100 100 97.9

Fig. 6 Transtage fuel tank and oxidizer tank.

USA

China France

India

Israel

Japan CIS/USSR

Country

Fig. 4 Space launch success rate.

General observations that can be made from the analysis of these data are as follows: 1) the predominant root cause of the SLV failures is in the propulsion subsystem (U.S. 64.3%; foreign 72.4%); 2) few failures are related to the basic design; 3) some failures are related to human errors, improper handling, poor procedures, management, workmanship, or judgment; and 4) fuel leakage accounts for many of the liquid-engine failures in the propulsion subsystem.

from the results of mathematical computer modeling. But at motor ignition, the face of the cut was pressurized and open, allowing flame to propagate along the cut. This propagation resulted in early exposure of the SRM side-wall insulation and eventual motor-case burnthrough at 101.2 s. The designed (nominal) burn time of the SRMisl27s(Ref.5).
Corrective Action

Cause of Failure and Corrective Action for the U.S. SLVs

The cause of failure and corrective action for the SLVs in the U.S. during the last 11 years are discussed briefly in this section.
U.S.DOD: Titan IV K-ll

1) Define the hardware acceptance criterion and qualification program for the SRM segments with repaired restrictor. 2) Improve manufacturing process for SRM segments to avoid restrictor repair.
U.S. DOD: Titan 34D-3

Launch site: Western Range. Fail time: 101.2s.

Cause of Failure

Launch site: Eastern Range. Fail time: 289 s.

Cause of Failure

The propellant of the Titan IV SRM was cut approximately 0.25 in. deep and extended 34 in. in the radial direction from the bore during the restrictor repair shown in Fig. 5. The repair was more extensive than had ever been attempted on such a motor segment. The specific cut made in the propellant of the motor segment was expected to be closed by internal pressure generated at ignition

Repair processing during prelaunch activities or shrapnel impact during the payload fairing release event at 289 s resulted in damage to the upper portion of the transtage fuel tank and pressurization lines shown in Fig. 6. A substantial fuel leak of approximately 1340 Ib occurred during park orbit, and a large helium-tank gas leak occurred

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201

during the transtage first burn. Not enough helium was left in the system to allow start of the second burn.6
Corrective Action

The fuel-tank manhole cover, seals, lines, and fittings of assembled systems were removed and replaced using revalidated processes and procedures. All relevant inventories were retested and reaccepted. Manufacturing and inspection procedures for new parts were improved.
U.S. DOD: Atlas-Centaur (AC-67)

Fig. 9 Stage 1 oxidizer suction system.

Launch site: Eastern Range. Fail time: 70.7 s.

Cause of Failure

Oxidizer Feed line Assembly

_ S/A-1 Flange s/A-2

The Atlas G vehicle was struck by lighting (see Fig. 7), which resulted in an erroneous full-scale positive yaw command induced by an electrical transient at 48.4 s of flight. The erroneous yaw maneuver resulted in the loss of vehicle control. The destruct signal was sent at 70.7 s into flight.7
Corrective Action

Bolted

Joint Marman Clamp

Fig. 10 Location of the Marman clamps.

1) Improve training of managers on critical launch support functions. 2) Specify, duties and responsibilities of launch weather team. 3) Revise launch-vehicle weather criteria and update to current knowledge. 4) Improve voice communication circuits.
U.S. DOD: Titan 34D-9

Marman Clamp
Bolted Joint
OX Pumpi S/A-2

Launch site: Western Range. Fail time: 8.7s.

Cause of Failure

The SRM case insulation unbonded, and the butt joint opened under the ignition pressure. The combustion flame directly heated the steel case wall, shown in Fig. 8, and burnthrough of the motor case occurred at 8.7 s after ignition. The nominal burn time for the Titan 34D SRM is 105 s (Ref. 8).
Corrective Action

Fig. 11 Pegasus XL aerodynamic control.

Pitch

1) Tighten hardware quality control (material, dimension, tolerance). 2) Improve manufacturing environment and process. 3) Ensure insulation-to-case bondline integrity (visual, x-ray, ultrasonic, proof test). 4) Revise SRM segment assembly procedure.

U.S. DOD: Titan 34D-7

Launch site: Western Range. Fail time: 213 s.

Cause of Failure

Fig. 7 Lightning strike caused AC-67 failure.

