Philosophy of Science Association

How Not to Russell Carnap's Aufbau Author(s): Alan Richardson Source: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1990, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1990), pp. 3-14 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192688 Accessed: 27/06/2009 08:41
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How not to Russell Carnap's Aufbaul Alan Richardson University of Minnesota Rudolf Carap is principally renowned for stating with remarkableprecision and rigor a rich variety of philosophical doctrines - doctrines which, thanks mainly to Carnap'smeticulous formulations,the philosophical world now holds to be clearly and fundamentally mistaken. Thus, it is Carnapwho, in Meaning and Necessity (Carnap 1947), presents in detail the linguistic doctrine of logical truthand the semantic underpinnings of the analytic/synthetic distinction, providing thereby the grist for the mill of Quine's highly influential and importantattackson precisely these doctrines. Again, it was Carnapwho, more than any other, precisely delineated the programof inductive logic. This programis now, thanks largely to Goodman's (1983) New Riddle of Induction, also considered hopeless. Carnapis now firmly associated with a bewildering variety of discredited views: reductionism and the unity of science; the verification criterion of meaning; logic as an uninterpretedcalculus; Russellian logicism even in the face of G6del's devastating incompleteness results; etc. This view of Carnapas importantprimarily for his precision and thoroughness in stating and teasing out the consequences of the major dogmas of logical empiricism is put forward especially by Quine and with particularemphasis on Carnap'sfirst major work: Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Carap 1928; Carnap 1969). Indeed the following two quotations from two of Quine's most widely read essays form the basis of the received view of the Aufbau common to most contemporaryphilosophers: Radical reductionism, conceived now with statements as units, set itself the task of specifying a sense-datum language and showing how to translatethe rest of significant discourse, statement by statement, into it. Carap embarked on this project in the Aufbau. The language which Carnapadopted as his startingpoint was not a sensedatum language in the narrowest conceivable sense, for it included also the notations of logic, up through higher set theory... Carnap's startingpoint is very parsimonious, however, in its extralogical or sensory part. In a series of constructions in which he exploits the resources of modem logic with much ingenuity, Carap succeeds in defining a wide arrayof importantadditional sensory concepts which, but for his constructions, one would not have dreamed were

PSA 1990, Volume 1, pp. 3-14 Copyright ? 1990 by the Philosophy of Science Association