The stage 1 engine suffered three separate major anomalies. First, during subassembly-2 (S/A-2) start transient (110 s) a large oxidizer leak of 165 Ib/s occurred in the engine oxidizer suction line, shown in Fig. 9. Second, at 213 s an internal fuel leak of 30 Ib/s occurred in subassembly 1 (S/A-1) downstream of the combustion chamber and created a vehicle side force. Third, the S/A-1 shut down at 213 s due to failure of its turbopump assembly.9
Corrective Action

The two Marman clamps on the oxidizer suction lines, shown in Fig. 10, were redesigned. The design integrity and manufacturing processes were revisited, and improvements were incorporated to increase their reliability.
debond

U.S. Non-DOD: Pegasus XL STEP-1

Launch site: Western Range. Fail time: 39 s.

Cause of Failure

Fig. 8 Motor case insulation debond.

The first-stage ignition for the Pegasus XL occurred at 5 s after drop from the L-1011 aircraft. At 32 s divergence in roll and yaw, shown in Fig. 11, began and increased exponentially to loss of control at 39 s. The vehicle continued planned course through first-stage burnout. A command destruct signal was sent at 171.5 s after the second stage failed to ignite. Inaccurate estimation of the

202
Turbopump

CHANG

High Pressure Propellant Ducts

Fig. 12 MA-5 booster.

c-2
Atlas LOX Tank

Fig. 14 Centaur engines.

T-4 K
Disconnect Solenoid Isolation

Fig. 13 Oxidizer regulator.

Centaur

DIAPH-RAGM
BLEED PLUG

vehicle aerodynamics and of their uncertainty levels has been identified as the principal cause of the roll-yaw divergence. These aerodynamic predictions were used to design the flight control system, which became unstable and allowed the vehicle to lose control in a coupled roll-yaw spiral divergence.1()
Corrective Action

1) Develop an aerodynamic model through use of a combination of wind-tunnel data and analytic techniques. 2) Implement procedures to ensure the inspection and acceptance requirements cover all aspects of aerodynamic shapes and mass properties. 3) Develop a comprehensive control uncertainty model for the new aerodynamic model. 4) Incorporate yaw load relief into the lateral autopilot.
U.S. Non-DOD: Atlas-Centaur (AC-74)

Fig. 15 Location of isolation and check valves.

Wlng

Launch site: Eastern Range. Fail time: 103 s.

Cause of Failure
Fin Rockets^

Stage3 Stage 2 Interstage

/ ^Fajrlng

Stage 1

The thrust from the MA-5 engine shown in Fig. 12 for the Atlas 1 first-stage booster dropped off to 65% of the nominal level 103 s into the flight, because of problems with a regulator (see Fig. 13) used to control the throttle setting. Inefficient burning of fuel at the lower throttle setting used up propellant from the first-stage engine. This resulted in depletion shutdown of the Centaur upper stage 22 s early. The payload was placed in an incorrect orbit. The designed nominal burn time for the MA-5 booster engine is 174 s (Ref. 11).
Corrective Action

Fig. 16 Pegasus launch vehicle: exploded view.

prevented the engine from achieving full thrust. The low performance of C-l engine produced an unbalanced thrust and resulted in the loss of vehicle control and of the mission.12
Corrective Action

1) Reduce precision regulator control band by lengthening stem in regulator. 2) Use special tool to avoid loose adjustment screw.
U.S. Non-DOD: Atlas-Centaur (AC-70, AC-71) AC-71

Launch site: Eastern Range. Fail time: 178s.

AC-70 Launch site: Eastern Range. Fail time: 360 s.
Cause of Failure

1) Add a solenoid isolation valve (shown in Fig. 15) in the helium chilldown system to prevent ingestion of air or nitrogen into the turbopumps. 2) Add a liquid-nitrogen-gaseous-helium (LN2-GHe) heat exchanger for ground prechill, and increase the duration of prestart chilldown to maintain the turbopump temperature above the nitrogen freezing point (-320F). 3) Add a 10-/xm absolute filter downstream of the heat exchanger in the ground chilldown system to minimize contamination in the engine. 4) Delete the helium warmup purge and tank blowdown purge to eliminate freezing of moisture from the tanks and ducts during prelaunch operations.
U.S. Non-DOD: Pegasus F-2

Launch site: Eastern Range. Fail time: 102.8 s.

Cause of Failure

The Centaur C-l engine shown in Fig. 14 failed because of ingestion of air into the turbopump during the Atlas boost phase. The air, entering through a stuck-open check valve, liquefied and froze in the C-l engine liquid hydrogen (LH2) pump and gearbox, which

The vehicle angled off in a wrong direction and placed the payload in a significantly lower orbit than planned. The major anomaly was

CHANG
Aluminum Sheath

203

RDX Charge
NASA Standard Initiator Foam B|Mt
Attenuator ^-Linear Shaped Charge

Detonator Block

Fuel Start Tank Oxidizer Start Tank Relay Box Gas Generator Heat Exchanger

Thrust Frame
Turbopump

Main Fuel Valve

Main Oxidizer Valve

\ Interstage Skin

Fig. 17 LSC-detonator block design.

LSC

Piggyback
Fig. 20 RS-27 engine.
O-Ring Seals

Thrust Chamber

"LSC Retainer
Fig. 18 LSC retainer and piggyback.

Zinc Chromate

Thermal Barrier

Leak Check PortJ

|nsulation

Fig. 21 Original field joint.

Capture Feature Arm

and O-Ring (New)

r-T-Seal
Thermal Barrier (New)

Fig. 19 Titan III CT-2 payload separation system: BW, bridge wire; SFC, squib firing circuit; and I/F, interface.

the incomplete first-second-stage separation (Fig. 16) as the secondstage burn started in a nose-down attitude at 102.8 s. Subsequent anomalies were incomplete payload fairing separation at 214 s and ejection of the fin rocket nozzle assembly because of overpressure caused by unsuccessful expulsion of a weather seal.13
Corrective Action

Heater (New) -*

\- Q-Ring Seals

Fig. 22 Redesigned field joint.

1) Increase linear shaped charge (LSC), add spacer protect LSC under detonation block (Fig. 17), and add piggyback LSC (Fig. 18) to ensure simultaneous detonation for graphite motor case cutting during first-second-stage separation. 2) Increase strength of fairing hinges through heat treatment, restrain umbilicals, and replace shear pin with spring to preclude fairing snag. 3) Redesign weather seal and requalify fin rockets.
U.S. Non-DOD: Titan III CT-2

device. The satellite never received the separation signal, and the booster and payload failed to separate.14
Corrective Action

1) Validate and verify that the wiring and discrete lists are compatible. 2) Carry discrete identification in circuit nomenclature in checkout drawing. 3) Ensure that flight combined system test is functionally equivalent to the mission-unique flight sequence.
U.S. Non-DOD: Delta 178

Launch site: Eastern Range. Fail time: 1499.5 s.

Cause of Failure

Launch site: Eastern Range. Fail Time: 71 s.

Cause of Failure

The payload separation system, shown in Fig. 19, was designed for two satellites and had two discrete outputs from the missile guidance computer (MGC). For this mission it carried only a single satellite. The wiring team mis wired the harness, which connected the MGC payload separation discretes to the payload separation

The first-stage Rocketdyne RS-27 engine, shown in Fig. 20, was shut down at 71 s because of an electrical short in the relay box. The vehicle was destroyed at 91 s by the range safety. The designed (nominal) burn time is 223 s (Ref. 15).

204

CHANG

pressure and the collapse of the intermediate bulkhead during the coast phase prior to the second burn.17
Nose Fairing

- Intelsat V

Corrective Action

j~t H ^_Interstage ; ''"Adapter

Split Barrel

Centaur

^Payload Adapter \i^ \Stub >-C-X Adapter Adac

1) Increase clearance between interstage adapter and LO2 tank blast shield, as shown in Fig. 24. 2) Reduce pressure in Centaur LO2 and LH2 tanks at the time of Atlas-Centaur separation and during Centaur-powered flight. 3) Add three tubing clamps in the hydrazine system to improve tubing support.

Cause of Failure and Corrective Action for the Foreign SLVs

The cause of failure and corrective action for some of the foreign SLVs during the last 11 years are discussed briefly in this section.
China: Long March CZ-2E

Fig. 23 Interstage adapter for Atlas G vehicle.

Launch site: Xichang, China. Fail time: 48 s.

Cause of Failure for the CZ-2E on December 21, 1992

s^N Notch x Blast Shield

The Australian communications satellite Optus B2 exploded at 48 s into the flight from Xichang, China. Evidence points to a structural flaw in the rocket's fairing, which probably imploded during launch.18
France: Ariane 42P

Fig. 24 LOX tank blast shield.