de nab e definable on so slender a base. He was the first empiricist who, not content s ender base he rs emp r c s who no con en w h asser ng he reduc b y o sc ence o erms o mmed a e exper ence with asserting the reducibility of science to terms of immediate experience, took serious steps toward carrying out the reduction. (Quine 1980, p. 39) ook ser ous s eps oward carry ng ou he reduc on Qu ne 1980 p 39 To account for the external world as a logical construct of sense data - such, accoun or he ex erna wor d da a such og ca cons ruc o in Russell's terms was the program [Russell's epistemological program of the n Russe s erms he o he Russe s ep s emo og ca 1910s - AR]. It was Carap, in his Der logische Aufbau der Welt of 1928, We o 1928 og sche Au bau AR I Carap n h s who came nearest to executing it... (Quine 1969, p. 74) neares o execu ng Qu ne 1969 p 74 O course h s phenomena s Of course, this phenomenalist and constructivist program in the Aufbau does not n he Au bau cons ruc v s no succeed No on y s mposs b e o der ve he o a y o sc ence rom succeed. Not only is it impossible to derive the totality of science from sensory expeexpe n exc us ve y observa ona r ence sc en c d scourse canno rience, scientific discourse cannot even be couched in exclusively observational w h he a d o he og ca sys em o Pr nc p a Ma hema ca For terms, even with the aid of the logical system of Principia Mathematica. For, as erms n Qu ne Quine argues in "Two Dogmas", highly theoretical sentences of empirical science do Dogmas" h gh y heore ca sen ences o emp r ca sc ence no not have sensory import individually. Rather only large portions of theory have emem mpor nd v dua y Ra her on y arge por ons o heory " rans a ed" hence on y arge segmen s o heory p r ca pirical consequences and hence, only large segments of theory can be "translated" into observational terms.A n o observa ona erms A Th s hen s he rece ved v ew o he Au bau I This then is the received view of the Aufbau: It was the first systematic attemptto he rs sys ema c a emp o he o ou he reduc ono a sc en c d scourse use the resources of moder logic to carry out the reduction of all scientific discourse og c o into the terms of immediate experience. And the principal legacy of the Aufbau is that n o he erms o mmed a e exper ence he pr nc pa egacy o he Au bau s ha ha d d no mere y a n ac it failed in this reduction - and that it did not merely fail in fact, it failed in principle. a ed n h s reduc on a ed n pr nc p e Tha s he mpor an esson o he Au bau s ha That is, the importantlesson of the Aufbau is that Carnapso rigorously formulated the r gorous y ormu a ed he he og ca ava ab e o he emp r c s emp r c s hes s o reduc b y empiricist thesis of reducibility and the logical resources available to the empiricist c ear ha he acknow edged a ure o Carnap sa emp a prov d ng that it became clear that the acknowledged failure of Carnap'sattemptat providing a ha cons ruc ona sys em s symp oma c o he mposs b y o he constructional system is symptomatic of the impossibility of the programas a whole. who e s some h ng h gh y unsa s ac ory rom There is something highly unsatisfactory from an interpretativepoint of view, n erpre a vepo n o v ew he Au bau n par cu ar however w h h s v ew o Carap s however, with this view of Carap's work generally and the Aufbau in particular. genera y o cons dered han Log ca emp r c sm pu orward Logical empiricism as put forward by Carnapdeserves to be considered as more than o va uab e bu u ma e y a ed a emp s o app y a sequence of very valuable but ultimately failed attempts to apply modem logical og ca se techniques to traditionalempiricist doctrines. At its best, logical empiricism was a seechn ques o rad ona emp r c s doc r nes A s bes og ca emp r c sm r ous rious and important attempt to find a place for philosophy in the scientific age - to o mpor an a emp o nd p ace or ph osophy n he sc en c find the scientifically acceptable kernel of certain traditionalphilosophical disciplines nd he sc en ca y accep ab e kerne o cer a n rad ona ph osoph ca d sc p nes such as logic and epistemology and scientifically acceptable replacements for other og c ep s emo ogy sc en ca y accep ab e replacemen s or o her rep acemen traditional philosophical disciplines such as metaphysics. To be sure, in this attempt rad ona ph osoph ca d sc p nes sure n h s a emp me aphys cs n par cu arar cu a eda var e y o the logical empiricists generally and Carap in particulararticulateda variety of he og ca emp r c s s genera y o unaccep ab e subsequen y ph osoph ca doc r nes wh ch philosophical doctrines which have subsequently been shown to be unacceptable. However concen ra onon he un enab e doc r nes However, concentration on the untenable doctrines proposed by Carnapthroughout hroughou hs his career obscures the fundamental themes of his philosophy. The fundamental queshe undamen a hemes o h s ph osophy undamen a ques tions that an interpreterof Carap's philosophy must seek to answer are questions ons ha o n erpre ero Carap s ph osophy mus ques ons o Carnap sph osoph ca h nk ng hroughou h s ca abou wha cons u es he about what constitutes the core of Carnap'sphilosophical thinking throughouthis can "Emp r c sm Seman cs re er reer so that, for example, Carnapin "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" can refer ha or examp e On o ogy" o argumen sg ven n "Pseudoprob emso Ph osophy" desp e he n er the reader to arguments given in "Pseudoproblemsof Philosophy" despite the interhe he ac ha h s v ews s ven ng wen y wo vening twenty-two years and the fact that Camap had changed his views on many issues including reductionism, verificationism, syntacticism, and logicism. nc ud ng reduc on sm ver ca on sm syn ac c sm og c sm ha he dea ha he Cons s en w h h s n erpre vepo n o v ew w Consistent with this interpretivepoint of view I will argue that the idea that the n rad ona emp r c s Au bau cons s s o r gorous h nk ng hrough o Aufbau consists of a rigorous thinking through of a traditionalempiricist program in no ho d scru ny Cons der he Qu nean concep ep s emo ogy s mp y epistemology simply does not hold up under scrutiny. Consider the Quinean conceps mpor ance above tion of the Aufbau and its importance canvassed above: The Aufbau is notable for on o he Au bau Au bau s no ab e or o emp r c sm s mos m mak ng prec se he rad ona phenomena s making precise the traditionalphenomenalist program of empiricism and is most imhe cr er ao ha program severa por an or a ng n pr nc p e o u portant for failing in principle to fulfill the criteria of that program. There are several oca ed aspec s o he s ruc ureo he Au bau wh ch nd ca e ha wh e Qu ne aspects of the structureof the Aufbau which indicate that, while Quine has located