Launch site: Kourou, French Guiana. Fail time: 900 s.

Cause of Failure for the Ariane 42P on December 1, 7994

Corrective Action

1) Add relays and lock-in circuits to the RS-27 engine relay box for built-in redundancy. 2) Add a second 28-V power source from the flight battery to the engine relay box to overcome the effects of power surges.
U.S. Non-DOD: STS Challenger

A blockage or a leak in the liquid oxygen (LOX) line to the gas generator resulted in oxygen shortage and 30% reduction in the gas generator pressure, which cut the third-stage engine speed from a nominal 62,000 rpm to about 50,000 rpm.18
Corrective Action

Launch site: Eastern Range. Fail time: 73.0 s.

Cause of Failure

The launch management waived the temperature-dependent launch commit criteria and launched the STS Challenger at 38F instead of 53F derived from the previous temperature experience of the STS program. The rubber O-rings in the motor case joint, shown in Fig. 21, lost their resiliency in the cold. The combustion flame leaked through the O-rings and case joint and impinged on the motor aft attach struts and external tank. Failure of the aft struts caused the aft end of the motor to move outward and forced the nose of the SRM into the upper portion of the external tank. The explosion ensued at 73 s after ignition. The designed nominal burn timeis'120s(Ref. 16).
Corrective Action

1) Improve manufacturing and processing to reduce the risk of contamination. 2) Install a 400-/>tm filter at the LOX injection unit input to strain out any particles. 3) Conduct additional engine tests to certify new filter and engine for flight.
France: Ariane 44LP

Launch site: Kourou, French Guiana. Fail time: 430 s.

Cause of Failure for the Ariane 44LP on January 24, 1994

1) Incorporate a capture feature arm at the joint to limit joint gap opening as shown in Fig. 22. 2) Add a third O-ring and J-seal thermal barrier for improved thermal protection. 3) Widen O-ring groove to improve O-ring pressure actuation capability. 4) Add joint heaters to maintain O-ring resiliency. 5) Add an external joint weather seal to prevent moisture and ice accumulation.
U.S. Non-DOD: Atlas-Centaur (AC-62)

Delayed chilldown of the LOX turbopump bearing, because of filter obstruction or on-line thermal blockage, caused overheating of the bearing at 60 s after normal third-stage ignition. This resulted in the LOX circuit opening, interruption of the LOX supply to the chamber and gas generator, and shutdown of the third-stage engine at 80 s after third-stage ignition.19
Corrective Action

1) Use ultradecontaminated filters at ground-onboard interfaces. 2) Adopt a continuous flushing of LH2 and LOX purge interfaces to prevent entry of air or moisture. 3) Include a nickel-silver, self-lubricating coating to reduce friction of the turbopump bearing.
France: Ariane 3

Launch site: Eastern Range. Fail time: 288.8 s.

Cause of Failure

Launch site: Kourou, French Guiana. Fail time: 277 s.

Cause of Failure for the Ariane 3 on September 12, 1985

A significant leak occurred in the LO2 tank at the time of AtlasCentaur separation for the Atlas G vehicle shown in Fig. 23. The leak resulted in the LO2 tank pressure falling below the LH2 tank

A solid-propellant, cartridge-type igniter in the combustion chamber malfunctioned, or a problem in the propellant feed at ignition of the third stage occurred. The ignition was 0.4 s later than planned,

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205

after which the normal operating condition of the engine was not reached, and the engine stopped at 277 s after launch. The third stage uses LH2 and LOX propellants. Its normal burn time is 720 s (Ref. 15).
India: PSLV

been prevented. This paper has briefly discussed the causes of the SLV failures and provided some of the lessons learned during the last 11 years. It is hoped that the information contained in this paper will be of help in mitigating some SLV failures and in reducing the waste of useful world resources in the future.

Launch site: Sriharikota, India. Fail time: 246 s.

Cause of Failure for the PSLV on September 20, 1993

Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center under Contract No. F04701-93-C-0094. The author wishes to thank M. Adams, J. D. Gilchrist, R. F. Johnson, and W. W. Wang for providing useful information to this investigation.

The rocket veered off course as the second stage separated from the vehicle. The third and fourth stages ignited but fell far short of the planned altitude. The internal guidance system and shifting liquid fiiel in the second stage of the rocket were the possible causes of the failure.18
CIS/USSR: Proton

References
Isakowitz, S. J., International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, AIAA, Washington, DC, 1991. 2 Thompson, T. D. (ed.), Space Log (1984-1993), TRW Inc., Redondo Beach, CA, 1994. 3 Anon., "NASA Pocket Statistics," NASA, Washington, DC, Jan. 1993. 4 Caceres, M. A., "World Space Systems Briefing," TEAL Group Corp., Fairfax, VA, July 1993. 5 Anon., "Titan IV K-l 1 Segment 054 Failure Scenario, Customer Senior Management Review," Chemical Systems Div., United Technologies Co., San Jose, CA, Sept. 1993. 6 Anon., "T34D-3 Special Study Investigation Report," The Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, CA, Jan. 1989. 7 Anon., "Test & Evaluation's Discrepancy Report Database AC-62 Through AC-71," Space Systems Div., General Dynamics, San Diego, CA, Sept. 1992. 8 Anon., "Titan 34D-9 Mishap Investigation," Chemical Systems Div., United Technologies Co., San Jose, CA, July 1986. 9 Anon., "Titan III Vehicle T34D-7 Flight Mishap Investigation," Aerojet Tech Systems Co., Sacramento, CA, Dec. 1985. 10 Anon., "Pegasus XL STEP-1 Failure Investigation Board Final Report," TM-11963, Orbital Sciences Corp., Chandler, AZ, Sept. 17,1994. 11 Anon., "AC-74 Failure Investigation," Space Systems Div., General Dynamics, San Diego, CA, June 1993. 12 Anon., "AC-71 Failure Scenario," Space Systems Div., General Dynamics, San Diego, CA, Feb. 1993. 13 Kreighbaum, B., "Pegasus F2 Anomaly Investigation Team Final Report," U.S. Air Force Space Systems Div., Los Angeles AFB, CA, Oct. 1991. 14 Anon., "Titan III (CT2) Failure Review," Martin Marietta Corp., Denver, CO, April 1990. 15 Anon., Aviation WeekandSpace Technology, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1984-1994. 16 McCool, A. A., and Ray, W. L., "Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor Program, Lessons Learned," AIAA Paper 91-2291, June 1991. 17 Anon., "Review of Past Centaur Flight Anomalies and Significant Countdown Anomalies," Rept. CAPS T-028, Space Systems Div., General Dynamics, San Diego, CA, April 1992. 18 Anon., Space News, Army Times Publishing Co., Springfield, VA, 1984-1994. 19 Anon., "Ariane Flight 63 Post Flight Briefing," Arianespace, Evry Cedex, France, March 1994.
1

Launch site: Tyuratam, Kazakhstan. Fail time: 572 s.

Cause of Failure for the SL-12 Proton on May 27,1993

A highly contaminated fuel mixture caused a burnthrough of the rocket's cooling tubes in the combustion chamber of the secondstage engine at 205 s into the flight from the Baikonur Cosmodrome. This burnthrough caused a rapid consumption of fuel by the secondstage engine. The third stage ignited earlier and ran out of fuel too early. The rocket lost control at 572 s into the flight.18
Corrective Action

Copper, iron, zinc, and aluminum were found in the rocket's liquid fuel (a mixture of nitrogen tetroxide and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine) in quantities exceeding several times the maximum admissible content. All rocket propellant at Baikonur will be analyzed, and fuel pipelines will be drained and flooded with new propellant and analyzed. A series of propellant quality checks will be instituted at Baikonur, and better records will be kept of how the fuel is delivered and tested.

Summary
The review revealed that the propulsion subsystem is still the Achilles' heel of the space program. To mitigate launch failures with the present fleet of the SLVs, special attention needs to be paid to the following items in the propulsion subsystem: 1) solid-motor manufacturing and process control; 2) liquid-engine manufacturing and process control; 3) system-level liquid-engine testing and evaluation; and 4) robust design of liquid-engine and solid-motor components. It is a prudent practice to adhere to the following rules, and not to disturb Zeus' weather game: 1) do not launch a vehicle on a cold day (STS 51-L, United States); 2) do not launch a vehicle on a rainy day (AC-67, United States); and 3) do not launch a vehicle on a windy day (ASLV-6, India). Space-related mission failures result in the waste of vast amounts of world resources. In hindsight, some of the failures could have

K.J. Weilmuenster Associate Editor